Rogoff & Reinhart answering my call in FT – Austerity is not the only answer to a debt problem

Good to see Ken, who I’ve never met, and Carmen who I do know, no doubt assisted by her husband Vince, beginning to come clean with this response. While not complete, it’s the beginning of an encouraging, epic reversal and a first step in the right direction!

My comments added below:

Austerity is not the only answer to a debt problem

By Kenneth Rogoff and Carmen Reinhart

May 1 (FT) — The recent debate about the global economy has taken a distressingly simplistic turn. Some now argue that just because one cannot definitely prove very high debt is bad for growth (though the weight of the results still say it is),

They could add here ‘though likely via the reaction functions of govts and not the high debt per se.’

then high debt is not a problem. Looking beyond the recent public debate about the literature on debt we have already discussed our results on debt and growth in that context the debate needs to be reconnected to the facts.

Let us start with one: the ratios of debt to gross domestic product are at historically high levels in many countries, many rising above previous wartime peaks. This is before adding in concerns over contingent liabilities on private sector balance sheets and underfunded old-age security and pension programmes. In the case of Germany, there is also the likely need to further cushion the debt loads of eurozone partners.

Adding here ‘as they are ‘users’ of the euro the way US states are ‘users’ of the dollar, and not the actual issuer of the currency like the ECB, the Fed, the BOE, the BOJ, and the rest of the world’s central banks.’

Some say not to worry, pointing to bursts of growth after the world wars. But todays debts,

Add ‘while they pose no solvency risk for the issuer of the currency.’

will not be dealt with by boosts to supply from postwar demobilisation and to demand from the lifting of wartime controls.

To be clear, no one should be arguing to stabilise debt, much less bring it down, until growth is more solidly entrenched if there remains a choice, that is.

BRAVO!!!! And add ‘as is always the case for the issuer of the currency.’

Faced with, at best, haphazard access to international capital markets and high borrowing costs, periphery countries in Europe face more limited alternatives.

Add ‘as is the case for ‘users’ of a currency in general, including the US states, for example’.

Nevertheless, given current debt levels, enhanced stimulus should only be taken selectively and with due caution. A higher borrowing trajectory is warranted, given weak demand

BRAVO!

and low interest rates,

Add ‘which are confirmation by the CB policy makers who set the rates low that they too believe demand is weak’.

where governments can identify high-return infrastructure projects. Borrowing to finance productive infrastructure raises long-run potential growth, ultimately pulling debt ratios lower. We have argued this consistently since the outset of the crisis.

BRAVO! And add ‘additionally, weak demand can be addressed by tax reductions, recognizing that counter cyclical fiscal policy of currency users, like the euro zone members, requires funding support from the issuer of the currency, which in this case is the ECB.’

Ultra-Keynesians would go further and abandon any pretense of concern about longer-term debt reduction.

Add ‘without a credible long term inflation concern, as for the issuer of the currency inflation is the only risk from excess demand.’

This position has been in the rhetorical ascendancy in recent months, with new signs of weaker growth. It throws caution to the wind on debt

Add ‘with regards to solvency, as is necessarily the case for the issuer of the currency.’

and, to quote Star Trek, pushes governments to go where no man has gone before

Add ‘apart from war time, when the importance of maximum output and employment takes center stage.’

The basic rationale

Add ‘of the mainstream deficit doves (not the ultra Keynesian MMT school of thought)’

is that low interest rates make borrowing a free lunch.

Unfortunately,

Add ‘the mainstream believes’

ultra-Keynesians are too dismissive of the risk of a rise in real interest rates. No one fully understands why rates have fallen so far so fast,

Add ‘apart from the Central Bankers who voted to lower them this far and this fast, and in some cases provide guarantees to other borrowers.’

and therefore no one can be sure for how long their current low level will be sustained.

Add ‘as it’s a matter of second guessing those central bankers.’

John Maynard Keynes himself wrote How to Pay for the War in 1940 precisely because he was not blas about large deficits even in support of a cause as noble as a war of survival. Debt is a slow-moving variable that cannot and in general should not be brought down too quickly. But interest rates can change rapidly.

Add ‘all it takes is a vote by central bankers.’

True, research has identified factors that might combine to explain the sharp decline in rates.

Add ‘in fact, all you have to do is research the votes at the central bank meetings.’

Greater concern

Add ‘by central bankers’

over potentially devastating future events such as fresh financial meltdowns may be depressing rates. Similarly, the negative correlation between returns on stocks and long-term bonds, while admittedly quite unstable, also makes bonds a better hedge. Emerging Asias central banks have been great customers for advanced economy debt, and now perhaps the Japanese will be once more. But can these same factors be relied on to keep yields low indefinitely?

Add ‘In the end, it’s all a matter of the central bank’s reaction function.’

Economists simply have little idea how long it will be until rates begin to rise. If one accepts that maybe, just maybe, a significant rise in interest rates in the next decade

Add ‘due to inflation concerns’

might be a possibility, then plans for an unlimited open-ended surge in debt should give one pause.

Add ‘if he does not see the merits of leaving risk free rates near 0 in any case, as there is no convincing central bank research that shows rate hikes reduce inflation rates, and even credible theory and evidence to be concerned that rate hikes instead exacerbate inflation.’

What, then, can be done? We must remember that the choice is not simply between tight-fisted austerity and freewheeling spending. Governments have used a wide range of options over the ages. It is time to return to the toolkit.

First and foremost,

Add ‘only’

governments

Add ‘who fail to recognize that these are merely matters of accounting that don’t themselves alter output and employment’

must be prepared to write down debts rather than continuing to absorb them. This principle applies to the senior debt of insolvent financial institutions, to peripheral eurozone debt and to mortgage debt in the US.

Add ‘Additionally’

For Europe, in particular, any reasonable endgame will require a large transfer

Add ‘of public goods production’

from Germany to the periphery.

Add ‘which in fact would be a real economic benefit for Germany.’

The sooner this implicit transfer becomes explicit, the sooner Europe will be able to find its way towards a stable growth path.

There are other tools. So-called financial repression, a non-transparent form of tax (primarily on savers), may be coming to an institution near you. In its simplest form, governments cram debt into domestic pension funds, insurance companies and banks

By removing governmental support of higher rates from their net issuance of debt instruments, particularly treasury securities.

Europe is there already and it has been there before, several times. How to Pay for the War was, in part, about creating captive audiences for government debt. Read the real Keynes, not rote Keynes, to understand our future.

One of us attracted considerable fire for suggesting moderately elevated inflation (say, 4-6 per cent for a few years) at the outset of the crisis. However, a once-in-75-year crisis is precisely the time when central banks should expend some credibility to take the edge off public and private debts, and to accelerate the process bringing down the real price of housing and real estate.

It is therefore imperative for the central bankers to make it clear to the politicians that there is no solvency risk, and that central bankers, and not markets, are necessarily in control of the entire term structure of risk free rates, and that their research shows that rate hikes are not the appropriate way to bring down inflation, should the question arise’

Structural reform always has to be part of the mix. In the US, for example, the bipartisan blueprint of the Simpson-Bowles commission had some very promising ideas for simplifying the tax codes.

There is a scholarly debate about the risks of high debt. We remain confident in the prevailing view in this field that high debt is associated with lower growth

Add ‘but must add that the risk is that of misguided policy response, and not the level of debt per se.’

Certainly, lets not fall into the trap of concluding that todays high debts are a non-issue.

Add ‘as we must be ever mindful of the possibility of excess demand using up our productive capacity’

Keynes was not dismissive of debt. Why should we be?

The writers are professors at Harvard University. They have written further on carmenreinhart.com

Norway oil fund makes big move from bonds to stocks

Seems like this ‘quasi’ govt type of thing is often later shown to be behind ‘difficult to explain’ ‘liquidity driven’ equity moves.

Norway oil fund makes big move from bonds to stocks

By Richard Milne in Oslo

April 29 (FT) — Norway’s oil fund has reduced its bond holdings to their lowest ever level as the worlds largest sovereign wealth fund signals its discomfort with the effects of western central banks money printing.

The fund held just 36.7 per cent of its $726bn assets in bonds at the end of the first quarter, the lowest proportion since it first received money in 1996. Its equity holdings were close to a record high, accounting for 62.4 per cent of the total.

Yngve Slyngstad, the funds chief executive, told the Financial Times there had been a significant change in rhetoric away from its previous comments that it was comfortable with a high level of equity holdings.

Now it is that we are not so comfortable with the low returns in the bond portfolio. It is not enthusiasm for the equity market but a lack of enthusiasm for the bond market, he said.

The worlds biggest sovereign wealth fund by some distance, Norways oil fund has for some time been concerned about the low level of government bond yields and what that will mean for fixed income return.

But Norges Bank Investment Management, as it is also known, is reluctant to comment about money printing, known as quantitative easing, by the US Federal Reserve, Bank of England or Bank of Japan as the fund is part of the Norwegian central bank.

