Says it all:

Schaeuble Says Deficit Spending Backers Have ’Learned Nothing’

(Bloomberg) German Finance Minister Wolfgang Schaeuble said that deficit spending is the wrong way to bolster economic growth.

People who believe you can generate growth without pursuing budget consolidation have “learned nothing from the experience of the crisis,” Schaeuble said in a speech in Berlin today.

Germany Turns Up Pressure on ECB

(WSJ) “I hope that the ECB acknowledges its limits and quickly rakes in the money later,” said Volker Kauder, the head of parliamentary group of Ms. Merkel’s conservative alliance of Christian Democrats and its sister party, the Bavarian Christian Social Union, in a Wirtschaftswoche interview on Saturday. Responding to warnings by Brazil about a “tsunami of cheap money” flooding global markets, Ms. Merkel, at the most recent summit of European leaders on March 2, said that she was certain that the ECB had now ended its program of issuing cheap 3-year loans to banks. Merkel also reassured critics that the ECB would not repeat such measures again.

ECB calls for tougher rules on budgets

(FT) The ECB has sharpened its hardline stance on eurozone fiscal policy by urging the still-tougher policing of member states’ public finances. In a report on proposed European Union regulations to monitor budgets better and strengthen the surveillance of countries in difficulties, the ECB makes clear it sees significant scope for further improvement. Among the proposals in the report dated March 7, the ECB suggests the surveillance of countries that run into difficulties in the future should be strengthened by public warnings for the most recalcitrant. Where a country under surveillance is threatening the eurozone’s financial stability, there should be an automatic recommendation that it seeks financial assistance, the ECB says.

From David Zervos:

(BN) *ISDA SAYS CREDIT EVENT HAS OCCURRED WITH RESPECT TO GREECE


(BN) *GREECE CREDIT SWAPS AUCTION TO BE `EXPEDITED,’ ISDA SAYS

“I’ve always said publicly that default is out of the question,” – Trichet

“There will be no default.” – Rehn

“People fail to see the costs to both Greece and the eurozone of a restructuring: the cost to its citizens, the cost to its access to markets. If Greece restructures, why on earth would people invest in other peripheral economies? It would be a fundamental break to the unity of the eurozone.” – Papaconstantinou

Its been a great 2 years watching this thing unfold and listening to lie after lie from European officials. While it has been a calm response in global markets today, there is some justice in the world. Those folks who bought Greek bonds lost their shirts – both accrual and mark to market folks. This is a clear victory for the Euroskeptics and I have no doubt that we will see the letters “PSI” in the European headlines once again.

In regard to the euro zone officials insisting there will be no further haircuts:

‘The lady doth protest too much, me thinks.’

Mr. Dallara and the rest of the euro mob have as yet not come up with any reason any one nation wouldn’t be better off, as evidenced by Greece, with a whopping big tax on bond holders vs the usual tax hikes and spending cuts otherwise demanded.

Rest of Europe Shouldn’t Follow Greek Bailout: Dallara

By Margo D. Beller

Mar 9 (CNBC) — Charles Dallara, who represented bond holders in the Greek debt talks, told CNBC Friday he doesn’t expect other troubled EU countries such as Italy, Portugal and Ireland to need a similar bond swap.

“I would strongly discourage other governments, other peoples of Europe from going this route,” he said, adding the Greek situation “cast a cloud over the entire euro zone.”

None of these other countries “have the same extraordinary high levels of debt and deficits and none of them have quite the same distortions in the economic system. They are on the right path and should maintain the path of reform.”

Greece’s problems were unique, he said, and the resulting financial crisis was “extremely painful for the citizens of Greece” and “prevented the building of confidence” throughout the euro zone.

Dallara, managing director of the U.S.-based Institute of International Finance, was the chief negotiator representing private-sector holders of Greek debt in the largest bond restructuring in history.

He said he was “quite pleased” that 83.5 percent of the bond holders voluntarily accepted losses of some 74 percent on the value of their investments in a deal that will cut more than 100 billion euros from Greece’s crippling public debt.

“To see so many bondholders voluntarily deliver their bonds into this exchange is remarkable” and speaks to the desire for Europe and investors to “turn the page” on the whole European sovereign debt problem, he added.

