Another Gross error.
Bank’s aren’t allowed to take what’s called ‘interest rate risk’ by borrowing short and lending long.
It’s the first thing the regulators and supervisors look for.
It’s the S in CAMELS ratings- Capital, Asset quality, Management, Earnings, Liquidity, and Sensitivity to interest rates.

Fed’s Low Rates Killing Credit, Slowing Recovery: Gross

By Jeff Cox

Feb 1 (CNBC) — The Federal Reserve’s zero-interest-rate policy is hampering economic recovery by discouraging bank lending, Pimco bond titan Bill Gross said in an analysis.

For banks, a healthy lending environment exists where they can borrow at low rates in the short term and lend at significantly higher rates over the long term, a situation that creates a profit through a positively sloped yield curve

This is from modest returns and low rates causing ‘savers’ to have to pony up more to provide future nominal incomes.

And it’s a drag on aggregate demand which should be a good thing, as it means we can have lower taxes for any given size govt.
But instead, of course, we let it keep unemployment high and the output gap wide in general.

Pensions & Investments News Alerts:

Verizon to dial up $1.26 billion for pension plans

Boeing to add $1.5 billion to pension plans in 2012

Raytheon, Lockheed Martin to add billions to pension plans

Ford to roll out $3.5 billion in pension contributions

The Fed is Starving Economy of Interest Income

By Warren Mosler

He left out the part about needing a fiscal adjustment to compensate but this is part one of a three part presentation of something I wrote.

Preface. I generally subscribe to the view that in free currencies, deficits are mostly self-funding, and ‘enormous’ deficits needn’t be accompanied by higher yields. Government builds a bridge, pays the bridgebuilder, who pays the grocer, who eventually either buys the Treasury or deposits in a bank whose reserves are fungible vs T-bills via the intermediating Fed. Government dissavings and private sector savings are equal and offsetting, as long as the Central Bank has a working spreadsheet and an interest rate target. Yields are just a function of duration needs of savers vs borrowers, but the AMOUNTS always match up. Likewise, I don’t believe that the creation of bank reserves is inflationary or hyper-inflationary; bank lending is capital – not reserve – constrained. Loan officers don’t check the vaults. There is always enough. I continue to marvel at the armies of deficit vigilantes who take aim at Treasuries and JGBs, armed with Gold Standard thinking or even the latest Reinhart/Rogoff, only to retreat 2-3 year later. It didn’t work shorting US Treasuries in 2009-2010 for the ‘money supply’ or ‘deficit spike,’ and that roadside is stacked with corpses. Even the Home Run deficit vigilante hitters who nailed Europe this year (and Europe is, for now, operating as a quasi-Gold standard and an entirely different set of risks) offset those gains with losses betting the other way on the US, UK, and Japan. It’s evident in the returns.

My proposals remain:

1. A full FICA suspension:

The suspension of FICA paid by employees restores spending which supports output and employment.
The suspension of FICA paid by business helps keep costs down which in a competitive environment lowers prices for consumers.

2. $150 billion one time distribution by the federal govt to the states on a per capita basis to get them over the hump.

3. An $8/hr federally funded transition job for anyone willing and able to work to assist in the transition from unemployment to private sector employment.

Call me an inflation hawk if you want. But when the fiscal drag is removed with the FICA suspension and funds for the states I see risk of what will be seen as ‘unwelcome inflation’ causing Congress to put on the brakes long before unemployment gets below 5% without the $8/hr transition job in place, even with the help of the FICA suspension in lowering costs for business.

It’s my take that in an expansion the ‘employed labor buffer stock’ created by the $8/hr job offer will prove a superior price anchor to the current practice of using the current unemployment based buffer stock as our price anchor.

The federal government caused this mess for allowing changing credit conditions to cause its resulting over taxation to unemploy a lot more people than the government wanted to employ. So now the corrective policy is to suspend the FICA taxes, give the states the one time assistance they need to get over the hump the federal government policy created, and provide the transition job to help get those people that federal policy is causing to be unemployed back into private sector employment in a more orderly, more ‘non inflationary’ manner.

I’ve noticed the criticism the $8/hr proposal- aka the ‘Job Guarantee’- has been getting in the blogosphere, and it continues to be the case that none of it seems logically consistent to me, as seen from an MMT perspective. It seems the critics haven’t fully grasped the ramifications of the recognition of the currency as a (simple) public monopoly as outlined in Full Employment AND Price Stability and the other mandatory readings.