Still, Mr Slyngstad said unconventional actions were riskier than normal measures, signalling his unease. Unconventional in this context means untried. Things that are untried have a different risk profile than things that have been tried, he added.

The fund has been shifting both its bond and equity holdings away from dollar, yen, euro and sterling assets to those of emerging markets . But the fund is noticeably more positive on US Treasuries than other western government bonds with Mr Slyngstad saying they serve [a] double purpose of being a haven and highly liquid.

Mr Slyngstad said the fund could take several courses of action to reduce the risk of a sharp fall in bond prices, including buying real assets such as property and diversifying into new currencies. It has also reduced the average duration of its bond holdings from about six to five years.

His comments came as the fund delivered its biggest ever quarterly increase in its market value of NKr366bn. It posted a 5.4 per cent overall return with equities gaining 8.3 per cent and fixed income just 1.1 per cent. Apple, Santander and BHP Billiton were its worst-performing investments while BlackRock, Nestl and Novartis were the best. The oil fund also formally unveiled its plans to become a more active investor , as first revealed by the Financial Times. Mr Slyngstad has joined the nomination committee of Swedish truckmaker Volvo , the first time the fund has formally participated in the selection of board directors.

Thaler’s Corner 04-22-2013 2013: And now?

Again, very well stated!

Thaler’s Corner

I must admit that I am at a loss for words these days. The analytical items at our disposal describe a situation so complex, given a myriad of contradictory influences, that I find it impossible to develop any sort of reasonable scenario.


I have spent a lot of time in recent weeks exchanging ideas and perceptions with academics, political officials and others in an effort to develop a coherent explanation of the events unfolding before us (Cyprus, wealth tax, etc.), but the conclusions are anything but conclusive!

Changes in financial securities will no longer be determined by purely economic factors but more and more by political decisions, such as whether or not to establish a real European banking union with all that implies in terms of cross-border budget transfer risks.

Whatever, lets take a look at the state of the real economy in the United Sates and Europe, given that it is still a bit early to draw any sort of conclusions about a third economic motor, Japan.

By the way, I strongly recommend that people check out the links in todays Macro Geeks Corner toward the end of the newsletter. It is interesting to see how two fairly divergent schools of thinking (the two first texts) end up with rather similar conclusions.

United States

In the United States, the economy is (logically) slowing as the effects of the Sequester slowly make themselves felt. Only the (increasingly discredited) partisans of Reinhold & Rogoffs constructive austerity thought it would not affect household consumption.

We had to wait for the hike in payroll taxes for the effect to be seen in retail sales figures, down 0.4% in March. Similarly, all the latest leading economic (PMI) and confidence indicators came in below expectations, which augurs for a soft patch in the US.

Moreover, the yens decline can only have a negative impact on America trade balance with Japan as it puts US exporters at a disadvantage, in particular, as they compete with their Japanese rivals on Asian markets. And the pitiful state of the European economy is not going to help this sector of the US economy either.

But there remains one bright spot, namely the residential real estate market, which should remain a powerful support in the quarters ahead. Check out one of my favorite graphs real animal rates.

Real animal rates in the US:


Full size image

These rates are calculated using a proprietary equation I developed, which includes, in addition to terms like mortgage interest rates, recent home price trends, the difference between the reported unemployment rate and that during periods of full employment, and the difference between the average length of unemployment and that existing in times of full employment.

With the Animal Spirits so dear to Keynes and behavioral science in mind, the goal was to factor in items more subjective than simple economic criteria (nominal borrowing rates) in the home purchase decision-making process of a household.

If experience has taught us anything, it is that the factors which most influence a potential homebuyers decision is his degree of job security and the feeling that prices can only rise.

The first point is that the only time these real animal rates dipped into negative territory (in the upper part of graph, transcribed in inverted scale) corresponds perfectly with the great real estate bubble of 1998 to 2006.

This big trend reversal occurred in 2006 when rates resurfaced above zero and thus below the graphs red line.

The only other time real animal rates became negative was in 1989, but that was abruptly reversed by the sharp hike in nominal interest rates.

In the current context, nominal interest rates are unlikely to undergo any such sharp hike in the quarters ahead, and this dip of real animal rates into negative territory should enable the real estate market to continue to recover. This all the more true, given that the yens decline will only strengthen disinflationary trends in North America, which ensure accommodative monetary policies for some time to come!

All you need to do is look at the steep decline in inflationary expectations, as expressed by the TIPS market in the US, to understand that investors seem to have finally realized that QE policies have nothing to do with the so-called dollar printing press. Notwithstanding the ZeroHedge paranoids!

That said, existing home sales in the US, out just a few minutes ago, came in weak, at -0.6% m-o-m (vs expected +0.4%, i.e. 4.92M vs 5M), which explains this afternoon shiver on stockmarket indices.

Now, as the IMF has said in recent days, the main brake on a worldwide recovery is the Eurozone, which remains paralyzed by the obsession of its northern member states on austerity and by the ECBs total and unforgivable incapacity to comply with its own mandate! In todays Macro Geeks Corner, you will find two instructive links on this matter.

Eurozone

Instead of harping on the endless stream of errors made by our beloved European monetary and governmental leaders, I prefer to comment on some far more instructive graphs.

Lets start with our graph on aggregate 2-year Eurozone government bond rates, which have proven to be so useful in recent years for evaluating the ECBs reaction function.

This rate, currently at a record low 0.55%, is now well below the 0.75% set for the refi. This stems from two factors.

First, in view of the state of the economy and the latest comments by certain ECB board members, investors expect that the refi rate will very soon (May or June) be cut to 0.50%.

Second, certainty that short-term interest rates, like the Eonia, which have been stuck between 5 bps and 12 bps for the past 9 months, are not going to rise anytime soon is pushing investors to seek yields wherever they can still find them, like in Spain and Italy where 2-year bonds still fetch between 1.95% and 1.25%, now that they are assured that, henceforth, in case of insolvency, bank depositors will be forced to pay the bill without pushing sovereign issuers into default, as happened in Greece!

Aggregated Eurozone government 2-year rate:

Full size image

However, we have reason to be concerned that the ECB, if it does lower the refi to 0.50%, will be satisfied with what it already deems a low rate and highly accommodative monetary policy. Such is far from being the case, even if we go by the ECBs own obsolete aggregates, like M3, as money velocity continues to skid to a halt, following Cyprus.

And all this has an impact on the real economy, as you can see in the following graphs.

Eurozone Industrial Production

Full size image

The least we can say is that this graph is particularly distressing. Of course, it does not account for the economys industrial aspect, which some call the old economy. But it provides a whole lot of jobs and no economic area can afford to neglect it.

And the impact of Mr Sarkozys renowned Walk of Canossa, following his summons by Ms Merkel in July 2011 to Berlin where the unfortunate decision to create the first sovereign default of a developed country was endorsed (Greek PSI), is very clear on this graph. Together with a hardening of austerity policies and the nefarious consequences of the ECBs hikes of benchmark interest rates in the spring of 2011, this decision torpedoed already distressed economies, with the consequences we all know today.


But if there is one depressing economic indicator, which reflects even more cruelly how austerity affected the Eurozone, it is surely the unemployment curve.

Eurozone Unemployment

Full size image

Here again, no comment is needed. I included earlier in this newsletter the graph comparing the US and Eurozone curves, but even that is no longer all that relevant. If people are happy to underperform the United States, who cares? If the Eurozone wants to try liquidationist economic policies to help drive home the morality message, it has every right to do so, just as its citizens merit the leadership they elect.

But to go from there to creating a situation of hysteria, leading to an increasingly large segment of the active population being ejected from the labor market, is a big step that must never be taken.

In some countries, the figures are just horrifying, with nearly 30% general unemployment and over 50% for those under 25 years of age. It is incredible that some continue to boast the merits of such policies for countries like Ireland while ignoring the daily siphoning of the population due to massive immigration to seek jobs elsewhere!!

I wonder if those responsible for such policies have forgotten the consequences of such an approach in Europe and the breakdown in the social fabric during the Great Depression, especially now, with so many leaders spicing their speeches with anti-German references?

This pathetic situation, reflecting month after month of economic policies based on no worthwhile or credible foundations, be it on a theoretical or empirical basis, explains why I am having a hard time re-establishing a decent pace of publication.

This is especially so in that the conflict between this depressive macro situation and the strong efforts undertaken by the Fed and the BoJ (among others) to reignite economic activity leave no space for laying out clear asset allocation biases.

We continue to enable our clients to take advantage of opportunities on option markets which make it possible during these troubled times to make bets on the cheap but without any real conviction.

Has our asset allocation strategy, dating from 2007 (a bit early, I know), of favoring government debt came to maturity with German 10-year rates at 1.23%, i.e. more than 30 bps below those of the United States?

Will European stock markets continue to suffer from our big fear, the Japanese syndrome? Or will popular pressure push the ECB and the Austrian School proponents to realize that they have a modern currency at their disposal and that reversing their entire intellectual edifice is possible?