Athens had said it would enforce the deal on all its bondholders, activating collective action clauses on the 177 billion euros worth of bonds regulated under Greek law.

That would potentially trigger payouts on the credit default swaps that some investors held on the bonds, an event which would have unknown consequences for the market.

Dallara said activating the collective action clauses was “one of the unfortunate dimensions” of the debt swap, but stressed it shouldn’t stop foreign investment in European sovereign debt.

“The issue is not just one of legal risk in investing in sovereign debt, it’s better credit analysis,” he said. “You have to understand the underlying credit risks.”

Will Greece Resolution Spark a Bigger Crisis?

By John Carney

Mar 8 (CNBC) — Markets around the world were buoyed on hopes that Greece’s long and winding journey to debt restructuring may at last be its final port of call.

But some are warning that this may actually be the beginning of a new and more dangerous crisis.

The private sector is being asked to write off more than 70 percent of the face value of their Greek government bonds in return for new debt. This will help Greece meet its debt obligations and enable it to tap into bailout funds from the EU and IMF.

It seems likely that other nations burdened by heavy debt loads and high interest rates may seek to follow Greece’s path to debt relief. If Greece doesn’t have to pay what it owes, they might argue, why should we? Call it Haircut Contagion.

European officials insist that Greece is a one-time deal, not meant to set a precedent for other nations. But it is easy to see that minority parties in debt-burdened European nations could find a demand for relief an attractive platform. Imposing a “tax” on bondholders rather asking citizens to pay higher taxes while public services are cut might prove popular with voters.

Demands for debt relief could take many forms. Greece has been able to encourage bond holders to participate in the debt swap by enacting laws that incorporated “collective action clauses” into the 86 percent of bonds governed by Greek law. These clauses allow super-majorities of bond holders to force hold-outs to participate in swaps. Other countries in the euro zone could replicate this strategy.

“Effectively, this is a large gift from the Greeks to the parts of the euro zone that face debt crises. By conducting its debt exchange in the way it did, Greece has in effect resurrected the plausibility of purely voluntary debt-reduction operations in Europe,” Moody’s has explained.

Such demands would put new strains on the global financial system. While Europe’s banks and insurance companies can withstand losses on Greek debt, a series of similar haircuts might destabilize the system and render some institutions insolvent.

Warren Mosler, a trader based in the Virgin Islands who is credited with creating the euro-swap futures contract, fears that all it would take to set off a panic would be serious political discussion of widespread haircuts.

“The idea of Greek default transformed from being a Greek punishment to a gift, with the pending question: ‘If Greece doesn’t have to pay, why do I?’ — threatening a far more disruptive outcome that is yet to be fully discounted,” Mosler writes on his website, Mosler Economics. “That is, should Greek bonds be formally discounted, the consequences of merely the political discussion of that question will be all it takes to trigger a financial crisis rivaling anything yet seen.”

He has spelled out exactly what he thinks would happen in a Haircut Contagion crisis.

“Possible immediate consequences of that discussion include a sharp spike in gold, silver, and other commodities in a flight from currency, falling equity and debt valuations, a banking crisis, and a tightening of ‘financial conditions’ in general from portfolio shifting, even as it’s fundamentally highly deflationary. And while it probably won’t last all that long, it will be long enough to seriously shake things up,” Mosler writes.

A recent paper cited by Reuters took a much more sanguine approach to the likelihood of Haircut Contagion. The ratings agency figures that countries may attempt to receive modest debt relief in exchange for giving up their rights to unilaterally change the terms of their debt. They could do this, for example, by restructuring bonds governed by domestic law into foreign law bonds, mostly likely governed by English law.

“Holders of local-law governed bonds in other euro zone countries that are perceived to be at risk might want to make a trade for English-law governed bonds,” Jeromin Zettelmeyer, deputy chief economist at the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and Duke University Professor Mitu Gulati, wrote in the paper. “Depending on how much these bondholders would be willing to pay to make this trade, it could serve the interest of the country as well to make it.”

Of course, countries that agreed to make this swap would be sacrificing a lot of their future flexibility. Some might find it too high a price to pay. In a sense, converting their debt to foreign jurisdiction bonds would be like doubling-down on the structural problems with the euro zone. The countries that did this would sacrifice sovereignty over their debt to achieve lower interest rates, much like they sacrificed monetary sovereignty for the currency union.

