Bernanke Feared a Second Great Depression – WSJ.com


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The great depression was the last US gold standard depression.

A gold standard is fixed exchange rate policy characterized by a continuous constraint on the supply side of the currency.

Interest rates are endogenous, and even the treasury must first borrow before it can deficit spend, and in doing so compete with other borrowers for funds from potential lenders who have the option to convert their currency into gold. Therefore interest rates always represent indifference rates between holding securities and holding the gold.

With non convertible currency the central bank is left to set interest rates as holders of the currency no longer have the option to convert the currency into gold. Without conversion rights, there are no supply side constraints on credit expansion, and government can therefore offer the credible deposit insurance necessary to sustain the functioning of the payments system.
Bernanke failed to recognize this and therefore saw systemic risks that weren’t there, and also failed to act in line with the tools available to the Fed that would not have been available under the previous gold standard. The most obvious is unsecured lending to member banks, as I have been proposing for a number of years.

With today’s non convertible currency and floating exchange rate policy the fiscal ‘automatic stabilizers’ functioned as they always have during previous recessions, and as the deficit got above 5% of GDP at year end it was enough to reverse the downward spiral and turn things around.

This could not have happened under a gold standard. Before the deficit got anywhere near that large it would have driven up interest rates at an accelerating pace and the gold while the national gold reserves were being rapidly depleted.

We’ve seen this happen most recently with Argentina in 2001 and Russia in 1998 where similar fixed exchange rate regimes had similar outcomes.

We’ve also seen failures of logic regarding how the FDIC handled banking system stresses. The FDIC can simply ‘take over’ any bank it deems insolvent, and then decide whether to continue operations, sell off the assets, replace management, etc. This can be done and has been done in an orderly manner without ‘business interruption.’

The alternative in this cycle- having the treasury ‘add capital’- in my opinion was a major error for a variety of reasons.

When a bank loses capital, there is then less private capital left to lose before the FDIC starts taking losses. When the treasury buys capital in the banks, the amount of private capital remains the same. All that changes is that should subsequent losses exceed the remaining private capital, the treasury rather than the FDIC takes the loss. For all practical purposes both are government agencies, so for all practical purposes this changes nothing regarding risk to government. The FDIC could have just as easily accomplished the same thing by allowing the banks in question to continue to operate but under the same terms and conditions set by the treasury (not that those would have been my terms and conditions).

Instead, substantial political capital was burned and numerous accounting issues and interagency issues confused and distorted including ‘adding to the federal deficit’ when there was nothing that altered aggregate demand.

We have paid a high price for financial leaders being completely out of paradigm and in this way over their heads.

Bernanke Feared a Second Great Depression

By Sudeep Reddy

July 27 (WSJ) — Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke on Sunday said he engineered the central bank’s controversial actions over the past year because “I was not going to be the Federal Reserve chairman who presided over the second Great Depression.”

Speaking directly to Americans in a forum to be shown on public television this week, Mr. Bernanke pushed back against Kansas City area residents who suggested he and other government officials were too eager to help big financial institutions before small businesses and common Americans.

“Why don’t we just let the behemoths lay down and then make room for the small businesses?” asked Janelle Sjue, who identified herself as a Kansas City mother.

“It wasn’t to help the big firms that we intervened,” Mr. Bernanke said, diving into a discourse on the damage to the overall economy that can result when financial firms that are “too big to fail” collapse.

“When the elephant falls down, all the grass gets crushed as well,” Mr. Bernanke said. He described himself as “disgusted” with the circumstances that led him to rescue a couple of large firms, and called for new laws that would allow financial firms other than banks to fail without going into bankruptcy.

Mr. Bernanke appeared stoic at times as he sought to explain his actions during the financial crisis at the town-hall-style meeting with 190 people at the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City hosted by the NewsHour’s Jim Lehrer. But he also joked with the crowd, saying “economic forecasting makes weather forecasting look like physics.” He quipped that he could face malpractice charges if he offered investment advice — although he then recommended that a questioner practice diversification and avoid trying to time the stock market.

The hourlong session was the latest unusual forum where the Fed chairman has explained his actions in recent months, including bailouts and massive lending. Mr. Bernanke appeared before the National Press Club in February, agreed to an interview with CBS’s “60 Minutes” in March and took questions on camera from Morehouse College students in April.

