The Center of the Universe

St Croix, United States Virgin Islands

MOSLER'S LAW: There is no financial crisis so deep that a sufficiently large tax cut or spending increase cannot deal with it.

Archive for the 'Interest Rates' Category


david walker okays deficits???!!!

Posted by WARREN MOSLER on 25th February 2010

>   
>   (email exchange)
>   
>   On Thu, Feb 25, 2010 at 12:54 PM, Roger wrote:
>   
>   am I reading this right?
>   
>   he seems to be admitting the difference between “structural” and nominal deficits, but
>   is still fixated on debt/GDP ratios, not to mention national “revenue”
>   
>   nevertheless, some progress is better than none, and ANY sign of movement is a
>   step in the right direction
>   

Agreed!

Looks like a serious chink in the armor of what used to be deficit terrorist #1???!!!

Address jobs now and deficits later

By LAWRENCE MISHEL & DAVID M. WALKER

Feb. 24 (Politico) — President Barack Obama is in a difficult position when it comes to deficits. Today’s high deficits will have to go even higher to help address unemployment. At the same time, many Americans are increasingly concerned about escalating deficits and debt. What’s a president to do?

The answer, from a policy perspective, is not that hard: A focus on jobs now is consistent with addressing our deficit problems ahead.

The difficulty is that many politicians and news organizations often cast deficit debates as a dichotomy: You either care about them or you don’t.

But this is rarely accurate. The fact that the two of us, who have philosophical differences on the proper role of government, find much to agree on about deficits is a testament to the importance of dropping this useless dichotomy and finally talking about deficits in a reasonable way.

As in every economic downturn, federal revenues have fallen steeply because individuals and corporations earn less in a recession. High unemployment also results in higher expenditures for safety net programs, like Medicaid, unemployment benefits and food stamps.

Not surprisingly then, a huge recession can yield a huge deficit. Efforts to put people back to work and help restore the economy, like the recovery package passed last February, can also increase short-term deficits.

Though a concern, most of the recent short-term rise in the deficit is understandable. Furthermore, public spending can help compensate for the fall in private spending, and help stem the pain of substantial job losses.

With more than a fifth of the work force expected to be unemployed or underemployed in 2010, there is an economic and a moral imperative to take action. Persistently high unemployment drives poverty up, makes it harder for families to find decent housing, increases family stress and, ultimately, harms children’s educational achievement. For young workers entering the workforce, the current jobs crisis reduces the amount they will earn over their lifetime.

In deep recessions, businesses tend to make fewer critical investments in research and development that can improve our economy’s productive capacity over the long term. Entrepreneurs usually find credit hard to obtain if they want to start a new business. These factors hurt U.S. global competitiveness and growth potential.

That’s why we agree that job creation must be a short-term priority. Job creation plans must be targeted so we can get the greatest return on investment. They must be timely, creating jobs this year and next. And they must be big enough to substantially fill the enormous jobs hole we’re in. They must also be temporary — affecting the deficit only in the next couple of years, without exacerbating our large and growing structural deficits in later years.

Funding key investment and infrastructure projects to promote economic growth and offering a job creation tax credit are among the policy ideas that meet all these standards. In addition, temporarily renewing extended unemployment benefits can lead to more jobs throughout the economy.
But these problems, and the resulting short-term deficits they cause, should not be confused with the primary deficit challenge facing our nation: structural deficits. These deficits are projected to exist in coming years — even when the country is at peace, even when the economy is growing, even when unemployment falls.

Specifically, the deficit could approach an already unsustainable 6 percent of gross domestic product 10 years from now, and will continue to rise thereafter.

While we address our short-term unemployment challenges, we must also immediately establish a path to address our large, and growing, structural deficits.

The Congressional Budget Office projects that after the economy has returned to full employment, spending will still substantially outstrip revenues. Over time, Medicare and Medicaid will be the key drivers of these structural deficits. This is primarily because these programs’ costs tend to mirror overall cost increases for health care, which have risen much faster than overall economic growth for decades, but also because of demographic changes.

Our nation’s fiscal picture will darken further with the passage of time, especially if interest rates increase.

These structural deficits are too substantial to close the gap without addressing both sides of the ledger: spending and revenues.

In doing so, it is important to distinguish critical and effective programs and tax policies from outdated and ineffective ones.

We must be careful to maintain the type of public investments that can help fuel broad-based economic growth while strengthening the safety net for our most vulnerable populations. And we should take into account growing retirement insecurity as employer pension systems erode and personal savings falter.

People should be able to count on government benefits they are promised. It is, therefore, critical that federal benefit and funding levels be reconciled.

None of this will be easy — not the policy or the politics. It will require hard choices, and an extraordinary process to engage the American people and to make recommendations to the Congress on budget controls, spending cuts and revenue increases.

Getting the deficit under control cannot be accomplished by simply ending “waste, fraud and abuse,” stopping all foreign aid or exiting Iraq and Afghanistan. Substantial progress could be made though by ending the tax cuts of 2001 and 2003, or paying for their extension through spending reductions. In the end, Congress must step up to the plate, not just with hearings, but with votes.

For all the disagreement in Washington, we both know that, like us, there are many who see the critical importance of addressing these challenges. We must accept higher deficits in the short-term in order to put people back to work.

At the same time, we must take immediate steps to agree on a path and a process for reducing the structural deficits that lie ahead.

In a town of division, this is one area where we need a real consensus now.

http://moslereconomics.com/wp-content/plugins/sociofluid/images/digg_48.png http://moslereconomics.com/wp-content/plugins/sociofluid/images/stumbleupon_48.png http://moslereconomics.com/wp-content/plugins/sociofluid/images/delicious_48.png http://moslereconomics.com/wp-content/plugins/sociofluid/images/newsvine_48.png http://moslereconomics.com/wp-content/plugins/sociofluid/images/technorati_48.png http://moslereconomics.com/wp-content/plugins/sociofluid/images/facebook_48.png http://moslereconomics.com/wp-content/plugins/sociofluid/images/twitter_48.png

Posted in Employment, Government Spending, Inflation, Interest Rates | 69 Comments »

updates

Posted by WARREN MOSLER on 25th February 2010

Markets are getting closer to the idea that:

Interest rates don’t/won’t help
QE doesn’t/won’t help

With the larger point being coming to terms with the possibility the Fed can’t inflate, or do much of anything that actually matters for the real economy, except maybe fund zombie entities to keep them from failing.

So bonds are throwing in the inflation towel and yields are coming down.
The dollar is going up with miles to go before ppp is reached.
Gold is well off the highs and being held up probably by europeans running from the euro to dollars and a bit of gold.

(***Bernanke just again testified that a contango in futures prices is a reasonable forecast of higher prices down the road. So much for the credibility of their inflation forecast)

Meanwhile the eurozone is continuing it’s methodical implosion with no credible response in sight.
And the realization that all eurozone bank deposits are only insured by the national govts has yet to hit the headlines.

The Obama administration believes the US Treasury is ‘out of money’ and we have to borrow from China to spend and leave that for our children to pay back.
So any kind of meaningful US fiscal response seems off the table.

The American economy works best when people working for a living make enough to be able to one way or another buy their own output, and business competes for their dollars. It’s not happening.

We are grossly overtaxed for current circumstances with no meaningful relief in sight.

Lots of reasons to stay on the sidelines.

http://moslereconomics.com/wp-content/plugins/sociofluid/images/digg_48.png http://moslereconomics.com/wp-content/plugins/sociofluid/images/stumbleupon_48.png http://moslereconomics.com/wp-content/plugins/sociofluid/images/delicious_48.png http://moslereconomics.com/wp-content/plugins/sociofluid/images/newsvine_48.png http://moslereconomics.com/wp-content/plugins/sociofluid/images/technorati_48.png http://moslereconomics.com/wp-content/plugins/sociofluid/images/facebook_48.png http://moslereconomics.com/wp-content/plugins/sociofluid/images/twitter_48.png

Posted in China, EU, Government Spending, Interest Rates, Obama, Political, Trading | 5 Comments »

Bernanke testimony

Posted by WARREN MOSLER on 24th February 2010


Karim writes:

Generally more upbeat on economic conditions….the ‘2 Es’ remain, but adds high-profile qualifier ‘ALTHOUGH’…watching Q&A

Final Demand
Private final demand does seem to be growing at a moderate pace, buoyed in part by a general improvement in financial conditions. In particular, consumer spending has recently picked up, reflecting gains in real disposable income and household wealth and tentative signs of stabilization in the labor market. Business investment in equipment and software has risen significantly. And international trade–supported by a recovery in the economies of many of our trading partners–is rebounding from its deep contraction of a year ago. However, starts of single-family homes, which rose noticeably this past spring, have recently been roughly flat, and commercial construction is declining sharply, reflecting poor fundamentals and continued difficulty in obtaining financing.

Credit
The improvement in financial markets that began last spring continues. Conditions in short-term funding markets have returned to near pre-crisis levels. Many (mostly larger) firms have been able to issue corporate bonds or new equity and do not seem to be hampered by a lack of credit. In contrast, bank lending continues to contract, reflecting both tightened lending standards and weak demand for credit amid uncertain economic prospects.

Jobs
Some recent indicators suggest the deterioration in the labor market is abating: Job losses have slowed considerably, and the number of full-time jobs in manufacturing rose modestly in January. Initial claims for unemployment insurance have continued to trend lower, and the temporary services industry, often considered a bellwether for the employment outlook, has been expanding steadily since October. Notwithstanding these positive signs, the job market remains quite weak, with the unemployment rate near 10 percent and job openings scarce.

FF Rate
Although the federal funds rate is likely to remain exceptionally low for an extended period, as the expansion matures, the Federal Reserve will at some point need to begin to tighten monetary conditions to prevent the development of inflationary pressures.

Sequencing
Of course, the sequencing of steps and the combination of tools that the Federal Reserve uses as it exits from its currently very accommodative policy stance will depend on economic and financial developments.

http://moslereconomics.com/wp-content/plugins/sociofluid/images/digg_48.png http://moslereconomics.com/wp-content/plugins/sociofluid/images/stumbleupon_48.png http://moslereconomics.com/wp-content/plugins/sociofluid/images/delicious_48.png http://moslereconomics.com/wp-content/plugins/sociofluid/images/newsvine_48.png http://moslereconomics.com/wp-content/plugins/sociofluid/images/technorati_48.png http://moslereconomics.com/wp-content/plugins/sociofluid/images/facebook_48.png http://moslereconomics.com/wp-content/plugins/sociofluid/images/twitter_48.png

Posted in Credit, Employment, Interest Rates | No Comments »

Dallas address

Posted by WARREN MOSLER on 4th February 2010


[Skip to the end]

This is the text of the address I gave at Dallas.

Will be repeating it in a northern Va meeting next weekend.

Still waiting for the video.

Feel free to distribute.

How tea party democrats can run successfully in the primaries

Honesty in government is a core value of the Tea Party movement and the most basic value in any representative democracy. Accordingly, my first proposal is that all candidates for public office be sworn in: ‘I solemnly swear to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help me God.’ As a consequence, any subsequent lies are perjury, and punishable by law.

I am here to discuss how I believe Tea Party Democrats can win in upcoming Democratic primaries. The answer is to emulate and extend the success of the Tea Party movement by getting back to basics. The Democratic party is the party of Jefferson and Jackson. The founders believed that the public voice should be heard. They believed in limited government. And they never kowtowed to special interests or cowered before purveyors of the conventional wisdom. This means Tea Party Democrats should be running against the Obama administration’s policies which are counter to both traditional Democratic values and Tea Party values.

It is the Washington elite that have moved away from the ideals of Jefferson and Jackson with policies that are, at best, regressive, elitist, and destructive to our quality of life. For example, with unemployment rising, real wage growth falling, and GDP now growing at over 5%, who’s getting all that increase in real goods and services?

Not the millions who voted Democratic who are losing their jobs and their homes, and watching wages fall even as their cost of living goes up. All that real wealth being created is instead rising to the top, due to impossible trickle down policies that would have made even Reagan blush.

The large majority of Americans that elected this administration did not do so to enrich the bankers, insurance executives, drug companies, and union leaders at the expense of the rest of us, in a perversion of true core Democratic values. But it’s clearly happening as even a blind man can see. And all because they don’t understand the monetary system, how and why government spends and taxes, and why we don’t owe China anything more than a bank statement.

I will devote most of the rest of my time talking about the economy. In part, that is because it is my area of expertise, given that I have spent most of my adult life in financial markets. But the most important reason is it is in that arena that the Washington elite have failed us the most. The so-called economic experts have confused themselves and their political masters with contrived explanations for the way the economy works. Their limited vision has limited the range of policy choice. And the result has been a monumental economic disaster and human tragedy.

My first proposal for the economy encompasses both the Tea Party and traditional Democratic values of limited government, fiscal responsibility, and reliance on competitive markets. Working through the logic of this proposal will show both how this straightforward government policy can work, and how convoluted is the elite’s understanding of finance.

I believe that the surest engine for full economic recovery is a full payroll tax holiday. Payroll taxes take away over 15% of everyone’s paycheck, from the very first dollar earned. This is big money- about $1 trillion per year. Half comes from the employee and half from the employer. A payroll tax holiday does not give anyone anything. What it does is stop taking away $1 trillion a year from working people struggling to make their payments and stay in their homes, and businesses struggling to survive. A full payroll tax holiday means a husband and wife earning $50,000 a year each will see their combined take home pay go up by over $650 a month, so they can make their mortgage payments and their car payments and maybe even do a little shopping.

This fixes the banks and fixes the economy, from what I call the bottom up. It fixes the banks without giving them anything more than people who can afford to make their payments. That’s all they need to remain viable.

And what all businesses need most to expand output and employment is people with spending money who can buy their products. Without people to buy goods and services, nothing happens. The payroll tax holiday also means there is also a big reduction in expenses for business. With competitive markets this means lower prices, which also helps consumers, helps keep inflation down, helps businesses compete domestically and in world markets to help optimize our real terms of trade, and helps keep the currency stable as the dollar is ultimately worth what it can buy. So with the payroll tax holiday we get a dramatic increase in economic activity, rising employment in good jobs, and better prices. And we’ll see millions of new jobs, because, again, what business needs most is people with money to buy their products. Then they hire and expand.

What I don’t see is how any self respecting Democrat can allow this tax to stand for a single moment. It is the most regressive, punishing tax we’ve ever had. It starts from the first dollar earned with a cap at $106,800 per year. It’s an utter disgrace to the Democratic party. It should be immediately eliminated. Yet, instead, the Washington Democratic elite are actually discussing increasing it.

Let’s now back up and review how we got to where we are at this moment in time. Headline unemployment is unthinkably high at 10%, and if you count workers who have given up looking for a full time job, it’s over 17%. As you all know, it’s about the financial crisis. The banks got in trouble when their loans went bad. Well, what makes a loan go bad? Only one thing- people who can’t make their payments. If people make their payments, the loans are AAA. If people don’t make their payments the loans are junk and toxic waste. No matter what the security is- a loan, a cmo, cdo, clo, or whatever, it’s all the same. If people are making their loan payments there is no financial crisis. Unfortunately, instead of attacking the problem from the bottom up with a payroll tax holiday, we have an administration that thinks it first needs to fix the financial sector from the top down, before the real economy can improve. This is completely upside down. But the elites believe it, so that’s what they have done to us.

So starting with President Bush, and supported by both Senators McCain and Obama, they funded the financial sector with trillions, while they kept taking away trillions from people working for a living who couldn’t make their payments.

How does that help anyone make their payments, apart from a few bankers? It doesn’t.

What happened for the next year and a half? The banks muddled through, profits and bonuses returned, but unemployment skyrocketed and is still going up, loan delinquencies and defaults and foreclosures skyrocketed and are still going up, and millions of Americans still can’t make their payments and are losing their homes. And a lot of the money the banks are making on federal support is being drained by continuing loan losses. We are getting nowhere as tens of millions of lives are being destroyed by policy makers who simply don’t understand how the monetary system works.

This has been a trickle down policy where nothing has trickled down, because there is no connection between funding the banks, and the incomes of people trying to make their payments. The answer, of course, is instead of giving trillions to the banks, to simply stop taking away trillions from people still working for a living. The government doesn’t even have to give us anything, just stop taking away the trillion dollars a year of payroll taxes with a full payroll tax holiday.

But then there’s the nagging question of ‘how are we going to pay for it? Aren’t we just going to have to borrow more money from China and leave it for our children to pay back? And if it doesn’t work, then where are we, another trillion in debt with nothing to show for it?’
And, in fact the failure to understand that question of ‘how are you going to pay for it’ is exactly what has set the Democratic party, and the nation, on the current path of economic ruin. Therefore, to run successfully against the Democrats who support current policy it is critical you understand what I’m going to say next. This understanding is the basis for achieving our core values of limited government and lower taxes. And what I’m about to tell you is pure, undisputable fact, and not theory or philosophy.

So let me start by examining exactly how government spends at what’s called the operational level. In other words, exactly how does government spend? And this is for the federal government, not the State and local government, who are in much the same position as you and I are. Well, when the federal government spends, it simply changes numbers up in bank accounts. Last May Fed Chairman Bernanke answered Congressman Pelley’s question about where the money comes from that the banks are getting. Bernanke told him the banks have accounts at the Fed and the Fed simply ‘marks them up’- changes the numbers in their bank accounts.

• (PELLEY) Is that tax money that the Fed is spending?
• (BERNANKE) It’s not tax money. The banks have– accounts with the Fed, much the same way that you have an account in a commercial bank. So, to lend to a bank, we simply use the computer to mark up the size of the account that they have with the Fed.

The Chairman is exactly right. All government spending is simply a matter of changing numbers upward in our bank accounts. It doesn’t come from anywhere. Just like when you kick a field goal and get 3 points. Where does the stadium get those points? Right, they don’t come from anywhere. It’s just scorekeeping. And that’s exactly how government actually pays for anything.

All it ever does, and ever can do when it spends, is mark up numbers in bank accounts, as the Fed Chairman told us. And with online banking you can actually watch it happen. When a government payment hits your account you can actually watch as the numbers change upward on your computer screen. And notice I’ve never mentioned China or anyone else in this spending process. They are simply not involved. Spending is done by changing numbers higher in our bank accounts. What China does or doesn’t do has nothing to do with this process. Again, this is not some theory or philosophy. It’s simply how it actually works. I’ve been there, I’ve seen it. I grew up on the money desk at Banker’s Trust on Wall St. in the 70’s, and I visit the Fed regularly and discuss monetary operations. I know exactly how it all works.

Now let’s look at how government taxes. And keep in mind what any Congressman will tell you- we have to get money from taxing or borrowing to be able to spend it.
Well, with modern on line banking you can watch what happens when a tax is paid. Suppose you have $5,000 in your bank account and you write a check to the government for $1,000 to pay your taxes. What happens? You can see it on your computer screen. The number 5,000 changes into the number 4,000. The number 5 changes to the number 4. All the government did is change the number in your bank account. They didn’t ‘get’ anything. No gold coins dropped into a box at the Fed. Yes, they account for it, which means they keep track of what they do, but they don’t actually get anything that they give to anyone. The man at the IRS simply changes numbers down in our bank accounts when he collects taxes. And, if you pay your taxes with actual cash, they give you a receipt, and then shred it. How does taking your cash and shredding it pay for anything? It doesn’t. Taxes don’t give the government anything to use to make payments.

So the absolute fact of the matter is, the government never has nor doesn’t have dollars. It taxes by changing numbers down, but doesn’t get anything. It spends by changing numbers up and doesn’t use up anything. Government can’t ‘run out of money’ like our President has repeated many times. There isn’t anything to run out of. It’s just data entry, it’s score keeping. And it has nothing to do with China, which I’ll get to shortly.

So why then does the government tax at all? To control our spending power, which economists call aggregate demand. If the government didn’t tax us at all and let us spend all the money we earn, and government spent all the money it wanted to spend, the result would be a lot of inflation, caused by more spending then there are real goods and services for sale. Too much spending power chasing too few goods and services is a sure way to drive up prices. So the purpose of taxes is to regulate the economy. If the economy is too hot, taxes can be raised to cool it down. If the economy is too cold, as it obviously is today, taxes should be cut to warm it up back to operating temperature.

Taxes are like the thermostat. When it gets too hot or too cold you adjust it. It’s not about collecting revenues, there is no such thing, government never has nor doesn’t have any dollars, it just changes numbers up and down in our bank accounts. It’s all about looking at the economy and deciding whether it’s too hot or too cold, and then making an adjustment.

So, given all this, just what does ‘fiscal responsibility’ mean?
Fiscal responsibility means not overtaxing us to the point we are at today with record unemployment. And Fiscal Responsibility means not spending so much or taxing so little that the economy ‘overheats’ and inflation becomes a problem. That’s what fiscal responsibility means. That’s all it means. The government is responsible for getting the economy right, and the monetary system, including taxation, is a tool for that job.
Taxation is a tool to get the economy right.

So where does China and borrowing come into the picture? To be a successful Tea Party Democrat you will have to understand this and be able to explain it.
So first, how does China get its dollars? It sells things to us and gets paid for them.

And where does China keep its dollars? In a bank account at the Federal Reserve Bank which they call a reserve account. It’s nothing more than a checking account with a fancy name. And why does China buy Treasury securities? To earn a bit more interest.

And what is a Treasury security? It is nothing more than a savings account at the Federal Reserve Bank with a fancy name. And just like any other savings account at any other bank, with a Treasury security you give the Federal Reserve Bank money, and you get it back plus interest. So when China buys a Treasury security, what happens? The Fed moves their funds- the money they earned from selling things to us- from their checking account at the Fed to their savings account at the Fed.

And what happens when those Treasury securities- savings accounts- come due? How do we pay off China? The Fed just moves the funds from China’s savings account at the Fed back to their checking account at the Fed, and makes the number a little higher to include the interest. That’s it. Debt paid. And our children will continue to do this just like our fathers did before us. None of this involves what we call government spending. When government spends to buy something or pay someone else, it just ‘marks up’- as Chairman Bernanke put it- numbers in bank accounts. China’s bank accounts at the Fed are not involved. So why is this administration kowtowing to China on everything from Korea to human rights? And why do we go over there, thinking they are our government’s bankers, worried about getting their money to spend on everything from health care to Afghanistan, when there is no such thing as the US government getting money to spend? Why? There is only one reason. This administration does not understand the monetary system. They reason the Democrats are against a payroll tax holiday is because they think they need those actual revenues to support their spending.

So yes, we are grossly overtaxed and that’s what’s causing the sky high unemployment and the failed economy, as well as the ongoing banking crisis. And fiscal responsibility means setting taxes at the right level to sustain our spending power- not to hot and not too cold, but just right for optimal output and employment and price stability, and a return to prosperity.

And this brings up the next question, which is how to determine the right size of government. First, tax revenues don’t tell us anything about that. Taxing is just changing numbers down. It doesn’t give us anything to spend. Spending is changing numbers up; there is no numerical limit to spending.

So how do we decide how much government we want if the money doesn’t tell us anything? We do it on a very practical level. For example, when it comes to the military we need to ask ourselves, how many soldiers do we need to defend ourselves? How many planes, boats, tanks, and missiles do we need? The more we need, the more people we take who could be in the private sector producing real private sector goods and services, including doctors and nurses, teachers and teaching assistants, scientists and engineers, etc. etc. The military also uses up real resources like oil and steel. That’s the real cost of the military- how many people and resources it takes away from productive private sector activity.

