Professor Bill Mitchell on inflation

Zimbabwe for hyperventilators 101

A very good read. Today’s hyper inflation fears due to ‘money printing’ are pure fear mongering.

My comment to Bill in support of his article:

Russia in 1998 is an example of how much the flat earth economists are wrong in what determines the value of a currency

Russia had a fixed fx rate of 6.45 rubles to the US dollar going into the August crisis.

At the end, rates on gko’s went to over 200% until there was no interest rate where holders of rubles did not want to cash them in at the CB for dollars. Dollar reserves were depleted, and no more dollars could be borrowed to support the currency.

Instead of simply floating the ruble and suspending conversion the CB simply shut down the payments system and the employees all walked out the door.

It was several months before the payments system was restarted.

There was no confidence, no faith, and no expectations of anything good happening.

The ruble went from 6.45 to about 28 or so in what has turned out to be a one time adjustment.

There was no hyper inflation, and not even much inflation as per Bill above, just a one time adjustment.

Pretty much the same for Mexico when it’s fixed fx regime blew up in the mid 90′s. The peso went from about 3.5 to 10 in a one time adjustment.

These are two examples of stress far in excess of whatever the US, Uk, and Japan could possibly face, yet with no actual inflationary consequences, as defined.

just when you thought it couldn’t get any more inane

Getting worse by the minute.

>   
>   (email exchange)
>   
>   On Thu, May 27, 2010 at 7:51 PM, wrote:
>   
>   Does anyone know of some way to talk to her?
>   This is embarrassing.
>   

Clinton spotlights US debt as diplomatic threat

Clinton says debt, deficit threaten U.S int’l position

U.S. committed to tough political steps on budget

Clinton urges new “national security” budget (Adds quotes, updates throughout)

By Andrew Quinn

May 27 (Reuters) — The United States’ huge national debt — now topping $13 trillion — is becoming a major threat to U.S. security and leadership in the world, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said on Thursday.

“The United States must be strong at home in order to be strong abroad,” Clinton said in remarks on the Obama administration’s new national security doctrine, which was made public on Thursday.

“We cannot sustain this level of deficit financing and debt without losing our influence, without being constrained in the tough decisions we have to make,” Clinton said, adding that it was time to “make the national security case about reducing the deficit and getting the debt under control.”

The new Obama security strategy joins diplomatic engagement with economic discipline and military power to boost America’s standing, and pledges expanded partnerships with rising powers like India and China to share the global burden.

Clinton emphasized controlling the budget deficit, saying it was “personally painful” for her to see the yawning U.S. spending gap after her husband, former President Bill Clinton, ended his second term in 2001 with budget surpluses.

“That was not just an exercise in budgeteering. It was linked to a very clear understanding of what the United States needed to do to get positioned to lead for the foreseeable future, far into the 21st century,” she said.

Clinton said that as a Democratic U.S. senator from New York during the administration of former President George W. Bush, she had voted against “tax cuts that were never sustainable, wars that were never paid for” — but without success.

“Now we’re paying the piper,” she said.

Clinton in February blamed “outrageous” advice from Former Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan in part for the grim U.S. deficit picture.

POLITICALLY TOUGH

President Barack Obama, who pushed through his own huge stimulus spending plan last year amid the global financial crisis, was committed to taking the politically difficult steps needed to put government finances back in order, Clinton said.

“We are in a much stronger economic position than we were. And that matters. That matters when we go to China. That matters when we try to influence Russia. That matters when we talk to our allies in Europe,” Clinton said.

Obama has formed an 18-member bipartisan commission to study ways to reduce the U.S. deficit projected at about $1.5 trillion this year and bring long-term debt to manageable levels. It aims to find $229 billion in savings in 2015 to bring the deficit down to 3 percent of the overall economy from about 10 percent now.

The U.S. debt this week topped $13 trillion, according to USDebtClock.org, a website that tracks real-time growth in U.S. debt. That amounts to about 90 percent of annual gross domestic product, a level that could start impacting the economy.

Big budget deficits and rising U.S. debt are becoming major issues in the run-up to November’s congressional elections, and the European debt crisis that has unnerved financial markets has fueled these voter concerns.

While arguing for tighter overall economic discipline, Clinton said it was no time for the United States to roll back spending on international diplomatic and development programs, particularly as civilian agencies take up more of the work in Iraq and Afghanistan formerly done by the military.

“In order for us to meet the obligations that are now being asked of our civilian personnel, it costs money,” Clinton said, adding that it was time to look at an overall “national security budget” that would encompass funding for diplomatic, development and military operations.

“You cannot look at a defense budget, a State Department budget and a USAID (U.S. Agency for International Development) budget without defense overwhelming the combined efforts of the other two and without us falling back into the old stovepipes that I think are no longer relevant for the challenges of today,” Clinton said.

in case there is any doubt about how the price of oil is set

OPEC (and mainly the Saudis) is the only entity with excess capacity, so it is necessarily price setter. Specifically, they post prices to their refiners and who order all they want at that price. They don’t sell in the spot markets. See highlighted text below. ‘Balancing supply and demand’ is price setting.

The higher prices, particularly in euro, are functioning as a drag on the oil importing economies and also starting to show up in their inflation reports, complicating the decision process of the world’s central bankers. The combination of low aggregate demand and cost push price pressures is always problematic with regards to interest rate policy.