So yes, we can simply restore aggregate demand with the FICA suspension and funds for the states, but if I were running things I’d include the $8 transition job to improve the odds of both higher levels of real output and lower ‘inflation pressures’.

Also, this is not to say that I don’t support the funding of public infrastructure (broadly defined) for public purpose. In fact, I see that as THE reason for government in the first place, and it should be determined and fully funded as needed. I call that the ‘right size’ government, and, in general, it’s not the place for cyclical adjustments.

4. An energy policy to help keep energy consumption down as we expand GDP, particularly with regard to crude oil products.

Here my presumption is there’s more to life than burning our way to prosperity, with ‘whoever burns the most fuel wins.’

Perhaps more important than what happens if these proposals are followed is what happens if they are not, which is more likely going to be the case.

First, given current credit conditions, world demand, and the 0 rate policy and QE, it looks to me like the current federal deficit isn’t going to be large enough to allow anything better than muddling through we’ve seen over the last few years.

Second, potential volatility is as high as it’s ever been. Europe could muddle through with the ECB doing what it takes at the last minute to prevent a collapse, or doing what it takes proactively, or it could miss a beat and let it all unravel. Oil prices could double near term if Iran cuts production faster than the Saudis can replace it, or prices could collapse in time as production comes online from Iraq, the US, and other places forcing the Saudis to cut to levels where they can’t cut any more, and lose control of prices on the downside.

In other words, the risk of disruption and the range of outcomes remains elevated.

Another well stated piece from John Carney on the CNBC website:

Modern Monetary Theory and Austrian Economics

By John Carney

Dec 27 (CNBC) — When I began blogging about Modern Monetary Theory, I knew I risked alienating or at least annoying some of my Austrian Economics friends. The Austrians are a combative lot, used to fighting on the fringes of economic thought for what they see as their overlooked and important insights into the workings of the economy.

Which is one of the things that makes them a lot like the MMT crowd.

There are many other things that Austrian Econ and MMT share. A recent post by Bob Wenzel at Economic Policy Journal, which is presented as a critique of my praise of some aspects of MMT, actually makes this point very well.

The MMTers believe that the modern monetary system—sovereign fiat money, unlinked to any commodity and unpegged to any other currency—that exists in the United States, Canada, Japan, the UK and Australia allows governments to operate without revenue constraints. They can never run out of money because they create the money they spend.

This is not to say that MMTers believe that governments can spend without limit. Governments can overspend in the MMT paradigm and this overspending leads to inflation. Government financial assets may be unlimited but real assets available for purchase—that is, goods and services the economy is capable of producing—are limited. The government can overspend by (a) taking too many goods and services out of the private sector, depriving the private sector of what it needs to satisfy the people, grow the economy and increase productivity or (b) increasing the supply of money in the economy so large that it drives up the prices of goods and services.

As Wenzel points out, Murray Rothbard—one of the most important Austrian Economists the United States has produced—takes exactly the same position. He says that governments take “control of the money supply” when they find that taxation doesn’t produce enough revenue to cover expenditures. In other words, fiat money is how governments escape revenue constraint.

Rothbard considers this counterfeiting, which is a moral judgment that depends on the prior conclusion that fiat money isn’t the moral equivalent of real money. Rothbard is entitled to this view—I probably even share it—but that doesn’t change the fact that in our economy today, this “counterfeiting” is the operational truth of our monetary system. We can decry it—but we might as well also try to understand what it means for us.

Rothbard worries that government control of the money supply will lead to “runaway inflation.” The MMTers tend to be more sanguine about the danger of inflation than Rothbard—although I do not believe they are entitled to this attitude. As I explained in my piece “Monetary Theory, Crony Capitalism and the Tea Party,” the MMTers tend to underestimate the influence of special interests—including government actors and central bankers themselves—on monetary policy. They have monetary policy prescriptions that would avoid runaway inflation but, it seems to me, there is little reason to expect these would ever be followed in the countries that are sovereign currency issuers. I think that on this point, many MMTers confuse analysis of the world as it is with the world as they would like it to be.

In short, the MMTers agree with Rothbard on the purpose and effect of government control of money: it means the government is no longer revenue constrained. They differ about the likelihood of runaway inflation , which is not a difference of principle but a divergence of political prediction.