What is the right size for the legal system? That depends on how long you want to wait for a court date, or for a decision. If the process is too slow, we may need more people working there, or we may need better technology. And again, the more people in government, the fewer there are to work in the private sector.

Once we have decided on the ‘right size’ of government, and pay for it by changing numbers up in people’s bank accounts when government spends, we have to decide the right amount to tax to keep the economy not too hot and not too cold, but just right. My educated guess would be, in a normal economy, to start with taxes that are less then spending by about 5% of GDP, if history is any guide. If I’m wrong taxes can either be lowered or raised to get it right. And when government spends more than it taxes- when it changes numbers up more than it changes down- we call that difference the budget deficit.

And when government changes more numbers changed up than down, the economy has exactly that many more dollars in it, which adds exactly that much to the savings of the economy. In fact, in US National Income Accounting, as taught in economics 101, the government deficit equals the total savings of financial assets in the rest of the economy, to the penny. Yes, deficits add to our monetary savings, to the penny. And everyone I’ve talked to in the Congressional Budget Office knows it. And it’s just common sense as well that if government changes numbers up in our bank accounts more than it changes them down, we have exactly that many more dollars.

Let me add one more thing about the size of government. It makes no sense to me to grow the size of the government just because the economy is too cold, if we already have the right sized government. And if we don’t have the right sized government we should immediately get it right, and then adjust taxes if the economy is too hot or too cold.
With this grasp of the fundamentals of taxing, spending, and the size of government, a Tea Party Democrat is well armed to take on the Democratic establishment that’s overtaxing us, driving up unemployment to today’s record levels, destroying our economy and standard of living, and arbitrarily growing government as well.

Conclusions:

Tea Party Democrats have a unique opportunity to be a part of history and overturn the ideas the current administration is employing that are, at best, regressive, elitist, and destructive to our quality of life.

With unemployment rising, real wage growth falling, and GDP now growing at about 4%, who’s getting that increased GDP? Not the millions who voted Democratic who are losing their jobs and their homes, and watching their wages fall. That real wealth being created is instead rising to the top, due to the Obama administration’s impossible trickle down policies. This administration was not elected to enrich the bankers, insurance executives, drug companies, and union leaders at the expense of the rest of us, in a perversion of true core Democratic values. But it’s clearly happening, and all because they don’t understand the monetary system, the don’t understand how and why government spends and taxes, and the don’t understand why we don’t owe China anything more than a bank statement.

The door is wide open for an enlightened, populist Democrat to lead the way to a new era of unsurpassed national prosperity.


[top]

http://moslereconomics.com/wp-content/plugins/sociofluid/images/digg_48.png http://moslereconomics.com/wp-content/plugins/sociofluid/images/stumbleupon_48.png http://moslereconomics.com/wp-content/plugins/sociofluid/images/delicious_48.png http://moslereconomics.com/wp-content/plugins/sociofluid/images/newsvine_48.png http://moslereconomics.com/wp-content/plugins/sociofluid/images/technorati_48.png http://moslereconomics.com/wp-content/plugins/sociofluid/images/facebook_48.png http://moslereconomics.com/wp-content/plugins/sociofluid/images/twitter_48.png

Posted in China, Currencies, Deficit, Employment, Fed, GDP, Government Spending, Interest Rates, Obama, Political, Tea Party | 17 Comments »

Mortgage Delinquencies Pass 10%

Posted by WARREN MOSLER on 4th February 2010


[Skip to the end]

Looks like nothing is trickling down, at least yet, even with 5.7% real growth. Still going the other way, in fact, for the lowest income groups.

On Wed, Feb 3, 2010 at 9:38 PM, Russell Huntley wrote:

From Jon Prior at HousingWire:

Mortgage Delinquencies Pass 10%: LPS

Home-loan delinquency rates in the US reached 10% in December, up from the record-high 9.97% in November, according to Lender Processing Services … which provides data on mortgage performance.

Accounting for foreclosures in the pipeline, the total non-current rate stands at 13.3% …. When extrapolated for the entire mortgage industry, 7.2m mortgage loans are behind on their payments.

More foreclosures and short sales coming!

Note: the MBA reported the delinquency rate in Q3 was 9.64%; the MBA Q4 delinquency data will be released soon.


[top]

http://moslereconomics.com/wp-content/plugins/sociofluid/images/digg_48.png http://moslereconomics.com/wp-content/plugins/sociofluid/images/stumbleupon_48.png http://moslereconomics.com/wp-content/plugins/sociofluid/images/delicious_48.png http://moslereconomics.com/wp-content/plugins/sociofluid/images/newsvine_48.png http://moslereconomics.com/wp-content/plugins/sociofluid/images/technorati_48.png http://moslereconomics.com/wp-content/plugins/sociofluid/images/facebook_48.png http://moslereconomics.com/wp-content/plugins/sociofluid/images/twitter_48.png

Posted in Housing, Interest Rates | 48 Comments »

Quantitative Easing in action

Posted by WARREN MOSLER on 13th January 2010


[Skip to the end]

Looks like the economy could have used that 45 billion in lost interest income the Fed turned over to the tsy.

0 rates and QE don’t seem to be all their cracked up to be.

>   
>   (email exchange)
>   
>   On Tue, Jan 12, 2010 at 4:46 PM, wrote:
>   

In December, the Mortgage Brokers Association anticipated an already staggering 24% drop in mortgage originations, a mere month later they now see the drop to be 40%. And all this occurring with Q.E.’s MBS purchases set to expire in less than 3 months.

For November, the amount of job openings dropped back to 2009 lows, at 2.4 million, dropping by 156,000 from October. After hitting a previous low in July, and gradually showing a moderate improvement, the last two months have killed that inflection point.






From the BLS:

There were 2.4 million job openings on the last business day of November 2009, the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics reported today. The job openings rate was little changed over the month at 1.8 percent. The openings rate has held relatively steady since March 2009. The hires rate (3.2 percent) and the separations rate (3.3 percent) were essentially unchanged in November. This release includes estimates of the number and rate of job openings, hires, and separations for the total nonfarm sector by industry and geographic region.


[top]

http://moslereconomics.com/wp-content/plugins/sociofluid/images/digg_48.png http://moslereconomics.com/wp-content/plugins/sociofluid/images/stumbleupon_48.png http://moslereconomics.com/wp-content/plugins/sociofluid/images/delicious_48.png http://moslereconomics.com/wp-content/plugins/sociofluid/images/newsvine_48.png http://moslereconomics.com/wp-content/plugins/sociofluid/images/technorati_48.png http://moslereconomics.com/wp-content/plugins/sociofluid/images/facebook_48.png http://moslereconomics.com/wp-content/plugins/sociofluid/images/twitter_48.png

Posted in Fed, Interest Rates | No Comments »

PIMCO on Japan

Posted by WARREN MOSLER on 11th January 2010


[Skip to the end]

>   
>   (email exchange)
>   
>   On Mon, Jan 11, 2010 at 9:43 AM, Wray, Randall wrote:
>   
>   This passage is particularly embarrassing:
>   Conventional wisdom holds that the most effective way to break a liquidity trap is with
>   fiscal policy, levering up and risking up the sovereign’s balance sheet to support
>   aggregate demand, when the private sector is delevering and de-risking. In general, we
>   have no quarrel with that. But what holds in general does not necessarily hold in
>   specific countries. And Japan is indeed an exception, because the central bank uniquely
>   has the ability to foster rising inflationary expectations, lower real long-term interest
>   rates, and a lower real exchange value for the yen, all keys to breaking out of her
>   liquidity trap.
>   
>   AND JUST HOW DO WE KNOW THAT??? THE BOJ HAS BEEN TRYING TO CREATE
>    INFLATIONARY EXPECTATIONS FOR 2 DECADES, WITH NO SUCCESS.
>   

Agreed.

And, of course the only risk associated with fiscal expansion is inflation which is what they are trying to accomplish.

If they think they have sufficient public goods and services and want domestic consumption and a shift towards inflation, the direct route of cutting domestic taxes, particularly on the lower income groups, will do the trick very quickly.

Someone ought to do the world a favor and tell them it’s up to the MoF and not the BoJ.

With global growth accelerating in the second half of 2009, policymakers and investors alike naturally turned to discussion and debate regarding central bank exit strategies from the extraordinary, conventional (near-zero policy rates) and unconventional (Quantitative/Credit Easing) accommodation needed to prevent the Great Recession from turning into Depression 2.0. Two key questions dominate: the how of exits and the when of exits.

The Federal Reserve has been exceedingly careful to distinguish between these two questions, providing detailed public discussion of the mechanics of exit, while stressing that economic fundamentals, notably below-target inflation in the context of huge resource slack, particularly labor markets, imply there is no urgent need to implement any exit for an extended period. Other central banks have provided similar guidance, with one major exception, the Bank of Japan (BoJ). And the reason is simple: Japan remains stuck in a deflationary liquidity trap, implying that not only would it be fundamentally wrong for the Bank of Japan to pull back from extraordinary accommodation, but that it should be even more extraordinary.

Thus, we were pleasantly surprised in December that the Bank of Japan publically acknowledged that it would “not tolerate a year-on-year rate of change in the CPI equal to or below 0 percent.” The BoJ’s path to anti-deflation redemption must start somewhere, and simply stating that its comfort zone for inflation does not include zero is a start. The fact of the matter is that the BoJ is trapped in a deflationary lacuna of its own making and can escape if it is willing to do the opposite of what central banks in other developed countries will eventually do in the matter of exit strategies. Simply put, the Bank of Japan needs to credibly commit to not exiting reflationary policies, even as other central banks proceed along that course.

Japan’s Liquidity Trap
An economy enters a liquidity trap when the monetary policy rate is pinned against zero, yet aggregate demand consistently falls short of aggregate supply potential. Such a state of affairs generates enduring economic slack, which in turn generates enduring deflation. That was a very real global risk a year ago, but was met head-on by BoJ’s sister central banks, in particular the Federal Reserve, whose mantra was “whatever it takes.” And while a relapse toward the fat tail risk of global deflationary pressures certainly still exists, that tail has been dramatically flattened by innovative, courageous, and explicitly reflationary policies. Not so for Japan, unfortunately: The country has been in a liquidity trap for almost two decades, with nominal GDP hovering near the levels of the early 1990s. And with a current output gap of 7-8% of its GDP, Japan faces perpetual deflation, unless and until the BoJ walks the reflationary walk.

To be sure, there are many, particularly in high-level policy positions in Japan, who argue that there is nothing more reflationary the BoJ can do, because the country’s liquidity trap is not a temporary one but rather a permanent one. The irony of the argument is that if it is followed, it is guaranteed to be “right,” or at least appear that way, as deflationary expectations remain entrenched and self-feeding. Yes, we recognize that Japan faces unique structural problems, most notably declining demographic growth. But neither in theory nor in practice does such a problem pre-ordain a permanent liquidity trap. It can be broken, if the BoJ were to become willing, in the famous words of Professor Krugman, to act responsibly irresponsible relative to monetary policy orthodoxy.

Conventional wisdom holds that the most effective way to break a liquidity trap is with fiscal policy, levering up and risking up the sovereign’s balance sheet to support aggregate demand, when the private sector is delevering and de-risking. In general, we have no quarrel with that. But what holds in general does not necessarily hold in specific countries. And Japan is indeed an exception, because the central bank uniquely has the ability to foster rising inflationary expectations, lower real long-term interest rates, and a lower real exchange value for the yen, all keys to breaking out of her liquidity trap. Yes, fiscal authorities in Japan can lever the sovereign’s balance sheet in a fashion that would make Keynes blush, but unless the monetary authority rejects orthodoxy, explicitly promising not to exit from reflationary policy, fiscal authorities’ stimulative efforts will be muted.

Krugman/Bernanke’s Prescriptions
Bank of Japan officials suggest that there is not much monetary policy can do, as evidenced by these comments in the minutes of its policy meeting on November 19-202 (our emphasis):

“A few members were of the opinion that the Bank should explain clearly to the public that the underlying cause of the continued decline in prices was the slack in the economy - in other words, the weakness in demand. These members added that to improve the situation it was essential to create an environment whereby final demand - specifically, business fixed investment and private consumption - could achieve self-sustaining growth, and for this purpose it was most important to alleviate households’ concerns about the future and underpin firms’ expectations of future economic growth.”

To be sure, there are indeed structural solutions besides resolutely reflationary monetary policy that would be helpful. For example, supply-side measures including increased immigration and child care facilities would be very helpful to mitigate Japan’s demographic trend. Likewise, a more flexible labor system would allow corporations to more quickly adjust employment to the levels sustainable in the New Normal, and allow them to invest for new opportunities emerging in Asia. Concurrently, accelerating Economic Partnership Agreements (EPA) would allow Japan Inc. to further benefit from Asia’s economic growth and to remain competitive. And the list goes on and on. So the BoJ does have a point: There needs to be many hands on the policy tiller.

But none of the non-monetary actions offers scope for what matters most: Breaking the private sector’s self-feeding deflationary expectations, while generating aggregate demand above the economy’s supply-side potential, lowering the output gap. Indeed, some desirable supply-side structural reforms would, on a cyclical horizon, actually increase the output gap. The unavoidable conclusion must be that reflationary monetary policy must be the workhorse to pull Japan out of its liquidity trap. For such an approach to be effective, it explicitly must not have an exit strategy, but the opposite: a promise to keep on keeping on, resisting all entreaties to pull back until inflation itself, not just inflationary expectations, is unleashed on the upside.

To its credit, the BoJ did adopt a commitment approach when it adopted Quantitative Easing (QE) in 2001, explicitly committing to a continuation of that regime until year-on-year change in the core CPI became positive in a “stable” manner. But when for a few months it appeared that “success” had been achieved in 2006, the BoJ exited QE. Whether or not it was a matter of a genuine policy mistake, made with the best intentions, or a policy mistake borne of a lack of will to be enduringly unorthodox is an open question. But the fact of the matter is that Japan slipped back into deflation soon thereafter. The missing ingredient was a commitment to not only resist pulling back from QE and avoiding rate hikes until inflation turned positive but to continue that policy even after inflation started moving up. And in terms of credibility, the cost has been high: Unless and until the BoJ commits credibly, backed by money-printing actions, to behaving “irresponsibly relative to orthodox, conventional thinking,” Japan will remain stuck in a liquidity trap.

If the BoJ needs academic footing to do what needs to be done, it could well follow then-Fed Governor Bernanke’s 2003 suggestion: Rather than targeting the inflation rate, the BoJ could target restoring the pre-deflation price level, meaning that deflationary sins are not forgiven. This way, Mr. Bernanke argued, the public would view reflationary increases in the BoJ’s balance sheet and the money stock as permanent, rather than something to be “taken back” at the earliest orthodox opportunity.

The BoJ: Time to Act Aggressively
Japan’s problem is deflation, not inflation as far as an eye can see. An “all-in” reflationary policy is what is needed.

Three concepts the BoJ could consider:

1. Explicitly promise there will be no exit from QE and no rate hikes until inflation is not just positive, but meaningfully positive. One way to do this would be to adopt a price level target rather than an inflation target, embracing the idea that past deflationary sins will not only not be forgiven but require even more aggressive reflationary atonement.

2. Buy unlimited amounts of the long-dated Japanese Government Bonds (JGBs) to pull down nominal yields, with an accord with the fiscal authority to absorb any future losses on JGBs, once reflationary policy has borne its fruits, generating a bear market in JGBs.

3. Working with the Ministry of Finance, sell unlimited amounts of Yen against other developed countries’ currencies, printing the necessary Yen.

Our read is that the BoJ has not concluded that such bold steps are required. But as Mr. Bernanke intoned,3 no country with a fiat currency, which borrows in its own currency in the context of a current account deficit, should ever willingly embrace deflation. It is to be fervently hoped that the Bank of Japan’s rhetorical reflationary thaw of December, declaring it will not “tolerate” zero or below inflation, will give way to active reflationary green shoots by spring.

Meanwhile, markets don’t wait. And if it becomes clear that the BoJ really does “get it,” the currency markets will be way out in front of the BoJ.

Paul McCulley
Managing Director


[top]

http://moslereconomics.com/wp-content/plugins/sociofluid/images/digg_48.png http://moslereconomics.com/wp-content/plugins/sociofluid/images/stumbleupon_48.png http://moslereconomics.com/wp-content/plugins/sociofluid/images/delicious_48.png http://moslereconomics.com/wp-content/plugins/sociofluid/images/newsvine_48.png http://moslereconomics.com/wp-content/plugins/sociofluid/images/technorati_48.png http://moslereconomics.com/wp-content/plugins/sociofluid/images/facebook_48.png http://moslereconomics.com/wp-content/plugins/sociofluid/images/twitter_48.png

Posted in Inflation, Interest Rates, Japan | 1 Comment »

reuters post

Posted by WARREN MOSLER on 8th January 2010


[Skip to the end]


Mosler’s 11 steps to fix the economy

1. A full ‘payroll tax holiday’ where the US Treasury makes all FICA payments for us (15.3%). This will restore ’spending power’ and, by allowing households to make their mortgage payments, will fix banks from the bottom up. It may also keep prices down as competitive pressures may lead businesses to cut prices, passing on their tax savings to consumers even as sales increase.

2. A $500 per capita federal distribution to all the states to sustain employment in essential services, service debt, and reduce the need for state tax hikes. This can be repeated at perhaps 6 month intervals until GDP surpasses previous high levels at which point state revenues that depend on GDP would be restored.

3. A federally-funded $8/hr job and healthcare benefits for anyone willing and able to work. The economy will improve rapidly with my first two proposals and the private sector far more readily hires folks that are already employed. In 2001 Argentina implemented this proposal, putting to work 2 million people who had never held a ‘real’ job. Within 2 years, 750,000 of those 2 million were employed by the private sector.

4. Making banks utilities. The following are disruptive, serve no public purpose and should be done away with:

–Secondary market transactions
–Proprietary trading
–Lending against financial assets
–Business activities beyond approved lending and bank account services.
–Contracting in LIBOR. Fed funds should be used.
–Subsidiaries of any kind.
–Offshore lending.
–Contracting in credit default insurance.

5. Federal Reserve — The liability side of banking is the wrong place to impose market discipline.

The Fed should lend in the fed funds market to all member banks to ensure permanent liquidity. Demanding collateral from banks is disruptive and redundant, as the FDIC already regulates and supervises all bank assets.

6. The Treasury should issue nothing longer than 3 month bills. Longer term securities serve to keep long term rates higher than otherwise.

7. FDIC

–Remove the $250,000 cap on deposit insurance. Liquidity is no longer an issue when fed funds are available from the Fed.
–Don’t tax good banks for losses by bad banks. This serves only to raise interest rates.

8. The Treasury should directly fund the housing agencies to eliminate hedging needs while directly targeting mortgage rates at desired levels.

9. Homeowners being foreclosed should have the option to stay in their homes at fair market rents with ownership going to the government at the lower of the mortgage balance or fair market value of the home.

10. Remove ’self imposed constraints’ that are disruptive to operations and serve no public purpose.

–Dump the debt ceiling – Congress already votes on spending and taxes.
–Allow Treasury ‘overdrafts’ at the Fed rather than forcing it to sell notes and bonds. This is left over from the gold standard days and is currently inapplicable.

11. Federal taxes function to regulate aggregate demand, not to raise revenue per se, and therefore should be increased only to cool down an overheating economy, and not to ‘pay for’ anything.


[top]

http://moslereconomics.com/wp-content/plugins/sociofluid/images/digg_48.png http://moslereconomics.com/wp-content/plugins/sociofluid/images/stumbleupon_48.png http://moslereconomics.com/wp-content/plugins/sociofluid/images/delicious_48.png http://moslereconomics.com/wp-content/plugins/sociofluid/images/newsvine_48.png http://moslereconomics.com/wp-content/plugins/sociofluid/images/technorati_48.png http://moslereconomics.com/wp-content/plugins/sociofluid/images/facebook_48.png http://moslereconomics.com/wp-content/plugins/sociofluid/images/twitter_48.png

Posted in Banking, Currencies, Deficit, Employment, Fed, GDP, Government Spending, Inflation, Interest Rates | 19 Comments »

China Guides Bill Yields Higher

Posted by WARREN MOSLER on 7th January 2010


[Skip to the end]

I would expect the higher rates to support aggregate demand through the interest earned channels in the nations that hike rates.

Also, much of China’s lending by state owned/sponsored banks may be thinly disguised fiscal transfers that support demand. Cutting back by raising lending standards would then reduce demand. They apparently have a lot of excess capacity. The question is whether they increase demand to use it up, or slow down investment.

China Guides Bill Yields Higher, Seeking to Curb Record Lending

By Bloomberg News

Jan. 7 (Bloomberg) — China’s central bank sold three-month bills at a higher interest rate for the first time in 19 weeks after saying its focus for 2010 is controlling the record expansion in lending and curbing price increases.

Stocks fell across Asia and oil declined on concern growth will slow in China, the engine of the world economy’s recovery from its worst recession since World War II. The People’s Bank of China offered 60 billion yuan ($8.8 billion) of bills at a yield of 1.3684 percent, four basis points higher than at last week’s sale, according to a statement.

“It’s definitely a signal that the central bank is tightening liquidity,” said Jiang Chao, a fixed-income analyst in Shanghai at Guotai Junan Securities Co., the nation’s largest brokerage by revenue. “The rising yield is used to prevent excessive growth in bank lending.”

Premier Wen Jiabao said on Dec. 27 that last year’s doubling in new loans had caused property prices to rise “too quickly,” while surging commodity costs were increasing inflationary pressure. Guiding market rates higher may be a prelude to raising reserve requirements or benchmark interest rates, said Shi Lei, a Beijing-based analyst at Bank of China Ltd., the nation’s third-largest lender.

The MSCI Asia Pacific Index of regional stocks fell 0.5 percent and oil for February delivery slid 0.7 percent after 10 days of gains. Copper for three-month delivery dropped 0.7 percent. The Shanghai Composite Index fell 1.9 percent, led by Bank of China Ltd. and Industrial & Commercial Bank of China Ltd.

Tightening in Asia

“We expect some tightening of monetary policy in Asia in the first half,” said Norman Villamin, Singapore-based head of investment analysis for Asia Pacific at Citigroup Private Bank. “Markets will struggle to go higher.”

Australia’s central bank raised borrowing costs by a quarter percentage point on Dec. 1 to 3.75 percent after similar moves in November and October. The Bank of Korea, which meets tomorrow, will probably raise its benchmark rate one percentage point to 3 percent by end-2010, according to a Bloomberg survey of economists. By contrast, the Federal Reserve target rate is close to zero and policy makers last month discussed increasing asset purchases should the economy weaken.

Policy makers will seek “moderate” loan growth while managing inflation expectations, the People’s Bank said yesterday in a report on its annual work meeting. The government has told lenders to pace lending, while tightening mortgage rules for second-home purchases. Liu Mingkang, the top banking regulator, wrote in an opinion piece in Bloomberg News this week that “structural bubbles threaten to emerge” in the economy.

Bill Sales

Guotai Junan’s Jiang said the yield on benchmark one-year bills will climb in open-market operations next week. The central bank resumed sales of those bills on July 9 after an eight-month suspension to help drain cash from banks.