Urals Discount Widens as Russia Boosts Output: Energy Markets

By Christian Schmollinger

May 4 (Bloomberg) — Russian and Mexican oil is trading at growing discounts to U.S. and U.K. crude benchmarks as production by nations outside OPEC reaches a record.

Russia’s Urals for loading in the Mediterranean trades at $2.22 a barrel less than Britain’s Brent crude, compared with a premium of 3 cents a barrel on July 24. The discount between Mexico’s Maya grade and West Texas Intermediate was at $10.82 a barrel on April 30, near the widest in 17 months.

Rising output from Russia and Mexico will push non-OPEC supplies up 1 percent this year to an average 52 million barrels a day, according to the International Energy Agency. At the same time, quota violations among members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries means global production will increase at a time when the need for oil is diminishing.

“Inventories are growing and non-OPEC supply is expanding and OPEC continues to leak,” said Victor Shum, a senior principal at consultants Purvin & Gertz Inc. in Singapore. “Market bulls should be concerned about the supply overhang.”

The U.S., Mexico, China and Russia have been responsible for most of the growth, boosting output for the past five consecutive quarters, according to an April 27 research note by Barclays Capital. Non-OPEC production reached a record high 49.6 million barrels a day in March, according to data from Energy Intelligence Group.
OPEC Less Needed

The IEA lowered its demand estimate for OPEC, which produces 40 percent of the world’s oil, by 200,000 barrels day to an average of 28.8 million barrels a day to balance supply and demand. The group currently pumps 29.2 million a day, according to Bloomberg data.

OPEC’s spare capacity levels have ballooned to 5.645 million barrels a day in April after falling as low as 2 million in July 2008, when crude hit a record $147.27. The group can produce a total of 34.84 million a day and may add 12 million barrels by 2015 by opening 140 new projects, Secretary- General Abdalla El-Badri said in February.

Russia, the world’s largest oil producer, pumped 10.14 million barrels a day in March, a post-Soviet Union high, according to official data. Mexico exported 1.33 million a day in March, the highest since January 2009, according to data from Petroleos Mexicanos.

U.S. production surged during 2009 and into this year as output returned from post-Hurricane Ike shut-ins in September 2008. The country has pumped an average of 4.482 million barrels a day in the first four months of 2010, up 6.6 percent from the average in 2006 and 2007.

Price Pressure

“If the positive momentum carries into the rest of 2010 and starts filtering through non-OPEC output views for 2011, this could result in a more significant source of downward price pressure along the curve,” said Barclays Capital analyst Costanza Jacazio in the note.

Crude oil for June delivery was at $85.94 a barrel at 10:28 a.m. Singapore time in after-hours electronic trading on the New York Mercantile Exchange, retreating from yesterday’s intraday peak of $87.15, the highest since Oct. 9, 2008.

“The pricing has been driven by the expectations of a tighter market over the long-term and the market has put aside the near-term supply overhang,” said Purvin & Gertz’s Shum.
The non-OPEC “momentum raises the crucial question of whether or not it is sustainable,” said Barclays. “If it fades quickly, as we expect, this will likely have limited implications for oil balances and prices, as OPEC stands in a position to handle a short-term rise in non-OPEC output by simply postponing any further increase in volumes.”

Altman is back

America’s disastrous debt is Obama’s biggest test

By Roger Altman

April 21 (FT) — The global financial system is again transfixed by sovereign debt risks. This evokes bad memories of defaults and near-defaults among emerging nations such as Argentina, Russia and Mexico.

Yes, all fixed FX blowups.

But the real issue is not whether Greece or another small country might fail. Instead, it is whether the credit standing and currency stability of the world’s biggest borrower, the US, will be jeopardised by its disastrous outlook on deficits and debt.

This comp completely misses the fundamental difference between the two. The Fed is an arm of the US govt, while the ECB is not an arm of greece.

America’s fiscal picture is even worse than it looks. The non-partisan Congressional Budget Office just projected that over 10 years, cumulative deficits will reach $9,700bn and federal debt 90 per cent of gross domestic product – nearly equal to Italy’s.

Another apples/oranges comp. This is less than poor analysis.

Global capital markets are unlikely to accept that credit erosion. If they revolt, as in 1979,

There was no ‘revolt’ in regards to the US in 1979.

ugly changes in fiscal and monetary policy will be imposed on Washington. More than Afghanistan or unemployment, this is President Barack Obama’s greatest vulnerability.

His greatest vulnerability is listening to this nonsense, and not recognizing that taxes function to regulate aggregate demand, and not to raise revenue.

The unemployment rate is all the evidence needed, screaming there is a severe shortage of aggregate demand, and a payroll tax holiday would restore private sector sales by which employment immediately returns.

Instead, the admin is listening to this nonsense and working to take measures to tighten fiscal policy which will work to reduce aggregate demand.

How bad is the outlook? The size of the federal debt will increase by nearly 250 per cent over 10 years, from $7,500bn to $20,000bn. Other than during the second world war, such a rise in indebtedness has not occurred since recordkeeping began in 1792.

Point? Govt deficit spending adds back the demand lost because of ‘non govt’ savings desires for dollar financial assets.

