NYT: Too big to fail?


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Too Big to Fail?


by Peter S Goodman

Using public money to spare Fannie and Freddie would increase the public debt, which now exceeds $9.4 trillion. The United States has been financing itself by leaning heavily on foreigners, particularly China, Japan and the oil-rich nations of the Persian Gulf.

This is ridiculous, of course. The US, like any nation with its own non-convertible currency, is best thought of as spending first, and then borrowing and/or collecting taxes.

Were they to become worried that the United States might not be able to pay up, that would force the Treasury to offer higher rates of interest for its next tranche of bonds.

Also ridiculous. Japan had total debt of 150% of GDP, 7% annual deficits, and were downgraded below Botswana, and they sold their 3 month bills at about 0.0001% and 10 year securities at yields well below 1% while the BOJ voted to keep rates at 0%. (Nor did their currency collapse.)

The CB sets the rate by voice vote.

And that would increase the interest rates that Americans must pay for houses and cars, putting a drag on economic growth.

As above.

For one thing, this argument goes, taxpayers — who now confront plunging house prices, a drop on Wall Street and soaring costs for food and fuel — will ultimately pay the costs. To finance a bailout, the government can either pull more money from citizens directly,

Yes, taxing takes money directly, and it’s contradictionary.

But when the government sells securities they merely provide interest bearing financial assets (treasury securities) for non-interest bearing financial assets (bank deposits at the Fed). Net financial assets and nominal wealth are unchanged.

or the Fed can print more money — a step that encourages further inflation.

This is inapplicable.

There is no distinction between ‘printing money’ and some/any other way government spends.

The term ‘printing money’ refers to convertible currency regimes only, where there is a ratio of bill printed to reserves backing that convertible currency.

Skip to next paragraph “They are going to raise the cost of living for every American,”

True, that’s going up!


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Deflation forecast


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This is the deflation argument.
(See below)

Never seen a split quite like this with calls for both accelerating inflation and outright deflation.

Which will it be?

My guess is inflation for the US as our friendly external monopolist continues to squeeze us with ever higher crude prices.

The political process is ensuring they will be passed through as sufficient government ‘check writing’ (net government spending) is sustained to support real growth.

(Bear Stearns, housing agencies, fiscal rebates, fiscal housing package, etc.)

And the dollar continues to adjust to the sudden, politically induced shift in foreign desires to accumulate USD financial and domestic assets.

Various private Q2 GDP estimates are now up to 2% – more than sufficient to support demand and pass through the higher headline prices.

Government is never revenue constrained regarding spending and/or lending.

The limit to government check writing is the political tolerance for inflation, which grows with economic weakness.

This inflation looks to me to be far worse than the 1970s.

Back then, we were able to muster a 15 million bpd positive supply response in crude that broke OPEC by deregulating natural gas.

We don’t have that card to play this time around.

From HFE:

July 14, 2008

WORLDWIDE:

  • Global Disinflation Is Going To Be The Next Big Move For The Bond Markets – Weinberg
  • Commodity And Oil Prices Cannot Rise Forever… There Is No Inflation – Weinberg
  • Bonds To Benefit – Weinberg

UNITED STATES:

  • STOP PRESS: Treasury, Fed To Make Credit Available To GSEs; Treasury To Seek Authority To Buy Their Stocks – Shepherdson
  • This Is A Lifeboat, Not a Bailout; Aim Is To Prevent Uncontained Failure – Shepherdson

CANADA:

  • We Cannot Rule Out A Rate Cut Tomorrow – Weinberg

EURO ZONE:

  • Core CPI Shows No Medium-Term Inflation Risks – Weinberg
  • Production Data Will Be Really Soft – Weinberg

GERMANY:

  • Core CPI Still Under 2% And Steady, ZEW At New Record Low – Weinberg
  • … Tighter Money Is Unhelpful Here – Weinberg

UNITED KINGDOM:

  • Starting Point For August QIR Forecasts To Emerge In This Week’s
  • Reports: Most Inputs To The Forecasts Will Be Stronger – Weinberg

FRANCE:

  • Not-Too-Scary Inflation Report Exported: Core Prices Are Steady – Weinberg

JAPAN:

  • Three Soft Report This Week Will Keep Investors Moving Out Of Stocks, Into Bonds – Weinberg

AUSTRALIA:

  • CPI Report For Q2, Due Next Week, May Rekindle Inflation Worries – Weinberg

CHINA:

  • Exploding Foreign Borrowing Diminishes Foreign Currency Reserve Adequacy; Trends Suggest Further Decay – Weinberg
  • GDP Will Be Below Recent Trend In This Week’s Report – Weinberg


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2008-07-08 China News Highlights


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Highlights:

Chinese entrepreneurs less confident in Q2
China’s Inflation Eased to 7.1% Last Month, Reuters Reports
China Home Prices to Drop More as Curbs Stay, Citic Ka Wah Says
Trade: China’s textile export growth drops significantly
Investors’ confidence in stock market remain

 
Perhaps coming apart with the approach of the Olympics as many have anticipated.

The crowd’s not always wrong!


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Re: Kohn to ROW- You hike, not us (today’s speech)


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(an interoffice email)

On Thu, Jun 26, 2008 at 7:48 AM, Karim wrote:
>   
>   
>   

Global Economic Integration and Decoupling


Vice Chairman Donald L. Kohn
At the International Research Forum on Monetary Policy, Frankfurt, Germany
June 26, 2008

For the moment, higher headline rates of inflation have shown only a few tentative signs of embedding themselves in core inflation or in longer-term inflation expectations.

>   -talking about u.s. here
>   
>   
>   

However, policymakers around the world must monitor the situation carefully for signs that the increases in relative prices globally do not generate persistently higher inflation. Additionally, in those countries where strong commodity demands are associated with rapid growth in aggregate demand that outstrips potential supply, actions to contain inflation by restraining aggregate demand would contribute to global price stability.

>   -not describing/talking about u.s. here;
>   focusing on EM primarily.
>   
>   

right, gets back to bernankes testimony a while back that the falling dollar has been a good thing as it works to lower the trade gap via increasing US exports that sustain US demand. the old ‘beggar they neighbor’ policy from the 30’s.

unfortunately for us it’s actually a ‘beggar thyself’ policy on closer examination as most mainstream economists will attest. they all say you don’t ‘inflate your way to prosperity’ by weakening your currency. otherwise latin america and africa for example would be the most prosperous places in the world

seems they are still in the mercantalist mode where exports are good and imports bad, and this policy is making us look like a bananna republic at an increasing rate.

recall from previous emails the dollar decline has been triggered by paulson succeeding in keeping cb’s from buying $US, Bush keeping oil producing monetary authorities from accumulating $US, and Bernanke discouraging foreign portfolio managers from accumulating same.

(more later on how it’s actually not happening due to fed rate policy, but they think it is)

as suspected, the $US is most likely to take another major leg down as it adjusts to a level where the trade gap is in line with foreign desire to accumulate $US financial assets which is probably a lot lower than the current 55-60 billion per month.

the ‘cost push inflation’ is pouring in through the trade channel, and the fed is increasingly taking the heat from the mainstream (not me- i’m the only one who thinks inflation isn’t a function of rates the way they do) for its apparent weak $US/inflate your way out of debt approach.

furthermore, the mainstream (and the stock market) sees the low interest rate/weak dollar policy as taking away US domestic demand as higher price for food/fuel leave less domestic income for everything else, including debt service.

that is, they see the falling dollar hurting us domestic demand more than the low interest rates are helping it.

the reality is there’s foreign monopolist- the saudis (and maybe russians)- that’s milking us for all they can with price hikes, and keeping us alive buying our goods and service and thereby keeping US gdp muddling through.

the real standard of living for most working americans has dropped by perhaps 10% as they work, get paid enough to eat and drive to work, and the rest of their real output is exported.

and our policy makers, including bernanke and paulson who’ve ‘engineered it’ think this is all a good thing- they think imports are bad and exports good and we are paying the price in declining real terms of trade.

while in my book interest rates are not a factor, the mainstream thinks they are, and the response when the inflation gets bad enough will be higher interest rates. The ‘correct’ anti-inflation rate last August was 5.25 when the fed didn’t cut.

by Jan 08 it was probably at least 7% with headline moving through 3% to get a sufficient ‘real rate.’

