The upcoming fiscal policy changes

Another possibility is the Fed doesn’t want to cut rates due to inflation risks, and might see a tax cut as sufficient potential
support for demand to allow them to not cut rates and instead address the inflation issue.

This would be based on the mainstream notion (not mine) that monetary policy is for inflation, while fiscal may function to shift demand from one period to another, depending on the degree of ‘Ricardian Equivalence.’ (The mainstream presumption that agents won’t spend extra income from a tax cut as they ‘know’ there will need to be a tax hike later to keep the budget balanced.) The mainstream (again, not me) would also be concerned that the higher govt. deficit would somehow ‘crowd out’ private borrowing. Nonetheless, the Fed does have reasonably strong empirical evidence for them to believe tax cuts do support demand in the short run.

The Upcoming Fiscal Policy Changes

by NewstraderFX

(Forex Factory) There’s a growing consensus among economists that changes in Monetary policy from the Fed will not be able to do enough by themselves to prevent the economy from going into a serious downturn and that a stimulus from a change in Fiscal policy will be required. The fiscal stimulus in this case will probably take the form of a temporary tax cut.

It’s very likely that the current meetings of the Presidents Working Group on Financial markets (a.k.a. the Plunge Protection Team) have been at least in part for the purpose of discussing the ways and means of how they will work and that the actual cuts themselves will be announced during the State of the Union address. It’s also very likely that momentum for this is going to be building in market participants and that just as with a change in monetary policy, the markets themselves will trade according to the ultimate outcome of whatever happens from a fiscal perspective.

Former Clinton Treasury Secretary Lawrence Summers has been talking about this since November. In his opinion, the economy requires between 50 and 75 $Billion in temporary tax cuts. Martin Feldstein of the NBER is also suggesting that due to entrenched problems in the consumer and banking sectors, monetary policy changes will not have the same “traction” and that “some kind of fiscal stimulus” is now required. There’s a precedent here as well: Bush made a temporary tax cut during the 2001 recession so it seems fairly certain he will want to use the same tactic again. However, the implementation of a fiscal policy change will likely be more difficult from a political perspective because things are very different this time around. Back in 2001, Congress was under Republican control so passing the tax cut was relatively easy. Now that the Democrats have control of the Hill, the actual passage could be far more difficult.


♥

The subprime mess

On Jan 5, 2008 9:40 PM, Steve Martyak wrote:
> http://www.autodogmatic.com/index.php/sst/2007/02/02/subprime_credit_crunch_could_trigger_col
>
>
> also….
>
> 9/4/2006
> Cover of Business Week: How Toxic Is Your Mortgage? :.
>
> The option ARM is “like the neutron bomb,” says George McCarthy, a housing
> economist at New York’s Ford Foundation. “It’s going to kill all the people
> but leave the houses standing.”
>
> Some people saw it all coming….
>

The subprime setback actually hit about 18 months ago. Investors stopped funding new loans, and would be buyers were were no longer able to buy, thereby reducing demand. Housing fell and has been down for a long time. There are signs it bottomed October/November but maybe not.

I wrote about it then as well, and have been forecasting the slowdown since I noted the fed’s financial obligations ratio was at levels in March 2006 that indicated the credit expansion had to slow as private debt would not be able to increase sufficiently to sustain former levels of GDP growth. And that the reason was the tailwind from the 2003 federal deficits was winding down. as the deficit fell below 2% of GDP, and it was no longer enough to support the credit structure.

Also, while pension funds were still adding to demand with their commodity allocations, that had stopped accelerating as well and
wouldn’t be as strong a factor.

Lastly, I noted exports should pick up some, but I didn’t think enough to sustain growth.

I underestimated export strength, and while GDP hasn’t been stellar as before, it’s been a bit higher than i expected as exports boomed.

That was my first ‘major theme’ – slowing demand.

The second major theme was rising prices – Saudis acting the swing producer and setting price. This was interrupted when Goldman changed their commodity index in aug 06 triggering a massive liquidation as pension funds rebalanced, and oil prices fell from near 80 to about 50, pushed down a second time at year end by Goldman (and AIG as well this time) doing it again. As the liquidation subsided the Saudis were again in control and prices have marched up ever since, and with Putin gaining control of Russian pricing we now have to ‘price setters’ who can act a swing producers and simply set price at any level they want as long as net demand holds up. So far demand has been more than holding up, so it doesn’t seem we are anywhere near the limits of how high they can hike prices.

Saudi production for December should be out tomorrow. It indicates how much demand there is at current prices. If it’s up that means they have lots of room to hike prices further. Only if their production falls are they in danger of losing control on the downside. And I estimate it would have to fall below 7 million bpd for that to happen. It has been running closer to 9 million.

What I have missed is the fed’s response to all this.

I thought the inflation trend would keep them from cutting, as they had previously been strict adherents to the notion that price
stability is a necessary condition for optimal employment and growth.

This is how they fulfilled their ‘dual mandate’ of full employment and price stability, as dictated by ‘law’ and as per their regular reports to congress.

The theory is that if the fed acts to keep inflation low and stable markets will function to optimize employment and growth, and keep long term interest rates low.

What happened back in September is they became preoccupied with ‘market functioning’ which they see as a necessary condition for low inflation to be translated into optimal employment and growth.

What was revealed was the FOMC’s lack of understanding of not only market functioning outside of the fed, but a lack of understanding of their own monetary operations, reserve accounting, and the operation of their member bank interbank markets and pricing mechanisms.

In short, the Fed still isn’t fully aware that ‘it’s about price (interest rates), not quantity (‘money supply, whatever that may be)’.

(Note they are still limiting the size of the TAF operation using an auction methodology rather than simply setting a yield and letting quantity float)

The first clue to this knowledge shortfall was the 2003 change to put the discount rate higher than the fed funds rate, and make the discount rate a ‘penalty rate.’ This made no sense at all, as i wrote back then.

The discount rate is not and can not be a source of ‘market discipline’ and all the change did was create an ‘unstable equilibrium’ condition in the fed funds market. (They can’t keep the system ‘net borrowed’ as before) it all works fine during ‘normal’ periods but when the tree is shaken the NY Fed has it’s hands full keeping the funds rate on target, as we’ve seen for the last 6 months
or so.

While much of this FOMC wasn’t around in 2002-2003, several members were.

Back to September 2007. The FOMC was concerned enough about ‘market functioning’ to act, They saw credit spreads widening, and in particular the fed funds/libor spread was troubling as it indicated their own member banks were pricing each other’s risk at higher levels than the FOMC wanted. If they had a clear, working knowledge of monetary ops and reserve accounting, they would have recognized that either the discount window could be ‘opened’ by cutting the rate to the fed funds rate, removing the ‘stigma’ of using it, and expanding the eligible collateral. (Alternatively, the current TAF is functionally the same thing, and could have been implemented in September as well.)

Instead, they cut the fed funds rate 50 bp, and left the discount rate above it, along with the stigma. and this did little or nothing for the FF/LIBOR spread and for market functioning in general.

This was followed by two more 25 cuts and libor was still trading at 9% over year end until they finally came up with the TAF which immediately brought ff/libor down. It didn’t come all the way down to where the fed wanted it because the limited the size of the TAFs to $20 billion, again hard evidence of a shortfall in their understanding of monetary ops.

Simple textbook analysis shows it’s about price and not quantity. Charles Goodhart has over 65 volumes to read on this, and the first half of Basil Moore’s 1988 ‘Horizontalists and Verticalsists’ is a good review as well.

The ECB’s actions indicate they understand it. Their ‘TAF’ operation set the interest rate and let the banks do all they wanted, and over 500 billion euro cleared that day. And, of course- goes without saying- none of the ‘quantity needles’ moved at all.

In fact, some in the financial press have been noting that with all the ‘pumping in of liquidity’ around the world various monetary
aggregates have generally remained as before.

Rather than go into more detail about monetary ops, and why the CB’s have no effect on quantities, suffice to say for this post that the Fed still doesn’t get it, but maybe they are getting closer.

