Have the Fed Financing Bank fund the agencies with fixed rate amortizing term funding.

Have the FFB eat the convexity and allow prepayments of advances at par as mtgs pay down.

Have Congress set the FFB’s advance rate for the mtgs for public purpose.

Have fed member banks originate agency mtgs on
Congressionally dictated terms as agents for the agencies on a fee basis.

Have the agencies hold all these newly issues loans in portfolio.

Have the banks do the servicing for a fee.

This would lower mtg rates maybe 1%.

Have the agencies offer refi’s for existing agency loans at current rates without new appraisals or income statements.

Am i missing anything?

Feel free to distribute!

If they actually understood how it all works they’d be calling for tax cuts rather than interest rate increases.

>   
>   (email exchange)
>   
>   On Mon, Aug 23, 2010 at 12:18 PM, wrote:
>   
>   Yes, Krugman criticised this today and I put in a kind word
>   for Mr Rajan in the comments section.
>   

I suspect Rajan is looking in part at the deflationary impact of the “fiscal channel” via the current 0% interest rate. Your NY Times colleague, Gretchen Morgenson, had a very good piece on this in the Sunday NY Times. Of course, the impact of this policy would, as you suggest, be ruinous for borrowers and highlights the comparatively diffuse impact of monetary policy, vs fiscal policy in terms of solving the problem of aggregate demand. Overall, this uncertainty points to the problems involved in using monetary policy to stimulate (or contract) the economy. It is a blunt policy instrument with ambiguous impacts.

The major problem facing the economy at present is that there is not a willingness to spend by the private sector and the resulting spending gap, has to, initially, be filled by the government using its fiscal policy capacity. I prefer direct public sector job creation to be the principle fiscal vehicle. But fiscal policy it has to be. Then when the negative sentiment is turned around, private borrowing will recommence and investment spending will grow again. Then the economy moves forward some more and the budget deficit falls.

Bernanke Must Raise Benchmark Rate 2 Points, Rajan Says

By Scott Lanman and Simon Kennedy

Aug. 22 (Bloomberg) — Raghuram Rajan accurately warned central bankers in 2005 of a potential financial crisis if banks lost confidence in each other. Now the International Monetary Fund’s former chief economist says the Federal Reserve should consider raising rates, even as almost 10 percent of the U.S. workforce remains unemployed.

Interest rates near zero risk fanning asset bubbles or propping up inefficient companies, say Rajan and William White, former head of the Bank for International Settlements’ monetary and economic department. After Europe’s debt crisis recedes, Fed Chairman Ben S. Bernanke should start increasing his benchmark rate by as much as 2 percentage points so it’s no longer negative in real terms, Rajan says.

“Low rates are not a free lunch, but people are acting as though they are,” said White, 67, who retired in 2008 from the Basel, Switzerland-based BIS and now chairs the Economic Development and Review Committee at the Paris-based Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. “There will be pressure on central banks to follow an expansionary monetary policy, and I worry that one can see the benefits, but what people inadequately appreciate are the downsides.”

He and Rajan will have the chance to make their case at the Fed’s annual symposium in Jackson Hole, Wyoming, this week. In 2003, White told attendees central banks might need to raise rates to combat asset-price bubbles. In 2005, Rajan, 47, said risks in the banking system had increased. They were met with skepticism from then-Fed Chairman Alan Greenspan, 84, and Governor Donald Kohn, 67.

Losing Confidence

While the Fed did boost its target rate for overnight loans among banks in quarter-point steps to 5.25 percent by 2006 from 1 percent in 2004, that didn’t prevent a housing bubble, which began to pop in 2006. Banks began losing confidence in August of the same year and started charging other financial institutions higher interest on loans.

A minority of policy makers are increasingly echoing Rajan and White’s current worries, including Kansas City Fed President Thomas Hoenig, who is hosting the Aug. 26-28 symposium, and Andrew Sentance, one of nine members on the Bank of England’s monetary-policy committee.

Hoenig has dissented from all five Fed policy decisions this year, preferring to jettison a pledge to keep rates low for an “extended period.” Sentance was defeated for a third month in August in his bid to withdraw emergency stimulus by increasing the benchmark interest rate.

Few Converts

The naysayers may fail to win many converts any time soon as the recovery slows and U.S. unemployment, at 9.5 percent in July, remains near a 26-year high. The resulting extension of low rates may increase volatility of government bonds, especially in response to any stronger-than-anticipated economic data, said Marc Fovinci, head of fixed income at Ferguson Wellman Capital Management Inc.

Indications that growth will be at least 3 percent “in the coming months” would cause yields on 10-year Treasuries, which were 2.61 percent on Aug. 20, to rise to 3 percent within about a week, said Fovinci, who is based in Portland, Oregon, and helps invest $2.5 billion.

JPMorgan Chase & Co. reduced its forecast last week for growth in this quarter to an annual rate of 1.5 percent from 2.5 percent and in the last three months of 2010 to 2 percent from 3 percent.

“I’m not worried about inflation, because the economy appears to be weak,” Fovinci said. At the same time, the bond market seems to be “tightly coiled up like a spring.”

Rising Yields

Between June 3 and June 8, 2009, yields on 10-year Treasuries rose to 3.88 percent from 3.54 percent after the smallest drop in U.S. payrolls in eight months and European Central Bank President Jean-Claude Trichet’s forecast for economic growth in 2010. Two-year Treasury yields rose to 1.4 percent from 0.91 percent in the same period.

The margin for error is “incredibly thin,” said Derrick Wulf, a portfolio manager at Dwight Asset Management Co. in Burlington, Vermont, which oversees $64.3 billion. “A lot of investors have become complacent about being long” in Treasuries.

Rajan, now a professor at the University of Chicago’s Booth School of Business, says near-zero interest rates are a crisis tool and economists don’t know if the benefits from using them for longer periods outweigh the costs. While inflation isn’t the main threat now, “you can’t be totally comfortable,” he said in an Aug. 18 interview. People think “there is significant unused capacity in the economy” and that assumption may be mistaken.

‘Bad Incentives’

Near-zero rates create “bad incentives” for financial firms, he added.

“Blow the system up, we’ll come back and reward you with very low interest rates that allow you to build up capital, and then you could try it again next time around,” Rajan said.

The Fed also may be “prolonging pain” by propping up the housing market and keeping home prices from falling, he said.

Companies are sending mixed signals.

“Demand is very low across the country” for houses, Richard Dugas, chief executive officer of Bloomfield Hills, Michigan-based Pulte Group Inc., said Aug. 20 on Bloomberg Television’s “In the Loop with Betty Liu.” Meanwhile, Caterpillar Inc., the world’s largest maker of construction equipment, may add as many as 9,000 workers worldwide this year, Doug Oberhelman, chief executive officer of the Peoria, Illinois-based company, said Aug. 19.

Another Bubble

White, a Bank of Canada deputy governor from 1988 to 1994, says the benefits of low rates may already be waning “in a world with so much debt, especially household debt,” which in the U.S. totaled a near-record $11.7 trillion at the end of June. There’s also a danger they might create another bubble, he said.

Another risk is that near-zero rates allow companies to roll over nonviable loans, a practice known as “evergreening” that can create so-called zombie businesses, which happened in Japan, he added.

Rajan and White’s arguments aren’t winning over Keith Hembre, chief economist at U.S. Bancorp’s FAF Advisors Inc. in Minneapolis, where he helps oversee $86 billion.

“There’s little evidence that the very low rates today are inflicting any harm,” said Hembre, a former Fed researcher. While he has “some longer-term sympathy with the argument,” it’s “just off-base today, given the evidence available from both real-time and market indicators.”

Bernanke, 56, and the majority of Fed officials show little inclination to change course. The Fed lowered its benchmark rate to a range of zero to 0.25 percent in December 2008 and said after each policy meeting since March 2009 it will likely stay very low for an “extended period.”

Emergency Measures

The ECB has kept its main refinancing rate at 1 percent since May 2009, and the Bank of England’s key rate has been 0.5 percent since March 2009. Axel Weber, an ECB council member, said in an Aug. 19 Bloomberg Television interview that policy makers should keep emergency liquidity measures in place at least through the end of the year, beyond Trichet’s October guarantee. Bernanke and Trichet will speak at the Fed symposium Aug. 27.

White and Rajan have ruffled central-bank feathers before at Jackson Hole, where policy makers, academics, analysts and money managers from dozens of countries mix hiking and rafting in Grand Teton National Park with debate over monetary policy and bank regulation.

In 2003, White and then-colleague Claudio Borio, who was head of BIS research and policy analysis, told central bankers they might need to raise interest rates to “lean against” asset-price bubbles.

‘Cannot Work’

“The one thing I am sure about is that a mild calibration of monetary policy to address asset-price bubbles does not and cannot work,” Greenspan, who retired in 2006, responded at the conference.

Bernanke, then a Fed governor, told attendees that Japan raised rates in 1989 to prick a bubble, and as a result, “asset prices collapsed and they had a 14-year depression.”

In 2005, Rajan warned that if banks lost confidence in each other, “the interbank market could freeze up, and one could well have a full-blown financial crisis.”

Kohn disagreed in a speech after Rajan’s presentation.

“As a consequence of greater diversification of risks and of sources of funds, problems in the financial sector are less likely to intensify shocks hitting the economy and financial market,” he said.

More Open

Bernanke has since become more open to White’s view. While low interest rates didn’t cause the U.S. housing bubble, he said in a January speech, if the next wave of regulation proves “insufficient to prevent dangerous buildups of financial risks, we must remain open to using monetary policy as a supplementary tool for addressing those risks.”

Kohn, the Fed’s vice chairman from 2006 through June, said in a March speech that “serious deficiencies” with securitization of loans “exposed the banking system to risks that neither participants in financial markets nor regulators fully appreciated.”

Spyros Andreopoulos, a London-based global economist at Morgan Stanley, says he worries about the inflationary implications of extreme monetary accommodation beyond the next two to three years, with policy makers likely to lean toward low rates because of the fear of deflation.

“Imagine a car that’s stuck in the mud,” he said. “When you press on the gas, the car doesn’t emerge smoothly; it jumps up. My fear is when economies pick up after the stimulus, you’ll see inflation faster than was expected.”

Karim writes:

Yes, Q2 GDP to be revised down, but it’s been down. Q2 is history. Corporate earnings were based on the actual numbers- sales, costs, profits.

In other words, we know what the S&P were able to earn even with very modest headline GDP growth.

The higher final demand is also at least sustainable.
The relatively large and ongoing fiscal deficit that added that much income and savings to the non govt sectors allowed for the higher final demand AND higher savings.