Despite all my efforts, studies, reading and discussion, I am totally incapable of responding to these questions, which a great lesson in humility. Sorry for the consequences in terms of this newsletters clarity and frequency of publication, but if anyone has any ideas, I am all ears!

The Macro Geeks Corner:

Dear Northern Europeans Monetary easing is not a bailout

A factual rebuttal of remarks of ECB chief Jrg Asmussen, made at the Bank of America/Merrill Lynch Investor conference

Breaking bad inflation expectations

BOJ Shockwave Leveling Rates Sends Banks to Dollar: Japan Credit

Bad for US banks if they are coming to compete in the US market again.
This will cut into net interest margins.

BOJ Shockwave Leveling Rates Sends Banks to Dollar: Japan Credit

By Monami Yui & Emi Urabe

April 16 (Bloomberg) — Shizuoka Bank Ltd. (8355) joined Japanese national lenders in expanding U.S. dollar finance activity, anticipating monetary easing will crush margins on yen loans.

The nations second-biggest regional bank by market value raised $500 million in zero-coupon notes due 2018, the first public sale of dollar-denominated convertible bonds by a Japanese company since 2002. The average interest rate on long- term yen loans from the countrys lenders fell to 0.942 percent in February, compared with 3.348 percent companies worldwide pay on dollar facilities, according to data compiled by Bloomberg.

Mitsubishi UFJ Financial Group Inc. plans to increase energy and utility financing in the U.S., as the Bank of Japan (8301)s focus on cutting long-term borrowing costs undercuts earnings from yen loans, President Nobuyuki Hirano said. Sumitomo Mitsui (8316) Financial Group Inc. aims to sell a record amount of dollar bonds this year for overseas business, even as the BOJ policy seeks to spur domestic lending to revive the economy.

You know its a big deal when a conservative lender like Shizuoka Bank does this, a sure sign that yen debt is just not cutting it anymore, said Nozomi Kokubun, a Tokyo-based analyst at SMBC Nikko Securities Inc. Dollar-denominated loans are attractive for banks because they offer a spread you simply wont find in Japan.

Excess Cash

Prime Minister Shinzo Abes call to boost fiscal and monetary stimulus hasnt been enough to spark corporate demand for loans, leaving Japans banks with a record amount of excess cash. Customer deposits held by Japanese lenders exceeded loans by 176.3 trillion yen ($1.8 trillion) in March, central bank data show.

The BOJ decided on April 4 to double monthly bond buying to 7.5 trillion yen and lengthened the average maturity of the purchases by twofold to about seven years. The central banks previous program under Governor Masaaki Shirakawa focused on notes maturing in one to three years.

The announcement sent Japans benchmark 10-year bond yield to a record low of 0.315 percent the following day. The rate surged to almost double that level in the same session and traded 6 1/2 basis points lower at 0.575 percent as of 2:20 p.m. in Tokyo today.

Without Precedent

This round of monetary easing is without precedent and we must prepare for the interest rates to fall even further, Mitsubishi UFJs Hirano said in an interview on April 8. The decline in yen-denominated interest rates is weighing heavily on earnings from capital.

The average interest rate on long-term loans from Japans six so-called city banks, which include Mitsubishi UFJ, Sumitomo Mitsui and Mizuho Financial Group Inc., dropped below 1 percent for the first time in January and was 1.01 percent in February, according to data compiled by Bloomberg. The rate for regional banks was 1.097 percent, after matching a record low of 1.075 percent in December, the data show.

Elsewhere in Japans credit markets, Nissan Motor Co. plans to price about 60 billion yen of five- and seven-year bonds later this week, according to a person familiar with the matter. The automaker is marketing 50 billion yen of the shorter-term notes at 16 to 21 basis points more than government debt and the remainder at an 18 to 24 basis point spread, the person said, asking not to be name because the terms arent set. A basis point is 0.01 percentage point.

7-Eleven Bonds

Seven & I Holdings Co. plans to raise 60 billion yen split between three-, six- and 10-year bonds, marketing all tranches at a yield spread of 10 to 14 basis points, a separate person familiar with the matter said yesterday. The operator of 7- Eleven convenience stores last sold debt in June 2010, offering 80 billion yen of seven- and 10-year debt, according to data compiled by Bloomberg.

A Ministry of Finance sale of about 2.5 trillion yen of five-year notes today attracted bids valued at 3.09 times the amount available, showing the weakest demand since December 2011, according to ministry data. The gap between the average and low prices at the auction was 0.05, the widest since June 2008, another sign of low demand.

Shizuoka Banks offering is the first sale of convertible notes by a Japanese company in the U.S. currency since Orix Corp.s May 2002 offering, according to Hiromitsu Umehara, a Tokyo-based general manager in its banking department. The lender, headquartered in Shizuoka Prefecture west of Tokyo, home to Suzuki Motor Corp. and Yamaha Corp., will use the proceeds to fund dollar offerings to its mostly Japanese clients seeking to expand overseas, Umehara said.

Loan Demand

Domestic loan demand should gradually improve, but at this moment company spending remains at a low level, said Shigeki Makita, deputy general manager at Shizuoka Banks corporate planning department. Higher interest rates on dollar loans make overseas facilities more profitable than domestic lending, he said.

Japans corporate bonds have handed investors a 0.56 percent return this year, compared with a 1.43 percent gain for the nations sovereign notes, according to Bank of America Merrill Lynch index data. Company debt worldwide has climbed 1.54 percent.

The yen traded at 97.41 per dollar at 2:30 p.m. in Tokyo today, after falling to a four-year low of 99.95 last week. The currency has plunged 10 percent this year, the worst performance among the 10 developed-market currencies tracked by the Bloomberg Correlation Weighted Indexes.

Sovereign Risk

The cost to insure Japans sovereign notes for five years against nonpayment was at 71 basis points yesterday, after reaching 78 earlier this month, the highest since Jan. 23, according to data provider CMA, which is owned by McGraw-Hill Cos. and compiles prices quoted by dealers in the privately negotiated market. A drop in the credit-default swaps signals improving perceptions of creditworthiness.

Japanese regional lenders and megabanks alike are very keen on opportunities for dollar financing, SMBC Nikkos Kokubun said. They dont even have to use the proceeds for lending and may just accumulate overseas securities.

Sumitomo Mitsuis lending unit targets two issuances that could total as much as $4.5 billion, matching last years amount as the most in the companys 11-year history, President Koichi Miyata said in a Dec. 19 interview. The two sales would range from $1 billion to $3 billion each, he said.

Sale Ranking

The bank raised 2.15 trillion yen from dollar bond sales this year, making it the third-largest Japanese borrower in the currency after Mitsubishi UFJ with 2.25 trillion yen, according to data compiled by Bloomberg. Toyota Motor Corp. led the rankings with 3.193 trillion yen, the data show.

Mitsubishi UFJ is looking to buy a regional bank on the west coast of the U.S., President Hirano said. The Tokyo-based lender acquired San Francisco-based UnionBanCal Corp. in 2008 and Santa Barbara, California-based Pacific Capital Bancorp last year as persistent deflation inhibits loan demand at home.

The balance of outstanding loans at Japanese banks rose 0.6 percent to 404.8 trillion yen in March, the highest level since April 2009, according to data compiled by Bloomberg. Lending by city banks climbed to 199.1 trillion yen in the period, 3.7 percent short of the level three years ago, the data show.

Theres been great demand for dollar funding among Japanese banks as they increase lending overseas, said Chikako Horiuchi, a Hong Kong-based analyst at Fitch Ratings Ltd. The trend is likely to continue.

Draghi Considers Plan B

Yet more proposals that won’t work.

The problem remains:
Deficits are too small while they all think they are too large.

Draghi Considers Plan B as Sentiment Dims After Cyprus Fumble

By Jeff Black and Jana Randow and Stefan Riecher

April 4 (Bloomberg) — European Central Bank President Mario Draghi is under pressure to reveal Plan B.

A botched attempt to rescue Cyprus last month sent bank shares tumbling across the euro area and rattled confidence in policy makers’ ability to tame the sovereign debt crisis. With doubts growing about Draghi’s forecast for a second-half economic recovery, he’s considering his options.

They range from an interest-rate cut to a new round of long-term loans to banks, to a plan to encourage lending to companies, three officials with knowledge of the deliberations said. They stressed that such action may not be announced today.

“They have to start thinking about a plan for unconventional measures if the recovery does not materialize,” said Martin van Vliet, senior euro-area economist at ING Bank NV in Amsterdam. “It may be too early for them to do that this month, but I’d expect Draghi to acknowledge that the economy is not improving and the chances of a surprise are bigger than they were.”

With Europe entering a second year of recession and fragmented financial markets preventing the ECB’s record-low borrowing costs from reaching the countries that need them most, Draghi may prefer to use so-called non-standard measures. He is particularly concerned about a lack of credit being extended to small and medium-sized companies in countries such as Italy and Spain, two of the officials said on condition of anonymity.

