Geithner- We’re going to try to get the biggest deal possible

Bill’s blog, below, as always, is well worth a read.

And note today’s news, where, of all things, the Democrats are trying to position themselves as larger deficit cutters than the Republicans:

“We’re going to try to get the biggest deal possible, a deal that’s best for the economy, not just in the short term,” Geithner said on NBC’s “Meet the Press.”

It is a pity that he doesn’t know the answer himself

By Bill Mitchell


We are deep into hard-disk crash trauma at CofFEE today with 2 volumes dying at the same time on Friday and a backup drive going down too. At least it was a sympathetic act on their behalf. Combine that with I lost a HDD on an iMAC after only 2 weeks since it was new a few weeks ago – after finally convincing myself that OS X was the way forward with virtual machines. Further another colleague’s back-up HDD crashed last week. It leaves one wondering what is going on. Backup is now a oft-spoken word around here today. But there is one thing I do know the answer to – Greg Mankiw’s latest Examination Question. It is a pity that he doesn’t know the answer himself. Further, it is a pity that one of the higher profiled “progressives” in the US buys into the same nonsense.



In his latest blog (July 3, 2011) – A Good Exam Question – Mankiw pokes fun at so-called progressive Dean Baker who wrote a column recently in The Republic (July 2, 2011) – Ron Paul’s Surprisingly Lucid Solution to the Debt Ceiling Impasse – where as the title suggests he thinks ultra-conservative US Republican politician Ron Paul is onto something good.

The truth is that none of them – Mankiw, Baker, or Paul – understand how the banking system operates.

First, let’s consider what Baker said in detail.

I think Mankiw’s summary of the Baker proposal is valid:


According to Congressman Paul, to deal with the debt-ceiling impasse, we should tell the Federal Reserve to destroy its vast holding of government bonds. Because the Fed might have planned on selling those bonds in open-market operations to drain the banking system of the currently high level of excess reserves, the Fed should (according to Baker) substantially increase reserve requirements.

Mankiw’s reaction is that “(t)his would be a great exam question: What are the effects of this policy? Who wins and who loses if this proposal is adopted?”.

I also agree that it would be an interesting examination question which I suspect all student who had studied macroeconomics using Mankiw’s own textbook would fail to answer correctly.

I will come back to Mankiw’s own answer directly – which suffers the same misgivings as the suggestion by Baker that we listen to Paul and then Baker’s own addendum to the idea.

Baker referred to Paul’s proposal as:


… a remarkably creative way to deal with the impasse over the debt ceiling: have the Federal Reserve Board destroy the $1.6 trillion in government bonds it now holds

He acknowledges that “at first blush this idea may seem crazy” but then claims it is “actually a very reasonable way to deal with the crisis. Furthermore, it provides a way to have lasting savings to the budget”.

So we have two ideas here – one to reduce debt as a way of tricking the pesky conservatives who want to close the US government down (or pretend they do for political purposes) by not approving the expansion of the “debt ceiling”. The debt ceiling is this archaic device that conservatives can use to make trouble for an elected government which has not operational validity. After all, doesn’t the US Congress approve the spending and taxation decisions of the US government anyway?

The second idea that Baker leaks into the debate is that by destroying public debt held by the central bank (as a result of their quantitative easing program) it would save them selling it back to the private sector which in turn would save the US government from paying interest on it. And he seems to think that is a good thing. Spare me!

In his own words:


The basic story is that the Fed has bought roughly $1.6 trillion in government bonds through its various quantitative easing programs over the last two and a half years. This money is part of the $14.3 trillion debt that is subject to the debt ceiling. However, the Fed is an agency of the government. Its assets are in fact assets of the government. Each year, the Fed refunds the interest earned on its assets in excess of the money needed to cover its operating expenses. Last year the Fed refunded almost $80 billion to the Treasury. In this sense, the bonds held by the Fed are literally money that the government owes to itself … As it stands now, the Fed plans to sell off its bond holdings over the next few years. This means that the interest paid on these bonds would go to banks, corporations, pension funds, and individual investors who purchase them from the Fed. In this case, the interest payments would be a burden to the Treasury since the Fed would no longer be collecting (and refunding) the interest.