The central bank is set to withdraw 137 billion yuan from the financial market this week, the biggest since the week ended on Oct. 23, according to data compiled by Bloomberg News.

China’s one-year interest-rate swap, the cost of receiving a floating rate for 12 months, rose 10.5 basis points to 2.24 percent. A basis point is 0.01 percentage point.

The central bank kept the benchmark one-year lending rate at a five-year low of 5.31 percent last year after five reductions in the last four months of 2008. It may rise to 5.85 by the end of 2010, according to a Bloomberg News survey of 29 economists in November.

Lending Boom

“There’s no doubt that lending has been excessive and that explains why policy makers are starting to be more cautious about lending this year,” said Qu Hongbin, chief China economist for HSBC Holdings Plc in Hong Kong.

Qu estimates new loans will be limited to 7 trillion yuan in 2010. Banks extended an unprecedented 9.21 trillion yuan of loans in the first 11 months of 2009, compared with 4.15 trillion yuan a year earlier.

The People’s Bank said it would curb volatility in lending and monitor the property market, while reaffirming a “moderately loose” monetary policy. The statement contrasted with the start of 2009, when the central bank targeted “appropriate” increases in lending and said monetary policy would play “a more active role in promoting economic growth.”

Consumer prices climbed 0.6 percent in November from a year earlier, snapping a nine-month run of declines. The central bank is on alert for inflation after economic growth accelerated to 8.9 percent in the third quarter of 2009, the fastest in a year.

Property Prices

Housing Minister Jiang Weixin said yesterday that the nation will limit credit for some home purchases to reduce property-market speculation. Prices across 70 cities rose at the fastest pace in 16 months in November, gaining 5.7 percent from a year earlier, led by Shenzhen, Wenzhou and Jinhua.

The central bank didn’t state a 2010 target for growth in M2, the broad measure of money supply, after overshooting a 17 percent goal last year. The actual rate was more than 25 percent for most of 2009, rising to a record 29.7 percent in November.

“Growth will probably slow this year as tight credit will dampen the demand side,” said Zhang Ling, who helps oversee about $7.21 billion at ICBC Credit Suisse Asset Management Co. in Beijing. “That will dash investors’ hopes of another year of fast growth.”


[top]

http://moslereconomics.com/wp-content/plugins/sociofluid/images/digg_48.png http://moslereconomics.com/wp-content/plugins/sociofluid/images/stumbleupon_48.png http://moslereconomics.com/wp-content/plugins/sociofluid/images/delicious_48.png http://moslereconomics.com/wp-content/plugins/sociofluid/images/newsvine_48.png http://moslereconomics.com/wp-content/plugins/sociofluid/images/technorati_48.png http://moslereconomics.com/wp-content/plugins/sociofluid/images/facebook_48.png http://moslereconomics.com/wp-content/plugins/sociofluid/images/twitter_48.png

Posted in BRIC, China, Interest Rates | No Comments »

latest from PIMCO

Posted by WARREN MOSLER on 6th January 2010


[Skip to the end]

Some of governments’ mystery money showed up in sovereign budgets funded by debt sold to investors, but more of it showed up on central bank balance sheets as a result of check writing that required no money at all.

The US govt never has nor doesn’t have dollars. It necessarily spends by changing numbers up in bank accounts, and taxes and borrows by changing numbers down in bank accounts.

The latter was 2009’s global innovation known as “quantitative easing,” where central banks and fiscal agents bought Treasuries, Gilts, and Euroland corporate “covered” bonds approaching two trillion dollars. It was the least understood, most surreptitious government bailout of all, far exceeding the U.S. TARP in magnitude.

Agreed! To the extent the purchases were govt and agency securities it was not a bailout for the issuers. To the extent it allowed investors to make profits from the govt over paying for outstanding securities it could be considered a bailout. But I think that was minimal at best.

In the process, as shown in Chart 1, the Fed and the Bank of England (BOE) alone expanded their balance sheets (bought and guaranteed bonds) up to depressionary 1930s levels of nearly 20% of GDP. Theoretically, this could go on for some time,

Indefinitely. Better still, the tsy could simply stop issuing the securities in the first place, as Charles Goodhart has recommended for the UK. That would save the transactions expenses, which are not trivial.

but the check writing is ultimately inflationary

Not per se. Only to the extent the resultant lower rates are inflationary, and the jury is out on that. Note the Fed just turned $60 billion or so in profits over to the tsy. This is interest income the private sector did not earn because the Fed bought the securities.

Point is, QE removes interest income from the non govt sectors and is thereby a contractionary bias.

and central bankers don’t like to get saddled with collateral such as 30-year mortgages that reduce their maneuverability and represent potential maturity mismatches if interest rates go up.

None of that should matter to central bankers, but agreed it does (for the wrong reasons).

So if something can’t keep going, it stops – to paraphrase Herbert Stein – and 2010 will likely witness an attempted exit by the Fed at the end of March, and perhaps even the BOE later in the year.

It can keep going, but agreed it is likely to stop.



Here’s the problem that the U.S. Fed’s “exit” poses in simple English: Our fiscal 2009 deficit totaled nearly 12% of GDP and required over $1.5 trillion of new debt to finance it. The Chinese bought a little ($100 billion) of that, other sovereign wealth funds bought some more, but as shown in Chart 2, foreign investors as a group bought only 20% of the total – perhaps $300 billion or so. The balance over the past 12 months was substantially purchased by the Federal Reserve. Of course they purchased more 30-year Agency mortgages than Treasuries, but PIMCO and others sold them those mortgages and bought – you guessed it – Treasuries with the proceeds. The conclusion of this fairytale is that the government got to run up a 1.5 trillion dollar deficit, didn’t have to sell much of it to private investors, and lived happily ever – ever – well, not ever after, but certainly in 2009.

I submit it could have easily issued at least that many 3 mo bills if it wanted to but chose not to, again for the wrong reasons.

It also could have issue no securities and simply let the deficit spending sit as additional excess reserves in member bank accounts at the fed, which would be my first choice. Reserve balances are functionally nothing more than one day securities. I see no reason to issue further out the curve and thereby support the term structure of rates at higher levels.

Now, however, the Fed tells us that they’re “fed up,” or that they think the economy is strong enough for them to gracefully “exit,” or that they’re confident that private investors are capable of absorbing the balance.

Yes, in fact, it’s a non event, much like when Japan ‘exited’ from its 30t yen of excess reserves several years ago.

Not likely. Various studies by the IMF, the Fed itself, and one in particular by Thomas Laubach, a former Fed economist, suggest that increases in budget deficits ultimately have interest rate consequences and that those countries with the highest current and projected deficits as a percentage of GDP will suffer the highest increases – perhaps as much as 25 basis points per 1% increase in projected deficits five years forward.

Wonder how they explain Japan with far higher deficits than the us, less QE, and a 10 year JGB of only 1.30% vs 3.80% for the us. The term structure of rates is a function of the combination of anticipated central bank rate settings and technicals. (the three month eurodollar futures add up to the 10 year swap rate, convexity adjusted)

If that calculation is anywhere close to reality,

No reason to think they will be. They aren’t based on reality.

investors can guesstimate the potential consequences by using impartial IMF projections for major G7 country deficits as shown in Chart 3.




Using 2007 as a starting point and 2014 as a near-term destination, the IMF numbers show that the U.S., Japan, and U.K. will experience “structural” deficit increases of 4-5% of GDP over that period of time, whereas Germany will move in the other direction. Germany, in fact, has just passed a constitutional amendment mandating budget balance by 2016.

Hopefully they don’t actually do that as the recession could be severe enough to bring down the entire system of govt.

If these trends persist, the simple conclusion is that interest rates will rise on a relative basis in the U.S., U.K., and Japan compared to Germany over the next several years and that the increase could approximate 100 basis points or more. Some of those increases may already have started to show up – the last few months alone have witnessed 50 basis points of differential between German Bunds and U.S. Treasuries/U.K. Gilts, but there is likely more to come.

The fact is that investors, much like national citizens, need to be vigilant and there has been a decided lack of vigilance in recent years from both camps in the U.S. While we may not have much of a vote between political parties, in the investment world we do have a choice of airlines and some of those national planes may have elevated their bond and other asset markets on the wings of central bank check writing over the past 12 months.

Yes, govt policy, or lack of it, sets the term structure of rates. When it comes to the risk free rate, govt is necessarily price setter, as it is the monopoly supplier of reserves at the margin.

Downdrafts and discipline lie ahead for governments and investor portfolios alike. While my own Pollyannish advocacy of “check-free” elections may be quixotic, the shifting of private investment dollars to more fiscally responsible government bond markets may make for a very real outcome in 2010 and beyond.Additionally, if exit strategies proceed as planned, all U.S. and U.K. asset markets may suffer from the absence of the near $2 trillion of government checks written in 2009.

True!

It seems no coincidence that stocks, high yield bonds, and other risk assets have thrived since early March, just as this “juice” was being squeezed into financial markets. If so, then most “carry” trades in credit, duration, and currency space may be at risk in the first half of 2010 as the markets readjust to the absence of their “sugar daddy.”

True, the curve could steepen some. But at the same time, if the output gap remains high, and it becomes more likely the fed will be low for long, the term structure of rates could decline accordingly, as it did in Japan.

There’s no tellin’ where the money went?

Where it always goes. One account at the Fed is debited and another credited.

Not exactly, but it’s left a suspicious trail. Market returns may not be “so fine” in 2010.

William Gross
Managing Director


[top]

http://moslereconomics.com/wp-content/plugins/sociofluid/images/digg_48.png http://moslereconomics.com/wp-content/plugins/sociofluid/images/stumbleupon_48.png http://moslereconomics.com/wp-content/plugins/sociofluid/images/delicious_48.png http://moslereconomics.com/wp-content/plugins/sociofluid/images/newsvine_48.png http://moslereconomics.com/wp-content/plugins/sociofluid/images/technorati_48.png http://moslereconomics.com/wp-content/plugins/sociofluid/images/facebook_48.png http://moslereconomics.com/wp-content/plugins/sociofluid/images/twitter_48.png

Posted in CBs, Credit, GDP, Government Spending, Inflation, Interest Rates | 4 Comments »

ISM/ADP

Posted by WARREN MOSLER on 6th January 2010


[Skip to the end]

We’ll see if the zero rate policy keeps giving that feeling that the economy is dragging an anchor chain, and requires lower taxes for a given amount of govt. spending to sustain a lower output gap.


Karim writes:

  • ADP, claims and employment component of ISM survey consistent with payroll gwth of 0 to -50k on Friday.
  • ISM (non-mfg) moves back above 50


Dec Nov
Composite 50.1 48.7
Activity 53.7 49.6
Prices paid 58.7 57.8
New Orders 52.1 55.1
Employment 44.0 41.6

  • “Economy seems to have leveled off with expectation of an upswing in our business in Q1 2010.” (Professional, Scientific & Technical Services)
  • “There has been a slight upturn in our business activities; however, it is not entirely attributable to any one particular source.” (Public Administration)
  • “The environment seems to be improving, but we will continue to be cautious as we look forward.” (Retail Trade)
  • “The current economic conditions are continuing to have a flat or negative effect on our business.” (Wholesale Trade)
  • “No items in short supply; suppliers looking to set up agreements for 2010 with quarterly or semiannual price reviews.” (Arts, Entertainment & Recreation)


[top]

http://moslereconomics.com/wp-content/plugins/sociofluid/images/digg_48.png http://moslereconomics.com/wp-content/plugins/sociofluid/images/stumbleupon_48.png http://moslereconomics.com/wp-content/plugins/sociofluid/images/delicious_48.png http://moslereconomics.com/wp-content/plugins/sociofluid/images/newsvine_48.png http://moslereconomics.com/wp-content/plugins/sociofluid/images/technorati_48.png http://moslereconomics.com/wp-content/plugins/sociofluid/images/facebook_48.png http://moslereconomics.com/wp-content/plugins/sociofluid/images/twitter_48.png

Posted in Employment, Interest Rates | No Comments »

Monetary Policy and the Housing Bubble

Posted by WARREN MOSLER on 29th December 2009


[Skip to the end]

>   
>   (email exchange)
>   
>   On Tue, Dec 29, 2009 at 8:55 AM, wrote:
>   
>   Do you agree with their conclusion that monetary policy (low rates) didn’t affect housing
>   prices?

Yes, seems that way to me, too.

>   
>   I guess they did raise rates from 2003-06.
>   
>   Seems the very low short rates DID contribute to the ability to buy “more house” or qualify for
>   any house.
>   

Maybe some.

>   
>   For me it was the bush 2003 fiscal adjustment- spending increases, retro tax cuts, etc. that got
>   the deficit up to 200 billion by q303 which was about 8% of gdp annual. Then after a few years
>   the sub prime housing fraud started with loan officers on commission pushing fraudulent
>   appraisals and fraudulent income statements that turned the recovery into a mini boom that
>   actually didn’t get all that large before it crashed when the $trillion fraud was discovered.
>   

Fed: “Monetary Policy and the Housing Bubble”

Excerpt:
“Lessons
Our findings are both clear and limited in scope.

We find little evidence that the setting of U.S. monetary policy could have directly accounted for a substantial share of the strength in U.S. housing markets between 2003 and 2006. In particular, the rise in house prices or housing activity during this period was much faster than the pace consistent with the overall macroeconomic environment at that time.

But we also find that housing-specific developments were unusual in this period—and not only with respect to prices and activity. The form of mortgage finance—the prevalence and nature of mortgages with adjustable rates versus fixed rates, the role of other “new” or exotic mortgage features, and the role of different types of lenders and securitization paths—all shifted during this period. These shifts undoubtedly fed on each other, with strong demand for housing and rising house prices spurring unsustainable evolution in the nature and perceived risks associated with mortgage innovations and vice versa. This finding is quite limited in that it describes developments but does not explain why such developments occurred.

Nonetheless, our clear finding that traditional channels of monetary policy accounted for little of the rise in housing markets and that housing-specific factors involved the interaction of shifts in demand and mortgage finance suggest two important lessons for policy and certainly for subsequent research. In particular, our discussion connects to the questions of whether monetary policy should “lean against the wind” in the face of asset price bubbles and of how complimentary financial policies (for example, macroprudential regulation) may interact with monetary policy.”














[top]

http://moslereconomics.com/wp-content/plugins/sociofluid/images/digg_48.png http://moslereconomics.com/wp-content/plugins/sociofluid/images/stumbleupon_48.png http://moslereconomics.com/wp-content/plugins/sociofluid/images/delicious_48.png http://moslereconomics.com/wp-content/plugins/sociofluid/images/newsvine_48.png http://moslereconomics.com/wp-content/plugins/sociofluid/images/technorati_48.png http://moslereconomics.com/wp-content/plugins/sociofluid/images/facebook_48.png http://moslereconomics.com/wp-content/plugins/sociofluid/images/twitter_48.png

Posted in Fed, Housing, Inflation, Interest Rates | 24 Comments »

more on the man of the year

Posted by WARREN MOSLER on 24th December 2009


[Skip to the end]

More on the Bernanke testimony:

Shortly after the failure of Lehman Brothers, I was in Brazil at an international meeting, and I had a meeting there with bankers, and I asked them how the Brazilian economy was doing. And they said well, it had been doing fine, but within a week after Lehman Brothers collapsed, it was like a frigid wind descended on the economy in Brazil. And there was an enormous impact almost immediately on their economy, on their ability to raise funds and make loans.

In dollars, I’m sure.

And it’s astonishing how quickly that one failure spread throughout the world, and created a very severe recession, not just in the U.S., but around the world.

The Federal Reserve, by making a large loan under very tough terms to AIG,

But allowing those funds to be used to meet margin calls on CDS and probably other related market losses. That’s perhaps the most controversial part. Those payments to creditors perhaps could have been labeled ‘loans from the Fed’ subject to AIG ultimate solvency rather than payments from the Fed.

prevented the failure of that institution, and, therefore, tried to contain the impact of the Lehman Brothers failure on the rest of the global financial system. I’ll come back and talk more about AIG, and those things later, but that was just the first step of many that we took to try to stop the crisis.

Subsequently, again, very concerned with the possibility of a global financial meltdown, we worked with Treasury and the Congress to develop a bill that would provide funding that the Fed, the Treasury and other agencies could use to stabilize the financial system, to prevent collapse of the financial system.

This immediately became relevant, because in mid-October, the crisis heated up again to the point that we thought that we were again within days or hours of a collapse of many of the largest financial firms in the world. It was a dramatic weekend. It was Oct. 10 or 11, Columbus Day weekend, when the Finance Ministers and the central bankers of seven of the largest industrial economies had a meeting here in Washington, which, of course, I attended. Usually, those meetings are very scripted and very dry. In this case, there was palpable concern among the participants that the collapse of their financial system might be just days away, and there was a great deal of discussion about how we, collectively, as the policy makers leading those countries could stop the collapse.

In the days that followed, countries all over the world, particularly the advanced industrial countries, took strong measures to prevent the collapse of the financial systems. That included putting capital into banks;

Obviously they didn’t know it was nothing more than regulatory forbearance.

it included preventing the failure of large financial firms; it included guaranteeing the debts of financial firms so they could borrow and keep themselves afloat; it included making short-term loans to firms so that they would have the short-term credit they needed to pay off lenders who were withdrawing their funding. And, again, this was the U.S. doing this, but also many of the most important industrial countries around the world simultaneously, including the U.K., Germany, France, Switzerland and others.

Again, many of those creditors ‘bailed out’ by the Fed’s liquidity provisions could have had those funds labeled ‘loans from the Fed’ rather than simply receiving payments from the Fed.

The result of this collective global effort over that week was essentially to succeed in stabilizing the global banking system, in that subsequent to that week the fears of utter collapse were largely overcome.

Now, in the following months after that, there were still many, many great difficulties in the financial markets. And the Fed, and other central banks and Treasuries around the world, worked very hard to restore the normal functioning of those markets. For example, following the Lehman failure, there was a run where ordinary investors went as quick as they could to pull their money out of money market mutual funds, which are a common investment vehicle for many Americans. It was very analogous to 100 years ago when a bank was about to fail, and the depositors would go to the bank, they would run and pull their money out as quickly as possible, and then the bank would fail. The money market mutual funds were experiencing exactly the same phenomenon.

The Fed and the Treasury working together provided short-term loans to these funds. The Treasury provided some insurance to depositors, or to investors so they would know they wouldn’t lose their money. We stopped the run on the money market mutual funds, and that was an example of how we helped stabilize the situation.

Not sure why that was critical?

There were many other steps we had to take helping individual institutions, and providing programs for backstop lending to make sure that the key markets in the financial system were functioning again, because for months after Lehman Brothers, the amount of fear and uncertainty in the financial markets was so elevated that these markets were, essentially, not functioning properly, and it took really many months until we had reached the point that these markets had begun to approach a normal state.

Doesn’t mention the dollar swap lines to foreign CB’s???

But bank lending is still weak. The banks had a near-death experience, they are now lending in a difficult economic environment. We are strongly encouraging them to lend. We have taken a lot of steps to help them raise new capital, so they’ll have a basis on which to make new loans. And we are taking a number of steps to try to open up markets through which investors invest directly in various forms of credit, like auto loans and credit card loans. All of these steps are improving the financial situation, but particularly the banking sector, we’re still in the convalescent stage.

They only bought AAA traunches which didn’t address the credit issues. They were more worried about taking losses than restoring auto credit, but wanted to give the appearance they were doing something.

As I said, I was a professor. I never worked for Wall Street. I have no connections on Wall Street. In fact, when I first became chairman, I was criticized in some quarters for not being close enough, or knowing enough about Wall Street. So, why did I take these actions?

I didn’t take these actions, or the Federal Reserve didn’t take these actions because we were trying to help bankers, or trying to help Wall Street. What I understood, and what knowledgeable people all around the world understood, is that the financial system is essential to the functioning of any economy. And that if the financial system had collapsed to the extent to which we believed was very likely in September and October 2008, then no force on earth, no policy, could have prevented the collapse of the entire U.S. economy with long-lasting and extreme consequences for every American.

How about a proportionate fiscal response, like a payroll tax holiday and per capita revenue distributions to the States? Instead, he continues to preach ‘fiscal responsibility.’

It was because we were concerned about jobs and incomes and the economic well-being of every American that we intervened to prevent the collapse of the financial system.

Now, going forward, we have a lot to do to get the economy back to stability, get jobs created. You can talk as much as you like about the things we’re doing there, but we’re also going to have to take some very strong steps to make sure that the crisis doesn’t ever happen again.

There were, certainly, weaknesses in our financial regulatory system. There were weaknesses in the way that financial regulators supervised the banks and other financial institutions. And the financial institutions themselves made lots of mistakes in terms of their ability to measure the risks that they were taking, and to control them properly. And to make sure we don’t ever have a crisis like this again, we need to have extensive reform in the private sector, in the public sector, to eliminate these risks in the future.

You had said that the banks were convalescent still, Mr. Chairman. Can you talk to us a little bit more about what that means?

Well, the banks have been stabilized. They’ve raised a good deal of capital, so they’re in much better shape than they were. They are lending, but they are not lending enough to support a healthy recovery. One important reason for that, is that given their losses, given what they’ve been through, they’re being very conservative in the face of what is still a very weak economy; and, therefore, a sense that many borrowers are quite risky.

As bank supervisors, we have a difficult challenge. We have told the banks very clearly that we want them to make loans to credit-worthy borrowers, where there are borrowers who can repay the loans. It’s in the interest of the banks, it’s in the interest of the economy, and, of course, it’s in the interest of the borrowers for those loans to get made.

But the problem is, of course, that we got into trouble in the first place by banks making loans that couldn’t be repaid, so we don’t want banks to make bad loans. Therefore, we are trying to work with banks to make sure that they are, in fact, able to make as many good loans as possible, that they have enough capital, that they have enough short-term funding, and that the examiners and the regulators who work with the banks are not unduly restricting the loans that they make. We want to work with the banks to make sure that they balance the appropriate prudence and caution against the need to make good loans for the economy, and for their own profits.

Banks and the entire private sector is necessarily procyclical.

Only govt via fiscal policy can be countercyclical.

So, what this means is that economic policy, and financial oversight have to take into account all the international dimensions of that. So, for example, on the monetary policy side, we have worked carefully and closely with other central banks to talk about monetary policy in different parts of the world. In fact, during the heat of the crisis in October 2008, the Federal Reserve and five other major central banks cut interest rates together on the same day, as a sign of how committed we were to cooperating on monetary policy.

Doesn’t seem concerned that interest rate cuts may in fact be deflationary as he knows they remove interest income for the private sectors (Bernanke, Sacks, Reinhart, 2004 Fed paper- see ‘the fiscal channel’)

The system worked.

It did work. It was an important first step. I mean, even after we took those steps, the financial markets were in a great deal of stress, and credit at all levels was very much constrained. But it stabilized the situation, and from there, we were able to take a number of steps to - both we, and our partners in other countries - to get the key markets working again, to get the banks stabilized, and to begin the very difficult process of getting the financial system back on its feet.

Never realizing that all the alphabet soup measures to get liquidity going missed the point that all the Fed had to do was lend fed funds to member banks without limit, as the ECB effectively did by immediately accepting any and all bank collateral, to immediately restore bank liquidity.