Rates on Hold

The Frankfurt-based ECB will leave its benchmark rate at a record low of 0.75 percent today, according to 54 of 56 economists in a Bloomberg News survey. Two predict a cut. The decision is due at 1:45 p.m. and Draghi holds a press conference 45 minutes later.

The Bank of England will hold its key rate at a record low of 0.5 percent and maintain bond purchases at 375 billion pounds ($568 billion), separate surveys of economists show. That decision is due at noon in London.

The Bank of Japan (8301) decided today to increase monthly bond purchases to 7 trillion yen ($74 billion) in a bid to reach 2 percent inflation in two years. At the first meeting led by Governor Haruhiko Kuroda, it also temporarily suspended a cap on some bond holdings and dropped a limit on the maturities of debt it buys.

Economists from ABN Amro Bank NV to Nordea Bank AB say Draghi needs to give reassurance he still has policy options at his disposal as evidence mounts that the recovery is faltering.

The ECB’s measure of bank lending to the private sector fell for a 10th month in February, dropping 0.9 percent from a year earlier, and manufacturing activity, measured by a survey of purchasing managers, contracted more than economists forecast in March.

Case for Action

“If you look at the world around you, with the economy weak, inflation falling to low levels, the disparities between countries and the credit mechanism not getting any better, you can’t conclude that no further action from the ECB is necessary,” said Nick Kounis, head of macro research at ABN Amro in Amsterdam. “The case for further action from the ECB remains very strong.”

Still, ECB officials haven’t provided clear guidance on what that further action might be. A rate reduction has been discussed since December, with Draghi saying last month that the “prevailing consensus” was against such a move.

That may be because lower ECB interest rates aren’t being fully passed on to the parts of the euro economy that really need them. A cut would also raise the issue of whether to take the deposit rate — the rate the ECB pays banks to park cash with it overnight — below zero.
Rates ‘Disconnect’

The ECB may be more concerned with what Executive Board member Benoit Coeure on March 12 called the “disconnect” between official lending rates and those that businesses are actually charged.

More than four times as many small businesses in Spain were rejected for loans in the second half of last year than in Germany, or walked away from an offer because it was too expensive, research published by Barclays Plc shows.

While the ECB is studying ways to ease that fragmentation, such as the Bank of England’s Funding for Lending Scheme, Draghi said at last month’s press conference on March 7 that it isn’t “planning anything special.”

‘Expectations’

An asset-purchase plan targeted at small- and medium-sized business lending is far from straightforward, said Jan von Gerich, chief fixed-income analyst at Nordea Bank in Helsinki.

“There are a lot of expectations but they’re quite limited in what they can do,” he said. “It’s most likely for them to ease collateral requirements and make it easier to package SME loans. But it gets messy quickly and hawkish members are probably not comfortable with it.”

With excess liquidity in the banking sector halving in the past six months, lenders in some parts of the region might be in need of more central-bank funds. Longer-term refinancing operations, or LTROs, have been the ECB’s signature tool to ease tensions in financial markets and encourage lending, and policy makers may resort to this option again if they can’t find consensus on more complex measures, economists said.

Draghi is also likely to be questioned today on the ECB’s role in Cyprus’s bailout. The ECB was party to and welcomed an initial plan to tax all deposits in Cypriot banks, which the nation’s parliament rejected.

While a revised agreement ditching a tax on deposits under 100,000 euros ($128,580) was negotiated over a week later under threat of the ECB cutting emergency funding to Cypriot banks, capital controls have been introduced for the first time in the euro region to prevent capital flight.

Confidence Damaged

The episode damaged investor confidence across the currency bloc. The Stoxx Europe 600 Banks Index (SX7P) dropped 6.8 percent between March 15 and 27, the day before banks reopened in Cyprus.

The cost of insuring against default on European bank bonds surged 41 percent in that period, with the Markit iTraxx Europe Senior Financial Index of credit-default swaps on 25 lenders jumping 58 points to 201.

Allowing a flawed plan to go to the Cypriot parliament exacerbated the financial reaction to the bailout and harmed trust in Europe’s crisis-fighting abilities, said Ken Wattret, chief euro-area economist at BNP Paribas in London, who predicts a rate cut today.

“The error originated in Cyprus, but the error from finance ministers and the ECB was to support it,” he said. “We saw an increase in stress in financial markets and a drop in economic sentiment. What we’re missing is a policy response.”

The Stockman’s big swinging whip

The Man from Snowy River

By Banjo Paterson

So Clancy rode to wheel them — he was racing on the wing
Where the best and boldest riders take their place,
And he raced his stock-horse past them, and he made the ranges ring
With the stockwhip, as he met them face to face.
Then they halted for a moment, while he swung the dreaded lash,
But they saw their well-loved mountain full in view,
And they charged beneath the stockwhip with a sharp and sudden dash,
And off into the mountain scrub they flew.

Unemployment is everywhere and always a monetary phenomenon, and necessarily a government imposed crime against humanity. The currency is a simple public monopoly.

The dollars to pay taxes, ultimately come from government spending or lending (or counterfeiting…)

Unemployment can only happen when a govt fails to spend enough to cover the tax liabilities it imposed, and any residual desire to save financial assets that are created by the tax and by other govt policy.

Said another way, for any given size government, unemployment is the evidence of over taxation.

Motivation not withstanding, David Stockman has long been aggressively promoting policy that creates and sustains unemployment.

Comments below:

State-Wrecked: The Corruption of Capitalism in America

By David Stockman

March 30 (NYT) — The Dow Jones and Standard & Poors 500 indexes reached record highs on Thursday, having completely erased the losses since the stock markets last peak, in 2007. But instead of cheering, we should be very afraid.

Over the last 13 years, the stock market has twice crashed and touched off a recession: American households lost $5 trillion in the 2000 dot-com bust and more than $7 trillion in the 2007 housing crash. Sooner or later within a few years, I predict this latest Wall Street bubble, inflated by an egregious flood of phony money from the Federal Reserve rather than real economic gains, will explode, too.

Phony money? What else are $US other than credit balances at the Fed or actual cash in circulation? Of course he fails to realize US treasury securities, also known as ‘securities accounts’ by Fed insiders, are likewise nothing more than dollar balances at the Fed, and that QE merely shifts dollar balances at the Fed from securities accounts to reserve accounts. It’s ‘money printing’ only under a narrow enough definition of ‘money’ to not include treasury securities as ‘money’. Additionally, of course, QE removes interest income from the economy, but that’s another story…

Since the S.&P. 500 first reached its current level, in March 2000, the mad money printers at the Federal Reserve have expanded their balance sheet sixfold (to $3.2 trillion from $500 billion).

And also debited/reduced/removed an equal amount of $US from Fed securities accounts. The net ‘dollar printing’ is 0.

Yet during that stretch, economic output has grown by an average of 1.7 percent a year (the slowest since the Civil War); real business investment has crawled forward at only 0.8 percent per year; and the payroll job count has crept up at a negligible 0.1 percent annually. Real median family income growth has dropped 8 percent, and the number of full-time middle class jobs, 6 percent. The real net worth of the bottom 90 percent has dropped by one-fourth. The number of food stamp and disability aid recipients has more than doubled, to 59 million, about one in five Americans.

Yes, and anyone who understood monetary operations knows exactly why QE did not add to sales/output/employment, as explained above.

So the Main Street economy is failing while Washington is piling a soaring debt burden on our descendants,

‘Paying off the debt’ is simply a matter of debiting securities accounts at the Fed and crediting reserve accounts at the Fed. There are no grandchildren or taxpayers involved, except maybe a few to program the computers and polish the floors and do the accounting, etc.

unable to rein in either the warfare state or the welfare state or raise the taxes needed to pay the nations bills.

The nations bills are paid via the Fed crediting member bank accounts on its books. Today’s excess capacity and unemployment means that for the size govt we have we are grossly over taxed, not under taxed.

By default, the Fed has resorted to a radical, uncharted spree of money printing.

As above, ‘money printing’ only under a narrow definition of ‘money’.

But the flood of liquidity, instead of spurring banks to lend and corporations to spend, has stayed trapped in the canyons of Wall Street, where it is inflating yet another unsustainable bubble.

With floating exchange rates, bank liquidity, for all practical purposes, is always unlimited. Banks are constrained by capital and asset regulation, not liquidity.

When it bursts, there will be no new round of bailouts like the ones the banks got in 2008.

There is nothing to ‘burst’ as for all practical purposes liquidity is never a constraint.

Instead, America will descend into an era of zero-sum austerity and virulent political conflict, extinguishing even todays feeble remnants of economic growth.

This dyspeptic prospect results from the fact that we are now state-wrecked. With only brief interruptions, weve had eight decades of increasingly frenetic fiscal and monetary policy activism intended to counter the cyclical bumps and grinds of the free market and its purported tendency to underproduce jobs and economic output. The toll has been heavy.

The currency itself is a simply public monopoly, and the restriction of supply by a monopolist as previously described, is, in this case the cause of unemployment and excess capacity in general.