today it’s probably moved up to 8%+ as cpi is forecast to go through 5% over the next few months and gdp muddles through around 1%.

the mainstream (not me) will say that by having a real rate that’s too low now the fed will need a rate that much higher down the road as inflation accelerates due to over accommodative fed policy.

by the time the cost push inflation works its way to core- probably over the two quarters- the fed will ‘suddenly’ feel itself way behind the inflation curve and recognize they made a horrible mistake and now the cost of bringing down inflation is far higher than it would have been early on- just like they’ve always said.

the mainstream knows this, and now sees a fed with its head in the sand regarding inflation. they also see this weak dollar policy as subversive as it undermines the currency and inflation accelerates.

i expect there will be a groundswell of mainstream economists calling for the replacement of bernanke, kohn and the entire fomc very soon.

ironically, in my book low rates have helped moderate inflation via cost channels and have helped moderate domestic demand via interest income channels.

rate hike will add to domestic demand as net interest income of the private sectors from higher government interest payments add to personal income and demand.

and rate hikes will add to the cost push inflation via higher interest costs for firms.

it’ all going down hill fast, with policy makers both going the wrong way on key issues as they have the fundamentals backwards.

the only near term ‘solutions’ are near term crude oil supply responses like 30 mph speed limits which isn’t even under consideration in any form, nor are any other crude supply responses. most other alternative energy sources don’t replace crude.

medium term supply responses include pluggable hybrids that only start being produced in late 2010.

longer term supply responses include nuclear which might come on line 15 years down the road.

a collapse in world demand is possible if china/india let up on their deficit spending and growth, but so far that doesn’t seem in the cards. all their ‘tightebning’ seems to be on the ‘monetary’ side which does nothing of consequence apart from further increase inflation.

so with no supply responses on the horizon expect the saudis to keep hiking prices, and keep spending the new revenues to keep world gdp muddling through, cb’s hiking interest rates that will bring results that will cause them to hike further, and continuously declining real terms of trade for oil importers.

what to do?

cds on germany- it’s one go all go over there, and germany is the least expensive insurance.

forward muni bmas over 80 with no interest rate hedge as markets should discount the obama lead and long move up with inflation.


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WSJ: An economist who matters


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An economist who matters


by Kyle Wingfield

(Wall Street Journal) Robert Mundell isn’t in the habit of making fruitless policy recommendations, though some take a long time ripening. Nearly four decades passed between his early work on optimal currency areas and the birth of the euro in 1999 – the same year he received the Nobel Prize for economics.

The Euro had nothing to do with the optimal currency area considerations.

Back in America, there’s an election going on. There’s also been a spate of financial problems, not the least of which is a weak dollar. But Mr. Mundell says “the big issue economically . . . is what’s going to happen to taxes.”

Democratic nominee Barack Obama regularly professes disdain for the Bush tax cuts, suggesting that those growth-spurring measures may be scrapped. “If that happens,” Mr. Mundell predicts, “the U.S. will go into a big recession, a nosedive.”

Even if the lost aggregate demand is more than replaced at the same time?

One of the original “supply-side” economists, he has long preached the link between tax rates and economic growth. “It’s a lethal thing to suddenly raise taxes,” he explains. “This would be devastating to the world economy, to the United States,

Even Laffer, the originator of his curve, does not agree with that.

and it would be, I think, political suicide” in a general election.

That may be true, but so far polls don’t show it.

Should taxes instead be cut again, I ask him, to stimulate the sluggish economy? Mr. Mundell replies that he favors a ceiling of 30% on marginal rates (the current top rate is 35%). He recounts how the past century experienced a titanic struggle over whether tax rates are too high or too low: from a 3% income tax in 1913; up to 60% during World War I; down to 25% before Congress and President Herbert Hoover raised taxes back to 60% in 1932 and “sealed the fate of our economy for a long, long time”; all the way up to 92.5% during World War II

When real output more than doubled, even as 7 million of our best workers went into the military.

before falling in three steps, reaching 28% under President Ronald Reagan; and back to nearly 40% under Bill Clinton before George W. Bush lowered them to their current level.

Deficit spending is much more of a driver of aggregate demand than marginal income tax rates.

