Category Archives: CBs

BOE’s King Says Higher Interest Rates Would Exacerbate Debt Woes

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Taking a page from the Fed’s playbook?

The BOE has seen the Fed effectively scare portfolio managers and speculators out of the dollar with QE, which they know does nothing apart from just that, and may in fact even be fundamentally supportive of the dollar.

So desirous of a weaker currency, why not make a knowingly silly statement like this and manipulate portfolio managers who don’t know any better into shedding pounds in this increasingly bizarre international display of managing expectations?

And even if I’m giving them far too much credit for cleverness, the result is the same none the less…

BOE’s King Says Higher Interest Rates Would Exacerbate Debt Woes

By Jim Brunsden

May 3 (Bloomberg) — Bank of England Governor Mervyn King said high debt levels pose “massive” economic challenges that would be exacerbated by higher interest rates.

“The economic consequences of high-level indebtedness now would become more severe if rates were to rise,” King said yesterday at a committee of the European Parliament in Brussels. “It is the main reason why interest rates are so low.”

Bank of England policy makers are split four ways over monetary policy. The central bank probably will leave the key interest rate at a record low of 0.5 percent at the next rate meeting on May 5, according to the median of 43 forecasts in a Bloomberg News survey of economists.

Last month, Andrew Sentance voted for an increase to 1 percent, Martin Weale and Spencer Dale for a quarter-percentage- point rise and Adam Posen for expansion of the bond-purchase program. The rest, including King, voted for no change.

“The problem of leverage, the sheer volume of debt in the economy, is still very large and this poses massive macro-economic challenges,” King said yesterday. “I think these macro-economic challenges will last many years.”

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BOJ Shirakawa Warns Japan Economic Outlook ‘Very Severe’

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After all these years they are still threatening to use policy tools that have no effect on the real economy, and little if any effect on finance.

And with the rest of world seemingly thinking the same way as well risks of a global double dip are increasing.

BOJ Shirakawa Warns Japan Economic Outlook ‘Very Severe’

By Leika Kihara

April 30 (Reuters) — Bank of Japan Governor Masaaki Shirakawa said on Saturday that the country’s economic outlook was very severe and that the central bank would take appropriate action to support the economy.
But he offered few clues on whether and when the BOJ would expand its asset-buying scheme, only saying that its next policy step would depend on economic conditions at the time.

“The BOJ sees the outlook for Japan’s economy as very severe,” Shirakawa told a financial committee meeting in the lower house of parliament. “We’d like to take appropriate policy steps as needed while monitoring the economy and prices, taking into account that uncertainty over the outlook is high,” he said.

Asked by a lawmaker whether the BOJ would consider buying more government bonds to support the economy, Shirakawa said only: “We’d like to consider in earnest what would be the desirable step to take.”

The BOJ kept monetary policy unchanged on Thursday even as it lowered its growth forecast for the current fiscal year, which began in April, and warned of uncertainties over the extent of damage that last month’s devastating earthquake would inflict on the economy.

Shirakawa reiterated that having just expanded its asset purchasing scheme days after the March 11 quake, the BOJ preferred to spend more time examining the impact the step would have on the economy.

But he also left open the possibility of easing monetary policy further if damage from the quake proved bigger than expected, stressing that the central bank was focusing on downside risks to growth for the time being.

In a sign some in the BOJ were more cautious about the economic outlook than Shirakawa, Deputy Governor Kiyohiko Nishimura proposed on Thursday expanding the central bank’s asset buying scheme by 5 trillion yen ($62 billion).

While the proposal was outvoted by the board, some market players said it may be a sign the BOJ may loosen policy as early as next month.

Japan is facing its worst crisis since World War Two after the 9.0 magnitude earthquake and subsequent tsunami devastated its northeast coast last month.

Reflecting the economic impact, factory output fell at a record monthly pace in March, household spending declined at a record annual rate and another private survey showed manufacturing activity languishing at a two-year low.

The BOJ eased policy days after the quake by doubling to 10 trillion yen the funds it sets aside for purchases of a range of financial assets, such as government bonds and corporate debt.

