Category Archives: GDP

The danger is from the spending cuts, not the potential downgrade

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The headlines are all about the risks of default or a too small deficit reduction package causing a downgrade of US debt.

And while markets react to those issues, they all miss the point.

The consequences of a downgrade to US govt debt are minor at best.
Note that when Japan was downgraded below Botswana,
with a debt/GDP ratio nearly triple that of the US,
interest rates remained the lowest in the world

The real risk comes from the spending cuts.

No debt ceiling extension is the worst case-
Government spending falls by some $150 billion/month as expenses can’t exceed revenues
Fed Chairman Bernanke mentioned that might reduce GDP by a full 6%
And that’s just the first order effect, as a falling economy means falling tax revenues,
Which means further reductions in Treasury spending in a pro cyclical nightmare.

And if they do extend the debt ceiling it will be with prescribed spending cuts.
This too adds drag to the economy.
The more the cuts are meaningful and immediate, the more the drag on the economy increases.

Because the markets don’t yet understand this,
the feedback they are giving is misleading policy makers,
and encouraging them to make deeper, more meaningful cuts.

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GS: Downgrading our Q2 and Q3 GDP forecasts

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As previously suspected, the soft patch looks to be continuing, making things all the more vulnerable to a govt spending interruption in August.

Following another week of weak economic data, we have cut our estimates for real GDP growth in the second and third quarter of 2011 to 1.5% and 2.5%, respectively, from 2% and 3.25. Our forecasts for Q4 and 2012 are under review, but even excluding any further changes we now expect the unemployment rate to come down only modestly to 8¾% at the end of 2012.

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CPI, Empire, and Bernanke’s managing of expectations

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Right, core is giving Bernanke ‘cover’ to not do any more QE.

I think he now realizes QE doesn’t actually do anything positive for the economy, as all his staff studies show. Yes, it can lower term rates a tad, but it also removes interest income as he himself seemed to have recognized in his own 2004 research paper.

But he also recognizes that it does scare the living daylight out of the likes of China and other portfolio managers who don’t understand monetary operations.

So he’s in a bit of a bind, as his tone of voice showed while responding to live questions.

If he says QE doesn’t do anything, he destroys what he now considers the useful fiction that the Fed has more tools in its toolbox, as markets would realize they are now flying without a net vs the belief in a ‘Bernanke put.’

And so he assures China there will be no more QE, while explaining to Congress that higher core inflation makes QE inappropriate at this time. And while this could be called intellectually dishonest, it’s also required under ‘expectations theory’ that says managing expectations is critical to price stability and optimal output.

As previously discussed, they all believe in the Confidence Fairy, and that economic performance is in no small way a function of expectations.

Also, while outlooks were positive, below, they were less positive than before.

And Michigan just came in lower than expected as well. The jury is still out on when the economic soft spot might end.

And Aug 3 looks to remove US and therefore world aggregate demand, one way or another.


Karim writes:
CPI

  • Headline declines as expected on energy (-0.2%); core much stronger than expected (0.3%)
  • Supports key message BB has been delivering that bar is high for QE3 due to core inflation high and rising now, vs low and falling a year ago
  • A year ago, Core CPI was 0.9%, with the 3mth and 6mth rate annualized rates of change near Zero
  • Now, Core CPI is 1.6% (highest since late 2009) and the 3mth and 6mth annualized rates of change are 2.9% and 2.5%.
  • What is interesting in looking at the attached chart is that the change from the lows is the highest in about 5yrs, and much higher than when oil went to $150 back in the summer of 2008
  • The key is OER (1/3 of core) is now trending at 0.1-0.2% m/m; combined with the other ‘sticky’ components of core (i.e., medical, education), its hard to see core falling back below 1.5%

Empire Survey: Modest gains in current conditions and strong gains in 6mth Outlook



Current July June
Business Conditions -3.76 -7.79
Prices Paid 43.33 56.12
New Orders -5.45 -3.61
Shipments 2.22 -8.02
Delivery Times 1.11 -3.06
Inventories -5.56 1.02
Employees 1.11 10.20
Workweek -15.56 -2.04


6MTH Outlook July June
Business Conditions 32.22 22.45
Prices Paid 51.11 55.10
Prices Received 30.00 19.39
New Orders 25.56 15.31
Shipments 30.00 17.35
Delivery Times 6.67 2.04
Inventories 1.11 -9.18
Unfilled Orders 5.56 -9.18
Employees 17.78 6.12
Workweek 2.22 -2.04
Capital Expenditures 22.22 26.53
Technology Spending 12.22 14.29
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Comments on Chairman Bernanke’s testimony

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>   
>   (email exchange)
>   
>   On Thu, Jul 14, 2011 at 9:55 AM, wrote:
>   
>   I see Bernanke is speaking your language now…
>   

Yes, a bit, but but as corrected below:

“DUFFY: We had talked about the QE2 with Dr. Paul. When — when you buy assets, where does that money come from?

BERNANKE: We create reserves in the banking system which are just held with the Fed. It does not go out into the public.

Not exactly, as all govt spending is done by adding reserves to member bank reserve accounts. Reserve accounts are held by member banks as assets, and so these balances are as much ‘out into the public’ as any.

What doesn’t change is net financial assets, as QE debits securities accounts at the Fed and credits reserve accounts.

But yes, spending is in no case operationally constrained by revenues.

DUFFY: Does it come from tax dollars, though, to buy those assets?

BERNANKE: It does not.

Operationally he is correct, and in this case, to the extent QE does not add to aggregate demand, he is further correct. In fact, to the extent that QE removes interest income from the economy, it actually acts as a tax on the economy, and not as a govt expenditure.

However, and ironically, I submit he believes that QE adds to aggregate demand, and therefore ‘uses up’ some of the aggregate demand created by taxation, and therefore, in that sense, it would be taxpayer dollars that he’s spending.

DUFFY: Are you basically printing money to buy those assets?

BERNANKE: We’re not printing money. We’re creating reserves in the banking system.

Technically correct in that he’s not printing pieces of paper.

But he is adding net balances to private sector accounts, which, functionally, is what is creating new dollars which is generally referred to as ‘printing money’

All govt spending can be thought of as printing dollars, taxing unprinting dollars, and borrowing shifting dollars from reserve accounts to securities accounts.

DUFFY: In your testimony — I only have 20 seconds left — you talked about a potential additional stimulus. Can you assure us today that there is going to be no QE3? Or is that something that you’re considering?

BERNANKE: I think we have to keep all the options on the table. We don’t know where the economy is going to go. And if we get to a point where we’re like, you know, the economy — recovery is faltering and — and we’re looking at inflation dropping down toward zero or something, you know, where inflation issues are not relevant, then, you know, we have to look at all the options.