This point of agreement sets both Austrians and MMTers outside of mainstream economics in precisely the same way. They appreciate that the modern monetary system is very, very different from older, commodity based monetary systems—in a way that many mainstream economists do not.

In MM, CC & TP, I briefly mentioned a few other positions on the economy MMTers tend to share. Wenzel writes that “there is nothing right about these views.”

I don’t think Wenzel actually agrees with himself here. Let’s run through these one by one.

1. The MMTers think the financial system tends toward crisis. Wenzel writes that the financial system doesn’t tend toward crisis. But a moment later he admits that the actual financial system we have does tend toward crisis. All Austrians believe this, as far as I can tell.

What has happened here is that Wenzel is now the one confusing the world as it is with the world as he wishes it would be. Perhaps under some version of the Austrian-optimum financial system—no central bank, gold coin as money, free banking or no fractional reserve banking—we wouldn’t tend toward crisis. But that is not the system we have.

The MMTers aren’t engaged with arguing about the Austrian-optimum financial system. They are engaged in describing the actual financial system we have—which tends toward crisis.

They even agree that the tendency toward crisis is largely caused by the same thing, credit expansions leading to irresponsible lending.

2. The MMTers say that “capitalist economies are not self-regulating.” Again, Wenzel dissents. But if we read “capitalist economies” as “modern economies with central banking and interventionist governments” then the point of disagreement vanishes.

Are we entitled to read “capitalist economies” in this way? I think we are. The MMTers are not, for the most part, attempting to argue with non-existent theoretical economies or describe the epic-era Icelandic political economy. They are dealing with the economy we have, which is usually called “capitalist.” Austrians can argue that this isn’t really capitalism—but this is a terminological quibble. When it comes down to the problem of self-regulation of our so-called capitalist system, the Austrians and MMTers are in agreement.

3. Next up is the MMT view (borrowed from an earlier economic school called “Functional Finance”) that fiscal policy should be judged by its economic effects. Wenzel asks if this means that this “supercedes private property that as long as something is good for the economy, it can be taxed away from the individual?”

Here is a genuine difference between the Austrians—especially those of the Rothbardian stripe—and the MMTers. The MMTers do indeed envision the government using taxes to accomplish what is good for the economy—which, for the most part, means combating inflation. They think that the government may need to use taxation to snuff out inflation at times. Alternatively, the government can also reduce its own spending to extinguish inflation.

Note that we’ve come across a gap between MMTers and Rothbardians that is far smaller than the chasm between either of them and mainstream economics, where taxation of private property and income is regularly seen as justified by the need to fund government operations. MMTers and Austrians both agree that under the current circumstances people in most developed countries are overtaxed.

4. Wenzel actually overlooks the larger gap between Austrians and MMTers, which has to do with the efficacy of government spending. Many MMTers believe that most governments in so-called capitalist economies are not spending enough. Most—if not all—Austrians think that these same government are spending too much.

The Austrian view is based on the idea that government spending tends to distort the economy, in part because—as the MMTers would agree—government spending in our age typically involves monetary expansion. The MMTers, I would argue, have a lot to learn from the Austrians on this point. I think that an MMT effort to more fully engage the Austrians on the topic of the structure of production would be well worth the effort.

5. Wenzel’s challenge to the idea of functional finance is untenable—and not particularly Austrian. He argues that the subjectivity of value means it is impossible for us to tell whether something is “good for the economy.” Humbug. We know that an economy that more fully reflects the aspirations and choices of the individuals it encompasses is better than one that does not. We know that high unemployment is worse than low unemployment. All other things being equal, a more productive economy is superior to a less productive economy, a wealthier economy is better than a more impoverished one.

Wenzel’s position amounts to nihilism. I think he is confusing the theory of subjective value with a deeper relativism. Subjectivism is merely the notion that the value of an economic good—that is, an object or a service—is not inherent to the thing but arises from within the individual’s needs and wants. This does not mean that we cannot say that some economic outcome is better or worse or that certain policy prescription are good for the economy and certain are worse.

It would be odd for any Austrian to adopt the nihilism of Wenzel. It’s pretty rare to ever encounter an Austrian who lacks normative views of the economy. These normative views depend on the view that some things are good for economy and some things are bad. I doubt that Wenzel himself really subscribes to the kind of nihilism he seems to advocate in his post.