So back to the point.

Major themes are:

  • Weakness due to low govt budget deficit
  • Inflation due to monopolists/price setters hiking price

And more recently, the Fed cutting interest rates due to ‘market functioning’ in a mistaken notion that ff cuts would address that issue, followed by the TAF which did address the issue. The latest announced tafs are to be 30 billion, up from 20, but still short of the understanding that it’s about price, not quantity.

The last four months have also given the markets the impression that the Fed in actual fact cares not at all about inflation, and will only talk about it, but at the end of the day will act to support growth and employment.

Markets acknowledge that market functioning has been substantially improved, with risk repriced at wider spreads.

However, GDP prospects remain subdued, with a rising number of economists raising the odds of negative real growth.

While this has been the forecast for several quarters, and so far each quarter has seen substantial upward revisions from the initial forecasts, nonetheless the lower forecasts for Q1 have to be taken seriously, as that’s all we have.

I am in the dwindling camp that the Fed does care about inflation, and particularly the risk of inflation expectations elevating which would be considered the ultimate Central Bank blunder. All you hear from FOMC members is ‘yes, we let that happen in the 70’s, and we’re not going to let that happen again’.

And once ‘markets are functioning’ low inflation can again be translated via market forces into optimal employment and growth, thereby meeting the dual mandate.

i can’t even imagine a Fed chairman addressing congress with the reverse – ‘by keeping the economy at full employment market forces will keep inflation and long term interest rates low’.

Congress does not want inflation. Inflation will cost them their jobs. Voters hate inflation. They call it the govt robbing their
savings. Govt confiscation of their wealth. They start looking to the Ron Paul’s who advocate return to the gold standard.

That’s why low inflation is in the Fed’s mandate.

And the Fed also knows they are facing a triple negative supply shock of fuel, food, and import prices/weak $.

While they can’t control fuel prices, what they see there job as is keeping it all a relative value story and not ‘monetizing it into an
inflation story’ which means to them not accommodating it with low real rates that elevate inflation expectations, followed by
accelerating inflation.

There is no other way to see if based on their models. Deep down all their models are relative value models, with no source of the ‘price level.’ ‘Money’ is a numeraire that expresses the relative values. The current price level is there as a consequence of history, and will stay at that level only if ‘inflation expectations are well anchored.’ The ‘expectations operator’ is the only source of the price level in their models.

(See ‘Mandatory Readings‘ for how it all actually works.)

They also know that food/fuel prices are a leading cause of elevated inflation expectations.

In their world, this means that if demand is high enough to drive up CPI it’s simply too high and they need to not accommodate it with low real rates, but instead lean against that wind with higher real rates, or risk letting the inflation cat out of the bag and face a long, expensive, multi year battle to get it back in.

They knew this at the Sept 18 meeting when they cut 50, and twice after that with the following 25 cuts, all as ‘insurance to forestall’ the possible shutdown of ‘market functioning’.

And they knew and saw the price of this insurance – falling dollar, rising food, fuel, and import prices, and CPI soaring past 4% year over year.

To me these cuts in the face of the negative supply shocks define the level of fear, uncertainty, and panic of the FOMC.

It’s perhaps something like the fear felt by a new pilot accidentally flying into a thunderstorm in his first flight in an unfamiliar plane without an instructor or a manual.

The FOCM feared a total collapse of the financial structure. The possibility GDP going to 0 as the economy ‘froze.’ Better to do
something to buy some time, pay whatever inflation price that may follow, than do nothing.

The attitude has been there are two issues- recession due to market failure and inflation.

The response has been to address the ‘crisis’ first, then regroup and address the inflation issue.

And hopefully inflation expectations are well enough anchored to avoid disaster on the inflation front.

So now with the TAF’s ‘working’ (duh…) and market functions restored (even commercial paper is expanding again) the question is what they will do next.

They may decide markets are still too fragile to risk not cutting, as priced in by Feb fed funds futures, and risk a relapse into market dysfunction. Recent history suggests that’s what they would do if the Jan meeting were today.

But it isn’t today, and a lot of data will come out in the next few weeks. Both market functioning data and economic data.

Yes, the economy may weaken, and may go into recession, but with inflation on the rise, that’s the ‘non inflationary speed limit’ and the Fed would see cutting rates to support demand as accomplishing nothing for the real economy, but only increasing inflation and risking elevated inflation expectations. The see real growth as supply side constrained, and their job is keeping demand balanced at a non inflationary level.

But that assumes markets continue to function, and the supply side of credit doesn’t shut down and send GDP to zero in a financial panic.

With a good working knowledge of monetary ops and reserve accounting, and banking in general that fear would vanish, as the FOMC would know what indicators to watch and what buttons to push to safely fly the plane.

Without that knowledge another FF cut is a lot more likely.

more later…

warren


♥

Fed communications

If conveying information is considered important for market function, why not just say it clearly and directly in a targeted announcement?

Kohn Says Fed Is Trying to Signal When Views Shift `Materially’

2008-01-05 11:15 (New York)
By Scott Lanman and Steve Matthews

(Bloomberg) Federal Reserve Vice Chairman Donald Kohn said the central bank has increased its communication on policy views to the public in the wake of the financial-market “turmoil” that began in August.

Fed officials have tried to signal when the central bank’s reading on the economic outlook shifted “materially” in between regular meetings, Kohn said in a speech in New Orleans. “We have tried to provide more information than usual to reduce uncertainty and clarify our intentions.”

Kohn spoke before a week in which Chairman Ben S. Bernanke and six other Fed policy makers are scheduled to deliver remarks. The speeches come amid increasing signs of danger to the U.S. economic expansion, including a jump in the unemployment rate to a two-year high and a contraction in manufacturing. Traders anticipate the Fed will cut interest rates again Jan. 30.

Still, investors “should understand” that officials “do not coordinate schedules and messages, and that members’ views are likely to be especially diverse” when circumstances are rapidly changing, Kohn said.

Kohn held out Bernanke’s last speech on Nov. 29 as a signal of a change in the Fed’s views. The chairman said at the time that volatility in credit markets had “importantly affected” the economic outlook and declined to repeat the Federal Open Market Committee’s October statement that inflation and growth risks were about equal. The Fed then cut rates on Dec. 11.

`Let People Know’

“We have attempted to let people know when our views of the macroeconomic situation had changed materially between FOMC meetings,” said Kohn said in prepared remarks at the National Association for Business Economics panel discussion, part of the Allied Social Science Associations annual meeting.

The vice chairman didn’t comment on the outlook for monetary policy or the economy in the text of his remarks.

Bank of Japan Deputy Governor Kazumasa Iwata and European Central Bank Vice President Lucas Papademos were also scheduled to speak in the same session.

Traders yesterday shifted to bets on 50 basis points of interest-rate cuts by the Fed this month from 25 basis points after U.S. hiring slowed more than forecast in December and unemployment rose to 5 percent. The Fed lowered its main rate a quarter percentage point to 4.25 percent at its last meeting on Dec. 11. A basis point is 0.01 percentage point.

Fed Speakers

Bernanke speaks Jan. 10 in Washington. Other Fed officials giving talks include Boston Fed President Eric Rosengren and Kansas City Fed President Thomas Hoenig, the last two policy makers to cast dissenting FOMC votes. Charles Plosser, head of the Philadelphia Fed, votes as an FOMC member for the first time this month; he will discuss his economic outlook Jan. 8.

The FOMC is scheduled to meet Jan. 29-30 in Washington.

Separately, Kohn said today that the FOMC’s new forecasts for inflation three years out do not represent an “explicit numerical definition of price stability,” something the committee decided against, but rather the inflation rate that is “acceptable and consistent with fulfilling our congressional mandates.”

Kohn, who said in 2003 that he was “skeptical” about a price target, chaired a subcommittee of officials that coordinated work on the Fed’s communication review that began in 2006. He suggested in September that his doubts about the idea had eased.

Inflation Expectations

“I expect that our new projections will provide some of the benefits of an explicit target in better anchoring inflation expectations while not giving up any flexibility to react to developments that threaten high employment,” Kohn said today.

