My response to a post on an Italian Keynes blog

Warren Mosler comments on Keynes blog, Italy

warren mosler 8 dicembre 2012 alle 15:33

First, let me remind that MMT was originally ‘Mosler Economics’ which began with ‘Soft Currency Economics’ (1993) which can be found at https://moslereconomics.com. Also, highlights of the ‘history of MMT’ are in ‘The 7 Deadly Innocent Frauds of Economic Policy’ free online also on my website. Note too that ‘Soft Currency Economics’ was a result of my first hand experience after 20 years in banking and monetary operations. I had never read Keynes, or even heard of Lerner, Knapp, or had any knowledge of any ‘post Keynesians’. So while it may be true that MMT can be derived from one school of thought or another, it didn’t happen that way. And, for example, when I put forward my ‘real vs nominal’ discussion of fiscal transfers in a monetary union earlier this year, explaining how the production of public goods and services for the benefit of the entire union is in fact a real cost to the region that receives the funding to produce these public goods and services, that was also ‘original MMT thought’ (fully recognizing the shortcomings of such a statement!).

Second, if there is a ‘fundamental’ contribution of MMT to ‘the literature’ it’s the explicit recognition that a currency like the dollar is in fact a simple public monopoly, and all the rest follows. Along those lines I have lectured on the long standing ‘Keynes vs the Classics’ discussion, where the Classics argued there can be no unemployment without monopoly, and Keynes argues there in fact can be persistent unemployment even without monopoly, due to the effects of unspent income, etc. in the monetary system. My response is they both failed to explicitly recognize the currency itself is a public monopoly. Notional demand is from taxation and from savings desires, and notional supply from state spending and/or state lending. And unemployment is the evidence of a restriction in supply from the monopolist- the failure to spend enough to satisfy the need to pay taxes and the desires to net save in that unit of account. So the classics were right in that unemployment does come from monopoly, but they failed to recognize the applicable monopoly. And Keynes was right, the problem was on the monetary side, but he failed to recognize the currency itself was a simple public monopoly, even though he described it much along those lines. If Keynes had recognized the currency was a monopoly, he surely would have explicitly said so in this discussion, and many other places as well to support many of his contentions. I’ll post this and then go on with additional response to the above blog.

warren mosler 8 dicembre 2012 alle 15:50

With regard to circuit theory, when I first met the Post Canadians ;) in the mid 1990’s who I very much respect, especially the M&M’s (Mario and Marc), and read a bit of circuit theory, it seemed so ‘intuitively obvious’- a case of ‘goes without saying’- I wondered why it was even worth writing about! And my first comment was that while I fully agreed with what they were saying, it didn’t ‘start from the beginning’ in that it began with firms borrowing to pay workers, but never discussed why anyone would work for the currency in the first place. I explained to them that it about the currency being a simply public monopoly, with tax liabilities the ‘driving force’ behind the ‘government circuit’ where, at the macro level, taxation creates sellers of real goods and services, including labor, which is why people work for businesses, etc. Professor Alain Parguez immediately picked up on this and added it to his model in his next paper, only to be severely criticized and isolated by much of the ‘Circuitist’ community for many years! Most came around to accept it over the years, though some continue to fail to do so.

warren mosler 8 dicembre 2012 alle 16:16

Next:

“I think it’s worth remembering that this thesis is a rigorous foundation of the theory of relative prices and distribution in the development of the so-called “theory of production”, which, among others, Leontief and Sraffa have made outstanding contributions above (see Pasinetti 1975; Kurz and Salvadori 1995, cf. Petri also 2004). In particular, in the light of the theory of production and the above-mentioned argument and its implications can be extended to so-called “long term”, and the objections of Krugman (2011) to the MMT can be effectively criticized.”

Relative prices, yes, but MMT reveals the source of absolute nominal prices. And it’s very simple. As everyone knows, a monopolist is ‘price setter’ rather than ‘price taker’.

And a monopolist is price setter for two prices. The first what Marshall called the ‘own rate’ which how his ‘item’ exchanges for itself. With a currency this is the rate of interest, which we know is set by the CB and not ‘the market’ as we know the CB is monopoly supplier of reserves to its banking system, and therefore is price setter as it prices the banking system’s marginal cost of funds. The second is how the monopolist’s ‘item’ exchanges for other goods and services, which we call ‘the general price level’

I say it this way- the price level is necessarily a function of prices paid by the issuer when it spends, and/or collateral demanded when it lends.

warren mosler 8 dicembre 2012 alle 16:28

Next:

“However, as Lavoie has shown, it is derived from a simple accounting convention: some modern monetary theorists analyze the central bank and the state as if they were a single sector consolidation. The mystery is easily solved, then. However, it should also add that this consolidation, in the current political and institutional reality, does not exist.” First, I do very well know, recognize, and account for the institutional realities at all times. As I do know that no matter how you look at it, spending comes first before taxing of borrowing for the issuer of the currency, which includes his designated agents.

Congress is the issuing authority, and has assigned various tasks to the Treasury and Fed to carry out its will.

The Fed operates a spread sheet that contains the accounts of its member banks, as well as an account for the Treasury.

I begin, for purposes of this discussion, at inception, with no balances in any accounts.

Any payment of taxes would require the Fed to debit a member bank account and credit the account of the treasury.

This is impossible with no balances in the member bank accounts, unless they are permitted to have negative balances.

However, negative balances- overdrafts- are functionally loans from the Fed, an agent of Congress. This means paying taxes via overdraft is paying taxes via obtaining a loan from the Fed. That is, in this example, the Fed must lend the dollars that it accounts for as payment of taxes.

The way ‘insiders’ say it, there can’t be a ‘reserve drain’ without a ‘reserve add’

That is, the dollars to pay taxes and to buy treasury securities necessarily ‘come from’ govt. spending and/or lending.