Wenzel’s final critique of me is that I over-emphasize cronyism and underplay the deeper problems of centralized power. My reply is three-fold. First, cronyism is a more concrete political problem than centralization; tactically, it makes sense to fight cronyism. Second, cronyism is endemic to centralized government decisions, as the public choice economists have shown. They call it special interest rent-seeking, but that’s egg-head talk from cronyism. Third, I totally agree: centralization is a real problem because the “rationalization” involved necessarily downplays the kinds of unarticulated knowledge that are important to everyday life, prosperity and happiness.

At the level of theory, Austrians and MMTers have a lot in common. Tactically, an alliance makes sense. Intellectually, bringing together the descriptive view of modern monetary systems with Austrian views about the structure of production and limitations of economic planning (as well Rothbardian respect for individual property rights) should be a fruitful project.

So, as I said last time, let’s make it happen.

When it comes to CB liquidity operations, as previously discussed, it’s about price- interest rates- and not quantities of funds. In other words, the LTRO is an ECB tool that assists in setting the term structure of euro interest rates. It helps the ECB set the term cost of funds for its banking system, with that cost being passed through to the economy on a risk adjusted basis, with the banking system continuing to price risk.

So what does locking in their funds via LTRO do for most banks? Not much. Helps keep interest rate risk off the table, but they’ve always had other ways of doing that. It takes away some liquidity risk, but not much, as the banks haven’t been euro liquidity constrained. And banks still have the same constraints due to capital and associated risks.

To it’s credit, the ECB has been pretty good on the liquidity front all along. I’d give it an A grade for liquidity vs the Fed where I’d give a D grade for liquidity. Back in 2008 the ECB was quick to provide unlimited euro liquidity to its member banks, while the Fed dragged its feet for months before expanding its programs sufficiently to ensure its member banks dollar liquidity. And the FDIC did the unthinkable, closing WAMU for liquidity rather than for capital and asset reasons.

But while liquidity is a necessary condition for banking and the economy under current institutional arrangements, and while aggregate demand would further retreat if the CB failed to support bank liquidity, liquidity provision per se doesn’t add to aggregate demand.

What’s needed to restore output and employment is an increase in net spending, either public or private. And that choice is more political than economic.

Public sector spending can be increased by simply budgeting and spending. Private sector spending can be supported by cutting taxes to enhance income and/or somehow providing for the expansion of private sector debt.

Unfortunately current euro zone institutional structure is working against both of these channels to increased aggregate demand, as previously discussed.

And even in the US, where both channels are, operationally, wide open, it looks like FICA taxes are going to be allowed to rise at year end and work against aggregate demand, when the ‘right’ answer is to suspend it entirely.

With the tools currently at their immediate disposal, including providing unlimited member bank liquidity,lowering the interbank rate, and buying euro national govt debt, the ECB has no chance of causing any monetary inflation, no matter how hard it might try. There just are no known channels, direct or indirect, in theory or practice, that connects those policies to the real economy. (Note that this is not to say that removing bank liquidity and national govt credit support wouldn’t be catastrophic. It’s a bit like engine oil. You need a gallon or two for the engine to run correctly, but further increasing the oil in the sump isn’t going to alter the engine’s performance.)

Lower rates sure doesn’t do the trick. Just look to Japan for going on two decades, the US going on 3 years, and the ECB’s low rate policies of recent years. There’s not a hint of monetary inflation/excess aggregate demand or inflationary currency weakness from low rates. If anything, seems to me the depressing effect on savers indicates low rates from the CB might even, ironically, promote deflation through the interest income channels, as the non govt sector is necessarily a net receiver of interest income when the govt is a net payer. (See Bernanke, Reinhart, and Sacks 2004 Fed paper on the fiscal effect of changes in interest rates.)

And if what’s called quantitative easing was inflationary, Japan would be hyperinflating by now, with the US not far behind. Nor is there any sign that the ECB’s buying of euro govt bonds has resulted in any kind of monetary inflation, as nothing but deflationary pressures continue to mount in that ongoing debt implosion. The reason there is no inflation from the ECB bond buying is because all it does is shift investor holdings from national govt debt to ECB balances, which changes nothing in the real economy.