DUFFY: And QE3 is one of those?

BERNANKE: Yes.

Very hesitant, as it still looks to me like there’s an tacit understanding with China that there won’t be any more QE, as per China’s statement earlier today.

PAUL: I hate to interrupt, but my time is about up. I would like to suggest that you say it’s not spending money. Well, it’s money out of thin air. You put it into the market. You hold assets and assets aren’t — you know, they are diminishing in value when you buy up bad assets.

But very quickly, if you could answer another question because I’m curious about this. You know, the price of gold today is $1,580. The dollar during these last three years was devalued almost 50 percent. When you wake up in the morning, do you care about the price of gold?

BERNANKE: Well, I pay attention to the price of gold, but I think it reflects a lot of things. It reflects global uncertainties. I think people are — the reason people hold gold is as a protection against what we call “tail risk” — really, really bad outcomes. And to the extent that the last few years have made people more worried about the potential of a major crisis, then they have gold as a protection.

PAUL: Do you think gold is money?

BERNANKE: No. It’s not money.

(CROSSTALK)

PAUL: Even if it has been money for 6,000 years, somebody reversed that and eliminated that economic law?

BERNANKE: Well, you know, it’s an asset. I mean, it’s the same — would you say Treasury bills are money? I don’t think they’re money either, but they’re a financial asset.

Right answer would have been gold used to be demanded/accepted as payment of taxes, which caused it to circulate as money.

Today the US dollar is what’s demanded for payment of US taxes, so it circulates as money.

In fact, if you try to spend a gold coin today, in most parts of the world you have to accept a discount to spot market prices to get anyone to take it.

PAUL: Well, why do — why do central banks hold it?

BERNANKE: Well, it’s a form of reserves.

Yes, much like govt land, the strategic petroleum reserve, etc.

PAUL: Why don’t they hold diamonds?

Some probably do.

BERNANKE: Well, it’s tradition, long-term tradition.

PAUL: Well, some people still think it’s money.”

“CLAY: Has the Federal Reserve examined what may happen on another level on August 3rd if we do not lift the debt ceiling?

BERNANKE: Yes, we’ve — of course, we’ve looked at it and thought about making preparations and so on. The arithmetic is very simple. The revenue that we get in from taxes is both irregular and much less than the current rate of spending. That’s what it means to have a deficit.

So immediately, there would have to be something on the order of a 40 percent cut in outgo. The assumption is that as long as possible the Treasury would want to try to make payments on the principal and interest of the government debt because failure to do that would certainly throw the financial system into enormous disarray and have major impacts on the global economy.

So this is a matter of arithmetic. Fairly soon after that date, there would have to be significant cuts in Social Security, Medicare, military pay or some combination of those in order to avoid borrowing more money.

If in fact we ended up defaulting on the debt, or even if we didn’t, I think, you know, it’s possible that simply defaulting on our obligations to our citizens might be enough to create a downgrade in credit ratings and higher interest rates for us, which would be counterproductive, of course, since it makes the deficit worse.

But clearly, if we went so far as to default on the debt, it would be a major crisis because the Treasury security is viewed as the safest and most liquid security in the world. It’s the foundation for most of our financial — for much of our financial system. And the notion that it would become suddenly unreliable and illiquid would throw shock waves through the entire global financial system.

And higher interest rates would also impact the individual American consumer. Is that correct?

BERNANKE: Absolutely. The Treasury rates are the benchmark for mortgage rates, car loan rates and all other types of consumer rates.”

“BERNANKE: A second problem is the housing market. Clearly, that’s an area that should get some more attention because that’s been one of the major reasons why the economy has grown so slowly. And I think many of your colleagues would agree that the tax code needs a look to try to improve its efficiency and to promote economic growth as well.”

While housing isn’t growing as in the past, housing or anything else is only a source of drag if it’s shrinking.

It’s not that case that if housing were never to grow we could not be at levels of aggregate demand high enough to sustain full employment levels of sales and output.

We’d just be doing other things than in past cycles.

G. MILLER: Well, the problem I had with the Fannie-Freddie hybrid concept was the taxpayers were at risk and private sector made all the profits.

BERNANKE: That’s right.

That’s the same with banking in general with today’s insured deposits, a necessary condition for banking. Taxpayers are protected by regulation of assets. The liability side is not the place for market discipline, as has been learned the hard way over the course of history.

G. MILLER: That — that’s unacceptable. What do you see the barriers to private capital entering mortgage lending (inaudible) market for home loans would be?

BERNANKE: Well, currently, there’s not much private capital because of concerns about the housing market, concerns about still high default rates. I suspect, though, that, you know, when the housing market begins to show signs of life, that there will be expanded interest.

I think another reason — and go back what Mr. Hensarling was saying — is that the regulatory structure under which securitization, et cetera, will be taking place has not been tied down yet. So there’s a lot of things that have to happen. But I don’t see any reason why the private sector can’t play a big role in the housing market securitization, et cetera, going forward.”

As above, bank lending is still a public/private partnership, presumably operating for public purpose.

See my Proposals for the Banking System, Treasury, Fed, and FDIC (draft)

And there’s no reason securitization has to play any role. Housing starts peaked in 1972 at 2.6 million units with a population of only 200 million, with only simple savings and loans staffed by officers earning very reasonable salaries and no securitization.

“CARSON: However, banks are still not lending to the public and vital small businesses. How, sir, do you plan on, firstly, encouraging banks to lend to our nation’s small businesses and the American public in general?

And, secondly, as you know, more banks have indeed tightened their lending standards than have eased them. Does the Fed plan to keep interest rates low for an extended period of time. Are the Fed’s actions meaningless unless banks are willing to lend?

CARSON: And, lastly, what are your thoughts on requiring a 20 percent down for a payment? And do you believe that this will impact homeowners significantly or — or not at all?

BERNANKE: Well, banks — first of all, they have stopped tightening their lending standards, according to our surveys, and have begun to ease them, particularly for commercial and industrial loans and some other types of loans.

Small-business lending is still constrained, both because of bank reluctance but also because of lack of demand because they don’t have customers or inventories to finance or because they’re in weakened financial condition, which means they’re harder to qualify for the loan.

Right, sales drive most everything, including employment

“PETERS: Do you see some parallels between what happened in the late ’30s?

BERNANKE: Well, it’s true that most historians ascribe the ’37- ’38 recession to premature tightening of both fiscal and monetary policy, so that part is correct.

Also, Social Security was initiated, and accounted for ‘off budget’, and, with benefit payments initially near 0, the fica taxes far outstripped the benefits adding a sudden negative fiscal shock.