The cumulative govt ‘debt’ equals and is the net financial equity- monetary savings- of the rest of us.

You could change the name on the deficit clock in nyc to the savings clock and use the same numbers.

It is so rapid that, by 2020, the Treasury may borrow about $5,000bn per year to refinance maturing debt and raise new money; annual interest payments on those borrowings will exceed all domestic discretionary spending and rival the defence budget. Unfortunately, the healthcare bill has little positive budget impact in this period.

That just means our net savings is rising and the interest payments are helping our savings rise.

In fact, treasury securities are nothing more than dollar savings accounts at the fed. Savers include us residents and non residents like the foreign countries that save in dollars.

Why is this outlook dangerous?

Because it leads to backwards policies by people who don’t get it.

Because dollar interest rates would be so high as to choke private investment and global growth.

There is no such thing.

First, rates are set by the fed.

Second, there is no imperative for the tsy to issue longer term securities or any securities at all.

Third, there is no econometric evidence high interest rates do that. In fact, because the nation is a net saver of the trillions called the national debt, higher rates increase interest income faster than the higher loan rates reduce it (bernanke, sacks, reinhart, 2004 fed paper).

It is Mr Obama’s misfortune to preside over this.

It’s his misfortune to be surrounded by people who don’t understand monetary operations. Otherwise we’d have been at full employment long ago.

The severe 2009-10 fiscal decline reflects a continuation of the Bush deficits and the lower revenue and countercyclical spending triggered by the recession. His own initiatives are responsible for only 15 per cent of the deterioration. Nonetheless, it is the Obama crisis now.

It’s the obama crisis because taxes remain far too high for the current level of govt spending and saving desires.

Now, the economy is too weak to withstand the contractionary impact of deficit reduction. Even the deficit hawks agree on that.

It’s too weak because the deficit is too small. And yes, making it smaller makes things worse.

In addition, Mr Obama has appointed a budget commission with a December deadline. Expectations for it are low and no moves can be made before 2011.

Yes, and then to cut social security and medicare!!!!

Yet, everyone already knows the big elements of a solution. The deficit/GDP ratio must be reduced by at least 2 per cent, or about $300bn in annual spending. It must include spending cuts, such as to entitlements,

Here you go!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

and new revenue. The revenues must come from higher taxes on income, capital gains and dividends or a new tax, such as a progressive value added tax.

Yes, all working to cut aggregate demand and weaken the economy.

It will be political and financial factors that determine which of three budget paths America now follows.

Yes, the backwards understanding by our leaders.

The first is the ideal. Next year, leaders adopt the necessary spending and tax changes, together with budget rules to enforce them, to reach, for example, a truly balanced budget by 2020. President Bill Clinton achieved a comparable legislative outcome in his first term. But America is more polarised today, especially over taxes.

Clinton was ‘saved’ by the unprecedented increase in private sector debt chasing impossible balance sheets of the dot com boom, which was expanding at 7% of GDP, driving the expansion even as fiscal was allowed to go into a 2% surplus, which drained that much financial equity, and ending in a crash when incomes weren’t able to keep up.

The second possible course is the opposite: government paralysis and 10 years of fiscal erosion. Debt reaches 90 per cent of GDP. Interest rates go much higher, but the world’s capital markets finance these needs without serious instability.

Japan is well over 200% (counting inter govt holdings) with the 10 year JGB at 1.35%. Interest rates are primarily a function of expectations of future fed rate settings, along with a few technicals.

History suggests a third outcome is the likely one: one imposed by global markets.

There is no history that suggests that, just misreadings of history.

Yes, there may be calm in currency and credit markets over the next year or two. But the chances that they would accept such a long-term fiscal slide are low. Here, the 1979 dollar crash is instructive.

A dollar crash, whatever that means, is a different matter from the funding issues he previously implied.

The Iranian oil embargo, stagflation and a weakening dollar were roiling markets. Amid this nervousness, President Jimmy Carter submitted his budget, incorporating a larger than expected deficit. This triggered a further, panicky fall in the dollar that destabilised markets. This forced Mr Carter to resubmit a tighter budget and the Fed to raise interest rates. Both actions harmed the economy and severely injured his presidency.

The problem was the policy response to the ‘dollar crash.’ rates went up because the fed raised them with a vote. Market forces aren’t a factor in the level of rates per se. They are part of the Fed’s reaction function, which is an entirely different matter.

America’s addiction to debt poses a similar threat now. To avoid an imposed and ugly solution, Mr Obama will have to invest all his political capital in a budget agreement next year. He will be advised that cutting spending and raising taxes is too risky for his 2012 re-election. But the alternative could be much worse.

So it’s all about avoiding a dollar crash?

So why are we pressing china to revalue their currency upward which means reducing the value of the dollar? Can’t have it both ways?

Altman was in the Clinton admin confirms they were in the ‘better lucky than good’ category.

