ECB’s Smaghi quoted

*ECB’S BINI SMAGHI SAYS THERE’S NO `ALTERNATIVE’ TO REFORMS

Yes there is

*BINI SMAGHI: CENTRAL BANKS CAN’T SHORE UP CAPITAL IN BNK SYSTEM

Yes they can

*BINI SMAGHI SAYS CENTRAL BANKS CAN’T PROVIDE SOLVENCY SUPPORT

Yes they can

*BINI SMAGHI SAYS MON POLICY CAN’T TAKE UP FISCAL `SLACK’

Correct!!!

*BINI SMAGHI: PRICE STABILITY `CRUCIAL’ FOR FIN MKT STABILITY

No it’s not

*BINI SMAGHI SAYS ECB TO SUPPORT NATIONS IF THEY STICK TO PLANS

Contradicts above statements?

*BINI SMAGHI SAYS NATIONS MUST STICK TO ADJUSTMENT PROGRAMS

Or else!

And now: *ECB’S GONZALEZ-PARAMO SAYS BANKING SECTOR FACING CHALLENGES
This story counters the negative talk a little- ECB may have more leeway.

Meanwhile the Greek market is better today, helped in part by news of asset sales ( 10% of Hellenic Telecom for €325mm).

An exchange of financial assets

Trucking tonnage Index declined and Department of Transportation Miles driven decreased in March

How to exit the euro- a proposal from 1997

This was published in a French newspaper in Quebec in 1997 (in French).

Today it has application in the eurozone, which is briefly discussed as well.

As always, feel free to distribute, repost, etc.

A Plan for Quebec Monetary Independence: The Non-Conformist view of an American Investor

By Warren B. Mosler

Canadian politicians and the media depict the international financial community as being unanimous in its condemnation not only of Quebec political independence but, even more so, of the possibility of a separate Quebec currency. Fearing the uncertainty that such a separate currency would supposedly generate, especially with regard to the international financial community, sovereigntist politicians have always favoured the idea of a monetary union with the rest of Canada and the retention of the Canadian dollar. Indeed, despite the numerous problems that have arisen with the implementation of the Maastricht Treaty in Europe, Quebec sovereigntists have pointed to the EMU as the model to be adopted in the eventuality of Quebec political independence from the rest of Canada. Though not necessarily being favorable to the separation of Quebec because of my lack of understanding of the political issues at stake, being a member of this larger international investment community where millions of US dollars are handled by our firm every day, I believe that such a position on monetary union is misguided. As in Europe, monetary union will essentially entail political union, since ultimately the national fiscal authorities will all have to abide by the bureaucratic decision of the common monetary authority. For this reason, the sovereigntist position is somewhat contradictory on this matter since, by espousing monetary union, Quebec will ultimately guarantee the status quo ante in both monetary and fiscal matters. I have been told that this was at the heart of the major debates between former prime ministers Bourassa and Parizeau some twenty years ago. Why go through the process of separating from the rest of Canada if, on crucial matters pertaining to the economy, all that sovereigntist politicians are apparently offering is something akin to the status quo?

Contrary to the conventional wisdom, my belief is that if the people of Quebec were offered a credible plan for their own currency, there may have actually been a ‘Yes’ victory in the October 1995 referendum, and by a significant margin. Although it may not solve all the problems faced by Quebeckers, I wish to propose such a plan. This is a viable plan in which the new currency is supported without any additional income tax, sales tax, or any other transaction tax that could diminish the economic welfare of the community. Additionally, the new currency will be established in such a way as to move the Quebec economy closer to both price stability and full employment, as well as favor very low interest rates. And, last but not least, the plan for this new currency unit, which, lacking a better term, I shall call “La Fleur”, is something every citizen can understand, and economists endorse.

The plan begins with the requirement that, in the eventuality of Quebec accession to independence, hence forth all new taxes would be payable in Quebec Fleurs. Only outstanding past tax liabilities would be payable in Canadian dollars. Since sales taxes and other transactions taxes, including the infamous GST, tend to discourage people from exchanging goods and services with each other, and require enormous record keeping and enforcement costs, they will be immediately eliminated. Instead, I propose a national property tax. Of course, since land is immobile, in one way or another everyone would pay a property tax, either directly by owners of landed property or in the form of higher rents.