The accountants realized their mistake and Social Security was put on budget where it remains and belongs.

I think every episode is different. We have to look, you know, at what’s going on in the economy today. I think with 9.2 percent unemployment, the economy still requires a good deal of support. The Federal Reserve is doing what we can to provide monetary policy accommodation.

But as we go forward, we’re going to obviously want to make sure that as we support the recovery that we also keep an eye on inflation, make sure that stays well controlled.

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Geithner- We’re going to try to get the biggest deal possible

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Bill’s blog, below, as always, is well worth a read.

And note today’s news, where, of all things, the Democrats are trying to position themselves as larger deficit cutters than the Republicans:

“We’re going to try to get the biggest deal possible, a deal that’s best for the economy, not just in the short term,” Geithner said on NBC’s “Meet the Press.”

It is a pity that he doesn’t know the answer himself

By Bill Mitchell


We are deep into hard-disk crash trauma at CofFEE today with 2 volumes dying at the same time on Friday and a backup drive going down too. At least it was a sympathetic act on their behalf. Combine that with I lost a HDD on an iMAC after only 2 weeks since it was new a few weeks ago – after finally convincing myself that OS X was the way forward with virtual machines. Further another colleague’s back-up HDD crashed last week. It leaves one wondering what is going on. Backup is now a oft-spoken word around here today. But there is one thing I do know the answer to – Greg Mankiw’s latest Examination Question. It is a pity that he doesn’t know the answer himself. Further, it is a pity that one of the higher profiled “progressives” in the US buys into the same nonsense.



In his latest blog (July 3, 2011) – A Good Exam Question – Mankiw pokes fun at so-called progressive Dean Baker who wrote a column recently in The Republic (July 2, 2011) – Ron Paul’s Surprisingly Lucid Solution to the Debt Ceiling Impasse – where as the title suggests he thinks ultra-conservative US Republican politician Ron Paul is onto something good.

The truth is that none of them – Mankiw, Baker, or Paul – understand how the banking system operates.

First, let’s consider what Baker said in detail.

I think Mankiw’s summary of the Baker proposal is valid:


According to Congressman Paul, to deal with the debt-ceiling impasse, we should tell the Federal Reserve to destroy its vast holding of government bonds. Because the Fed might have planned on selling those bonds in open-market operations to drain the banking system of the currently high level of excess reserves, the Fed should (according to Baker) substantially increase reserve requirements.

Mankiw’s reaction is that “(t)his would be a great exam question: What are the effects of this policy? Who wins and who loses if this proposal is adopted?”.

I also agree that it would be an interesting examination question which I suspect all student who had studied macroeconomics using Mankiw’s own textbook would fail to answer correctly.

I will come back to Mankiw’s own answer directly – which suffers the same misgivings as the suggestion by Baker that we listen to Paul and then Baker’s own addendum to the idea.

Baker referred to Paul’s proposal as:


… a remarkably creative way to deal with the impasse over the debt ceiling: have the Federal Reserve Board destroy the $1.6 trillion in government bonds it now holds

He acknowledges that “at first blush this idea may seem crazy” but then claims it is “actually a very reasonable way to deal with the crisis. Furthermore, it provides a way to have lasting savings to the budget”.

So we have two ideas here – one to reduce debt as a way of tricking the pesky conservatives who want to close the US government down (or pretend they do for political purposes) by not approving the expansion of the “debt ceiling”. The debt ceiling is this archaic device that conservatives can use to make trouble for an elected government which has not operational validity. After all, doesn’t the US Congress approve the spending and taxation decisions of the US government anyway?

The second idea that Baker leaks into the debate is that by destroying public debt held by the central bank (as a result of their quantitative easing program) it would save them selling it back to the private sector which in turn would save the US government from paying interest on it. And he seems to think that is a good thing. Spare me!

In his own words:


The basic story is that the Fed has bought roughly $1.6 trillion in government bonds through its various quantitative easing programs over the last two and a half years. This money is part of the $14.3 trillion debt that is subject to the debt ceiling. However, the Fed is an agency of the government. Its assets are in fact assets of the government. Each year, the Fed refunds the interest earned on its assets in excess of the money needed to cover its operating expenses. Last year the Fed refunded almost $80 billion to the Treasury. In this sense, the bonds held by the Fed are literally money that the government owes to itself … As it stands now, the Fed plans to sell off its bond holdings over the next few years. This means that the interest paid on these bonds would go to banks, corporations, pension funds, and individual investors who purchase them from the Fed. In this case, the interest payments would be a burden to the Treasury since the Fed would no longer be collecting (and refunding) the interest.

First, note the recognition that the central bank and treasury are just components of the consolidated government sector – a basic premise of Modern Monetary Theory (MMT) and should dispel the myth of the central bank being independent.

Mankiw also agreed with that saying “Since the Fed is really part of the government, the bonds it holds are liabilities the government owes to itself”. Which makes you wonder why he doesn’t tell his students that in his textbook. Further, why do those textbooks make out that the central bank is independent when it clearly is part of the monetary operations of the government? The answer is that it suits their ideological claim that monetary policy is superior to fiscal policy.

Please read my blogs – Central bank independence – another faux agenda and The consolidated government – treasury and central bank – for more discussion on this point.

I will come back to that status presently.

Second, the accounting hoopla by which the treasury gets interest income back from the central bank but lets it keep some funds to pay for its staff etc might be interesting to accountants but is largely meaningless from a monetary operations perspective. It is in the realm of the government lending itself money and paying itself back with some territory.

I agree with Mankiw that Paul’s suggestion which Baker endorses “is just an accounting gimmick”. But then the whole edifice surrounding government spending and bond-issuance is also “just an accounting gimmick”. The mainstream make much of what they call the government budget constraint as if it is an a priori financial constraint when in fact it is just an accounting statement of the monetary operations surrounding government spending and taxation and debt-issuance.

There are political gimmicks too that lead to the US government issuing debt to match their net public spending. These just hide the fact that in terms of the intrinsic characteristics of the monetary system the US government is never revenue constrained because it is the monopoly issuer of the currency. Which makes the whole debt ceiling debate a political and accounting gimmick.

Third, note that Baker then falls into the trap that the mainstream are captured by in thinking that in some way the interest payments made by the government to the non-government sector are a “burden”. A burden is something that carries opportunity costs and is unpleasant with connotations of restricted choices.

From a MMT perspective, one of the “costs” of the quantitative easing has been the lost private income that might have been forthcoming had the central bank left the government bonds in the private sector. Given how little else QE has achieved those costs make it a negative policy intervention.