Sunday’s setting offered the former Princeton economics professor a chance to speak outside of congressional testimony and speeches to economists, as his tenure leading the central bank faces increasing scrutiny. With just six months left in his term as chairman, Mr. Bernanke will learn in the coming months whether President Barack Obama will reappoint him to another four-year term or replace him.

Mr. Bernanke repeatedly used the frustrations voiced by people in the room to show his limited options during the crisis and reiterate the need for a regulatory overhaul.

David Huston, who called himself a third-generation small-business owner, said he was “very frustrated” to see “billions and billions of dollars” sent to large financial firms and called the government approach “too big to fail, too small to save.”

“Small businesses represent the lifeblood of small cities, large cities and our American economy,” he said, and they are “getting shortchanged by the Federal Reserve, the Treasury Department and Congress.”

Mr. Bernanke responded that “nothing made me more frustrated, more angry, than having to intervene” when firms were “taking wild bets that had forced these companies close to bankruptcy.”

More than 20 people asked questions of the Fed chairman, on topics ranging from bailouts to mortgage-regulation practices to the Fed’s independence, a topic that drew the most forceful tone from the Fed chairman. Mr. Bernanke suggested that a movement by lawmakers to open the Fed’s monetary-policy operations to audits by the Government Accountability Office is misunderstood by the public.

Congress already can look at the Fed’s books and loans that could be at risk for taxpayers, he said. Under the proposed law, the GAO would also be able to subpoena information from Fed officials and make judgments about interest-rate decisions based on requests from Congress.

“I don’t think that’s consistent with independence,” he said. “I don’t think people want Congress making monetary policy.”

After appearing before lawmakers three times last week, Mr. Bernanke broke little new ground in explaining the state of the economy. He said the Fed’s expected economic growth rate of 1% in the second half of the year would fall short of what is needed to bring down unemployment, which he sees peaking sometime next year.

“The Federal Reserve has been putting the pedal to the metal,” he says. “We hope that’s going to get us going next year sometime.”


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Nonsense from Wells Fargo


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Please send this on to Eugenio Aleman at Wells Fargo

Thinking The Unthinkable: The Treasury Black Swan, And The LIBOR-UST Inversion

Posted by Tyler Durden

>   The below piece is a good analysis of a hypothetical Treasury/Dollar black swan
>   event, courtesy of Eugenio Aleman from, surprisngly, Wells Fargo. Eugenio does
>   the classic Taleb thought experiment: what happens if the unthinkable become
>    not just thinkable, but reality. Agree or disagree, now that we have gotten to
>   a point where 6 sigma events are a daily ocurrence, it might be prudent to
>   consider all the alternatives.

In previous reports, I have touched upon the concerns I have regarding the overstretching of the federal government as well as of monetary policy while the Federal Reserve tries to maintain its independence and its ability, or willingness, to dry the U.S. economy of the current excess liquidity.

Excess reserves are functionally one day Treasury securities.
It’s a non issue.

Furthermore, we heard this week the Fed Chairman’s congressional testimony on the perils of excessive fiscal deficits and the effects these deficits are having on interest rates at a time when the Federal Reserve is intervening in the economy to try to keep interest rates low.

His thinking is still on the gold standard in too many ways.

Now, what I call “thinking the unthinkable” is what if, because of all these issues, individuals across the world start dumping U.S. dollar notes, i.e., U.S. dollar bills?

The dollar would go down for a while.
Prices of imports would go up.
Exports would go up for a while

All assuming the other nations would let their currencies appreciate and let their exporters lose their hard won US market shares, which is certainly possible, though far from a sure thing.

Why? Because one of the advantages the U.S. Federal Reserve has over almost all of the rest of the world’s central banks is that there seems to be an almost infinite demand for U.S. dollars in the world, which has made the Federal Reserve’s job a lot easier than that of other central banks, even those from developed countries.

In what way? They set rates, that’s all. It’s no harder or easier for the Fed than any other central bank.

if there is a massive run against the U.S. dollar across the world then the Federal Reserve will have to sell U.S. Treasuries to exchange for those U.S. dollars being returned to the country, which means that the U.S. Federal debt and interest payments on that debt will increase further.

Not true. First, they have a zero rate policy anyway so they can just sit as excess reserves should anyone deposit them in a bank account, and earn 0. Or they can hold the cash and earn 0.