The national property tax would be payable only in Fleurs. No record keeping would be necessary, beyond the current property registration system. If the tax isn’t paid, the government would simply sell the property regardless of who the owner is. Of course, the fiscal authority could decide to permit tax exemptions, such as for charitable contributions, should the electorate so desire. Notice, however, that the tax is payable in Fleurs, but no one yet has any Fleurs, except the new State of Quebec, which it can issue them as it desires. The population, and particularly property owners, will be willing sellers of real goods and services in exchange for needed Fleurs. The value of the Fleur will be whatever the government decides it is willing to pay for what it wishes to buy, as it knows the private sector needs its Fleurs to pay the new taxes.

Let’s stop here and examine a few things: 1) The State of Quebec can’t collect any Fleurs until AFTER it spends them, as no one has any to begin with. 2) In contrast to the conventional view peddled by politicians, the State does not tax to collect Fleurs so it can spend them. It taxes so that the private sector will need Fleurs, and therefore be willing sellers of real goods and services in exchange for needed Fleurs. 3) The government can expect to spend AT LEAST as many Fleurs as the private sector needs to pay its taxes. 4) The government will likely be able to spend more Fleurs, at the prices it wishes to pay, than exactly the amount needed for tax payments, as any Fleurs desired to be held by the public as, say, pocket cash must be left over after taxes are paid.

In order effectively to anchor the new currency unit, I further propose that the State first set a wage that it will pay to anyone willing to work for the State.(1) The effect of this government commitment would be essentially to eliminate involuntary unemployment and establish a minimum wage without any further legislation or intrusion into the private sector. This also effectively sets a value for the Fleur in terms of labor time. The market can be left to base all other pricing decisions when purchasing or selling other goods and services on the alternative universally available means of obtaining the Fleur- denominated basic State service. Here I will introduce a bit of arithmetic to illustrate how the State will get the real goods and services it needs to properly run the new nation. Let’s assume a hypothetical example where the consolidated new property and income taxes total 100 billion Fleurs. The State can expect to be able to spend at least that amount as the property owners have no other means of obtaining Fleurs. If the State offered 10,000 Fleurs as the basic State service wage, and spent nothing else, it could be reasonably sure at least 10 million workers would apply for the basic state job (100 billion divided by 10,000=10 million). Well, the State doesn’t want 10 million basic workers (especially since in the present hypothetical case the number would exceed the current population of Quebec!), but it does want other things that will be offered for sale by the private sector (as alternative ways of earning Fleurs to pay taxes). Let’s say the State spends 99 billion Fleurs at market prices, buying the other things that it really needs, including specialized labor and materials needed for the legal system, defense, education, health care and other government services. The private sector now needs only 1 billion more Fleurs to pay its taxes, so a minimum of only 10,000 basic workers can be relied on to apply for work. Of course, there will be a desire in the private sector for cash in circulation, and other activities that cause a desire to net save. This is generally a substantial amount. Suppose it amounts to a desire to earn another 5 billion Fleurs. This will be evidenced by another 500,000 basic wage earners applying for government jobs, for a total of 600,000. In any case, the more the State spends at market prices, the fewer the number of basic State job seekers. If there are what is deemed too many basic State job seekers, taxes can be lowered or other State spending increased until the number of basic State workers falls to the desired level.

What about interest rates? With this system, the State doesn’t have to pay interest, even when it spends more than it taxes. Notice that the State does not have to borrow in order to spend more than it taxes, as it simply issues currency, or credits someone’s bank account, when that person wishes to sell something in exchange for Fleurs. The key is that there is price stability as long as the State doesn’t spend so much at market prices that no workers apply for the basic job. In other words, there is price stability as long as the State doesn’t spend more Fleurs than the taxpayers determine they want. And, because the State always requires that at the margin State service is necessary to get needed Fleurs, the value of the Fleur is equal to the value of the labor time of the person who has to work at the basic State job to get the Fleurs.