As the federal government and its central-bank sidekick, the Fed, have groped for one goal after another smoothing out the business cycle, minimizing inflation and unemployment at the same time, rolling out a giant social insurance blanket, promoting homeownership, subsidizing medical care, propping up old industries (agriculture, automobiles) and fostering new ones (clean energy, biotechnology) and, above all, bailing out Wall Street they have now succumbed to overload, overreach and outside capture by powerful interests.

He may have something there!

The modern Keynesian state is broke,

Not applicable. Congress spends simply by having its agent, the tsy, instruct the Fed to credit a member bank’s reserve account.

paralyzed and mired in empty ritual incantations about stimulating demand, even as it fosters a mutant crony capitalism that periodically lavishes the top 1 percent with speculative windfalls.

Some truth there as well!

The culprits are bipartisan, though youd never guess that from the blather that passes for political discourse these days. The state-wreck originated in 1933, when Franklin D. Roosevelt opted for fiat money (currency not fundamentally backed by gold), economic nationalism and capitalist cartels in agriculture and industry.

Under the exigencies of World War II (which did far more to end the Depression than the New Deal did), the state got hugely bloated, but remarkably, the bloat was put into brief remission during a midcentury golden era of sound money and fiscal rectitude with Dwight D. Eisenhower in the White House and William McChesney Martin Jr. at the Fed.

Actually it was the Texas railroad commission pretty much fixing the price of oil at about $3 that did the trick, until the early 1970’s when domestic capacity fell short, and pricing power shifted to the saudis who had other ideas about ‘public purpose’ as they jacked the price up to $40 by 1980.

Then came Lyndon B. Johnsons guns and butter excesses, which were intensified over one perfidious weekend at Camp David, Md., in 1971, when Richard M. Nixon essentially defaulted on the nations debt obligations by finally ending the convertibility of gold to the dollar. That one act arguably a sin graver than Watergate meant the end of national financial discipline and the start of a four-decade spree during which we have lived high on the hog, running a cumulative $8 trillion current-account deficit. In effect, America underwent an internal leveraged buyout, raising our ratio of total debt (public and private) to economic output to about 3.6 from its historic level of about 1.6. Hence the $30 trillion in excess debt (more than half the total debt, $56 trillion) that hangs over the American economy today.

It also happens to equal the ‘savings’ of financial assets of the global economy, with the approximately $16 trillion of treasury securities- $US in ‘savings accounts’ at the Fed- constituting the net savings of $US financial assets of the global economy. And the current low levels of output and high unemployment tell us the ‘debt’ is far below our actual desire to save these financial assets. In other words, for the size government we have, we are grossly over taxed. The deficit needs to be larger, not smaller. We need to either increase spending and/or cut taxes, depending on one’s politics.

This explosion of borrowing was the stepchild of the floating-money contraption deposited in the Nixon White House by Milton Friedman, the supposed hero of free-market economics who in fact sowed the seed for a never-ending expansion of the money supply.

And the never ending expansion of $US global savings desires, including trillions of accumulations in pension funds, IRA’s, etc. Where there are tax advantages to save, as well as trillions in corporate reserves, foreign central bank reserves, etc. etc.

As everyone at the CBO knows, the US govt deficit = global $US net savings of financial assets, to the penny.

The Fed, which celebrates its centenary this year, fueled a roaring inflation in goods and commodities during the 1970s that was brought under control only by the iron resolve of Paul A. Volcker, its chairman from 1979 to 1987.

It was the Saudis hiking price, not the Fed. Note that similar ‘inflation’ hit every nation in the world, regardless of ‘monetary policy’. And it ended a few years after president Carter deregulated natural gas in 1978, which resulted in electric utilities switching out of oil to natural gas, and even OPEC’s cutting of 15 million barrels per day of production failing to stop the collapse of oil prices.

Under his successor, the lapsed hero Alan Greenspan, the Fed dropped Friedmans penurious rules for monetary expansion, keeping interest rates too low for too long and flooding Wall Street with freshly minted cash. What became known as the Greenspan put the implicit assumption that the Fed would step in if asset prices dropped, as they did after the 1987 stock-market crash was reinforced by the Feds unforgivable 1998 bailout of the hedge fund Long-Term Capital Management.

The Fed didn’t bail out LTCM. They hosted a meeting of creditors who took over the positions at prices that generated 25% types of annual returns for themselves.

That Mr. Greenspans loose monetary policies didnt set off inflation was only because domestic prices for goods and labor were crushed by the huge flow of imports from the factories of Asia.

No, because oil prices didn’t go up due to the glut from the deregulation of natural gas .

By offshoring Americas tradable-goods sector, the Fed kept the Consumer Price Index contained, but also permitted the excess liquidity to foster a roaring inflation in financial assets. Mr. Greenspans pandering incited the greatest equity boom in history, with the stock market rising fivefold between the 1987 crash and the 2000 dot-com bust.

No, it wasn’t about Greenspan, it was about the private sector and banking necessarily being pro cyclical. And the severity of the bust was a consequence of the Clinton budget surpluses ‘draining’ net financial assets from the economy, thereby removing the equity that supports the macro credit structure.

Soon Americans stopped saving and consumed everything they earned and all they could borrow. The Asians, burned by their own 1997 financial crisis, were happy to oblige us. They China and Japan above all accumulated huge dollar reserves, transforming their central banks into a string of monetary roach motels where sovereign debt goes in but never comes out. Weve been living on borrowed time and spending Asians borrowed dimes.

Yes, the trade deficit is a benefit that allows us to consume more than we produce for as long as the rest of the world continues to desire to net export to us.

This dynamic reinforced the Reaganite shibboleth that deficits dont matter and the fact that nearly $5 trillion of the nations $12 trillion in publicly held debt is actually sequestered in the vaults of central banks. The destruction of fiscal rectitude under Ronald Reagan one reason I resigned as his budget chief in 1985

I wonder if he’ll ever discover how wrong he’s been, and for a very long time.

was the greatest of his many dramatic acts. It created a template for the Republicans utter abandonment of the balanced-budget policies of Calvin Coolidge and allowed George W. Bush to dive into the deep end, bankrupting the nation

Hadn’t heard about an US bankruptcy filing? Am I missing something?

through two misbegotten and unfinanced wars, a giant expansion of Medicare and a tax-cutting spree for the wealthy that turned K Street lobbyists into the de facto office of national tax policy. In effect, the G.O.P. embraced Keynesianism for the wealthy.

He’s almost convinced me deep down he’s a populist…

The explosion of the housing market, abetted by phony credit ratings, securitization shenanigans and willful malpractice by mortgage lenders, originators and brokers, has been well documented. Less known is the balance-sheet explosion among the top 10 Wall Street banks during the eight years ending in 2008. Though their tiny sliver of equity capital hardly grew, their dependence on unstable hot money soared as the regulatory harness the Glass-Steagall Act had wisely imposed during the Depression was totally dismantled.

Can’t argue with that!

Within weeks of the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy in September 2008, Washington, with Wall Streets gun to its head, propped up the remnants of this financial mess in a panic-stricken melee of bailouts and money-printing that is the single most shameful chapter in American financial history.

The shameful part was not making a fiscal adjustment when it all started falling apart. I was calling for a full ‘payroll tax holiday’ back then, for example.

There was never a remote threat of a Great Depression 2.0 or of a financial nuclear winter, contrary to the dire warnings of Ben S. Bernanke, the Fed chairman since 2006. The Great Fear manifested by the stock market plunge when the House voted down the TARP bailout before caving and passing it was purely another Wall Street concoction. Had President Bush and his Goldman Sachs adviser (a k a Treasury Secretary) Henry M. Paulson Jr. stood firm, the crisis would have burned out on its own and meted out to speculators the losses they so richly deserved. The Main Street banking system was never in serious jeopardy, ATMs were not going dark and the money market industry was not imploding.

While the actual policies implemented were far from my first choice, they did keep it from getting a lot worse. Yes, it would have ‘burned out’ as it always has, but via the automatic fiscal stabilizers working to get the deficit high enough to catch the fall. I would argue it would have gotten a lot worse by doing nothing. And, of course, a full payroll tax holiday early on would likely have sustained sales/output/employment as the near ‘normal’ levels of the year before. In other words, Wall Street didn’t have to spill over to Main Street. Wall Street Investors could have taken their lumps without causing main street unemployment to rise.

Instead, the White House, Congress and the Fed, under Mr. Bush and then President Obama, made a series of desperate, reckless maneuvers that were not only unnecessary but ruinous. The auto bailouts, for example, simply shifted jobs around particularly to the aging, electorally vital Rust Belt rather than saving them. The green energy component of Mr. Obamas stimulus was mainly a nearly $1 billion giveaway to crony capitalists, like the venture capitalist John Doerr and the self-proclaimed outer-space visionary Elon Musk, to make new toys for the affluent.

Some good points there. But misses the point that capitalism is about business competing for consumer dollars, with consumer choice deciding who wins and who loses. ‘Creative destruction’ is not about a collapse in aggregate demand that causes sales in general to collapse, with survival going to those with enough capital to survive, as happened in 2008 when even Toyota, who had the most desired cars, losing billions when 8 million people lost their jobs all at once and sales in general collapsed.