There is no way around it. Any issuer must issuer before he can collect the thing he issues as a simple point of logic.

warren mosler 8 dicembre 2012 alle 16:36

regarding trade, with a floating exchange rate there is ‘continuous balance.’ For example, in the case of the US, with perhaps a $400 billion trade deficit, it can be said that we have the goods and services we imported, and non residents are holding the additional $400 billion of $US financial assets they received in payment, and at this point in time there is that ‘balance’ which has resulted in the current exchange rate martix.

So I see only ‘balance’ at any given point in time, never ‘imbalance’, as a point of logic. Am I missing something? If so, rather than I write about every possible question I can imagine you might raise, can I ask for any of you to give me an example of why this is a ‘problem’ so to speak? Thanks!

warren mosler 8 dicembre 2012 alle 16:45

“In a period in which the theme of the insertion of foreign capital in the ownership and control seems to go beyond the scope of the last strategic assets in public hands and even get to lick the banking system, it would be good to do a lot more clarity on this point .”

Yes, at any time I see public purpose in sourcing matters of strategic purpose domestically. For example, you do not want to outsource the programming of your military software which could render it useless in time of war. And I see public purpose in producing goods and services with strategic military purpose domestically, like the steel that goes into maintaining the military, and domestic sources of energy, food, etc. etc. Again, government is there for public infrastructure that serves public purpose, which includes strategic planning.

On the other hand, I don’t see the public purpose in not allowing non residents to sell us most of what we call ‘consumer goods and services’ where, for example, a cut off in time of war would not alter the outcome of the war.

Along these lines, I see a serious problem with the euro zone’s dependence on Russian energy supplies, even though Russia has ‘promised’ never to cut them off.

That and $20 will get you a cup of coffee in Rome…

I see the euro zone as paying a heavy price in regards to real terms of trade with Russia and others, due to arrangements that I don’t see serving public purpose, though the certainly do serve influential private purpose.

warren mosler 8 dicembre 2012 alle 16:53

Remember, economically speaking, employment is a real cost to the worker. He is selling his time. The real benefit is the output. So I suggest you look at real consumption with regard to the euro members, to see who’s winning and losing economically. But yes, any monetary union needs a system of fiscal transfers to ensure full employment and price stability. And I suggest the reason it doesn’t happen is because it’s not widely understood that if a region is assigned the production of public goods and services, in real terms that process is a real cost to that region, as it’s employed to produce real goods and services that other parts of the union are consuming. Instead, because that region gets funding, it’s assumed that region is benefiting in real terms. In other words, fiscal transfers can be effected to use the areas of higher unemployment to produce goods and services that are exported to the rest of the union. This all comes back to exports being real costs, and imports real benefits, etc.

warren mosler 8 dicembre 2012 alle 17:00

let me conclude today that as a matter of simple game theory labor is not a fair game, and if not supported in some manner real wages will stagnate at very low levels. This is because people must ‘work to eat’ while business hire only if they can make a desired return on investment.

For me it suits public purpose to make sure people actually working for a living and producing real goods and services consumed by the majority are worthy of being supported with high levels of education, health care, and other such publlc services, as well as being fed, housed, and clothed at levels that make feel proud to be members of that society. The proposals on my website are intended to work to that end.

Italian article this am

Misrepresents what I say a bit, but they do have my picture next to JFK!
;)

The IMF: sovereign currency, no longer the monopoly of the banks

Eliminate the public debt of the United States at once, and do the same with Great Britain, Italy, Germany, Japan, Greece. At the same time revive the ‘ economy, stabilize prices and oust the bankers. In a clean and painless, and faster than what you can imagine. With a magic wand? No. With a simple law, but able to replace the current system, in which to create money out of nothing are private banks. We only need a measure requiring the banks to hold a financial reserve real, 100%. To propose two economists at the International Monetary Fund, Jaromir Bene and Michael Kumhof. You, the bank, you want to make money on the loan of money? First you have to prove it really that much money. Too easy to have it by the central bank (which the factory from scratch) and then “extort” families, businesses and entire states, imposing exorbitant interest.

The study of two economists, “The Chicago Plan Revisited,” with “a revolutionary and” scandalous “‘Maria Grazia Bruzzone,” La Stampa “, emphasizes the global resonance of the dossier, that bursts like a bomb on the world capitalist system now jammed. The global debt came the exorbitant sum of 200 trillion, that is 200 trillion dollars, while the world GDP is less than 70 trillion. Translated: the world debt is 300% of gross domestic product of the entire planet. “And to hold this huge mountain of debt – which continues to grow – there are more advanced economies and developing countries,” says the Bruzzone, stressing that “the heart of the problem and the cross” is the highest “power” Japan, Europe and the United States. Hence the sortie “heretical” by Bene and Kumhof: simply write off the debt, it disappears.Sparked the debate was the last IMF report, which points the finger on austerity policies aimed at reducing thepublic debt . Policies that “could lead to recession in the economies ‘, since’ cuts and tax increases depress the ‘economy ‘.

Not only. The IMF would be really worried the crisis that is ravaging the ‘ Europe threatens to be worse than the 2008 financial. The surprise is that even the IMF now thinks that “austerity can be used to justify the privatization of public services,” with consequences “potentially disastrous”. But if the problem is the debt – public, but now “privatized” by finance – you can not delete? Solution already ventilated by the Bank of England, which holds 25% of the British sovereign debt: the Bank of England may reset it by clicking on the computer. Advantages: “You will pay much less interest, it would free up cash and you could make less harsh austerity.” The debate rages on many media, starting from the same “Financial Times”. thread which breaks now the revolutionary proposal of the two IMF economists targati: cancel the debt.