In light of this fiscal roller coaster, Mr. Mundell says, “the most important thing that could be done with respect to tax rates now is to make the Bush tax cuts permanent. Eliminating that uncertainty would be more important than pushing for a further cut – in the income tax rates, anyway.”

One tax that he would cut, to 25%, is the corporate tax rate. “It could be even lower,” he says, “but I think it would be a big step to lower it to 25% . . . I made that proposal back in the 1970s.”

Very small potatoes from a macro point of view.

A long-haired Mr. Mundell spent that decade not only arguing for the euro, but laying the intellectual groundwork for the Reagan tax-cut revolution. Mr. Mundell says those tax cuts remain “as important to the United States as the creation of the euro was to Europe – a fundamental change.”

The deficit spending of the Regan years was the driver of the expansion- tax cuts and spending increases.

Combined with Paul Volcker’s tight-money policy at the Fed, which Mr. Mundell also championed, supply-side economics killed off stagflation.

And not the drop in crude prices due to a 15 million barrel per day supply response when natural gas prices were uncapped and utilities switched from oil to gas (and coal, etc.)???

Seems Mundell is pure propaganda.

Or at least it killed it off at the time. With prices again rising as growth slows, some economists are worried that stagflation could be making a comeback. Not Mr. Mundell – not yet.

He draws a comparison with the situation in 1979-1980. Start with the dollar price of oil, which he calls “one of the two most important prices in the world” (the other being the dollar-euro exchange rate, which we’ll get to in a moment).

“If you look at the price level since 1980,” he begins, “oil prices would naturally double by the year 2000. So from $34 a barrel in 1980 to $68 a barrel. And then . . . because the inflation rate’s about 3.5%, it would double again by 2020. So the natural price . . . would be something like $136 in 2020.

So ‘naturally’ doesn’t include inflation???

More to the point, the inflation rate was about 3.5% for 20 years or so with oil prices under $20, so now with oil spiking to $140, inflation should fall to the Fed’s target of maybe 2% due to a modest output gap?

“Now, we [already] got to $130-something, but . . . I really think the price is going to settle down, probably below $100, if not below $90. What I’m saying is we’re not so far off track.”

Guess he forgot the first week of micro that shows how monopolists set price?

As an economist, he should know Saudis are necessarily setting price.

American motorists still shocked by $4-a-gallon gasoline might think we’re rather more off track than Mr. Mundell suggests. Bolstering his case, he immediately moves on to another commodity often invoked to demonstrate inflation: gold.

“The price of gold in 1980 was $850 an ounce. And the price of gold today is about the same. It’s astonishing,” he says. “It’s true, gold did go up” to more than $1,000 an ounce earlier this year, “but the public doesn’t believe that there is inflation. If there was big inflation coming, then you’d see the price of gold going up to $1,500 an ounce very quickly, and that hasn’t happened.”

If they could take Nobel Prizes away, that statement would put him at risk.

In any case, don’t expect to hear Barack Obama or John McCain talk about the weak dollar’s contributions to any problem. “As [journalist] Robert Novak once put it, it’s like cleaning ladies who come in and say ‘I don’t do ironing.’

Good thing he isn’t running with a statement like that.

[Politicians] say, ‘I don’t do exchange rates,'” Mr. Mundell chuckles. “They think they can only lose by talking about exchange rates, because they don’t know enough about it, and it’s hard to predict anyway, for anyone.”

If Mr. Mundell had his way, there wouldn’t be anything for politicians to say about exchange rates. They would be fixed – as they were under the Bretton Woods arrangement after World War II until 1971, when President Nixon took the U.S. off the postwar gold standard and effectively launched the era of floating exchange rates.

“It’s a very poor and a dangerous system,” Mr. Mundell says of the floating regime, “because it creates exaggerated swings in the exchange rate.”

Vs. exaggerated swings in unemployment. Fixed foreign exchange regimes regularly ‘blow up’ with double digit or higher unemployment, negative growth, and actual blood in the streets. They have been abandoned for very good and practical reasons.

Case in point is the dollar-euro rate. From a low of about 82 cents in 2000, Europe’s common currency has risen fairly steadily and has been valued at more than $1.50 since late February, even breaking the $1.60 barrier once.