Less than 5 percent of the $800 billion Obama stimulus went to the truly needy for food stamps, earned-income tax credits and other forms of poverty relief. The preponderant share ended up in money dumps to state and local governments, pork-barrel infrastructure projects, business tax loopholes and indiscriminate middle-class tax cuts. The Democratic Keynesians, as intellectually bankrupt as their Republican counterparts (though less hypocritical), had no solution beyond handing out borrowed money to consumers, hoping they would buy a lawn mower, a flat-screen TV or, at least, dinner at Red Lobster.

Ok, apart from the ‘borrowed money’ part. Congressional spending is via the Fed crediting a member bank reserve account. They call it borrowing when they shift those funds from reserve accounts at the Fed to security accounts at the Fed. The word ‘borrowed’ is highly misleading, at best.

But even Mr. Obamas hopelessly glib policies could not match the audacity of the Fed, which dropped interest rates to zero and then digitally printed new money at the astounding rate of $600 million per hour.

And ‘unprinted’ securities accounts/treasury securities at exactly the same pace, to the penny.

Fast-money speculators have been purchasing giant piles of Treasury debt and mortgage-backed securities, almost entirely by using short-term overnight money borrowed at essentially zero cost, thanks to the Fed. Uncle Ben has lined their pockets.

Probably true, though quite a few ‘headline’ fund managers and speculators have apparently been going short…

If and when the Fed which now promises to get unemployment below 6.5 percent as long as inflation doesnt exceed 2.5 percent even hints at shrinking its balance sheet, it will elicit a tidal wave of sell orders, because even a modest drop in bond prices would destroy the arbitrageurs profits. Notwithstanding Mr. Bernankes assurances about eventually, gradually making a smooth exit, the Fed is domiciled in a monetary prison of its own making.

It’s about setting a policy rate. The notion of prison isn’t applicable.

While the Fed fiddles, Congress burns. Self-titled fiscal hawks like Paul D. Ryan, the chairman of the House Budget Committee, are terrified of telling the truth: that the 10-year deficit is actually $15 trillion to $20 trillion, far larger than the Congressional Budget Offices estimate of $7 trillion. Its latest forecast, which imagines 16.4 million new jobs in the next decade, compared with only 2.5 million in the last 10 years, is only one of the more extreme examples of Washingtons delusions.

And with no long term inflation problem forecast by anyone, the savings desires over that time period are at least that high.

Even a supposedly bold measure linking the cost-of-living adjustment for Social Security payments to a different kind of inflation index would save just $200 billion over a decade, amounting to hardly 1 percent of the problem.

Thank goodness, as the problem is the deficit is too low, as evidenced by unemployment.

Mr. Ryans latest budget shamelessly gives Social Security and Medicare a 10-year pass, notwithstanding that a fair portion of their nearly $19 trillion cost over that decade would go to the affluent elderly. At the same time, his proposal for draconian 30 percent cuts over a decade on the $7 trillion safety net Medicaid, food stamps and the earned-income tax credit is another front in the G.O.P.s war against the 99 percent.

Never seen him play the class warfare card like this?

Without any changes, over the next decade or so, the gross federal debt, now nearly $17 trillion, will hurtle toward $30 trillion and soar to 150 percent of gross domestic product from around 105 percent today.

Not that it will, but if it does and inflation remains low it just means savings desires are that high.

Since our constitutional stasis rules out any prospect of a grand bargain, the nations fiscal collapse will play out incrementally, like a Greek/Cypriot tragedy, in carefully choreographed crises over debt ceilings, continuing resolutions and temporary budgetary patches.

No description of what ‘fiscal collapse’ might look like. Because there is no such thing.

The future is bleak. The greatest construction boom in recorded history Chinas money dump on infrastructure over the last 15 years is slowing. Brazil, India, Russia, Turkey, South Africa and all the other growing middle-income nations cannot make up for the shortfall in demand.

Agreed.

The American machinery of monetary and fiscal stimulus has reached its limits.

Do not agree. In fact, there are no numerical limits.

Japan is sinking into old-age bankruptcy and Europe into welfare-state senescence. The new rulers enthroned in Beijing last year know that after two decades of wild lending, speculation and building, even they will face a day of reckoning, too.

The state-wreck ahead is a far cry from the Great Moderation proclaimed in 2004 by Mr. Bernanke, who predicted that prosperity would be everlasting because the Fed had tamed the business cycle and, as late as March 2007, testified that the impact of the subprime meltdown seems likely to be contained. Instead of moderation, whats at hand is a Great Deformation, arising from a rogue central bank that has abetted the Wall Street casino, crucified savers on a cross of zero interest rates and fueled a global commodity bubble that erodes Main Street living standards through rising food and energy prices a form of inflation that the Fed fecklessly disregards in calculating inflation.

It’s not at all disregarded. And the Fed has only done ‘pretend money printing’ since they ‘unprint’ treasury securities as they ‘print’ reserve balances.

These policies have brought America to an end-stage metastasis. The way out would be so radical it cant happen.

How about a full payroll tax holiday? Too radical to happen???

It would necessitate a sweeping divorce of the state and the market economy. It would require a renunciation of crony capitalism and its first cousin: Keynesian economics in all its forms. The state would need to get out of the business of imperial hubris, economic uplift and social insurance and shift its focus to managing and financing an effective, affordable, means-tested safety net.

These are the conclusions of his way out of paradigm conceptualizing.

All this would require drastic deflation of the realm of politics and the abolition of incumbency itself, because the machinery of the state and the machinery of re-election have become conterminous. Prying them apart would entail sweeping constitutional surgery: amendments to give the president and members of Congress a single six-year term, with no re-election; providing 100 percent public financing for candidates; strictly limiting the duration of campaigns (say, to eight weeks); and prohibiting, for life, lobbying by anyone who has been on a legislative or executive payroll. It would also require overturning Citizens United and mandating that Congress pass a balanced budget, or face an automatic sequester of spending.

Whatever…

It would also require purging the corrosive financialization that has turned the economy into a giant casino since the 1970s. This would mean putting the great Wall Street banks out in the cold to compete as at-risk free enterprises, without access to cheap Fed loans or deposit insurance. Banks would be able to take deposits and make commercial loans, but be banned from trading, underwriting and money management in all its forms.

I happen to fully agree with narrow banking, as per my proposals.

It would require, finally, benching the Feds central planners, and restoring the central banks original mission: to provide liquidity in times of crisis but never to buy government debt or try to micromanage the economy. Getting the Fed out of the financial markets is the only way to put free markets and genuine wealth creation back into capitalism.

Rhetoric that shows his total lack of understanding of monetary operations.

That, of course, will never happen because there are trillions of dollars of assets, from Shanghai skyscrapers to Fortune 1000 stocks to the latest housing market recovery, artificially propped up by the Feds interest-rate repression.

No govt policy necessarily supports rates. Without the issuance of treasury securities, paying interest on reserves, and other ‘interest rate support’ policy rates fall to 0%. He’s got the repression thing backwards.

The United States is broke fiscally, morally, intellectually and the Fed has incited a global currency war (Japan just signed up, the Brazilians and Chinese are angry, and the German-dominated euro zone is crumbling) that will soon overwhelm it. When the latest bubble pops, there will be nothing to stop the collapse.

How about a full payroll tax holiday???

If this sounds like advice to get out of the markets and hide out in cash, it is.

I tend to agree but for the opposite reason.

The deficit may have gotten too small with the latest tax hikes and spending cuts.

(feel free to distribute)

comments on Bass and Koll

Cooler Heads: The Rebuttal to Kyle Bass’s Japan Market Meltdown Scenario from JPMorgan’s Jesper Koll and Masaaki Kanno

By Stephen Harner

Bass comments:

At 24 times central government tax revenues, cumulative Japanese government debt has reached a level which ensures financial collapse.

Not, just a reserve drain.

With the Abe/Aso government setting a 2% inflation target, the collapse will occur sooner—probably within the next 18 to 24 months.

Not, inflation targets are meaningless. Inflation expectations theory is a myth.

The revelation will be that interest on the debt—currently 25% of national tax revenue—will double under higher interest rates.

Could be. But deficits generally come down as well during an expansion, of course posing a risk to that expansion, etc.

The result will be massive JGB selling, a collapsing yen, and systematic financial crisis resulting from a collapse in yen asset prices.

Yes, when rates go up bond prices go down. There are both winners and losers when/if prices change.

Koll suggests:

Rising interest rates would of course raise debt service costs for all borrowers, and especially the hugely indebted government. But they would enable lenders–including household depositors–to charge higher rates on new debt and raise returns on non-fixed rate debt. Since net stock of private savings is larger than the net stock of public sector liabilities, Koll reckons that the overall effect on the economy would be positive.

Agreed! Rate hikes are expansionary, cuts contractionary due to interest income channels.