He also echoed remarks by Bernanke that the Fed will continue to look for “additional steps” to improve communication.

Fed officials decided last year not to report members’ assumptions of the “appropriate” path of interest rates because of concern that investors would “infer more of a commitment to following the implied path than would be appropriate for good policy,” the vice chairman said.

Kohn, speaking yesterday at the same conference, said diverse views on the 19-member FOMC lead to better monetary policy decisions. “The authority of the chairman rests on his ability to persuade the other members of the committee that the choices they are making under his leadership will accomplish their objectives,” he said.

–Editor: Chris Anstey, Christopher Wellisz
To contact the reporter on this story:
Scott Lanman in Washington at +1-202-624-1934 or
slanman@bloomberg.net;
Steve Matthews in New Orleans at +1-404-507-1310 or
smatthews@bloomberg.net.

To contact the editor responsible for this story:
Chris Anstey at +1-202-624-1972 or canstey@bloomberg.net


♥

Re: fed mandate discussion

On 03 Jan 2008 20:05:33 +0000, Prof. P. Arestis wrote:
> Dear Warren,
>
(snip)
>
> One point is this: some more extreme people would argue that low inflation
> is both a necessary and sufficient condition for optimal longterm growth and
> employment.

Dear Philip,

Agreed, and we will soon see if the Fed leans in that direction, as
they professed repeatedly before Sept of this year as the way they
complied with their dual mandate of price stability and full
employment.

Seems hard to imagine a change to something like “full employment is a
necessary condition for low and stable prices” but I suppose anything
is possible!

All the best,

Warren

>
> Best wishes,
>
> Philip

Payrolls

(email)

On Jan 4, 2008 10:43 AM, Mike wrote:

> Warren, right now economic sectors in stock mkt are pricing in a severe
> recession-your call on no recession is extremely out of consensus now-I
> think that mkt has overdone the recession theme short term…

Agreed!

We may get to 0 or negative growth for a quarter or so, but probably not due to financial sector losses, ‘market functioning’ issues, or housing related issues.

More likely if it happens it will be a fall off in exports or something like that.

Also, the Fed can’t talk about it, but it knows it’s way behind the inflation curve due to fears of ‘market functioning.’ Their concern now turns to the ‘insurance premium’ they paid- food, fuel, $/import prices.

ISM service just came out- solid number.

Orders and employment strong, prices strong.

And in today’s employment number service sector jobs expanded faster than the rest fell, so q4 remains ok at 2% or so, and q1 still looks up.

I still see GDP muddling through (assuming exports hold up), and upward price pressures continuing indefinately as Saudis/Russians keep hiking.

Saudi production numbers due out for Dec any day. That’s the best indicator we have for whether demand is holding up at current prices.

warren
> Mike

Yes, a weak number for sure, though probably as expected by those originally looking for negative growth for the entire quarter.

And only a few months ago a negative employment number was revised to a strong up number.

And unemployment is also a lagging indicator, reflecting the weakness of several months ago.

Service sector added 93,000, other sectors lost, so employment continues its multi year shift.

And, however weak demand may have been, from the Fed’s point of view it was still strong enough to further drive up food/fuel/import prices.

3 mo libor down again and now about 75 bps lower than August in absolute terms, and spread to ff falling and way down from the wides, cp starting to expand, and most everything indicating market functioning returning and financial conditions easing..

The Fed views this as an ‘ease’ the same way it viewed the reverse as a ‘tightening’ when it cut 50.

Even write down announcements have subsided with less than 100 billion in write offs announced so far. In 1998, for example, $100 billion was lost the first day due to the Russian default, with no prospect of recoveries. That’s probably equiv to a 300b initial loss today.

Also heard this statement on CNBC: current oil prices mean $4 gasoline at the pump, and that will cut into consumer spending so the Fed has to cut rates to keep us out of recession.

That’s exactly what the Fed doesn’t want to happen- they call that monetizing a negative supply shock and turning a relative value story into an inflation story.

With the return of ‘market functioning’ the risks to growth change dramatically for the Fed.

They are now far less concerned about ‘the financial system shutting down’ and instead can now get back to their more familiar discussion of the long term relation between inflation and growth when making their decisions.

A fiscal package is being discussed to day by Bernanke, Paulson, and Bush. That would also reduce the odds of a Fed cut.

With their belief that fiscal is for the economy and monetary policy for inflation, the mainstream might prefer to see a fiscal response to support gdp rather than an inflation inducing rate cut to support growth.


♥

January 2008 update

The following sums up the mainstream approach:

Low inflation is a NECESSARY condition for optimal long term growth and employment.

There is not trade off. If a CB acts to support near term output, and allows inflation to rise, the longer term cost to output of bringing down that inflation is far higher than any near term gains in output.

The evidence of excessive demand is prices. So the way the mainstream sees it, currently demand is sufficiently high to support today’s prices of fuel, food, gold, and other commodities, as well as CPI in general.

In the first instance, price increases are ‘relative value stories.’ The negative supply shocks of food, fuel, and import prices are shifts in relative value, and not inflation. However, should the Fed ‘accommodate’ those price increases, and allow inflation expectations to elevate and other prices to ‘catch up,’ the Fed has allowed a ‘relative value story’ to become an ‘inflation story.’

Therefore, to optimize long term employment and growth, the Fed needs only to conduct a monetary policy that targets low inflation, and let markets function to optimize long term employment and growth.

There’s the rub. The Fed has been concerned about ‘market functioning.’ The mainstream understanding assumes markets are
‘functioning’ (and competitive, but that’s another story). If markets are not functioning there is no channel to translate low inflation to optimal growth and employment.

Hence the Fed concern for ‘market functioning.’ Unfortunately, there isn’t much in the literature to help them. There’s nothing, for example, that tells them what transactions volumes, bid/offer spreads, credit spreads, etc. are evidence of sufficient ‘market functioning.’ Nor do they have studies on which markets need to function to support long term output and growth. For example, are the leveraged buyout markets, CMO and other derivative markets supportive of optimal growth? And what about markets such as the sub prime markets that added to demand for housing, but may be unsustainable as borrowers can’t support payment demands? And meaning all they did was get housing subsidized by investor’s shareholder equity.

On Sept 18 the Fed cut rates 50 basis points citing risks to ‘market functioning.’ Given the above, this was a logical concern,
particularly given the lack of experience with financial markets of the FOMC members.

In the latest minutes, a different story seems to be emerging. Markets are now pricing in rate cuts based on the risks of a weakening economy per se.

While it is generally agreed that markets are now functioning (there are bid/offer spreads, and sufficient trading is taking place to
support the economy at modest levels of real growth) the concern now is that higher prices for fuel, food, and imports, higher credit thresholds, falling home prices, and a host of other non ‘market functioning’ issues, might reduce growth and employment to recession levels.

This view has no support in mainstream economic theory. As above, mainstream math- and lots of it- concludes that any level of demand that is driving inflation higher is too much demand for optimal long term growth and employment. If that means recession in the near term, so be it. The alternative is perhaps a bit more short term growth, but at the risk of accelerating inflation which will cost far more to bring under control than any possible short term gains. As Fed Governor Kohn stated, “We learned that lesson in the 70’s and we’re not going to make that mistake again.”

To be continued.

U.S. Federal Reserve Meeting Minutes for December 11

U.S. Federal Reserve Meeting Minutes for December 11

2008-01-02 14:06 (New York)

(Bloomberg) Following are the minutes of the Federal Reserve’s Open Market Committee meeting that concluded on December 11.

The Manager of the System Open Market Account reported on recent developments in foreign exchange markets. There were no open market operations in foreign currencies for the System’s account in the period since the previous meeting. The Manager also reported on developments in domestic financial markets and on System open market operations in government securities and federal agency obligations during the period since the previous meeting. By unanimous vote, the Committee ratified these transactions.