If the central bank were to next ease policy, the most likely step would be to expand the scheme again, sources familiar with the BOJ’s thinking say.

Aside from the government bonds it purchases under the asset buying scheme, the central bank buys 21.6 trillion yen worth of long-term government bonds from the market each year.

Some lawmakers have called on the BOJ to buy more government bonds from the market, or even underwrite them directly, to help the government fund the huge costs for reconstruction.

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Goldman on monetary policy in the BRICs

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Excellent recap of what’s happening through the eyes of Wall St. in the BRICS.

To be noted:

The BRICS all seem to be fighting inflation, which means the problem is that bad.

Unfortunately, hiking rates via direct rate hikes, reserve requirement hikes, and the like, which they all are doing, add to aggregate demand through the interest income channels, making their inflations that much worse. (That’s the price of being out of paradigm, as reinforced by analysts who are also out of paradigm)

Some are using credit controls, which do slow demand, as does fiscal tightening which generally happens through automatic stabilizers that work through higher nominal growth, including reduced transfer payments and higher tax receipts.

In general, this type of thing tends to end with a very hard landing, which their equity markets may be starting to discount.

BRICs Monthly : 11/04 – Monetary Policy in the BRICs

Published April 28, 2011

The BRICs’ central banks rely on a variety of tools to adjust monetary policy. As output gaps have closed and inflation pressures have accelerated, policy stances in the BRICs have shifted meaningfully towards tightening. We expect policy to continue to tighten in the coming months via a combination of policy rate hikes, reserve ratio requirement hikes and other measures.

There is a large degree of variation in the stated goals of monetary policy and the tools used to achieve those goals, both among the BRICs and relative to the advanced economies. The BRICs (like many other emerging markets) rely more heavily on a broader set of tools than is typical in the developed world. These include several policy rates, reserve ratio requirements, open market operations and FX intervention. As a result, looking at the policy rate alone does not provide an accurate picture of the overall monetary policy stance.

Over the past year, BRICs’ policymakers have shifted from an accommodative policy stance (in response to the financial crisis) to tightening (in response to closing output gaps and rising inflation pressures). However, the unusual shape of the global recovery—in which most of the BRICs and other EMs have rebounded quickly, while the developed world has lagged behind—has brought about a shift in the way in which the BRICs have tightened monetary policy. This time around, most have relied less on policy rate hikes and more on alternative tools.

While the BRICs have tightened monetary policy meaningfully, we believe that more is on the way. We expect Brazil, India and Russia to hike their policy rate by another 125bp and China to hike by 25bp by end-2011. In addition, we expect further tightening through the exchange rate, the reserve requirement ratio and other measures.

Monetary Policy in the BRICs

There is a large degree of variation in the stated goals of monetary policy and the tools used to achieve those goals, both among the BRICs and relative to advanced countries. The BRICs (like many other EMs) rely more heavily on a broader set of tools than is typical in the developed world. Hence, looking at the policy rate alone does not provide an accurate picture of their monetary policy stance.

Brazil’s monetary policy framework has shifted dramatically over the past two decades. As it struggled against hyper- and high inflation in the early 1990s, the government first introduced a period of extremely high interest rates (over 50%) in 1994, and then transitioned in 1995 to a soft exchange rate peg accompanied by high and volatile interest rates. In 1999, Brazil shifted to its current inflation-targeting regime. The current inflation target is set at 4.5%, with a relatively wide band of +/- 2% and no repercussions if the target is missed (as it has been for the past three years). To this end, COPOM targets the SELIC interest rate (the overnight interbank rate).

China uses a more eclectic form of monetary policy that involves a range of players, objectives and instruments. The People’s Bank of China (PBoC) is the official implementer, but the central government often weighs heavily on the PBoC’s decisions. The Bank does not hold regular policy meetings and policy changes are typically released after the close of the local market without advance notice. The Monetary Policy Committee of the PBoC is an advisory body, which does not determine policy direction. Chinese monetary policy has an official quad mandate of growth, employment, inflation and a balanced external account. To achieve these goals, the PBoC uses a range of quantity- and price-based mechanisms, such that there is no single policy instrument that can be used as a main indicator of its monetary policy stance at any given time. Quantity-based tools include reserve requirement (RRR) changes and credit controls. Price-based tools include changes in the benchmark deposit and lending interest rates.