While the QE from the Fed does nothing beyond causing term rates to be marginally lower than other wise, it does add some support for asset prices via implied discount rates.

As discussed earlier this year, markets are figuring out that the economy is flying without a net. All the Fed can do is alter interest rates which, with each passing day since the recession began, has been shown to not be able to support output and employment, or even prices and lending. (Just like Japan has shown for going on 20 years.)

And a Congress and Administration that thinks it’s run out of money and is dependent on borrowing and leaving the bill to our grand children to be able to spend is unlikely to provide meaningful fiscal adjustments to support aggregate demand.

So we muddle through with unthinkably high levels of unemployment and modest GDP growth waiting for an increase in private sector demand to kick in via credit expansion from the usual channels- cars and housing.

The risk to growth is now primarily proactive fiscal consolidation- spending cuts and/or tax hikes- in advance of private sector credit expansion. So far I haven’t seen anything meaningful enough to be of consequence. But the anti deficit rhetoric is certainly there, counterbalanced to some degree by the call for jobs.

So it remains a pretty good equity environment but a very ugly political environment.

Looks like someone’s catching on to the interest rate channel. And Bloomberg is reporting it.

(Bloomberg never reported it when I communicated with them.)

China Seen Robbing Consumers With Low Interest Rates

Aug 6 (Bloomberg) — Peking University professor Michael
Pettis was discussing declining bank-deposit returns when a
student interrupted with a story about her aunt that may stymie
China’s plan to boost consumer spending.

“To send her son to university in six years it means she
must replace each yuan in lost income with one from her wages,”
the student said, according to Pettis.

The government’s policy of keeping interest rates low to
reduce the burden of soaring municipal debt is costing savers as
much as 1.6 trillion yuan ($236 billion) a year in lost income
on bank deposits, according to Pettis, former head of emerging
markets at Bear Stearns Cos. To make up the shortfall, savers
have to set aside a larger proportion of wages, undermining
China’s efforts to counter slower export growth with consumer
spending at home.

“Consumption is already at a dangerously low level,” said
Pettis, author of the “The Volatility Machine,” a 2001 book
that examines financial crises in emerging markets. “If it
doesn’t begin to rise very quickly, China has a problem because
household consumption will continue to drop as a share of GDP.”

Emphasis on exports and investments have caused domestic
consumption to fall to 35 percent of gross domestic product, the
lowest of any major economy, from 45 percent a decade ago,
Societe Generale AG says.

Pettis isn’t alone in being skeptical about a consumer boom
in China. Yale University finance professor Chen Zhiwu and Huang
Yasheng at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology also
predict constrained consumer spending.

State Controlled

Chen estimates the state controls 70 percent of the
nation’s assets and says most of its profits don’t flow to
consumers. On an inflation-adjusted basis government income
surged more than tenfold in the past 15 years while disposable
urban income increased less than three times, he said.

Pettis said the drag on consumer spending from depressed
deposit rates may help slash China’s annual economic expansion
to between 5 and 7 percent a year through 2020, from an average
of about 10 percent in the past decade.

The Group of 20 nations has urged China to boost domestic
consumer spending to help offset reduced consumption from debt-
strapped consumers in the U.S. and Europe. If Chinese shoppers
fail to take over that mantle as the government’s 4 trillion
yuan in stimulus wanes, then the nation may have to fall back on
exports for growth. That would revive trade disputes with the
U.S., which is battling 9.5 percent unemployment, said Huang.

Trade Tensions

“I do not see how trade tensions can be avoided,” said
Huang, a professor at MIT’s Sloan School of Management in
Cambridge, Massachusetts, and author of “Capitalism with
Chinese Characteristics: Entrepreneurship and the State.”
“Even in the best-case scenario I do not see household
consumption replacing investment as a driver of growth in the
foreseeable future.”

China’s leaders have vowed to boost consumption’s share of
GDP since at least 2006 — so far to no avail. The ratio of
consumption in China’s economy is about half that of the U.S.,
and about 60 percent of both Europe and Japan, according to
Credit Agricole CIB.

China’s past development has created an “irrational
economic structure” and “uncoordinated and unsustainable
development is increasingly apparent,” said Vice Premier Li
Keqiang in a June article in the government-owned Qiu Shi
magazine. Long-term dependence on investment and exports for
growth “will grow the instability of the economy,” he said.

Low Rates

Pettis computes the 1.6 trillion yuan in lost returns to
savers by comparing the difference between China’s nominal
deposit and growth rates to those in other emerging markets.
That calculation indicates China’s deposit rates should be at
least 4 percentage points higher, he said.

“The government maintains a cap on deposit rates, which
helps prop up bank profits, but only by spreading the cost to
households in the form of artificially low interest returns,”
said Mark Williams, an economist at Capital Economics Ltd. in
London who worked at the U.K. Treasury as an adviser on China
from 2005 to 2007.

China has left interest rates unchanged since December 2008,
even as countries from Malaysia to Taiwan, South Korea and India
raised them. The central bank sees little need for an imminent
increase, the International Monetary Fund said in a staff report
on July 29 after consultation with the Chinese government.

China’s inflation, near a two-year high of 2.9 percent in
June, is also eroding household savings. That may cause people
to spend less and save more to cover rising costs of healthcare,
pensions and children’s education, said Pettis. The one-year
deposit rate is 2.25 percent.

Lost Returns

In June 2009 savers earned a real return on one-year
deposits of 3.95 percent. That slumped to a negative 0.65
percent in June this year, indicating lost returns to savers of
1.8 trillion yuan annually compared with a year earlier. Pettis
estimates China’s household deposits account for 60 percent of
total deposits, or about 40 trillion yuan.

Chinese investors have few appealing options. Capital
controls inhibit citizens from investing overseas. A crackdown
on property speculation may cause property prices to fall as
much as 30 percent in the next 12 months, according to Barclays
Capital. The Shanghai Composite Index, up 0.1 percent as of the
11:30 a.m. local time break in trading, has slumped about 20
percent this year.

Pettis said the 3.06 percentage-point spread between
deposit and lending rates that is set by the central bank will
help banks pay for potential bad loans after an 18-month lending
boom that was almost as big as the U.K.’s gross domestic product.

Bad Loans

“Evidence is mounting that the lending spree not only has
created bad loans but is now constraining monetary policy,”
said Huang.

Concern about potential losses in the financial system may
deepen after China’s banking regulator decided to conduct stress
tests of the nation’s lenders. The tests include a worst-case
scenario of property prices falling as much as 60 percent in
cities where they have risen significantly, a person with
knowledge of the matter said.

Banks could be saddled with bad loans of more than $400
billion, said Jim Walker, chief economist at Hong Kong-based
Asianomics Ltd.

Some economists argue that surging retail-sales figures and
rising wages show China’s shift to greater consumer spending is
on track. Dariusz Kowalczyk at Credit Agricole CIB in Hong Kong
estimates consumption will account for 47 percent of GDP within
10 years.

Retail sales rose 18 percent in the first half of 2010 to
7.3 trillion yuan. Citigroup Inc. says wages in the unskilled
labor market may double over the next five years.

Middle Class

“Disposable income levels are growing, the middle class is
growing and urbanization is alive and strong,” said Andy Mantel,
Hong Kong-based managing director of Pacific Sun Investment
Management Ltd.’s consumer-focused Mantou Fund, which invests
mainly in Greater China equities. “That would be positive for
the next five to 10 years.”

Mantou’s holdings include companies like Fujian-based fruit
and vegetable producer China Green (Holdings) Ltd. whose new
drinks line is “higher quality than has been available on the
market,” said Mantel. “People these days are willing to pay a
bit extra for better products.”

Hong Kong-based Nomura Holdings Inc. analyst Emma Liu
expects China Green’s stock to rise more than 20 percent over
the next year to HK$10.8 ($1.4).

Investor’s Picks

Rising rural incomes prompted Shanghai-based River Fund
Management to buy shares this year in Qingdao-based Qingdao
Haier Co. Ltd. and Zhuhai-based Gree Electric Appliances Inc.,
two of China’s biggest makers of air conditioners.

“People nowadays are not only replacing their old air-
conditioners, but upgrading from low-end to high-end ones,”
said fund manager Zhang Ling. “This will continue over the next
10 years.”

Driven by government subsidies for consumer products
including cars and refrigerators, retail sales rose 16 percent
in 2009 after adjusting for consumer price changes, the most
since 1986.

China supplanted the U.S. as the world’s largest auto
market last year as vehicle sales jumped 46 percent. Households
borrowed 2.5 trillion yuan, almost four times more than a year
earlier.

Even as sales rise, the hope that China was at “a turning
point” for the role of consumer spending in the economy may
have been premature, said Nicholas Lardy, a senior fellow at the
Peterson Institute for International Economics in Washington.

‘More Unbalanced’

The economy is “still becoming slightly more unbalanced”
toward investment, said Glenn Maguire, chief Asia Pacific
economist at Societe Generale in Hong Kong. “Until consumption
grows faster than fixed-asset investment for a sustained period,
the economy will remain unbalanced.”

Urban fixed-asset investment surged 25.5 percent in the
first half to 9.8 trillion yuan. Another 29.6 trillion yuan is
needed to finish outstanding fixed-asset projects, said Sun
Mingchun, an economist with Nomura Holdings Inc. in Hong Kong.

To achieve sustained rebalancing, China should allow a
stronger currency that boosts household purchasing power,
improve pension and healthcare coverage and gradually allow
markets to determine interest rates, the IMF report said.

“I never believed the hype that China was turning the
corner on rebalancing growth toward consumption,” said Huang.
“The main political agenda is not to let GDP growth slip and
that means continued investment growth.”

It’s not just him, the all say ‘quantitative easing’ will ‘work’ when they should now have enough evidence and theory to know all it does is lower interest rates which are already plenty low with regards encouraging lending.

Might just be managing expectations but more likely they still actually believe it.

*DJ Fed’s Bullard: Worried About Possible Deflationary Outcome For US(DJ)
*DJ Bullard: Says More Quantitative Easing Will Work(DJ)
*DJ Bullard: Says Deflation Not Most Likely Economic Scenario(DJ)
*DJ Fed’s Bullard: Most Likely Scenario Is That Recovery Will Continue(DJ)
*DJ Bullard: Acknowledges Weaker US Data Over Last Two Months(DJ)
*DJ Bullard: Euro Zone Has Done Reasonable Job Containing Crisis(DJ)

>   
>   (email exchange)
>   
>   On Mon, Jun 21, 2010 at 6:31 AM, wrote:
>   
>   Soros’s recipe, FYI
>   much about bubbles,
>   also about how bad can be deficit reductions at this time
>   

I usually don’t read or comment on Soros, but comments below this one time only for you.