The Committee approved a foreign currency swap arrangement with the Swiss National Bank that paralleled the arrangement with the European Central Bank approved during the Committee’s conference call on December 6, 2007. With Mr. Poole dissenting, the Committee voted to direct the Federal Reserve Bank of New York to establish and maintain a reciprocal currency (swap) arrangement for the System Open Market Account with the Swiss National Bank in an amount not to exceed $4 billion. The Committee authorized associated draws of up to the full amount of $4 billion, and the arrangement itself was authorized for a period of up to 180 days unless extended by the FOMC. Mr. Poole dissented because he viewed the swap agreement as unnecessary in light of the size of the Swiss National Bank’s dollar-denominated foreign exchange reserves.

Seems that would make them all that much more credit worthy?

The information reviewed at the December meeting indicated that, after the robust gains of the summer, economic activity decelerated significantly in the fourth quarter. Consumption growth slowed, and survey measures of sentiment dropped further. Many readings from the business sector were also softer: Industrial production fell in October, as did orders and shipments of capital goods. Employment gains stepped down during the four months ending in November from their pace earlier in the year.

Yes, they were expecting a ‘rough spot’.

GDP was subsequently revised higher when consumer spending was subsequently released at up 1.2% with the previous month revised up as well from 0.2% to 0.4%.

Headline consumer price inflation moved higher in September and October as energy prices increased significantly; core inflation also rose but remained moderate.

November was even higher.

The slowing in private employment gains was due in large part to the ongoing weakness in the housing market. Employment in residential construction posted its fourth month of sizable declines in November, and employment in housing-related sectors such as finance, real estate, and building-material and garden-supply retailers continued to trend down.

As expected.

Elsewhere, factory jobs declined again, while employment in most serviceproducing industries continued to move up.

A multi-decade trend.

Aggregate hours of production or nonsupervisory workers edged up in October and November. Some indicators from the household survey also suggested softening in the labor market, but the unemployment rate held steady at 4.7 percent through November.

Yes, demographics keeping unemployment low, as the fed expects labor force participation to work its way lower over time. This also keeps the fed’s GDP non inflationary ‘speed limit’ lower than otherwise.

Industrial production fell in October after small increases in the previous two months. The index for motor vehicles and parts fell for the third consecutive month, and the index for construction supplies moved down for the fourth straight month. Materials output also declined in October, with production likely curbed by weak demand from the construction and motor vehicle sectors. Production in high-tech industries, however, increased modestly, and commercial aircraft production registered another solid gain. In November, output appeared to have edged up in manufacturing sectors (with the exception of the motor vehicles sector) for which weekly physical product data were available. After posting notable gains in the summer, real consumer spending was nearly flat in September and October.

Subsequently, November was up big and October was revised up as well.

Spending on goods excluding motor vehicles was little changed on net over that period. Spending on services edged down, reflecting an extraordinarily large drop in securities commissions in September. The most recent readings on weekly chain store sales as well as industry reports and surveys suggested subdued gains in November and an uneven start to the holiday shopping season.

Seems holiday sales muddled through with modest gains meeting low ends of expectations.

Sales of light motor vehicles in November remained close to the pace that had prevailed since the second quarter. Real disposable income was about unchanged in September and October. The Reuters/University of Michigan index of consumer sentiment ticked down further in early December as respondents took a more pessimistic view of the outlook for their personal finances and for business conditions in the year ahead.

In the housing market, new home sales were below their third-quarter pace, and sales of existing homes were flat in October following sharp declines in August and September.

Still down, but signs of bottoming.

These declines likely were exacerbated by the deterioration in nonprime mortgage markets and by the higher interest rates and tighter lending conditions for jumbo loans.

Those have subsequently eased some, last I checked.

Single-family housing starts stepped down again in October after substantial declines in the June-September period. Yet, because of sagging sales, builders made only limited progress in paring down their substantial inventories. Single-family permit issuance continued along the steep downward trajectory that had begun two years earlier, which pointed toward further slowing in homebuilding over the near term. Multifamily starts rebounded in October from an unusually low reading in September, and the level of multifamily starts was near the midpoint of the range in which this series had fluctuated over the past ten years.

Housing remains weak.

Real spending on equipment and software posted a solid increase in the third quarter. In October, however, orders and shipments of nondefense capital goods excluding aircraft declined, suggesting that some deceleration in spending was under way in the fourth quarter. The October decline in orders and shipments was led by weakness in the high-tech sector: Shipments of computers and peripheral equipment declined while the industrial production index for computers was flat; orders and shipments for communications equipment plunged. Some of that weakness may have been attributable to temporary production disruptions stemming from the wildfires in Southern California; cutbacks in demand from large financial institutions affected by market turmoil may have contributed as well. In the transportation equipment category, purchases of medium and heavy trucks changed little, and orders data suggested that sales would remain near their current levels in the coming months. Orders for equipment outside high-tech and transportation rose in October, but shipments were about flat, pointing to a weaker fourth quarter for business spending after two quarters of brisk increases. Some prominent surveys of business conditions remained consistent with modest gains in spending on equipment and software during the fourth quarter, but other surveys were less sanguine. In addition, although the cost of capital was little changed for borrowers in the investment-grade corporate bond market, costs for borrowers in the high-yield corporate bond market were up significantly. In the third quarter, corporate cash flows appeared to have dropped off, leaving firms with diminished internally generated funds for financing investment. Data available through October suggested that nonresidential building activity remained vigorous.

Real nonfarm inventory investment excluding motor vehicles increased slightly faster in the third quarter than in the second quarter. Outside of motor vehicles, the ratio of book-value inventories to sales had ticked up slightly in September but remained near the low end of its range in recent years. Book-value estimates of the inventory investment of manufacturers–the only inventory data available beyond the third quarter– were up in October at about the third-quarter pace. The U.S. international trade deficit narrowed slightly in September as an increase in exports more than offset higher imports. The September gain in exports primarily reflected higher exports of goods; services exports recorded moderate growth. Exports of agricultural products exhibited particularly robust growth, with both higher prices and greater volumes. Exports of industrial supplies and consumer goods also moved up smartly in September. Automotive products exports, in contrast, were flat, and capital goods exports fell, led by a decline in aircraft. The increase in imports primarily reflected higher imports of capital goods, with imports of computers showing particularly strong growth. Imports of automotive products, consumer goods, and services also increased. Imports of petroleum, however, were flat, and imports of industrial supplies fell. Output growth in the advanced foreign economies picked up in the third quarter. In Japan, real output rebounded, led by exports. In the euro area, GDP growth returned to a solid pace in the third quarter on the back of a strong recovery in investment. In Canada and the United Kingdom, output growth moderated but remained robust, as vigorous domestic demand was partly offset by rapid growth of imports. Indicators of fourth-quarter activity in the advanced foreign economies were less robust on net. Confidence indicators had deteriorated in most major economies in the wake of the financial turmoil and remained relatively weak.

Must all be watching CNBC.

In November, the euro-area and U.K. purchasing managers indexes for services were well below their level over the first half of the year; nevertheless they pointed to moderate expansion. Labor market conditions generally remained relatively strong in recent months.

No slack yet. Maybe this Friday’s number will change that.

Incoming data on emerging-market economies were positive on balance. Overall, growth in emerging Asia moderated somewhat in the third quarter from its double-digit pace in the second quarter, but remained strong. Economic growth was also solid in Latin America, largely reflecting stronger-than-expected activit in Mexico.

World demand still ok.

In the United States, headline consumer price inflation increased in September and October from its low rates in the summer as the surge in crude oil prices began to be reflected in retail energy prices. In addition, though the rise in food prices in October was slower than in August and September, it remained above that of core consumer prices. Excluding food and energy, inflation was moderate, although it was up from its low rates in the spring. The pickup in core consumer inflation over this period reflected an acceleration in some prices that were unusually soft last spring, such as those for apparel, prescription drugs, and medical services, as well as nonmarket prices. On a twelve-month-change basis, core consumer price inflation was down noticeably from a year earlier. In October, the producer price index for core intermediate materials moved up only slightly for a second month, and the twelve-month increase in these prices was considerably below that of the year-earlier period. This pattern reflected, in part, a deceleration in the prices of a wide variety of construction materials, such as cement and gypsum, and in the prices of some metal products. In response to rising energy prices, household survey measures of expectations for year-ahead inflation picked up in November and then edged higher in December. Households’ longer-term inflation expectations also edged up in both November and December.