So the so-called “burden” really falls on the private sector in the form of lost income. Once you accept that there are no financial constraints on the US government (which means that the opportunity costs are all real) then the concept of a burden as it is used by Baker is inapplicable.

And then once we recognise that there is a massive pool of underutilised labour and capital equipment in the US at present contributing nothing productive at all then one’s evaluation of those real opportunity costs should be low. That is, at full employment the interest payments made by government to the non-government sector on outstanding public debt have real resource implications that might require some offsetting policies (lower spending/higher taxation) to defray any inflation risks.

With an unemployment rate of nearly 10 per cent and persistently low capacity utilisation rates overall, every dollar the government can put into the US economy will be beneficial from a real perspective.

But it gets worse.

Baker turns his hand to thinking about the monetary operations involved in the central bank destroying the bonds. He might have saved us the pain. He notes that the reason the Federal Reserve “intends to sell off its bonds in future years” is because they want to:


… reduce the reserves of the banking system, thereby limiting lending and preventing inflation. If the Fed doesn’t have the bonds, however, then it can’t sell them off to soak up reserves.

But as it turns out, there are other mechanisms for restricting lending, most obviously raising the reserve requirements for banks. If banks are forced to keep a larger share of their deposits on reserve (rather than lend them out), it has the same effect as reducing the amount of reserves.

Baker falls head long into the mainstream myth that banks lend out reserves.

Please read the following blogs – Building bank reserves will not expand credit and Building bank reserves is not inflationary – for further discussion.

I remind you of this piece of analysis by the Bank of International Settlements in – Unconventional monetary policies: an appraisal – it is a very useful way to understanding the implications of the current build-up in bank reserves.

The BIS says:


… we argue that the typical strong emphasis on the role of the expansion of bank reserves in discussions of unconventional monetary policies is misplaced. In our view, the effectiveness of such policies is not much affected by the extent to which they rely on bank reserves as opposed to alternative close substitutes, such as central bank short-term debt. In particular, changes in reserves associated with unconventional monetary policies do not in and of themselves loosen significantly the constraint on bank lending or act as a catalyst for inflation …

In fact, the level of reserves hardly figures in banks’ lending decisions. The amount of credit outstanding is determined by banks’ willingness to supply loans, based on perceived risk-return trade-offs, and by the demand for those loans. The aggregate availability of bank reserves does not constrain the expansion directly.

It is obvious why this is the case. Loans create deposits which can then be drawn upon by the borrower. No reserves are needed at that stage. Then, as the BIS paper says, “in order to avoid extreme volatility in the interest rate, central banks supply reserves as demanded by the system.”

The loan desk of commercial banks have no interaction with the reserve operations of the monetary system as part of their daily tasks. They just take applications from credit worthy customers who seek loans and assess them accordingly and then approve or reject the loans. In approving a loan they instantly create a deposit (a zero net financial asset transaction).

The only thing that constrains the bank loan desks from expanding credit is a lack of credit-worthy applicants, which can originate from the supply side if banks adopt pessimistic assessments or the demand side if credit-worthy customers are loathe to seek loans.

In answering his own “examination question”, Mankiw gets positively angry and says of the plan to raise reserve requirements that it would be:


… a form of financial repression. Assuming the Fed does not pay market interest rates on those newly required reserves, it is like a tax on bank financing. The initial impact is on those small businesses that rely on banks to raise funds for investment. The policy will therefore impede the financial system’s ability to intermediate between savers and investors. As a result, the economy’s capital stock will be allocated less efficiently. In the long run, there will be lower growth in productivity and real wages.

First, if the central bank didn’t use the bonds to drain reserves (via open market operations) then it would have to pay market rates of interest to the banks who held reserves with them or lose control of its target policy rate. So unless the central bank is going to keep short-term rates at zero for an indefinite period (which I recommend) then we would be unwise to assume they will not be paying a return on the reserves (as they are doing now).

Consistent with MMT, there are two broad ways the central bank can manage bank reserves to maintain control over its target rate. First, central banks can buy or sell government debt to control the quantity of reserves to bring about the desired short-term interest rate.

MMT posits exactly the same explanation for public debt issuance – it is not to finance net government spending (outlays above tax revenue) given that the national government does not need to raise revenue in order to spend. Debt issuance is, in fact, a monetary operation to deal with the banks reserves that deficits add and allow central banks to maintain a target rate.

Try finding this explanation for public sector debt issuance in Mankiw’s macroeconomics text book.

Second, a central bank might, instead, provide a return on excess reserve holdings at the policy rate which means the financial opportunity cost of holding reserves for banks becomes zero. A central bank can then supply as many reserves as it likes at that support rate and the banks will be happy to hold them and not seek to rid themselves of the excess in the interbank market. The important point is that the interest rate level set by the central bank is then “delinked” from the volume of bank reserves in the banking system and so this becomes equivalent to the first case when the central bank drains reserves by issuing public debt.

So the build-up of bank reserves has no implication for interest rates which are clearly set solely by the central bank. All the mainstream claims that budget deficits will drive interest rates up misunderstand their impact on reserves and the central bank’s capacity to manage these bank reserves in a “decoupled” fashion.

Second, Mankiw falls prey to the same error that Baker makes – that banks lend out reserves. As noted this is a mainstream myth. The banks could still lend out whatever they liked as long as there were credit-worthy customers queuing up for loans. So no small businesses would be affected in the way Mankiw claims.

Anyway, as to what the debt-ceiling means, I was asked by several readers about the status of the US government (by which they meant the Treasury) in relation to the central bank (the Federal Reserve).

The legal code in the US essentially recognises that the central bank and treasury are part of the government sector.

If you consult the United States Code which reflects the legislative decisions made by the US Congress you find, for example, the section – TITLE 31 – MONEY AND FINANCE § 5301 – which deals with the Buying obligations of the United States Government

The US law stipulates the following:


31 USC § 5301. Buying obligations of the United States Government

  • (a) The President may direct the Secretary of the Treasury to make an agreement with the Federal reserve banks and the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System when the President decides that the foreign commerce of the United States is affected adversely because –
    • (1) the value of coins and currency of a foreign country compared to the present standard value of gold is depreciating;
    • (2) action is necessary to regulate and maintain the parity of United States coins and currency;
    • (3) an economic emergency requires an expansion of credit; or
    • (4) an expansion of credit is necessary so that the United States Government and the governments of other countries can stabilize the value of coins and currencies of a country.
  • (b) Under an agreement under subsection (a) of this section, the Board shall permit the banks (and the Board is authorized to permit the banks notwithstanding another law) to agree that the banks will-
    • (1) conduct through each entire specified period open market operations in obligations of the United States Government or corporations in which the Government is the majority stockholder; and
    • (2) buy directly and hold an additional $3,000,000,000 of obligations of the Government for each agreed period, unless the Secretary consents to the sale of the obligations before the end of the period.
  • (c) With the approval of the Secretary, the Board may require Federal reserve banks to take action the Secretary and Board consider necessary to prevent unreasonable credit expansion.