First, note the recognition that the central bank and treasury are just components of the consolidated government sector – a basic premise of Modern Monetary Theory (MMT) and should dispel the myth of the central bank being independent.

Mankiw also agreed with that saying “Since the Fed is really part of the government, the bonds it holds are liabilities the government owes to itself”. Which makes you wonder why he doesn’t tell his students that in his textbook. Further, why do those textbooks make out that the central bank is independent when it clearly is part of the monetary operations of the government? The answer is that it suits their ideological claim that monetary policy is superior to fiscal policy.

Please read my blogs – Central bank independence – another faux agenda and The consolidated government – treasury and central bank – for more discussion on this point.

I will come back to that status presently.

Second, the accounting hoopla by which the treasury gets interest income back from the central bank but lets it keep some funds to pay for its staff etc might be interesting to accountants but is largely meaningless from a monetary operations perspective. It is in the realm of the government lending itself money and paying itself back with some territory.

I agree with Mankiw that Paul’s suggestion which Baker endorses “is just an accounting gimmick”. But then the whole edifice surrounding government spending and bond-issuance is also “just an accounting gimmick”. The mainstream make much of what they call the government budget constraint as if it is an a priori financial constraint when in fact it is just an accounting statement of the monetary operations surrounding government spending and taxation and debt-issuance.

There are political gimmicks too that lead to the US government issuing debt to match their net public spending. These just hide the fact that in terms of the intrinsic characteristics of the monetary system the US government is never revenue constrained because it is the monopoly issuer of the currency. Which makes the whole debt ceiling debate a political and accounting gimmick.

Third, note that Baker then falls into the trap that the mainstream are captured by in thinking that in some way the interest payments made by the government to the non-government sector are a “burden”. A burden is something that carries opportunity costs and is unpleasant with connotations of restricted choices.

From a MMT perspective, one of the “costs” of the quantitative easing has been the lost private income that might have been forthcoming had the central bank left the government bonds in the private sector. Given how little else QE has achieved those costs make it a negative policy intervention.

So the so-called “burden” really falls on the private sector in the form of lost income. Once you accept that there are no financial constraints on the US government (which means that the opportunity costs are all real) then the concept of a burden as it is used by Baker is inapplicable.

And then once we recognise that there is a massive pool of underutilised labour and capital equipment in the US at present contributing nothing productive at all then one’s evaluation of those real opportunity costs should be low. That is, at full employment the interest payments made by government to the non-government sector on outstanding public debt have real resource implications that might require some offsetting policies (lower spending/higher taxation) to defray any inflation risks.

With an unemployment rate of nearly 10 per cent and persistently low capacity utilisation rates overall, every dollar the government can put into the US economy will be beneficial from a real perspective.

But it gets worse.

Baker turns his hand to thinking about the monetary operations involved in the central bank destroying the bonds. He might have saved us the pain. He notes that the reason the Federal Reserve “intends to sell off its bonds in future years” is because they want to:


… reduce the reserves of the banking system, thereby limiting lending and preventing inflation. If the Fed doesn’t have the bonds, however, then it can’t sell them off to soak up reserves.

But as it turns out, there are other mechanisms for restricting lending, most obviously raising the reserve requirements for banks. If banks are forced to keep a larger share of their deposits on reserve (rather than lend them out), it has the same effect as reducing the amount of reserves.

Baker falls head long into the mainstream myth that banks lend out reserves.

Please read the following blogs – Building bank reserves will not expand credit and Building bank reserves is not inflationary – for further discussion.

I remind you of this piece of analysis by the Bank of International Settlements in – Unconventional monetary policies: an appraisal – it is a very useful way to understanding the implications of the current build-up in bank reserves.

The BIS says:


… we argue that the typical strong emphasis on the role of the expansion of bank reserves in discussions of unconventional monetary policies is misplaced. In our view, the effectiveness of such policies is not much affected by the extent to which they rely on bank reserves as opposed to alternative close substitutes, such as central bank short-term debt. In particular, changes in reserves associated with unconventional monetary policies do not in and of themselves loosen significantly the constraint on bank lending or act as a catalyst for inflation …

In fact, the level of reserves hardly figures in banks’ lending decisions. The amount of credit outstanding is determined by banks’ willingness to supply loans, based on perceived risk-return trade-offs, and by the demand for those loans. The aggregate availability of bank reserves does not constrain the expansion directly.