Rising interest rates would not spell large losses for Japanese financial institutions because these institutions’ bond–and especially JGB–portfolios are largely held to maturity, avoiding the requirement to be marked to market. The institutions would have no incentive to sell, and ample incentive to hold the JGBs [the weighted average duration of which they have in any event been shortening to well under five years–Harner].

They represent at least lost income, and if implied costs of funds rise implied losses. Etc. Again, winners and losers with change.

As to who is or would buy JGBs, the answer for the present and foreseeable near term future is: the Bank of Japan. BOJ is already committed to buying the entire debt out to a maturity of three years and a new governing board to be installed in April may extend the range to three to five years. Interest rates will rise only as much as BOJ will allow. This is why foreigners and domestic institutions are still buying the bonds.

Note that functionally the BOJ buying is the same as the MOF not issuing.

Whether or not significant inflation develops in Japan depends on productivity. Significant increases in productivity could fully mitigate inflationary pressures.

I’d guess most ‘inflation’ comes through the ‘cost channels’ as low aggregate demand tends to keep ‘monetary inflation’ in check.

There is plenty of room in Japan’s economy for raising productivity. Agriculture, in particular, has abysmal productivity that could easily be raised through deregulation. Land policy that affects housing is another. Health care is another. Indeed, deregulation is needed throughout the economy. “The Abe administration must implement real deregulation, so that private investors put their savings and capital to work, by building new factories, new hospitals, and so forth.” [This is a point I emphasized in my post a week ago on Abe’s “Three Arrows” program.–Harner]

Deregulation could be deflationary as suggested.

The proposed BOJ policies won’t do anything, the fiscal could move the needle some. And relighting the nukes will firm the yen.

Thaler’s Corner 19th Februaryy 2013: Positive Currency Wars!

The usual excellent post!

Positive Currency Wars!

19 February 2013


Financial markets are today being buffeted about by a slew of highly complex and changing influences. As readers may recall, at end-January (Thaler’s Corner 31/01: Too Cloudy), we advised people to favor Risk Off positions (references 2725 Euro Stoxx and 141.85 Bund), but this morning we returned to a neutralization of asset allocation biases (references 2635 and 142.85).

Not only do European markets seem to have lagged too far behind their American and Japanese peers, but, above all, I consider the current jitters about currency wars to be completely off the wall!

That said, there are still dark clouds hovering over Europe, mainly the eurozone, which is why we have yet to join the clan of the optimists.

Let us examine the macroeconomic situation area-by-area.

United States

The Fed is pursuing its easy money policies, the target QE, and I do not see them ending these policies any time soon. Despite the prevailing conventional wisdom, these policies are not boosting inflation at all, quite the contrary!

By continuously removing treasuries and MBS from the private sector via its QE asset-purchasing program and by replacing them with base money reserves, the Fed is in reality absorbing the interest that the private sector would have received on these bonds, as base money does not pay a coupon! The best illustration of the absorption carried out by the government is the amount of profits earned and transferred to the Treasury, a total of €335 billion since 2009!

This QE program functions like a tax, or more specifically, a savings tax somewhat like the French ISF or wealth tax (except that it is not at all progressive). It is nonetheless “progressive” in that it has helped the federal government, among others.

The 0% interest rate policy is certainly supposed to help reignite the American economy by making its easier for investment projects to achieve profitability, but at a time when the private sector feels overloaded with debt (deleveraging), its “inflationist” aspect is limited to the value of financial assets.

As long as US government budget policy remains frankly expansionist, with cumulative deficits totaling over $5 trillion since 2009, this deflationist aspect of the QE has little importance. However, not only have US budget deficits been trending downwards since 2009 (at a record high of $1.415 trillion), falling from 10.4% to 6.7% of GDP, but the latest budget measures raise concerns that the trend will accelerate.

In the first place, the hike in the payroll tax has had a direct impact on the American consumer. This 2% decrease in take-home income, for which employees were hardly prepared, led Wal-Mart Vice President Jerry Murray to declare February sales figures to be a “total disaster”:

“In case you haven’t seen a sales report these days, February MTD (month-to-date) sales are a total disaster. The worst start to a month I have seen in my seven years with the company. Where are all the customers? And where’s their money?”

Moreover, if sequester negotiations between Congress and the White House do not lead to a deal by the beginning of March, the ensuing decline in spending would represent about 1% of GDP and thus a new tightening of budget policy.

In contrast, the real estate market continues to give encouraging signs of a rebound. I will provide you the stats fresh February 22nd publication date.

The yen’s decline (currency wars) is a positive factor, which I will examine in the conclusion.

Europe

The eurozone is the world’s weakest economic zone, with the economic outlook as desperate as ever. The zone is suffering from an unfortunate mix of pro-cyclical budgetary policies and monetary policy, which refuses to use all the means available to counter recessive austerity.

Aside from their crazy devotion to Ricardian theories, supporters of “expansionist austerity” do not seem to take into account that the rare examples of such policies being successful are with very open small economies who, boasting their own currency, devalue their money and cut interest rates while defaulting on or restructuring foreign debt!

As for the distressed eurozone countries, which mainly trade with their neighbors, they not only lack their own currency and thus the possibility of devaluation, but also, in addition, suffer from a euro that remains high compared to the currencies of its trading partners!

And that’s leaving aside monetary policy and how its non-transmission to peripheral countries is making their economies even worse.

In addition, there are the problems specific to the zone, as exemplified by the Cypriot turmoil, the Italian elections, the protest movements in Spain and Portugal and the painful establishment of a common banking solution, etc.

But a ray of hope may be on the horizon, with the restructuring plan of the Promissory Notes just established by Ireland. Without going into the highly technical details, you can believe me when I say that this is the closest thing to fiscal financing ever carried out by a central bank on the eurozone or even in a developed country!

Quite simply, the Irish state has issued very long-term bonds, at very low interest rates, directly into the capital of the restructured bank, which then refinances it with the Irish central bank. The state thus skirts appealing to markets; this is monetary financing, albeit indirectly so. In any case, it would have had a hard time raising capital on such good terms with the public.

And Mario Draghi’s apparent nod to this operation, limiting himself to stating the ECB board had unanimous taken note of the deal, augurs well! We will not be surprized to hear the screams of alarm from Mr Weidmann and the Bundesbank, but they seem to have definitely lost control.

In short, while the euro’s rise is a drag on European exporters in the short term, reflecting more far more restrictive monetary and budgetary policies than those of our trading partners, this is also a case of the tree hiding the forest, as I will explain in the case of the Land of the Rising Sun.

Japan

This is where things are really going to play out!

The latest comments by Japanese government officials suggest that the next BoJ President will not only be a lot more dovish than his predecessors but that he will also work much more closely with the government.

Such coordination is absolutely necessary in times of deflation when the country has been faced with 0 Lower Bound for so many years. Check out the excellent paper written by Paul McCulley and Zoltan Pozsar on this topic in MG.

If a country in the midst of severe deflation/recession, like Japan, whose trade balance has deteriorated so abruptly since 2011, does not have the right to use all the tools at its disposal to pull itself out of this quagmire, who does?

I would farther than the prevailing discourse, with its focus on Japanese-style quantitative easing, and say flat out that the country should electronically print money!

Screams of a Weimer situation aside, such an approach would technically change little, since it would amount to injecting the budget deficit into the economy in the form of Monetary Financing instead of JGBs (Bonds Financing), which are nearly identical to cash (floor rate and possibility of going through the repo market).

In contrast, one thing is for sure: the fears generated by such an announcement would be enough to send the yen back to 110 vis-à-vis the dollar, which is in no way catastrophic. Bear in mind that this parity averaged 118.40 between the two shocks of 1987 and 2008!

These jitters would also fuel inflationist expectations, which is precisely the goal of a country in which the latest statistics show the economy stuck in deflation.

But the main reason I say that such a monetary and budgetary turnabout by Japan would be good for the rest of the world is that one of its main goals is to reignite domestic consumption, a natural corollary of easier monetary conditions and higher inflationist expectations.

And that would also benefit its foreign trading partners!

We are not witnessing so much a race to competitive devaluation (currency wars) as a race to more accommodative monetary policies, under the impulsion of the Fed and the BoJ, not to mention the BoE and the SNB, among others.

And all this will end up influencing the ECB, which, if it does not change its policies, will end up with a euro climbing toward 140 against the yen and 1.45 against the dollar. Let’s not forget that in 2007-2008, the euro was trading at 170 against the yen and 1.60 against the dollar, mainly due to the ECB’s intransigence, with the results we all know.

As Mr Draghi has declared that he will take the euro’s level into consideration, not as a target, but as a variable in monetary policy, we can only hope that it will continue to appreciate and thus force our central banks to carry out its own Copernican revolution and enter into concertation with the world’s central banks managing modern currencies.

In conclusion, thanks to these monetary hopes stemming from the Japanese initiatives, I have decided to put between parentheses the still heavy clouds, cited above, and advise clients this morning to abandon the Risk Off bias to capture profits offered by the last market shifts and to, at minimum, put ourselves in a position of maximum reactivity.