§ 5301. Buying obligations of the United States Government under Title 31 of the US Code as currently published by the US Government reflects the laws passed by Congress as of February 1, 2010.

So it seems the President can never run out of “money”. Can any constitutional lawyers out there who are expert in the USC please clarify if there are exceptions to this law? The law (including the accompanying notes which I didn’t include here) appears to say that an economic emergency can justify the President commanding the Federal Reserve to hand over credit balances in favour of the US Treasury.

Conclusion

I hope you all answered Mankiw’s examination question correctly.

My attention is now turning to computer hardware!

That is enough for today!

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ISM/Consumer Credit

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Karim writes:

  • Similar to Manufacturing ISM, Non-Mfg activity largely stabilized in June.
  • Most components also stable
  • One notable feature of most PMIs is the collapse of input prices over the last 3mths. Although not a feature of this report, output prices have held largely steady in most surveys-suggesting margins are expanding.
  • Interesting mix of data and anecdotals in article below on progress of U.S. household deleveraging.



June May
Composite 53.3 54.6
Business activity 53.4 53.6
Prices Paid 60.9 69.6
New Orders 53.6 56.8
Backlog of Orders 48.5 55.0
Supplier Deliveries 52.0 54.0
Inventory Change* 53.5 55.0
Employment 54.1 54.0
Export orders* 57.0 57.0
Imports* 46.5 50.5

*=Non-seasonally adjusted

Best Consumer Credit Since ‘06 Reveals Loan Rebound Across U.S.

June 25 (Bloomberg) — Michael Busick says his credit union “was shocked” to discover his credit score was 812 of a possible 850 when he applied for a $19,500 new-car loan.

The loan officer told Busick he rarely sees scores so close to perfect, said the Charlotte, North Carolina, math teacher, who added that he always pays his bills on time and doesn’t “overextend.” He got the funds in May.

The average U.S. credit score — a predictor of the likelihood lenders will be paid back — rose to 696 in May, the highest in at least four years, according to Equifax Inc., a provider of consumer-credit data. The ratio of consumer-debt payments to incomes is the lowest since 1994, and delinquencies have dropped 30 percent in two years, Federal Reserve data show.

Improving credit quality gives households the ability to lift borrowing as concerns ease about rising gasoline prices, hard-to-find jobs and falling home prices. A reacceleration in spending would belie Morgan Stanley economist Stephen Roach’s assertion that consumers will be “zombies” for years because of too much debt.

“The financial situation of the household sector has improved far faster and far more than everyone thought it would two years ago,” said James Paulsen, chief investment strategist for Wells Capital Management in Minneapolis. “People are still locked into the view that consumers are facing record burdens, and they are not. There has been a change that is sustainable and durable.”

Willing to Lend

Bank senior loan officers reported a pickup in demand for auto loans in the second quarter, following first-quarter growth for all consumer lending — the first increase since 2005, according to a quarterly Fed survey released in May. About 29 percent were more willing to make consumer installment loans, the highest percentage since 1994, the survey found.

“The household deleveraging process is much further along than is appreciated,” said Mark Zandi, chief economist at Moody’s Analytics Inc. in West Chester, Pennsylvania. “This is evident in the rapid improvement in credit quality. ‘Zombie consumers’ is a mischaracterization of the state of the American consumer.”

More borrowing could help spur growth slowed by higher gasoline prices, Paulsen said. That will make stocks more attractive than bonds, pushing the Standard & Poor’s 500 Index up about 8 percent to 1,450 by year end, while raising the yield on 10-year Treasury notes more than half a point to 3.75 percent, he said.

Fewer Defaults

Discover Financial Services’ shares have risen about 43 percent this year to $26.55 on July 1. The Riverwoods, Illinois- based credit-card issuer reported a record second-quarter profit of $600 million on June 23, more than double a year earlier, as consumers spent more and defaulted less.

Fewer losses will benefit stocks of other credit-card and banking companies, said senior analyst Brian Foran of Nomura Securities International Inc. in New York, who has a “buy” rating on Discover, Capital One Financial Corp. and U.S. Bancorp, Minnesota’s biggest lender.

Consumers have reduced debt by more than $1 trillion in the 10 quarters ended in March, according to data from the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, and Roach, nonexecutive chairman of Morgan Stanley Asia, says they will retrench “a minimum of another three to five years.” While household obligations are at a 17-year low because of increased savings and lower interest rates since 2007, debt remains high, he said. He calculates that it amounts to 115 percent of income, compared with a 75 percent average from 1970 to 2000.

‘Overly Indebted’

“What I worry about now is we are creating a whole new generation of zombie consumers in the United States,” Roach said in a Bloomberg Television interview with Carol Massar. “We need to encourage balance-sheet repair and adjustment by overly indebted, savings-short consumers.”

Roach’s view is supported by economists who say the credit that fueled the housing boom from 2002 to 2006 will take years to unwind.

“It’s pernicious, it’s ongoing and it’s holding back the growth because people are going to save more and spend less, and this is a process that will last for several years,” said Kevin Logan, chief U.S. economist at HSBC Securities USA Inc. in New York.

Confidence among U.S. consumers rose to a 10-week high for the period ended June 26 as gasoline prices declined, according to Bloomberg’s Consumer Comfort Index. Expectations had soured in the past few months following a 29 percent surge in regular unleaded prices during the past year, according to AAA, the nation’s largest auto club.

Falling Home Values

Unemployment climbed to 9.1 percent in May, the highest this year, figures from the Labor Department showed June 3, while the S&P/Case-Shiller index of property values in 20 cities fell 4 percent from April 2010, the biggest drop since November 2009.

Even so, Dean Maki, chief U.S. economist at Barclays Capital Inc. in New York, says the growth in credit reflects an underlying optimism, part of a virtuous cycle. As a Fed economist in 2000, he published research that concluded “high debt burdens are not a negative force” and the debt-income ratio isn’t reliable in predicting spending.

“Stronger credit growth is associated with stronger consumer spending,” Maki said. “When consumer credit is growing, it is a sign that households have become more confident about income prospects.”

Rising Profits

Craig Kennison, a senior analyst at Robert W. Baird & Co. in Milwaukee, predicts lending profits will rise at CarMax Inc., the largest U.S. seller of used cars, and at Milwaukee-based Harley-Davidson Inc., the largest U.S. motorcycle manufacturer.