It is obvious why this is the case. Loans create deposits which can then be drawn upon by the borrower. No reserves are needed at that stage. Then, as the BIS paper says, “in order to avoid extreme volatility in the interest rate, central banks supply reserves as demanded by the system.”

The loan desk of commercial banks have no interaction with the reserve operations of the monetary system as part of their daily tasks. They just take applications from credit worthy customers who seek loans and assess them accordingly and then approve or reject the loans. In approving a loan they instantly create a deposit (a zero net financial asset transaction).

The only thing that constrains the bank loan desks from expanding credit is a lack of credit-worthy applicants, which can originate from the supply side if banks adopt pessimistic assessments or the demand side if credit-worthy customers are loathe to seek loans.

In answering his own “examination question”, Mankiw gets positively angry and says of the plan to raise reserve requirements that it would be:


… a form of financial repression. Assuming the Fed does not pay market interest rates on those newly required reserves, it is like a tax on bank financing. The initial impact is on those small businesses that rely on banks to raise funds for investment. The policy will therefore impede the financial system’s ability to intermediate between savers and investors. As a result, the economy’s capital stock will be allocated less efficiently. In the long run, there will be lower growth in productivity and real wages.

First, if the central bank didn’t use the bonds to drain reserves (via open market operations) then it would have to pay market rates of interest to the banks who held reserves with them or lose control of its target policy rate. So unless the central bank is going to keep short-term rates at zero for an indefinite period (which I recommend) then we would be unwise to assume they will not be paying a return on the reserves (as they are doing now).

Consistent with MMT, there are two broad ways the central bank can manage bank reserves to maintain control over its target rate. First, central banks can buy or sell government debt to control the quantity of reserves to bring about the desired short-term interest rate.

MMT posits exactly the same explanation for public debt issuance – it is not to finance net government spending (outlays above tax revenue) given that the national government does not need to raise revenue in order to spend. Debt issuance is, in fact, a monetary operation to deal with the banks reserves that deficits add and allow central banks to maintain a target rate.

Try finding this explanation for public sector debt issuance in Mankiw’s macroeconomics text book.

Second, a central bank might, instead, provide a return on excess reserve holdings at the policy rate which means the financial opportunity cost of holding reserves for banks becomes zero. A central bank can then supply as many reserves as it likes at that support rate and the banks will be happy to hold them and not seek to rid themselves of the excess in the interbank market. The important point is that the interest rate level set by the central bank is then “delinked” from the volume of bank reserves in the banking system and so this becomes equivalent to the first case when the central bank drains reserves by issuing public debt.

So the build-up of bank reserves has no implication for interest rates which are clearly set solely by the central bank. All the mainstream claims that budget deficits will drive interest rates up misunderstand their impact on reserves and the central bank’s capacity to manage these bank reserves in a “decoupled” fashion.

Second, Mankiw falls prey to the same error that Baker makes – that banks lend out reserves. As noted this is a mainstream myth. The banks could still lend out whatever they liked as long as there were credit-worthy customers queuing up for loans. So no small businesses would be affected in the way Mankiw claims.

Anyway, as to what the debt-ceiling means, I was asked by several readers about the status of the US government (by which they meant the Treasury) in relation to the central bank (the Federal Reserve).

The legal code in the US essentially recognises that the central bank and treasury are part of the government sector.

If you consult the United States Code which reflects the legislative decisions made by the US Congress you find, for example, the section – TITLE 31 – MONEY AND FINANCE § 5301 – which deals with the Buying obligations of the United States Government

The US law stipulates the following:


31 USC § 5301. Buying obligations of the United States Government

  • (a) The President may direct the Secretary of the Treasury to make an agreement with the Federal reserve banks and the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System when the President decides that the foreign commerce of the United States is affected adversely because –
    • (1) the value of coins and currency of a foreign country compared to the present standard value of gold is depreciating;
    • (2) action is necessary to regulate and maintain the parity of United States coins and currency;
    • (3) an economic emergency requires an expansion of credit; or
    • (4) an expansion of credit is necessary so that the United States Government and the governments of other countries can stabilize the value of coins and currencies of a country.
  • (b) Under an agreement under subsection (a) of this section, the Board shall permit the banks (and the Board is authorized to permit the banks notwithstanding another law) to agree that the banks will-
    • (1) conduct through each entire specified period open market operations in obligations of the United States Government or corporations in which the Government is the majority stockholder; and
    • (2) buy directly and hold an additional $3,000,000,000 of obligations of the Government for each agreed period, unless the Secretary consents to the sale of the obligations before the end of the period.
  • (c) With the approval of the Secretary, the Board may require Federal reserve banks to take action the Secretary and Board consider necessary to prevent unreasonable credit expansion.