India’s monetary policy is conducted by the Reserve Bank of India (RBI), which has the dual mandate of price stability and the provision of credit to productive sectors to support growth. To this end, the RBI targets the interest rate corridor for overnight money market rates, with the reverse-repo rate as the floor and the repo rate as the ceiling. The RBI also utilises open market operations and two types of reserve ratio requirements (the cash reserve ratio and the statutory liquidity ratio).

In Russia, monetary policy is set by the Central Bank of Russia (CBR). Until recently, the CBR concentrated on exchange rate stability and allowed inflation to vary. Its main policy rates are the overnight deposit rate and the 1-week minimum repo rate, although these historically have played a subordinate role to FX intervention. The CBR also monitors liquidity through reserve requirements, FX interventions and open market operations.

Shift in BRICs’ Approach to Monetary Tightening

The unusual shape of the global recovery—in which most of the BRICs and other EMs have rebounded quickly, while the developed world has lagged—has brought about a shift in the way in which the BRICs have tightened monetary policy.

Policymakers in Brazil have been hesitant to raise rates as aggressively as they normally would in response to the current high-growth/high-inflation domestic cyclical picture, given their concern that this would attract greater capital inflows. Instead, they have increasingly relied on two alternative mechanisms to tighten the overall policy stance: (1) a gradual FX appreciation and (2) several ‘macro-prudential’ measures that slow the pace of new credit concessions, raise the cost and lengthen the maturity of new loans, and raise the tax on foreign fixed income inflows.

Over the recent cycle, Chinese policymakers have relied most heavily on explicit and implicit credit controls, including window guidance meetings and the Dynamic Differentiated RRR System (under which the PBoC imposes a differentiated RRR for some banks but removes it for others, if they have been following government lending controls). Frequent RRR hikes have generally not produced any net tightening, as they were counterbalanced by increased FX inflows and expiring central bank bills. Likewise, recent interest rate hikes have been an effective signalling device but have been too small in magnitude to have a large impact.

In India, the RBI has kept liquidity tight in order to pass policy rate hikes through to bank deposit and lending rates. However, excessively tight and volatile liquidity has caused overnight borrowing rates to fluctuate widely in recent months, such that market participants have focused more on liquidity than policy rate actions in determining the direction and magnitude of interest rates at the short end. In an effort to address this issue and increase transparency, the RBI has proposed shifting to a single policy rate target (the repo rate) while simultaneously improving its control over system-wide liquidity.

Russia has seen the largest change in its monetary policy framework since the onset of the financial crisis. The CBR has shifted towards more FX flexibility with a greater focus on inflation, with the goal of an eventual move towards an inflation targeting regime (although, as the CBR has highlighted, such a move would ultimately be a government decision, which is unlikely to be realised in the absence of a strong political will to make the change). To this end, the CBR has moved towards interest rates as its primary monetary policy tool, and has scaled down its presence in the FX markets. It now sterilizes most FX interventions so as not to impact money supply growth. It has also relied more heavily on reserve requirement changes in recent months, in an effort to signal tightening liquidity.

More Tightening to Come

While the BRICs have meaningfully tightened monetary policy via a variety of tools, we believe more is needed. Demand-driven inflationary pressures are picking up as output gaps close, contributing to an acceleration in core inflation. Moreover, the BRICs also face large food and energy price spikes, which are likely to continue to push up headline inflation at least through the summer. In addition, fiscal policy is not turning sufficiently contractionary, leaving the burden of tightening on monetary policymakers.

In Brazil, we expect five more SELIC hikes by 25bp per meeting and further macro-prudential measures. For China, we forecast at least one more rate hike (25bp in 2011Q2), further currency appreciation (6% annualised), liquidity absorption measures through RRR hikes and open market operations, and tight control over credit issuance. We have a much more hawkish view of India than consensus, where we now expect the RBI to hike policy rates by another 125bp in 2011. Russia’s CBR should hike deposit and repo rates by 150bp and 125bp respectively by end-2011.