:)

George Soros Speech

Institute of International Finance, Vienna, Austria
June 10, 2010

In the week following the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers on September 15, 2008 – global financial markets actually broke down and by the end of the week they had to be put on artificial life support. The life support consisted of substituting sovereign credit for the credit of financial institutions which ceased to be acceptable to counter parties.

As Mervyn King of the Bank of England brilliantly explained, the authorities had to do in the short-term the exact opposite of what was needed in the long-term: they had to pump in a lot of credit to make up for the credit that disappeared and thereby reinforce the excess credit and leverage that had caused the crisis in the first place. Only in the longer term, when the crisis had subsided, could they drain the credit and reestablish macro-economic balance.

Not bad, but he doesn’t seem to understand there is no ‘macro balance’ per se in that regard. He should recognize that what he means by ‘macro balance’ should be the desired level of aggregate demand, which is altered by the public sector’s fiscal balance. So in the longer term, the public sector should tighten fiscal policy (what he calls ‘drain the credit’) only if aggregate demand is deemed to be ‘too high’ and not to pay for anything per se.

This required a delicate two phase maneuver just as when a car is skidding, first you have to turn the car into the direction of the skid and only when you have regained control can you correct course.

It’s more like when you come to an up hill stretch you need to press harder on the gas to maintain a steady speed and if you get going too fast on a down hill section you need to apply the brakes to maintain a steady speed. And for me, the ‘right’ speed is ‘full employment’ with desired price stability.

The first phase of the maneuver has been successfully accomplished – a collapse has been averted.

But full employment has not been restored. I agree this is not the time to hit the fiscal brakes. In fact, I’d cut VAT until output and employment is restored, and offer a govt funded minimum wage transition job to anyone willing and able to work.

In retrospect, the temporary breakdown of the financial system seems like a bad dream. There are people in the financial institutions that survived who would like nothing better than to forget it and carry on with business as usual. This was evident in their massive lobbying effort to protect their interests in the Financial Reform Act that just came out of Congress. But the collapse of the financial system as we know it is real and the crisis is far from over.

Indeed, we have just entered Act II of the drama, when financial markets started losing confidence in the credibility of sovereign debt. Greece and the euro have taken center stage but the effects are liable to be felt worldwide. Doubts about sovereign credit are forcing reductions in budget deficits at a time when the banks and the economy may not be strong enough to permit the pursuit of fiscal rectitude. We find ourselves in a situation eerily reminiscent of the 1930’s. Keynes has taught us that budget deficits are essential for counter cyclical policies yet many governments have to reduce them under pressure from financial markets. This is liable to push the global economy into a double dip.

Yes, and this is an issue specific to govts that are not the issuers of their currency- the US States, the euro zone members, and govts with fixed exchange rates.

It is important to realize that the crisis in which we find ourselves is not just a market failure but also a regulatory failure and even more importantly a failure of the prevailing dogma about financial markets. I have in mind the Efficient Market Hypothesis and Rational Expectation Theory. These economic theories guided, or more exactly misguided, both the regulators and the financial engineers who designed the derivatives and other synthetic financial instruments and quantitative risk management systems which have played such an important part in the collapse. To gain a proper understanding of the current situation and how we got to where we are, we need to go back to basics and reexamine the foundation of economic theory.

I agree, see my proposals here.

I have developed an alternative theory about financial markets which asserts that financial markets do not necessarily tend towards equilibrium; they can just as easily produce asset bubbles. Nor are markets capable of correcting their own excesses. Keeping asset bubbles within bounds have to be an objective of public policy. I propounded this theory in my first book, The Alchemy of Finance, in 1987. It was generally dismissed at the time but the current financial crisis has proven, not necessarily its validity, but certainly its superiority to the prevailing dogma.

First we can always act to sustain aggregate demand and employment at desired levels across any asset price cycle with fiscal policy. No one would have cared much about the financial crisis if we’d kept employment and output high in the real sectors. Note that because output and employment remained high (for whatever reason) through the crash of 1987, the crash of 1998, and the Enron event, they were of less concern than the most recent crisis where unemployment jumped to over 10%.

Let me briefly recapitulate my theory for those who are not familiar with it. It can be summed up in two propositions. First, financial markets, far from accurately reflecting all the available knowledge, always provide a distorted view of reality. This is the principle of fallibility. The degree of distortion may vary from time to time. Sometimes it’s quite insignificant, at other times it is quite pronounced. When there is a significant divergence between market prices and the underlying reality I speak of far from equilibrium conditions. That is where we are now.

I’d say ‘equilibrium’ conditions are necessarily transitory at best under current institutional arrangements, including how policy is determined in Washington and around the world, and continually changing fundamentals of supply and demand.

Second, financial markets do not play a purely passive role; they can also affect the so called fundamentals they are supposed to reflect. These two functions that financial markets perform work in opposite directions. In the passive or cognitive function the fundamentals are supposed to determine market prices. In the active or manipulative function market prices find ways of influencing the fundamentals. When both functions operate at the same time they interfere with each other. The supposedly independent variable of one function is the dependent variable of the other so that neither function has a truly independent variable. As a result neither market prices nor the underlying reality is fully determined. Both suffer from an element of uncertainty that cannot be quantified.

Goes without saying.

I call the interaction between the two functions reflexivity. Frank Knight recognized and explicated this element of unquantifiable uncertainty in a book published in 1921 but the Efficient Market Hypothesis and Rational Expectation Theory have deliberately ignored it. That is what made them so misleading.

Reflexivity sets up a feedback loop between market valuations and the so-called fundamentals which are being valued. The feedback can be either positive or negative. Negative feedback brings market prices and the underlying reality closer together. In other words, negative feedback is self-correcting. It can go on forever and if the underlying reality remains unchanged it may eventually lead to an equilibrium in which market prices accurately reflect the fundamentals. By contrast, a positive feedback is self-reinforcing. It cannot go on forever because eventually market prices would become so far removed from reality that market participants would have to recognize them as unrealistic. When that tipping point is reached, the process becomes self-reinforcing in the opposite direction. That is how financial markets produce boom-bust phenomena or bubbles. Bubbles are not the only manifestations of reflexivity but they are the most spectacular.

Ok, also seems obvious? Now he need to add that the currency itself is a public monopoly, as the introduction of taxation, a coercive force, introduces ‘imperfect competition’ with ’supply’ of that needed to pay taxes under govt. control. This puts govt in the position of ‘price setter’ when it spends (and/or demands collateral when it lends). And a prime ‘pass through’ channel he needs to add is indexation of public sector wages and benefits.

In my interpretation equilibrium, which is the central case in economic theory, turns out to be a limiting case where negative feedback is carried to its ultimate limit. Positive feedback has been largely assumed away by the prevailing dogma and it deserves a lot more attention.

Even his positive feedback will ‘run its course’ (not to say there aren’t consequences) for the most part if it wasn’t for the fact that the currency itself is a case of monopoly and the govt. paying more for the same thing, for example, is redefining the currency downward.

I have developed a rudimentary theory of bubbles along these lines. Every bubble has two components: an underlying trend that prevails in reality and a misconception relating to that trend. When a positive feedback develops between the trend and the misconception a boom-bust process is set in motion. The process is liable to be tested by negative feedback along the way and if it is strong enough to survive these tests, both the trend and the misconception will be reinforced.

Makes sense.

Eventually, market expectations become so far removed from reality that people are forced to recognize that a misconception is involved.

I’d say it’s more like the price gets high enough for the funding to run dry at that price for any reason? Unless funding is coming from/supported by govt (and/or it’s designated agents, etc), the issuer of the currency, that funding will always be limited.

A twilight period ensues during which doubts grow and more and more people lose faith but the prevailing trend is sustained by inertia.

‘Inertia’? It’s available spending power that’s needed to sustain prices of anything. The price of housing sales won’t go up without someone paying the higher price.

As Chuck Prince former head of Citigroup said, “As long as the music is playing you’ve got to get up and dance. We are still dancing.”

This describes the pro cyclical nature of the non govt sectors, which are necessarily pro cyclical. Only the currency issuer can be counter cyclical. Seems to me Minsky has the fuller explanation of all this.

Eventually a tipping point is reached when the trend is reversed; it then becomes self-reinforcing in the opposite direction.

The spending power- or the desire to use it- fades.

Typically bubbles have an asymmetric shape. The boom is long and slow to start. It accelerates gradually until it flattens out again during the twilight period. The bust is short and steep because it involves the forced liquidation of unsound positions. Disillusionment turns into panic, reaching its climax in a financial crisis.

The simplest case of a purely financial bubble can be found in real estate. The trend that precipitates it is the availability of credit; the misconception that continues to recur in various forms is that the value of the collateral is independent of the availability of credit. As a matter of fact, the relationship is reflexive. When credit becomes cheaper activity picks up and real estate values rise. There are fewer defaults, credit performance improves, and lending standards are relaxed. So at the height of the boom, the amount of credit outstanding is at its peak and a reversal precipitates false liquidation, depressing real estate values.

It all needs to be sustained by incomes. the Fed’s financial burdens ratios indicate when incomes are being stretched to their limits. The last cycle went beyond actual incomes as mortgage originators were sending borrowers to accountants who falsified income statements, and some lenders were willing to lend beyond income capabilities. But that didn’t last long and the bust followed by months.

The bubble that led to the current financial crisis is much more complicated. The collapse of the sub-prime bubble in 2007 set off a chain reaction, much as an ordinary bomb sets off a nuclear explosion. I call it a super-bubble. It has developed over a longer period of time and it is composed of a number of simpler bubbles. What makes the super-bubble so interesting is the role that the smaller bubbles have played in its development.

Fraud was a major, exaggerating element in the latest go round, conspicuously absent from this analysis.

The prevailing trend in the super-bubble was the ever increasing use of credit and leverage. The prevailing misconception was the believe that financial markets are self-correcting and should be left to their own devices. President Reagan called it the “magic of the marketplace” and I call it market fundamentalism. It became the dominant creed in the 1980s. Since market fundamentalism was based on false premises its adoption led to a series of financial crises.

Again, a financial crisis doesn’t need to ’spread’ to the real economy. Fiscal policy can sustain full employment regardless of the state of the financial sector. Losses in the financial sector need not affect the real economy any more than losses in Las Vegas casinos.