So, while it’s difficult to know exactly what the outcome would have been, certainly, just judging on what happened after the failure of a single firm, the collapse of the global financial system would surely have led to a far deeper recession, higher unemployment, much greater fiscal cost to the taxpayer, and to rebuild the financial system, and to get the economy moving again. And almost certainly, [we would have had] many, many years of subnormal - substandard - performance by the U.S. economy, and by other industrial economies, as well. Again, we can’t know precisely, but I think if anything, the financial crisis last fall was as severe, and as dangerous as anything we’ve ever seen, including the 1930s.

The whole point of going off the gold standard in 1934 was to be able to provide liquidity without limit to the banking system, so the fact that he did that, however belatedly, is nothing to brag about. It also allowed for unlimited fiscal responses, which he still seems to not fathom.

There is an irony here that’s literary, that here’s this man who spends his life distinguishing himself studying economic history. And then one day you wake up and realize that you’re at the center of economic history in this really unusual chapter. How do you process that personally? I mean, how does that change how you go from being the academic expert to you are in the arena?

Well, I certainly didn’t anticipate when I came to Washington in 2002, I certainly didn’t anticipate these events, or how things would evolve. No question about it. And when I became chairman in 2006, I thought that - I hoped that my main objectives would be improving the management, communication and monitoring policy.

We were certainly attentive to the risks of financial crisis. Secretary Paulson and I talk frequently to people on Wall Street, and we secured the Federal Reserve. We set up a team of staff drawn from different disciplines to try to identify problems and weaknesses in the financial sector. So, we were certainly aware of the risks of financial crisis, but one as large and as dangerous as this one, I certainly did not anticipate. I wish I had, but I didn’t.

Then when the crisis came, you know, rather unexpectedly, a different part of my training and research became relevant, which was to work on financial crises generally, and also on the Great Depression. And I believe very much that that experience, and that knowledge, was very helpful to me in many dimensions of this effort, ranging from - I think the most important lesson, there are many lessons, but I think the most important lesson was that we were not going to have a healthy stable economy with a completely dysfunctional financial system. We had to take strong measures to prevent that from happening.

And in the 1930s, the Federal Reserve was quite passive, and allowed the banks to fail, and we know the result of that. So, we were determined that that wasn’t going to happen on my watch, on our watch, so we were prepared to take very strong actions to avoid that.

That was under the gold standard. Nothing could be done without losing the nation’s gold supply. It was only after the banks reopened in 1934 with a non convertible currency could there be credible deposit insurance unlimited Fed provision of liquidity. Clearly he doesn’t understand that or a) he’d be stating it b) I don’t want to say…

You’ve been quite forthcoming, I think, in your testimony about saying, there’s a lot of things you didn’t see, there’s some things that we didn’t do. If I gave you a kind of do-over to go back as long as you want to say you know what, if we’d seen this, if we’d looked at the sub-prime mortgage crisis. I mean, how could you have handled it, and the Fed handled it better to have a different outcome?

Well, we have, based on the experience of the crisis, we - the Treasury and others - have made proposals for how the financial regulatory system ought to be reformed and restructured. I’ll say a word about that. If we had been in that forum, I think we would have avoided the crisis. So, there were some important lessons.

One was that our regulatory system was too myopic. It was too focused on individual firms, or individual markets, and there was nobody paying attention to the broad overall financial system. So, the Federal Reserve was not entrusted with looking at the whole financial system. We were - we had very specific assignments. We were supposed to look at specific institutions. Those institutions did not include many of the firms that had severe problems, like Lehman Brothers or Bear Stearns or AIG. Those were outside of our purview, and since they were outside of our purview, we didn’t look at them.

They missed one critical factor- allowing bank loan officers to work on a commission basis. Nor, did the regulators look into actual loan files to check for fraudulent appraisals and income statements promoted by loan officers working on a commission basis. Regulation is necessarily a work in progress. Mistakes will be made, including mistakes of this scale. Critical to our well being is the knowledge of how to keep these errors in the financial sector from damaging the real economy. And that requires appropriate fiscal responses to sustain aggregate demand, preferably in an equitable manner.

But there were many situations where there was really nobody who was looking carefully at what was going on, and nobody who was looking at how the parts of the system fit together. So, a very important recommendation that we have made is that there be a more systemic approach - that is, have some arrangement whereby a regulator, or a group of regulators, has responsibility to look at the system as a whole, and try to identify emerging problems, or gaps in the regulatory apparatus, or weaknesses in individual institutions, as they relate to other institutions, that threaten the integrity of the system as a whole.

Better still, most of the issues came from allowing banking activities that in fact served no further public purpose. That includes any bank participation in secondary markets, loaning against financial assets, using LIBOR as an index, and many others.

We didn’t have that. Therefore, nobody paid enough attention to AIG, nobody paid enough to attention to credit and call swaps, nobody paid enough attention to some of the activities of investment banks. You go on, and on, and on. Again, if we had had a more comprehensive overview approach that would have been helpful.

A second key element is the problem too big to fail, and how to address that. So, I just want to be very, very clear that even though the Federal Reserve was involved in rescuing Bear Stearns and AIG, we did that extremely reluctantly, and with - it was a very distasteful thing for us to do. We did not do it - we were not set up to do it. We were - it was very difficult for us to do, but we did it because there was no appropriate mechanism, there was no set of laws that would allow the government to intervene in a situation like that in a way that would allow the firm to fail, but would not have all the negative consequences for the financial system and the economy.

So, we had a situation where there were firms who were literally too big to fail, or too complex to fail, or too interconnected to fail. When they came to the edge of collapsing, we had only two very, very bad choices: we either bailed them out, put taxpayer money at risk, put the Federal Reserve at risk in terms of our lending, or we could let them collapse and have all the hugely negative consequences for the financial system and for the economy.

So, what we did not have, and what we very much need going forward, is a third option, and that option should be a legal framework which allows the government - and I think that means, in practice, the Treasury and Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation - to intervene when a large complex systemically critical firm is about to fail, and to allow the firm to fail, impose losses on the lenders, the creditors of the firm, the shareholders, fire the management, protect the taxpayer, but be able to do that in a way that protects the system, so that the financial system is protected from the immediate impact of that collapse.

I submit we already have that for the large banks, and the others as well. He just didn’t grasp how to use it. The receivership they did set up did not have to pay off all the creditors, and if there were issues, it would have been a relatively simple matter to petition congress for an ‘emergency’ alteration of current law. They didn’t even try.

We did not have a system like that in place. I think if we had, we could have dealt with Lehman Brothers and AIG in a much more satisfactory way. We would have avoided many of the problems. And, most importantly, we would have not, in some sense, rewarded failure, which is what happened. In the future, it’s important that firms be allowed to fail if they, in fact, take excessive risks, and make bad gambles.

But that mechanism is not in place now.

The mechanism is not in place, and we have asked Congress to address it, and I believe that they will. But until they do, we are really still in a situation where we don’t have good options in dealing with potential collapse of a global financial firm.

It isn’t that hard to do.

Right now people are sort of looking to you, and to Congress, to kind of break the back of unemployment. And you’ve talked about how that is really our biggest challenge right now. Do you feel there is anything else that can be done, or has the Fed shot all its bullets, and has Congress shot all its bullets?

Well, the Federal Reserve has been very aggressive on the unemployment side. So, let me just first say that even though the recession may be technically over., in a sense that the economy is growing, it’s going to feel like a recession for some time, because unemployment remains very high, about 10%. And even people who have jobs, there are many people who are on short hours, that are in voluntary part-time, or maybe people who are not technically unemployed, only because they stopped looking. So, the labor market is in very weak condition, and we’re not going to see a healthy, vibrant economy again until the labor market - the job market - has recovered. So, that is really an extraordinarily important objective for policy going forward. And, certainly, our job won’t be done until the economy is growing again, and jobs are being created.

The Federal Reserve’s attempts to address employment issues, we’ve done several things. Certainly, one of the things is we’re using our monetary policy. In December 2008, while the crisis was still in an intense phase, we cut the short-term interest rate that is the measure of our monetary policy almost to zero. The first time that had ever been the case, the Fed had ever done that, in order to provide the maximum amount of support to the economy, and it remains close to zero today. So, that is a very powerful measure.

Again, he gives no weight to the possibility that the interest income he removed from ’savers’ is weighing on the economy, even though it’s in his own paper from 2004.

Having used that tool to its maximum extent, we have then turned to new and innovative tools, things that have never been done before in the Federal Reserve. I’ll give you two examples. One, we’ve purchased about $1 trillion worth of mortgages that are guaranteed by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, and the U.S. Treasury. And in doing those purchases, we have succeeded in reducing the national 30-year fixed-rate mortgage rate from about 6-1/2% to about 4.8%. By lowering mortgage rates that way, we have helped to stabilize the housing sector, to help stabilize the housing crisis, and allow people to refinance, to buy homes. And that, obviously, should get construction started again and house prices stabilizing, and people being able to meet their mortgages. That’s obviously going to be helpful.

The far more effective way would be to directly fund the agencies at the fixed rate the Fed wanted for mortgages and allow that funding to be prepaid without penalty if the mortgages prepaid. But that was never even a consideration.

We’ve also created a program that helps bring credit from Wall Street to support a wide variety of consumer and small-business loans. So, for example, our program allows Wall Street money to come in and support auto loans, credit card loans, student loans, small business loans, commercial real estate loans. By providing that conduit, we are supporting what the banks are doing to get credit flowing into those important sectors.

But only the AAA pieces, as previously discussed.

And I guess a third thing, an additional thing I would mention is that we serve not only as monetary policy makers, but also as bank supervisors. And there we’ve been sparing no effort, as I talked about earlier, to get the banks able and willing to lend again, to create - particularly the small businesses - to create the credit that’s needed to create new jobs and get employment back on track.

I would mention, in particular, our leadership of the stress tests. In the spring, the Federal Reserve led an effort to evaluate the balance sheets of 19 of the largest banking companies in the U.S., and our report on those balance sheets, along with the FDIC, the OCC, to other banking agencies, our reports on those balance sheets is public, greatly increased the confidence in the banking system, which meant that they were able to go out and raise new capital in the stock market, and many of them have paid back the capital to the government.

Still no clue it was only regulatory forbearance.

But by raising new capital, they increased their own capacity to lend. And, as conditions improve, they’ll be able to make new loans as well.

So, by keeping interest rates low, including both short-term rates and long-term rates, like mortgage rates, by supporting a flow of credit to small businesses, consumers and the like, that is our primary effort. Those are the tools that we have. We can always do more, if necessary, but those are the tools that we are applying trying to get job growth going again.

They have more tools but aren’t using them? Unless this is a bluff, what are they waiting for? This is an extraordinary statement.

And we have seen, obviously, the labor market is still very weak, but the last report we saw shows that we’re now coming closer to the point where we’ll stop seeing job losses and start seeing job gains.

We’ve talked about a lot of those extraordinary things you’ve done. But is that it? Like now do we have to - because there’s still really bad numbers, even your forecasts are like what, 10% [unemployment] this year, 9% going forward, I think like 8% in 2012. Do we just have to kind of now sit back and take it?

Well, the Federal Reserve will continue to see what other policy actions we can take. And we’ve really been very aggressive, thus far. And the additional steps aren’t as obvious or clear as the ones that we’ve already taken.

Right, they don’t have any actual ideas.

A lot of the scope now is on the fiscal side of the house. As you know, the government passed a major fiscal program earlier this year, and I think it was just today the President announced a number of individual - a package of programs to try to address unemployment. So, [there are] a lot of new initiatives probably coming from the fiscal side.

While he preaches fiscal responsibility. See below.

Did they ask you for your opinion of those before…

Well, our staffs confer frequently with the Treasury and other parts of the Economic Advisory Groups that advise the President. And we often give our views. Our views are solicited. But, of course, they are responsible for their policy choices.

Have you said before, or are you prepared to say now, that a second stimulus, a round of incentives, is a good idea, on the fiscal side?

So, my domain is monetary policy and financial stability. And we have done, of course, a lot of aggressive things to try to support the economy, try to support job creation. I generally leave the details of fiscal programs to the Administration and Congress. That’s really their area of authority and responsibility, and I don’t think it’s appropriate for me to second guess.

You have said that there’s a long-term deficit program that needs to be dealt with. You said health care costs ought to be cut back, so it’s not like you won’t talk at all about the fiscal situation. Regardless of the details, which I understand that you don’t want to tell them how to do it, do you think that the fiscal side ought to do something?

Well, let me say this, I think that it’s very important that whatever actions that Congress and Administration take on the fiscal side, that they begin soon, or even sooner, to develop a credible medium-term interest strategy for fiscal policy, one that will persuade the markets and the public that over the medium term, the next few years, we will - we, as government, we, as a country - will be able to bring our deficits down to a level that could be sustained over a period of time.

Yes, he’s clearly part of the problem, not part of the answer. He’s failed to realize the ramifications of lifting convertibility in 1934 (and 1971 internationally) and is one of the leading deficit terrorists.

If we can do that, which will increase the confidence of the markets in American fiscal policy, that would give us more scope to take action today, because, again, there would be confidence that we have a way out, a way back towards sustainability.

There is no sustainability issue and he should know that. But he doesn’t even fully understand monetary operations of the Fed itself.

In your testimony the other day, one Senator talked about here’s the money that the federal government takes in, here’s what we spend on entitlements. It’s basically the same. Everything else we have to borrow for. I mean, there are a lot of people saying that it’s not sustainable, as you have said. And they said one of the only solutions is some kind of tax, a sales tax, value-added tax, something other than an income tax. But would you be in favor of any of those alternatives?

So, the way I put this before Congress before is that the one law that I strongly advocate is the law of arithmetic. (Laughter.) That law of arithmetic says that if you are a low-tax person, then you have to - you are responsible for finding ways on saving on expenditure, so that you don’t have enormous imbalances between revenues and spending. And by the same law of arithmetic, if you were somebody who believes that government spending is important, and you are for bigger and more spending, and bigger programs, then it’s incumbent upon you to figure out where the revenues are going to come from to meet that spending. So, again, I think that’s, again, Congress’ main responsibility.

I have spoken about deficit, and I think deficits are important, because they address broad economic and financial stability. We need to talk about that. But in terms of the specifics about how to get to fiscal balance, that’s the elected officials’ responsibility.

He sees spending as revenue constrained where that concept is entirely inapplicable to non convertible currency and floating fx policy.

Do you think Congress is fiscally illiterate? Economically illiterate?

No, of course not. But what they have to deal with is not just a question of understanding. It’s a question of making very, very tough choices, and in a political environment, where people understandably are resistant to cuts in programs or benefits, or increases of taxes. So, there needs to be tough choices made, there needs to be leadership. And I don’t envy Congress those choices, because they’re very difficult ones to make.

Are you saying that time for fiscal and monetary stimulus is over? And, if so, what’s the downside of pushing even harder?

There are not easy solutions. It’s an enormous problem. I think the Federal Reserve - one direction that we can go is to continue to encourage the extension of credit, small businesses, in particular, create a lot of jobs, particularly during economic recoveries. And we have lots and lots of evidence and anecdotes suggesting that small businesses are particularly harmed by the tightness of the bank lending standards and unavailability of credit. So, everything we can do, and that the Administration and Congress can do, to support credit extension to all business, but primarily small business, would be a very powerful.

You don’t think it’s a liquidity problem?

Well, I mean, interest rates are very low, so I think it’s going to be a question, first of all, of getting credit flowing again. And the Federal Reserve has got a role to play there. And then, Congress and the Administration will consider possible programs and fiscal policies.

You’re definitely not okay with long-term profligacy, but are you okay with them doing something in the short-term?

I think if they do that, it’s critically important they clarify the longer-term plan for establishing sustainable fiscal [policy].

Again ducking the question. But it’s clear he is not a supporter of using fiscal adjustments to sustain aggregate demand.

Adair Turner, the chief British [financial services] regulator, said that we’ve learned that much of what the financial services sector did in the past 10 years has no economic or social value. Do you agree? Did the financial services sector just get too big, and should it be smaller?

Okay. Well, a strong financial system is very important. It allocates capital to new businesses and new industries. It allows for people to invest in a wide range of activities, so it’s critically important to have a good financial system. And the evidence for that is that when the financial system breaks down, the system just doesn’t function.

That is not evidence for that. Seems a breakdown of logic???

You see what the impact has had on the economy. With that being said, the financial system is unique to the extent, first, that it is so critical to the economy, and, secondly, to the very, very old tendency to succumb to booms and busts.

Again, this is too confused to not be an insight into his basic sense of logic.

And, therefore, we do need to have an effective comprehensive financial regulatory system that will essentially allow us to tame the beast so that it provides the benefits, the growth and development without creating these kinds of crisis.

And then this says it all regarding his understanding of monetary operations:

Okay. When the Federal Reserve buys mortgages, it pays for them by creating reserves the banks hold in Federal Reserve. So, as we purchase $1 trillion of mortgages, we’ve created roughly $1 trillion of reserves that banks hold at the Federal Reserve. The banks, at this point, are just willing to hold those reserves with the Fed, and not do anything with them.

Banks don’t ‘do anything’ with reserves.

Ultimately, if the economy normalized, and the Fed took no action, the banks would take those reserves, try to lend them out, and they would begin to circulate, and the money supply would start to grow.

Banks don’t ‘lend out’ reserves.

And then, ultimately, that would create an inflationary risk.

This is not how it works.

So, therefore, as the economy begins to recover, and as we move away from this very weak economic environment, the Federal Reserve is going to have to pull those reserves out of the system.

We have a number of means for doing that, which we have explained to the markets, and the public, and everyone is confident we can do that. And we will do that over time, in order to make sure that as we come out of this crisis, we don’t generate inflation at the end.

Reserve management has nothing to do with inflation with a non convertible currency and floating fx. This is ancient gold standard rhetoric.

So, the reserves can be pulled out through various mechanisms or can mobilize. And we don’t have to do that yet, but when the time comes, we have tools to do that.

And are there lurking dangers in those mortgages that you purchased that we don’t even know about now?

Well, the mortgages are guaranteed. The credit, even if they go bad, Fannie and Freddie with the backing of the U.S. Treasury will pay them off, so the Fed is not taking any credit risk by holding these mortgages.

It’s comforting for you, but not for the taxpayers. Right?

Well, on the other hand, what’s happening is that we earn the interest from those mortgages, and then we remit that interest back to the Treasury, so the money finds its way back to the taxpayer.

That’s exactly how the Fed’s portfolio removes interest income from the private sectors.

And, indeed, the Federal Reserve will be paying the Treasury a good bit more money the next few years than it has in the past, because of the interest we’re earning on these mortgages we acquired.

On that note, this week we did learn the TARP is going to pay back nearly all of what it was required to from the taxpayer. Looking back a year later, are surprised by that?

Well, we said at the beginning that the TARP money was an investment. It was going to acquire assets, and that most or all might come back to the taxpayer. Right now, if you look at all these repayments from banks, and the fact that the government is sitting on capital gains, as well as other investments, I think it’s a reasonable probability that the TARP money invested in financial institutions, that the great majority of it will come back to the taxpayer. So, in the end, we will have stabilized the financial system and avoided this global crisis at not a small amount of money, but relative to the alternative, a quite small amount of money.

Were there days where you woke up and you thought, what am I not thinking of that we could be doing?

We had a philosophy right here, which was what we called blue-sky thinking. And what blue-sky thinking was, was we have a problem, I want everybody to give me just three associations. What can you think of? How can we approach this, what can we do? And we’ll worry about getting rid of the silly answers later. So, there’s been a lot of creativity here, and I give credit to terrific staff . I think one of the lessons of the depression, and this is something that Franklin Roosevelt demonstrated, was that when orthodoxy fails, then you need to try new things. And he was very willing to try unorthodox approaches when the orthodox approach had shown that it was not adequate.


[top]

http://moslereconomics.com/wp-content/plugins/sociofluid/images/digg_48.png http://moslereconomics.com/wp-content/plugins/sociofluid/images/stumbleupon_48.png http://moslereconomics.com/wp-content/plugins/sociofluid/images/delicious_48.png http://moslereconomics.com/wp-content/plugins/sociofluid/images/newsvine_48.png http://moslereconomics.com/wp-content/plugins/sociofluid/images/technorati_48.png http://moslereconomics.com/wp-content/plugins/sociofluid/images/facebook_48.png http://moslereconomics.com/wp-content/plugins/sociofluid/images/twitter_48.png

Posted in Banking, CBs, Congress, ECB, Employment, Fed, GDP, Government Spending, Inflation, Interest Rates, Political, Recession, USA | 23 Comments »

fixing the economy

Posted by WARREN MOSLER on 24th December 2009


[Skip to the end]

I was asked by a reporter to state how I’d fix the economy in 500 words and replied:

Fixing the Economy

1. A full ‘payroll tax holiday’ where the US Treasury makes all FICA payments for us (15.3%). This will restore ’spending power’ allowing households to make their mortgage payments, which ‘fixes the banks’ from the ‘bottom up.’ It also helps keep prices down as competitive pressures will cause many businesses to lower prices due to the tax savings even as sales increase.

2. A $500 per capita Federal distribution to all the States to sustain employment in essential services, service debt, and reduce the need for State tax hikes. This can be repeated at perhaps 6 month intervals until GDP surpasses previous high levels at which point state revenues that depend on GDP are restored.

3. A Federally funded $8/hr job for anyone willing and able to work that includes healthcare. The economy will improve rapidly with my first two proposals and the private sector far more readily hires people already working vs people idle and unemployed.
In 2001 Argentina, population 34 million, implemented this proposal, putting to work 2 million people who had never held a ‘real’ job. Within 2 years 750,000 were employed by the private sector.

4. Returning banking to public purpose. The following are disruptive and do not serve no public purpose:
a. No secondary market transactions
b. No proprietary trading
c. No lending vs financial assets
d. No business activities beyond approved lending and providing banking accounts and related services.
e. No contracting in LIBOR, only fed funds.
f. No subsidiaries of any kind.
g. No offshore lending.
h. No contracting in credit default insurance.
5. Federal Reserve- The liability side of banking is not the place for market discipline. The Fed should lend in the fed funds
market to all member banks to ensure permanent liquidity. Demanding collateral from banks is disruptive and redundant, as
the FDIC already regulates and supervises all bank assets.
6. The Treasury should issue nothing longer than 3 month bills. Longer term securities serve to keep long term rates higher than
otherwise.
7. FDIC
a. Remove the $250,000 cap on deposit insurance. Liquidity is no longer an issue when fed funds are available from the Fed.
b. Don’t tax the good banks for losses by bad banks. All that does is raise interest rates.
8. The Treasury should directly fund the housing agencies to eliminate hedging needs and directly target mortgage rates at
desired levels.
9. Homeowners being foreclosed should have the option to stay in their homes at fair market rents with ownership going to the
government at the lower of the mortgage balance or fair market value of the home.
10. Remove the ’self imposed constraints’ that are disruptive to operations and serve no public purpose.
a. Treasury debt ceiling- Congress already voted for the spending and taxes
b. Allow Treasury ‘overdrafts’ at the Fed. This is left over from the gold standard days and is currently inapplicable.
11. Federal taxes function to regulate aggregate demand, not to raise revenue per se, and therefore should be increased only
to cool down an overheating economy, and not to ‘pay for’ anything.