“The Chicago Plan Revisited,” writes Maria Grazia Bruzzone, raises and explores the “Chicago Plan” original, drawn up in the middle of the Great Depression of the ’30s by two other economists, Irving Fisher, Henry Simons of the University of Chicago, the cradle of liberalism . Cancel 100% of the debt? “The trick is to replace our system, where money is created by private banks – for 95-97% of the supply of money – money created by the state. It would mean return to the historical norm, before the English King Charles II put in private hands control of the money available, “back in 1666. It would mean a frontal assault on the “fractional reserve” banking, accused of seigniorage on the issue of currency speculation: if lenders are instead forced to hold 100% of its reserves to guarantee deposits and loans, “pardon the exorbitant privilege of create money out of nothing. ” As a result: “The nation regained control over the availability of money,” and also “reduces the pernicious cycles of expansion and contraction of credit.”

The authors of the first “Plan of Chicago” had thought that the cycles of expansion and contraction of credit lead to an unhealthy concentration of wealth: “They had seen in the early thirties creditors seize farmers effectively bankrupt, grab their lands or comprarsele for a piece of bread. ” Today, the authors of the new edition of this plan argue that the “trauma” of the credit cycle that expands and contracts – caused by private money creation – is a historical fact that is already outlined with Jubilees Debt ancient Mesopotamia, as well as in ancient Greece and even Rome. Sovereign control (the state or the Pope) on currency, recalls Bruzzone, Britain remained so throughout the Middle Ages, until 1666, when it began the era of the cycles of expansion and contraction. With the “bank privatization” of money, add the “Telegraph”, “opened the way for the agricultural revolution, and after the industrial revolution and the biggest leap Economic ever seen “- but it is not the case of” quibbling, “quips the newspaper.

According to the young economists of the IMF, is just a myth – disclosed “innocently” by Adam Smith – that the money has been developed as a medium of exchange based on gold, or related to it. Just as it is a myth, the study points out the IMF, what you learn from books: that is the Fed, the U.S. central bank, to control the creation of the dollar. “In fact, money is created by private banks to 95-97% through loans.” Private banks, in fact, do not lend as owners of cash deposits, the process is exactly the opposite. “Every time a bank makes a loan, the computer writes the loan (plus interest) and the corresponding liability in its balance sheet. But the money that pays the bank has a small part. If it does borrow from another bank, or by the central bank. And the central bank, in turn, creates out of nothing that lends the money to the bank. ”

In the current system, in fact, the bank is not required to have its own reserves – except for a tiny fraction of what it provides. Under a system of “fractional reserve”, each money created out of nothing is a debt equivalent: “Which produces an exponential increase in the debt, to the point that the system collapses on itself.” The economists of the IMF hours overturn the situation. The key is the clear distinction between the amount of money and the amount of credit between money creation and lending. If you impose banks to lend only numbers covered by actual reserves, loans would be fully funded from reserves or profits accrued. At that point, the banks can no longer create new money out of thin air. Generate profits through loans – without actually having a cash reserve – is “an extraordinary and exclusive privilege, denied to other business.”

“The banks – says Maria Grazia Bruzzone – would become what he mistakenly believed to be, pure intermediaries who have to get out their funds to be able to make loans.” In this way, the U.S. Federal Reserve “is approprierebbe for the first time the control over the availability of money, making it easier to manage inflation.” In fact, it is observed that the central bank would be nationalized, becoming a branch of the Treasury, and now the Fed is still owned by private banks. “Nationalizing” the Fed, the huge national debt would turn into a surplus, and the private banks’ should borrow reserves to offset possible liabilities. ” Already wanted to do John Fitzgerald Kennedy, who began to print – at no cost – “dollars of the Treasury,” against those “private” by the Fed, but the challenge of JFK died tragically, as we know, under the blows of the killer of Dallas , quickly stored from “amnesia” of powerful debunking.

Sovereign coin, issued directly by the government, the state would no longer be “liable”, but it would become a “creditor”, able to buy private debt, which would also be easily deleted. After decades, back on the field the ghost of Kennedy. In short: even the economists of the IMF hours espouse the theory of Warren Mosler, who are fighting for their monetary sovereignty as a trump card to go out – once and for all – from financial slavery subjecting entire populations, crushed by the crisis , the hegemonic power of a very small elite of “rentiers”, while the ‘ economic reality – with services cut and the credit granted in dribs and drabs – simply go to hell. And ‘the cardinal assumption of Modern Money Theory supported in Italy by Paul Barnard: if to emit “money created out of nothing” is the state, instead of banks, collapsing the blackmail of austerity that impoverishes all, immeasurably enriching only parasites of finance . With currency sovereign government can create jobs at low cost. That is, welfare, income and hope for millions of people, with a guaranteed recovery of consumption. Pure oxygen ‘s economy . Not surprisingly, adds Bruzzone, if already the original “Chicago Plan”, as approved by committees of the U.S. Congress, never became law, despite the fact that they were caldeggiarlo well 235 academic economists, including Milton Friedman and English liberal James Tobin, the father of the “Tobin tax”. In practice, “the plan died because of the strong resistance of the banking sector.” These are the same banks, the journalist adds the “Print”, which today recalcitrano ahead to reserve requirements a bit ‘higher (but still of the order of 4-6%) required by the Basel III rules, however, insufficient to do deterrent in the event of a newcrisis . Banks: “The same who spend billions on lobbying and campaign contributions to presidential candidates. And in front of the new “Chicago Plan” threaten havoc and that “it would mean changing the nature of western capitalism. ‘” That may be true, admits Bruzzone: “Maybe but it would be a better capitalism. And less risky. ”

Why is Putin stockpiling gold?

He’s probably afraid of Draghi’s policies?

Or got long gold in his personal account, has his CB run it up for him to sell?

No telling!

Why is Putin stockpiling gold?

By Brett Arends

September 5 (WSJ) — I can’t imagine it means anything cheerful that Vladimir Putin, the Russian czar, is stockpiling gold as fast as he can get his hands on it.