Feel free to distribute, thanks.

detail for book

The following, from a 2005 paper of mine, provides a good summary of the argument with quotations and bibliographic citations. Feel free to use for any project of Warren Mosler, as per his instructions. Also, please let me know if you have any further questions or I can provide any additional information. In addition to the information on Colonial Africa, I have added a brief section on Europe and Asia, where the same phenomenon can be found. Also, I refer to a 2006 paper of mine that provides evidence that many of the most famous names in the history of economics were well aware of the phenomenon. Also many political scientists, policy-makers, sociologists, historians, etc. Finally, I have also documented the “tax-driven cowrie shell” from both Africa and Asia, that is, contrary to what has previously been thought (by such economists as Milton Friedman), cowrie currency was not a so-called ‘primitive’ money, but was similarly tax-driven as colonial currency or today’s dollar. Let me know if you would like these references as well.

The economist “Rodney” Warren refers to is Walter Rodney, and his book is in the bibliography. I provide examples from many African colonies, such as Nigeria, German East Africa, French West Africa, British Central Africa, Upper Volta, Southern Rhodesia, and South Africa, but not specifically Ghana. If you need examples specifically from Ghana, let me know and I can provide them.

Once again, please do not hesitate to contact me directly anytime for further assistance. My contact info follows.

Sincerely,

Mathew Forstater

Professor of Economics

University of Missouri—Kansas City

From:

Mathew Forstater, 2005, “Taxation and Primitive Accumulation: The Case of Colonial Africa” in Research in Political Economy, Vol. 22, pp. 51-64.

Direct taxation [and the requirement that tax obligations be settled in colonial currency] was used to force Africans to work as wage laborers, to compel them to grow cash crops, to stimulate labor migration and control labor supply, and to monetize the African economies. Part of this latter was to further incorporate African economies into the larger emerging global capitalist system as purchasers of European goods. If Africans were working as wage laborers or growing cash crops instead of producing their own subsistence, they would be forced to purchase their means of subsistence, and that increasingly meant purchasing European goods, providing European capital with additional markets. It thus also promoted, in various ways, marketization and commoditization. [Direct taxation] appears to have been one of the most powerful policies in terms of both its wide variety of functions, its universality in the African colonial context, and its success in achieving its intended effects. Of course, taxation was not the sole determinant of primitive accumulation [note: “primitive accumulation” or similar terms such as primary accumulation or original accumulation, was a term used by the Classical economists, such as Adam Smith, David Ricardo, and Karl Marx to refer to the process by which subsistence workers became wage-laborers, and the process of early capitalist development in general]. But it has certainly been under-recognized in the literature on primitive accumulation. The history of direct taxation also has some wider theoretical implications. It shows, for example, “that ‘monetization’ did not spring forth from barter; nor did it require ‘trust’—as most stories about the origins of money claim” (Wray, 1998, p. 61). In the colonial context, money was clearly a “creature of the state”. In addition, this phenomenon was in no way unique to the African case. As will be seen following the section on Africa, the same process was also found in Europe, Asia, and elsewhere.

TAXATION AND PRIMITIVE ACCUMULATION IN COLONIAL AFRICA

Colonial administrators at first believed that market incentives and persuasion might result in a forthcoming supply of labor:

Initially the French imagined that if they would only create new needs for the Africans, the indigenous people would go out to work. When this did not happen, the French introduced taxes so as to make Africans earn wages. (Coquery-Vidrovitch, 1969, pp. 170-171)

From the first it was assumed that ample cheap labor was a major asset in Africa…Practical experience soon showed, however, that Africans did not, as a rule, approximate to Indian coolies. Few in sub-Saharan African had experience of working for pay or outside the traditional subsistence economy, and few had any real need to do so. In course of time monetary incentives might generate a voluntary labor force, but during the first decades after pacification neither governments nor private investors could afford to wait indefinitely for the market to work this revolution. (Fieldhouse, 1971, p. 620)

A number of methods were utilized to compel Africans to provide labor and cash crops. Among these were work requirements, pressure for ‘volunteers’, land policy squeezing Africans into ‘reserves’ destroying the subsistence economy, and ‘contracts’ with penal sanctions (Fieldhouse, 1971, pp. 620-621). But the most successful method turned out to be direct taxation.

Direct taxation was used throughout Africa to compel Africans to produce cash crops instead of subsistence crops and to force Africans to work as wage laborers on European farms and mines:

In those parts of Africa where land was still in African hands, colonial governments forced Africans to produce cash crops no matter how low the prices were. The favourite technique was taxation. Money taxes were introduced on numerous items—cattle, land, houses, and the people themselves. Money to pay taxes was got by growing cash crops or working on European farms or in their mines. (Rodney, 1972, p. 165, original emphasis)

The requirement that taxes be paid in colonial currency rather than in-kind was essential to producing the desired outcome, as well as to monetize the African communities, another part of colonial capitalist primitive accumulation and helping to create markets for the sale of European goods:

African economies were monetised by imposing taxes and insisting on payments of taxes with European currency. The experience with paying taxes was not new to Africa. What was new was the requirement that the taxes be paid in European currency. Compulsory payment of taxes in European currency was a critical measure in the monetization of African economies as well as the spread of wage labor. (Ake, 1981, pp. 333-334)

Colonial governors and other administrators were well aware of this ‘secret’ of colonial capitalist primitive accumulation, although they often justified the taxation on other grounds, some ideological and others demonstrating the multiple purposes of taxation from the colonial point of view. “One Governor, Sir Perry Girouard, is reported to say: ‘We consider that taxation is the only possible method of compelling the native to leave his reserve for the purpose of seeking work’” (Buell, 1928, p. 331). First Governor General of the Colony and Protectorate of Nigeria, Sir Frederick Lugard’s Political Memoranda and Political Testimonies are filled with evidence regarding direct taxation: “Experience seems to point to the conclusion that in a country so fertile as this, direct taxation is a moral benefit to the people by stimulating industry and production” (Lugard, 1965a, p. 118). Lugard’s belief that “Direct taxation may be said to be the corollary of the abolition, however, gradual, of forced labour and domestic slavery” (1965a, p. 118), acknowledges the role of direct taxation in forcing Africans to become wage-laborers. Lugard was also clear that the “tax must be collected in cash wherever possible…The tax thus promotes the circulation of currency with its attendant benefits to trade” (1965a, p. 132).