This means that we will go from paying nothing on our “currency” loans to having to pay interest on those U.S. Treasuries that will be used to sterilize the massive influx of U.S. dollar bills into the U.S. economy, putting further pressure on interest rates.

No treasuries have to sold to sterilize anything.
A little knowledge about monetary operations would go a long way towards not letting this nonsense be published in respectable forums.

If we add the nervousness from Chinese officials regarding U.S. debt issues, then we understand the reason why we had Treasury secretary Timothy Geithner in China last week “calming” Chinese officials concerned with the massive U.S. fiscal deficits. I remember similar trips from the Bush administration’s Treasury officials pleading with Chinese officials for them to continue to buy GSEs (Freddie Mac and Freddie Mae) paper just before the financial markets imploded.

Yes, they have it wrong, and it’s making the administration negotiate from a perceived position of weakness while the Chinese and others take us for fools.

But the situation today is even more delicate because of the impressive amounts of U.S. Treasuries s we will have to issue during the next several years in order to pay for all the programs we have put together to minimize the fallout from this crisis.

Issuing Treasuries does not pay for anything. Spending pays for things, and spending is not operationally constrained by revenues.

The Treasuries issued support interest rates. They don’t ‘provide’ funds.

Furthermore, if China and other countries do not keep buying U.S. Treasuries, then interest rates are going to skyrocket.

There’s some hard scientific analysis. They go to the next highest bidder. The funds to pay for the securities come from government spending/Fed lending, so by definition the funds are always there and the term structure of rates is a matter of indifference levels predicated on future fed rate decisions.

This is one of the reasons why Bernanke was so adamant against fiscal deficits in his latest congressional appearance.

And because on a gold standard deficits can be deadly and cause default. He’s still largely in that paradigm that’s long gone.

Of course, the U.S. government knows that the Chinese are in a very difficult position: if they don’t buy U.S. Treasuries, then the Chinese currency is going to appreciate against the U.S. dollar and thus Chinese exports to the U.S., and consequently, Chinese economic growth will falter.

Yes, as I indicated above.

The U.S. and China are like Siamese twins joined at the chest and sharing one heart. This is something that will probably keep Chinese demand for Treasuries elevated during the next several years. However, this is not a guarantee, especially if the Chinese recovery is temporary and they have to keep on spending resources on more fiscal stimulus rather than on buying U.S. Treasuries.

Again, this shows no understanding of monetary operations and reserve accounting. The last two are not operationally or logically connected.

Thus, my perspective for the U.S. dollar is not very good. And now comes the caveat. Having said this, what is the next best thing? Hugo Chavez’s Venezuelan peso? Putin’s Russian rubble? The Iranian rial? The Chinese renminbi? Kirchner’s Argentine peso? Lula da Silva’s Brazilian real? That is, the U.S. dollar is still second to none!


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BRICs Add $60 Billion Reserves as Zhou Derides Dollar


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They don’t like to buy dollars but they don’t want their currencies to appreciate and risk export market share.

And Bernanke, Geithner, and Obama want them to let their currencies appreciate to help our exports and ALSO want them to buy dollars and treasury securities because they think we need that to fund our deficit spending.

It is one confused and sorry state of affairs on our part.

On balance it looks like our exports won’t be going up nearly as fast as imports especially with crude prices higher. And a good chunk of domestic demand will be channeled towards imports (including those new fiats…). And with flattish GDP and rising unemployment and talk of spending cuts and tax increases it’s starting to look very grim again.

Not to mention no plan to cut imported energy bills anytime soon.

BRICs Add $60 Billion Reserves as Zhou Derides Dollar

by Shanthy Nambiar and Lilian Karunungan

June 8 (Bloomberg) — Reserves Reversal

Asian central banks, excluding China, ran down foreign-
exchange reserves by more than $300 billion in the 12 months
ended April 30, according to London-based HSBC Holdings Plc.
Russia’s slid by $213 billion in the eight months ended March 31,
central bank data show. Brazil’s reserves dropped $5.7 billion
in the six months ended Feb. 27.


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Britain looks to the land of the rising sun with envy


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Starts off good and then goes bad.