According to the World Gold Council, Russia has more than doubled its gold reserves in the past five years. Putin has taken advantage of the financial crisis to build the world’s fifth-biggest gold pile in a handful of years, and is buying about half a billion dollars’ worth every month.

It emerged last month that financial gurus George Soros and John Paulson had also increased their bullion exposure, but it’s Putin that’s really caught my eye.

No one else in the world plays global power politics as ruthlessly as Russia’s chilling strongman, the man who effectively stole a Super Bowl ring from Bob Kraft, the owner of the New England Patriots, when they met in Russia some years ago.

Putin’s moves may matter to your finances, because there are two ways to look at gold.

On the one hand, it’s an investment that by most modern standards seems to make no sense. It generates no cash flow and serves no practical purpose. Warren Buffett has pointed out that we dig it out of one hole in the ground only to stick it in another, and anyone watching this from Mars would be very confused.

You can forget claims that it’s “real” money. There’s no such thing. Money is just an accounting device, a way of keeping track of how much each of us produces and consumes. Gold is a shiny and somewhat tacky looking metal that is malleable, durable and heavy. A recent research paper by Duke University’s Campbell Harvey and co-author Claude Erb raised serious questions about most of the arguments in favor of gold as an investment.

But there’s another way to look at gold: As the most liquid reserve in times of turmoil, or worse.

The big story of our era is not that the Spanish government is broke, nor is it that Paul Ryan apparently feels the need to embellish his running record. It’s that the United States, which has dominated the world’s economy for several lifetimes, is in relative decline.

As was first reported here in April of last year, according to International Monetary Fund calculations, the U.S. is on track to lose its status as the world’s biggest economy—when measured in real, purchasing-power terms—to China by 2017.

We will soon be the first people in two hundred years to live in a world not dominated by either Pax Americana or Pax Britannica. This sort of changing of the guard has never been peaceful. The declines of the Spanish, French and British empires were all accompanied by conflict. The decline of British hegemony was a leading cause of the First and Second World Wars.

What will happen as the U.S. loses its pre-eminence?

Maybe this will turn out better than similar episodes in the past. Maybe the Chinese will embrace an open society and the rule of law. If you believe that, there is probably no reason to hold any gold.

Gold standard thoughts

>   
>   (email exchange)
>   
>   On Fri, Aug 24, 2012 at 5:28 AM, Dave wrote:
>   
>   When you get a chance could you send a quick note out on problems with this type of
>   thinking?
>   

The reasons nations have gone off the gold standard isn’t because it was working so well and their economies were doing well. The reason they go off, like the US did in 1934, was because it was a disaster.

Historically nations suspend their gold standards in times of war, when they need their economies to function to the max. If a gold standard was so good for an economy, why suspend it when you need max economic performance? Obviously because it is not conducive of maximum real output.

The ideological issue is whether the primary function of the currency is to be an investment/savings vehicle, or a tool for provisioning government and optimizing real economic performance. In a market economy you can’t fix the price of two things without a relative value shift causing you to be buying one of them and running out of the other. Likewise, you can’t sustain full employment and a stable gold price if there is a shift in relative value between the two.

A gold standard is a fixed exchange rate policy, where the govt continuously offers to buy or sell gold at a fixed price.

This means the holder of a dollar, for example, has the option of ‘cashing it in’ for a fixed amount of gold from the govt, and a holder of gold has the option of selling it at a fixed price to the govt.

Therefore a new gold discovery which causes gold to be sold to the govt is inflationary and tends to increase output and employment, and a gold ship sinking in transit or a sudden desire to hoard gold is deflationary and tends to decrease output and employment. And there’s nothing that can be done about these relative value shifts, except to ride them out. The only public purpose served (by definition) is the stable nominal price of gold set by Congress.

With a gold standard, like any fixed fx regime, interest rates are necessarily set by market forces. With the govt’s spending being convertible currency, it is limited to spending only to the extent it has sufficient gold reserves backing the currency it spends. With gold reserves generally pretty much constant and not expandable in the short run, this means govt spending is limited to what it can tax and/or borrow. So when the govt wants to deficit spend, doing so by ‘printing’ new convertible dollars risks those dollars being ‘cashed in’ for gold. Govt borrowing, therefore, functions to remove that risk by delaying conversion privileges until the borrowings mature. This means the govt is competing with the right to convert when the govt borrows. In other words, the holder of the gold certificates has the option of either converting to gold or buying the treasury securities. The interest rate the treasury must pay therefore represents the indifference rate of holders of the convertible currency between cashing in the currency for gold now or earning the interest rate and not being able to convert until maturity. Note that it’s in fixed exchange rate environments that govt borrowing costs have soared to triple digits as govts have competed with their conversion features, and that govts generally lose those fights as the curve goes vertical expressing the fact that at that point there is no interest rate that can keep holders of the currency from wanting to convert.

Note that this also means the nations gold reserves are the net financial equity that supports the entire dollar credit structure, a source of continuous financial fragility and instability.

It’s all here in a paper I did in the late 1990’s.

Hope this helps!

A few more thoughts:

Being on the gold standard doesn’t prevent a financial crisis, but it makes the consequences far more severe.

We were on a gold standard when the roaring 20’s private sector debt boom lead to the crash of 1929 and the depression that followed. 4,000 banks closed before we went off gold in 1934, and it was only getting worse which is why we went off of it.

Gold would not have prevented the pre 2008 sub-prime boom, but it would have made the consequences far more severe. Including no Fed liquidity provision to offset a system wide shortage due to hoarding and banks bidding ever higher for funds that didn’t exist, most all firms losing inventory financing and being forced to liquidate inventories as rates spiked competing for funds that didn’t exist, and no deficit spending for unemployment comp as federal revenues fell from the collapse. In other words, the automatic fiscal stabilizers we rely on can’t be there. Instead it’s a deflationary disaster that only ends when prices fall sufficiently to reflect changes in relative value between gold and everything else.