All inflation data has subsequently deteriorated.

Average hourly earnings increased faster in November than in the previous two months. Over the twelve months that ended in November, however, this wage measure rose a bit more slowly than over the previous twelve months. At its October meeting, the FOMC lowered its target for the federal funds rate 25 basis points, to 4« percent. The Board of Governors also approved a 25 basis point decrease in the discount rate, to 5 percent, leaving the gap between the federal funds rate target and the discount rate at 50 basis points.

This shows a lack of understanding of monetary operations and reserve accounting. Otherwise, they would set the discount rate at or below the Fed Funds rate.

The Committee’s statement noted that, while economic growth was solid in the third quarter and strains in financial markets had eased somewhat on balance,

Interesting! They recognized strains have eased.

the pace of economic expansion would likely slow in the near term, partly reflecting the intensification of the housing correction. The Committee indicated that its action, combined with the policy action taken in September, should help forestall some of the adverse effects on the broader economy that might otherwise arise from the disruptions in financial markets and should promote moderate growth over time.

Again, forestall effects from ‘disruptions’ in financial markets.

Readings on core inflation had improved modestly during the year, but the statement noted that recent increases in energy and commodity prices, among other factors, may put renewed upward pressure on inflation.

They have done exactly that.

In this context, the Committee judged that some inflation risks remained and indicated that it would continue to monitor inflation developments carefully.

Markets think this means monitor with no intention to act?

The Committee also judged that, after this action, the upside risks to inflation roughly balanced the downside risks to growth.

Subsequently, the upside risks to inflation have increased dramatically. Growth seems to be at least at the levels they anticipated, especially with December being revised up.

The Committee said that it would continue to assess the effects of financial and other developments on economic prospects and would act as needed to foster price stability and sustainable economic growth.

They claim to believe low inflation is a necessary condition for optimal long term growth and employment.

The Committee’s action at its October meeting was largely expected by market participants, although the assessment that the upside risks to inflation balanced the downside risks to growth was not fully anticipated and apparently led investors to revise up slightly the expected path for policy.

February Fed Funds are, again, pricing another cut.

During the intermeeting period, the release of the FOMC minutes and associated summary of economic projections, as well as various data releases, elicited only modest market reaction. In contrast, markets were buffeted by concerns about the potential adverse effects on credit availability and economic growth of sizable losses at large financial institutions and of financial market strains in general. Market participants marked down their expected path for policy substantially, and by the time of the December meeting, investors were virtually certain of a rate cut. Two-year Treasury yields fell on net over the intermeeting period by an amount about in line with revisions to policy expectations. Ten-year Treasury yields also declined, but less than shorter-term yields. The steepening of the yield curve was due mostly to sharply lower short- and intermediate-term forward rates, consistent with investors’ apparently more pessimistic outlook for economic growth. TIPS yields fell less than their nominal counterparts, implying modest declines in inflation compensation both at the five-year and longer horizons.

After showing some signs of improvement in late September and October, conditions in financial markets worsened over the intermeeting period.

Seems they have since eased, especially FF/LIBOR.

Heightened worries about counterparty credit risk, balance sheet constraints, and liquidity pressures affected interbank funding markets and commercial paper markets, where spreads over risk-free rates rose to levels that were, in some cases, higher than those seen in August. Strains in those markets were exacerbated by concerns related to year-end pressures. In longer-term corporate markets, both investment- and speculative-grade credit spreads widened considerably; issuance slowed but remained strong. In housing finance, subprime mortgage markets stayed virtually shut, and spreads on jumbo loans apparently widened further. Spreads on conforming mortgage products also widened after reports of losses and reduced capital ratios at the housingrelated government-sponsored enterprises. Broadbased equity indexes were volatile and ended the period down noticeably.

Up for the year, but down from the highs. And nonfinancial did far better.

Financial stocks were especially hard hit, dropping substantially more than the broad indexes. Similar stresses were evident in the financial markets of major foreign economies. The tradeweighted foreign exchange value of the dollar against major currencies moved up, on balance, over the intermeeting period.

Since moved down.

Debt in the domestic nonfinancial sector was estimated to be increasing somewhat more slowly in the fourth quarter than in the third quarter. Nonfinancial business debt continued to expand strongly, supported by solid bond issuance and by a small rebound in the issuance of commercial paper.

Real economy functioning though housing weak.

Bank loans outstanding also continued to rise rapidly.

Absorbing CP.

Household mortgage debt was expected to expand at a reduced rate in the fourth quarter, reflecting softer home prices and declining home sales, as well as a tightening in credit conditions for some borrowers. Nonmortgage consumer credit in the fourth quarter appeared to be expanding at a moderate pace. In November, M2 growth picked up slightly from its October rate.

Interesting they care about that.

While liquid deposits continued to grow slowly, heightened demand for safety and liquidity appeared to boost holdings of retail money market mutual funds. Small time deposits continued to expand, likely in part due to high rates offered by some depository institutions to attract retail deposits. Currency outstanding was about flat in November. In the forecast prepared for this meeting, the staff revised down its estimate of growth in aggregate economic activity in the fourth quarter. Although thirdquarter real GDP was revised up sharply, most available indicators of activity in the fourth quarter were more downbeat than had previously been expected. Faster inventory investment contributed importantly to the upward revision to third-quarter real GDP, but part of that upswing was expected to be unwound in the fourth quarter. The available data for domestic final sales also suggested a weaker fourth quarter than had been anticipated. In particular, real personal consumption expenditures had been about unchanged in September and October, and the contraction in singlefamily construction had intensified. Providing a bit of an offset to these factors, however, was further improvement in the external sector.

Q4 subsequently revised up.

The staff also marked down its projection for the rise in real GDP over the remainder of the forecast period. Real GDP was anticipated to increase at a rate noticeably below its potential in 2008. Conditions in financial markets had deteriorated over the intermeeting period and were expected to impose more restraint on residential construction as well as consumer and business spending in 2008 than previously expected.

They have eased some since the TAFs over year end were implemented.

In addition, compared with the previous forecast, higher oil prices and lower real income were expected to weigh on the pace of real activity throughout 2008 and 2009.

Interesting that they are now expecting higher oil prices going forward.

By 2009, however, the staff projected that the drag from those factors would lessen and that an improvement in mortgage credit availability would lead to a gradual recovery in the housing market. Accordingly, economic activity was expected to increase at its potential rate in 2009. The external sector was projected to continue to suppor domestic economic activity throughout the forecast period. Reflecting upward revisions to previously published data, the forecast for core PCE price inflation for 2007 was a bit higher than in the preceding forecast; core inflation was projected to hold steady during 2008 as the indirect effects of higher energy prices on prices of core consumer goods and services were offset by the slight easing of resource pressures and the expected deceleration in the prices of nonfuel imported goods.

Projecting declining nonfuel import prices?

The forecast for headline PCE inflation anticipated that retail energy prices would rise sharply in the first quarter of 2008 and that food price inflation would outpace core price inflation in the beginning of the year. As pressures from these sources lessened over the remainder of 2008 and in 2009,

Wonder why they think pressures would drop as that’s when they think their 100 bp of easing kicks in?

both core and headline price inflation were projected to edge down, and headline inflation was expected to moderate to a pace slightly below core inflation.

Subsequently, fuel and food have gone back through their highs.

Delinquency rates on credit card loans, auto loans, and other forms of consumer credit, while still moderate, had increased somewhat, particularly in areas hard hit by house price declines and mortgage defaults. Past and prospective losses appeared to be spurring lenders to tighten further the terms on new extensions of credit, not just in the troubled markets for nonconforming mortgages but, in some cases, for other forms of credit as well. In addition, participants noted that some intermediaries were facing balance sheet pressures and could become constrained by concerns about rating-agency or regulatory capital requirements. Among other factors, banks were experiencing unanticipated growth in loans as a result of continuing illiquidity in the market for leveraged loans, persisting problems in the commercial paper market that had sparked draws on back-up lines of credit, and more recently, consolidation of assets of off-balance-sheet affiliates onto banks’ balance sheets.