Britain looks to the land of the rising sun with envy

by Ambrose Evans-Pritchard

May 22 (Telegraph) — Perhaps most surprising is that Japan fell in 1998, though it was by then
the world’s top creditor with more than $1.5 trillion of net foreign assets
(now $3 trillion). Lender abroad, it is a mega-debtor at home, the result of
Keynesian pump-priming to fight perma-slump. The stimulus vanished into
those famously empty bridges in Hokkaido.

“The Japanese didn’t take the downgrade seriously,” said Russell Jones, of
RBC Capital, a Japan veteran from the 1990s. “They didn’t think they would
have any trouble funding their debt.”

They were right. Yields on 10-year bonds fell to 1pc by the end of the
decade, and to 0.5pc in the deflation scare of 2003 – confounding those who
expected Japan’s emergency stimulus to stoke inflation and push up yields.


Eisuke Sakakibara, then the finance ministry’s “Mr Yen”, was insouciant
enough to swat aside the Moody’s downgrade as an irrelevance. “Personally, I
think if Moody’s continues to behave like that, the market evaluation of
Moody’s will go down,” he said.


Japan had a crucial advantage: its captive bond market. Some 95pc of
government debt was held by Japanese savers or the big pension funds.

Not! Does not matter. The funds to buy government securities ‘come
from’ the government deficit spending.

Deficit spending adds reserve balances at the central bank,
buying govt securities reduces reserve balances at the same central bank.

It is all a matter of data entry by the central bank its own spread sheet.

The foreign share of UK public debt has risen from 18pc to 34pc over the
past six years. The central banks of Asia, Russia and emerging economies
like gilts because they offered 1pc extra yield over bunds. This was the
“proxy euro” trade.

Does not matter.

“We’re far more vulnerable than Japan ever was,” said Albert Edwards, global
strategist at Société Générale.

Wrong!!!

“Japan had a huge current account surplus
and a strong currency. The UK is a deficit country, at risk of a sterling
collapse.

Yes, the currency might go down, but seems to be doing ok for the moment!

Years of UK macro-mismanagement have dragged the UK economy to the
edge of a precipice.”

As the BOE’s Charles Goodhart once responded,
Yes, they have been telling us that for 300 years.


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My 2002 letter on the ratings agencies downgrading of Japan


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Hi David- been a long time, seems nothing has changed!

(See my 2002 letter to you below)

You downgraded Japan below Botswana, their debt/GDP went to over 150% with annual deficits over 8%, and all with a zero or near zero interest rate policy for over a decade, cds traded up, and 10 year JGB’s were continually issued in any size they wanted at the lowest rates in the world.

This is no accident. It’s inherent in monetary operations with non convertible currency and floating exchange rates. Your analysis is applicable only to fixed exchange rate regimes regarding defaulting on their conversion clauses.

Do the world a favor, reverse your position, and explain the reason for your current and prior errors, thanks!

All the best,

Warren

AN OPEN LETTER TO THE RATINGS AGENCIES

Flawed Logic Destabilizing the World Financial System


Repeated downgrades of Japan by the ratings agencies due to flawed logic have been destabilizing both Japan and the financial world in general. Their monumental error can be traced to a lack of understanding the operational realities of a Government that issues its own currency. For the Government of Japan, payment in yen, its currency of issue, is a simple matter of crediting a member bank account at the BOJ (Bank of Japan). There is no inherent operational constraint for this process. Simply stated, Government checks (payable in yen) will not bounce. The BOJ has the ABILITY to clear any MOF check for ANY size, simply by adding a credit balance to the member bank account in question. Yes, the BOJ could be UNWILLING to clear ANY check, but that is an entirely different matter than being UNABLE to credit an account. Operationally, concepts of the BOJ not having ‘sufficient funds’ to credit member accounts are functionally inapplicable.

As a point of logic, the concept of ABILITY to pay being inherently revenue constrained is not applicable to the issuer of a currency. Any such constraints are necessarily self-imposed (including various ‘no overdraft’ legislation in some countries for the Treasury at the Central Bank). The issuer can always make payment of its currency by crediting the appropriate account or by issuing actual paper currency if demanded by the counter party.

An extreme example is Russia in August 1998. The ruble was convertible into $US at the Russian Central Bank at the rate of 6.45 rubles per $US. The Russian government, desirous of maintaining this fixed exchange rate policy, was limited in its WILLINGNESS to pay by its holdings of $US reserves, since even at very high interest rates holders of rubles desired to exchange them for $US at the Russian Central Bank. Facing declining $US reserves, and unable to obtain additional reserves in international markets, convertibility was suspended around mid August, and the Russian Central Bank has no choice but to allow the ruble to float.