Note that the recent decade of gold going from under $600 to over $1,600 is viewed as a sign ‘inflationary’ and a 250% ‘dollar devaluation’ as it takes 2.5x as many dollars to buy the same amount of gold. But if we were on a gold standard, and all else equal, and gold had been fixed at $600 back then, the same relative value shift would be manifested as the general price level falling that much in an unthinkable deflationary nightmare.

Republicans Eye Return to Gold Standard

Just when you think it can’t get any worse:

Republicans Eye Return to Gold Standard

By Robin Harding and Anna Fifield

August 23 (FT) — The gold standard has returned to mainstream U.S. politics for the first time in 30 years, with a “gold commission” set to become part of official Republican party policy.

Drafts of the party platform, which it will adopt at a convention in Tampa Bay, Florida, next week, call for an audit of Federal Reserve monetary policy and a commission to look at restoring the link between the dollar and gold.

The move shows how five years of easy monetary policy — and the efforts of congressman Ron Paul — have made the once-fringe idea of returning to gold-as-money a legitimate part of Republican debate.

Marsha Blackburn, a Republican congresswoman from Tennessee and co-chair of the platform committee, said the issues were not adopted merely to placate Paul and the delegates that he picked up during his campaign for the party’s nomination.

“These were adopted because they are things that Republicans agree on,” Blackburn told the Financial Times. “The House recently passed a bill on this, and this is something that we think needs to be done.”

The proposal is reminiscent of the Gold Commission created by former president Ronald Reagan in 1981, 10 years after Richard Nixon broke the link between gold and the dollar during the 1971 oil crisis. That commission ultimately supported the status quo.

“There is a growing recognition within the Republican party and in America more generally that we’re not going to be able to print our way to prosperity,” said Sean Fieler, chairman of the American Principles Project, a conservative group that has pushed for a return to the gold standard.

A commission would have no power except to make recommendations, but Fieler said it would provide a chance to educate politicians and the public about the merits of a return to gold. “We’re not going to go from a standing start to the gold standard,” he said.

The Republican platform in 1980 referred to “restoration of a dependable monetary standard,” while the 1984 platform said that “the gold standard may be a useful mechanism”. More recent platforms did not mention it.

Any commission on a return to the gold standard would have to address a host of theoretical, empirical and practical issues.

Inflation has remained under control in recent years, despite claims that expansion of the Fed’s balance sheet would lead to runaway price rises, while gold has been highly volatile. The price of the metal is up by more than 500 per cent in dollar terms over the past decade.

A return to a fixed money supply would also remove the central bank’s ability to offset demand shocks by varying interest rates. That could mean a more volatile economy and higher average unemployment over time.

ECB to Ensure That Lenders Have Enough Liquidity, Visco Says

More constructive hints?

ECB to Ensure That Lenders Have Enough Liquidity, Visco Says

(Bloomberg) The European Central Bank will continue to guarantee sufficient liquidity for lenders and keep up the fight against market fragmentation among the 17 countries that share the euro, Bank of Italy Governor Ignazio Visco said. “The ECB can’t but continue to pursue these objectives,” Visco said today in a speech in Rome. The ECB cut rates to a record low on July 5 on concern the euro area is slipping deeper into a recession. The central bank, headed by Mario Draghi, agreed in June to help nations in distress by acting as a buying agent for sovereign bonds purchased by government-run bailout funds. The rate cut, to 0.75 percent, is an indication of the ECB’s intention to guarantee “adequate monetary conditions” in the euro area, Visco said. “It followed other measures adopted last month designed to continue to ensure necessary liquidity for the banking system and fight the effects of the fragmentation of monetary and financial markets,” he said.

German Finance Minister Asks Court Not to Block Euro Assistance

(New York Times) The German finance minister warned on Tuesday that there would be severe consequences for the euro currency union if this country’s highest court blocks Germany’s recent ratification of two measures for fighting Europe’s financial crisis.

Officials Spar Over Who Will Guarantee Bank Losses

(WSJ) German finance minister Wolfgang Schäuble said that even once the euro zone’s bailout fund has been authorized to directly recapitalize struggling banks, the lenders’ host government should retain final liability for any losses. “We expect that the final liability of the state will remain” even once the banking supervisor is up and running, he told journalists. He added that what mattered was that the bank support wouldn’t add to a country’s debt—something that he said would be possible even under a scenario where the government retained liability for potential losses. Other officials insisted that banks’ host states wouldn’t have to guarantee any support from the bailout fund.

A Euro-Zone Strategy Shift

(WSJ) Finance ministers from the euro zone agreed that Spain need only reduce its deficit to 4.5% of gross domestic product next year, and 2.8% in 2014, in order to avoid financial penalties. The deal, Spanish Finance Minister Luis de Guindos told reporters, had been clinched without fresh demands on fiscal policy from euro-zone partners, although Eurogroup Chairman Jean-Claude Juncker had warned that there would be a thorough examination of every bank that asks for aid. “I repeat it again, and these are fundamental points, these are two completely independent agreements, they are not related in any way because there is no macroeconomic conditionality in the agreement on the memorandum [of understanding],” he said.

Noyer Warns Hollande of France’s ‘Serious’ Economic Weakness

(Bloomberg) France’s unit cost of labor of 34.20 euros an hour compares with Germany’s 30.10 euros, Italy’s 26.80 euros and 20.60 euros for Spain. Unit labor costs in France have increased by about 20 percent relative to Germany since 2000 as French companies implemented the nation’s 35-hour work-week law, according to Coe-Rexecode. “Of all advanced countries, France has registered, since 2000, the sharpest decline in its market share in global exports,” Bank of France Governor Christian Noyer said. “The drop in the number of hours worked and rigidities in working time arrangements have probably played a role” and reviving exports means tackling all sorts of restrictions that hamper activity, he said.