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China’s dollar reserves being used to fight inflation?

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This may be some of the most recent data:

The SAFE Releases Data on Chinas External Debt at the End of September 2010

Excerpt: “At the end of September 2010, China’s outstanding external debt (excluding that of Hong Kong SAR, Macao SAR, and Taiwan Province) reached USD546.449 billion. Specifically, the outstanding registered external debt reached USD326.549 billion and the balance of trade credit totaled USD219.9 billion. ”

Then Mktwatch reported this end Dec 2010:

China’s external debt nears $550 billion: Safe

Escerpt: “HONG KONG (MarketWatch) — China’s external debt was $548.938 billion at the end of 2010, compared to $546 billion owed at the end of the third quarter, according to newswire reports Thursday that cited figures released by the State Administration of Foreign Exchange. Of that total, China’s short-term debt was $375.7 billion, or equivalent to 13.2% of China’s foreign exchange reserves, the agency said”

CAUTION,THIS IS ALL VERY PRELIMINARY AND COULD PROVE TO BE ENTIRELY WRONG

I got this response, and I’m looking further into it.

I don’t think this includes dollar debt of state banks and state owned enterprises.

What it means is that China’s net reserves aren’t as high as generally believed, and that they are being ‘spent/lent’ by borrowing dollars and then spending, leaving the gross, headline reserve number intact, rather than spending the reserves directly.

They could even be buying their own currency to drive it higher to fight inflation.

This would be an interesting, quasi desperation move, as it would mean they are willing to risk export markets to try to keep prices in check.

It would also help explain the downward drift in the dollar over the last 6 months or so.

And currency support under these circumstances is also, in general, unsustainable. If the trade flows have turned against them due to inflation, they will burn through all their reserves trying to support their currency without a lot more fiscal tightening at all levels, and a very hard landing as well. And even that might not be enough, depending on how institutionalized the inflation is.

All speculation on my part at this point.

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from Press Conference

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I thought he did a AAA job within his paradigm.

The answers on the dollar were spot on- ultimately the dollar is worth what it can buy, so ‘low inflation’ is a strong dollar policy in the long term. It’s pretty much the purchasing power parity argument. Additionally, he said a strong economy helps the dollar, citing the capital inflow channel, probably a reference to China and other emerging market nations. And I might have added the fiscal tightening channel, as strong economies tend to cause federal deficits to fall via automatic fiscal stabilizers.

Interestingly, he did not mention specifically how higher oil prices, set by a foreign monopolist, continue to work against the dollar.

Nor how highly deflationary policies in other currencies tend to strengthen those currencies relative to the dollar.

And there was no mention of how portfolio shifting alters the dollar, which may be the largest driver currently.

Let me suggest, however, it would have been more nearly correct for him to have said the policy of low inflation and strong growth also happens to support the dollar, rather than imply a strong dollar was the policy variable.

He remains out of paradigm on the QE issue, still not realizing it’s entirely about price and not quantity, but that was to be expected.

The more dovish tone from the FOMC indicates some fundamental insecurity about the economy. Yes, they remain moderately optimistic, but probably continue to worry disproportionately about the downside risks. They see downside risks to demand everywhere from the euro zone and the UK, to Japan and China, and, though recognizing nothing of consequence has happened yet, they hear the fiscal sabre rattling from both the left and the right. And they see it’s unlikely for the housing channel to provide much support in the near future as it’s done in previous cycle.

Also, second chance to buy my 100oz gold bar at the current spot price of gold!
When I offered it for sale when gold was $1,200, no one wanted it so I still have it.

:)


Karim writes:

1) Extended period means a ‘couple of meetings’.
2) Q1 GDP weakness transitory (i.e., they didn’t alter the outlook for rest of f/cast period) due to
   a. timing of defense outlays
   b. timing of export shipments
   c. weather
3) No fiscal measures that have been announced so far have altered their near-term outlook
4) Impact of Japan supply disruptions ‘moderate and temporary’
5) Strong and stable dollar in U.S. best interest

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What happened to Q1?