Nor does bank liquidity provision have anything to do with monetary inflation, currency depreciation, or bank lending. As all monetary insiders know, bank lending is never reserve constrained. Constraints on banking come from regulation, including capital requirements and lending standards, and, of course credit worthy entities looking to borrow. With the ECB providing unlimited liquidity for the last several years, wouldn’t you think if there was going to be some kind of monetary problem it would have happened by now?

So the grand irony of the day is, that while there’s nothing the ECB can do to cause monetary inflation, even if it wanted to, the ECB, fearing inflation, holds back on the bond buying that would eliminate the national govt solvency risk but not halt the deflationary monetary forces currently in place.

So where does monetary inflation come from? Fiscal policy. The Weimar inflation was caused by deficit spending on the order of something like 50% of GDP to buy the foreign currencies demanded for war reparations. It was no surprise that selling that many German marks for foreign currencies in the market place drove the mark down as it did. In fact, when that policy finally ended, so did the inflation. And there was nothing the central bank could do with interest rates or buying and selling securities or anything else to stop the inflation caused by the massive deficit spending, just like today there is nothing the ECB can do to reverse the deflationary forces in place from the austerity measures.

So here we are, with the ECB demanding deflationary austerity from the member nations in return for the limited bond buying that has been sustaining some semblance of national govt solvency, not seeming to realize it can’t inflate with its monetary policy tools, even if it wanted to.

Post script:

The only way the ECB could inflate would be to buy dollars or other fx outright, which it doesn’t do even when it might want a weaker euro, as ideologically they want the euro to be the reserve currency, and not themselves build fx reserves that give the appearance of the euro being backed by fx.

>   
>   (email exchange)
>   
>   On Sat, Nov 12, 2011 at 2:19 PM, Stephanie wrote:
>   
>   John Carney loving on us again

Yes!

Paul Krugman Goes MMT on Italy

By John Carney

November 11 (CNBC) — It seems pretty clear that the school of thought known as Modern Monetary Theory has made a big impact on Paul Krugman’s thinking.

As Cullen Roche at Pragmatic Capitalism points out, just a few months ago the spread between bonds issued by Japan and Italy, which have similar debt and demographic issues, was perplexing Krugman.

“A question (to which I don’t have the full answer): why are the interest rates on Italian and Japanese debt so different? As of right now, 10-year Japanese bonds are yielding 1.09%; 10-year Italian bonds 5.76%.

…I actually don’t have a firm view. But it seems to be an important puzzle to resolve.”

But today’s column is basically right out of MMT.

“What has happened, it turns out, is that by going on the euro, Spain and Italy in effect reduced themselves to the status of Third World countries that have to borrow in someone else’s currency, with all the loss of flexibility that implies. In particular, since euro-area countries can’t print money even in an emergency, they’re subject to funding disruptions in a way that nations that kept their own currencies aren’t — and the result is what you see right now. America, which borrows in dollars, doesn’t have that problem.”

The news flow from last week was so voluminous it was nearly impossible to process. For good measure I want to start today’s commentary with a simple recap of what happened.

On the negative side -

· Greece called a referendum and threw bailout plans up in the air taking Greek 2yrs from 70% to 90% or +2000bps.
· Italian 10yr debt collapsed 40bps with spreads to Germany out 70bps. The moves were far larger in the 2yr sector.
· France 10y debt widened 25bps to Germany. At one point spreads were almost 40 wider.
· Italian PMI and Spanish employment data were miserable.
· German factory orders plunged 4.3 percent on the month.
· The planned EFSF bond for 3bio was pulled.
· Itraxx financials were +34 while subs were +45.
· Draghi predicted a recession for Europe along with disinflation.
· The G20 was flop – there was no agreement on IMF involvement in Europe.
· The US super committee deadline is 17 days away with no clear agreement.
· The 8th largest US bankruptcy in history took place.
· US 10yr and 30yr rallied 28bps, Spoos were -2.5%, the Dax was -6% and EURUSD was -3%.
· German CDS was up 16bps on the week.

On the positive side -

· The Fed showed its hand with tightening dissents now gone and an easing dissent in place.

Too bad what they call ‘easing’ at best has been shown to do nothing.

· The Fed’s significant downside risk language remained intact.

Downside risks sound like bad news to me.

· In the press conference Ben teed up QE3 in MBS space.

Which at best have been shown to do little or nothing for the macro economy.

· US payrolls, claims, vehicle sales and productivity came in better than expected.