Each time, the authorities intervened, merged away, or otherwise took care of the failing financial institutions, and applied monetary and fiscal stimuli to protect the economy. These measures reinforced the prevailing trend of ever increasing credit and leverage and as long as they worked they also reinforced the prevailing misconception that markets can be safely left to their own devices. The intervention of the authorities is generally recognized as creating amoral hazard; more accurately it served as a successful test of a false belief, thereby inflating the super-bubble even further.

‘Monetary policy’ did nothing and probably works in reverse, as I’ve discussed elsewhere. Fiscal policy does not have to introduce moral hazard issues. It can be used to sustain incomes from the bottom up at desired levels, and not for top down bailouts of failed businesses. Sustaining incomes will not keep an overbought market from crashing, but it will sustain sales and employment in the real economy, with business competing successfully for consumer dollars surviving, and those that don’t failing. That’s all that’s fundamentally needed for prosperity, along with a govt that understands its role in supporting the public infrastructure.

It should be emphasized that my theories of bubbles cannot predict whether a test will be successful or not. This holds for ordinary bubbles as well as the super-bubble. For instance I thought the emerging market crisis of 1997-1998 would constitute the tipping point for the super-bubble, but I was wrong. The authorities managed to save the system and the super-bubble continued growing. That made the bust that eventually came in 2007-2008 all the more devastating.

No mention that the govt surpluses of the late 90’s drained net dollar financial assets from the non govt sectors, with growth coming from unsustainable growth in private sector credit fueling impossible dot com business plans, that far exceeded income growth. When it all came apart after y2k the immediate fiscal adjustment that could have sustained the real economy wasn’t even a consideration.

What are the implications of my theory for the regulation of the financial system?

First and foremost, since markets are bubble-prone, the financial authorities have to accept responsibility for preventing bubbles from growing too big. Alan Greenspan and other regulators have expressly refused to accept that responsibility. If markets can’t recognize bubbles, Greenspan argued, neither can regulators–and he was right. Nevertheless, the financial authorities have to accept the assignment, knowing full well that they will not be able to meet it without making mistakes. They will, however, have the benefit of receiving feedback from the markets, which will tell them whether they have done too much or too little. They can then correct their mistakes.

Second, in order to control asset bubbles it is not enough to control the money supply; you must also control the availability of credit.

Since the causation is ‘loans create deposits’ ‘controlling credit’ is the only way to alter total bank deposits.

This cannot be done by using only monetary tools;

Agreed, interest rates are not all that useful, and probably work in the opposite direction most believe.

you must also use credit controls. The best-known tools are margin requirements

Changing margin requirements can have immediate effects. But if the boom is coming for the likes of pension fund allocations to ‘passive commodity strategies’ driving up commodities prices, which has been a major, driving force for many years now, margin increases won’t stop the trend.

and minimum capital requirements.

I assume that means bank capital. If so, that alters the price of credit but not the quantity, as it alters spreads needed to provide market demanded risk adjusted returns for bank capital.

Currently they are fixed irrespective of the market’s mood, because markets are not supposed to have moods. Yet they do, and the financial authorities need to vary margin and minimum capital requirements in order to control asset bubbles.

Yes, man is naturally a gambler. you can’t stop him. and attempts at control have always been problematic at best.

One thing overlooked is the use of long term contracts vs relying on spot markets. Historically govts have used long term contracts, but for business to do so requires long term contracts on the sales side, which competitive markets don’t allow.

You can’t safely enter into a 20 year contract for plastic for cell phone manufacturing if you don’t know that the price and quantity of cell phones is locked in for 20 years as well, for example. And locking in building materials for housing for 20 years to stabilize prices means less flexibility to alter building methods, etc. But all this goes beyond this critique apart from indicating there’s a lot more to be considered.

Regulators may also have to invent new tools or revive others that have fallen into disuse. For instance, in my early days in finance, many years ago, central banks used to instruct commercial banks to limit their lending to a particular sector of the economy, such as real estate or consumer loans, because they felt that the sector was overheating. Market fundamentalists consider that kind of intervention unacceptable but they are wrong. When our central banks used to do it we had no financial crises to speak of.

True. What the govt creates it can regulate and/or take away. Public infrastructure is to serve further public purpose.

But both dynamic change and static patterns have value and trade offs.

The Chinese authorities do it today, and they have much better control over their banking system. The deposits that Chinese commercial banks have to maintain at the People’s Bank of China were increased seventeen times during the boom, and when the authorities reversed course the banks obeyed them with alacrity.

Yes, and always with something gained and something lost when lending is politicized.

Third, since markets are potentially unstable, there are systemic risks in addition to the risks affecting individual market participants. Participants may ignore these systemic risks in the belief that they can always dispose of their positions, but regulators cannot ignore them because if too many participants are on the same side, positions cannot be liquidated without causing a discontinuity or a collapse. They have to monitor the positions of participants in order to detect potential imbalances. That means that the positions of all major market participants, including hedge funds and sovereign wealth funds, need to be monitored. The drafters of the Basel Accords made a mistake when they gave securities held by banks substantially lower risk ratings than regular loans: they ignored the systemic risks attached to concentrated positions in securities. This was an important factor aggravating the crisis. It has to be corrected by raising the risk ratings of securities held by banks. That will probably discourage loans, which is not such a bad thing.

My proposals, here, limit much of that activity at the source, rather than trying to regulate it, leaving a lot less to be regulated making regulation that much more likely to succeed.

Fourth, derivatives and synthetic financial instruments perform many useful functions but they also carry hidden dangers. For instance, the securitization of mortgages was supposed to reduce risk thru geographical diversification. In fact it introduced a new risk by separating the interest of the agents from the interest of the owners. Regulators need to fully understand how these instruments work before they allow them to be used and they ought to impose restrictions guard against those hidden dangers. For instance, agents packaging mortgages into securities ought to be obliged to retain sufficient ownership to guard against the agency problem.

One of my proposals is that banks not be allowed to participate in any secondary markets, for example

Credit default swaps (CDS) are particularly dangerous they allow people to buy insurance on the survival of a company or a country while handing them a license to kill. CDS ought to be available to buyers only to the extent that they have a legitimate insurable interest. Generally speaking, derivatives ought to be registered with a regulatory agency just as regular securities have to be registered with the SEC or its equivalent. Derivatives traded on exchanges would be registered as a class; those traded over-the-counter would have to be registered individually. This would provide a powerful inducement to use exchange traded derivatives whenever possible.

There is no public purpose served by allowing banks to participate in CDS markets and therefore no reason to allow banks to own any CDS.

Finally, we must recognize that financial markets evolve in a one-directional, nonreversible manner. The financial authorities, in carrying out their duty of preventing the system from collapsing, have extended an implicit guarantee to all institutions that are “too big to fail.” Now they cannot credibly withdraw that guarantee. Therefore, they must impose regulations that will ensure that the guarantee will not be invoked. Too-big-to-fail banks must use less leverage and accept various restrictions on how they invest the depositors’ money. Deposits should not be used to finance proprietary trading. But regulators have to go even further. They must regulate the compensation packages of proprietary traders to ensure that risks and rewards are properly aligned. This may push proprietary traders out of banks into hedge funds where they properly belong. Just as oil tankers are compartmentalized in order to keep them stable, there ought to be firewalls between different markets. It is probably impractical to separate investment banking from commercial banking as the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933 did. But there have to be internal compartments keeping proprietary trading in various markets separate from each other. Some banks that have come to occupy quasi-monopolistic positions may have to be broken up.

Banks should be limited to public purpose as per my proposals, here.

While I have a high degree of conviction on these five points, there are many questions to which my theory does not provide an unequivocal answer. For instance, is a high degree of liquidity always desirable? To what extent should securities be marked to market? Many answers that followed automatically from the Efficient Market Hypothesis need to be reexamined.

Also in my proposals, here.

It is clear that the reforms currently under consideration do not fully satisfy the five points I have made but I want to emphasize that these five points apply only in the long run. As Mervyn King explained the authorities had to do in the short run the exact opposite of what was required in the long run. And as I said earlier the financial crisis is far from over. We have just ended Act Two. The euro has taken center stage and Germany has become the lead actor. The European authorities face a daunting task: they must help the countries that have fallen far behind the Maastricht criteria to regain their equilibrium while they must also correct the deficinies of the Maastricht Treaty which have allowed the imbalances to develop. The euro is in what I call a far-from-equilibrium situation. But I prefer to discuss this subject in Germany, which is the lead actor, and I plan to do so at the Humboldt University in Berlin on June 23rd. I hope you will forgive me if I avoid the subject until then.

Looks like a better functioning refi market with new construction and prices remaining relatively low as the tax credit ends.

No sign of credit growth coming from this sector any time soon.

US Home Refinancing Jumps While Purchasing Slumps

By Julie Haviv

May 26 (Reuters) — U.S. mortgage applications to refinance home loans jumped to a seven-month high last week as rates neared record lows, but purchase demand remained stuck at a 13-year low.

Interest rates on 30-year fixed-rate mortgages, the most widely used loan, reached their lowest level since late-November 2009, the Mortgage Bankers Association said on Wednesday.

Low mortgage rates may prove to be the saving grace for the housing market as it copes with the expiration of popular home buyer tax credits.

The MBA said its seasonally adjusted index of mortgage applications, which includes both purchase and refinance loans, for the week ended May 21, increased 11.3 percent.

The four-week moving average of mortgage applications, which smoothes the volatile weekly figures, was up 4.4 percent.

“Refinance application volume jumped last week as continuing financial market turmoil related to the budget crises in Europe extended the opportunity for homeowners to lock in at historically low mortgage rates,” Michael Fratantoni, MBA’s Vice President of Research and Economics, said in a statement.

Can’t resist the temptation to repeat my suspicions that zero interest rate policy is deflationary from the supply and the demand side.

:)

Karim writes:

Fed also re opening swap lines to ECB – looks ready to do more unsecured dollar lending to them and maybe others.

They look to be doing what they did last time around to keep libor down – lend unsecured to bad credits. High risk but it does get rates down.

On Fri, Apr 30, 2010 at 12:23 PM, Jason wrote:

Confluence of events..


Month end bid for treasuries
Goldman stock down 14 and financial CDS wider creating some fears for financial sector
Greece flight to quality concerns going into the weekend

Fed to begin expanding the Term deposit facility which will remove excess cash and remove downward pressure on term LIBOR

LIBOR quoted for Monday as 35.375 / 35.5 +1

1y OIS-LIBOR 5 day chart:

Result

2y spreads leading the way wider +5 to 23.5

Still cheap though

Press Release
Release Date: April 30, 2010


For immediate release
The Federal Reserve Board has approved amendments to Regulation D (Reserve Requirements of Depository Institutions) authorizing the Reserve Banks to offer term deposits to institutions that are eligible to receive earnings on their balances at Reserve Banks. These amendments incorporate public comments on the proposed amendments to Regulation D that were announced on December 28, 2009.