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This is typical of recent announcements:

“With most of the news on 1Q growth now in, the GDP “bean count” looks even softer than it did a couple of weeks ago. The most recent disappointments have come on the export side—with trade now set to subtract significantly from growth in the quarter—and from inventories. Consequently, we are downgrading our real GDP growth estimate to 1¾% (annualized), from 2½% previously (and from 3½% not too long ago).”

So what went wrong?

Maybe, as I guessed at just prior to year end:

The effect of world austerity was underestimated, particularly in Europe and China?

The effects of income channel from QE2 (remember the Fed turning over $79 billion to the tsy that the economy would have earned if the Fed hadn’t bought/owned those securities?) were underestimated?

The effect of the year end tax adjustment was less than anticipated, as work for pay that was eliminated maybe had higher propensities to consume than the 2%, one year FICA reduction?

Rising gasoline prices slowed things down some?

Rising food price as we burn up our food supply for fuel wreak havoc world wide?

So how about Q2, which is starting about as high as Q1 did?

High food and gasoline prices continue.

Supply disruptions from the Japan.

The Fed owns more tsy secs and has thereby removed more interest income from the economy.

World austerity intensifies, now including the US.

China’s inflation fight intensifies.

And business top line growth starting to falter from modest levels?

And this time the fiscal safety nets are in jeopardy as govt’s believe they have ‘run out of money’ and need to tighten up, with Japan now the prime example, looking at tax hikes to ‘pay for’ earthquake damage.

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WARNING- Euro Zone Automatic Fiscal Stabilizers Deactivated!

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I now believe that system risk in the euro zone is being grossly under discounted.

The implied assumption for the major currency regions is that during a slowdown the automatic fiscal stabilizers- falling government ‘revenues’ and increased transfer payments- will kick in to increase deficit spending, and thereby add the income and savings to catch the fall and support the next expansion.

This has always been the case, and as we all know, the most accurate forecasts are the ones that assume it’s not different this time.

But the relatively new and evolving euro zone arrangements are qualitatively different.
Spending by euro zone national governments is now market constrained in Greece, Ireland, and Portugal, with the rest looking like they aren’t far away from those same market constraints.

In a slow down, this means as tax revenues fall, markets may not permit government spending to rise, unless the ECB immediately funds all the national governments as well as the banks. Just as we see happening to the US states.

Not that the ECB won’t eventually do that, but that they are unlikely to proactively do it.
In other words, it will all have to get bad enough for the ECB to write the check that only they can write.

This means the euro zone is now flying without a net.

And the potential drop in aggregate demand is far higher than markets are discounting.

And that kind of catastrophic collapse in aggregate demand in the euro zone will have immediate catastrophic global impact.

And the fiscal discussions going on in Japan and elsewhere tell me there is a clear risk even the operationally unconstrained nations will be very reluctant to immediately and proactively move towards fiscal expansion.
Instead, they will let it all deteriorate until their automatic fiscal stabilizers to kick in.
Much like what happened with the 2008 financial crisis, where the lack of a will to engage in an immediate fiscal response let that financial crisis spill over into the real economy.

Can all this be avoided? Yes, and the remedy is both simple, immediate, and would quickly lead to unprecedented global prosperity.

All the euro zone has to do is have the ECB write the check, and announce immediate and annual distributions of 10% of GDP to member nations to pay down their outstanding debts, and at the same time impose national deficit ceilings sufficiently high to promote desired levels of aggregate demand. And the penalty for non compliance would be the withdrawal of ECB support. This would remove credit concerns, without increasing government spending, so there would be no inflationary impact.

And all the rest of the world has to do is recognize that federal taxes function to regulate aggregate demand, and not to fund expenditures per se. And then set taxation and/or government spending at levels that sustain desired aggregate demand.