[top]

http://moslereconomics.com/wp-content/plugins/sociofluid/images/digg_48.png http://moslereconomics.com/wp-content/plugins/sociofluid/images/stumbleupon_48.png http://moslereconomics.com/wp-content/plugins/sociofluid/images/delicious_48.png http://moslereconomics.com/wp-content/plugins/sociofluid/images/newsvine_48.png http://moslereconomics.com/wp-content/plugins/sociofluid/images/technorati_48.png http://moslereconomics.com/wp-content/plugins/sociofluid/images/facebook_48.png http://moslereconomics.com/wp-content/plugins/sociofluid/images/twitter_48.png

Posted in Banking, CBs, Congress, Fed, GDP, Government Spending, Inflation, Interest Rates, Political, Proposal | 7 Comments »

Hedge funds bet on rising yields

Posted by WARREN MOSLER on 23rd December 2009


[Skip to the end]

Yet another legend (or two) slips into the ‘better lucky than good’ category.

They may be right, but it will be for a different reason:

Top hedge funds bet on big yields rise

By Henry Sender

Dec. 22 (FT) —The recent rise in long-term US interest rates comes as good news for several leading hedge fund managers, including John Paulson, who have positioned their trading books to benefit from higher yields on US Treasury securities.

Mr Paulson, who made big gains earlier this decade by betting against the subprime mortgage market and whose firm, Paulson & Co, manages $33bn, has said he believes government stimulus efforts will inevitably lead to higher inflation and a corresponding rise in rates.

“It will be difficult for the government to withdraw the economic stimulus,” Mr Paulson said in a speech. “An increase in the monetary base leads to an increase in the money supply, which leads to inflation.”

Bond prices fall as yields rise, and Mr Paulson told the Financial Times last week that he has been hoping to benefit in the Treasury market by buying options that would become profitable if rates headed higher. TPG-Axon’s Dinakar Singh has been making similar options trades, according to a person familiar with the matter.

Julian Robertson, the hedge fund manager, has pursued a related strategy, hoping to benefit from a bigger difference between short-term and long-term interest rates, known as a steeper yield curve, a person familiar with his trades said.

The yield on the 10-year Treasury, which hit a crisis low of 2.055 per cent last year, has moved from 3.2 per cent last month to 3.75 per cent on Tuesday.

Hedge fund managers, however, have been hesitant to engage in short sales of Treasury bonds to profit from the rising yields – and falling prices – because of the Federal Reserve’s heavy involvement in the market. This has led some to buy options – dubbed “high strike receivers” – that would enable them to profit from sharply higher Treasury yields, hedge fund managers say. These trades, which are relatively cheap to execute because they are so out of the money, are based on the thesis that yields could hit 7 or 8 per cent.

“If they are right, and the world ends, they will make a fortune,” said one fund manager who is sceptical of the idea. “If they are wrong, they haven’t lost much.”

Some traders are cautious because many peers lost large sums betting that rates would rise in Japan in the 1990s – as yields fell to less than half a percentage point. The trade was termed the “black widow” because it left so many victims.

“Nobody understood the extent of deflation and economic weakness in Japan,” said Dino Kos of Portales Partners, a research consultancy, who was then a Fed official. “More money was lost on that trade than on any other single trade. Everyone piled in when rates were at 3 per cent and then at 2.5 per cent and then at 2 per cent.”


[top]

http://moslereconomics.com/wp-content/plugins/sociofluid/images/digg_48.png http://moslereconomics.com/wp-content/plugins/sociofluid/images/stumbleupon_48.png http://moslereconomics.com/wp-content/plugins/sociofluid/images/delicious_48.png http://moslereconomics.com/wp-content/plugins/sociofluid/images/newsvine_48.png http://moslereconomics.com/wp-content/plugins/sociofluid/images/technorati_48.png http://moslereconomics.com/wp-content/plugins/sociofluid/images/facebook_48.png http://moslereconomics.com/wp-content/plugins/sociofluid/images/twitter_48.png

Posted in Financial Times, Inflation, Interest Rates | No Comments »

Updated: 7 Deadly Innocent Frauds

Posted by WARREN MOSLER on 10th December 2009

The Seven Deadly Innocent Frauds of Economic Policy

By Warren Mosler

INTRODUCTION
The term “innocent fraud” was introduced by Professor John Kenneth Galbraith in his last book, The Economics of Innocent Fraud, which he wrote at the age of ninety-four in 2004, just two years before he died. 1 Professor Galbraith coined the term to describe a variety of incorrect assumptions embraced by mainstream economists, the media, and most of all, politicians.

The presumption of innocence, yet another example of Galbraith’s elegant and biting wit, implies those perpetuating the fraud are not only wrong, but also not clever enough to understand what they have been doing. And any claim of prior understanding becomes an admission of deliberate fraud—an unthinkable self incrimination.

Galbraith’s economic views gained a wide audience during the 1950’s and 1960’s, with his best selling books The Affluent Society, and The New Industrial State. He was well connected to both the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations, serving as the United States Ambassador to India from 1961 to 1963, when he returned to his post as Harvard’s most renowned Professor of Economics.
Galbraith was largely a Keynesian who believed that only fiscal policy can restore “spending power.” Fiscal policy is what economists call tax cuts and spending increases, and spending in general is what they call aggregate demand.

Galbraith’s academic antagonist, Milton Friedman, led another school of thought known as the “monetarists.” The monetarists believe the Federal government should always keep the budget in balance and use what they called “monetary policy” to regulate the economy. Initially that meant keeping the “money supply” growing slowly and steadily to control inflation, and letting the economy do what it may. However they never could come up with a measure of money supply that did the trick, nor could the Federal Reserve ever find a way to actually control the measures of money they experimented with.

Paul Volcker was the last Fed Chairman to attempt to directly control the money supply. After a prolonged period of actions that merely demonstrated what most central bankers had known for a very long time—that there was no such thing as controlling the money supply—Volcker abandoned the effort.

Monetary policy was quickly redefined as a policy of using interest rates as the instrument of monetary policy rather than any measures of the quantity of money. And “inflation expectations” moved to the top of the list as the cause of inflation, as the money supply no longer played an active role. Interestingly, “money” doesn’t appear anywhere in the latest monetarist mathematical models that advocate the use of interest rates to regulate the economy.

Whenever there are severe economic slumps, politicians need results—in the form of more jobs—to stay in office. At first they watch as the Federal Reserve cuts interest rates, waiting patiently for the low rates to somehow “kick in.” Unfortunately, interest rates never to seem to “kick in.” Then, as rising unemployment threatens the re-election of members of Congress and the President, the politicians turn to Keynesian policies of tax cuts and spending increases. These policies are implemented over the intense objections and dire predictions of the majority of central bankers and mainstream economists.

It was Richard Nixon who famously declared during the double dip economic slump of 1973 that “We are all Keynesians now.”
Despite Nixon’s statement, Galbraith’s Keynesian views lost out to the monetarists when the “Great Inflation” of the the 1970s sent shock waves through the American psyche. Public policy turned to the Federal Reserve and its manipulation of interest rates as the most effective way to deal with what was coined “stagflation”—the combination of a stagnant economy and high inflation.

This book is divided into three sections. Part one immediately reveals the seven ‘innocent frauds’ that I submit are the most imbedded obstacles to national prosperity. They are presented in a manner that does not require any prior knowledge or understanding of the monetary system, economics, or accounting. The first three concern the federal government’s budget deficit, the fourth addresses social security, the fifth international trade, the sixth savings and investment, and the seventh returns to the budget deficit. This chapter is the core message. It’s purpose is to promote a universal understanding of these critical issues facing our nation.

Part two is a history of how I discovered these seven deadly innocent frauds during my more than three decades of experience in the world of finance.
In part three, I set forward a specific action plan for our country to realize our economic potential and restore the American Dream.

April 15, 2010
Warren Mosler
St. Croix
US Virgin Islands

SUMMARY OF THE SEVEN DEADLY INNOCENT FRAUDS OF ECONOMIC POLICY
#1: The government must raise funds through taxing or borrowing in order to spend. In other words, government spending is limited by the government’s ability to tax or borrow.

#2. With government deficits we are leaving our debt burden to our children.

#3: Government budget deficits take away savings.

#4: Social Security is broken.

#5: The trade deficit is an unsustainable imbalance that takes away jobs and output.

#6: We need savings to provide the funds for investment.

#7: It’s a bad thing that higher deficits today mean higher taxes tomorrow.

CHAPTER ONE—THE FIRST DEADLY INNOCENT FRAUD

Deadly Innocent Fraud #1:

The government must raise funds through taxing or borrowing in order to spend. In other words, government spending is limited by the government’s ability to tax or borrow.

Fact:

The actual act of Government spending is NOT operationally limited or in any way constrained by taxing or borrowing.

Ask any congressman (as I have many times), or private citizen, how it all works, and he will tell you emphatically that:

“…the government has to either tax or borrow to get funds to spend, just like any household has to somehow get the money it needs to spend.”
And from this comes the inevitable question about healthcare, defense, social security, and everything else:

‘How are you going to pay for it?!’

This is the killer question, the one no one gets right, and getting the answer to this question right is the core of the public purpose behind writing this book.
In the next few moments of reading it will all be revealed to you with no theory and no philosophy- just a few hard, cold facts.
I answer this question by first looking at exactly how government taxes, followed by how government spends.

HOW GOVERNMENT TAXES

Let’s start by looking at what happens if you pay your taxes by writing a check.
When the government gets your check, and your check is deposited and ‘clears,’ all the government does is change the number in your checking account ‘downward’ when they subtract the amount of your check from your bank balance.

Does the government actually get anything real to give to someone else? No, it’s not like they get a gold coin to spend.
You can actually watch this happen with online banking. You can see the balance in your bank account on your computer screen.
Suppose the balance in your account is $5,000 and you write a check to the govt. for $2,000.

When that checks clears (gets processed), what happens? The 5 turns into a 3, and your new balance is now down to $3,000. All before your very eyes!
And all they did was change a number in your bank account.
The government didn’t actually ‘get’ anything to give to someone else.
No gold coin dropped into a bucket at the Fed.
All they did was change numbers in bank accounts. Nothing ‘went’ anywhere.

And what happens should you go to the Government to pay your taxes with actual cash?
First, you hand over your pile of currency to the person on duty as payment.

Next, he counts it, and then gives you a receipt and hopefully a thank you for helping to pay for social security, the interest on the national debt, and the Iraq war.

Then, as you, the tax payer, leave the room and close the door behind you, he takes that hard earned cash you just forked over and throws it in a shredder.

Yes, it gets thrown it away. Destroyed! Why? They have no further use for it. Just like a ticket to the Super Bowl. As you go into the stadium, you hand the man a ticket that was worth maybe $1000, and then he tears it up and throws it away. In fact, you can actually buy shredded money in Washington DC.

So if government throws away your cash after collecting it, how does that cash pay for anything, like Social Security and the rest of the government’s spending?

It doesn’t. Something else is going on.

Can you now see why it makes no sense at all to say the government has to get money by taxing in order to spend? In no case does it actually ‘get’ anything that it subsequently ‘uses.’ So if govt. doesn’t actually get anything when it taxes, how and what does it spend?

HOW GOVERNMENT SPENDS

Imagine you are expecting your $2,000 social security payment to hit your bank account which already has $3,000 in it, and you are watching your account on your computer screen. You are about to see how government spends without having anything to spend.

Presto!

Suddenly your account statement that read $3,000 now reads $5,000. What did the government do to give you that money?
It simply changed the number in your bank account from 3,000 to 5,000. It changed the 3 into a 5. That’s all. It didn’t take a gold coin and hammer it into a computer. All it did was change a number in your bank account by making data entries into its own spread sheet which is linked to other spread sheets in the banking system.
Government spending is all done by data entry on its own spread sheet we can call ‘The US dollar monetary system.’

And even if the government paid you with actual cash, that cash is nothing more than the same data, but written on a piece of paper rather than entered into a spread sheet.
And how about this quote from the good Federal Reserve Bank Chairman on 60 minutes for support:

(PELLEY) Is that tax money that the Fed is spending?
(BERNANKE) It’s not tax money. The banks have– accounts with the Fed, much the same way that you have an account in a commercial bank. So, to lend to a bank, we simply use the computer to mark up the size of the account that they have with the Fed.1

The Chairman of the Federal Reserve Bank is telling us in plain English that they give out money (spend and lend) simply by changing numbers in bank accounts. There is no such thing as having to ‘get’ taxes (or borrow) to make a spread sheet entry that we call ‘Government spending.’ Computer data doesn’t come from anywhere. Everyone knows that!

Where else do we see this happen? Your team kicks a field goal and on the scoreboard the score changes from, say, 7 point to 10 points. Does anyone wonder where the stadium got those three points? Of course not! Or you knock down 5 pins at the bowling alley and your score goes from 10 to 15. Do you worry about where the bowling alley got those points? Do you think all bowling alleys and football stadiums should have a ‘reserve of points’ in a ‘lock box’ to make sure you can get the points you have scored? Of course not! And if the bowling alley discovers you ‘foot faulted’ and lowers your score back down by 5 points, does the bowling alley now have more score to give out? Of course not!

We all know how ‘data entry’ works, but somehow this has gotten all turned around upside down and backwards by our politicians, media, and most all of the prominent main stream economists.
Just keep this in mind as a starting point:

The Federal Government doesn’t ever ‘have’ or ‘not have’ any dollars.

Just like the stadium doesn’t ‘have’ or ‘not have’ a hoard of points to give out.
When it comes to the dollar, our Government, working through its Federal agencies called the Federal Reserve Bank and the US Treasury Department, is the score keeper. (And it also makes the rules!)

You now have the operational answer to the question:

‘How are we going to pay for it?’

Answer- the same way government pays for anything- it changes the numbers in our bank accounts.

Government isn’t going to ‘run out of money’ as our President has mistakenly repeated. There is no such thing. Nor is it dependent on ‘getting’ dollars from China or anyone else. All it takes for Government to spend is change numbers up in bank accounts at its own bank- the Federal Reserve Bank. There is no numerical limit to how many dollars our Government can spend, whenever it wants to spend. This includes making interest payments, and Social Security and Medicare and payments. It includes all Government payments made in dollars to anyone.
This is not to say excess government spending won’t possibly cause prices to go up (which we call inflation).

It is to say the government can’t go broke and can’t be bankrupt. There is simply no such thing.

So why does no one in government seem to get it? Why does the Ways and Means Committee in Congress worry about ‘how are we going to pay for it’?
One reason might be because they are stuck in the popular notion that the government, just like any household, must somehow first ‘get’ money to be able to spend it.
Yes, they have heard that it’s different for a government, but they don’t believe it, and there’s never a convincing explanation that makes sense to them.
What they all miss is the difference between spending your own currency that only you create, and spending a currency someone else creates.
So to properly utilize this popular government/household analogy in a meaningful way, we next look at an example of a ‘currency’ created by a household.
The story begins with the parents creating coupons they then use to pay their children for doing various household chores.

Additionally, to ‘drive the model,’ the parents require the children to pay them a tax of 10 coupons a week to avoid punishment.
This closely replicates taxation in the real economy, where we have to pay our taxes or face penalties.

The coupons are now the new household currency. Think of the parents as ‘spending’ these coupons to purchase ‘services’ (chores) from their children.
With this new household currency, the parents, like the government, are now the issuer of their own currency.

And now you can see how a household with its own currency is indeed very much like a government with its own currency.
Let’s begin by asking some questions about how this new household currency works.

Do the parents have to somehow get coupons from their children before they can pay their coupons to their children to do chores?
Of course not!

In fact, the parents must first spend their coupons by paying their children to do household chores, to be able to collect the payment of 10 coupons a week from their children. How else can the children get the coupons they owe the parents?

Likewise, in the real economy, the Federal Government, just like this household with its own coupons, doesn’t have to get the dollars it spends from taxing or borrowing, or anywhere else, to be able to spend them. With modern technology, the Federal Government doesn’t even have to print the dollars it spends the way the parents print their own coupons.
Remember, the Federal Government itself neither has nor doesn’t have dollars, any more than the bowling alley ever has a box of points. When it comes to the dollar, our Government is the scorekeeper.

And how many coupons do the parents have in the parent/child coupon story? It doesn’t matter. They could even just write down on a piece of paper how many coupons the children owe them, how many they’ve earned, and how many they’ve paid each month.

When the Federal Government spends, the funds don’t ‘come from’ anywhere any more than the points ‘come from’ somewhere at the football stadium or the bowling alley.
Nor does collecting taxes (or borrowing) somehow increase the government’s ‘hoard of funds’ available for spending.

In fact, the people at the US Treasury who actually spend the money (by changing numbers on bank accounts up) don’t even have the phone numbers of the people at the IRS who collect taxes (they change the numbers on bank accounts down), or the other people at the US Treasury who do the ‘borrowing’ (issue the Treasury securities).

If it mattered at all how much was taxed or borrowed to be able to spend, you’d think they at least would know each other’s phone numbers! Clearly, it doesn’t matter for their purposes.

From our point of view (not the government’s) we need to first have US dollars to be able to make payments. Just like the children need to earn the coupons from their parents before they can make their weekly coupon payments.

In fact, as a point of logic, the dollars we need to pay taxes must, directly or indirectly, from the inception of the currency, come from government spending (or government lending, which I’ll discuss later).

Now let’s build a national currency from scratch.
Imagine a new country with a newly announced currency.
No one has any.

Then the government proclaims, for example, a property tax.
How can it be paid?
It can’t, until after the government starts spending.
Only after the government spends its new currency does the population have the funds to pay the tax.
To repeat, the funds to pay taxes, from inception, come from government spending (or lending). Where else can they come from?

Yes, that means the government had to spend first, to ultimately provide us with the funds we need to pay our taxes.
The government, in this case, is just like the parents who have to spend their coupons first, before they can start actually collecting them from their children.
And, neither the government, nor the parents, from inception, can collect more of their own currency than they spend. Where else could it possibly come from?
So while our politicians truly believe government needs to take our dollars, either by taxing or borrowing, for them to be able to spend, the truth is we need the Federal Government’s spending to get the funds we need to pay our taxes.

We don’t get to change numbers like the federal government does (or the bowling alley and the football stadium).

And just like the children who have to earn or somehow get their coupons to make their coupon payments, we have to earn or somehow get US dollars to make our payments.

And, as you now understand, this is just like it happens in any household that issues its own coupons. The coupons the kids need to make their payments to their parents have to come from their parents.

And, as previously stated, government spending is in no case operationally constrained by revenues (tax payments and borrowings). Yes, there can be and there are ‘self imposed’ constraints on spending put there by Congress, but that’s an entirely different matter. These include debt ceiling rules, Treasury overdraft rules, and restrictions of the Fed buying securities from the Treasury. They are all imposed by a Congress that does not have a working knowledge of the monetary system. And, with our current monetary arrangements, all of those self imposed constraints are counterproductive with regard to furthering public purpose. All they do is put blockages in the monetary plumbing that wouldn’t otherwise be there, and, from time to time, create problems that wouldn’t otherwise arise. In fact, it was some of these self imposed blockages that caused the latest financial crisis to spill over to the real economy and contribute to the recession.

The fact that government spending is in no case operationally constrained by revenues means there is no ‘solvency risk.’ In other words, the federal government can always make any and all payments in its own currency, no matter how large the deficit is, or how few taxes it collects. This, however, does NOT mean the government can spend all it wants without consequence. Over spending can drive up prices and create inflation. What it does mean is there is no solvency risk, which means the federal government can’t go broke, and there is no such thing as our government ‘running out of money to spend’ as President Obama has incorrectly stated repeatedly. Nor, as President Obama also stated, is US spending limited by what it can borrow.

So next time you hear ‘where will the money for social security come from’ go ahead and tell them ‘it’s just data entry. It comes from the same place as your score at the bowling alley comes from.’

Putting it all yet another way, government checks don’t bounce, unless the government decides to bounce its own checks.

Government checks don’t bounce.

A few years ago I gave a talk in Australia at an economics conference. The title was ‘Government Checks Don’t Bounce.’ In the audience was the head of research for the Reserve Bank of Australia, a Mr. David Gruen. This was high drama. I had been giving talks for several years to this group of academics and I had not convinced most of them that government solvency wasn’t an issue. They always started with the familiar ‘What Americans don’t understand is that it’s different for a small, open economy like Australia than it is for the United States.’ There seemed to be no way to get it through their perhaps overeducated skulls that at least for this purpose none of that matters. A spread sheet is a spread sheet. All but Professor Bill Mitchell and a few of his colleagues seemed to have this mental block, and so they deeply feared what would happen if ‘the markets’ turned against Australia to somehow keep them from being able to ‘finance the deficit.’

So I began my talk about how government checks don’t bounce, and after a few minutes David’s hand shot up with the statement familiar to all modestly advanced economic students:
‘If the interest rate on the debt is higher than the rate of growth of GDP, than the government’s debt is unsustainable.’

It wasn’t even a question. It was presented as a fact.

I then replied ‘I’m an operations type of guy, David, so tell me, what do you mean by the word unsustainable?’ Do you mean that if the interest rate is very high, and 20 years from now the government debt has grown to a large enough number the government won’t be able to make its interest payments? And if it writes a check to a pensioner that check will bounce?’

David got very quiet, deep in thought, and said while he was thinking it through ‘you know, when I came here, I didn’t think I’d have to think through how the Reserve Bank’s check clearing works’ in an attempt at humor. But no one in the room laughed or made a sound. They were totally focused on what his answer might be. Again, this was high drama - it was the ‘showdown’ on this issue.
David finally said ‘no, we’ll clear the check, but it will cause inflation and the currency will go down. That’s what people mean by unsustainable.’
There was dead silence in the room. The long debate was over. Solvency is not an issue, even for a small, open economy. Bill and I instantly commanded an elevated respect, which took the usual outward form of ‘well of course, we always said that’ from the former doubters and skeptics.

I continued with David, ‘Well, I think most pensioners are concerned about whether the funds will be there when they retire, and whether the Australian government will be able to pay them.’ To which David replied, ‘No, I think they are worried about inflation and the level of the Australian dollar.’ To which Professor Martin Watts, head of the economics department at the University of Newcastle replied, ‘The Hell they are, David!’ To which David very thoughtfully replied, ‘Yes, I suppose you’re right.’

So what actually was confirmed to the Sydney academics in attendance that day? Governments using their own currency can spend what they want when they want, just like the football stadium can put points on the board at will. The consequences of overspending might be inflation or a falling currency, but never bounced checks.
The fact is:

Government deficits can never cause a government to miss any size payment. There is no solvency issue. There is no such thing as running out of money when spending is just changing numbers upwards in bank accounts at your own Federal Reserve Bank.
Yes, households, businesses, and even the States need to have dollars in their bank accounts when they write checks, or those checks can bounce. That’s because the dollars they spend are created by someone else—the Federal Government- and households, businesses, and the States are not the scorekeeper for the dollar.

Why Government Taxes

So why then does government tax us, if it doesn’t actually get anything to spend or need to get anything to spend?

(Hint: It’s the same reason the parents demand 10 coupons a week from their children, when the parents don’t actually need the coupons for anything.)

There is a very good reason they tax us. Taxes create an ongoing need in the economy to get dollars, and therefore an ongoing need for people to sell their goods and their services and their labor to get dollars. With tax liabilities in place the government can buy things with its otherwise worthless dollars, because someone needs the dollars to pay taxes.

Just like the coupon tax on the children creates an ongoing need for the coupons which can be earned by doing the chores for the parents.
Think of a property tax. (You’re not ready to think about income taxes—it comes down to the same thing, but it’s a lot more indirect and complicated). You have to pay the property tax in dollars or lose your house. It’s just like the kids situation, where the need to get 10 coupons or face the consequences.