§ 5301. Buying obligations of the United States Government under Title 31 of the US Code as currently published by the US Government reflects the laws passed by Congress as of February 1, 2010.

So it seems the President can never run out of “money”. Can any constitutional lawyers out there who are expert in the USC please clarify if there are exceptions to this law? The law (including the accompanying notes which I didn’t include here) appears to say that an economic emergency can justify the President commanding the Federal Reserve to hand over credit balances in favour of the US Treasury.

Conclusion

I hope you all answered Mankiw’s examination question correctly.

My attention is now turning to computer hardware!

That is enough for today!

China June Inflation at 3-Year High

Note that as previously discussed, the rate hikes have, if anything, made it worse.

The slowdown comes from cutting back state lending and cutting back deficit spending.

And what usually happens is that governments press on with fiscal tightening, most often from automatic stabilizers triggered by the nominal growth, until they trigger a collapse and a hard landing.

But this time could be different…

China June Inflation at 3-Year High; Revives Rate Debate

July 9(Reuters) — China’s annual inflation accelerated to a three-year high in June, increasing the chances that the central bank will keep raising interest rates to tame price pressures that are spreading beyond food and energy.

Saturday’s data, which comes just three days after China raised interest rates for the third time this year, may prove to be the near-term peak for China’s inflation as global commodity prices cool, but most economists were still pencilling in one more rate increase this year.

The consumer price index for June rose 6.4 percent from a year earlier, slightly above economists’ forecasts for a 6.3 percent increase, with sharp rises recorded in food, consumer goods and property.

China 2011 new lending seen around 6.7 trln yuan

This kind of direct limiting of lending does slow things down, and can cause a credit implosion induced hard landing. It’s like a cut in govt spending.

It doesn’t have to be a hard landing, but it’s a serious risk, especially going into the second half of the year.

China 2011 new lending seen around 6.7 trln yuan -paper

July 6 (Reuters) — Chinese banks are seen issuing 6.7 trillion yuan ($1.04 trillion) worth of new loans this year, an official paper said on Wednesday, suggesting lending could slow markedly in 2011 as part of Beijing’s drive to tame inflation.

Drawing on its own calculations and without citing sources, the China Securities Journal said the pace of new bank lending could ease considerably from last year’s 7.95 trillion yuan.

The pace of bank lending is a focal point in China’s monetary policy as it is used by Beijing to manage economic growth and inflation. The government tells banks how much they should lend by setting loan quotas.

Although Beijing did not publicly announce a loan quota this year, it is widely believed to have an informal target of 7 trillion-7.5 trillion yuan.

Chinese banks likely lent 4 trillion yuan worth of new loans in the first six months of this year, after lending 3.5 trillion between January and May, the paper said.

Accordingly, total new lending for the year would hit around 6.7 trillion yuan if Chinese banks control their pace of lending according to a formula stipulated by the central bank, the paper said.

It said the formula calls for banks to lend 60 percent of annual loans in the first half of the year, and the remaining 40 percent in the second.

With inflation at 34-month highs and a lending spree by Chinese banks in 2009 feeding worries about a build-up of bad debt, Beijing wants to temper bank lending this year.

Since October, it has increased interest rates four times and raised the reserve requirement ratio for banks six times, effectively ordering banks to lock a record 21.5 percent of deposits with the central bank.

China Extends Crackdown on Off-Balance-Sheet Loans

Cutbacks now will further slow things:

China Extends Crackdown on Off-Balance-Sheet Loans

July 4 (Reuters) — China’s bank regulator has cracked down on off-balance-sheet lending by the country’s banks, sources told Reuters on Monday, its latest step to prevent over-zealous and risky lending from hurting its financial system.

China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC) has ordered banks to check all their deals in discounted commercial bills after discovering misconduct among some banks, two sources said.