And the real output gap if anything widened.

· S&P earnings are coming in at +18% y/y with implied corporate profits at +23 percent q/q a.r.

Reinforces the notion that it’s a good for stocks, bad for people economy.

· Mortgage speeds were much faster than expectations suggesting some easing refi pressures.

And savers holding those securities saw their incomes cut faster than expected.

· The ECB cut 25bps and indicated a dovish forward looking stance.

Which reduced euro interest income for the non govt sectors

· CME Margins were reduced.

Just means volatility was down some.

· There was a massive USDJPY intervention which may be a precursor to a Swiss style Japanese policy easing.

Which, for the US, means reduced costs of imports from Japan, which works against US exports, which should be a good thing for the US as it means for the size govt we have, taxes could be lowered to sustain demand, but becomes a bad thing as our leadership believes the US Federal deficit to be too large and so instead we get higher unemployment.

· The Swiss have indicated they want an even weaker CHF – possibly EURCHF 1.40.

When this makes a list of ‘positives’ you know the positives are pretty sorry

· The Aussies cut rates 25bps

Cutting net interest income for the economy.

More of the blind leading the blind. The one thing they all agree on, at great expense to global well being, is the budget deficits are all too large and the need for shared sacrifice and all that.

No chance for anything constructive to come out of any of this.

And these masters of their money machines don’t even know how to inflate, as they all desperately try to inflate with their versions of quantitative easing, which, functionally, is just another demand draining tax.

*DJ Merkel, Obama Discussed How To Boost EFSF Firepower Without ECB
*DJ Obama To Merkel: We Are Totally Invested In Your Success – Source
*DJ Geithner, Schaeuble May Meet To Discuss IMF Role In Euro Crisis -Source

The markets like the announcement. Of course they also liked QE2…

Unfortunately, as previously discussed, without the ECB the EFSF isn’t sustainable. It’s like trying to lift up the bucket by the handle when you are standing in it.

Nor is it cast in stone yet, but all subject to details.

Also, the positive market response, if it continues, only encourages the continuing austerity measures that are weakening the euro economy and forcing already unsustainable deficits higher.

And, again, it’s a case of ‘the food was terrible and the portions were small.’

Starting with the 50% private sector loss on Greek bonds-

Presumably that ‘works’ if it indeed brings Greek debt down to 120% of GDP from 160% by 2020. But that implies the austerity measures won’t continue to reduce GDP and cause the Greek deficit to increase, as continues to be the case.

It presumes the 50% haircut will be considered sufficiently voluntary to not be a credit event that triggers a variety of global default clauses.

The rest of the ‘package’ presumes markets won’t reduce the presumed credit worthiness of member nations who fund the EFSF.

It presumes private sector funds will recapitalize the banks that lost capital on the write downs.

It presumes the EFSF won’t be needed to fully fund Portugal, Spain, and Italy.

It presumes banks and other investors required to be prudent and financially responsible to shareholders will continue to buy other euro member nation debt even after seeing the euro zone members allow Greece to default on half of their obligations.

That is, how could any bank now buy, for example, Italian debt, in full knowledge that euro zone policy options include a forced write down of that debt. And not in extreme, unforeseen circumstances, but under current conditions.

And how can prudent investors invest in the banks when they’ve just seen euro zone remove some 100 billion euro in equity by decree?

The problem is, it takes a presumption of general improvement to presume additional losses will not be incurred by investors.

And it takes a presumption of general improvement to presume the EFSF will be successful.

And that requires the presumption that continued austerity measures will result in a general improvement.

Even as all evidence (and most theory) is showing the opposite.

Euro deal leaves much to do on rescue fund, Greek debt

By Luke baker and Julien Toyer

October 27 (Reuters) — Euro zone leaders struck a last-minute deal to limit the damage from the currency bloc’s debt crisis early on Thursday but are still far from finalizing plans to slash Greece’s debt burden and strengthen their rescue fund.

Brilliant. Reminds me of Will Rogers. Think of all he’d have said if he’d understood MMT.

US Treasury May Issue Debt With Floating Interest Rate

By Jeff Cox

October 24 (CNBC) — Dealers and traders have been approached recently with plans to issue a floating-rate note that for investors would provide an opportunity to profit should rates go up and for the government a chance to restructure its debt even further.

Well stated MMT based narrative.