Term deposits, which are deposits with specified maturity dates that are held by eligible institutions at Reserve Banks, will be offered through a Term Deposit Facility (TDF). Term deposits will be one of several tools that the Federal Reserve could employ to drain reserves when policymakers judge that it is appropriate to begin moving to a less accommodative stance of monetary policy. The development of the TDF is a matter of prudent planning and has no implication for the near-term conduct of monetary policy.

The amendments approved by the Board are a necessary step in the implementation of the TDF. As noted in the attached Federal Register notice, the Federal Reserve anticipates that it will conduct small-value offerings of term deposits under the TDF in coming months to ensure the effective operation of the TDF and to help eligible institutions to become familiar with the term-deposit program. More detailed information about the structure and operation of the TDF, including information on the steps necessary for eligible institutions to participate in the program, will be provided later.

The amendments will be effective 30 days after publication in the Federal Register, which is expected shortly.

Too big to fail should not mean restricted liquidity.

Hopefully they don’t use the liability side of banking for market discipline.

But as they don’t even know what a bank is and are in this way over their heads they might!

>   
>   (email exchange)
>   
>   On Tue, Apr 27, 2010 at 8:09 AM, Jason wrote:
>   
>   Possibly if the legislation succeeds in removing risk for those determining the setting…
>   
>   But one of the primary goals is to remove the lending subsidy provided by the TBTF
>   moniker
>   
>   If they firmly establish banks as no longer too big to fail, their short term credit ratings
>   could fall as far as tier 2 in some cases.
>   
>   Thus the average LIBOR setting may move higher just as their CP rates move higher.
>   
>   Also if they lose their ability to lend at lowest rates some of their businesses fall into
>   jeopardy (bank letters of credit, liquidity facilities for VRDNs etc)
>   

Yes, his causation is off on the less important point of the central bank eliminating opportunity costs when in fact market forces eliminate opportunity cost as they express indifference levels to central bank rate policies.

But apart from that it’s very well stated and what we’ve been saying all along, thanks!!! The highlighted part is especially on message and hopefully becomes common knowledge.

Jaime Caruana, General Manager of the BIS says ‘unconventional
measures’ do not increase lending, nor are inflationary:

In fact, bank lending is determined by banks’ willingness to grant
loans, based on perceived risk-return trade-offs, and by the demand
for those loans. An expansion of reserves over and above the level
demanded for precautionary purposes, and/or to satisfy any reserve
requirement, need not give banks more resources to expand lending.
Financing the change in the asset side of the central bank balance
sheet through reserves rather than some other short-term instrument
like central bank or Treasury bills only alters the composition of the
liquid assets of the banking system. As noted, the two are very close
substitutes. As a result, the impact of variations in this composition
on bank behaviour may not be substantial.

This can be seen another way. Recall that in order to finance balance
sheet policy through an expansion of reserves the central bank has to
eliminate the opportunity cost of holding them. In other words, it
must either pay interest on reserves at the positive overnight rate
that it wishes to target, or the overnight rate must fall to the
deposit facility floor (or zero). In effect, the central bank has to
make bank reserves sufficiently attractive compared with other liquid
assets. This makes them almost perfect substitutes, in particular for
other short-term government paper. Reserves become just another type
of liquid asset among many. And because they earn the market return,
reserves represent resources that are no more idle than holdings of
Treasury bills.

(…) What about the concern that large expansions in bank reserves
will lead to inflation – the second issue? No doubt more accommodative
financial conditions resulting from central bank lending and asset
purchases, insofar as they stimulate aggregate demand, can generate
inflationary pressures. But the point I would like to make here is
that there is no additional inflationary effect coming from an
increase in reserves per se. When bank reserves are expanded as part
of balance sheet policies, they should be viewed as simply another
form of liquid asset that is comparable to short-term government
paper. Thus funding balance sheet policies with reserves should be no
more inflationary than, for instance, the issuance of short-term
central bank bills.

(…) Ultimately, any inflationary concerns associated with
monetisation should be mainly attributed to the monetary authorities’
accommodating fiscal deficits by refraining from raising rates. In
other words, it is not so much the financing of government spending
per se – be it in the form of bank reserves or short-term sovereign
paper – that is inflationary, but its accommodation at inappropriately
low interest rates for too long a time. Critically, these two aspects
are generally lumped together in policy debates because the prevailing
paradigm has failed to distinguish changes in interest rate from
changes in the amount of bank reserves in the system. One is seen as
the dual of the other: more reserves imply lower interest rates. As I
explained earlier, this is not the case. While both the central bank’s
balance sheet size and the level of reserves will reflect an
accommodating policy, neither serves as a summary measure of the
stance of policy.

>   
>   (email exchange)
>   
>   On Sun, Apr 11, 2010 at 10:58 AM, wrote:
>   
>   What is your call?
>   

It’s certainly possible, but my suspicion is that we may be going the way of Japan, with interest rates low for very long. With core CPI going negative and the output gap/unemployment remaining very high, especially people who can’t find full time work hitting a new high of 16.9%, the Fed is far from meeting its dual mandate of full employment and price stability (along with low long term rates). And the recent dollar strength, stubbornly high jobless claims numbers, weak loan demand numbers, and not much sign of life in housing has to be a concern about the recovery being more L shaped than V shaped as well.

Seems the Fed would have to have some pretty strong forecasts for CPI and much higher levels of employment to move any time soon apart from perhaps going to what they consider a more ‘normal’ real rate of 1% or so.

And when I look at the euro dollar rates out past 5 years they’re higher than libor got in the last cycle, and this one doesn’t feel like it’s stronger than the last, at least so far. So to discount rates that high (well over 5%) as midpoints of expectations for fed funds looks high to me.

Consumers in U.S. Face the End of an Era of Cheap Credit

By Nelson D. Schwartz

April 10 (NYT) — Even as prospects for the American economy brighten, consumers are about to face a new financial burden: a sustained period of rising interest rates.

That, economists say, is the inevitable outcome of the nation’s ballooning debt and the renewed prospect of inflation as the economy recovers from the depths of the recent recession.

The shift is sure to come as a shock to consumers whose spending habits were shaped by a historic 30-year decline in the cost of borrowing.

“Americans have assumed the roller coaster goes one way,” said Bill Gross, whose investment firm, Pimco, has taken part in a broad sell-off of government debt, which has pushed up interest rates. “It’s been a great thrill as rates descended, but now we face an extended climb.”

The impact of higher rates is likely to be felt first in the housing market, which has only recently begun to rebound from a deep slump. The rate for a 30-year fixed rate mortgage has risen half a point since December, hitting 5.31 last week, the highest level since last summer.

ECB’s Liikanen Says Interest Rates Won’t Stay Low

By Diana ben-Aaron

March 29 (Bloomberg) — European Central Bank Governing Council member Erkki Liikanen said interest rates won’t stay at the current level indefinitely, Maaseudun Tulevaisuus reported, citing an interview.

While low rates have eased the economic slowdown, households and businesses shouldn’t count on them forever, Liikanen was quoted as saying by the Helsinki-based newspaper. He declined to say when or by how much rates would increase.

“We decide the key central bank rate in the ECB council according to the requirements of the economic situation,” Liikanen said.

>   
>   (email exchange)
>   
>   On Thu, Feb 25, 2010 at 12:54 PM, Roger wrote:
>   
>   am I reading this right?
>   
>   he seems to be admitting the difference between “structural” and nominal deficits, but
>   is still fixated on debt/GDP ratios, not to mention national “revenue”
>   
>   nevertheless, some progress is better than none, and ANY sign of movement is a
>   step in the right direction
>   

Agreed!

Looks like a serious chink in the armor of what used to be deficit terrorist #1???!!!

Address jobs now and deficits later

By LAWRENCE MISHEL & DAVID M. WALKER

Feb. 24 (Politico) — President Barack Obama is in a difficult position when it comes to deficits. Today’s high deficits will have to go even higher to help address unemployment. At the same time, many Americans are increasingly concerned about escalating deficits and debt. What’s a president to do?

The answer, from a policy perspective, is not that hard: A focus on jobs now is consistent with addressing our deficit problems ahead.

The difficulty is that many politicians and news organizations often cast deficit debates as a dichotomy: You either care about them or you don’t.

But this is rarely accurate. The fact that the two of us, who have philosophical differences on the proper role of government, find much to agree on about deficits is a testament to the importance of dropping this useless dichotomy and finally talking about deficits in a reasonable way.

As in every economic downturn, federal revenues have fallen steeply because individuals and corporations earn less in a recession. High unemployment also results in higher expenditures for safety net programs, like Medicaid, unemployment benefits and food stamps.

Not surprisingly then, a huge recession can yield a huge deficit. Efforts to put people back to work and help restore the economy, like the recovery package passed last February, can also increase short-term deficits.

Though a concern, most of the recent short-term rise in the deficit is understandable. Furthermore, public spending can help compensate for the fall in private spending, and help stem the pain of substantial job losses.

With more than a fifth of the work force expected to be unemployed or underemployed in 2010, there is an economic and a moral imperative to take action. Persistently high unemployment drives poverty up, makes it harder for families to find decent housing, increases family stress and, ultimately, harms children’s educational achievement. For young workers entering the workforce, the current jobs crisis reduces the amount they will earn over their lifetime.

In deep recessions, businesses tend to make fewer critical investments in research and development that can improve our economy’s productive capacity over the long term. Entrepreneurs usually find credit hard to obtain if they want to start a new business. These factors hurt U.S. global competitiveness and growth potential.

That’s why we agree that job creation must be a short-term priority. Job creation plans must be targeted so we can get the greatest return on investment. They must be timely, creating jobs this year and next. And they must be big enough to substantially fill the enormous jobs hole we’re in. They must also be temporary — affecting the deficit only in the next couple of years, without exacerbating our large and growing structural deficits in later years.

Funding key investment and infrastructure projects to promote economic growth and offering a job creation tax credit are among the policy ideas that meet all these standards. In addition, temporarily renewing extended unemployment benefits can lead to more jobs throughout the economy.
But these problems, and the resulting short-term deficits they cause, should not be confused with the primary deficit challenge facing our nation: structural deficits. These deficits are projected to exist in coming years — even when the country is at peace, even when the economy is growing, even when unemployment falls.

Specifically, the deficit could approach an already unsustainable 6 percent of gross domestic product 10 years from now, and will continue to rise thereafter.