Chinese banks have in the past year taken to off-balance-sheet lending, or keeping loans outside balance sheets after authorities clamped down on bank loans as part of their fight against inflation.

Last week the regulator tightened control on sales of wealth management products to ward off potential risks, and the regulator had earlier told banks to include all their loans extended via trust investment programs into their account books.

Discounted bills, an important source of financing for firms with no access to formal bank loans, accounted for about 2.5 percent of the 49.5 trillion yuan ($7.7 trillion) of total outstanding loans at the end of March, according to data from the Chinese central bank.

The regulator’s latest move comes after discovering that some rural credit cooperatives and banks in the central Henan province were issuing loans through discounted commercial bills and keeping them outside their loan books.

Under China’s banking laws, banks’ deals in discounted commercial bills should be reflected on their balance sheets.

Banks have been asked to investigate all deals linked to discounted commercial bills and submit their findings by Monday, sources said.

Under the review, banks were ordered to verify that bills issued were based on real transactions, and were ordered to track how extended credit was spent, they added.

Banks were also instructed to stop discounting bills that they issued to get funds for property and stock investments.

Analysts welcomed the move towards stringent regulation, which would also boost transparency.

“There is some concern that some borrowers were using these discounted bills as collateral for further borrowing,” said Mike Werner, a China banking analyst with Sanford Bernstein.

“So the idea that the CBRC is going to increase diligence covering this area of the market is not surprising.”

The regulator said bank branches found with serious misconduct would be barred from the discounted commercial bill market entirely, the sources added.

CBRC was not immediately available for comment when contacted by Reuters.

As China tightens policy and rein in lending to tame 34-month high inflation of 5.5 percent, many companies are struggling to get loans.

For these firms, discounted commercial bills are an important source of financing. They let companies bring bills or drafts to banks and request for money to be disbursed before they mature.

China’s second half now in progress

With govt lending and spending ‘front loaded’ into the first quarter the second half slows down relative to the first, and the first half was just ok this year.

Headlines:

China’s June Home Prices Slow in Major Cities, SouFun Says
China June PMI hits 28-mth low as global slowdown bites
China’s GDP to grow 9.5% in H1
China Eliminates Income Tax for 60 Million Workers Amid Tension Over Inflation, Wealth Gap

Global indicators not so good this am

The hope is that the entire soft spot is a temporary consequence of the earthquake, and that China holds together, and that global austerity isn’t sufficient to slow overall growth:

Headlines:

Bank of England warns against quick fix to crisis (AP)
U.K. Services Drop Most Since January 2010 on Extra Holiday (Bloomberg)
U.K. Mortgage Approvals Increased Less Than Forecast in May (Bloomberg)
Bank of England Split on Interest Rate Policy as Consumers Struggle (Telegraph)
PBOC Adviser Sees China ‘Chronic’ Inflation Lasting Decade
Why China’s Heading for a Hard Landing, Part 3: A. Gary Shilling
Sweden: Slowdown After Strong Growth
Europe June Economic Confidence Drops to Lowest in 8 Months
Trichet Urges New Vision of Europe as Greeks Protest Austerity
Up to 15 EU banks to fail stress test
ECB’s Stark Rejects Brady-Bond Solution for Greece, Zeit Reports
French Greek Rollover Plan Depends on No Default Rating
French Output Grew Less Than Estimated on Consumer Spending
Growth of German retail sales maintained in June
French Jobless Claims Increase for First Time in Five Months
Spanish premier proposes new economic measures
Portugal plans tougher austerity measures
Spanish Existing Home Prices Decline 1.8% in Second Quarter
Mortgage Applications Dipped Last Week

China real estate comments

Yes, China understands it’s unlimited ability to support demand through deficit spending that includes funding through state owned banks.

The limits are their tolerance of inflation.

The question remains whether they can deliver a soft landing, rather than a hard landing, in their efforts to dampen inflation.

While theory says it’s possible, I’ve never seen it.

Other analysts say there are far more leveraged purchases of real estate than recognized in the official statistics.

To fight the effects of the global downturn, Chinese state-owned banks, on government orders, loaned about $3 trillion, mostly to giant state-owned enterprises. The money was reported to have largely financed infrastructure projects, such as China’s ambitious high-speed railway network.