The Problem With The Deficit? It’s Not Big Enough

Interesting day so far.
Stocks down, interest rates down, commodities down, including gold (seems the found Hugo’s gold?) but the euro is up some, after falling some last week.

With federal deficits too low most everywhere, it’s like a general crop failure, with the question being which crops will go up the most vs each other.

Not easy to say, but the euro has to be a bit of a favorite given the sincerity and intensity of their commitment to austerity/deficit reduction? And their new good buddies, the Swiss, now helping out by buying euro as others buy their currency with their new cap in place.

However lower crude and product prices do help the US more than the rest, so that’s a factor that gives the dollar an edge. And the portfolio shifting/speculation/trend following in illiquid markets can overpower the underlying fundamentals as well medium term.

And the dollar and the euro are seeing bids from China and Japan now and then as those nations work to protect their softening export markets.

My least favorite currency longer term may be the yuan, with its inflation issue and ongoing deficit spending, both direct and via state bank lending, though they too seem to be cutting back some. But until FDI (foreign direct investment) lets up, those ‘flows’ continue to support the yuan.

And commodity currencies are in a class of their own, weakening with weakening commodity prices.

It’s also noteworthy that the deflation is coming at a time when central banks, for all practical purposes, can’t be much more inflationary by (errant) mainstream standards of measurement. Unfortunately, however, it’s not that they are out of bullets, it’s that the presumed lethal live ammo has turned out to be blanks, with mounting evidence that the gun was pointed backwards as well.

The obvious answer is a simple fiscal adjustment- just a few keystrokes on the govt’s computers can immediately restore aggregate demand/employment/output- but they’ve all talked themselves out of that one.

However it’s not total doom and gloom.
For example, the US deficit is large enough to muddle through with decent corporate earnings and a bit of minor ‘job creation’ as well.

And sequentially, GDP is slowly improving: .5 q1, 1.0 q2, and maybe 1-2% for q3.
Good for stocks, not so good for people, but the bar is now set so low and the understanding so skewed that ‘blood in the streets’ isn’t yet even a passing thought, so don’t expect much to change any time soon.

And standby for the ECB writing the next check, no matter how large, to keep that all muddling through as well.

First, I see no public purpose in burning any crude oil to fly the Chairman and his entourage to make any speech.

He could just as easily deliver this one from the steps of the Fed in DC.
Congress should demand a statement of public purpose before endorsing any travel by its agents.

Next is what I expect from the speech.
The short answer is not much.

I don’t see more QE as the purpose of QE is to bring long rates down, and they are already down substantially. And the Fed now has sufficient evidence to confirm that long rates are mainly a function of expectations of future FOMC votes on rate settings.

To that point, when the Fed announced QE, and market participants believed it would spur growth, and therefore FOMC rate hikes somewhere down the road, long rates worked their way higher. And when the Fed ended QE, and market participants believed the economy would be slower to recover, long rates worked their way lower. Not to mention China hates QE and it still looks to me there’s an understanding in place where China allocates reserves to $US as long as the Fed doesn’t do any QE.

The Fed could cut it’s target Fed funds rate, the cost of funds for the banking system, down to 0 and lower that cost of funds by a few basis points. But those few basis points can hardly be expected to have much effect on anything.

It’s not the Fed has run out of bullets, it’s that the Fed has never had any bullets of any consequence.
And with the few it’s fired, it hasn’t realized the odds are the gun has been pointed backwards.
For example, it still looks to me lower rates, if anything, reduce aggregate demand via the interest income channels.

And QE isn’t much other than a tax on the economy, that also removes interest income.

So look for a forecast of modest GDP growth with downside risks, core inflation remaining reasonably firm even as unemployment remains far too high, all of which support continued Fed ‘accommodation’ at current levels.

Lots of refi’s with the low rates but not much in the way of new purchases:

MBA Weekly Mortgage Applications Survey: Market Composite Index increased 4.1%, Refinance Index increased 8.0% and the Purchase Index decreased 10.1%.

They see it all about managing expectations.

So with the announcement they managed interest rate expectations a bit lower out to 2013.

But now they are concerned they managed expectations about economic growth and employment lower as well, which they believe works to lower actual growth and employment.

So now they are trying to adjust both a bit back in the other directions.