Concerns about credit risk and the pressures on banks’ balance sheet capacity appeared to be contributing to diminished liquidity in interbank markets and to a pronounced widening in term spreads for periods extending through year-end.

Subsequently, FF/LIBOR narrowed with the TAFs and now the passing of year end.

A number of participants noted some potential for the Federal Reserve’s new Term Auction Facility and accompanying actions by other central banks to ameliorate pressures in term funding markets.

Some potential? More evidence of the lack of understanding of reserve accounting and monetary operations.

Participants recognized, however, that uncertainties about values of mortgage-related assets and related losses, and consequently strains in financial markets, could persist for quite some time. Some participants cited more-positive aspects of recent financial developments. A number of large financial intermediaries had been able to raise substantial amounts of new capital. Moreover, credit losses and asset write-downs at regional and community banks had generally been modest; these institutions typically were not facing balance sheet pressures and reportedly had not tightened lending standards appreciably, except for those on real estate loans. And, although spreads on corporate bonds had widened over the intermeeting period, especially for speculative-grade issues, the cost of credit to most nonfinancial firms remained relatively low; nonfinancial firms outside of the real estate and construction sectors generally reported that credit conditions, while somewhat tighter, were not restricting planned investment spending; and consumer credit remained readily available for most households. Nonetheless, participants agreed that heightened financial stress posed increased downside risks to growth and

In their discussion of the economic situation and outlook, participants generally noted that incoming information pointed to a somewhat weaker outlook for spending than at the time of the October meeting. The decline in housing had steepened, and consumer outlays appeared to be softening more than anticipated, perhaps indicating some spillover from the housing correction to other components of spending. These developments, together with renewed strains in financial markets, suggested that growth in late 2007 and during 2008 was likely to be somewhat more sluggish than participants had indicated in their October projections.

Again, December subsequently revised up.

Still, looking further ahead, participants continued to expect that, aided by an easing in the stance of monetary policy, economic growth would gradually recover as weakness in the housing sector abated and financial conditions improved, allowing the economy to expand at about its trend rate in 2009. Participants thought that recent increases in energy prices likely would boost headline inflation temporarily, but with futures prices pointing to a gradual decline in oil prices

Still using futures prices!

and with pressures on resource utilization seen as likely to ease a bit, most participants continued to anticipate some moderation in core and especially headline inflation over the next few years.

Seems to not talk about cutting rates into a negative supply shock of food and fuel was discussed?

Participants discussed in detail the resurgence of stresses in financial markets in November. The renewed stresses reflected evidence that the performance of mortgage-related assets was deteriorating further, potentially increasing the losses that were being borne in part by a number of major financial firms, including money-center banks, housing-related governmentsponsored enterprises, investment banks, and financial guarantors. Moreover, participants recognized that some lenders might be exposed to additional losses: made the outlook for the economy considerably more uncertain. Participants noted the marked deceleration in consumer spending in the national data. Real personal consumption expenditures had shown essentially no growth in September and October, suggesting that tighter credit conditions, higher gasoline prices, and the continuing housing correction might be restraining growth in real consumer spending. Retailers reported weaker results in many regions of the country, but in some, retailers saw solid growth. Job growth rebounded somewhat in October and November, and participants expected continuing gains in employment and income to support rising consumer spending, though they anticipated slower growth of jobs, income, and spending than in recent years. However, consumer confidence recently had dropped by a sizable amount, leading some participants to voice concerns that household spending might increase less than currently anticipated.

Recent data and anecdotal information indicated that the housing sector was weaker than participants had expected at the time of the Committee’s previous meeting.

OK, that is news to me.

I had thought the weakness was in line with expectations.

In light of elevated inventories of unsold homes and the higher cost and reduced availability of nonconforming mortgage loans, participants agreed that the housing correction was likely to be both deeper and more prolonged than they had anticipated in October. Moreover, rising foreclosures and the resulting increase in the supply of homes for sale could put additional downward pressure on prices, leading to a greater decline in household wealth and potentially to further disruptions in the financial markets.

Indicators of capital investment for the nation as a whole suggested solid but appreciably less rapid growth in business fixed investment during the fourth quarter than the third. Participants reported that firms in some regions and industries had indicated they would scale back capital spending, while contacts in other parts of the country or industries reported no such change. Similarly, business sentiment had deteriorated in many parts of the country, but in other areas firms remained cautiously optimistic. Anecdotal evidence generally suggested that inventories were not out of line with desired levels. Even so, participants expected that inventory accumulation would slow from its elevated third-quarter pace. Several participants remarked that, participants also noted the deterioration in the secondary market for commercial real estate loans and the possible effects of that development, should it persist, on building activity. The available data showed strong growth abroad and solid gains in U.S. exports. Participants noted that rising foreign demand was benefiting U.S. producers of manufactured goods and agricultural products, in particular. Exports were unlikely to continue growing at the robust rate reported for the third quarter, but participants anticipated that the combination of the weaker dollar and still-strong, though perhaps less-rapid, growth abroad would mean continued firm growth in U.S. exports. Several participants observed, however, that strong growth in foreign economies and U.S. exports might not persist if global financial conditions were to deteriorate further.

Seems they were putting a negative bias on everything.

Probably watching CNBC a lot.

Recent readings on inflation generally were seen as slightly less favorable than in earlier months, partly due to upward revisions to previously published data. Moreover, earlier increases in energy and food prices likely would imply higher headline inflation in the next few months, and past declines in the dollar would put upward pressure on import prices. Some participants said that higher input costs and rising prices of imports were leading more firms to seek price increases for goods and services. However, few business contacts had reported unusually large wage increases. Downward revisions to earlier compensation data, along with the latest readings on compensation and productivity, indicated only moderate pressure on unit labor costs. With futures prices pointing to a gradual decline in oil prices

Again, futures prices are getting into their models and their thinking. They fail to recognized the difference between perishable and nonperishable commodities in regards the information discounted by future prices.

and with an anticipation of some easing of pressures on resource utilization, participants generally continued to see core PCE inflation as likely to trend down a bit over the next few years, as in their October projections, and headline inflation as likely to slow more substantially from its currently elevated level. Nonetheless, participants remained concerned about upside risks to inflation stemming from elevated prices of energy and non-energy commodities; some also cited the weaker dollar. Participants agreed that continued stable inflation expectations would be essential to achieving and sustaining a downward trend to inflation, that wellanchored expectations couldn’t be taken for granted,

OK, that is inline with main stream thought.

and that policymakers would need to continue to watch inflation expectations closely.

Mainstream theory says that when expectations elevate it is too late – the inflation cat is out of the bag.

softening in the outlook for economic growth warranted an easing of the stance of policy at this meeting. In view of the further tightening of credit and deterioration of financial market conditions, the stance of monetary policy now appeared to be somewhat restrictive.

Mainstream economics would counter that it should be restrictive with inflation as high as it is.

And that if demand is strong enough to drive up prices, it is too high.

Moreover, the downside risks to the expansion, resulting particularly from the weakening of the housing sector and the deterioration in credit market conditions, had risen. In these circumstances, policy easing would help foster maximum sustainable growth and provide some additional insurance against risks.

Only if they are not concerned about inflation.

At the same time, members noted that policy had already been eased by 75 basis points and that the effects of those actions on the real economy would be evident only with a lag. And some data, including readings on the labor market, suggested that the economy retained forward momentum. Members generally saw overall inflation as likely to be lower next year, and core inflation as likely to be stable, even if policy were eased somewhat at this meeting;

Seems they were not at all concerned about inflation.

but they judged that some inflation pressures and risks remained, including pressures from elevated commodity and energy prices and the possibility of upward drift in the public’s expectations of inflation. Weighing these considerations, nearly all members judged that a 25 basis point reduction in the Committee’s target for the federal funds rate would be appropriate at this meeting. Although members agreed that the stance of policy should be eased, they also recognized that the situation was quite fluid and the economic outlook unusually uncertain. Financial stresses could increase further, intensifying the contraction in housing markets and restraining other forms of spending. Some members noted the risk of an unfavorable feedback loop in which credit market conditions restrained economic growth further, leading to additional tightening of credit; such an adverse development could require a substantial further easing of policy.