And it’s not clear that this would be all that attractive to bondholders, either. After all, a country that cannot or will not pay its debt cannot be forced to, just because the bonds are subject to foreign law.

The hope of European leaders was that preventing a disorderly default in Greece would avoid a domino effect of sovereign debt defaults. The danger, however, is that debt relief for Greece could spark a new and unexpected Haircut Contagion crisis.

Talk of widespread haircuts getting more serious. As previously discussed, this has the potential for catastrophic global financial meltdown.

Analysis: Greek default may be gift to other euro strugglers

By Mike Dolan

Mar 7 (Reuters) — Greece’s tortuous debt restructuring and threat of retroactive laws to compel reluctant creditors heaps regulatory risk onto investors but may make voluntary sovereign debt revamps more attractive and likely for other cash-strapped euro sovereigns and their creditors.

Thursday could mark a climax of the Greek debt workout with private creditors due to respond to an offer that would see them effectively write off more than 70 percent of the face value of their bonds in return for new debt with a series of sweeteners.

With Greek government bonds currently trading at less than 20 cents in the euro and the risk of a total wipeout if Greece decided to unilaterally refuse all payments, a majority will likely go for it. Legally-binding majorities are another matter.

Athens said this week it aims for 90 percent acceptance but if the takeup is at least 75 percent then it would consider triggering so-called “collective action clauses” retroactively inserted into the bonds issued under Greek law — about 85 percent of the 200 billion euros being restructured.

Those clauses in practice force all affected creditors to comply.

But it’s this distinction between debt issued under domestic laws and that sold under internationally-accepted English law that some say has consequences for other troubled euro nations eyeing Greece’s so-called Private Sector Involvement, or PSI.

A GIFT FROM GREECE

In essence, English-law Greek bonds, as is the case for many emerging market sovereigns, trade as if they were senior to local-law debt — at almost twice the price in fact right now. That’s because the terms of foreign-law bonds cannot be altered by an Athens parliament, and agreement for debt swaps is needed bond-by-bond, unlike local laws that aggregate majorities across all debtors and make blocking minorities more difficult to muster.

A paper released this week by Jeromin Zettelmeyer, deputy chief economist at the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and Duke University Professor Mitu Gulati reckons this legal gulf could well encourage other debt-hobbled euro zone countries and their creditors into mutually acceptable and beneficial debt restructurings.

This would involve an agreed switch in the legal status of the debt in return for relatively modest haircuts.

“Holders of local-law governed bonds in other euro zone countries that are perceived to be at risk might want to make a trade for English-law governed bonds,” the economists wrote. “Depending on how much these bondholders would be willing to pay to make this trade, it could serve the interest of the country as well to make it.”

The sovereign gets a chance to reduce a crippling debt burden while bondholders get greater contractual protection in any future restructuring.

Given that the Greek precedent of retroactive legislation vastly increases the allure of foreign-law bonds, which credit rating firm Moody’s says now make up less than 10 percent of all euro zone government bonds, a window of opportunity may open up.

“Effectively, this is a large gift from the Greeks to the parts of the euro zone that face debt crises. By conducting its debt exchange in the way it did, Greece has in effect resurrected the plausibility of purely voluntary debt-reduction operations in Europe.”

Although Berlin, Paris and Brussels insist the Greek case is a one-off and European Central Bank liquidity has insulated the wider banking system, Portugal’s 10-year bonds still trade as low as 50 cents in the euro and many creditors reckon it will be very difficult for the country to avoid some restructuring.

Even the 10-year debt of fellow bailout recipient Ireland, which many investors reckon has the underlying economic capacity to go back to the markets next year, is still trading at less than 90 cents in the euro and many doubt its imminent market return.

“We still expect a sizeable growth undershoot and deficit overshoot and expect that Ireland will need a second financing package (which may include PSI) beyond 2013,” economists at Citi said on Monday.

What’s more, if Europe’s new fiscal pact is rejected by voters in a planned referendum there in the coming months, Ireland would lose access to the financial backstop of the European Stability Mechanism and likely unnerve many investors.

Yet voluntary debt swaps with some debt relief stemming from more modest haircuts than Greece may well be the best way to ensure these two countries avoid outright default and return to private financing in a reasonable amount of time.