When the State does spend more than it taxes, the extra Fleurs will likely settle as excess deposits in the banking system. This is an imbalance that any economist will tell you will result in ultra low short term interest rates, perhaps even a bit lower than seen in Japan during recent years. The prime rate, for example, could be expected to be around 3 1/2%. The bank regulators will of course have to continue to maintain their strict capital guidelines and credit requirements to prevent banks from speculating with insured depositors’ money, as they do today. If the State should desire higher interest rates for any reason, it always has the option of offering to pay a desired base rate of interest on excess bank deposits held at the central bank.

With this basic plan, the new State of Quebec could establish and maintain its own currency. The State would be able to purchase that which it requires to run the nation and simultaneously maintain full employment and price stability. There would also be an automatic increase in real prosperity associated with the elimination of the dampening side effects of sales taxes, which include restricted transactions, compliance costs, and enforcement costs. There would be no reason to restrict free trade, especially under NAFTA, and the State would allow the Fleur to trade freely as well. While undoubtedly facing initial speculation in the foreign exchange markets, ultimately the value of the Fleur would be established by what it can buy — the basic State job. And improving the value of those State workers through education, health care, etc. would serve to improve the value of the Fleur in the long run.

I would like to thank Professor Mario Seccareccia for his assistance.

Notes:
(1). I have elaborated a very precise plan which has been widely debated during the last year in both academic and and non-academic circles in the United States on exactly this question of government as employer of last resort. Please consult “Soft Currency Economics” for further details.

Warren B. Mosler
July 17, 1997

Yes I certainly remember that paper! As you say, Pierre Paquette and I had done a translation of it and it was eventually published in the well-ranked daily newspaper, Le Devoir, during that year. But I do not have the exact reference now. It was almost fourteen years ago! As they say in Quebec, « Plus ça change, plus c’est la même chose »! [The more things change, the more they stay the same!]

Best,

Mario

Warren’s latest presentation

Attached is a copy of a presentation that Warren delivered yesterday in Montreal.

We were extremely well received and Warren was a huge hit, mixing a concoction of high dose monetary economic realities with real life experiences and anecdotes from his long and lustrous career as a market wizard. The presentation was scheduled for 45 minutes but turned into 1hr20 minutes including Q&A.

Presentation link here.

ECB debt buying plan suffers fresh setback

ECB debt buying plan suffers fresh setback

Another silly headline that completely misses the point of monetary operations.

The ‘debt buying plan’ is a purely technical move to do what is called ‘offset operating factors’ as a means to hitting the ECB’s interest rate targets.

The quantity of securities offered to do this is entirely inconsequential. As always, for a central bank, the monopoly supplier of net reserves for its currency of issue, it’s about price (interest rates) and not quantities. And the only possible ‘inflationary impact’ is via the interest rate channels:

(FT) — The European Central Bank faced embarrassment on Tuesday after failing for a second consecutive week to neutralise fully the inflationary impact of funds it had spent buying government bonds to combat the region’s debt crisis. On Tuesday, the ECB was due to reabsorb €76bn – the total amount spent under the bond-buying programme so far. But banks only offered €62bn. Last week, the ECB had also failed to reabsorb the required amount. In total, such operations have failed five times in the past year.

The latest setback was the result of higher market interest rates, which deterred banks from parking funds at the ECB. It could fuel ECB nervousness about its bond buying.

Europe Services, Manufacturing Growth Accelerated in April

(Bloomberg) — European services and manufacturing growth accelerated in April. A composite index based on a survey of euro-area purchasing managers in both industries rose to 57.8 from 57.6 in March, Markit Economics said. That’s in line with an initial estimate on April 19.

They call the above an acceleration, I suppose because it fell in March:

The euro-area services indicator fell to 56.7 from 57.2 in March, Markit said, below a preliminary reading of 56.9 released last month. The manufacturing gauge increased to 58 from 57.5. In Germany, which has fueled the region’s recovery, a manufacturing indicator rose to 62 from 60.9 in March, while a services gauge slipped to 56.8 from 60.1.