Lugard and other colonial administrators cited a number of other justifications for direct taxation:

Even though the collection of the small tribute from primitive tribes may at first seem to give more trouble than it is worth, it is in my view of great importance as an acknowledgement of British Suzerainty…It is, moreover, a matter of justice that all should pay their share alike, whether civilized or uncivilized, and those who pay are quick to resent the immunity of others. Finally, and in my judgment the most cogent reason, lies in the fact that the contact with officials, which the assessment and collection necessitates, brings these tribes into touch with civilizing influences, and promotes confidence and appreciation of the aims of Government, with the security it affords from slave raids and extortion.” (Lugard, 1965b, pp. 129-130)

The tax affords a means to creating and enforcing native authority, of curbing lawlessness, and assisting in tribal evolution, and hence it becomes a moral benefit, and is justified by the immunity from slave-raids which the people now enjoy.” (p. 173)

Taxation was also justified on grounds that it assisted in ‘civilizing’ African peoples: “For the native,” Ponty stated in 1911, “taxation, far from being the sign of a humiliating servitude, is seen rather as proof that he is beginning to rise on the ladder of humanity, that he has entered upon the path of civilization. To ask him to contribute to our common expenses is, so to speak, to elevate him in the social hierarchy” (Conklin, 1997, p. 144). Colonial tax policies were also introduced in the name of the ‘dignity’ of, and the obligation to, work, where contact with Europeans again was emphasized:

From this need for native labor, the theory of the dignity of labor has developed; this dignity has been chiefly noticeable in connection with labor in the alienated areas. The theory has also developed that it is preferable for the native to have direct contact with the white race so that his advance in civilization should be more rapid than if he remained in his tribal area attending to his own affairs. This is the “inter-penetration” theory in contrast to the “reserve” or “separation” theory. (Dilley, 1937, p. 214)

All of these functions of direct taxation may be seen in some sense as part of colonial capitalist primitive accumulation, whether as assisting in promoting marketization or serving ideological functions in the reproduction of the colonial capitalist mode.

Several points concerning the role of direct taxation in colonial capitalist primitive accumulation need to be made. First, direct taxation means that the tax cannot be, e.g., an income tax. An income tax cannot assure that a population that possesses the means of production to produce their own subsistence will enter wage labor or grow cash crops. If they simply continue to engage in subsistence production, they can avoid the cash economy and thus escape the income tax and any need for colonial currency. The tax must therefore be a direct tax, such as the poll tax, hut tax, head tax, wife tax, and land tax. Second, although taxation was often imposed in the name of securing revenue for the colonial coffers, and the tax was justified in the name of Africans bearing some of the financial burden of running the colonial state, in fact the colonial government did not need the colonial currency held by Africans. What they needed was for the African population to need the currency, and that was the purpose of the direct tax. The colonial government and European settlers must ultimately be the source of the currency, so they did not need it from the Africans. It was a means of compelling the African to sell goods and services, especially labor services for the currency. Despite the claims by the colonial officials that the taxes were a revenue source, there is indication that they understood the working of the system well. For example, often the tax was called a “labor tax” or “prestation.” Under this system, one was relieved of their tax obligation if one could show that one had worked for some stated length of time for Europeans in the previous year (see, e.g., Christopher, 1984, pp. 56-57; Crowder, 1968, p. 185; Davidson, 1974, pp. 256-257; Dilley, 1937, p. 214; Wieschoff, 1944, p. 37). It is clear in this case that the purpose of the tax was not to produce revenue.

To achieve its intended effects, it was also important that the direct tax be enforced, and numerous penalties existed for failing to meet one’s obligation. In German East Africa, “Sanctions against non-payment were severe—huts were burnt and cattle confiscated—so tax defaulters were not numerous” (Gann and Duignan, 1977, pp. 202-203). All kinds of harsh penalties for failing to pay taxes have been documented:

If a man refused to pay his taxes, the Mossi chief was permitted to sequester his goods and sell them. If the man had neither the taxes nor the goods, the chief had to send him and his wife (or wives) to the administrative post to be punished. Sometimes, a man and his wife would be made to look at the sun from sunrise to sunset while intoning the prayer Puennam co mam ligidi (“God, give me money”). Other times a man would be made to run around the administrative post with his wife on his back; if he had several wives, he had to take each one in turn. Then his wife or wives had to carry him around. (Skinner, 1970, p. 127)

Collective punishments were also used widely to enforce the tax. At the very least, failure to “pay could be met, and regularly was met, by visits from the colonial police and spells of ‘prison labour’.” (Davidson, 1974, pp. 256-257)