Their finance arms “have fully recovered,” said Kennison, who rates both “outperform.” CarMax, based in Richmond, Virginia, “is looking to take a larger share of the loan originations at CarMax dealerships, a sign of confidence,” and “Harley-Davidson is poised to see retail growth for the first time in the U.S. since 2006.”

Households spent just 16.4 percent of their earnings on debt payments in the first quarter, including lease and rental payments, homeowners’ insurance and property taxes. That’s the least since 1994, Fed figures show. Since the 18-month recession began in December 2007, household obligations have dropped by 2.37 percent of incomes.

Even consumers still in trouble are in better shape, said Mark Cole, chief operating officer for Atlanta-based CredAbility, which provides nonprofit credit counseling nationally. Clients have an average of $19,500 in unsecured debt this year, down 30 percent from 2009 and the lowest in at least six years. “We really see people’s credit quality is increasing,” he said.

‘Fine’ Cash Flows

Credit-card charge-offs “are collapsing” as companies have written off debt of people unemployed for 27 weeks or longer, who account for about 45 percent of all the jobless, Foran said. “Consumers spend money based on their cash flows, and their cash flows are fine.”

Discover’s rate of 30-day delinquencies was 2.79 percent in the second quarter, the lowest in its 25-year history, company officials said on a June 23 conference call with investors. The nationwide rate fell in May to 3.09 percent, the lowest since May 2007, according to Bloomberg data.

Jennifer Lahotski, 28, who has a marketing job in Los Angeles, said she’s worked to repair her credit from 2007, when it scored “absolutely below 660,” the minimum considered prime for consumer loans, according to Equifax. The Pennsylvania State University alumnus had been late on some bills and had an old charge of $5 from a gym.

‘Sent Them a Check’

“I went through each expense, each delinquency, and sent them a check,” she said. “I turned myself into a hermit for six months but I did it,” she added, eliminating most restaurant meals and “random Target runs where you come out with $50” of merchandise.

Lahotski, who has a Visa and an American Express card and $15,000 in student loans, said she is saving “a few hundred a month,” with plans to buy a house when she can afford a down payment.

Math teacher Busick, 33, who has a home loan and four credit cards, estimates his near-perfect credit score has risen from the upper 700s in the past few years. While he uses an American Express card to accumulate frequent-flier miles on Delta Air Lines Inc., he pays it off in full most months. Busick says he strives to maintain strong credit.

“I don’t have late payments,” he said. “I pay all my bills on time.”

Busick is eying a Sony television or Dell or Hewlett- Packard computer that could cost $2,000.

“If I want something, I will get it,” he says.

Or (and),

With higher gas prices and lower personal income, consumers had to borrow more to buy the same amount. So somewhat lower gas prices might not mean more spending, just less borrowing and some paying down of credit cards

Yes, the federal deficits have largely repaired consumer balance sheets. But a new ‘borrowing to spend’ cycle has not yet emerged, which has been the driver of prior expansions.

The problem is, the prior borrowing to spend cycles were driven by circumstances that no one wants to repeat- the sub prime expansion of a few years ago, the dot com bubble of the late 1990’s, the S and L expansion phase of the 1980’s that drove the Reagan years, the emerging market lending boom of the prior decade, etc. etc. etc.

After Japan’s credit bubble burst in 1991 they’ve been very careful not to repeat that performance, and have stagnated ever since, even with what are considered relatively high levels of govt deficit spending.

My point is, the demand leakages seem to be high enough such that without an extraordinary surge in private sector credit expansion we need a lot higher deficit to close the output gap.

Which to me is a good thing. I’d prefer lower taxes for a given level of public expenditure to another credit bubble. But when govt. doesn’t understand this, and instead looks to reduce the federal deficit, the result is high unemployment and a relatively weak economy, again, much like Japan.

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Bernanke’s press conference

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First, the Chairman’s comments along the lines of ‘addressing our long term deficit problem will lower the risk of interest rates spiking’ yet again clearly demonstrated our Fed Chairman remains lost in some kind of fixed exchange rate paradigm, and is steering things accordingly, both directly with Fed policy and indirectly with his advice to Congress, all of which continues to work to keep the output gap as high as it is.

Anyway, here’s my take on what’s happening, as per the Chairman:

Things have changed since QE2.

Job growth has increased, and unemployment is forecast to come down over time.

And inflation indicators have bottomed and turned up some, perhaps a bit too high short term, but are forecast to come back down to desired levels, given, as always assumed in Fed forecasts, appropriate monetary policy. And right now appropriate monetary policy means no more qe.

in other words, the room for further ‘monetary stimulus’ isn’t there.
it might interfere with the hoped for transient nature of recent cpi increases and not allow the cpi to come back in line with desired levels

that is, the Fed doesn’t see the risk/reward suggesting pushing any harder.

Which is exactly what China wanted to hear, but that’s another story.

Lastly, it was again stated the Fed hasn’t run out of bullets (as if it ever had any bullets), yet open options mentioned didn’t seem at all meaningful. And the Chairman maintained that because inflation is a monetary phenomena the Fed can always create inflation. Nice slogan, but talk is cheap, and so far the only inflation they’ve created is that of scaring portfolio managers out the dollar, which works until they cover their shorts in the broad sense, and that transitory inflation, as the Fed calls it, reverses.

None of this bodes well for aggregate demand.

My macro view remains the same-

because we fear becoming the next Greece, we continue to work turn ourselves into the next Japan.

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Fed Chairman Ben S. Bernanke on Fiscal Sustainability

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This is from the same Ben S. Bernanke that stated the Fed spends by using their computer to mark up numbers in bank accounts.

Now, by extension, he’d propose basketball stadiums have a reserve of points for their scoreboards to make sure the teams could get their scores when they put the ball through the hoop.

If he was a state Governor this would be a pretty good speech. But he’s not.

Comments below:

Bernanke Speech

At the Annual Conference of the Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget, Washington, D.C.
June 14, 2011
Fiscal Sustainability

I am pleased to speak to a group that has such a distinguished record of identifying crucial issues related to the federal budget and working toward bipartisan solutions to our nation’s fiscal problems.

Yes, we now have bipartisan support for deficit reduction. Good luck to us.

Today I will briefly discuss the fiscal challenges the nation faces and the importance of meeting those challenges for our collective economic future. I will then conclude with some thoughts on the way forward.

Fiscal Policy Challenges
At about 9 percent of gross domestic product (GDP), the federal budget deficit has widened appreciably since the onset of the recent recession in December 2007. The exceptional increase in the deficit has mostly reflected the automatic cyclical response of revenues and spending to a weak economy as well as the fiscal actions taken to ease the recession and aid the recovery. As the economy continues to expand and stimulus policies are phased out, the budget deficit should narrow over the next few years.