Europe Retail Sales Decline Most in Almost a Year on Oil

Note the ‘and government austerity measures’ didn’t make the headline:

(Bloomberg) — European retail sales declined the most in almost a year in March as higher oil prices and government austerity measures curbed consumer spending. Sales in the 17-nation euro region fell 1 percent from the previous month after a revised 0.3 percent increase in February. March sales dropped 1.7 percent from a year earlier. Among services companies, “expectations for their activity levels in 12 months’ time slipped for the second successive month to reach a six-month low,” Markit said in a report. German retail sales declined 2.1 percent in March from February, when they fell 0.4 percent, today’s Eurostat report showed. In France, sales dropped 1 percent. Spanish sales fell 1.4 percent, while Ireland saw a 0.6 percent increase.

more on ECB funding dependence in the eurozone

Yet another substantiation of just how much the entire system is (necessarily) dependent on ECB funding/backstopping.

The ECB’s Secret Bailout Strategy

By: Hans-Werner Sinn

Excerpt:
The amount of the ECB’s “replacement lending” is shown by the so-called Target2 account, which measures the deficit or surplus of a country’s financial transactions with other countries. As the account includes international payments for both trade in goods and financial claims, a deficit in a country’s Target account indicates foreign borrowing via the ECB, whereas a surplus denotes foreign lending via the ECB.

The balance is not reported on the ECB’s balance sheet, since it is zero in the aggregate, but it does show up on the respective balance sheets of the national central banks as interest-bearing claims against, and liabilities to, the ECB system. Until mid-2007, the Target accounts were close to zero, but since then, they have grown by about €100 billion per year.

For example, the Bundesbank’s Target claims ballooned from €5 billion in 2006 to €323 billion by March 2011. The counterpart to these claims were the PIGS’ liabilities, which had grown to about €340 billion by the end of last year. Interestingly, the PIGS’ cumulative current-account deficits from 2008 through 2010 were of roughly the same order of magnitude – €365 billion, to be precise.

Had the ECB failed to finance these deficits, the PIGS would have had a hard time finding the money to pay for their net imports. If they succeeded at all, high interest rates would have induced them to tighten their belts, and their current-account deficits, which in the case of Greece and Portugal exceeded 10% of GDP, would have diminished.

More on the euro zone deficit report

Yes, the deficit went from 6.3% to 6% of GDP, but the question remains as to whether they are at the point where further slowing from austerity measures continue to reduce the overall deficit or, instead, an induced slowdown begins to increase it.

Euro Zone 2010 Deficit Shrinks, Debt Rises

April 26 (Reuters) — The euro zone’s aggregated budget deficit fell last year as most countries slashed government spending to restore market confidence in public finances, but the debt still grew, Eurostat data showed.

The European Union’s statistics office said on Tuesday the budget deficit in the euro zone in 2010 was 6.0 percent of gross domestic product, down from 6.3 percent in 2009. Public debt, however, rose to 85.1 percent from 79.3 percent in 2009.

All euro zone countries except Germany, Ireland, Luxembourg and Austria improved their budget balance last year, but debt rose in all euro zone countries except Estonia.

Eurostat said Greece, which was forced to seek emergency funding from the euro zone last year because it was effectively cut off from market borrowing due to its large debt, cut its budget gap to 10.5 percent of GDP from 15.4 percent in 2009.

This is well above the initial target of the Greek austerity programme of 8 percent and even above the latest estimate from the European Union and the International Monetary Fund of 9.6 percent.

Greek public debt rocketed to 142.8 percent of GDP from 127.1 percent in 2009.

Ireland saw its budget deficit more than double to 32.4 percent of GDP last year from 14.3 percent in 2009 and its debt jumped to 96.2 percent from 65.6 percent as the country had to borrow to bail out its banking sector.

Euro-Area Debt Reaches Record 85.1% of GDP as Crisis Festers

It’s hard to say from the headlines whether proactive deficit reduction measures are slowing the economies to the point where the slowing is causing their deficits to increase.

However, if that is the case, continuing their deficit reduction efforts will only make things worse, to the point of forcing social upheaval.

And the rising deficits will begin to weaken the euro, as the deficit reduction that initially worked to strengthen the euro reverse.

And higher rates from the ECB will only serve to further increase national government deficits via higher interest payments by those same governments.

This also makes euro ‘easier to get’ and thereby weakens the currency.