And if such exchanges were wholly voluntary, it would also mean credit default swap insurance would not pay out — a stated aim for many euro policymakers concerned about the speculative nature of a market where it’s possible to buy insurance on something you don’t own.

One danger is that the prospect of countries opting for such a swap may scare creditors in larger countries like Italy and Spain where currently no bond haircut is expected by the market, thanks in large part to the ECB’s liquidity injections.

And the upshot for many economists is that there will be a longer-term price to pay for governments for tinkering with the rules of the game, as many investors view it, via the likes of retroactive bond legislation and obfuscation of CDS markets.

“Investors will expect a premium for bearing this regulatory risk,” Morgan Stanley’s Manoj Pradhan told clients in a note, adding that only central bank liquidity floods were now obscuring the resultant higher financing costs and there would be a dangerous blurring of lines between macro and market risks.

But given that indiscriminate cheap lending was seen as at least partly responsible for the credit binge and bust of the past five years, maybe higher risk premia are not all bad.

I agree that the ECB is ‘backing off’ and will only again engage if it gets bad enough.

Back to the analogy of watering the flower only when it’s about to die.

They don’t realize that it needs continuous watering in the normal course of events.

14 more days to the Greek payment date.

Unfortunately, looking like darned if you do and darned if you don’t.

ECB after the LTROs: It is up to governments now

After the implementation of the second 3-year LTRO last week, the ECB now is likely to believe it has done enough to stabilise the Euro area’s financial system and, implicitly, the funding situation for peripheral governments. Any announcement of further non-standard measures seems unlikely at this stage, as the Governing Council now views the ball as being squarely in the court of governments.

Are Japanese Banks Bailing Out Europe?

Looks like the drop in Spanish and Italian bond yields was at least partially driven by Spanish and Italian bank buying of their govt’s debt. While the LTRO did provide floating rate ECB term funding, funding has generally been available in any case, and the bond buying did add risk and ‘use up’ bank capital. So I suspect there is still more to it than has so far been disclosed.

ECB figures published on Monday showed that Spanish banks increased their government debt holdings by more than €23bn in January while Italian banks bought nearly €21bn – both record monthly increases. Over December and January, Italian and Spanish banks increased their holdings by 13 and 29 per cent to €280bn and €230bn respectively.

Just a hunch now, but Italian, Spanish, and related bond yields began falling coincident with the first ECB LTRO. The question is why, as I saw no operative channel of consequence from ECB liquidity provision of 3 year funds on a floating rate basis to the term structure of rates.

So it seemed to me that also coincident to the LTRO was some entity giving the nod to its banks to buy those bonds, or some reason sellers of those bonds backed off.

I’m now thinking it may have been the BOJ giving the nod to its member banks to buy euro member debt denominated in euro and keep the fx risk on their books, with the assurance govt policy would keep the yen weak and guarantee the banks an fx profit.

We learned after the fact that Japan had been selling yen well before they announced their new weak yen stance. And having their banks buy euro member euro denominated debt directly weakens the yen vs the euro.

The timing of the events- the LTRO/yen sell off/yen policy change- is close enough to get my attention.

So Japan managed to weaken the yen and firm euro member debt prices all under the cover of the ECB LTRO operation which they gladly allowed to take the credit.

In any case, I don’t expect any more from this next LTRO than I expected from the last, but I am keeping a close eye on the yen.

As previously discussed, all policies seem to be ‘strong euro’ first.

And the ‘success’ of the euro continues to be gauged by its ‘strength’.

The haircuts on the Greek bonds are functionally a tax that removes that many net euro financial assets. Call it an ‘austerity’ measure extending forced austerity to investors.

Other member nations will likely hold off on turning towards that same tax until after Greece is a ‘done deal’ as early noises could work to undermine the Greek arrangements, and take the ‘investor tax’ off the table.

Like most other currencies, the euro has ‘built in’ demand leakages that fall under the general category of ‘savings desires’. These include the demand to hold actual cash, contributions to tax advantaged pension contributions, contributions to individual retirement accounts, insurance and other corporate ‘reserves’, foreign central bank accumulations euro denominated financial assets, along with all the unspent interest and earnings compounding.