French current account deficit narrows in May

(AFP) The French current account deficit narrowed slightly in May, owing to a smaller shortfall in the trade of goods and a bigger surplus in services, official data showed on Monday. The Bank of France said the current account, which measures all current payments in and out of the country, showed an overall deficit of 4.1 billion euros ($5.3 billion), compared with a 4.4 billion euro shortfall in April. A breakdown of data showed that the deficit in exchanges of goods had decreased to 5.6 billion euros in May from 6.0 billion in April, while a surplus in services grew to 1.9 billion euros from 1.7 billion.

This is not good if/when implemented:

Rajoy Announces 65 Billion Euros in Budget Cuts to Fight Crisis

(Bloomberg) Spanish Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy announced tax increases and spending cuts totaling 65 billion euros in the next two-and-a-half years. Rajoy’s fourth austerity package in seven months will raise the sales levy to 21 percent from 18 percent; scrap a tax rebate for home buyers; scale back unemployment benefits; consolidate local governments and eliminate the year-end bonus for some public workers. The budget cuts are about double those previously announced. Spain’s central government budget deficit swelled to 3.41 percent of gross domestic product in the first five months of the year, approaching the full-year goal of 3.5 percent after the government brought forward transfers to regional administrations and the social-security system.

Spain Agrees to Guarantee Bond Issuance of Cash-Strapped Regions

(Bloomberg) Spain will guarantee bonds issued by regional governments to help them regain access to capital markets and ease a funding squeeze. The program will be “voluntary” for regions and will come with additional conditions on budget deficits, Antonio Beteta, deputy minister for public administration, told reporters. The plan will be presented at a meeting of regional budget chiefs on July 12, he said. “The mechanism aims to make issues more liquid and easier to place on the markets as they have a central-government guarantee,” Beteta said. Regions face redemptions of about 15 billion euros in the second half of the year, according to data on the Budget Ministry’s website.

Spain Says European Rescue for Banks Opens Door to ECB Funding

(Bloomberg) Spain’s FROB rescue fund will distribute bonds issued by the EFSF to the banks, which “can use them at the ECB if they need the liquidity,” Spanish Economy Minister Luis de Guindos told reporters. As part of the agreement for Spain’s 100 billion-euro bank bailout, one or several vehicles will be created to buy assets from lenders at a “reasonable” price, de Guindos said. Those vehicles will issue bonds that will also be eligible at the ECB. Industrywide conditions for the financial assistance include a 9 percent capital requirement, de Guindos said. A first tranche of 30 billion euros is to be used as soon as the end of the month. Remaining details will be clinched in the memorandum of understanding due to be signed on July 20, he said.

Krugman 2003

A Fiscal Train Wreck

By Paul Krugman

March 11, 2003 (NYT) — With war looming, it’s time to be prepared. So last week I switched to a fixed-rate mortgage. It means higher monthly payments, but I’m terrified about what will happen to interest rates once financial markets wake up to the implications of skyrocketing budget deficits.

From a fiscal point of view the impending war is a lose-lose proposition. If it goes badly, the resulting mess will be a disaster for the budget. If it goes well, administration officials have made it clear that they will use any bump in the polls to ram through more big tax cuts, which will also be a disaster for the budget. Either way, the tide of red ink will keep on rising.

Last week the Congressional Budget Office marked down its estimates yet again. Just two years ago, you may remember, the C.B.O. was projecting a 10-year surplus of $5.6 trillion. Now it projects a 10-year deficit of $1.8 trillion.

And that’s way too optimistic. The Congressional Budget Office operates under ground rules that force it to wear rose-colored lenses. If you take into account — as the C.B.O. cannot — the effects of likely changes in the alternative minimum tax, include realistic estimates of future spending and allow for the cost of war and reconstruction, it’s clear that the 10-year deficit will be at least $3 trillion.

This Republican Economy

Not to mention taking $500 billion out of the medicare budget to give to the insurance companies and then declaring victory on healthcare. And the early statement about needing to first fix the financial sector before the real sector can recover.

And, of course, it would be nice if Professor Krugman would reverse his errant and highly counterproductive contention that the federal deficit presents a long term economic or financial problem per se.

This Republican Economy

By Paul Krugman

June 3 (NYT) — What should be done about the economy? Republicans claim to have the answer: slash spending and cut taxes. What they hope voters won’t notice is that that’s precisely the policy we’ve been following the past couple of years. Never mind the Democrat in the White House; for all practical purposes, this is already the economic policy of Republican dreams.

So the Republican electoral strategy is, in effect, a gigantic con game: it depends on convincing voters that the bad economy is the result of big-spending policies that President Obama hasn’t followed (in large part because the G.O.P. wouldn’t let him), and that our woes can be cured by pursuing more of the same policies that have already failed.

For some reason, however, neither the press nor Mr. Obama’s political team has done a very good job of exposing the con.

What do I mean by saying that this is already a Republican economy? Look first at total government spending — federal, state and local. Adjusted for population growth and inflation, such spending has recently been falling at a rate not seen since the demobilization that followed the Korean War.

How is that possible? Isn’t Mr. Obama a big spender? Actually, no; there was a brief burst of spending in late 2009 and early 2010 as the stimulus kicked in, but that boost is long behind us. Since then it has been all downhill. Cash-strapped state and local governments have laid off teachers, firefighters and police officers; meanwhile, unemployment benefits have been trailing off even though unemployment remains extremely high.

Over all, the picture for America in 2012 bears a stunning resemblance to the great mistake of 1937, when F.D.R. prematurely slashed spending, sending the U.S. economy — which had actually been recovering fairly fast until that point — into the second leg of the Great Depression. In F.D.R.’s case, however, this was an unforced error, since he had a solidly Democratic Congress. In President Obama’s case, much though not all of the responsibility for the policy wrong turn lies with a completely obstructionist Republican majority in the House.