While we address our short-term unemployment challenges, we must also immediately establish a path to address our large, and growing, structural deficits.

The Congressional Budget Office projects that after the economy has returned to full employment, spending will still substantially outstrip revenues. Over time, Medicare and Medicaid will be the key drivers of these structural deficits. This is primarily because these programs’ costs tend to mirror overall cost increases for health care, which have risen much faster than overall economic growth for decades, but also because of demographic changes.

Our nation’s fiscal picture will darken further with the passage of time, especially if interest rates increase.

These structural deficits are too substantial to close the gap without addressing both sides of the ledger: spending and revenues.

In doing so, it is important to distinguish critical and effective programs and tax policies from outdated and ineffective ones.

We must be careful to maintain the type of public investments that can help fuel broad-based economic growth while strengthening the safety net for our most vulnerable populations. And we should take into account growing retirement insecurity as employer pension systems erode and personal savings falter.

People should be able to count on government benefits they are promised. It is, therefore, critical that federal benefit and funding levels be reconciled.

None of this will be easy — not the policy or the politics. It will require hard choices, and an extraordinary process to engage the American people and to make recommendations to the Congress on budget controls, spending cuts and revenue increases.

Getting the deficit under control cannot be accomplished by simply ending “waste, fraud and abuse,” stopping all foreign aid or exiting Iraq and Afghanistan. Substantial progress could be made though by ending the tax cuts of 2001 and 2003, or paying for their extension through spending reductions. In the end, Congress must step up to the plate, not just with hearings, but with votes.

For all the disagreement in Washington, we both know that, like us, there are many who see the critical importance of addressing these challenges. We must accept higher deficits in the short-term in order to put people back to work.

At the same time, we must take immediate steps to agree on a path and a process for reducing the structural deficits that lie ahead.

In a town of division, this is one area where we need a real consensus now.

Markets are getting closer to the idea that:

Interest rates don’t/won’t help
QE doesn’t/won’t help

With the larger point being coming to terms with the possibility the Fed can’t inflate, or do much of anything that actually matters for the real economy, except maybe fund zombie entities to keep them from failing.

So bonds are throwing in the inflation towel and yields are coming down.
The dollar is going up with miles to go before ppp is reached.
Gold is well off the highs and being held up probably by europeans running from the euro to dollars and a bit of gold.

(***Bernanke just again testified that a contango in futures prices is a reasonable forecast of higher prices down the road. So much for the credibility of their inflation forecast)

Meanwhile the eurozone is continuing it’s methodical implosion with no credible response in sight.
And the realization that all eurozone bank deposits are only insured by the national govts has yet to hit the headlines.

The Obama administration believes the US Treasury is ‘out of money’ and we have to borrow from China to spend and leave that for our children to pay back.
So any kind of meaningful US fiscal response seems off the table.

The American economy works best when people working for a living make enough to be able to one way or another buy their own output, and business competes for their dollars. It’s not happening.

We are grossly overtaxed for current circumstances with no meaningful relief in sight.

Lots of reasons to stay on the sidelines.

Karim writes:

Generally more upbeat on economic conditions….the ‘2 Es’ remain, but adds high-profile qualifier ‘ALTHOUGH’…watching Q&A

Final Demand
Private final demand does seem to be growing at a moderate pace, buoyed in part by a general improvement in financial conditions. In particular, consumer spending has recently picked up, reflecting gains in real disposable income and household wealth and tentative signs of stabilization in the labor market. Business investment in equipment and software has risen significantly. And international trade–supported by a recovery in the economies of many of our trading partners–is rebounding from its deep contraction of a year ago. However, starts of single-family homes, which rose noticeably this past spring, have recently been roughly flat, and commercial construction is declining sharply, reflecting poor fundamentals and continued difficulty in obtaining financing.

Credit
The improvement in financial markets that began last spring continues. Conditions in short-term funding markets have returned to near pre-crisis levels. Many (mostly larger) firms have been able to issue corporate bonds or new equity and do not seem to be hampered by a lack of credit. In contrast, bank lending continues to contract, reflecting both tightened lending standards and weak demand for credit amid uncertain economic prospects.

Jobs
Some recent indicators suggest the deterioration in the labor market is abating: Job losses have slowed considerably, and the number of full-time jobs in manufacturing rose modestly in January. Initial claims for unemployment insurance have continued to trend lower, and the temporary services industry, often considered a bellwether for the employment outlook, has been expanding steadily since October. Notwithstanding these positive signs, the job market remains quite weak, with the unemployment rate near 10 percent and job openings scarce.

FF Rate
Although the federal funds rate is likely to remain exceptionally low for an extended period, as the expansion matures, the Federal Reserve will at some point need to begin to tighten monetary conditions to prevent the development of inflationary pressures.

Sequencing
Of course, the sequencing of steps and the combination of tools that the Federal Reserve uses as it exits from its currently very accommodative policy stance will depend on economic and financial developments.

[Skip to the end]

This is the text of the address I gave at Dallas.

Will be repeating it in a northern Va meeting next weekend.

Still waiting for the video.

Feel free to distribute.

How tea party democrats can run successfully in the primaries

Honesty in government is a core value of the Tea Party movement and the most basic value in any representative democracy. Accordingly, my first proposal is that all candidates for public office be sworn in: ‘I solemnly swear to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help me God.’ As a consequence, any subsequent lies are perjury, and punishable by law.

I am here to discuss how I believe Tea Party Democrats can win in upcoming Democratic primaries. The answer is to emulate and extend the success of the Tea Party movement by getting back to basics. The Democratic party is the party of Jefferson and Jackson. The founders believed that the public voice should be heard. They believed in limited government. And they never kowtowed to special interests or cowered before purveyors of the conventional wisdom. This means Tea Party Democrats should be running against the Obama administration’s policies which are counter to both traditional Democratic values and Tea Party values.

It is the Washington elite that have moved away from the ideals of Jefferson and Jackson with policies that are, at best, regressive, elitist, and destructive to our quality of life. For example, with unemployment rising, real wage growth falling, and GDP now growing at over 5%, who’s getting all that increase in real goods and services?

Not the millions who voted Democratic who are losing their jobs and their homes, and watching wages fall even as their cost of living goes up. All that real wealth being created is instead rising to the top, due to impossible trickle down policies that would have made even Reagan blush.

The large majority of Americans that elected this administration did not do so to enrich the bankers, insurance executives, drug companies, and union leaders at the expense of the rest of us, in a perversion of true core Democratic values. But it’s clearly happening as even a blind man can see. And all because they don’t understand the monetary system, how and why government spends and taxes, and why we don’t owe China anything more than a bank statement.

I will devote most of the rest of my time talking about the economy. In part, that is because it is my area of expertise, given that I have spent most of my adult life in financial markets. But the most important reason is it is in that arena that the Washington elite have failed us the most. The so-called economic experts have confused themselves and their political masters with contrived explanations for the way the economy works. Their limited vision has limited the range of policy choice. And the result has been a monumental economic disaster and human tragedy.

My first proposal for the economy encompasses both the Tea Party and traditional Democratic values of limited government, fiscal responsibility, and reliance on competitive markets. Working through the logic of this proposal will show both how this straightforward government policy can work, and how convoluted is the elite’s understanding of finance.

I believe that the surest engine for full economic recovery is a full payroll tax holiday. Payroll taxes take away over 15% of everyone’s paycheck, from the very first dollar earned. This is big money- about $1 trillion per year. Half comes from the employee and half from the employer. A payroll tax holiday does not give anyone anything. What it does is stop taking away $1 trillion a year from working people struggling to make their payments and stay in their homes, and businesses struggling to survive. A full payroll tax holiday means a husband and wife earning $50,000 a year each will see their combined take home pay go up by over $650 a month, so they can make their mortgage payments and their car payments and maybe even do a little shopping.

This fixes the banks and fixes the economy, from what I call the bottom up. It fixes the banks without giving them anything more than people who can afford to make their payments. That’s all they need to remain viable.

And what all businesses need most to expand output and employment is people with spending money who can buy their products. Without people to buy goods and services, nothing happens. The payroll tax holiday also means there is also a big reduction in expenses for business. With competitive markets this means lower prices, which also helps consumers, helps keep inflation down, helps businesses compete domestically and in world markets to help optimize our real terms of trade, and helps keep the currency stable as the dollar is ultimately worth what it can buy. So with the payroll tax holiday we get a dramatic increase in economic activity, rising employment in good jobs, and better prices. And we’ll see millions of new jobs, because, again, what business needs most is people with money to buy their products. Then they hire and expand.

What I don’t see is how any self respecting Democrat can allow this tax to stand for a single moment. It is the most regressive, punishing tax we’ve ever had. It starts from the first dollar earned with a cap at $106,800 per year. It’s an utter disgrace to the Democratic party. It should be immediately eliminated. Yet, instead, the Washington Democratic elite are actually discussing increasing it.

Let’s now back up and review how we got to where we are at this moment in time. Headline unemployment is unthinkably high at 10%, and if you count workers who have given up looking for a full time job, it’s over 17%. As you all know, it’s about the financial crisis. The banks got in trouble when their loans went bad. Well, what makes a loan go bad? Only one thing- people who can’t make their payments. If people make their payments, the loans are AAA. If people don’t make their payments the loans are junk and toxic waste. No matter what the security is- a loan, a cmo, cdo, clo, or whatever, it’s all the same. If people are making their loan payments there is no financial crisis. Unfortunately, instead of attacking the problem from the bottom up with a payroll tax holiday, we have an administration that thinks it first needs to fix the financial sector from the top down, before the real economy can improve. This is completely upside down. But the elites believe it, so that’s what they have done to us.

So starting with President Bush, and supported by both Senators McCain and Obama, they funded the financial sector with trillions, while they kept taking away trillions from people working for a living who couldn’t make their payments.

How does that help anyone make their payments, apart from a few bankers? It doesn’t.

What happened for the next year and a half? The banks muddled through, profits and bonuses returned, but unemployment skyrocketed and is still going up, loan delinquencies and defaults and foreclosures skyrocketed and are still going up, and millions of Americans still can’t make their payments and are losing their homes. And a lot of the money the banks are making on federal support is being drained by continuing loan losses. We are getting nowhere as tens of millions of lives are being destroyed by policy makers who simply don’t understand how the monetary system works.

This has been a trickle down policy where nothing has trickled down, because there is no connection between funding the banks, and the incomes of people trying to make their payments. The answer, of course, is instead of giving trillions to the banks, to simply stop taking away trillions from people still working for a living. The government doesn’t even have to give us anything, just stop taking away the trillion dollars a year of payroll taxes with a full payroll tax holiday.