All throughout this process, the Russian Government had the ABILITY to pay in rubles. However, due to its choice of fixing the exchange rate at level above ‘market levels’ it was not, in mid August, WILLING to make payments in rubles. In fact, even after floating the ruble, when payment could have been made without losing reserves, the Russian Government, which included the Treasury and Central Bank, continued to be UNWILLING to make payments in rubles when due, both domestically and internationally. It defaulted on ruble payment BY CHOICE, as it always possessed the ABILITY to pay simply by crediting the appropriate accounts with rubles at the Central Bank.

Why Russia made this choice is the subject of much debate. However, there is no debate over the fact that Russia had the ABILITY to meet its notional ruble obligations but was UNWILLING to pay and instead CHOSE to default.

Note that even Turkey, with lira debt in quadrillions, interest rates in the neighborhood of 100%, annual currency depreciation in the neighborhood of 50%, little ‘faith’ in government, and only inflation keeping the debt to gdp ratio from rising, has never missed a lira payment and never had a lira ‘funding crisis.’ Turkey has had problems with its $US debt, but not with its ability to spend lira. Government spending of lira is limited only by the desire to purchase what happens to be offered for sale. It is not and cannot be ‘revenue constrained.’ Operationally, Turkey has the same unlimited ABILITY to pay in its own currency as does Japan, the US, or any other issuer of its own currency.

The Turkish example, and many others, makes it quite obvious that ABILITY to pay in local currency is, in practice as well as in theory, unlimited. ‘Deteriorating debt ratios’ and the like do not inhibit a sovereign’s ABILITY to pay in its currency of issue.

So why have the ratings agencies implied that default risk for holders of Japan’s yen denominated debt has increased to the point of deserving a downgrade? Do they understand that ABILITY to pay is beyond question, and therefore are basing their downgrade on the premise that Japan may at some point be UNWILLING to pay? If so, they have never mentioned that in their country reports.

A few years back, due to political disputes, the US Congress decided to default on US Government debt. The only reason the US Government did not default was because Treasury Secretary Robert Rubin was able to make payment from an account balance undisclosed to Congress. The US Government clearly showed an UNWILLINGNESS to pay that Japan has NEVER shown or even hinted at. Furthermore, again unlike Japan, the US continues this behavior just about every time the self imposed US ‘debt ceiling’ is about to be breached. And yet the ratings agencies have never even considered downgrading the US on WILLINGNESS to pay.

Therefore, one can only conclude 1) Japan has been downgraded on ABILITY to pay, and 2) The logic of the ratings agencies is flawed. In a world where currently there are serious ‘real’ financial problems to address, the ratings agencies have introduced a ‘contrived’ financial problem of substantial magnitude, as many regulations regarding the holdings of securities specify ratings assigned by the leading ratings agencies. Governments have chosen to rely on the ratings agencies for credit analysis, and downgrades often compel banks, insurance companies, pension plans, and other publicly regulated institutions to liquidate the securities in question.

Japan’s yen denominated debt qualifies for a AAA rating. ABILITY to pay is beyond question. WILLINGNESS to pay has never been questioned, even by the agencies engaged in recent downgrades. The destabilizing downgrades are the result of flawed logic.


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It’s not just Chrysler


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Thanks!

Another example of politicians using the TARP card to influence the bankruptcy process. Banks may think twice before they provide their next DIP. If nothing else, the cost of this financing will increase. Which I believe is counter to what said politicians would like to see happening.