Both the Congressional Budget Office and the Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget project that the budget deficit will be almost 5 percent of GDP in fiscal year 2015, assuming that current budget policies are extended and the economy is then close to full employment.1 Of even greater concern is that longer-run projections that extrapolate current policies and make plausible assumptions about the future evolution of the economy show the structural budget gap increasing significantly further over time. For example, under the alternative fiscal scenario developed by the Congressional Budget Office, which assumes most current policies are extended, the deficit is projected to be about 6-1/2 percent of GDP in 2020 and almost 13 percent of GDP in 2030. The ratio of outstanding federal debt to GDP, expected to be about 69 percent at the end of this fiscal year, would under that scenario rise to 87 percent in 2020 and 146 percent in 2030.2 One reason the debt is projected to increase so quickly is that the larger the debt outstanding, the greater the budgetary cost of making the required interest payments. This dynamic is clearly unsustainable.

Unfortunately, even after economic conditions have returned to normal, the nation faces a sizable structural budget gap.

The nation’s long-term fiscal imbalances did not emerge overnight. To a significant extent, they are the result of an aging population and fast-rising health-care costs, both of which have been predicted for decades. The Congressional Budget Office projects that net federal outlays for health-care entitlements–which were 5 percent of GDP in 2010–could rise to more than 8 percent of GDP by 2030. Even though projected fiscal imbalances associated with the Social Security system are smaller than those for federal health programs, they are still significant. Although we have been warned about such developments for many years, the difference is that today those projections are becoming reality.

Up to hear he’s discussed the size of the debt with words like ‘unfortunate’ and ‘imbalances’ and finally we here why he believes this is all a bad thing:

A large and increasing level of government debt relative to national income risks serious economic consequences. Over the longer term, rising federal debt crowds out private capital formation and thus reduces productivity growth.

What? Yes, public acquisition of real goods and services removes those goods and services from the private sector. But this is nothing about that. This is about deficits reducing the ability of firms to raise financial capital to invest in real investment goods and services to keep up productivity.

The type of crowding out the chairman is warning about is part of loanable funds theory, which is applicable to fixed exchange rate regimes, not floating fx regimes. This is a very serious error.

To the extent that increasing debt is financed by borrowing from abroad, a growing share of our future income would be devoted to interest payments on foreign-held federal debt.

Yes, if the interest payments set by the Fed are high enough, that will happen. However it isn’t necessarily a problem, particularly with the foreign sector’s near 0% propensity to spend their interest income on real goods and services. Japan, for example, as yet to spend a dime of it’s over $1 trillion in dollar holdings accumulated over the last six decades, and china’s holdings only seem to grow as well. In fact, the only way paying interest on the debt could be a problem is if that interest income is subsequently spent in a way we don’t approve of, and it’s easy enough to cross that bridge when we come to it.

High levels of debt also impair the ability of policymakers to respond effectively to future economic shocks and other adverse events.

There is no actual, operational impairment to spend whatever they want whenever they want. Federal spending is not constrained by revenues, as a simple fact of monetary operations. The only nominal constraints on spending are political, and the only constraints on what can be bought are what is offered for sale.

Even the prospect of unsustainable deficits has costs, including an increased possibility of a sudden fiscal crisis.

Where does this come from??? Surely he’s not comparing the US govt, the issuer of the dollar, where he spends by using his computer to mark up numbers in bank accounts, to Greece, a user of the euro, that doesn’t ‘clear its own checks’ like the ECB and the Fed do?

As we have seen in a number of countries recently, interest rates can soar quickly if investors lose confidence in the ability of a government to manage its fiscal policy.

He is looking at Greece!

Although historical experience and economic theory do not show the exact threshold at which the perceived risks associated with the U.S. public debt would increase markedly, we can be sure that, without corrective action, our fiscal trajectory is moving the nation ever closer to that point.

‘That point’ applies to users of a currency, like Greece, the other euro members, US states, businesses, households, etc.

But it does not apply to issuers of their own currency, like the US, Japan, UK, etc.

Is it possible the Fed chairman does not know this???

Perhaps the most important thing for people to understand about the federal budget is that maintaining the status quo is not an option. Creditors will not lend to a government whose debt, relative to national income, is rising without limit; so, one way or the other, fiscal adjustments sufficient to stabilize the federal budget must occur at some point.

Again with the ‘some point’ thing. There is no ‘some point’ for issuers of their own currency, like Japan, who’s debt to GDP is maybe 200% and 10 year JGB’s are trading at 1.15%.

These adjustments could take place through a careful and deliberative process that weighs priorities and gives individuals and firms adequate time to adjust to changes in government programs and tax policies. Or the needed fiscal adjustments could come as a rapid and much more painful response to a looming or actual fiscal crisis in an environment of rising interest rates, collapsing confidence and asset values, and a slowing economy. The choice is ours to make.

Right, the sky is falling.

Achieving Fiscal Sustainability

As if we didn’t already and automatically have it as the issuer of the currency.

The primary long-term goal for federal budget policy must be achieving fiscal sustainability.

What happened to his dual mandates of low inflation and full employment? That’s just for the Fed, but not for budget policy?

Well, if you believe the sky is falling no telling what your priority would be.

A straightforward way to define fiscal sustainability is as a situation in which the ratio of federal debt to national income is stable or moving down over the longer term.

And what does ‘straightforward’ mean? The math is easy? Is that how to set goals for the nation?

This goal can be attained by bringing spending, excluding interest payments, roughly in line with revenues, or in other words, by approximately balancing the primary budget. Given the sharp run-up in debt over the past few years, it would be reasonable to plan for a period of primary budget surpluses, which would serve eventually to bring the ratio of debt to national income back toward pre-recession levels.

All arbitrary measures not tied down to real world consequences apart from being a defensive move to keep the sky from falling.

Fiscal sustainability is a long-run concept. Achieving fiscal sustainability, therefore, requires a long-run plan, one that reduces deficits over an extended period and that, to the fullest extent possible, is credible, practical, and enforceable. In current circumstances, an advantage of taking a longer-term perspective in forming concrete plans for fiscal consolidation is that policymakers can avoid a sudden fiscal contraction that might put the still-fragile recovery at risk.

A glimmer of hope here where he seems to recognize how fiscal adjustments alter the real economy. Unfortunately, with the sky about to fall, he has more important fish to fry.

At the same time, acting now to put in place a credible plan for reducing future deficits would not only enhance economic performance in the long run,

Right, so govt doesn’t crowd out private capital formation with a floating fx regime…

but could also yield near-term benefits by leading to lower long-term interest rates and increased consumer and business confidence.