Offsetting all of that unspent income is, historically, the expansion of debt, where agents spend more than their income. This includes borrowing for business and consumer purchases, which includes borrowing to buy cars and houses. In other words, net savings of financial assets are increased by the demand leakages and decreased by credit expansion. And, in general, most of the variation is due to changes in the credit expansion component.

Austerity in the euro zone consists of public spending cuts and tax hikes, which have both directly slowed the economies and increased net savings desires, as the austerity measures have also reduced private sector desires to borrow to spend. This combination results in a decline in sales, which translates into fewer jobs and reduced private sector income. Which further translates into reduced tax collections and increased public sector transfer payments, as the austerity measures designed to reduce public sector debt instead serve to increase it.

Now adding to that is this latest tax on investors in Greek debt, and if the propensity to spend any of the lost funds of those holders was greater than 0, aggregate demand will see an additional decline, with public sector debt climbing that much higher as well.

All of which serves to make the euro ‘harder to get’ and further support the value of the euro, which serves to keep a lid on the net export channel. The ‘answer’ to the export dilemma would be to have the ECB, for example, buy dollars as Germany used to do with the mark, and as China and Japan have done to support their exporters. But ideologically this is off the table in the euro zone, as they believe in a strong euro, and in any case they don’t want to build dollar reserves and give the appearance that the dollar is ‘backing’ the euro.

And all of which works to move all the euro member nation deficits higher as the ‘sustainability math’ of all deteriorate as well, increasing the odds of the ‘investor tax’ expanding to the other member nations that continues the negative feedback loop.

Given the demand leakages of the institutional structure, as a point of logic prosperity can only come from some combination of increased net exports, a private sector credit expansion, or a public sector credit expansion.

And right now it looks like they are still going backwards on all three.

Comes back to the idea that resolving solvency issues in the euro zone doesn’t fix the economy.

And with negative growth the solvency math doesn’t work for any of the euro members.

And what’s with the ECB threatening to back away on liquidity support for the banking system?

So looks to me like the Greek resolution is not the end of the solvency issues, but that the focus simply moves on to the next weaker sister.

And, as previously discussed, the risk remains elevated that if Greece gets to haircut its obligations and gets funding, others will ask for the same, triggering a general, global, catastrophic financial meltdown.

My first order proposal remains an ECB distribution on a per capita basis to the euro member nations of maybe 10% of euro zone GDP per year to put the solvency issue behind them. Along with relaxed budget rules, maybe allowing deficits up to 6% of GDP annually, further supported by the ECB funding a transition job at a non disruptive wage to facilitate the transition from unemployment to private sector employment. I might also recommend deficits be increased by suspending VAT as a way to increase aggregate demand and lower prices at the same time.

Alternatively, the ECB could simply guarantee all national govt debt and rely on the growth and stability pact for fiscal discipline, which would probably require enhanced authorities.

And rather than trying to bring Greece’s deficit down to current target levels, they could instead relax the growth and stability pact limits to something closer to full employment levels. And, again, I’d look into suspending VAT to both increase aggregate demand and lower prices.

Meanwhile, elsewhere in today’s world news:

The likes of Ford adding to pension funds makes the point of the increasing and ongoing demand leakages putting a damper on GDP.

And oil prices have now crept up enough to materially cut into aggregate demand as well.

Nor are banks adding to capital to meet expanding demand for credit, which remains anemic.

Headlines:

Data Suggests Euro Zone May Slide Back Into Recession
German Manufacturing Slows as New Export Orders Fall
China’s Factory Activity Shrinks for Fourth Month
ECB Preparing to Close Liquidity Floodgates
Ford Pours $3.8 Billion Into Pension Plan
Oil Could Turn to Headwind as Dow Flirts With 13,000
UBS to Issue More Loss-Absorbing Capital
Iran ‘Winning’ on Oil Sanctions: Top Trader
Greek Bailout Puts Focus Back on Credit Default Swaps
Iran Fuels Oil-Price Rally—And Prices Could Keep Rising

Marshall Auerback video

The issues I’ve been discussing over the last year or two while now crystallizing, remain highly problematic.

The idea of Greek default transformed from being a Greek punishment to a gift, with the pending question: ‘If Greece doesn’t have to pay, why do I?’- threatening a far more disruptive outcome that is yet to be fully discounted.

That is, should Greek bonds be formally discounted, the consequences of merely the political discussion of that question will be all it takes to trigger a financial crisis rivaling anything yet seen.