*DJ Fed’s Plosser: FOMC Statement On Econ Too Negative -Bloomberg Radio
*DJ Fed’s Plosser: Extending Policy To ’13 `Inappropriate’ -Bloomberg Radio
*DJ Fed’s Plosser: Expects Will Have To Raise Rates Before ’13 -Bloomberg Radio

Franc Thoughts on Long-Run Fiscal Issues

By Paul Krugman

August 11 (NYT) — Regular readers of comments will notice a continual stream of criticism from MMT (modern monetary theory) types, who insist that deficits are never a problem as long as you have your own currency.

Right, ability to pay is not an issue.

I really don’t want to get into that fight right now, because for the time being the MMT people and yours truly are on the same side of the policy debate. Right now it really doesn’t matter at all whether the United States issues zero-interest short-term debt or simply prints zero-interest dollar bills, and concern about crowding out is just bad economics.

Right.

But we won’t always be in a liquidity trap.

We don’t have one now. It’s a fixed fx concept at best.

But we won’t always be in a liquidity trap.

Someday private demand will be high enough that the Fed will have good reason to raise interest rates above zero, to limit inflation.

Yes, because they ignore the interest income channels.

And when that happens, deficits — and the perceived willingness of the government to raise enough revenue to cover its spending — will matter.

Yes, deficit spending adds to aggregate demand and nominal savings to the penny. Add too much and you get ‘demand pull inflation’

With fixed fx, that can drive up interest rates and threaten reserves. With floating fx it only causes the currency to fluctuate.

I have a specific example that illustrates my point: France in the 1920s, which I wrote about in my dissertation lo these many years ago. Like many nations, France came out of World War I with very large debts, peaking at 240 percent of GDP according to this recent IMF presentation (pdf, slide 17). And France was unable politically to raise enough taxes to cover the cost of servicing that debt. And investors lost confidence in the government’s solvency.

If it was a floating fx policy, interest rates would have been wherever the bank of france set them. If it was a fixed fx policy, rates would be market determined, as the tsy had to compete with the option to convert at the CB.

And taxes falling short of spending is the norm in most nations. Japan for example has one of the largest debts and deficits and one of the strongest currencies. So there’s more to it.

Various expedients were tried, including — late in the game — creation of monetary base, which was advocated by a finance minister on the (very MMT) grounds that the division of government liabilities between currency and short-term bills made no difference. But it turned out that it did: the franc plunged, and the price level soared.

He still hasn’t indicated whether it was a fixed or floating fx policy, and I don’t recall, so I can’t comment.

Now as it turned out this was just what the doctor ordered: because France’s budget problem was overwhelmingly the debt overhang rather than current spending, inflation eroded the real value of that debt and made possible the Poincare stabilization of 1926.

Yes, if a nation goes to a fixed fx policy at the’wrong’ price a further adjustment can address that, though it still doesn’t address the fundamental difficulties of living with a fixed fx policy.

So what does this say about the United States? At a future date, when we’re out of the liquidity trap,

that we aren’t in

public finances will matter — and not just because of their role in raising or reducing aggregate demand. The composition of public liabilities as between debt and monetary base does matter in normal times —

Yes, it determines the term structure of risk free rates.

hey, if it didn’t, the Fed would have no influence, ever.

True, and it doesn’t have much in any case, apart from shifting income between savers and borrowers and altering the interest income of the economy, which is a net saver to the tune of the govt debt, to the penny.

So if we try at that point to finance the deficit by money issue rather than bond sales, it will be inflationary.

Only under a fixed exchange rate policy, which we don’t have.

And unlike France in the 1920s, such a hypothetical US deficit crisis wouldn’t be self-correcting: the biggest source of our long-run deficit isn’t the overhang of debt, it’s the prospective current cost of paying for retirement, health care, and defense. So such a crisis — again, it’s very much hypothetical — could spiral into something very nasty, with very high inflation and, yes, hyperinflation.

Highly unlikely. It would probably take annual deficit of well over 20% to get that kind of inflation from excess demand.

Now, all of this is remote right now. And notice too that France in the 1920s stabilized with debt of 140 percent of GDP — far higher than the numbers that are supposed to terrify us now. So none of this is relevant to the current policy debate.

But since the MMTers seem to have decided to harass those of us who want stronger action now but think there really is a long-run fiscal issue, I needed to put this out there.

MMT explains the difference between fixed and floating fx policy.