Yes, if that happens and the inflation outlook continues to not be a concern.

Members also recognized that financial market conditions might improve more rapidly than members expected, in which case a reversal of some of the rate cuts might become appropriate.

Financial market conditions have improved, but downside risks to growth remain and the inflation outlook has deteriorated.

The Committee agreed that the statement to be released after this meeting should indicate that economic growth appeared to be slowing, reflecting the intensification of the housing correction and some softening in business and consumer spending, and that strains in financial markets had increased. The characterization of the inflation situation could be largely unchanged from that of the previous meeting.

I did not think so then and certainly not any more.

Members agreed that the resurgence of financial stresses in November had increased uncertainty about the outlook. Given the In the Committee’s discussion of monetary policy for the intermeeting period, members judged that the sof unlike residential real estate, commercial and industrial real estate activity remained solid in their Districts. But heightened uncertainty, the Committee decided to refrain from providing an explicit assessment of the balance of risks. The Committee agreed on the need to remain exceptionally alert to economic and financial developments and their effects on the outlook, and members would be prepared to adjust the stance of monetary policy if prospects for economic growth or inflation were to worsen.

The risks to growth are still very real, and inflation risks are increasing.

If they continue to not care about inflation, another cut is likely. Seems to me the inflation outlook has gone from bad to worse, and by now they should realize the futures prices are not a reliable indicator of food and fuel prices in the future.

They might also realize that after seeing their GDP forecasts revised up for the last few quarters, there are risks to the upside as well as the downside.

At the conclusion of the discussion, the Committee voted to authorize and direct the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, until it was instructed otherwise, to execute transactions in the System Account in accordance with the following domestic policy directive: ?The Federal Open Market Committee seeks monetary and financial conditions that will foster price stability and promote sustainable growth in output. To further its long-run objectives, the Committee in the immediate future seeks conditions in reserve markets consistent with reducing the federal funds rate to an average of around 4¬ percent.?

The vote encompassed approval of the statement below to be released at 2:15 p.m.: ?The Federal Open Market Committee decided today to lower its target for the federal funds rate 25 basis points to 4¬ percent. Incoming information suggests that economi growth is slowing, reflecting the intensification of the housing correction and some softening in business and consumer spending. Moreover, strains in financial markets have increased in recent weeks. Today’s action, combined with the policy actions taken earlier, should help promote moderate growth over time. Readings on core inflation have improved modestly this year, but elevated energy and commodity prices, among other factors, may put upward pressure on inflation. In this context, the Committee judges that some inflation risks remain, and it will continue to monitor inflation developments carefully. Recent developments, including the deterioration in financial market conditions, have increased the uncertainty surrounding the outlook for economic growth and inflation. The Committee will continue to assess the effects of financial and other developments on economic prospects and will act as needed to foster price stability and sustainable economic growth. Votes for this action: Messrs. Bernanke, Geithner, Evans, Hoenig, Kohn, Kroszner, Mishkin, Poole, and Warsh. Votes against this action: Mr. Rosengren. Mr. Rosengren dissented because he regarded the weakness in the incoming economic data and in the outlook for the economy as warranting a more aggressive policy response. In his view, the combination of a deteriorating housing sector, slowing consumer and business spending, high energy prices, and illfunctioning financial markets suggested heightened risk of continued economic weakness. In light of that possibility a more decisive policy response was called for to minimize that risk. In any case, he felt that wellanchored inflation expectations and the Committee’s ability to reverse course on policy would limit the inflation risks of a larger easing move, should the economy instead prove significantly stronger than anticipated. It was agreed that the next meeting of the Committee would be held on Tuesday-Wednesday, January 29-30, 2008. The meeting adjourned at 1:15 p.m.


♥

A very British bubble for Mr Brown

A very British bubble for Mr Brown

Leader
Sunday December 16 2007
The Observer

The buzz words in the world of finance these days are ‘moral hazard’. That is economist-speak for what happens when people who have engaged in risky business and fallen foul of market forces are let off the hook. It is the recognition that when you give dodgy lenders and borrowers an inch, they recklessly gamble for another mile.

When the City started to feel the ‘credit crunch’ over the summer, the Bank of England at first took a tough line on moral hazard. But it subsequently changed its mind. It rescued Northern Rock.

It rescued the depositors. Hardly a moral hazard issue. The shareholders still stand to lose if the assets don’t have the hoped for cash flows over time.

Last week it joined a coordinated action with US, Canadian and European central banks to provide easy credit to any institution that can’t borrow elsewhere.

Sort of, the CB’s job is to administer policy interest rates. And, again, there is nothing yet to indicate shareholders are getting baled out.

That was the right course of action. The banking sector may be in a mess of its own making – it over-exposed itself to US sub-prime mortgages – but the danger to the wider economy of a prolonged cash drought is too big to ignore.

What is a ‘cash drought’???

But even if last week’s intervention gets the wheels of global finance moving again,

Whatever that means. GDP seems to be muddling through as before.

the danger will not have receded. That is because high street lenders have no reason to pass central bank largesse onto their customers. Ordinary people will still find it hard to borrow and will still pay more than before to service their debts.

Haven’t seen any evidence of that, apart from would be subprime borrowers who perhaps never should have had access to funds anyway.

Since Britons are some of the most indebted people in the world, that puts us in a particularly vulnerable position. Per capita, Britons borrow more than twice as much as other Europeans. The average family pays 18 per cent of disposable income servicing debt. If the world economy slumps, the bailiffs will knock at British doors first.

More confused rhetoric. Aggregate demand is about spending. The risk to output and employment remains a slump in spending.

It might not come to that. The best case scenario envisages a mild downturn, consumers turning more prudent, demand dipping and inflation falling, which would free the Bank of England to cut interest rates and re-energise the economy for a prompt comeback.

No evidence cutting rates adds to demand in a meaningful way. It takes a strong dose of fiscal for that or for the non resident sector to start spending its hoard of pounds in the UK.

But in the worst case scenario, the credit crunch turns into a consumer recession.

If it results in a cut in aggregate demand, which it might, but somehow this discussion does not get into that connection.

House prices fall dramatically. People feel much poorer and stop spending.

OK, there is a possible channel, but it is a weak argument. Seems to take a cut in income for spending to fall.

Small businesses can’t get credit and fold.

Could happen, but if consumers spend at the remaining businesses that do not fold and employment and income stays constant, GDP stays pretty much the same.

But high fuel and commodity prices keep inflation high. Unemployment rises

When that happens, it is trouble for GDP, but he skirts around the channels that might lead to a loss of income, spending, and employment.

and millions of people default on their debts. Boom turns to bust.

Right, and the policy response can be an immediate fiscal measure that sustains demand and prevents that from happening.

The problem is with ‘high inflation’ and an inherent fear of government deficits; policy makers may not want to go that route.

The government can hope for the best, but it must prepare for the worst.

Fallout shelters?

That means talking to banks, regulators and debt relief charities to work out ways to help people at risk of insolvency.

Actually, bankruptcy is a means of sustaining demand. Past debts are gone and earned income goes toward spending and often spending beyond current income via new debt.

They must look first at reform of Individual Voluntary Arrangements. These are debt restructuring packages that fall short of personal bankruptcy declarations. In theory, they allow people to consolidate and write off some of their debt, paying the rest in installments.

This could hurt demand unless the installment payments get spend by the recipients.

There is no debtors prison over there anymore, last I heard?

But in practice they are sometimes scarcely more generous than credit card balance transfer deals, with large arrangement fees and tricky small print. There is emerging evidence they have been mis-sold to desperate debtors.