Yes, long term rates would likely be lower, because markets, which anticipate Fed rate settings, would believe the economy would be weak for a very long time, and therefore the odds of rate hikes would be lower.

While it is crucial to have a federal budget that is sustainable,

Don’t want to crowd out that private capital that gets borrowed from banks where the causation runs from loans to deposits (there’s no such thing as banks running out of money to lend).

our fiscal policies should also reflect the nation’s priorities by providing the conditions to support ongoing gains in living standards and by striving to be fair both to current and future generations.

Living standards are best supported by full employment policy, which happens to be a Fed mandate, in case he’s forgotten.

Interesting question, does the Fed’s mandate extend to influencing policy through speeches as to what others should do, or is it just a mandate for monetary policy decisions?

In addressing our long-term fiscal challenges, we should reform the government’s tax policies and spending priorities so that they not only reduce the deficit, but also enhance the long-term growth potential of our economy–for example, by increasing incentives to work and to save, by encouraging investment in the skills of our workforce, by stimulating private capital formation, by promoting research and development, and by providing necessary public infrastructure.

Big fat fallacy of composition there. Especially from a Princeton professor who should know better.

We cannot reasonably expect to grow our way out of our fiscal imbalances, but a more productive economy will ease the tradeoffs that we face.

Making Fiscal Plans
It is easy to call for sustainable fiscal policies but much harder to deliver them. The issues are not simply technical; they are also closely tied to our values and priorities as a nation. It is little wonder that the debates have been so intense and progress so difficult to achieve.

Recently, negotiations over our long-run fiscal policies have become tied to the issue of raising the statutory limit for federal debt. I fully understand the desire to use the debt limit deadline to force some necessary and difficult fiscal policy adjustments, but the debt limit is the wrong tool for that important job. Failing to raise the debt ceiling in a timely way would be self-defeating

Maybe, but he’s just guessing.

if the objective is to chart a course toward a better fiscal situation for our nation.

The current level of the debt and near-term borrowing needs reflect spending and revenue choices that have already been approved by the current and previous Congresses and Administrations of both political parties. Failing to raise the debt limit would require the federal government to delay or renege on payments for obligations already entered into. In particular, even a short suspension of payments on principal or interest on the Treasury’s debt obligations could cause severe disruptions in financial markets and the payments system, induce ratings downgrades of U.S. government debt, create fundamental doubts about the creditworthiness of the United States, and damage the special role of the dollar and Treasury securities in global markets in the longer term.

All of which has happened to Japan, with no adverse consequences on the currency or interest rates, as is necessarily the case for the issuer of a non-convertible currency and floating exchange rate.

Interest rates would likely rise, slowing the recovery and, perversely, worsening the deficit problem by increasing required interest payments on the debt for what might well be a protracted period.3

Some have suggested that payments by the Treasury could be prioritized to meet principal and interest payments on debt outstanding, thus avoiding a technical default on federal debt. However, even if that were the case, given the current size of the deficit and the uneven time pattern of government receipts and payments, the Treasury would soon find it necessary to prioritize among and withhold critical disbursements, such as Social Security and Medicare payments and funds for the military.

Yes, as congress is well aware, to the point that it’s no longer about a debt default, but about a partial shutdown of the rest of the govt.

This has been yesterday’s speech. Congress has moved on from the risk of debt default to the risk of partial govt shutdown.

Moreover, while debt-related payments might be met in this scenario, the fact that many other government payments would be delayed could still create serious concerns about the safety of Treasury securities among financial market participants.

That doesn’t follow?

The Hippocratic oath holds that, first, we should do no harm. In debating critical fiscal issues, we should avoid unnecessary actions or threats that risk shaking the confidence of investors in the ability and willingness of the U.S. government to pay its bills.

Our reps take a different oath

In raising this concern, I am by no means recommending delay or inaction in addressing the nation’s long-term fiscal challenges–quite the opposite. I urge the Congress and the Administration to work in good faith to quickly develop and implement a credible plan to achieve long-term sustainability. I hope, though, that such a plan can be achieved in the near term without resorting to brinksmanship or actions that would cast doubt on the creditworthiness of the United States.

What would such a plan look like? Clear metrics are important, together with triggers or other mechanisms to establish the credibility of the plan. For example, policymakers could commit to enacting in the near term a clear and specific plan for stabilizing the ratio of debt to GDP within the next few years and then subsequently setting that ratio on a downward path.

Again, the falling sky trumps concerns over output and employment.

Indeed, such a trajectory for the ratio of debt to GDP is comparable to the one proposed by the National Commission on Fiscal Responsibility and Reform.4To make the framework more explicit, the President and congressional leadership could agree on a definite timetable for reaching decisions about both shorter-term budget adjustments and longer-term changes. Fiscal policymakers could look now to find substantial savings in the 10-year budget window, enforced by well-designed budget rules, while simultaneously undertaking additional reforms to address the long-term sustainability of entitlement programs.

In other words, cuts in the social security and Medicare budgets. This at a time of record excess capacity.

If only the sky wasn’t falling…

Such a framework could include a commitment to make a down payment on fiscal consolidation by enacting legislation to reduce the structural deficit over the next several years.

Conclusion
The task of developing and implementing sustainable fiscal policies is daunting, and it will involve many agonizing decisions and difficult tradeoffs. But meeting this challenge in a timely manner is crucial for our nation. History makes clear that failure to put our fiscal house in order will erode the vitality of our economy, reduce the standard of living in the United States, and increase the risk of economic and financial instability.

And what history might that be? There’s no such thing as a currency issuer ever not being able to make timely payment.

Madison sq garden will not run out of points to post on the scoreboard.

And check out the references. He relies on the information from the group he’s addressing:

References
Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget (2010). The CRFB Medium and Long-Term Baselines. Washington: CRFB, August.

Congressional Budget Office (2010). The Long-Term Budget Outlook. Washington: Congressional Budget Office, June (revised August).

National Commission on Fiscal Responsibility and Reform (2010). The Moment of Truth: Report of the National Commission on Fiscal Responsibility and Reform. Washington: NCFRR, December.

Zivney, Terry L., and Richard D. Marcus (1989). “The Day the United States Defaulted on Treasury Bills,” Financial Review, vol. 24 (August), pp. 475-89.

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Roubini’s latest

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He must have just read my year end post.

And he left out US fiscal tightening:

Roubini Says a ‘Perfect Storm’ May Converge on the Global Economy in 2013

By Shamim Adam

June 12 (Bloomberg) — A “perfect storm” of fiscal woe in the U.S., a slowdown in China, European debt restructuring and stagnation in Japan may converge on the global economy, New York University professor Nouriel Roubini said.

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