But then there’s the nagging question of ‘how are we going to pay for it? Aren’t we just going to have to borrow more money from China and leave it for our children to pay back? And if it doesn’t work, then where are we, another trillion in debt with nothing to show for it?’
And, in fact the failure to understand that question of ‘how are you going to pay for it’ is exactly what has set the Democratic party, and the nation, on the current path of economic ruin. Therefore, to run successfully against the Democrats who support current policy it is critical you understand what I’m going to say next. This understanding is the basis for achieving our core values of limited government and lower taxes. And what I’m about to tell you is pure, undisputable fact, and not theory or philosophy.

So let me start by examining exactly how government spends at what’s called the operational level. In other words, exactly how does government spend? And this is for the federal government, not the State and local government, who are in much the same position as you and I are. Well, when the federal government spends, it simply changes numbers up in bank accounts. Last May Fed Chairman Bernanke answered Congressman Pelley’s question about where the money comes from that the banks are getting. Bernanke told him the banks have accounts at the Fed and the Fed simply ‘marks them up’- changes the numbers in their bank accounts.

• (PELLEY) Is that tax money that the Fed is spending?
• (BERNANKE) It’s not tax money. The banks have– accounts with the Fed, much the same way that you have an account in a commercial bank. So, to lend to a bank, we simply use the computer to mark up the size of the account that they have with the Fed.

The Chairman is exactly right. All government spending is simply a matter of changing numbers upward in our bank accounts. It doesn’t come from anywhere. Just like when you kick a field goal and get 3 points. Where does the stadium get those points? Right, they don’t come from anywhere. It’s just scorekeeping. And that’s exactly how government actually pays for anything.

All it ever does, and ever can do when it spends, is mark up numbers in bank accounts, as the Fed Chairman told us. And with online banking you can actually watch it happen. When a government payment hits your account you can actually watch as the numbers change upward on your computer screen. And notice I’ve never mentioned China or anyone else in this spending process. They are simply not involved. Spending is done by changing numbers higher in our bank accounts. What China does or doesn’t do has nothing to do with this process. Again, this is not some theory or philosophy. It’s simply how it actually works. I’ve been there, I’ve seen it. I grew up on the money desk at Banker’s Trust on Wall St. in the 70’s, and I visit the Fed regularly and discuss monetary operations. I know exactly how it all works.

Now let’s look at how government taxes. And keep in mind what any Congressman will tell you- we have to get money from taxing or borrowing to be able to spend it.
Well, with modern on line banking you can watch what happens when a tax is paid. Suppose you have $5,000 in your bank account and you write a check to the government for $1,000 to pay your taxes. What happens? You can see it on your computer screen. The number 5,000 changes into the number 4,000. The number 5 changes to the number 4. All the government did is change the number in your bank account. They didn’t ‘get’ anything. No gold coins dropped into a box at the Fed. Yes, they account for it, which means they keep track of what they do, but they don’t actually get anything that they give to anyone. The man at the IRS simply changes numbers down in our bank accounts when he collects taxes. And, if you pay your taxes with actual cash, they give you a receipt, and then shred it. How does taking your cash and shredding it pay for anything? It doesn’t. Taxes don’t give the government anything to use to make payments.

So the absolute fact of the matter is, the government never has nor doesn’t have dollars. It taxes by changing numbers down, but doesn’t get anything. It spends by changing numbers up and doesn’t use up anything. Government can’t ‘run out of money’ like our President has repeated many times. There isn’t anything to run out of. It’s just data entry, it’s score keeping. And it has nothing to do with China, which I’ll get to shortly.

So why then does the government tax at all? To control our spending power, which economists call aggregate demand. If the government didn’t tax us at all and let us spend all the money we earn, and government spent all the money it wanted to spend, the result would be a lot of inflation, caused by more spending then there are real goods and services for sale. Too much spending power chasing too few goods and services is a sure way to drive up prices. So the purpose of taxes is to regulate the economy. If the economy is too hot, taxes can be raised to cool it down. If the economy is too cold, as it obviously is today, taxes should be cut to warm it up back to operating temperature.

Taxes are like the thermostat. When it gets too hot or too cold you adjust it. It’s not about collecting revenues, there is no such thing, government never has nor doesn’t have any dollars, it just changes numbers up and down in our bank accounts. It’s all about looking at the economy and deciding whether it’s too hot or too cold, and then making an adjustment.

So, given all this, just what does ‘fiscal responsibility’ mean?
Fiscal responsibility means not overtaxing us to the point we are at today with record unemployment. And Fiscal Responsibility means not spending so much or taxing so little that the economy ‘overheats’ and inflation becomes a problem. That’s what fiscal responsibility means. That’s all it means. The government is responsible for getting the economy right, and the monetary system, including taxation, is a tool for that job.
Taxation is a tool to get the economy right.

So where does China and borrowing come into the picture? To be a successful Tea Party Democrat you will have to understand this and be able to explain it.
So first, how does China get its dollars? It sells things to us and gets paid for them.

And where does China keep its dollars? In a bank account at the Federal Reserve Bank which they call a reserve account. It’s nothing more than a checking account with a fancy name. And why does China buy Treasury securities? To earn a bit more interest.

And what is a Treasury security? It is nothing more than a savings account at the Federal Reserve Bank with a fancy name. And just like any other savings account at any other bank, with a Treasury security you give the Federal Reserve Bank money, and you get it back plus interest. So when China buys a Treasury security, what happens? The Fed moves their funds- the money they earned from selling things to us- from their checking account at the Fed to their savings account at the Fed.

And what happens when those Treasury securities- savings accounts- come due? How do we pay off China? The Fed just moves the funds from China’s savings account at the Fed back to their checking account at the Fed, and makes the number a little higher to include the interest. That’s it. Debt paid. And our children will continue to do this just like our fathers did before us. None of this involves what we call government spending. When government spends to buy something or pay someone else, it just ‘marks up’- as Chairman Bernanke put it- numbers in bank accounts. China’s bank accounts at the Fed are not involved. So why is this administration kowtowing to China on everything from Korea to human rights? And why do we go over there, thinking they are our government’s bankers, worried about getting their money to spend on everything from health care to Afghanistan, when there is no such thing as the US government getting money to spend? Why? There is only one reason. This administration does not understand the monetary system. They reason the Democrats are against a payroll tax holiday is because they think they need those actual revenues to support their spending.

So yes, we are grossly overtaxed and that’s what’s causing the sky high unemployment and the failed economy, as well as the ongoing banking crisis. And fiscal responsibility means setting taxes at the right level to sustain our spending power- not to hot and not too cold, but just right for optimal output and employment and price stability, and a return to prosperity.

And this brings up the next question, which is how to determine the right size of government. First, tax revenues don’t tell us anything about that. Taxing is just changing numbers down. It doesn’t give us anything to spend. Spending is changing numbers up; there is no numerical limit to spending.

So how do we decide how much government we want if the money doesn’t tell us anything? We do it on a very practical level. For example, when it comes to the military we need to ask ourselves, how many soldiers do we need to defend ourselves? How many planes, boats, tanks, and missiles do we need? The more we need, the more people we take who could be in the private sector producing real private sector goods and services, including doctors and nurses, teachers and teaching assistants, scientists and engineers, etc. etc. The military also uses up real resources like oil and steel. That’s the real cost of the military- how many people and resources it takes away from productive private sector activity.

What is the right size for the legal system? That depends on how long you want to wait for a court date, or for a decision. If the process is too slow, we may need more people working there, or we may need better technology. And again, the more people in government, the fewer there are to work in the private sector.

Once we have decided on the ‘right size’ of government, and pay for it by changing numbers up in people’s bank accounts when government spends, we have to decide the right amount to tax to keep the economy not too hot and not too cold, but just right. My educated guess would be, in a normal economy, to start with taxes that are less then spending by about 5% of GDP, if history is any guide. If I’m wrong taxes can either be lowered or raised to get it right. And when government spends more than it taxes- when it changes numbers up more than it changes down- we call that difference the budget deficit.

And when government changes more numbers changed up than down, the economy has exactly that many more dollars in it, which adds exactly that much to the savings of the economy. In fact, in US National Income Accounting, as taught in economics 101, the government deficit equals the total savings of financial assets in the rest of the economy, to the penny. Yes, deficits add to our monetary savings, to the penny. And everyone I’ve talked to in the Congressional Budget Office knows it. And it’s just common sense as well that if government changes numbers up in our bank accounts more than it changes them down, we have exactly that many more dollars.

Let me add one more thing about the size of government. It makes no sense to me to grow the size of the government just because the economy is too cold, if we already have the right sized government. And if we don’t have the right sized government we should immediately get it right, and then adjust taxes if the economy is too hot or too cold.
With this grasp of the fundamentals of taxing, spending, and the size of government, a Tea Party Democrat is well armed to take on the Democratic establishment that’s overtaxing us, driving up unemployment to today’s record levels, destroying our economy and standard of living, and arbitrarily growing government as well.

Conclusions:

Tea Party Democrats have a unique opportunity to be a part of history and overturn the ideas the current administration is employing that are, at best, regressive, elitist, and destructive to our quality of life.

With unemployment rising, real wage growth falling, and GDP now growing at about 4%, who’s getting that increased GDP? Not the millions who voted Democratic who are losing their jobs and their homes, and watching their wages fall. That real wealth being created is instead rising to the top, due to the Obama administration’s impossible trickle down policies. This administration was not elected to enrich the bankers, insurance executives, drug companies, and union leaders at the expense of the rest of us, in a perversion of true core Democratic values. But it’s clearly happening, and all because they don’t understand the monetary system, the don’t understand how and why government spends and taxes, and the don’t understand why we don’t owe China anything more than a bank statement.

The door is wide open for an enlightened, populist Democrat to lead the way to a new era of unsurpassed national prosperity.

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Looks like nothing is trickling down, at least yet, even with 5.7% real growth. Still going the other way, in fact, for the lowest income groups.

On Wed, Feb 3, 2010 at 9:38 PM, Russell Huntley wrote:

From Jon Prior at HousingWire:

Mortgage Delinquencies Pass 10%: LPS

Home-loan delinquency rates in the US reached 10% in December, up from the record-high 9.97% in November, according to Lender Processing Services … which provides data on mortgage performance.

Accounting for foreclosures in the pipeline, the total non-current rate stands at 13.3% …. When extrapolated for the entire mortgage industry, 7.2m mortgage loans are behind on their payments.

More foreclosures and short sales coming!