In theory, individuals can also negotiate debt relief directly with banks. But that requires the pairing of a financially literate, assertive consumer with a generous-hearted lender – not the most common combination. The government and banks should already be planning their strategy to make impartial brokering of such deals easier.

But the first hurdle on the way to easing a private debt crisis is political. Gordon Brown has constructed a mythology of himself as the alchemist Chancellor who eliminated the cycle of boom-and-bust from Britain’s economy. To stay consistent with that line, he has to pretend that Britain is well insulated from financial turbulence originating in the US.

Banning CNBC would help out a lot!

That simply isn’t true. The excessive level of consumer borrowing in recent years is a very British bubble and the government can deny it no longer. If the bubble bursts, we will face a kind of moral hazard very different from the one calculated by central banks when bailing out the City. It is the hazard of millions of people falling into penury.

Rising incomes can sustain rising debt indefinitely. It is up to the banks to make loans to people who can service them; otherwise, their shareholders lose. That is the market discipline, not short term bank funding issues.


Crisis may make 1929 look a ‘walk in the park’

Crisis may make 1929 look a ‘walk in the park’

Telegraph
by Ambrose Evans-Pritchard

As central banks continue to splash their cash over the system, so far to little effect, Ambrose Evans-Pritchard argues that things risk spiralling out of their control

Twenty billion dollars here, $20bn there, and a lush half-trillion from the European Central Bank at give-away rates for Christmas.
Buckets of liquidity are being splashed over the North Atlantic banking system, so far with meagre or fleeting effects.

It’s about price, not quantity (net funds are not altered), and the CB actions have helped set ‘policy rates’ at desired levels.

That is all the CBs can do, apart from altering the absolute level of rates, which, by their own research, does little or nothing and with considerable lags.

Not to say changing rates isn’t disruptive as it shifts nominal income/wealth between borrowers and savers of all sorts.

As the credit paralysis stretches through its fifth month, a chorus of economists has begun to warn that the world’s central banks are fighting the wrong war, and perhaps risk a policy error of epochal proportions.

“Liquidity doesn’t do anything in this situation,” says Anna Schwartz, the doyenne of US monetarism and life-time student (with Milton Friedman) of the Great Depression.

The last major, international fixed exchange rate/gold standard implosion. Other since – ERM, Mexico, Russia, Argentina – have been ‘contained’ to the fixed fx regions.

“It cannot deal with the underlying fear that lots of firms are going bankrupt. The banks and the hedge funds have not fully acknowledged who is in trouble. That is the critical issue,” she adds.

The critical issue at the macro policy level is what it is all doing to the aggregate demand that sustains output, employment, and growth. So far so good on that front, but it remains vulnerable, especially given the state of knowledge of macro economics and fiscal/monetary policy around the globe.

Lenders are hoarding the cash, shunning peers as if all were sub-prime lepers. Spreads on three-month Euribor and Libor – the interbank rates used to price contracts and Club Med mortgages – are stuck at 80 basis points even after the latest blitz. The monetary screw has tightened by default.

The CB can readily peg Fed Funds vs. LIBOR at any spread they wish to target.

York professor Peter Spencer, chief economist for the ITEM Club, says the global authorities have just weeks to get this right, or trigger disaster.

Seems they pretty much did before year end. Spreads are narrower now and presumably at CB targets.

“The central banks are rapidly losing control. By not cutting interest rates nearly far enough or fast enough, they are
allowing the money markets to dictate policy. We are long past worrying about moral hazard,” he says.

They have allowed ‘markets’ to dictate as the entire FOMC and others have revealed a troubling lack of monetary operations and reserve accounting.

“They still have another couple of months before this starts imploding. Things are very unstable and can move incredibly fast. I don’t think the central banks are going to make a major policy error, but if they do, this could make 1929 look like a walk in the park,” he adds.

Hard to do with floating exchange rates, but not impossible if they try hard enough!

The Bank of England knows the risk. Markets director Paul Tucker says the crisis has moved beyond the collapse of mortgage securities, and is now eating into the bedrock of banking capital. “We must try to avoid the vicious circle in which tighter liquidity conditions, lower asset values, impaired capital resources, reduced credit supply, and slower aggregate demand feed back on each other,” he says.

Seems a lack of understanding of the ‘suppy side’ of money/credit is pervasive and gives rise to all kinds of ‘uncertainties’ (AKA – fears, as in being scared to an extreme).

New York’s Federal Reserve chief Tim Geithner echoed the words, warning of an “adverse self-reinforcing dynamic”, banker-speak for a downward spiral. The Fed has broken decades of practice by inviting all US depositary banks to its lending window, bringing dodgy mortgage securities as collateral.

Banks can only own what the government puts on their ‘legal list’, and banks can issue government insured deposits, which is government funding, in order to fund government approved assets.

Functionally, there is no difference between issuing government insured deposits to fund their legal assets and using the discount window to do the same. The only difference may be the price of the funds, and the fed controls that as a matter of policy.

Quietly, insiders are perusing an obscure paper by Fed staffers David Small and Jim Clouse. It explores what can be done under the Federal Reserve Act when all else fails.

Section 13 (3) allows the Fed to take emergency action when banks become “unwilling or very reluctant to provide credit”. A vote by five governors can – in “exigent circumstances” – authorise the bank to lend money to anybody, and take upon itself the credit risk. This clause has not been evoked since the Slump.

The government already does this. They already determine legal bank assets, capital requirements, and via various government agencies and association advance government guaranteed loans of all types.

This is business as usual – all presumably for public purpose.

Get over it!!!

Yet still the central banks shrink from seriously grasping the rate-cut nettle. Understandably so. They are caught between the Scylla of the debt crunch and the Charybdis of inflation. It is not yet certain which is the more powerful force.

Yes, as they cling to the belief that ‘inflation’ is a ‘strong’ function of interest rates, while it is an oil monopolist or two and a government induced and supported link from crude to food via biofuels that are driving up CPI and inflation in general.

America’s headline CPI screamed to 4.3 per cent in November. This may be a rogue figure, the tail effects of an oil, commodity, and food price spike. If so, the Fed missed its chance months ago to prepare the markets for such a case. It is now stymied.

CPI might also be headed higher if crude continues its advance.

This has eerie echoes of Japan in late-1990, when inflation rose to 4 per cent on a mini price-surge across Asia. As the Bank of Japan fretted about an inflation scare, the country’s financial system tipped into the abyss.

As I recall, it was a tax hike that hurt GDP.

Yes, the world economies are vulnerable to a drop in GDP growth, but the financial press seems to have the reasoning totally confused.


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China – Passing higher food prices to Asia

It makes political sense to use export taxes as a form of a domestic subsidy for basic necessities, and from a macro economic
point of view, it a good way to express the political desire as well.

A negative is this will give domestic producers an incentive to ‘cheat’ to avoid the tax. Enforcement costs depend on they type of borders, etc.

It also puts downward pressure on the currency, though very modestly in this case, as it now takes more fx to buy the same products.

China – Passing higher food prices to Asia

Barclays Capital Research
by Wai Ho Leong

Tax on food grain exports comes shortly after subsidies removed.

In a further attempt to rein in food price inflation, China will introduce a one-year tax on grain exports beginning in January 2008. This will require exporters of 57 types of food grains to pay temporary taxes of 5-25%. Exporters of wheat, rye, barley and oats will be required to pay a 20% tax, while exporters of corn, rice and soy beans will have to pay 5%. Soaring food prices (+18% Y/Y in November), which have a 33% weight in the CPI, drove inflation to an 11-year high of 6.9% in November. The tax applies only to basic food grains. Other agricultural and processed products are not included, reflecting the government’s continued emphasis on promoting higher-value-added agricultural exports.

This latest administrative measure comes less than two weeks after China scrapped a 13% rebate on 84 types of exported food grains on 18 December. Prices have been rising, even though government reserves of corn and wheat were opened up earlier this year to meet domestic demand. The administrative measures taken in China will compound these pressures further, particularly in North Asian countries.


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