Another important element in assuring the smooth functioning of the direct tax system was keeping wages low, which had the additional benefit of keeping costs down for private employers. If wages were too high relative to the tax burden, Africans would only work enough to pay off their tax obligation and the labor supply would remain limited:

While taxation is high, wages are very low. It would not do to pay the Natives too much for they would not work a day more than it was absolutely necessary to get tax money. So employers pay the minimum in order to exploit their labourers as long as possible. (Padmore, 1936, p. 67)

Direct taxation was also used to promote and control migration of wage labor. If wage labor and money for cash crops was not available locally, Africans were forced to migrate to plantations and mines to find money wages (see, e.g., Greenberg, 1987; Groves, 1969; Onselan, 1976; although see also Manchulle, 1997, especially p. 8, for a critique).

TAXATION AND PRIMITIVE ACCUMULATION IN EUROPE AND ASIA

In arguing that taxation played an important role in primitive accumulation, this paper has focused on the case of Colonial Africa, but this should in no way imply that the process was limited to Africa. Evidence has already been mentioned in passing with reference to Russia and elsewhere. Vries, in a section entitled “Taxes, the Financial Revolution, War, Primitive Accumulation, and Empire” from his article “Governing Growth: A Comparative Analysis of the Role of the State in the Rise of the West” (Vries, 2002), argues that:

Praising Europe’s state-system and its mercantilist competition implies, whether one likes it or not, praising taxes. The increase of taxation we see in mercantilist countries may also have been a blessing in disguise. Paying them may have been an unpleasant experience, but it need not necessarily have been a bad thing from a macro-economic point of view. It is not farfetched to expect that ever-increasing taxes forced people to work harder and longer. Since the economy of large parts of early modern Europe was characterized by un(der)employment and under-utilization of the available means of production, there was plenty of room for increased production. Moreover, the fact that taxes were collected in money, led to increasing commercialization. Which in turn could increase government income via indirect taxes. (Vries, 2002, p. 75)

Despite Vries’ view of the process as a ‘blessing’, etc., it is clear that the description highlights the ways in which money taxes affected labor supply and monetization in early modern Europe, and even uses the term ‘primitive accumulation’. Later in the article, Vries reports that, in China, “one finds officials proclaiming that taxes ought to be raised to force the populace to work harder” (Vries, 2002, p. 95; for more on China, see Von Glahn, 1996). Vries goes on to report that this development took place throughout Europe and Asia:

When it comes to the way taxes were levied, monetization appears to be the tendency in the entire Eurasian continent. This process had progressed furthest in Europe. All governments preferred to get their income in money and to a very large extent managed to do so. In China an important grain levy continued to exist, but all other important government taxes had gradually been transformed into monetary payments. In India taxes for the central government had to be paid in cash. In the Ottoman Empire monetization made the least progress, but with the increasing weight of cizye, avariz, and tax farming, here too cash payments were on the rise. (Vries, p. 98)

Additional support for Europe and Western Asia is provided by Banaji (2001). Evidence for the notion that money taxes force pressures for increased market activity is provided by the reverse development, namely that a “decline in the exaction of money taxes brought about a decline in trade” (Hopkins, 1980, p. 116, quoted in Banaji, 2001, p. 16). Banaji goes on to report that:

the relentless pressure for taxation in money would also mean that despite the commercial decline which is supposed to have occurred in the Mediterranean of the seventh century, Egyptian landowners and rural communities were undoubtedly forced to meet their monetary obligations through increased production for the market (or participation in it as wage-labourers). (Banaji, 2001, p. 158)

Additional research is necessary to provide a more comprehensive and detailed documentation of the role of monetary taxation in monetization, marketization, and the creation of wage-labor and cash crop production in other regions and time periods, but it is clear that the historical process was in no way confined to Colonial Africa. The fact that various aspects of the phenomenon were recognized by economists as geographically, temporally, and theoretically diverse as Adam Smith, John Stuart Mill, Karl Marx, Fred M. Taylor, Philip Henry Wicksteed, W. Stanley Jevons, Karl Polanyi, and John Maynard Keynes supports the position that it existed with a great deal of generality (see Forstater, 2006).

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Ake, Claude, 1981, A Political Economy of Africa, Essex, England: Longman Press.

Amin, Samir, 1976, Unequal Development, New York: Monthly Review Press.

Banaji, Jairus, 2001, Agrarian Change in Late Antiquity, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Buell, Raymond Leslie, 1928, The Native Problem in Africa, Vol. 1, New York: Macmillan.

Christopher, A. J., 1984, Colonial Africa, London: Croom Helm.

Conklin, Alice L., 1997, A Mission to Civilize: The Republican Idea of Empire in France and West Africa, 1895-1930, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

Coquery-Vidrovitch, Catherine, 1969, “French Colonization in Africa to 1920: Administration and Economic Development,” in L. H. Gann and P. Duignan (eds.), Colonialism in Africa, 1870-1914, Volume 1: The History and Politics of Colonialism, 1870-1914, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Coquery-Vidrovitch, Catherine, 1986, “French Black Africa,” in A. D. Roberts (ed.), The Cambridge History of Africa, Volume 7, from 1905 to 1940, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Crowder Michael, 1968, West Africa Under Colonial Rule, Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press.