Note: the MBA reported the delinquency rate in Q3 was 9.64%; the MBA Q4 delinquency data will be released soon.

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Looks like the economy could have used that 45 billion in lost interest income the Fed turned over to the tsy.

0 rates and QE don’t seem to be all their cracked up to be.

>   
>   (email exchange)
>   
>   On Tue, Jan 12, 2010 at 4:46 PM, wrote:
>   

In December, the Mortgage Brokers Association anticipated an already staggering 24% drop in mortgage originations, a mere month later they now see the drop to be 40%. And all this occurring with Q.E.’s MBS purchases set to expire in less than 3 months.

For November, the amount of job openings dropped back to 2009 lows, at 2.4 million, dropping by 156,000 from October. After hitting a previous low in July, and gradually showing a moderate improvement, the last two months have killed that inflection point.

From the BLS:

There were 2.4 million job openings on the last business day of November 2009, the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics reported today. The job openings rate was little changed over the month at 1.8 percent. The openings rate has held relatively steady since March 2009. The hires rate (3.2 percent) and the separations rate (3.3 percent) were essentially unchanged in November. This release includes estimates of the number and rate of job openings, hires, and separations for the total nonfarm sector by industry and geographic region.

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>   
>   (email exchange)
>   
>   On Mon, Jan 11, 2010 at 9:43 AM, Wray, Randall wrote:
>   
>   This passage is particularly embarrassing:
>   Conventional wisdom holds that the most effective way to break a liquidity trap is with
>   fiscal policy, levering up and risking up the sovereign’s balance sheet to support
>   aggregate demand, when the private sector is delevering and de-risking. In general, we
>   have no quarrel with that. But what holds in general does not necessarily hold in
>   specific countries. And Japan is indeed an exception, because the central bank uniquely
>   has the ability to foster rising inflationary expectations, lower real long-term interest
>   rates, and a lower real exchange value for the yen, all keys to breaking out of her
>   liquidity trap.
>   
>   AND JUST HOW DO WE KNOW THAT??? THE BOJ HAS BEEN TRYING TO CREATE
>    INFLATIONARY EXPECTATIONS FOR 2 DECADES, WITH NO SUCCESS.
>   

Agreed.

And, of course the only risk associated with fiscal expansion is inflation which is what they are trying to accomplish.

If they think they have sufficient public goods and services and want domestic consumption and a shift towards inflation, the direct route of cutting domestic taxes, particularly on the lower income groups, will do the trick very quickly.

Someone ought to do the world a favor and tell them it’s up to the MoF and not the BoJ.

With global growth accelerating in the second half of 2009, policymakers and investors alike naturally turned to discussion and debate regarding central bank exit strategies from the extraordinary, conventional (near-zero policy rates) and unconventional (Quantitative/Credit Easing) accommodation needed to prevent the Great Recession from turning into Depression 2.0. Two key questions dominate: the how of exits and the when of exits.

The Federal Reserve has been exceedingly careful to distinguish between these two questions, providing detailed public discussion of the mechanics of exit, while stressing that economic fundamentals, notably below-target inflation in the context of huge resource slack, particularly labor markets, imply there is no urgent need to implement any exit for an extended period. Other central banks have provided similar guidance, with one major exception, the Bank of Japan (BoJ). And the reason is simple: Japan remains stuck in a deflationary liquidity trap, implying that not only would it be fundamentally wrong for the Bank of Japan to pull back from extraordinary accommodation, but that it should be even more extraordinary.

Thus, we were pleasantly surprised in December that the Bank of Japan publically acknowledged that it would “not tolerate a year-on-year rate of change in the CPI equal to or below 0 percent.” The BoJ’s path to anti-deflation redemption must start somewhere, and simply stating that its comfort zone for inflation does not include zero is a start. The fact of the matter is that the BoJ is trapped in a deflationary lacuna of its own making and can escape if it is willing to do the opposite of what central banks in other developed countries will eventually do in the matter of exit strategies. Simply put, the Bank of Japan needs to credibly commit to not exiting reflationary policies, even as other central banks proceed along that course.

Japan’s Liquidity Trap
An economy enters a liquidity trap when the monetary policy rate is pinned against zero, yet aggregate demand consistently falls short of aggregate supply potential. Such a state of affairs generates enduring economic slack, which in turn generates enduring deflation. That was a very real global risk a year ago, but was met head-on by BoJ’s sister central banks, in particular the Federal Reserve, whose mantra was “whatever it takes.” And while a relapse toward the fat tail risk of global deflationary pressures certainly still exists, that tail has been dramatically flattened by innovative, courageous, and explicitly reflationary policies. Not so for Japan, unfortunately: The country has been in a liquidity trap for almost two decades, with nominal GDP hovering near the levels of the early 1990s. And with a current output gap of 7-8% of its GDP, Japan faces perpetual deflation, unless and until the BoJ walks the reflationary walk.

To be sure, there are many, particularly in high-level policy positions in Japan, who argue that there is nothing more reflationary the BoJ can do, because the country’s liquidity trap is not a temporary one but rather a permanent one. The irony of the argument is that if it is followed, it is guaranteed to be “right,” or at least appear that way, as deflationary expectations remain entrenched and self-feeding. Yes, we recognize that Japan faces unique structural problems, most notably declining demographic growth. But neither in theory nor in practice does such a problem pre-ordain a permanent liquidity trap. It can be broken, if the BoJ were to become willing, in the famous words of Professor Krugman, to act responsibly irresponsible relative to monetary policy orthodoxy.

Conventional wisdom holds that the most effective way to break a liquidity trap is with fiscal policy, levering up and risking up the sovereign’s balance sheet to support aggregate demand, when the private sector is delevering and de-risking. In general, we have no quarrel with that. But what holds in general does not necessarily hold in specific countries. And Japan is indeed an exception, because the central bank uniquely has the ability to foster rising inflationary expectations, lower real long-term interest rates, and a lower real exchange value for the yen, all keys to breaking out of her liquidity trap. Yes, fiscal authorities in Japan can lever the sovereign’s balance sheet in a fashion that would make Keynes blush, but unless the monetary authority rejects orthodoxy, explicitly promising not to exit from reflationary policy, fiscal authorities’ stimulative efforts will be muted.

Krugman/Bernanke’s Prescriptions
Bank of Japan officials suggest that there is not much monetary policy can do, as evidenced by these comments in the minutes of its policy meeting on November 19-202 (our emphasis):

“A few members were of the opinion that the Bank should explain clearly to the public that the underlying cause of the continued decline in prices was the slack in the economy – in other words, the weakness in demand. These members added that to improve the situation it was essential to create an environment whereby final demand – specifically, business fixed investment and private consumption – could achieve self-sustaining growth, and for this purpose it was most important to alleviate households’ concerns about the future and underpin firms’ expectations of future economic growth.”

To be sure, there are indeed structural solutions besides resolutely reflationary monetary policy that would be helpful. For example, supply-side measures including increased immigration and child care facilities would be very helpful to mitigate Japan’s demographic trend. Likewise, a more flexible labor system would allow corporations to more quickly adjust employment to the levels sustainable in the New Normal, and allow them to invest for new opportunities emerging in Asia. Concurrently, accelerating Economic Partnership Agreements (EPA) would allow Japan Inc. to further benefit from Asia’s economic growth and to remain competitive. And the list goes on and on. So the BoJ does have a point: There needs to be many hands on the policy tiller.

But none of the non-monetary actions offers scope for what matters most: Breaking the private sector’s self-feeding deflationary expectations, while generating aggregate demand above the economy’s supply-side potential, lowering the output gap. Indeed, some desirable supply-side structural reforms would, on a cyclical horizon, actually increase the output gap. The unavoidable conclusion must be that reflationary monetary policy must be the workhorse to pull Japan out of its liquidity trap. For such an approach to be effective, it explicitly must not have an exit strategy, but the opposite: a promise to keep on keeping on, resisting all entreaties to pull back until inflation itself, not just inflationary expectations, is unleashed on the upside.

To its credit, the BoJ did adopt a commitment approach when it adopted Quantitative Easing (QE) in 2001, explicitly committing to a continuation of that regime until year-on-year change in the core CPI became positive in a “stable” manner. But when for a few months it appeared that “success” had been achieved in 2006, the BoJ exited QE. Whether or not it was a matter of a genuine policy mistake, made with the best intentions, or a policy mistake borne of a lack of will to be enduringly unorthodox is an open question. But the fact of the matter is that Japan slipped back into deflation soon thereafter. The missing ingredient was a commitment to not only resist pulling back from QE and avoiding rate hikes until inflation turned positive but to continue that policy even after inflation started moving up. And in terms of credibility, the cost has been high: Unless and until the BoJ commits credibly, backed by money-printing actions, to behaving “irresponsibly relative to orthodox, conventional thinking,” Japan will remain stuck in a liquidity trap.

If the BoJ needs academic footing to do what needs to be done, it could well follow then-Fed Governor Bernanke’s 2003 suggestion: Rather than targeting the inflation rate, the BoJ could target restoring the pre-deflation price level, meaning that deflationary sins are not forgiven. This way, Mr. Bernanke argued, the public would view reflationary increases in the BoJ’s balance sheet and the money stock as permanent, rather than something to be “taken back” at the earliest orthodox opportunity.

The BoJ: Time to Act Aggressively
Japan’s problem is deflation, not inflation as far as an eye can see. An “all-in” reflationary policy is what is needed.

Three concepts the BoJ could consider:

1. Explicitly promise there will be no exit from QE and no rate hikes until inflation is not just positive, but meaningfully positive. One way to do this would be to adopt a price level target rather than an inflation target, embracing the idea that past deflationary sins will not only not be forgiven but require even more aggressive reflationary atonement.

2. Buy unlimited amounts of the long-dated Japanese Government Bonds (JGBs) to pull down nominal yields, with an accord with the fiscal authority to absorb any future losses on JGBs, once reflationary policy has borne its fruits, generating a bear market in JGBs.

3. Working with the Ministry of Finance, sell unlimited amounts of Yen against other developed countries’ currencies, printing the necessary Yen.

Our read is that the BoJ has not concluded that such bold steps are required. But as Mr. Bernanke intoned,3 no country with a fiat currency, which borrows in its own currency in the context of a current account deficit, should ever willingly embrace deflation. It is to be fervently hoped that the Bank of Japan’s rhetorical reflationary thaw of December, declaring it will not “tolerate” zero or below inflation, will give way to active reflationary green shoots by spring.

Meanwhile, markets don’t wait. And if it becomes clear that the BoJ really does “get it,” the currency markets will be way out in front of the BoJ.

Paul McCulley
Managing Director

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