Japan Pension Funds Bonds Too Many If Abe Succeeds, Mitani

For all practical purposes this is about and part of ‘official policy’ to weaken the yen if they do it.

That is, it’s not a reaction to govt policy, it is govt policy.

Japan Pension Funds Bonds Too Many on Abe Plan, Mitani Says

By Anna Kitanaka, Toshiro Hasegawa & Yumi Ikeda

Feb 4 (Bloomberg) — Japans public pension fund, the worlds biggest manager of retirement savings, is considering the first change to its asset balance as a new governments policies could erode the value of $747 billion in local bonds.

Managers of the Government Pension Investment Fund, which oversees about 108 trillion yen ($1.16 trillion) in assets, will begin talks in April about reducing its 67 percent target allocation to domestic bonds, President Takahiro Mitani said in a Feb. 1 interview in Tokyo. The fund may increase holdings in emerging market stocks and start buying alternative assets.

The GPIF, created in 2006, didnt alter the structure of its holdings during the worst global financial crisis in 80 years or in response to the 2011 earthquake and nuclear disaster. Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and the Bank of Japan (8301) have pledged to restore economic growth and spur inflation, which will mean higher interest rates, Mitani said.

If we think about the future and if interest rates go up, then 67 percent in bonds does look harsh, said Mitani, who was appointed in 2010 after serving as an executive director at the Bank of Japan. We will review this soon. We will begin discussions for this in April-to-May. Any changes to our portfolio could begin at the end of the next fiscal year.

GPIF, one of the biggest buyers of Japanese government bonds, held 69.3 trillion yen, or 64 percent of total assets, in domestic debt at the end of September, according to its latest quarterly financial statement. That compares with 12 trillion yen, or 11 percent, in Japanese stocks; 9.6 trillion yen, or 9 percent, in foreign bonds; and 12.6 trillion yen, or 12 percent, in overseas stocks.

Relative Yield

The fund, which took over management of government employee retirement savings when it was set up, returned to profit in the three months ended Dec. 31 from a 1.4 percent loss in the first six months of the fiscal year, Mitani said. He declined to be more specific. It needs to raise about 6.4 trillion yen this fiscal year through March 31 to meet payments.

The yield on Japans 10-year government bond climbed 3.5 basis points to 0.8 percent as of 4:35 p.m. in Tokyo today. By comparison, the projected dividend yield for the Topix Index (TPX), the countrys broadest measure of equity performance, is 2.05 percent. The Topix added 1.4 percent today.

Japans bonds handed investors a 1.8 percent return in 2012, according to a Bank of America Merrill Lynch Index, compared with the 18 percent surge in the Topix.

Even as shares jumped amid optimism surrounding Abes stimulus plans, benchmark Japanese government bond yields have remained below their five-year average yield of 1.18 percent. Benchmark 10-year yields are the lowest in the world after Switzerland and are less than half the level in the U.S.

Rates Outlook

JGBs were how we made money over the past 10 years, Mitani said. The BOJ said that they are increasing buying bonds, but theyre also putting power into lowering interest rates. If the economy gets better, then long-term interest rates like a 10-year yield at less than 1 percent are unlikely.

The five-year JGB rate touched a record low 0.14 percent last month amid speculation the Bank of Japan will expand bond purchases as part of the monetary easing advocated by Abe.

The comments by Mitani show the pension manager needs to consider higher-risk, higher-yield assets to help fund retirements of the worlds oldest population. About 26 percent of the nation is older than 65, according to data compiled by Bloomberg.

Under Mitanis leadership, the GPIF began buying emerging- market assets in September 2011 and started purchasing shares in countries included in the MSCI Emerging Market Index (MXEF) last year. Mitani said in July 2012 that the fund was selling JGBs to pay for peoples entitlements and might consider alternative investments as it seeks better returns.

100 Years

We havent changed the core portfolio for a long time so it was thought that its about time to review this, Mitani said. The portfolio was based on a prerequisite of things such as long-term interest rates at 3 percent on average for the next 100 years. Whether this is good will be a possible point of discussion.

Holdings have been broadly unchanged since inception, when the fund was formulated with an outlook for consumer prices to rise 1 percent annually. Instead, the nations headline CPI has fallen an average 0.1 percent each month since the start of 2006, according to data compiled by Bloomberg.

The Bank of Japan last month doubled its inflation target to 2 percent, a level last seen in 1997, when a sales tax was increased, with no sustained price gains of that magnitude in two decades. Falling prices reduce incentives to borrow and invest in new business projects, erode tax receipts and increase the attractiveness of saving in cash rather than spending or putting money into stocks or bonds.

Topix Surge

GPIF is the biggest pension fund in the world by assets, followed by Norways government pension fund, according to the Towers Watson Global 300 survey in August.

Japans Topix Index surged 30 percent from Nov. 14, when elections were announced, through Feb. 1 on optimism the Liberal Democratic Party will lead the economy out of recession and end deflation. The yen weakened almost 14 percent against the dollar in that time, and touched its lowest level since May 2010 last week.

Even after 12 straight weekly advances, the longest streak in 40 years, the Topix is still 67 percent below its December 1989 record high.

Relative Value

The measure trades for 1.1 times the value of net assets. That compares with 2.3 times for the S&P 500, 1.6 times for the Hang Seng Index and 1.9 times for the MSCI World Index. A reading above one means investors are paying more for a company than the value of its net assets.

The yen dropped 11 percent last year versus the dollar, the most since 2005. A weaker yen increases the value of exports and typically raises import costs, boosting consumer prices.

Japanese stocks do not look expensive, Mitani said. Were still in the middle of a rising stocks, weakening yen trend. It will continue for a while.

ecb getting there?

>   
>   (email exchange)
>   
>   On Jan 6, 2013 6:41 AM, Andrea wrote:
>   
>   Some interesting points made by Ulrich Bindseil and Adalbert Winkler (ECB) in
>   their October 2012 paper
>   
>   How about these authors rethinking fiscal policy in the light of this?
>   ;-)
>   

The results of our analysis are as follows:

A central bank that operates under a paper standard with a flexible exchange rate and without a monetary financing prohibition and other limits of borrowings placed on the banking sector is most flexible in containing a dual liquidity crisis.

• Raising interest rates to attract funding / capital inflows, while being the standard economic mechanism in normal times, may fail to equilibrate demand and supply in a confidence crisis as higher interest rates make it less likely that borrowers will be able to serve the debt. As a result, within any international monetary system characterized by some sort of a fixed exchange rate, the availability of inter-central bank credit determines the elasticity of a crisis country’s central bank in providing liquidity to banks and financial markets, notably government bond markets. Thus, the sustainability of fixed exchange rate systems depends on the elasticity of inter-central bank credit, i.e. the ability and willingness of the central banks of “safe haven countries” to provide loans to central banks of countries in financial distress (gold standard and peg to another country’s currency) and on the elasticity of liquidity provision by the common central bank (monetary union).

• In a monetary union, like the euro area, international arrangements are replaced by a common central bank that provides lender-of-last-resort lending to banks. In the institutional set-up of the euro area where national central banks are in charge of the actual conduct of central bank operations with a country’s banking system, this provision of liquidity is reflected in the “TARGET2 balances”. At the same time, the comparison of a central bank of a euro area type monetary union with a country central bank operating under flexible exchange rates and a paper standard, like the US Federal Reserve, shows that central banks under the former framework have a similar capacity in managing dual liquidity crises as long as the integrity of the monetary union is beyond any doubt.

• Collateral constraints matter systematically under all monetary frameworks. As a result, a central bank confronted with a dual liquidity crisis has to be in a position to adjust collateral constraints in order to enhance the elasticity of its liquidity provision and to limit bank defaults and a deepening of the crisis. If done prudently, this may actually reduce central bank risk taking.

• Banks and securities markets can be subject to a liquidity crisis. However, while lender of last resort activities vis-à-vis banks are a widely accepted toolkit of a central bank, outright purchases of securities have been a controversial tool of central bank liquidity provision in financial crisis since the days of the real bills doctrine. Monetary financing prohibitions (regarding Governments) are a specific case of banning direct lending or primary market purchases of securities, namely securities issued by governments. If the central bank is either not allowed, or it is unwilling to conduct outright purchases of securities, the banking sector – supported by the central bank – can in principle act as the lender of last resort for debt securities markets. However, this is subject to additional constraints, i.e. the banks’ ability and willingness to perform this role. Moreover, it has specific drawbacks as, for instance, the possibility of diabolic solvency loops between banks, the issuers of debt securities, including the government and the real economy may arise.

• Borrowing limits of banks, i.e. quantitative credit constraints deliberately imposed by the central bank to limit the borrowing of banks from the central bank, accelerate a crisis because – if enforced – they signal to banks and markets that at those limits the central bank’s elasticity of liquidity provision ends. As a result, those limits push all banks (potentially) affected into a state of fear of becoming illiquid and hence into a state of strict liquidity hoarding.