Hartmarx- A Harbinger of Things to Come

by Rodney Johnson

May 9 (HS Dent) — Hartmarx, the clothier who’s recent fame is making suits warn by President Obama, filed for bankruptcy protection in late January. Wells Fargo supplied Debtor in Possession Financing (DIP) while the company reorganized. Three bidders have emerged: two of the bidders are interested in keeping the operation going, the third would liquidate the company. When employees got wind of the third bid, they rallied against Wells Fargo, assailing the bank and calling congressmen, as reported by Progress Illinois:

This news of a potential liquidiation caused workers, union leaders, and members of Congress to spring into action to aid the company, which employs 3,000 people nationwide, including 1,000 in Illinois. Rep. Phil Hare, who spent 13 years as a Hartmarx employee, described himself as “livid” at the bank, which accepted $25 billion in federal bailout funds. He went on to enlist the help of Rep. Barney Frank (D-MA) and Sen. Chuck Schumer (D-NY). Rep. Jan Schakowsky, whose great-aunt found a job with Hartmarx after emigrating from Russia, called Wells Fargo CEO John Strumpf and urged him to keep the company running. Illinois Treasurer Alexi Giannoulias, meanwhile, sent a letter to Strumpf threatening to sever the state’s business with the bank if Hartmarx was ultimately liquidated.

This is not isolated. This is not about Chrysler, GM, and tens of thousands of workers and the ability of the United State to mass produce heavy vehicles as a point of national security and safety. This is a company that makes clothing, who through the power of employees, not owners, is bringing pressure on a bank through political paths because of TARP funding. A year ago this would have been seen as a bizarre episode. Today it is an indication of where we are headed, as the recently silenced critics of the Chrysler deal know all too well.


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Claims/G20


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Factory orders rise in February

by Emily Kaiser

Apr 2 (Reuters) —The IMF was told its war chest will be boosted by $500 billion and it will receive another $250 billion in special drawing rights, the agency’s synthetic currency.

Multilateral development banks including the World Bank will be enabled to lend at least $100 billion more.

Thanks, IMF funding functions very much much like deficit spending.

Hearing talk of flat q2 GDP.

The great Mike Masters inventory liquidation that triggered the sudden negative growth ended late December.

The rising deficit spending and the new quarter seems to be bringing new buyers into equities and the rest of the credit structure.

The Obamaboom seems in progress- strong financial markets, rising energy costs, and painfully high unemployment.

Hardly the outcome they are shooting for.

Karim writes:

  • Initial claims up 12k to new high for the cycle (4wk avg moves from 650k to 657k)
  • Rise in continuing claims continues to astound-up another 161k this week to another all-time high-cumulative rise in past 4 weeks is 654k
  • May signify upside risk to consensus on unemployment rate tomorrow (consensus at 8.5% vs prior 8.1%)

Some early snippets out of G20:

  • Greater funding for IMF to be targeted at EM countries and trade finance has EM risk on fire in past 24hrs
  • Agreement that OECD will publish list of ‘tax havens’ and that Swiss will be on the black list has Chf quite a bit weaker
  • Russia proposal that IMF or G20 conduct a study on creating a new intl reserve currency generating headlines and some USD weakness; but IMF and OECE both state they see no change in USD status (1 interpretation that Russia went into meeting long Eur/Usd)

New orders received by U.S. factories rose in February, government data showed on Thursday, breaking a six-month streak of declines and bolstering hopes the economy may be beginning to crawl out of the depths of a recession.

The Commerce Department said factory orders rose 1.8 percent in February after a revised 3.5 percent drop in January, initially reported as a 1.9 percent decline.

Economists polled by Reuters had expected a February increase of 1.5 percent.

Orders for non-defense capital goods excluding aircraft, seen as a measure of business confidence, jumped 7.1 percent after a steep 12.3 percent drop in January.

Orders for durable goods rose 3.5 percent, revised from the previously published 3.4 percent increase, while orders for nondurable goods edged up 0.3 percent.

Inventories decreased 1.2 percent, down for a sixth consecutive month. That was the longest streak since March 2003-January 2004.


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China to bolster oil reserves


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It’s not a lot but seems private inventories are low and were probably liquidated in the last 6 months.

China to bolster oil reserves

by Sun Xiaohua

Mar 2 (China Daily) — China is accelerating the build-up of its oil reserves to avoid the economic dislocations the country suffered in 2008 from fluctuations in the world oil price.

China’s National Energy Administration (NEA) recently released a plan to build nine large refining bases in coastal areas over the next three years, sources with the China Petroleum and Chemical Industry Association said last week.

The plan involves building three 30-million-ton refinery bases in three cities (Shanghai, Ningbo and Nanjing) in China’s economically dynamic Yangtze Delta and six 20-million-ton bases in other coastal areas from Tianjin in the north to Guangzhou in the south. It will also facilitate major joint-venture refinery projects between Chinese companies and partners from oil-producing countries such as Venezuela,Qatar and Russia.