And note, also as previously discussed, that there has yet to be an actual Greek default, and that all Greek bonds have continued to mature at par, as there has yet to be an acceptable alternative.

So what are the alternatives?

1. Continue to fund Greece with terms and conditions.
2. Don’t fund Greece which forces:
  a. Greece is forced to limit spending to actual tax revenues
  b. Greece moves back to the drachma

And what are the ‘terms and conditions’?

Austerity is always the lead demand, which slows both the Greek economy and to some extent the euro zone in general.

Additional demands currently include discounting Greek bonds to bring down their debt to GDP ratio to ‘sustainable’ levels. However, after 8 months of negotiations, this has proven highly problematic, probably for reasons yet to be fully disclosed. And, as just discussed, there may be a growing awareness that discounting opens Pandora’s box with the politically attractive question ‘if Greece doesn’t have to pay, why do we?’

So what actually happens?

My best guess, and not with a lot of conviction, is that nothing is concluded before the coming maturity dates, and the ECB winds up writing the check to support short term Greek funding to buy more time for more inconclusive discussion. So, again as previously discussed, seems like this is the solution- death by 1,000 cuts and reluctant ECB bond buying when push comes to shove to keep it all going.

And, currently, the catastrophic risk I’d highly recommend immediately hedging is the risk that Greek bonds are formally discounted, rapidly followed by a global discussion of ‘so why should we have to pay?’ Possible immediate consequences of that discussion include a sharp spike in gold, silver, and other commodities in a flight from currency, falling equity and debt valuations, a banking crisis, and a tightening of ‘financial conditions’ in general from portfolio shifting, even as it’s fundamentally highly deflationary. And while it probably won’t last all that long, it will be long enough to seriously shake things up.

As previously discussed, once Greece does it, it’s compelling for everyone else to do it.

It’s the classic fallacy of composition.
When someone stands up at a football game to get a better view,
it quickly makes sense for everyone else to stand up as well.

Yes, you can say they all are better off if everyone stays seated,
but once one goes, all go.

So expect a serious shock wave to quickly depreciate all euro debt.

Irish want debt concession if ECB aids Greece

Feb 8 (Reuters) — Ireland would see any European Central Bank contribution to the restructuring of Greek debt as a precedent that would boost Dublin’s efforts to ease the burden of its own sovereign debt, the country’s finance minister said on Wednesday…

There is probably not much voter support for returning to the drachma.

The voters would probably rather have the Germans run their finances than their own leaders.

They’ve seen past drachma financial dramas, with interest rates spiking for everyone, not just the govt, rampant inflation, and a collapsing currency as well as high unemployment.

With the euro none of that happened, so it’s not obvious the currency is the problem.

What does seem obvious to them is that their leaders are the problem.

So I expect the austerity measures to pass, as the alternative is 0 deficit spending.

And if discounts are ‘granted’ the politics quickly move towards same for the rest of the euro member nations.

Yes, as previously discussed, the obvious political move is to demand the same discounts as Greece.

Especially with the pending Greek ‘restructure’ and ECB check writing to support the banking system seemingly making the euro stronger and not causing inflation.

And the ‘sustainability maths’ is just about the same for all of them as well, particularly given the current slowdown.

Once the markets realize the politics are moving in that direction, all euro member nation bonds again become suspect and the crisis enters the next stage, resulting in the ECB pretty much funding everything, one way or another.

It’s just a question of how it all gets from here to there.

Portugal Union Leader Wants Debt Renegotiation

By Axel Bugge and Daniel Alvarenga

Feb 7 (Reuters) — Portugal must renegotiate its debts rather than impose harsh austerity measures to overcome its economic crisis, the head of the country’s largest trade union said on Wednesday, threatening to step up strikes if the government pushed on with cuts.

Armenio Carlos, head of the CGTP union, told Reuters Portuguese workers would take a stand against attacks on labor rights, which he said were part of the government’s sweeping economic reforms promised under a 78 billion euro ($103.29 billion) bailout.

“What we defend is the renegotiation of debts, in terms of deadlines, in terms of interest and in terms of the amount,” Carlos said in an interview, adding that the country’s bailout had made it impossible to meet its obligations.

Portugal’s debt currently equals about 105 percent of gross domestic product.