Crowder, Michael, 1970, “The White Chiefs of Tropical Africa,” in L. H. Gann and P. Duignan (eds.), Colonialism in Africa, 1870-1960, Volume II: The History and Politics of Colonialism, 1914-1960, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Davidson, Basil, 1974, Africa in History, new revised edition, New York: Collier.

Dilley, Marjorie Ruth, 1937, British Policy in Kenya, New York: Barnes and Noble.

Fieldhouse, David K., 1971, “The Economic Exploitation of Africa: Some British and French Comparisons,” in P. Gifford and W. R. Louis (eds.), France and Britain in Africa: Imperial Rivalry and Colonial Rule, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Forstater, Mathew, 2006, “Tax-Driven Money: Additional Evidence from the History of Thought, Economic History, and Economic Policy,” in M. Setterfield, ed., Complexity, Endogenous Money, and Exogenous Interest Rates: Festschrift in Honor of Basil J. Moore, Cheltenham, U.K.: Edward Elgar.

Freund, Bill, 1984, The Making of Contemporary Africa, Bloomington, Indiana University Press.

Gann, L. H. and Peter Duignan, 1977, The Rulers of German Africa, 1884-1914, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

Greenberg, Stanley B., 1987, Legitimating the Illegitimate: State, Markets, and Resistance in South Africa, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

Groves, Charles Pelham, 1969, “Missionary and Humanitarian Aspects of Imperialism from 1870 to 1914,” in L. H. Gann and P. Duignan (eds.), Colonialism in Africa, 1870-1914, Volume 1: The History and Politics of Colonialism, 1870-1914, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Lugard, F. D., 1965a [1906, 1918], “Lugard’s Political Memoranda: Taxation, Memo No. 5” in A. H. M. Kirk-Greene (ed.), The Principles of Native Administration in Nigeria: Selected Documents, 1900-1947, London: Oxford University Press.

Lugard, F. D., 1965b [1922], “Lugard’s Political Testimony,” in A. H. M. Kirk-Greene (ed.), The Principles of Native Administration in Nigeria: Selected Documents, 1900-1947, London: Oxford University Press.

Manchulle, François, 1997, Willing Migrants: Soninke Labor Diasporas, 1848-1960, Athens, OH: Ohio University Press.

McCracken, John, 1986, “British Central Africa,” in A. D. Roberts (ed.), The Cambridge History of Africa, Volume 7, from 1905 to 1940, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Onselan, Charles van, 1976, Chibaro: African Mine Labour in Southern Rhodesia, 1900-1933, London: Pluto Press.

Padmore, George, 1936, How Britain Rules Africa, New York: Negro Universities Press.

Rodney, Walter, 1972, How Europe Underdeveloped Africa, Washington, D. C.: Howard University Press.

Skinner, Elliott P., 1970, “French Colonialism and Transformation of Traditional Elites: Case of Upper Volta,” in W. Cartey and M. Kilson (eds.), The Africa Reader: Colonial Africa, New York: Random House.

Temu, A., and B. Swai, 1981, Historians and Africanist History: A Critique, London: Zed Books.

Thomas, Clive Y., 1984, The Rise of the Authoritarian State in Peripheral Societies, New York: Monthly Review Press.

Von Glahn, Richard, 1996, Fountain of Fortune, Berkeley: University of California Press.

Vries, P. H. H., 2002, ““Governing Growth: A Comparative Analysis of the Role of the State in the Rise of the West,” Journal of World History, Vol. 13, No. 1, pp. 67-138.

Wieschoff, H. A., 1944, Colonial Policies in Africa, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.

Iraq to increase crude production


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This would be a game changer if they do it and pump all that:

BAGHDAD
Petroleumworld.com, Dec 14, 2009

Iraq struck deals with several foreign energy giants to nearly triple its oil output in an auction that ended on Saturday, as the country bids to become one of the world’s biggest energy producers.

Major agreements were reached with Russian firm Lukoil and Anglo-Dutch company Shell over giant fields during the two-day sale, while contracts were also awarded to China’s CNPC and Malaysia’s Petronas.

“Iraq’s oil production will reach 12 million barrels per day (bpd) within the next six years,” Oil Minister Hussein al-Shahristani told reporters after the auction. “That is the highest production level of the world’s oil-producing countries.”


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foreign dollar buying


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The possibility of announcing an exit from Afghanistan with the funds saved to pay down the deficit would be extremely popular short term and contribute to lower GDP and higher levels of unemployment over the medium term.

Those shorting dollars are selling them to foreign central banks who want their currencies weaker vs the dollar. This means it is unlikely they ever sell their dollars.

Float to lower crude prices and modestly declining us gasoline consumption would threaten the viability of the dollar shorts.

Much of this has been a reaction to the fed building its portfolio, which many presume to be an inflationary act of ‘printing money’ which it is, in fact, not.


Dollar Overwhelms Central Banks From Brazil to Korea

By Oliver Biggadike and Matthew Brown

Nov. 12 (Bloomberg) — Brazil, South Korea and Russia are losing the battle among developing nations to reduce gains in their currencies and keep exports competitive as the demand for their financial assets, driven by the slumping dollar, is proving more than central banks can handle.