That same obstructionist House majority effectively blackmailed the president into continuing all the Bush tax cuts for the wealthy, so that federal taxes as a share of G.D.P. are near historic lows — much lower, in particular, than at any point during Ronald Reagan’s presidency.

As I said, for all practical purposes this is already a Republican economy.

As an aside, I think it’s worth pointing out that although the economy’s performance has been disappointing, to say the least, none of the disasters Republicans predicted have come to pass. Remember all those assertions that budget deficits would lead to soaring interest rates? Well, U.S. borrowing costs have just hit a record low. And remember those dire warnings about inflation and the “debasement” of the dollar? Well, inflation remains low, and the dollar has been stronger than it was in the Bush years.

Put it this way: Republicans have been warning that we were about to turn into Greece because President Obama was doing too much to boost the economy; Keynesian economists like myself warned that we were, on the contrary, at risk of turning into Japan because he was doing too little. And Japanification it is, except with a level of misery the Japanese never had to endure.

So why don’t voters know any of this?

Part of the answer is that far too much economic reporting is still of the he-said, she-said variety, with dueling quotes from hired guns on either side. But it’s also true that the Obama team has consistently failed to highlight Republican obstruction, perhaps out of a fear of seeming weak. Instead, the president’s advisers keep turning to happy talk, seizing on a few months’ good economic news as proof that their policies are working — and then ending up looking foolish when the numbers turn down again. Remarkably, they’ve made this mistake three times in a row: in 2010, 2011 and now once again.

At this point, however, Mr. Obama and his political team don’t seem to have much choice. They can point with pride to some big economic achievements, above all the successful rescue of the auto industry, which is responsible for a large part of whatever job growth we are managing to get. But they’re not going to be able to sell a narrative of overall economic success. Their best bet, surely, is to do a Harry Truman, to run against the “do-nothing” Republican Congress that has, in reality, blocked proposals — for tax cuts as well as more spending — that would have made 2012 a much better year than it’s turning out to be.

For that, in the end, is the best argument against Republicans’ claims that they can fix the economy. The fact is that we have already seen the Republican economic future — and it doesn’t work.

Frozen Europe Means ECB Must Resort to ELA

They have become resigned to the idea that the ECB must write the check for the banking system as do all currency issuers directly or indirectly as previously discussed.

And they now also know the ECB is writing the check for the whole shooting match directly or indirectly also as previously discussed.

With deficits as high as they are and bank and government liquidity sort of there, the euro economy can now muddle through with flattish growth and a large output gap. Ok for stocks and bonds and not so good for people.

Next the action moves to moral hazard risk in an attempt to keep fiscal policies tight without market discipline.

But that’s for another day as first the work on an acceptable framing of the full ECB support they’ve backed into.

Frozen Europe Means ECB Must Resort to ELA

By Dara Doyle and Jeff Black

May 25 (Bloomberg) — The first rule of ELA is you don’t talk about ELA.

The European Central Bank is trying to limit the flow of information about so-called Emergency Liquidity Assistance, which is increasingly being tapped by distressed euro-region financial institutions as the debt crisis worsens. Focus on the program intensified last week after it emerged that the ECB moved some Greek banks out of its regular refinancing operations and onto ELA until they are sufficiently capitalized.

European stocks fell and the euro weakened to a four-month low as investors sought clarity on how the Greek financial system would be kept alive. The episode highlights the ECB’s dilemma as it tries to save banks without taking too much risk onto its own balance sheet. While policy makers argue that secrecy is needed around ELA to prevent panic, the risk is that markets jump to the worst conclusion anyway.

“The lack of transparency is a double-edged sword,” said David Owen, chief European economist at Jefferies Securities International in London. “On the one hand, it increases uncertainty, but at the same time we do not necessarily want to know how bad things are as it can add fuel to the fire.”

Under ELA, the 17 national central banks in the euro area are able to provide emergency liquidity to banks that can’t put up collateral acceptable to the ECB. The risk is borne by the central bank in question, ensuring any losses stay within the country concerned and aren’t shared across all euro members, known as the euro system.

ECB Approval

Each ELA loan requires the assent of the ECB’s 23-member Governing Council and carries a penalty interest rate, though the terms are never made public. Owen estimates that euro-area central banks are currently on the hook for about 150 billion euros ($189 billion) of ELA loans.

The program has been deployed in countries including Germany, Belgium, Ireland and now Greece. An ECB spokesman declined to comment on matters relating to ELA for this article.

The ECB buries information about ELA in its weekly financial statement. While it announced on April 24 that it was harmonizing the disclosure of ELA on the euro system’s balance sheet under “other claims on euro-area credit institutions,” this item contains more than just ELA. It stood at 212.5 billion euros this week, up from 184.7 billion euros three weeks ago.

The ECB has declined to divulge how much of the amount is accounted for by ELA.

Ireland’s Case

Further clues can be found in individual central banks’ balance sheets. In Ireland, home to Europe’s worst banking crisis, the central bank’s claims on euro-area credit institutions, where it now accounts for ELA, stood at 41.3 billion euros on April 27.

Greek banks tapped their central bank for 54 billion euros in January, according to its most recently published figures. That has since risen to about 100 billion euros, the Financial Times reported on May 22, without citing anyone.

Ireland’s central bank said last year it received “formal comfort” from the country’s finance minister that it wouldn’t sustain losses on collateral received from banks in return for ELA.

“If the collateral underpinning the ELA falls short, the government steps in,” said Philip Lane, head of economics at Trinity College Dublin. “Essentially, ELA represents the ECB passing the risk back to the sovereign. That could be the trigger for potential default or, in Greece’s case, potential exit.”

Greek Exit

The prospect of Greece leaving the euro region increased after parties opposed to the terms of the nation’s second international bailout dominated May 6 elections. A new vote will be held on June 17 after politicians failed to form a coalition, and European leaders are now openly discussing the possibility of Greece exiting the euro.