So now you are motivated to sell things—goods, services, your own labor—to get the dollars you need. It’s just like the kids, who are motivated to do chores to get the coupons they need.
Finally, I have to connect the dots from some people needing dollars to pay their taxes to everyone wanting and using dollars for almost all of their buying and selling. To do that, let’s go back to the example of a new country, with a new currency I’ll call “the crown”, where the government levies a property tax.

Let’s assume the government levies this tax for the further purpose of raising an army, and offers jobs to soldiers who are paid in “crowns”.

Suddenly, a lot of people who own property now need to get crowns, and many of them won’t want to get crowns directly from the government by serving as soldiers. So they start offering their goods and services for sale in exchange for the new crowns they need and want, hoping to get these crowns without having to join the army.

Other people now see many things for sale they would like to have—chickens, corn, clothing, and all kinds of services like haircuts, medical services, and many other services. The sellers of these goods and services want to receive crowns to avoid having to join the army to get the money they need to pay their taxes.

The fact that all these things are being offered for sale in exchange for crowns makes some other people join the army to get the money needed to buy some of those goods and services.
In fact, prices will adjust until as many soldiers as the government wants are enticed to join the army. Because until that happens, there won’t be enough crowns spent by the government to allow the taxpayers to pay all of their taxes, and those needing the crowns who don’t want to go into the army will cut the prices of their goods and services as much as they have to in order to get them sold, or else thow in the towel and join the army themselves.

The following is is not merely a theoretical concept. It’s exactly what happened in Africa in the 1800’s when the British established colonies there to grow crops. The British offered jobs to the local population, but none of them were interested in earning British coins. So the British placed a “hut tax” on all their dwellings, payable only in British coins. Suddenly, the area was “monetized,” as everyone now needed British coins, and the local population started offering things for sale to get the needed coins, including offering their labor for sale. The British could then hire them and pay them in British coins to work the fields and grow their crops.

And this is exactly what the parents did to get labor hours from their children to get the chores done.
And that’s exactly how all of what are called non convertible currencies work (no more gold standards and very few fixed exchange rates left), like the US dollar, the Japanese yen, and the British pound.

Now we’re ready to look at the role of taxes from a different angle, that of today’s economy, using some of the language of economics.

A learned economist today would say that “taxes function to reduce aggregate demand.” Their term aggregate demand is just a fancy term for “spending power.”
The government taxes us and takes away our money for one reason—so we have that much less to spend which makes the currency that much more scarce and valuable.
Taking away our money can also be thought of as leaving room for the government to spend without causing ‘inflation.’

Think of the economy as one big department store full of all the goods and services we all produce and offer for sale every year. We all get paid enough in wages and profits to buy everything in that store, assuming we spent all the money we earned and all the profits we made. (And if we borrow to spend we can buy even more than there is in that store.)

But when some of our money is goes to pay taxes, that leaving us short of the spending power we would need to buy all of what’s for sale in the store. This gives government the ‘room’ to buy what it wants so that when it spends what it wants the combined spending of government and the rest of is isn’t too much for what’s for sale in the store.

This is what happens when the government taxes too much relative to its spending, and total spending isn’t enough to make sure everything in the store gets sold.

Keep in mind the public purose behind government doing all this is to raise an army, operate a legal system, support a legislature and executive branch of government, promote public infrastructure, promote basic research, etc. So there is quite a bit that even the most conservative voters would have the government do.

So I look at it this way-

for the ‘right’ amount of government spending which we presume is necessary to run the nation the way we would like to see it run, how high should taxes be?

The reason I look at it this way is because the ‘right amount of government spending’ is an economic and political decision that, properly understood, has nothing to do with government finances. The real ‘costs’ of running the government are the real goods and services it consumes- all the labor hours, fuel, electricity, steel, carbon fiber, hard drives, etc. etc. etc. The real cost of the government using all these real goods and services is that those resources would other wise be available for the private sector. So when they government takes those real resources for its own purposes, there are that many fewer real resources left for private sector activity.

So, for example, the real cost of the ‘right size’ army with enough soldiers to defend ourselves is that there are fewer workers left in the private sector to grow the food, build the cars, do the doctoring and nursing and administrative tasks, sell us stocks and real estate, paint our houses, mow our lawns, etc. etc. etc.

Therefore, the way I see it, we first set the size of government at the ‘right’ level, based on real benefits and real costs, and not the ‘financial’ considerations. The monetary system is the tool we use to achieve our real economic and political objectives, not the source of information as to what those objectives are. And after deciding what we need to spend to the ‘right sized’ government, we adjust taxes so that we all have enough spending power to buy what’s still for sale in the ‘store’ after the government is done with its shopping.

In general, I’d expect taxes to be quite a bit lower than government spending, for reasons already explained and also for reasons explained later in this book. In fact, a budget deficit of perhaps 5% of our gross domestic product might turn out to be the norm, which in today’s economy is about $750 billion annually. However, that number per se is of no particulary economic consequence, and could be a lot higher or a lot lower, depending on the circumstances. What matters is that taxes are set to balance the economy and make sure it’s not too hot or not too cold. And government spending is set at the ‘right amount’ given the size and scope of government we want.

That means just because we are in a slow down, we should not add to the size of government to help the economy. We should already be at the ‘right’ size for government, and therefore not add to it every time the economy slows down and grow it to the ‘wrong’ size. So while during a slowdown increasing government spending will indeed make the numbers work, and will end the recession, for me that is far less desireable than accomplishing the same thing with the ‘right’ tax cuts in sufficient size to restore non government spending to the desired amounts.

Even worse is increasing the size of government just because the government might find itself in surplus. Again, government finances tell us nothing about how large government should be. That decision is rightly and totally independent of government finances. The right amount of government spending has nothing to do with tax revenues or the ability to borrow, as both of those are but tools for implementing policy on behalf of public purpose, and not reasons for spending or not spending, and not sources of revenue needed for actual government spending.

I’ll get specific on what role I see for government later in this book, but rest assured my vision is for a far more streamlined and efficient government, that’s intensely focused on the basis of fundamental public purpose. Fortunately, there are readily available and infinitely sensible ways to do this. We can put the right incentives in place that channel market forces with far less regulation and guidance to better promote the public purpose. This will result in a government and culture that will continue to be the envy of the world. It will be a government that expresses our American values of rewarding hard work and innovation, and promoting equal opportunity, equitable outcomes, and enforceable laws and regulations we can respect with true pride.

But I digress. Returning to the issue of how high taxes need to be, recall that if the government simply tried to buy what it wanted to buy and didn’t take away any of our spending power-no taxes- there would be ‘too much money chasing too few goods’ and the result would be a lot of inflation. In fact, with no taxes nothing would even be offered for sale in exchange for the government money in the first place, as previously discussed.

To prevent the government’s spending from causing that kind of inflation, the government must take away some of our spending power by taxing us, not to actually pay for anything, but so their spending won’t cause inflation. The economist would say it this way- taxes function to regulate aggregate demand, not to raise revenue per se.
In other words, the government taxes us, and takes away our money, to prevent inflation, and not to actually get our money in order to spend it.
Restated one more time- Taxes function to regulate the economy, and not to get money for Congress to spend.

And, again, the government neither has nor doesn’t have dollars, it simply changes numbers in our bank accounts upward when it spends, and downwards when it taxes.
All, presumably, for the further public purpose of regulating the economy.

But as long as government continues to believe this first of 7 deadly innocent frauds- that they need to get money from taxing or borrowing in order to spend, they will continue to support policy that constrains output and employment, and prevents us from achieving what are otherwise readily available economic outcomes.

CHAPTER TWO—THE SECOND DEADLY INNOCENT FRAUD

Deadly Innocent Fraud #2:

With government deficits we are leaving our debt burden to our children.

Fact:

Collectively, in real terms, there is no such burden possible. Debt or no debt, our children get to consume whatever they can produce.

This deadly innocent fraud is often the first answer most give to what they perceive to be the main problem associated with government deficit spending.
Borrowing now means paying for today’s spending later. Or, as commonly seen and heard in the media:

“Higher deficits today mean higher taxes tomorrow.”

And paying later means somehow our children’s real standard of living and general well being will be lower because of our deficits.
Professional economists call this the ‘intergenerational’ debt issue. It is thought that if the federal government deficit spends, it is somehow leaving the real burden of today’s expenditures to somehow be paid for by future generations.

And the numbers are staggering.

But, fortunately, like all of the 7 deadly innocent frauds, it is all readily dismissed in a way that all can understand.

In fact, the idea of our children being somehow necessarily deprived of real goods and services in the future because of what’s called the national debt is nothing less than ridiculous.
Here’s a story that illustrates the point.

A year or two ago I ran into former Senator and Governor Lowell Weicker of Connecticut and his wife Claudia on a boat dock in St. Croix. I asked Senator Weicker what was wrong with the country’s fiscal policy. He replied we have to stop running up these deficits and leaving the burden of paying for today’s spending to our children.

I then asked him the following questions to hopefully illustrate the absurdity of his statement:
“When our children build 15 million cars per year 20 years from now, will they have to send them back in time to 2008 to pay off their debt?”
“Are we still sending real goods and services back in time to 1945 to pay off the lingering debt from World War II?”

Interestingly, it was Claudia who instantly grasped it, agreed with me, and asked her husband what he had to say to that. All he could say was he had to think about it some more.
Of course we all know we don’t send real goods and services back in time to pay off federal government deficits, and that our children won’t have to do that either.

Nor is there any reason government spending from previous years should prevent our children from going to work and producing all the goods and services they are capable of producing.
And in our children’s future, just like today, whoever is alive will be able to go to work and produce and consume their real output of goods and services, no matter how many US Treasury securities are outstanding.

There is no such thing as giving up current year output to the past, and sending it back in time to previous generations. Our children won’t and can’t pay us back for anything we leave them- even if they wanted to.

Nor is the financing of deficit spending anything of any consequence. When government spends, it just changes numbers up in our bank accounts. More specifically, all the commercial banks we use for our banking have bank accounts at the Fed called reserve accounts. Foreign governments have reserve accounts at the Fed as well. These reserve accounts are just like checking accounts at any other bank.

When government spends without taxing it changes the numbers up it the appropriate bank reserve account. That means when government makes a $2,000 social security payment to you, for example, it changes the number up in the reserve account of your bank by $2,000 which also automatically changes the number up in your account at your bank by $2,000.

Next you need to know what a US Treasury security actually is. A treasury security is nothing more than a savings account at the Fed. When you buy a treasury security, you send your dollars to the Fed and some time in the future they send the dollars back plus interest. The same holds true for any savings account at any bank. You send the bank dollars and you get them back plus interest.

So let’s say your bank decides to buy $2,000 worth of Treasury securities. To pay for those treasury securities, the Fed reduces the amount your bank has in its ‘checking account’ at the Fed by $2,000 and ‘puts’ $2,000 ‘into’ your bank’s ‘savings account’ at the Fed, which is called a Treasury security.

In other words when the US government does what’s called ‘borrowing money,’ all it does is move funds from checking accounts the Fed to savings accounts (Treasury securities) at the Fed. In fact, the entire $13 trillion national debt is nothing more than the economy’s total holdings of savings accounts at the Fed.

And what happens when the Treasury securities come due, and that ‘debt’ has to be paid back? The Fed merely shifts the dollar balances from the savings accounts at the Fed (Treasury securities) to the appropriate checking accounts at the Fed (reserve accounts). Nor is this anything new. It’s been done exactly like this for a very long time, and no one seems to get it.

What the government deficits can influence is the current year distribution of real output.

Distribution is about who gets all the goods and services that are produced. In fact, this is what politicians do every time they pass legislation. They redirect real goods and services by decree, for better or for worse. And the odds of doing it for better are substantially decreased when they don’t understand the 7 deadly innocent frauds. Each year, for example, Congress discusses tax policy, always with an eye to the distribution of income and spending. Many seek to tax those ‘who can most afford it’ and direct federal spending to ‘those in need.’ And they also decide how to tax interest, capital gains, estates, etc. as well as how to tax income. All of these are distributional issues.

In addition, Congress decides who they hire and fire, who they buy things from, and who gets direct payments. Congress also makes laws that directly affect many other aspects of prices and incomes.

Foreigners who hold US dollars are particularly at risk. They earn those dollars from selling us real goods and services, yet have no assurance they will be able to buy real goods and services from us in the future. Prices could go up (inflation) and the US Government could legally impose all kinds of taxes on anything foreigners wish to buy from us, which reduces their spending power.

Think of all those cars Japan sold to us for under $2,000 years ago. They’ve been holding those dollars, and would now probably have to pay in excess of $20,000 per car to buy cars from us, if they even wanted to. What can they do? Call the manager and complain? They’ve traded millions of perfectly good cars to us in exchange for credit balances on the Fed’s books that can buy only what we allow them to buy. And look at what happened recently- the Federal Reserve cut rates, which reduced the interest Japan earns on its US Treasury securities. (This discussion continues in a subsequent innocent fraud.)

This is all perfectly legal and business as usual, as each year’s output is ‘divided up’ among the living. None of the real output gets ‘thrown away’ because of outstanding debt, no matter how large. Nor does outstanding debt necessarily reduce output and employment, except of course when ill informed policy makers decide to take anti deficit measures measures that do reduce output and employment. Unfortunately, that is currently the case, and that is why this is a deadly innocent fraud.

Today (December, 2009), it’s clear Congress is taking more spending power away from us in taxes than is needed to make room for their own spending. Even after we spend what we want and our government does all of its massive spending, there’s still a lot left unsold in that big department store called the economy.

How do we know that? Easy! Count the bodies in the unemployment lines. Looks at the massive amount of excess capacity in the economy. Look at what the Fed calls the ‘output gap’ which is the difference between what we could produce at full employment and what we are now producing. It’s enourmous.

Sure, there’s a ‘record deficit and national debt,’ though still far below Japan’s, most all of Europe, and World War II US deficits that got us out of that depression with no ‘debt burden consequences, ’ of course.

And if you’ve gotten this far into this book hopefully you know why the size of the deficit isn’t a financial issue. And hopefully you know that taxes function to regulate the economy, and not to raise revenue the way Congress thinks.

When I look at today’s economy, it’s screaming at me that that problem is people don’t have enough money to spend. It’s not telling me they have too much spending power and are over spending.

Who would not agree?
Unemployment has doubled and GDP is more than 10% below where it would be if Congress wasn’t taking so much spending power away from us.

And when we operate at less than our potential- less than full employment- then we are depriving our children of the real goods and services we could be producing on their behalf. When we cut back on our support of higher education we are depriving our children of the knowledge they’ll need to be the very best they can be in their future days. When we cut back on basic research and space exploration we are depriving our children of all the fruits of that labor we are instead transferring to the unemployment lines.

So yes, those alive get to consume this year’s output, and also get to decide to use some of the output as ‘investment goods and services, ’ which should increase future output.

And yes, Congress has a big say in who consumes this year’s output. And potential distributional issues due to previous federal deficits can be readily addressed by Congress and distribution can be legally altered to their satisfaction.

So How Do We Pay Off China?

Those worried about paying off the national debt can’t possibly understand how it all works at the operational, nuts and bolts, debits and credits level. Otherwise they would realize that question is entirely inapplicable.

What they don’t understand is that both dollars and US Treasury debt (securities) are nothing more than ‘accounts’ which are nothing more than numbers that the government makes on its own books.

So let’s start by looking a how we got where we are today with China.

It all started when China wanted to sell things to us and we wanted to buy them.

For example, let’s suppose the US Army wanted to buy $1 billion worth of uniforms from China, and China wanted to sell $1 billion worth of uniforms to the US Army at that price.
So the Army buys $1 billion worth of uniforms from China.

First, understand both parties are ‘happy.’ There is no ‘imbalance.’ China would rather have the $1 billion than the uniforms or they wouldn’t have sold them, and the US army would rather have the uniforms than the money or it wouldn’t have bought them. The transactions are all voluntary.

But back to our point- how does China get paid?

China has a ‘reserve account’ at the Federal Reserve Bank. A reserve account is nothing more than a fancy name for a checking account. It’s the Federal RESERVE Bank so they call it a RESERVE account instead of a checking account.

So to pay China, the Fed adds $1 billion to China’s checking account at the Fed. It does this by changing the numbers in China’s checking account up by $1 billion.

China then has some choices. It can do nothing and keep the $1 billion in its checking account at the Fed, or it can buy US Treasury securities.

A US Treasury security is, functionally, nothing more than a fancy name for a savings account at the Fed. The buyer gives the Fed money, and gets it back later with interest. That’s what a savings account is- you give a bank money and you get it back later with interest.

So let’s say China buys a one year Treasury security.

All that happens is that the Fed subtracts $1 billion from China’s checking account at the Fed, and adds $1 billion to China’s savings account at the Fed.

And all that happens a year later when China’s one year Treasury bill comes due is the Fed takes that money out of China’s savings account at the Fed and puts it in China’s checking account at the Fed.

Right now China is holding some $2 trillion US Treasury securities. So what do we do when they mature and it’s time to pay China back? We move the money from their savings account at the Fed to their checking account at the Fed and wait for them to say what, if anything they might want to do next.

This is what happens when all US government debt comes due, which happens continuously. The Fed moves money from savings accounts to checking accounts on its books. And when people buy Treasury securities, the Fed moves money from their checking accounts to their savings accounts. So what’s all the fuss?

It’s all a tragic misunderstanding.

China knows we don’t need them for anything and is playing us for total fools. Today that includes Geithner, Clinton, Obama, Summers, and the rest of the administration. It also includes Congress and the media.

They know all we owe them to ‘pay them back’ is a bank statement from the Fed that says how much is in their checking account at the Fed.

Now let me describe this all a bit more technically for those of you who care.

When a Treasury bill, note, or bond is purchased by a bank, for example, the government makes two entries on its spreadsheet we call the ‘monetary system.’

First, it debits (subtracts from) the buyer’s reserve account (checking account) at the Fed.

Then it increases (credits) the buyer’s securities account (savings account) at the Fed.

As before, the government simply changes numbers on its own spread sheet - one number gets changed down and another gets changed up.

And when the dreaded day arrives, and the Treasury securities Chinas holds come due and need to be repaid, the Fed again simply changes two numbers on its own spread sheet.

The Fed debits (subtracts from) China’s securities account at the Fed.

And they credit (add to) China’s reserve (checking) account at the Fed.

That’s all- debt paid!

China now ‘has its money back.’ It has a (very large) dollar balance in its checking account at the Fed. If it wants anything else- cars, boats, real estate, other currencies- it has to buy them at market prices from a willing seller who wants dollar deposits in return. And if China does buy something the Fed will subtract that amount from China’s checking account and add that amount to the checking account of whoever China bought it all from.

Notice too, that ‘paying off China’ doesn’t change China’s stated $ wealth. They simply have dollars in a checking account rather than US Treasury securities of equal dollars. And if they want more Treasury securities instead, no problem, the Fed just moves their dollars from their checking accout to their savings account again, by appropriately changing the numbers.

Paying off the entire US national debt is but a matter of subtracting the value of the maturing securities from one account at the Fed, and entering adding that valued to another account at the Fed. These transfers are non-events for the real economy, and not the source of dire stress presumed by the mainstream economists, the politicians, business people, and the media.

One more time:

To pay off the national debt the government changes two entries in its own spreadsheet - a number that says how many securities are owned by the private sector is changed down, and another number that says how many $ US are being kept at the Fed in reserve accunts is changed up.

Nothing more.

Debt paid, all creditors have their ‘money back’.

What’s the big deal?

So what happens if:

China refuses to buy our debt at current low interest rades paid to them. Interest rates have to go up to attract their purchase of the Treasury Securities, right?

Wrong!

They can leave it in their checking account. It’s of no consequence to a US government that understands it’s own monetary system. The fundes are not ‘used’ for spending, as we previously described. There are no negative consequences of that.

What happens if China says—I don’t want to keep a checking account at the Fed any more? Pay me in gold or some other means of exchange!

That’s simply not possible under our current “fiat currency” system.

And some day it will be our children changing numbers on what will be their spread sheet, just as seamlessly as we did.

Though hopefully with a better understanding!

But for now, the deadly innocent fraud of leaving our debt to our children continues to drive policy, and keeps us from optimizing output and employment.

The lost output and depreciated human capital is a real price we and our children paying for now that diminishes both the present and the future. We make do with less than what we can produce, and sustain high levels of unemployment, while our children are deprived of the real investments that would have been made on their behalf if we knew how to keep our human resources fully employed and productive.

CHAPTER THREE—THE THIRD DEADLY INNOCENT FRAUD

Deadly Innocent Fraud #3:

Government budget deficits take away savings.

Fact:

Government budget deficits ADD to savings.

Lawrence Summers
Several years ago I had a meeting with Senator Tom Daschle and then Assistant Treasury Secretary Lawrence Summers. I had been discussing these innocent frauds with the Senator, and explaining how they were working against the well being of those who voted for him. So he set up this meeting with the Assistant Treasury Secretary, who was also a former Harvard economics professor and had two uncles who had won Nobel prizes in economics, to get his response and hopefully confirm what I was saying.

I opened with a question:
“Larry, what’s wrong with the budget deficit?”
To which he replied:
“It takes away savings that could be used for investment.’
To which I replied:

“No it doesn’t, all Treasury securities do is offset operating factors at the Fed. It has nothing to do with savings and investment”
To which he replied:
“Well, I really don’t understand reserve accounting so I can’t discuss it at that level.”

Senator Daschle was looking at all this in disbelief. The Harvard professor of economics Assistant Treasury Secretary Lawrence Summers didn’t understand reserve accounting? Sad but true. So I spent the next twenty minutes explaining the ‘paradox of thrift’ (more detail on this innocent fraud #6 later) step by step, which he sort of got right when he finally responded.
“…so we need more investment which will show up as savings?”

I responded with a friendly ‘yes’ after giving this first year economics lesson to the good Harvard professor and ended the meeting. And the next day I saw him on a podium with the Concord Coalition- a band of deficit terrorists- talking about the grave dangers of the budget deficit.

This third deadly innocent fraud was and is alive and well at the very highest levels.
So here’s how it really works, and it could not be simpler:
Any $US government deficit exactly EQUALS the total net increase in the holdings $US financial assets of the rest of us- businesses and households, residents and non residents- what’s called the ‘non government’ sector.

In other words,
Government deficits = increased ‘monetary savings’ for the rest of us. To the penny.
Most simply- Governmtent deficits ADD to ‘our’ savings, to the penny.

This is accounting fact, not theory or philosophy. There is no dispute. It is basic national income accouting.
So, for example, if the government deficit was $1 trillion last year, it means the net increase in savings of financial assets for everyone else combined was exactly $1 trillion.

To the penny.
(For those who took some economics courses, you might remember that net savings of financial assets is held as some combination of actual cash, Treasury securities, and member bank deposits at the Federal Reserve.)

This is economics 101, and first year money banking. It is beyond dispute. It’s an accounting identity. Yet it’s misrepresented continuously, and at the highest levels of political authority. They are just plain wrong.

Just ask anyone at the CBO (Congressional Budget Office), as I have, and they will tell you they have to ‘balance the check book’ and make sure the government deficit equals our new savings, or they have to stay late and find their accounting mistake.