Yes, the euro zone is seeing ‘inflation’, as they define it, moving higher, but under current conditions I don’t see any channel from rate hikes to lower ‘inflation’, again as they define it. But I do see how higher rates can instead add to the general price level through income interest and cost channels. All of which would be exacerbated should this policy also cause the euro to depreciate.

With regards to funding, there is nothing operationally to stop the ECB from, for all practical purposes, funding/backstopping the entire banking system as well as the national governments.

The question is the political will, which is not quantifiable.

And the solution remains painfully simple- the ECB can simply announce an annual payment of 10% of the euro zone’s gdp to the national governments on a per capita basis.

This will have no effect on inflation as it won’t get spent. It will only serve to allow all of the national governments to borrow at the ECB’s target rate, which would lower funding costs for the nations currently paying premiums for funding.

This will also give the ECB a lever to control deficits- the threat of suspending a nation’s funding if it is not in compliance.

And by removing the threat of market discipline from funding, the region would be free to set their stability and growth pact deficit targets at levels designed to achieve their macro economic goals for employment, output, and price stability.

Euro-Area Debt Reaches Record 85.1% of GDP as Crisis Festers

(Bloomberg) Euro-area debt reached a record in 2010. Debt rose in all 16 countries that were using the euro last year, lifting the bloc’s average to 85.1 percent of gross domestic product from 79.3 percent in 2009, the European Union’s statistics office said. Greece’s deficit topped expectations and debt ballooned to 142.8 percent of GDP, the highest in the euro’s 12-year history. Ireland’s debt surged the most, by 30.6 percentage points to 96.2 percent of GDP. Contingent liabilities from guaranteeing the banking system after the 2008 financial panic now amount to 6.5 percent of GDP, down from 8.6 percent in 2009, Eurostat said.

The Wall of Shame (cont.)

Today is year and in Japan,
which means the last few days could be mainly quarter end and year end maneuvers,
with a high probability of ‘buy the rumor sell the news’ types of unwinds coming up.

This would include the anticipation of another 200,000 new private sector jobs to be reported tomorrow am.
And the euro strength we’ve seen in front of the announced ECB rate hike next week.

There have been lots of promotional reasons to rush to get stocks on your books for year and/quarter end reporting,
as well as a bit of gold, silver, foods, and other commodities.

But fundamentally I see what’s going on below- a world heck bent on removing aggregate demand.

More noises from Japan on how they will pay for the rebuild, which looks to be a very modest appropriation tempered by fears of being at a fiscal tipping point.

UK austerity ratchets up April 1.

China still fighting inflation with further reduced spending and lending.

The euro zone demanding and getting austerity in return for funding, with signs in some members of austerity no longer bringing down deficits as revenues fall off from economic weakness. And no fiscal safety net if it does all go bad as markets have shown extreme reluctance to fund countercyclical deficits.

And food and fuel from monopoly pricing both eating into consumer demand and driving large segments of the world population into desperation.

Talk of Q1 US GDP down to maybe only +2%, housing still bumping along the bottom, and Q2 threatened by supply shortages due to the earthquake in Japan.

And the US debt ceiling showdown now possibly happing late next week as the deficit terrorists seal their congressional victory with the promised down payment on net spending cuts that won’t end there.

In fact, their army of support is now all but universal.

Everyone in DC and the mainstream media and economics profession agrees on the problem.

The only discussion is where the cuts should be, and who should pay more.

March 31, 2011
President Barack Obama
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20500
The Honorable John Boehner
Speaker of the House
1101 Longworth House Office Building
Washington, DC 20515
The Honorable Nancy Pelosi
House Minority Leader
235 Cannon House Office Building
Washington, DC 20515
The Honorable Harry Reid
Senate Majority Leader
522 Hart Senate Office Building
Washington, DC 20510
The Honorable Mitch McConnell
Senate Minority Leader
361-A Russell Senate Office Building
Washington, DC 20510

Dear President Obama, Speaker Boehner, Minority Leader Pelosi, Majority Leader Reid, and Minority Leader McConnell:


As you continue to work on our current budget situation, we are writing to let you know that we join with the 64 Senators who recently wrote that comprehensive deficit reduction measures are imperative, and to urge you to work together in support of a broad approach to solving the nation’s fiscal problems. As they said in their letter to President Obama:

“As you know, a bipartisan group of Senators has been working to craft a comprehensive deficit reduction package based upon the recommendations of the Fiscal Commission. While we may not agree with every aspect of the Commission’s recommendations, we believe that its work represents an important foundation to achieve meaningful progress on our debt. The Commission’s work also underscored the scope and breadth of our nation’s long-term fiscal challenges.