A Greek departure could spark a further flight of deposits from banks in other troubled euro nations, according to UBS AG economists, leaving them more reliant on funding from monetary authorities. Banks in Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain saw a decline of 80.6 billion euros, or 3.2 percent, in household and corporate deposits from the end of 2010 through March this year, according to ECB data.

“ELA is a symptom of the strain in the system, and Greece is the tip of the iceberg here,” Owen said. “As concerns mount about break-up, that sparks deposit flight. Suddenly we’re talking about 350 billion, 400 billion as bigger countries avail of ELA.”

German ELA

ELA emerged as part of the euro system’s furniture in 2008, when the global financial crisis led to the bailouts of German property lender Hypo-Real Estate AG and Belgian banking group Dexia. While the Bundesbank’s ELA facility has now been closed, Dexia Chief Executive Officer Pierre Mariani told the bank’s shareholders on May 9 that it continues to access around 12 billion euros of ELA funds.

ELA was a measure that gave central banks more flexibility to keep their banks afloat in situations of short-term stress, said Juergen Michels, chief euro-area economist at Citigroup Global Markets in London.

“It seems to be now a more permanent feature in the periphery countries,” Michels said, adding there’s a risk that “the ECB loses control to some extent over what’s going on.”

The ECB was forced to confirm on May 17 it had moved some Greek banks onto ELA after the news leaked out, roiling financial markets. The ECB said in an e-mail that as soon as the banks are recapitalized, which it expected to happen “soon,” they will regain access to its refinancing operations. The ECB “continues to support Greek banks,” it added.

‘Life Support’

By approving ELA requests, the ECB is ensuring that banks that would otherwise not qualify for its loans have access to liquidity.

“The ELA is a perfect life-support system, but it’s not a system for what happens after that,” said Lorcan Roche Kelly, chief Europe strategist at Trend Macrolytics LLC in Clare, Ireland. “What you need is a bank resolution mechanism, a method to get rid of a bank that’s insolvent. In Ireland, and perhaps in Greece as well, the problem is that you’ve got banking systems that are insolvent.”

For Citigroup chief economist Willem Buiter, there is a bigger issue at stake. ELA breaks a key rule that is designed to bind the monetary union together, he said.

“It constitutes a breach of the principle of one monetary, credit and liquidity policy on uniform terms and conditions for the whole euro system. The existence of ELA undermines the monetary union.”

Spain’s Valencia Struggles To Repay Debt

Note how ‘currency users’ are limited to relatively low levels of debt by markets:

Valencia’s total outstanding debt at the end of 2011 was EUR20.76 billion, equal to around 20% of its GDP.

Spain ran up it’s current national debt as a currency issuer when it not only didn’t matter financially with regards to funding and solvency, but it was, for all practical purposes, a requirement to accommodate non govt savings desires at desired levels of output and employment.

Spain, and the rest of the former currency issuers, then waltzed into the euro zone arrangements as currency users who all agreed to keep the same debt levels they had accumulated as currency issuers, rendering the euro arrangements ‘an accident waiting to happen’ from the get go.

Spain’s Valencia Struggles To Repay Debt

By Jonathan House and Art Patnaude

May 4 (Dow Jones) — Spain’s financially troubled Valencia region had to pay a punitive interest rate to roll over a short-term debt Friday, raising new concerns about its solvency and prompting the regional government to offer assurances it can avoid a default.

“We have covered our refinancing needs through June and we are planning on meeting our commitments,” a Valencia spokesman said.

Valencia had to offer institutional investors a 7% interest rate to roll over a EUR500 million debt for six months on Friday, a new sign of a deepening financial crisis for the regions that control over one third of spending in highly decentralized Spain. That’s more than four times what the Spain’s central government offered at its last auction of six-month treasury bills.

With a long history of overspending, Spain’s regions have moved to the center of the country’s fiscal crisis. As Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy tries to close yawning budget gaps at all levels of government and return the ailing local economy to growth, his government is scrambling to make sure the regions meet their financial obligations while reining in expenditures.

Spain had a general government budget deficit equal to 8.5% of gross domestic product in 2011, far in excess of the 6%-of-GDP target it had committed to with the European Union and international investors. Much of the overrun was the fault of the regions.

In recent months, the fiscally frail regions are facing increasing difficulty in financing themselves. International investors are steering clear. “There’s still a great deal of reluctance from institutional investors to get involved in Spain. The uncertainties are a bit too big,” said Elisabeth Afseth, fixed-income analyst at Investec Bank in London.

Valencia, on Spain’s Mediterranean coast, is one of the most troubled of its 17 regions. With its hundreds of kilometers of beachfront properties, it is ground zero for the collapse of the Spain’s housing industry, which has punched a large hole in national tax revenue and sent the economy into a long slump. The housing bust, coupled with years of high spending, has made Valencia one of the most indebted regions.

Valencia’s total outstanding debt at the end of 2011 was EUR20.76 billion, equal to around 20% of its GDP.

Late last year, Moody’s Investor Service downgraded Valencia’s credit to junk status and the central government had to advance Valencia some of its regular financing to prevent it from defaulting on a EUR123 million debt to Deutsche Bank AG (DB). In Spain, most tax revenue is collected by the central government.

Since then, Rajoy’s government, which came to power in December, has strengthened financial support for the regions and said it won’t let any default on their obligations. It set up an EUR10 billion credit facility they can draw on to refinance their debts and is offering EUR35 billion worth of loans to help them pay off debts to suppliers.

The Valencia spokesman said his region has received EUR2.69 billion from the credit facility that will allow it to meet all its debt obligations in the first half of the year. In addition, Valencia and other regions are pushing hard to get Madrid agree to guarantee their debts, which should help lower borrowing costs, he added.

Valencia has to refinance EUR4.5 billion worth of debt this year.