South Korea Deputy Finance Minister Shin Je Yoon said yesterday the country will leave the level of its currency to market forces after adding about $63 billion to its foreign exchange reserves this year to slow the appreciation of the won. Chile Finance Minister Andres Velasco said the same day that lawmakers approved an increase in local debt sales to finance spending, a move that will allow the government to keep more of its dollar-based savings overseas and slow the peso’s rally.

Governments are amassing record foreign-exchange reserves as they direct central banks to buy dollars in an attempt to stem the greenback’s slide and keep their currencies from appreciating too fast and making their exports too expensive. Half of the 10-best performers in the currency market this year came from developing markets, gaining at least 14 percent on average, according to data compiled by Bloomberg.

“It looked for a while like the Bank of Korea was trying to defend 1,200, but it looks like they’ve given up and are just trying to slow the advance,” said Collin Crownover, head of currency management in London at State Street Global Advisors, which has $1.7 trillion under management.

The won, after falling 44 percent against the dollar in March 2009 from its 10-year high of 899.69 to the dollar in October 2007, is now headed for its biggest annual rally since a 15 percent gain in 2004. It traded today at 1,160.32, up 8.6 percent since the end of December.

‘Suffered Tremendously’

Brazil’s real is up 1.6 percent this month, even after imposing a tax in October on foreign stock and bond investments and increasing foreign reserves by $9.5 billion in October in an effort to curb the currency’s appreciation. The real has risen 33 percent this year.

“We have to be careful that our exchange rate doesn’t appreciate too much as to deindustrialize the country,” Marcos Verissimo, chief of staff at Brazil’s state development bank known as BNDES, said yesterday at a conference in Sao Paulo. “The capital goods industry has suffered tremendously.”

Russia’s Bank Rossii increased its foreign reserves by 15 percent since March 13 as it sold rubles in an attempt to cap the currency’s gain. Even so, the surge in commodities prices this year means Russia’s steps to fight a stronger ruble may “not be productive,” the International Monetary Fund said yesterday. Energy, including oil and natural gas, accounted for 69.5 percent of exports to countries outside the former Soviet Union and the Baltic states in the first nine months, according the Federal Customs Service.


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Fate of the US Dollar?


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I think they want to accumulate financial assets and would like to get a currency they could feel good about to do that.

And at the same time they want to net export.

The only way they could do that is to somehow ‘force’ us to borrow their new currency in order for us to net import from them.

It would be easier for them to instead come up with an inflation index and only sell their exports in exchange for financial assets linked to their new inflation index. As long as the financial assets are linked to their index the currency of denomination isn’t critical. But credit worthiness would be critical.

>   
>   (email exchange)
>   
>>   The following was printed in the Independent in the UK. Doesn’t this move
>>   threaten the US Dollar as the world’s reserve currency?
>   

Doesn’t matter what anything is ‘priced in’ as that is just a numeraire. What matters is what the ‘save in’ which determines trade flows.

>   
>   Interesting. A political move.
>   Seems a clumsy project though: they need to find a name for this ‘basket
>   currency’ (petrodollar?) and then accept payments in any ‘real’ currency
>   equivalent to the value of the ‘petrodollar’ at the time of payment.
>   Possible that all will continue to use dollars for payment.
>   Economic consequences will depend on whether this has any effect on the
>   willingness of foreigners to hold the given amount of dollars they own.
>   

>>   
>>   â€œIn the most profound financial change in recent Middle East history, Gulf
>>   Arabs are planning – along with China, Russia, Japan and France to end
>>   dollar dealings for oil, moving instead to a basket of currencies including
>>   the Japanese yen and Chinese yuan, the euro, gold and a new, unified
>>   currency planned for nations in the Gulf Co-operation Council, including
>>   Saudi Arabia, Abu Dhabi, Kuwait and Qatar. Secret meetings have already
>>   beenheld by finance ministers and central bank governors in Russia, China,
>>   Japan and Brazil to work on the scheme, which will mean that oil will no
>>   longer be priced in dollars.”
>>   


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OECD Calls an End to the Global Recession


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Guess it wasn’t as bad as most of the doomsday crowd thought?

They never give sufficient credit to the automatic stabilizers and fiscal policy in general.

I suppose that were understood there would have been a policy response at least a year ago to avert the damage that resulted by their lack of appropriate action.

Nor is a double dip out of the question, with proposals to tighten fiscal looming and interest rates very low.

OECD calls an end to the global recession

By David Prosser

September 12 (The Independent) — The global downturn was effectively declared over yesterday, with the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) revealing that “clear signs of recovery are now visible” in all seven of the leading Western economies, as well as in each of the key “Bric” nations.

The OECD’s composite leading indicators suggest that activity is now improving in all of the world’s most significant 11 economies – the leading seven, consisting of the US, UK, Germany, Italy, France, Canada and Japan, and the Bric nations of Brazil, Russia, India and China – and in almost every case at a faster pace than previously.

Composite Leading Indicators point to broad economic recovery

September 11 (OECD) — OECD composite leading indicators (CLIs) for July 2009 show stronger signs of recovery in most of the OECD economies. Clear signals of recovery are now visible in all major seven economies, in particular in France and Italy, as well as in China, India and Russia. The signs from Brazil, where a trough is emerging, are also more encouraging than in last month’s assessment.


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