Beyond FY2011 funding decisions, we urge you to engage in a broader discussion about a comprehensive deficit reduction package. Specifically, we hope that the discussion will include discretionary spending cuts, entitlement changes and tax reform.

By approaching these negotiations comprehensively, with a strong signal of support from you, we believe that we can achieve consensus on these important fiscal issues. This would send a powerful message to Americans that Washington can work together to tackle this critical issue. Thank you for your attention to this matter.”

We agree with this letter and hope that you will work together to agree on a comprehensive, multi-year debt stabilization package.

Sincerely,
The Honorable Roger C. Altman
Former Assistant Secretary of the U.S.
Department of the Treasury; Founder
and Chairman, Evercore Partners

Barry Anderson
Former Acting Director, Congressional
Budget Office

Joseph Antos
Wilson H. Taylor Scholar in Health Care
and Retirement Policy, American
Enterprise Institute

The Honorable Martin Baily
Former Chairman, Council of Economic
Advisers

Robert Bixby
Executive Director, Concord Coalition

Charles Blahous
Research Fellow, Hoover Institute

Erskine Bowles
Former Co-Chair, National Commission
on Fiscal Responsibility and Reform

The Honorable Charles Bowsher
Former Comptroller General of the
United States

The Honorable John E. Chapoton
Former Assistant Secretary for Tax
Policy, U.S. Department of the Treasury

David Cote
Former Member, National Commission
on Fiscal Responsibility and Reform;
Chairman and CEO, Honeywell
International

Pete Davis
President, Davis Capital Investment
Ideas

John Endean
President, American Business
Conference

The Honorable Vic Fazio
Former Member of Congress

The Honorable Martin Feldstein
Former Chairman, Council of Economic
Advisers

The Honorable William Frenzel
Former Ranking Member, House
Budget Committee; Co-Chair,
Committee for a Responsible Federal
Budget

Ann Fudge
Former Member, National Commission
on Fiscal Responsibility and Reform;
Former CEO, Young & Rubicam Brands

William G. Gale
Senior Fellow, Brookings Institution William A. Galston
Senior Fellow and Ezra K. Zilkha Chair,
Brookings Institution

The Honorable Bill Gradison
Former Ranking Member, House
Budget Committee

The Honorable Judd Gregg
Former Chairman, Senate Budget
Committee

Ron Haskins
Senior Fellow, Brookings Institution

Kevin Hassett
Senior Fellow and Director of Economic
Policy Studies, American Enterprise
Institute

G. William Hoagland
Former Staff Director, Senate Budget
Committee

The Honorable Glenn Hubbard
Former Chairman, Council of Economic
Advisers; Dean, Columbia Business
School

David B. Kendall
Senior Fellow for Health and Fiscal
Policy, Third Way

The Honorable Bob Kerrey
Former Member of Congress

Donald F. Kettl
Dean, School of Public Policy,
University of Maryland

The Honorable Charles E.M. Kolb
President, Committee for Economic
Development

The Honorable Jim Kolbe
Former Member of Congress

Lawrence B. Lindsey
President and CEO, The Lindsey Group;
Former Director, National Economic
Council

Maya MacGuineas
President, Committee for a Responsible
Federal Budget

The Honorable N. Gregory Mankiw
Former Chairman, Council of Economic
Advisers

The Honorable Donald Marron
Director, Urban-Brookings Tax Policy
Center; Former Acting Director,
Congressional Budget Office

William Marshall
President, Progressive Policy Institute

The Honorable James T. McIntyre, Jr.
Former Director, Office of Management
and Budget

Olivia S. Mitchell
Economist

The Honorable William A. Niskanen
Chairman Emeritus and Distinguished
Senior Economist, Cato Institute; Former
Acting Chairman, Council of Economic
Advisers