As before, it’s just a bunch of spread sheet entries on the government’s own spreadsheet. When the accountants debit (subtract from) the account called ‘government’ when government spends, they also credit (add to) the accounts of whoever gets those funds. When the government account goes down, some other account goes up, by exactly the same amount.

Next is an example of how operationally government deficits add to savings. This also puts to rest a ridiculous new take on this innocent fraud that’s popped up recently:
“Deficit spending means the government borrows from one person and gives it to another, so nothing new is added- it’s just a shift of money from one person to another.”

In other words, they are saying deficits don’t add to our savings, but just shift savings around. This could not be more wrong! So let’s demonstrate how deficits do ADD to savings, and not just shift savings:
1. Start with the government selling $100 billion of Treasury securities.

(Note this sale is voluntary, which means the buyer buys the securities because he wants to. Presumably because he believes he is better off buying them than not buying them. No one is ever forced to buy government securities. They get sold at auction to the highest bidder who is willing to accept the lowest yield.)

2. When the buyers of these securities pay for them, bank accounts at the Fed are reduced by $100 billion to make the payment.
In other words, money in bank accounts at the Fed is exchanged for the new Treasury securities (which are also accounts at the Fed). At this point (non government) savings is unchanged. The buyers now have new Treasury securities as savings, rather than the money that was in their bank accounts before they bought the Treasury securities.

3. Now the Treasury spends $100 billion after the sale of the $100 billion of new Treasury securities.

4. This Treasury spending adds back $100 billion to someone’s bank accounts.

5. The non government sector now has its $100 billion of bank accounts back
AND $100 billion of new Treasury securities.

Bottom line-
The deficit spending of $100 billion directly added $100 billion of savings in the form of new Treasury securities to non government savings (which includes everyone but the government).
The savings of the buyer of the $100 billion of new treasury securities shifted from money in his bank account to his holdings of the Treasury securities.
Then the Treasury spent $100 billion after selling the Treasury securities, and the savings of receipents of those funds saw their bank accounts and savings increase by that amount.
So, to the original point, deficit spending doesn’t just shift financial assets (money and Treasury securities) outside of the government.
Instead, deficit spending directly adds that amount of savings of financial assets to the non govt sector.

And, likewise,
A federal budget surplus directly subtracts exactly that much from our savings.
And the media and politicians and even top economists all have it BACKWARDS!

In July 1999 the front page of the Wall Street Journal had two headlines. Towards the left was a headline praising President Clinton and the record government budget surplus, and explaining how well fiscal policy was working. On the right margin was a headline that said Americans weren’t saving enough and we had to work harder to save more. Then a few pages later there was a graph with one line showing the surplus going up, and another line showing savings going down.

They were nearly identical, but going in opposite directions, and clearly showing the gains in the government surplus roughly equaled the losses in private savings.

There can’t be a budget surplus with private savings increasing (including nonresident savings of $US financial assets). There is no such thing, yet not a single mainstream economist or government official had it right.

Al Gore
Early in 2000, in a private home in Boca Raton Florida, I was seated next to then Presidential Candidate Al Gore at a fundraiser/dinner to discuss the economy.

The first thing he asked was how I thought the next president should spend the coming $5.6 trillion surplus forecast for the next 10 years. I explained that there wasn’t going to be a $5.6 trillion surplus, because that would mean a $5.6 trillion drop in non government savings of financial assets, which was a ridiculous proposition. At that time the private sector didn’t even have that much in savings to be taxed away by the government, and the latest surpluses of several hundred billion dollars had already removed more than enough private savings to turn the Clinton boom to the soon to come bust.

I pointed out to Candidate Gore how the last six periods of surplus in our more than two hundred year history had been followed by the only six depressions in our history, and how the coming bust due to allowing the budget to go into surplus and drain our savings would result in a recession that would not end until the deficit got high enough to add back our lost income and savings, and deliver the aggregate demand needed to restore output and employment.

I suggested the $5.6 trillion surplus forecast for the next decade would more likely be a $5.6 trillion deficit, as normal savings desires are likely to average 5% of GDP over that period of time.

And that’s pretty much what happened. The economy fell apart, and President Bush temporarily reversed it with his then massive deficit spending of 2003, but after that, and before we had enough deficit spending to replace the financial assets lost to the Clinton surplus years (a budget surplus takes away exactly that much savings from the rest of us), we let the deficit get too small again, and after the sub-prime debt driven bubble burst we again fell apart due to a deficit that was and remains far too small for the circumstances.

For the current level of government spending, govt is over taxing us and we don’t have enough after tax income to buy what’s for sale in that big department store called the economy.

Anyway, Al was a good student, and went over all the details, and agreed it made sense and was indeed what might happen, but said he couldn’t ‘go there.’ And I said I understood the political realities, as he got up and gave his talk about how he was going to spend the coming surpluses.

Robert Rubin

Maybe 10 years ago, around the turn of the century, just before it all fell apart, I found myself in a private client meeting at Citibank with Robert Rubin and about 20 Citibank clients. Rubin gave his take on the economy, and indicated the low savings rate might turn out to be a problem. With just a few minutes left, I told him I agreed about the low savings rate being an issue, and added:
“Bob, does anyone in Washington realize that the budget surplus takes away savings from the non government sectors?
To which he replied:
“No, the surplus adds to savings. When the govt runs a surplus, it buys Treasury securities in the market, and that adds to savings and and investment.
To which I replied:
“No, when you run a surplus we have to sell our securitites to get the money to pay our taxes, and our net financial assets and savings go down by the amount of the surplus.”
Rubin: “No, I think you’re wrong.”

I let it go and the meeting was over. My question was answered. If he didn’t understand surpluses removed savings no one in the administration did. And the economy crashed soon afterwards.

When the January 09 savings report was released, and the press noted that the rise in savings to 5% of GDP was the highest since 1995, they failed to note the current budget deficit passed 5% of GDP, which also happens to be the highest it’s been since 1995.

Clearly the mainstream doesn’t yet realize deficits add to savings. And if Al Gore does, he isn’t saying anything. So watch this year as the federal deficit goes up and savings goes up. Again, the only source of ‘net $ US monetary savings’ (financial assets) for the non government sectors combined (both residents and non residents) is US government deficit spending.

And watch how the same people who want us to save more at the same time want to ‘balance the budget’ by taking away our savings, either through spending cuts or tax increases.
They are all talking out of both sides of their mouths.
They are part of the problem, not part of the answer.
And they are at the very highest levels.
Except for one.

Professor Wynne Godley
Professor Wynne Godley, retired head of Economics at Cambridge University and now over 80 years old, was widely renowned as the most successful forecaster of the British economy for multiple decades. And he did it all with his ‘sector analysis’ which had at its core the fact that the government deficit equals the savings of financial assets of the other sectors combined. And even the success of his forecasting, the iron clad support from the pure accounting facts, and the weight of his office, all of which continues to this day, he has yet to convince the mainstream of the validity of his understandings.

So now we know deficits aren’t the ‘bad things’ the way the mainstream thinks they are.
The government won’t go broke;
Federal deficits don’t burden our children;
Federal deficits don’t just shift funds from one person to another; and
Federal deficits add to our savings.
Taxes function to regulate our spending power and the economy in general.

If the ‘right’ level of taxation needed to support output and employment happens to be a lot less than government spending, that resulting budget deficit is nothing to be afraid of regarding solvency, sustainability, or doing bad by our children.

The only risk is inflation (to be discussed in detail later in this book).
So what is the role for deficits in regard to policy?
It’s very simple. Whenever spending falls short of sustaining our output and employment; when we don’t have enough spending power to buy what’s for sale in that big department store we call the economy for ANY reason; government can act to see to it our own output is sold by either cutting taxes or increasing govt. spending.

So if everyone wants to work and earn money but doesn’t want to spend it, fine!

Government can either buy the output (hand out contracts for infrastructure repairs, national security, medical research, and the like or spend directly) and/or keep cutting taxes until we decide to spend and buy our own output. The choices are political. ‘Finance’ and the size of the deficit offers no useful informantion in making that decision.

The right sized deficit is the one that gets us to where we want to be with regards to output and employment, as well as the size of government we want, no matter how large or how small a deficit that might be.

What matters is real life- output and employment- not the size of the deficit, which is an accounting statistic. In the 1940’s an economist named Abba Lerner called this ‘Functional Finance’ and wrote a book by that name that is still very relevant today.

More on this later, as we now move on to the next innocent fraud.

CHAPTER FOUR—THE FOURTH DEADLY INNOCENT FRAUD

Deadly Innocent Fraud #4:

Social Security is broken.

Fact:

Government Checks Don’t Bounce.

If there is one thing all members of Congress believe is that social security is broken. President elect Obama said the money won’t be there. President Bush used the word bankruptcy four times in one day, and Senator McCain said social security is broken. They are all wrong.

As we’ve already discussed, the government never has or doesn’t have any of its own money. It spends by changing numbers in our bank accounts. This includes social security.

There is no operational constraint on the Government’s ability to meet all Social Security payments in a timely manner.

It does’t matter what the numbers are in the Social Security Trust Fund account.

The trust fund is nothing more than record keeping, as are all accounts at the Fed.

When it comes time to make Social Security payments, all the govt has to do is change numbers up in the beneficiary’s accounts, and then change numbers down in the trust fund accounts to keep track of what it did. If the trust fund number goes negative, so be it. That just reflects the numbers that are changed up as payments to beneficiaries are made.

And one of the major discussions in Washington is whether or not to privatize social security. As you might be guessing by now, that entire discussion makes no sense whatsoever, so let me begin with that and then move on.
The idea of privatization is that:

1. Social security taxes and benefits are reduced, and instead,
2. The amount of the tax reduction is used to buy specified shares of stock. And
3. Because the government is going to collect that much less in taxes the budget deficit will be that much higher, and so the government will have to sell that many more Treasury securities to ‘pay for it all’ (as they say).

Got it?

1. They take less each week from your pay check for social security and
2. You get to use the funds they no longer take from you to buy stocks.
3. You later will collect a bit less in social security payments when you retire, but
4. You will own stocks that will hopefully become worth more than the social security payments you gave up.

From the point of view of the individual it looks like an interesting trade off. The stocks you buy only have to go up modestly over time for you to be quite a bit ahead.

Those who favor this plan say yes, it’s a relatively large one time addition to the deficit, but the savings in social security payments down the road for the government pretty much makes up for that, and the payments going into the stock market will help the economy grow and prosper.

Those against the proposal say the stock market is too risky for this type of thing, and point to the large drop in 2008 as an example. And if people lose in the stock market the government will be compelled to increase social security retirement payments to keep them out of poverty. Therefore, unless we want to risk a high percentage of our seniors falling below the poverty line, government is taking all the risk.

They are both terribly mistaken. (Who would have thought!)

The major flaw in this main stream dialogue is what is called a ‘fallacy of composition.’ The typical textbook example of a fallacy of composition is the football game where you can see better if you stand up, and then conclude that everyone would see better if everyone stood up.

Wrong!

If everyone stands up no one can see better, and everyone is standing up rather than sitting down. So all are worse off.

They all are looking at what is called the micro level for the individual social security participants rather than looking at the macro level which includes the entire population.

To understand what’s fundamentally wrong at the macro (big picture, top down) level, you first have to understand that participating in social security is functionally the same as buying a government bond. Let me explain.
With the current social security program you give the government your dollars now, and it gives you back dollars later. That is exactly what happens when you buy a government bond (yes, or put your money in a savings account). You give the government your dollars now and you get dollars back later plus any interest.

Yes, one might turn out to be a better investment and give you a higher return, but apart from the rate of return, each is very much the same.(Now that you know this, you are way ahead of Congress, by the way.)

Steve Moore

And now you are ready to read about the conversation of several years back I had with Steve Moore, then head of economics at the CATO institute, now a CNBC regular, and a long time supporter of privatizing Social Security.

Steve came down to speak about social security at one of my conferences in Florida. He gave his talk that went much like I just stated- by letting people put their money in the stock market rather than making social security payments they will better off over time when they retire, and the one time increase in the government budget deficit will be both well worth it and probably paid down over time in the expansion to follow, as all that money going into stocks will help the economy grow and prosper.

At that point I led off the question and answer session.
Warren: “Steve, giving the government money now in the form of social security taxes, and getting it back later is functionally the same as buying a government bond, where you give the government money now and it gives it back to you later. The only difference is the return.”
Steve: “OK, but with government bonds you get a higher return than with Social Security which only pays your money back at 2% interest. Social Security is a bad investment for individuals.”
Warren: “OK, I’ll get to the investment aspect later, but let me continue. Under your privatization proposal, the government would reduce Social Security payments and the employees would put that money into the stock market.”
Steve: “Yes, about $100 per month, and only into approved, high quality stocks.”
Warren: “OK, and the US Treasury would have to issue and sell additional securities to cover the reduced revenues.”
Steve: “Yes, and it would also be reducing social security payments down the road.”
Warren: “Right. So to continue with my point, the employees buying the stock buy them from someone else, so all the stocks do is change hands. No new money goes into the economy.”
Steve: “Right”
Warren: “And the people who sold the stock then have the money from the sale which is the money that buys the government bonds.”
Steve: “Yes, you can think of it that way.”
Warren: “So what’s happened is the employees stopped buying into social security, which we agree was functionally the same as buying a government bond, and instead bought stocks. And other people sold their stocks and bought the newly issued government bonds. So looking at it from the macro level, all that happened is some stocks changed hands, and some bonds changed hands. Total stocks outstanding and total bonds outstanding, if you count social security as a bond, remained about the same. And so this should have no influence on the economy, or total savings, or anything else apart from generating transactions costs?”
Steve: “Yes, I suppose you can look at it that way, but I look at it as privatizing, and I believe people can invest their money better than government can.”
Warren: “Ok, but you agree the amount of stocks held by the public hasn’t changed, so with this proposal nothing changes for the economy as a whole.”
Steve: “But it does change things for Social Security participants.”
Warren: “Yes, with exactly the opposite change for others. And none of this has even been discussed by Congress or any mainstream economist? It seems you have an ideological bias towards privatization rhetoric, rather than the substance of the proposal.”
Steve: “I like it because I believe in privatization- I believe that you can invest your money better than government can.”

With that I’ll let Steve have the last word here. The proposal in no way changes the number of shares of stock, or which stocks the American public would hold for investment. So at the macro level it is not the case of allowing the nation to ‘invest better than the government can.’ And Steve knows that, but it doesn’t matter, and he continues to peddle the same illogical story that he knows is illogical. And he gets no criticism from the media apart from the discussion as to whether stocks are a better investment than social security, and whether the bonds the government has to sell will take away savings that could be used for investment, and whether the government risks its solvency by going even deeper into debt, and all the other such innocent fraud nonsense.

Unfortunately, the deadly innocent frauds continuously compound and obscure any chance for legitimate analysis.

And it gets worse yet. The ‘intergenerational’ story continues with something like this:

“The problem is that 30 years from now there will be a lot more retired people and proportionately fewer workers (that part’s right), and the Social Security trust fund will run out of money (as if number in a trust fund is an actual constraint on govt’s ability to spend…silly, but they believe it), so to solve the problem we need to figure out a way to be able to provide seniors with enough money to pay for the goods and services they will need.”

With that last statement it all goes bad. They assume that the real problem of fewer workers and more retirees, which is also known as the dependency ratio, can be ‘solved’ by making sure the retirees have sufficient funds to buy what they need.

Let’s look at it this way. 50 years from now when there is one person left working and 300 million retired people (I exaggerate to make the point), that guy is going to pretty busy since he’ll have to grow all the food, build and maintain all the buildings, do the laundry, take care of all medical needs, produce the TV shows, etc. etc. etc.

So what we need to do is make sure those 300 million retired people have the funds to pay him??? I don’t think so! This problem obviously isn’t about money.

What we need to do is make sure that one guy working is smart enough and productive enough and has enough capital goods and software to be able to get all that done, or those retirees are in serious trouble, no matter how much money they might have.

So the real problem is, if the remaining workers aren’t sufficiently productive there will be a general shortage of goods and services and more ‘money to spend’ will only drive up prices, and not somehow create more goods and services.

The mainstream story deteriorates further as it continues:

“Therefore, government needs to cut spending or increase taxes today, to accumulate the funds for tomorrow’s expenditures.”
By now I trust you know this is ridiculous, and evidence of the deadly innocent frauds hard at work to undermine our well being and the next generation’s standard of living as well.

Our government neither has or doesn’t have dollars. It spends by changing numbers up in our bank accounts, and taxes by changing numbers down in our bank accounts.

And raising taxes serves to lower our spending power. That’s ok if spending is too high causing the economy to ‘overheat’ as we have too much spending power for what’s for sale in that big department store called the economy.

But if that’s not the case, and, in fact, spending is falling far short of what’s needed to buy what’s offered for sale at full employment levels of output, raising taxes and taking away our spending power only makes things that much worse.

And the story gets even worse. Any mainstream economist will agree that there pretty much isn’t anything in the way of real goods we can produce today that will be useful 50 years from now. They go on to say that the only thing we can do for our descendents that far into the future is to do our best to make sure that they have the knowledge and technology to help them meet their future demands.

So the final irony is that in order to somehow ‘save’ public funds for the future, what we do is cut back on expenditures today, which does nothing but set our economy back and cause the growth of output and employment to decline.

And, for the final ‘worse yet,’ the great irony is that the first thing they cut back on is education- the one thing the mainstream agrees should be done that actually helps our children 50 years down the road.

Should our policy makers ever actually get a handle on how the monetary system functions, they would realize the issue is social equity, and possibly inflation, but never government solvency.

They would realize that if they want seniors to have more income at any time, it’s a simple matter of raising benefits, and that the real question is, what level of real resource consumption do we want to provide for our seniors? How much food do we want to allocate to them? How much housing? Clothing? Electricity? Gasoline? Medical services? Those are the real issues, and yes, giving seniors more of those goods and services means less for us. The amount of goods and services we allocate to seniors is the real cost to us, not the actual payments, which are nothing more than numbers in bank accounts.

And if they are concerned about the future, they would support the types of education they thought would be most valuable for that purpose.

But they don’t understand the monetary system and they won’t see it the ‘right way around’ until they do understand it.

Meanwhile, the deadly innocent fraud of Social Security takes its toll on both our present and our future well being.

CHAPTER FIVE—THE FIFTH DEADLY INNOCENT FRAUD

Deadly Innocent Fraud #5:

The trade deficit is an unsustainable imbalance that takes away jobs and output.

Facts:

Imports are real benefits and exports are real costs. Trade deficits directly improve our standard of living. Jobs are lost because taxes are too high for a given level of government spending, not because of imports.

By now you might suspect that, once again, the mainstream has it all backwards, including the trade issue. To get on track with the trade issue, always remember this:
In economics, it’s better to receive than to give. Therefore:

Imports are real benefits.
Exports are real costs.

In other words, going to work to produce real goods and services to export to someone else to consume does you no economic good at all, unless you get to import and consume the real goods and services others produce in return.
And also remember:
The real wealth of a nation is all it produces and keeps for itself,

plus all it imports,
minus what it must export.
A trade deficit in fact increases our real standard of living. How can it be any other way? And the higher the trade deficit the better.

Yes, the mainstream economists, politicians, and media all have the trade issue completely backwards. Sad but true.

To further make the point, if, for example, General McArthur had proclaimed after WWII that since Japan had lost the war, they would be required to send the US 2 million cars a year and get nothing in return, the result would have been a major international uproar about US exploitation of conquered enemies. We would have been accused of fostering a repeat of the aftermath of WWI, where the allies demanded reparations from Germany that were presumably so high and exploitive they caused WWII.

Well, McArthur did not order that, yet for over 60 years, Japan has in fact been sending us about 2 million cars per year, and we have been sending them little or nothing. And, surprisingly, they think this means they are winning the ‘trade war’ and we think it means we are losing it.

Same with China- they think they are winning because they keep our stores full of their products and get nothing in return. And our leaders agree and think we are losing.

This is madness on a grand scheme! Now take a fresh look at the headlines and commentary we see and hear daily:

*The US is suffering from a trade deficit.
*The trade deficit is an unsustainable imbalance.
*The US is losing jobs to China.
*Like a drunken sailor, the US is borrowing from abroad to fund its spending habits, leaving the bill to our children, as we deplete our national savings.

I’ve heard it all. It’s all total nonsense. We are benefiting IMMENSELY from the trade deficit. The rest of the world has been sending us hundreds of billions of dollars worth of real goods and services in excess of what we send them. They get to produce and export, and we get to import and consume.

Is this an unsustainable imbalance? Certainly not for us! Why would we want to end it? As long as they want to send us goods and services without demanding any goods and services in return, why should we not be able to take them?

There is no reason, apart from a complete misunderstanding of our monetary system by our leaders that’s turned a massive real benefit into a nightmare of domestic unemployment.

Recall from the previous innocent frauds, the US can ALWAYS support domestic output and sustain domestic full employment with fiscal policy (tax cuts and/or govt. spending), even when China, or any other nation, decides to send us real goods and services that displace our industries previously doing that work.

All we have to do is keep American spending power high enough to be able to buy BOTH what foreigners want to sell us AND all the goods and services we can produce ourselves at full employment levels. Yes, jobs may be lost in one or more industries. But with the right fiscal policy there will always be sufficient domestic spending power to be able to employ those willing and able to work producing other goods and services for our private and public consumption. In fact, up until recently, unemployment remained relatively low even as our trade deficit went ever higher.

So what about all the noise about the US borrowing from abroad like drunken sailor to fund our spending habits? Also not true! We are not dependent on China to buy our securities or in any way fund our spending.

Here’s what’s really going on:

Domestic credit creation is funding foreign savings.
What does this mean? Let’s look at an example of a typical transaction. Assume you live in the US and decide to buy a car made in China.
You go to a US bank, get accepted for a loan, and spend the funds on the car.
So where do things then stand? You exchanged the borrowed funds for the car, the Chinese car company has a deposit in the bank, and the bank has a loan to you and a deposit belonging to the Chinese car company on their books. First, all parties are ‘happy.’
You would rather have the car than the funds, or you would not have bought it, so you are happy.
The Chinese car company would rather have the funds than the car, or they would not have sold it, so they are happy.
The bank wants loans and deposits, or it wouldn’t have made the loan, so it’s happy.
There is no ‘imbalance.’ Everyone is sitting fat and happy. They all got exactly what they wanted. The bank has a loan and a deposit, so they are happy and in balance. The Chinese car company has the $ US deposit they want as savings, so they are happy and in balance. And you have the car you want and a car payment you agreed to, so you are happy and in balance as well. Everyone is happy with what they have at that point in time.
And domestic credit creation-the bank loan- has funded the Chinese desire to hold a $ US deposit at the bank which we also call savings.
Where’s the ‘foreign capital?’ There isn’t any! The entire notion of the US somehow depending on foreign capital is inapplicable. Instead, it’s the foreigners who are dependent on our domestic credit creation process to fund their desire to save $ US financial assets.
It’s all a case of domestic credit funding foreign savings.
We are not dependent on foreign savings for funding anything.
Nor can we be. Again, it’s our spread sheet and if they want to save our $ they have to play in our sandbox. And what options do foreign savers have for their dollar deposits? They can do nothing, or they buy other financial assets from willing sellers, or they buy real goods and services from willing sellers. And when they do that, at market prices, again, both parties are happy. The buyers get what they want- real goods and services, other financial assets, etc. The sellers get what they want- the dollar deposit. No imbalances are possible. And there is not even the remotest possibility of US dependency on foreign capital, as there’s no foreign capital involved anywhere in this process.