They need to know the question is not whether longer term the budget deficit is sustainable- as it’s always nominally sustainable- but instead worry about sustaining aggregate demand at desired levels, both long term and short term.

But, unfortunately, I see the odds of a catastrophic collapse in aggregate demand as far higher than the odds of an awakening to a global understanding of actual monetary operations.

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IMF’s Lipsky Says Advanced-Nation Debt Risks Future Crisis as Yields Set to Rise

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If any of you can forward this to John please do, thanks.
We went through all this from way back in his Salomon Bros. days- he should know better.

Comments below.

Lipsky Says Advanced-Nation Debt Risks Future Crisis as Yields Set to Rise

By Kevin Hamlin

March 20 (Bloomberg) — The mounting debt burden of the world’s most developed nations, set for a post-World War II record this year, is unsustainable and risks a future fiscal crisis, the International Monetary Fund’s John Lipsky said.

The average public debt ratio of advanced countries will exceed 100 percent of their gross domestic product this year for the first time since the war, Lipsky, the IMF’s first deputy managing director, said in a speech at a forum in Beijing today.

“The fiscal fallout of the recent crisis must be addressed before it begins to impede the recovery and create new risks,” said Lipsky. “The central challenge is to avert a potential future fiscal crisis, while at the same time creating jobs and supporting social cohesion.”

John, there is no potential future fiscal crisis for nations that issue their own non convertible/floating fx currencies.

Lipsky’s view clashes with Nobel laureate Joseph Stiglitz, who told the same forum yesterday that further fiscal stimulus is needed to aid growth, and that European nations focused on austerity have a “fairly pessimistic” outlook. At stake is sustaining the developed world’s rebound without a deepening in the debt crisis that’s engulfed nations from Greece to Ireland.

Long-term bond yields could climb 100 to 150 basis points, driven by the 25 percentage point rise in sovereign debt ratios since the global financial crisis and projected increases in borrowing in coming years, according to Lipsky.

So? You know there is no solvency issue. So do you forecast increased aggregate demand, a too small output gap and too low unemployment because of that? What sense does that make???

A basis point is 0.01 percentage point. Yields on benchmark 10-year Treasury notes closed at 3.27 percent last week, with comparable-maturity German debt at 3.19 percent and Japanese bonds at 1.21 percent.

‘Unsustainably Low’

Bank of England Governor Mervyn King reiterated his view at a conference four days ago in Beijing that “long-term real interest rates are unsustainably low” in the aftermath of policy makers’ unprecedented monetary stimulus during the 2008 financial crisis.

And Professor Geoffrey Harcourt’s star pupil, of all people. Shame shame shame. What’s his problem- unemployment might get too low???

Total U.S. public debt was more than $14 trillion at the end of 2010, a 72 percent increase during five years, while Japan’s debt is about double the size of its $5 trillion economy. The European turmoil has forced policy makers to create rescue packages for Ireland and Greece.

This is slipped in now for the second time by Kevin Hamlin, the author of this article, in a way that suggests its associated with Lipsky, King, etc. though he obviously didn’t get any direct quotes from them, or he would have used them. In any case, its an inexcusable error to push the analogy that Ireland and Greece, users of the euro and not the issuer (the ECB is the issuer) are analogous to currency issuers like the US, Japan, and the UK.

While interest payments on debt have remained stable at about 2.75 percentage points of GDP over the last three years, “higher deficits and debts together with normalizing economic growth sooner or later will lead to higher interest rates,” Lipsky said. The IMF estimates fiscal deficits for developed nations will average about 7 percent of GDP this year.

The cost of repaying debt would increase by 1.5 percentage points of GDP by 2014 even if interest rates rise only about 100 basis points, Lipsky said.

And so what then? Create excess aggregate demand that would overly shrink the output gap? If so, I don’t see it in any IMF forecast?

IMF studies show that each 10-percentage-point increase in the debt ratio slows annual real economic growth by around 0.15 percentage point because of the adverse effect on investment and lower productivity growth, according to Lipsky, a former chief economist at JPMorgan Chase & Co.

He should know those studies are not applicable to what he’s talking about.

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