The refinery scheme is part of China’s plan to bolster its oil inventories. The NEA announced at a national energy conference in early February that China will, in addition to the current four strategic petroleum reserve (SPR) bases, build eight new ones by 2011. The program will increase China’s strategic crude reserve capacity to 44.6 million cu m, or 281 million barrels.

The country will also increase its refined oil reserve to 10 million tons by 2011, a source familiar with the stockpile plan told China Daily in February.

“China’s attentiveness to its oil reserve capacity has grown in tandem with its rising dependence on imported oil,” said Pan Jiahua, an expert with the Chinese petroleum society.

China, the world’s second largest oil consumer, relies on imports for about half of its oil needs. It imported 178.9 million tons of crude oil in 2008, up 9.6 percent from the previous year, according to the National Development and Reform Commission.

But China cannot simply take advantage of attractive prices and store as much oil as it wants because its current reserve capacity is not commensurate with its energy appetite.

Customs statistics shows China’s crude imports in January even fell 7.99 percent year-on-year. A slowing economy bears most of the blame but analysts said the country’s limited capacity also played a role.

Zhao Youshan, head of the petroleum distribution committee of the China General Chamber of Commerce, an industry group, recently submitted a proposal to oil-related government agencies, calling for using tanks controlled by private companies to store more cheap oil.

Zhou said in his proposal that China’s more than 600 private oil companies have 230 million tons worth of storage tanks, almost ten times the capacity of the eight new SPR tanks combined.


China has massive private oil storage facilities, built up by oil companies since China opened its oil markets to private operators in the mid-1990s. But State companies, mainly China National Petroleum Corp (CNPC) and China PetroChemical Corp (Sinopec), basically control oil-importing licenses and hundreds of private oil distributors and refiners are currently sitting on empty tanks.

Zhou said in his report that the industry slump last year has left many private oil companies broke and that some of the survivors are struggling with the high maintenance cost of empty tanks.


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Fears rise on Russian foreign debt


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Yes, the risk of Russian corporate defaults due to governmental difficulties goes with the territory.

Fears rise over Russia’s foreign debt

by Catherine Belton

Feb 22 (Financial Times) — Western bankers are increasingly anxious about Russian companies’ ability to repay $500bn in foreign corporate debt after the government said this month it was suspending a $50bn bail-out programme due to dwindling reserves. Bankers are demanding clarity after Igor Shuvalov, first deputy prime minister, said in a closed-door briefing this month that Russia was going to switch focus from bailing out tycoons to supporting the banking system.


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Re: UK currency heading south


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>   
>   On Thu, Jan 22, 2009 at 12:06 AM, Russell wrote:
>   
>   Warren:
>   
>   Is the UK going BK.
>   

Many private sector agents, but not the government. There is no such thing in local currency, and the FX debt is private, not public.

When government takes over a bank and declares it insolvent, the holders of foreign currency debt can become shareholders, general creditors in liquidation, or simply wiped out if not senior enough.

There is no reason for government to pay any FX.

>   
>   They are going to have to nationalize the banks and take interest rates to zero.
>   

Looks like they will be making those choices.

>   
>   The Pound is probably going to get par with the USD.
>   

There’s an ‘inventory liquidation’ of pounds going on, as players exit, as well as private sector agents short USD and other FX covering.

The low price of crude had dried up the dollar income of the rest of the world as our trade gap shrinks, leading to a dollar short squeeze.

(Russian and mid east oil dudes who were selling their dollar revenue for the pounds they were spending on London flats and entertainment when oil was high, have cut back on the way down.)

And the worlds portfolio managers and army of trend followers are piling in with their shorts.

While this is a ‘one time’ event, it’s a big one!

The pound has looked over valued to me on an anecdotal purchasing power parity basis for quite a while. Last time I was there seemed even at one to one with the dollar prices would still be way too high over there.

Fundamentally, apart from anecdotal purchasing power parity, the pound looks OK. Fiscal has been tight for a while and isn’t all that loose yet, though they are talking about larger deficits. Prices are in check, with asset prices falling. And borrowing to spend is way down, probably for a while. But the same is true for the US, so there’s no bias there.

Net net, the pound was an indirect beneficiary of the high oil prices, and getting hurt by the fall.

British pound


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