CHAPTER SIX—THE SIXTH DEADLY INNOCENT FRAUD

Deadly Innocent Fraud #6:

We need savings to provide the funds for investment.

Fact:

Investment adds to savings

Second to last but not least, this innocent fraud undermines our entire economy, as it diverts real resources away from the real sectors to the financial sector, and results in real investment being directed in a manner totally divorced from public purpose. In fact, it’s my guess that this deadly innocent fraud might be draining over 20% annually from useful output and employment- a staggering statistic unmatched in human history. And it leads directly the type of financial crisis we’ve been going through.

It begins with what’s called the paradox of thrift in the economics text books, which goes something like this:
In our economy, spending must equal all income, including profits, for the output of the economy to get sold. (Think about that some to make sure you’ve got it before moving on.)
If anyone attempts to save by spending less than his income, at least one other person must make up for that by spending more than his own income, or the output of the economy won’t get sold.

Unsold output means excess inventories, and the low sales means production and employment cuts, and less total income. And that shortfall of income is equal to the amount not spent by the person trying to save.

Think of it as the person trying to save by not spending his income losing his job, and not getting any income, because his employer can’t sell all the output.

So the paradox is,

decisions to save by not spending income result in less income and no new net savings.

Likewise, decisions to spend more than one’s income by going into debt cause incomes to rise and can drive real investment and savings.

Consider this extreme example to make the point:

Supposed everyone ordered a new pluggable hybrid car from our domestic auto industry. Because the industry can’t currently produce that many cars, they would hire us, and borrow to pay us to first build the new factories to meet the new demand.

That means we’d all be working on new plant and equipment- capital goods- and getting paid. But there would not yet be anything to buy, so we would necessarily be ‘saving’ our money for the day the new cars roll off the new assembly lines.

The decision to spend in this case resulted in less spending and more savings. And funds spent on the production of capital goods, which constitute real investment, led to an equal amount of savings.

I like to say it this way-

‘Savings is the accounting record of investment’

Professor Basil Moore
I had this discussion with a Professor Basil Moore in 1996 at a conference in New Hampshire, and he asked if he could use that expression in a book he wanted to write. I’m pleased to report the book with that name has been published and I’ve heard it’s a good read. (I’m waiting for my autographed copy.)

Unfortunately, Congress, the media, and mainstream economists get this all wrong, and somehow conclude we need more savings so there will be funding for investment. What seems to make perfect sense at the micro level is again totally wrong at the macro level.

Just as loans create deposits, investment creates savings. So what do our leaders do in their infinite wisdom when investment falls usually, because of low spending?

They invariably decide ‘we need more savings so there will be more money for investment.’ (And I’ve never heard a single objection from any mainstream economist.) And to accomplish this Congress uses the tax structure to create tax advantaged savings incentives, such as pension funds, IRA’s, and all sorts of tax advantaged institutions that accumulate reserves on a tax deferred basis.

Predictably, all that these incentives do is remove aggregate demand (spending power). They function to keep us from spending our money to buy our output. This slows the economy and introduces the need for private sector credit expansion and public sector deficit spending just to get us back to even.

That’s why what seem to be enormous deficits turn out not to be as inflationary as they otherwise might be.

In fact the deficits are necessary to offset these
Congressionally engineered ‘demand leakages’ caused by the tax advantaged savings vehicles.

Ironically, the same Congressmen pushing the tax advantaged savings programs, we need more savings to have money for investment, are the ones categorically opposed to federal deficit spending.

But it gets even worse. The massive pools of funds (created by the deadly innocent fraud that savings are needed for investment) also need to be managed, and for the further purpose of compounding the monetary savings for the beneficiaries.

This is the support base of the dreaded financial sector- thousands of pension fund managers whipping around vast sums of dollars, which are largely subject to government regulation. For the most part that means investing in publicly traded stocks, rated bonds, and with some diversification to other strategies such as hedge funds and passive commodity strategies. And feeding on these ‘bloated whales’ are the inevitable sharks- the thousands of financial professionals in the brokerage, banking, and financial management industries. But that’s another story…

CHAPTER SEVEN—THE SEVENTH DEADLY INNOCENT FRAUD

Deadly Innocent Fraud #7:

Your reward for getting this far is a look at what has become the most common criticism of government deficits:

Higher deficits today mean higher taxes tomorrow.

Fact:

I agree,
the innocent fraud is that it’s a bad thing,
when in fact it’s a good thing!!!

Your reward for getting this far is you already know the truth about this most common criticism of government deficits. I saved this for last so you would have all the tools to give it a decisive and informed response.

First, why does government tax?

Not to get money, but to take away our spending power if it thinks we have too much spending power and it’s causing an inflation problem.

Why are we running higher deficits today?

Because the ‘department store’ has a lot of unsold goods and services in it- unemployment is high and output is lower than capacity. The government is buying what it wants and we don’t have enough after tax spending power to buy what’s left over. So we cut taxes and maybe increase government spending to increase spending power and help clear the shelves of unsold goods and services.

And why would we ever increase taxes?

Not for the government to get money to spend- we know it doesn’t work that way.

We would increase taxes only when our spending power is too high, and unemployment has gotten so low, and the shelves have gone empty do to our excess spending power, and our available spending power is causing unwanted inflation.

So the statement “Higher deficits today mean higher taxes tomorrow” in fact is saying:

“Higher deficits today when unemployment is high will cause unemployment to go down to the point we need to raise taxes to cool down a booming economy.”

Agreed!

http://moslereconomics.com/wp-content/plugins/sociofluid/images/digg_48.png http://moslereconomics.com/wp-content/plugins/sociofluid/images/stumbleupon_48.png http://moslereconomics.com/wp-content/plugins/sociofluid/images/delicious_48.png http://moslereconomics.com/wp-content/plugins/sociofluid/images/newsvine_48.png http://moslereconomics.com/wp-content/plugins/sociofluid/images/technorati_48.png http://moslereconomics.com/wp-content/plugins/sociofluid/images/facebook_48.png http://moslereconomics.com/wp-content/plugins/sociofluid/images/twitter_48.png

Posted in Banking, Books, China, Congress, Credit, Currencies, Deficit, ECB, Economic Releases, Employment, Equities, Exports, Fed, GDP, Housing, Inflation, Interest Rates, Mosler 2012, Proposal, Published, Tea Party | 121 Comments »

Bernanke quote revisited

Posted by WARREN MOSLER on 28th November 2009


[Skip to the end]

“Under a paper-money system, a determined government can always generate higher spending and hence positive inflation.”

- Ben Bernanke

It also has to know which buttons to press.
QE and lower interest rates are not the buttons for that job.
The button is the budget deficit, and they seem categorically against pressing it due to deficit myths.

Any continuing shortage of agg demand and high unemployment is entirely self inflicted.


[top]

http://moslereconomics.com/wp-content/plugins/sociofluid/images/digg_48.png http://moslereconomics.com/wp-content/plugins/sociofluid/images/stumbleupon_48.png http://moslereconomics.com/wp-content/plugins/sociofluid/images/delicious_48.png http://moslereconomics.com/wp-content/plugins/sociofluid/images/newsvine_48.png http://moslereconomics.com/wp-content/plugins/sociofluid/images/technorati_48.png http://moslereconomics.com/wp-content/plugins/sociofluid/images/facebook_48.png http://moslereconomics.com/wp-content/plugins/sociofluid/images/twitter_48.png

Posted in Government Spending, Inflation, Interest Rates | 5 Comments »

Krugman on ‘The Phantom Menace’

Posted by WARREN MOSLER on 24th November 2009


[Skip to the end]

Thanks, problem areas in yellow that tend to discredit what he’s saying.

He needs our help bad!

The Phantom Menace

By Paul Krugman

Nov 22 (NYT) — A funny thing happened on the way to a new New Deal. A year ago, the only thing we had to fear was fear itself; today, the reigning doctrine in Washington appears to be “Be afraid. Be very afraid.”

What happened? To be sure, “centrists” in the Senate have hobbled efforts to rescue the economy. But the evidence suggests that in addition to facing political opposition, President Obama and his inner circle have been intimidated by scare stories from Wall Street.

Consider the contrast between what Mr. Obama’s advisers were saying on the eve of his inauguration, and what he himself is saying now.

In December 2008 Lawrence Summers, soon to become the administration’s highest-ranking economist, called for decisive action. “Many experts,” he warned, “believe that unemployment could reach 10 percent by the end of next year.” In the face of that prospect, he continued, “doing too little poses a greater threat than doing too much.”

Ten months later unemployment reached 10.2 percent, suggesting that despite his warning the administration hadn’t done enough to create jobs. You might have expected, then, a determination to do more.

But in a recent interview with Fox News, the president sounded diffident and nervous about his economic policy. He spoke vaguely about possible tax incentives for job creation. But “it is important though to recognize,” he went on, “that if we keep on adding to the debt, even in the midst of this recovery, that at some point, people could lose confidence in the U.S. economy in a way that could actually lead to a double-dip recession.”

What? Huh?

Most economists I talk to believe that the big risk to recovery comes from the inadequacy of government efforts: the stimulus was too small, and it will fade out next year, while high unemployment is undermining both consumer and business confidence.

Now, it’s politically difficult for the Obama administration to enact a full-scale second stimulus. Still, he should be trying to push through as much aid to the economy as possible. And remember, Mr. Obama has the bully pulpit; it’s his job to persuade America to do what needs to be done.

Instead, however, Mr. Obama is lending his voice to those who say that we can’t create more jobs. And a report on Politico.com suggests that deficit reduction, not job creation, will be the centerpiece of his first State of the Union address. What happened?

It took me a while to puzzle this out. But the concerns Mr. Obama expressed become comprehensible if you suppose that he’s getting his views, directly or indirectly, from Wall Street.

Ever since the Great Recession began economic analysts at some (not all) major Wall Street firms have warned that efforts to fight the slump will produce even worse economic evils. In particular, they say, never mind the current ability of the U.S. government to borrow long term at remarkably low interest rates — any day now, budget deficits will lead to a collapse in investor confidence, and rates will soar.

And it’s this latter claim that Mr. Obama echoed in that Fox News interview. Is he right to be worried?

Well, spikes in long-term interest rates have happened in the past, most famously in 1994. But in 1994 the U.S. economy was adding 300,000 jobs a month, and the Fed was steadily raising short-term rates. It’s hard to see why anything similar should happen now, with the economy still bleeding jobs and the Fed showing no desire to raise rates anytime soon.

He’s conceding it is a risk, though small. Allows the critics that opening and it actually supports them.

A better model, I’d argue, is Japan in the 1990s, which ran persistent large budget deficits, but also had a persistently depressed economy — and saw long-term interest rates fall almost steadily. There’s a good chance that officials are being terrorized by a phantom menace — a threat that exists only in their minds.

Again, he concedes they may be right, and that all he has is a theory that with a weak economy blah blah blah.

And shouldn’t we consider the source? As far as I can tell, the analysts now warning about soaring interest rates tend to be the same people who insisted, months after the Great Recession began, that the biggest threat facing the economy was inflation. And let’s not forget that Wall Street — which somehow failed to recognize the biggest housing bubble in history — has a less than stellar record at predicting market behavior.

Same thing. These are not decisive arguments, and can’t be until he gets our of gold standard paradigm into non convertible currency paradigm.

Still, let’s grant that there is some risk that doing more about double-digit unemployment would undermine confidence in the bond markets. This risk must be set against the certainty of mass suffering if we don’t do more — and the possibility, as I said, of a collapse of confidence among ordinary workers and businesses.

Resorting to the ‘bleeding heart’ argument is a sign of desperation.

Unfortunately he’s part of the problem rather than part of the answer even though his heart may be in the right place.

And Mr. Summers was right the first time: in the face of the greatest economic catastrophe since the Great Depression, it’s much riskier to do too little than it is to do too much. It’s sad, and unfortunate, that the administration appears to have lost sight of that truth.


[top]

http://moslereconomics.com/wp-content/plugins/sociofluid/images/digg_48.png http://moslereconomics.com/wp-content/plugins/sociofluid/images/stumbleupon_48.png http://moslereconomics.com/wp-content/plugins/sociofluid/images/delicious_48.png http://moslereconomics.com/wp-content/plugins/sociofluid/images/newsvine_48.png http://moslereconomics.com/wp-content/plugins/sociofluid/images/technorati_48.png http://moslereconomics.com/wp-content/plugins/sociofluid/images/facebook_48.png http://moslereconomics.com/wp-content/plugins/sociofluid/images/twitter_48.png

Posted in Government Spending, Interest Rates | 2 Comments »

Housing starts and 10 year tsy rates

Posted by WARREN MOSLER on 17th November 2009


[Skip to the end]

Interesting how high housing starts were when interest rates were a lot higher than they are now.

And if you ‘population adjust’ the housing starts the ‘Greenspan super bubble’ fell far short of previous highs, even with much higher mtg rates back then. (add about 2% to the 10 year note rates to approximate mortgage rates.)

In fact, it’s hard to attribute housing performance to interest rates in general.

I saw a graph from Goldman a couple of years ago showing how housing related to the fiscal cycle and at that time it was forecasting a decline. And interest rates were nowhere to be found in that model. While I did criticize some of the policies of the Greenspan era, I never have ‘blamed’ him for the housing bubble. Ironically he’s watched this destroy his reputation and largely believes it himself.

Interest rates didn’t get us into this and they won’t get us out, as the late John Kenneth Galbraith stated in his last book, ‘The Economics of Innocent Fraud.’


[top]

http://moslereconomics.com/wp-content/plugins/sociofluid/images/digg_48.png http://moslereconomics.com/wp-content/plugins/sociofluid/images/stumbleupon_48.png http://moslereconomics.com/wp-content/plugins/sociofluid/images/delicious_48.png http://moslereconomics.com/wp-content/plugins/sociofluid/images/newsvine_48.png http://moslereconomics.com/wp-content/plugins/sociofluid/images/technorati_48.png http://moslereconomics.com/wp-content/plugins/sociofluid/images/facebook_48.png http://moslereconomics.com/wp-content/plugins/sociofluid/images/twitter_48.png

Posted in Fed, Housing, Interest Rates | 6 Comments »

Short-Rate Thoughts: DEFLATION - Radical Thesis Turnaround

Posted by WARREN MOSLER on 4th November 2009


[Skip to the end]

Well stated!

*Not house view.

Since March I have been arguing that the world was a better place than people thought. I am now shifting my core view, which still might take several months to develop in the marketplace.

Skipping to the Conclusions
1. Deflation will be the surprise theme of 2010, when Congress will go into a pre-election deadlock; elections have only underscored this is the public direction
2. Excess Reserves will neither generate new lending nor generate inflation; actually, the quantity of reserves (M0) basically has no real economic effect
3. ZIRP and QE actually CONTRIBUTE to the deflation mostly by depriving the spending public of much-needed coupon income
4. When Federal Tax Rates increase in 2011 this problem will become even more severe
5. The overall level of public indebtedness (vs GDP) will not put upward pressure on yields in this backdrop and there will be a reckoning in the high-rates/‘deficit hawk’ community
6. Strong possibility that QE will actually be upsized next year rather than ended when the Fed observes these effects (and this might actually make things WORSE)

The Explanation (a Journey)

It seemed fairly intuitive and obvious for thousands of years that the Earth was at rest and the Sun moving around it. Likewise, it has ’seemed’ that the Fed controls the money supply, balances the economy by setting interest rates and fixing reserves which power bank lending, that more ‘Fed’ money means less buying power per dollar (inflation), that the federal government needs to borrow this same money from The People in order to be able to spend, and that it needs to grow its way out of its debt burden or risks fiscal insolvency. I have, in just a fortnight, been COMPLETELY disabused of all these well-entrenched notions. Starting from the beginning, here is how I now think it works:

1. The first dollar is created when Treasury gives it to someone in exchange for something - ammo, a bridge, labor. It is a coupon. In exchange for your bridge, here is something you - or anyone you trade it with - can give me back to cover your taxes. In the mean time, it goes from person A to person B, gets deposited in a bank, which then deposits it at the Fed, which then records the whole thing in a giant spreadsheet. Liability: One overnight reserve/demand deposit/tax coupon. Asset: IOU from Treasury general account. Tax day comes, Person A pulls his deposit, ‘cashes in’ the coupon, the Treasury scraps it, and POOF, everything is back to even.

2. For various reasons (either a gold-standard relic or a conscious power restraint, depending who you ask), we ‘make’ the Treasury cover its ‘shortfall’ at the Fed and SWAP one type of tax-coupon (a deposit or reserve) for another by selling a Treasury note. Either the Fed (in the absence of enough reserves – we’ll get to this) or a Bank (to earn risk-free interest) or Person A (who sets a price for his need to save) is ‘forced’ out his demand deposit dollar and into a treasury note at the auction clearing price. What about the fact that treasuries aren’t fungible like currency? On an overnight basis, that doesn’t really constrain anyone’s behavior. A reserve or a deposit means you get your money back the next day. Same thing with a treasury. Functionally it’s cash and won’t influence your decision to buy a car. Likewise for the bank. In the overnight duration example, it does NOT affect their term lending decisions if they have more reserves and few overnight bills, or more bills and fewer reserves. It’s even possible to imagine a world (W.J.Bryan’s dream) where the Fed, with its scorekeeping spreadsheet, combines the line-items we call treasuries and reserves.

3. Total “public sector dissavings is equal to private sector savings (plus overseas holdings)” as a matter of accounting identity. This really means that the only money available to buy treasuries came from government itself (here I am being a bit loose combining Tres+Fed), from its own tax coupons. If there aren’t enough ready coupons at settlement time for those Treasuries, the Fed MUST ‘supply’ them by doing a repo (trading deposits/coupons for a treasury by purchasing one themselves at least temporarily). They don’t really have a choice in the matter, however, because if the reserves in the banking system didn’t cover it, overnight rates would go to the moon. So in setting interest rates they MUST do a recording on their spreadsheet and the Fedwire and shift around some reserve-coupons (usable as cash) for treasury-coupons (usable for savings but functionally identical).

4. Thus ‘monetizing the deficit’ is actually just the Fed’s daily recordkeeping combined with its interest rate targetting, just ‘keeping the score in balance.’ However, duration is real, as only overnight bills are usable as currency, and because people (and pensions!) need savings, they need to be able to pay taxes or trade tax-coupons for goods when they retire, and so there is a price for long-term money known as interest rates. The Fed CAN affect this by settings rates and by shifting between overnight reserves, longer-term treasuries, and cash in circulation. When the Fed does a term repo or a coupon sale, they shift around the banking and private sector’s duration, trading overnight coupons for longer-term ones as needed to keep the balance in order.

5. But all this activity doesn’t influence the real economy or even the amount of money out there. The amount of money out there dictates the recordkeeping that the Fed must do.

6. This is where QE comes in to play. In QE, aside from its usual recordkeeping activities, the Fed converts overnight reserves into treasuries, forcing the private sector out of its savings and into cash. This is just a large-scale version of the coupon-passes it ‘needed’ to do all along. Again, they force people out of treasuries and into cash and reserves.

7. The private sector is net saving, by definition. It has saved everything the Treasury ever spent, in cash and in treasuries and in deposits. In fact, Treasuries outstanding plus cash in circulation plus reserves are just the tangible record of the cumulative deficit spending, also by IDENTITY.

8. So when QE is going on, there is some combination of savers getting fewer coupons – which constrains their aggregate demand just like a lower social security check would, and banks being forced out of duration instruments and into cash reserves. I do not think this makes them ‘lend more’ – their lending decision was not a function of their ‘cashflow’ but rather a function of their capital and the opportunities out there (even when you judge a bank’s asset/equity capital ratio, there is no duration in accounting, so a reserve asset and a treasury asset both ‘cost’ the same). If they had the capital and the opportunities, they would keep lending and ‘force’ the Fed to give them the cash (via coupon passes and repos, which we then wouldn’t call QE but rather ‘preventing overnight rates from going to infinity’). As far as I can tell, excess reserves is a meaningless operational overhang that has no impact on the economy or prices. The Fed is actually powering rates (cost of money) not supply (amount of money) which is coming from everyone else in the economy (Tres spending and private loan demand).

9. I’ll grant there is a psychological component to inflation phenomenon, as well as a preponderance of ignorance about what reserves are, and that might result in some type of inflationary event in another universe, but not in the one we are in where interest rates are low and taxes are going up and the demand for savings is therefore rising rather than falling.

10. One can now retell history through this better lens. Big surpluses in ‘97-’01, then a big tax cut in ‘03. Big surpluses in ‘27-’30, then a huge deficit in ‘40-’41. Was an aging Japanese public ’shocked’ into its savings rate or is that savings just the record of the recessionary deficit spending that came after ‘97? It will be interesting to watch what happens there as the demographic story forces households to live moreso off JGB income - will this force the BOJ to push rates higher or will they never ‘get it’ and force the deflation deeper?

11. There are, as always mitigating factors. Unlike in the Japan example, a huge chunk of US fixed income is held abroad, so lower rates are depriving less exported coupon income which is actually a benefit. There is of course some benefit from lower private sector borrowing rates as well - MEW, lower startup costs for new capital investment, etc. Also, even if one denies that higher debt/gdp ratios are what weakened it (rather than China’s decisions - again something unavailable to Japan), the dollar IS weaker now which is inflationary. But this is all more than offset, I think, by ppl’s expectation that higher taxes are coming, and that’s hugely deflationary and curbs aggregate demand via multiple channels.

12. Additionally, there seems to be a finite amount of political capital that can be spent via the deficit, and that amount seems to be rapidly running out. See https://portal.gs.com/gs/portal/home/fdh/?st=1&d=8055164 . The period of deficit stimulus is mostly behind us. Instead, people are depending upon ZIRP and the Fed to stimulate the economy, and in fact there is marginal, and possible negative, stimulation coming from that channel. The Fed is taking away the social security checks knowns as ‘coupon interest.’

13. Finally, there is a huge caveat that I can’t get around, which is whether we are measuring inflation correctly. It happens that I don’t think we are – strange effects like declining inventory will provide upward pressure and lagged-accounting for rents providing downward pressure in the CPI. This is an unfortunate, untradeable fact about the universe that I think will be offset by other indicators (Core PCE) sending a better signal. But this is part of the reason this whole story will take time to develop in the marketplace. As a massive importer of goods and exporter of debts we are not quite Japan, but the path of misunderstanding is remarkably similar.

* Credit due Warren Mosler and moslereconomics.com for guiding my logic.


J.J. Lando


[top]

http://moslereconomics.com/wp-content/plugins/sociofluid/images/digg_48.png http://moslereconomics.com/wp-content/plugins/sociofluid/images/stumbleupon_48.png http://moslereconomics.com/wp-content/plugins/sociofluid/images/delicious_48.png http://moslereconomics.com/wp-content/plugins/sociofluid/images/newsvine_48.png http://moslereconomics.com/wp-content/plugins/sociofluid/images/technorati_48.png http://moslereconomics.com/wp-content/plugins/sociofluid/images/facebook_48.png http://moslereconomics.com/wp-content/plugins/sociofluid/images/twitter_48.png

Posted in CBs, Fed, Government Spending, Interest Rates, Japan, Mosler 2012 | 20 Comments »