The Honorable Jim Nussle
Former Director, Office of Management
and Budget; Former Chairman, House
Budget Committee; Co-Chair,
Committee for a Responsible Federal
Budget Michael E. O’Hanlon
Senior Fellow and Sydney Stein Jr.
Chair, Brookings Institution

The Honorable Paul O’Neill
Former Secretary of the U.S.
Department of the Treasury

Marne Obernauer, Jr.
Chairman, Beverage Distributors
Company

Rudolph G. Penner
Former Director, Congressional Budget
Office

The Honorable Timothy Penny
Former Member of Congress; Co-Chair,
Committee for a Responsible Federal
Budget

The Honorable Alice Rivlin
Former Director, Congressional Budget
Office; Former Director, Office of
Management and Budget; Former
Member, National Commission on
Fiscal Responsibility and Reform

The Honorable Charles Robb
Former Member of Congress

Diane Lim Rogers
Chief Economist, Concord Coalition

The Honorable Christina Romer
Former Chairwoman, Council of
Economic Advisers

The Honorable Robert E. Rubin
Former Secretary of the U.S.
Department of the Treasury

The Honorable Martin Sabo
Former Chairman, House Budget
Committee

Isabel V. Sawhill
Senior Fellow, Brookings Institution

Allen Schick
Distinguished University Professor,
University of Maryland

Sylvester J. Schieber
Former Chairman, Social Security
Advisory Board

Daniel N. Shaviro
Wayne Perry Professor of Taxation,
New York University School of Law

The Honorable George P. Shultz
Former Secretary of the U.S.
Department of the Treasury; Former
Secretary of the U.S. Department of
State; Former Secretary of the U.S.
Department of Labor

The Honorable Alan K. Simpson
Former Member of Congress; Co-Chair,
National Commission on Fiscal
Responsibility and Reform

C. Eugene Steuerle
Institute Fellow and Richard B. Fisher
Chair, Urban Institute

The Honorable Charlie Stenholm
Former Member of Congress; Co-Chair,
Committee for a Responsible Federal
Budget The Honorable Phillip Swagel
Former Assistant Secretary for
Economic Policy, U.S. Department of the
Treasury

The Honorable John Tanner
Former Member of Congress

John B. Taylor
Mary and Robert Raymond Professor of
Economics, Stanford University; George
P. Shultz Senior Fellow in Economics,
Hoover Institution
The Honorable Laura D. Tyson
Former Chairwoman, Council of
Economic Advisers; Former Director,
National Economic Council
The Honorable George Voinovich
Former Member of Congress

The Honorable Paul Volcker
Former Chairman, Federal Reserve
System

Carol Cox Wait
Former President, Committee for a
Responsible Federal Budget

The Honorable David M. Walker
Former Comptroller General of the
United States


The Honorable Murray L.
Weidenbaum
Former Chairman, Council of Economic
Advisers

The Honorable Joseph R. Wright, Jr.
Former Director, Office of Management
and Budget
Mark Zandi
Chief Economist, Moody’s Analytics

WARNING- Euro Zone Automatic Fiscal Stabilizers Deactivated!

I now believe that system risk in the euro zone is being grossly under discounted.

The implied assumption for the major currency regions is that during a slowdown the automatic fiscal stabilizers- falling government ‘revenues’ and increased transfer payments- will kick in to increase deficit spending, and thereby add the income and savings to catch the fall and support the next expansion.

This has always been the case, and as we all know, the most accurate forecasts are the ones that assume it’s not different this time.

But the relatively new and evolving euro zone arrangements are qualitatively different.
Spending by euro zone national governments is now market constrained in Greece, Ireland, and Portugal, with the rest looking like they aren’t far away from those same market constraints.

In a slow down, this means as tax revenues fall, markets may not permit government spending to rise, unless the ECB immediately funds all the national governments as well as the banks. Just as we see happening to the US states.

Not that the ECB won’t eventually do that, but that they are unlikely to proactively do it.
In other words, it will all have to get bad enough for the ECB to write the check that only they can write.

This means the euro zone is now flying without a net.

And the potential drop in aggregate demand is far higher than markets are discounting.