“We are being confronted with a neo-liberal attack on workers’ rights,” he added, saying the government’s recent labor reform, making it easier to hire and fire, could spark a growing wave of protests.

The union leader, a former electrician and an ex-Communist lawmaker who took over as head of the CGTP a week ago, warned that with the austerity policies demanded by the bailout, Portugal was heading down the same road to ruin as Greece.

Out of the goodness of their hearts.

Not if, but Wen-

China’s Wen Suggests Euro Funding After Meeting With Merkel

Feb 6 (Bloomberg) — Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao raised the prospect of contributing to the euro-area’s bailout programs, telling Chancellor Angela Merkel that China may be prepared to assist in resolving its debt crisis.

The Chinese government is considering funding options for the temporary European Financial Stability Facility and its permanent successor, the European Stability Mechanism, through the International Monetary Fund to help stabilize the monetary union, Wen said yesterday after meeting Merkel in Beijing. China has previously said that it needs more detail on any plan to contribute funds to the euro area.

China is “investigating and evaluating ways, through the IMF, to be more deeply involved using the ESM and EFSF channels in solving the European debt issue,” Wen said at a briefing alongside Merkel, who arrived in China early yesterday on her fifth visit to the world’s most populous country as chancellor.

Evidence of real progress will be a statement like:
‘Draghi sees no evidence of any possible channel from ECB loans to the economy’

Bank liquidity is something like wheels on a car.
Without wheels the car won’t function, but neither are wheels alone enough to make it go.

Banks are public/private partnerships, with govt’s role being liquidity provider, as private capital in the first loss position prices risk. And with unlimited liquidity provision comes the necessity of full regulation and supervision of the asset/capital side.

In the US the unlimited liquidity provision comes mainly via FDIC insured deposits, supplemented by funding from the Fed. The Fed is the liquidity provider of last resort for its member banks, while at the same time it uses the banking system’s cost of funds as its instrument of monetary policy.

The euro zone hasn’t figured this out yet.
The liquidity provider of last resort is the ECB, as it’s the ‘issuer of the currency’, and as such not itself liquidity constrained. The member nations are like the US states, and are necessarily liquidity constrained, and therefore not ‘empowered’ to be liquidity providers of last resort to their member banks.

So in that sense, as the bank funding by the ECB grows, it’s all gravitating towards what all other nations have in place. The problem is the euro zone leaders don’t understand that aspect of banking, as evidenced by the way they are resisting the shift to ECB funding, and, in fact, working towards moving banks away from ECB funding.

Draghi Sees No Evidence ECB Loans Are Financing Economy Yet

By Jana Randow and Simone Meier

Jan 28 (Bloomberg) — “Do we know that actually this money is going to finance the real economy? We don’t have evidence of this kind yet,” ECB President Mario Draghi told Davos. “There is a lag. We will have to see.” “We know for sure we have avoided a major, major credit crunch, a major funding crisis,” he said today. “You have parts of the euro area where credit is more or less normal, but you have other parts where credit is seriously contracting.” “If you take 0.5 trillion euros and then you take off the reimbursement of other short-term facilities by the banking system in December, you get a figure of roughly 220 billion euros, which is exactly the amount of bank bonds that were to come due in this period of time,” he said.

So it could be that the creditors have agreed to swap their bonds for 30 year bonds with ‘half their face value’ but maybe also with about equal economic value, which can in theory be done if the coupon and quality of the new bonds is high enough.

But, again, seven months of negotiations shows it’s not all that easy to come to agreement, and also that for reasons probably not entirely disclosed the bond holders have substantial bargaining power.

Greece hopes for debt swap deal by end of week

Jan 26 (AP) — Greece is aiming to complete negotiations on its debt swap deal by the end of the week, the government’s spokesman said Wednesday, adding that the talks were at their “most delicate phase.” Charles Dallara, head of the Institute of International Finance will head back to Athens on Thursday for the negotiations on a bond swap, known as the Private Sector Involvement. Athens is trying to get its private creditors to swap their Greek government bonds for new ones with half their face value, thereby slicing some euro100 billion ($130 billion) off its debt. The new bonds would also push the repayment deadlines 20 to 30 years into the future.

The Fed Is Misleading Congress About Europe – US Business News Blog – CNBC

By Warren Mosler