But many of the loans wound up financing real-estate purchases instead, said Deng Yongheng, director of the Institute of Real Estate Studies at the National University of Singapore.

Prices at auctions for residential land in eight major cities doubled in 2009, largely because of highly leveraged purchases by state-owned companies, he and three co-authors calculate. In March 2010, state-owned companies bid up the price of one piece of Beijing land to 10 times the asking price, according to one analyst.

The magnitude of the leveraged purchases is hard to gauge.

One indication: Shortly after the Beijing land sale, the Chinese agency that oversees state-owned companies, ordered 78 firms–whose charters had nothing to do with real estate–to cease buying and selling property. Nearly a year later, in Feb. 2011, state-owned Xinhua news agency reported that just 14 firms had left the business and another 20 were expected to get out later in the year.

A spokesman for the agency said that the firms needed time to finish their projects, but added that there isn’t any prohibition against companies owned by provinces or municipalities to continue to invest in real estate.

quick update

First, a few of today’s headlines to set the mood:

China factory sector close to stalling – Flash PMI
Europe Services, Manufacturing Weaken More Than Forecast
France’s Manufacturing, Services Growth Slows More Than Forecast
Trichet Says Risk Signals ‘Red’ as Crisis Threatens Banks
Italian Household Confidence Falls Amid Concerns on Growth, Jobs
U.K. Retail-Sales Index Declines to Lowest in a Year, CBI Says

Deficit-Cut Talks Hit Roadblock, Cantor Exits
Jobs Picture Grows Worse as Weekly Claims Post Jump
New US Home Sales Fall 2.1 Percent in May
Fed Slashes Growth Forecast, Sees High Unemployment
Oil Prices Plunge

It’s all unfolding like a slow motion train wreck.
The underlying deflationary forces were temporarily masked when QE2, under the misconception that it was somehow inflationary, caused global portfolio managers to exit the dollar, both directly and indirectly.

But now that psychology is fading, as the global lack of aggregate demand revealing the actual spending power just isn’t there to support things at the prices managers paid to place their bets.
And the next ‘really big shoe’ (as Ed Sullivan used to say) to fall could be China, as they move into their traditionally weaker second half.

Which looks to be closely followed by the US as some kind of austerity is passed by Congress, further supported by continuing austerity in the UK and the euro zone, and the setback in Japan and much of the rest of the world from the earthquake, and not to mention Brazil and India attempting to fight inflation.

Yes, the lower crude and product prices will help the consumer, but prices were lowered in reaction to a weakening consumer, so seems more likely they will slow the decline some rather than reverse it.

Bernanke’s press conference

First, the Chairman’s comments along the lines of ‘addressing our long term deficit problem will lower the risk of interest rates spiking’ yet again clearly demonstrated our Fed Chairman remains lost in some kind of fixed exchange rate paradigm, and is steering things accordingly, both directly with Fed policy and indirectly with his advice to Congress, all of which continues to work to keep the output gap as high as it is.

Anyway, here’s my take on what’s happening, as per the Chairman:

Things have changed since QE2.

Job growth has increased, and unemployment is forecast to come down over time.

And inflation indicators have bottomed and turned up some, perhaps a bit too high short term, but are forecast to come back down to desired levels, given, as always assumed in Fed forecasts, appropriate monetary policy. And right now appropriate monetary policy means no more qe.

in other words, the room for further ‘monetary stimulus’ isn’t there.
it might interfere with the hoped for transient nature of recent cpi increases and not allow the cpi to come back in line with desired levels

that is, the Fed doesn’t see the risk/reward suggesting pushing any harder.

Which is exactly what China wanted to hear, but that’s another story.

Lastly, it was again stated the Fed hasn’t run out of bullets (as if it ever had any bullets), yet open options mentioned didn’t seem at all meaningful. And the Chairman maintained that because inflation is a monetary phenomena the Fed can always create inflation. Nice slogan, but talk is cheap, and so far the only inflation they’ve created is that of scaring portfolio managers out the dollar, which works until they cover their shorts in the broad sense, and that transitory inflation, as the Fed calls it, reverses.

None of this bodes well for aggregate demand.

My macro view remains the same-

because we fear becoming the next Greece, we continue to work turn ourselves into the next Japan.