And that kind of catastrophic collapse in aggregate demand in the euro zone will have immediate catastrophic global impact.

And the fiscal discussions going on in Japan and elsewhere tell me there is a clear risk even the operationally unconstrained nations will be very reluctant to immediately and proactively move towards fiscal expansion.
Instead, they will let it all deteriorate until their automatic fiscal stabilizers to kick in.
Much like what happened with the 2008 financial crisis, where the lack of a will to engage in an immediate fiscal response let that financial crisis spill over into the real economy.

Can all this be avoided? Yes, and the remedy is both simple, immediate, and would quickly lead to unprecedented global prosperity.

All the euro zone has to do is have the ECB write the check, and announce immediate and annual distributions of 10% of GDP to member nations to pay down their outstanding debts, and at the same time impose national deficit ceilings sufficiently high to promote desired levels of aggregate demand. And the penalty for non compliance would be the withdrawal of ECB support. This would remove credit concerns, without increasing government spending, so there would be no inflationary impact.

And all the rest of the world has to do is recognize that federal taxes function to regulate aggregate demand, and not to fund expenditures per se. And then set taxation and/or government spending at levels that sustain desired aggregate demand.

They need to know the question is not whether longer term the budget deficit is sustainable- as it’s always nominally sustainable- but instead worry about sustaining aggregate demand at desired levels, both long term and short term.

But, unfortunately, I see the odds of a catastrophic collapse in aggregate demand as far higher than the odds of an awakening to a global understanding of actual monetary operations.

Welcome to the 7th US depression, Mr. bond market

Looks to me like the lack of noises out of Japan means there won’t be a sufficient fiscal response to restore demand.

If anything, the talk is about how to pay for the rebuilding, with a consumption tax at the top of the list.

That means they aren’t going to inflate.
More likely they are going to further deflate.
Yes, the yen will go down by what looks like a lot, maybe even helped by the MOF, but I doubt it will be enough to inflate.

In fact, all the evidence indicates that Japan doesn’t don’t know how to inflate, nor does anyone else.

Worse, what they all think inflates, more likely actually deflates.

0 rate policies mean deficits can be that much higher without causing ‘inflation’ due to income channels and supply side effects.
There is no such thing as a debt trap springing to life.
Debt monetization is a meaningless expression with non convertible currency and floating fx.
QE mainly serves to further remove precious income from an already income starved economy.

Only excess deficit spending can directly support prices, output, and employment from the demand side, as it directly adds to incomes, spending, and net savings of financial assets.

The international fear mongering surrounding deficits and debt issues is entirely a chicken little story that’s keeping us in this depression (unemployment over 10% the way it was measured when the term was defined) that’s now taking a turn for the worse.

The euro zone is methodically weakening it’s ‘engines of growth’- its own (weaker) members being subjected to austerity measures that are reducing their deficit spending that paid for their imports from Germany. And now China, Japan, the US and others will be cutting imports as well.

UK fiscal austerity measures are accelerating on schedule.

The US is also working to tighten fiscal policy, particularly now that both sides agree that deficit reduction is in order, beaming as they make progress towards agreeing on the cuts.

The US had 6 depressions while on the gold standard, which followed the only 6 periods of budget surpluses.
And now, even with a floating fx policy and non convertible currency that allows for immediate and unlimited fiscal adjustments,
we have allowed the deflationary forces unleashed by the Clinton budget surpluses to result in this 7th depression.

We were muddling through with modest real growth and a far too high output gap and may have continued to do so all else equal.

But all else isn’t equal.

Collective, self inflicted proactive austerity has been working against growth, including China’s ‘fight against inflation.’

And now Japan’s massive disaster will be deflationary shock that, in the absence of a proactive fiscal adjustment, is highly likely to further reduce world demand.

Hopefully, the Saudis capitulate and follow the price of crude lower, easing the burden somewhat on the world’s struggling populations.
If so, watch for a strong dollar as well.

And watch for a lot more global civil unrest as no answers emerge to the mass unemployment that will likely get even worse. Not to mention food prices that may come down some, but will remain very high at the consumer level as we continue to burn up our food supply for motor fuel.

And it’s all only likely to get worse until the world figures out how its monetary system actually works.