Without any negative growth, moderate inflation, and, in the Eurozone, declining unemployment.

“What people have to realize is there’s been a fundamental change in the way markets work in the past 20 years,” Mr. Mundell says. “Now, exchange rates are driven not so much by trade but by capital accounts and capital movements, and the huge amount of liquidity that’s sloshing around the world.”

Guaranteed he can’t discuss ‘liquidity sloshing around the world’ beyond that rhetoric.

Central banks world-wide, he notes, are trying to reach an equilibrium between dollars and euros in their $6.5 trillion worth of foreign reserves. Roughly two-thirds of these reserves are kept in dollars now, so they have about $1 trillion left to move into euros.

“If you did a hundred billion dollars” annually, Mr. Mundell points out, “you’d need 10 years to build that up, and that amount of capital movement has a tremendous effect in keeping the euro overvalued. It’s not good for Europe

It does help their real terms of trade, but maybe he doesn’t think that’s ‘good.’

and . . . ultimately it would cause more inflation in the United States.”

It already is, but here he’s denying it.

But this continuing shift doesn’t mean that the dollar’s status as the world’s dominant currency is in danger, at least not in the short run. Countries like Iran may be pushing for the pricing of oil in another currency, “but it wouldn’t happen unless Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states moved in that direction, and I don’t see any way in which they would do this,” Mr. Mundell says.

He also doesn’t ‘see’ that it doesn’t matter what currency anything is ‘priced in’ as it’s just a numeraire. What matters is the currency they ‘save in’ as he mentions when he estimates how they want to hold their reserves and how that matters.

“It would be very damaging to the relations between the United States and the Gulf countries. There’s an implicit defense alliance between those, and that’s what overrides as a top priority.”

Nor is there a macroeconomic argument for demoting the dollar. “Remember, the growth prospects for the United States are probably stronger than that of Europe, because you’ve got continued and substantial population growth in the United States, and zero population growth in Europe,” Mr. Mundell says. “Quite apart from the fact that the U.S. economy is innovating more rapidly, and the population is younger and not getting old as rapidly, so they pick up new technology faster. So I look upon the United States still as the main sparkplug of economic growth in the world.”

He misses his own argument. It’s about what currency non-residents want to ‘save in’ that determines reserve levels and the dollar being a reserve currency.

As for the euro’s overvalued status, he forecasts deflation in Europe,

Negative CPI???

along with a slowdown and an end to its housing boom.

Already happening to some degree.

The answer, he suggests, is for the Federal Reserve and the European Central Bank to cooperate in putting a floor and a ceiling on both the euro and the dollar. “You have to grope” to the appropriate range, he maintains, but a good starting point would be to keep the euro between 90 cents and $1.30.

That would mean the ECB buying $ and giving the appearance that the $ is ‘backing’ the Euro as the ECB collects dollar reserves. This is probably unthinkable politically for the Eurozone as they want the Euro to be the world’s reserve currency, not the $.

Even better, in his mind – and now we’re really talking long term – would be to have a global currency. This could take the form of a new money or a dominant existing one to which all others are fixed – probably the dollar. “As Paul Volcker says,” Mr. Mundell relates, “the global economy needs a global currency.”

With no global fiscal authority to regulate aggregate demand? That’s a prescription for economic disaster.

To get there, he proposes holding a new, Bretton Woods-type meeting in 2010 at the Shanghai World’s Fair. Mr. Mundell, who has been spending “a lot of time” in China advising the government, says reviving an international system of fixed exchange rates would be a tremendous help to Beijing as it tries to fend off demands from U.S. and European politicians that it appreciate or float its currency.

Here, he recalls Washington’s similar “bashing” of the Japanese yen in the 1980s, and its ultimately disastrous effects: “Japan got stuck with an overvalued currency for a decade, and suffered from a perpetual deflation in its housing market from 1990 until just a couple of years ago. And China doesn’t want to have the same problem.”

Japan ran/allowed a budget surplus from 1987 to 1992 that wiped out demand and the economy didn’t begin to recover until subsequent deficits got over 7% of GDP.

China isn’t making that mistake.

Another part of his solution is for Asian countries to form their own currency bloc. If they did so, he says, “it’d be comparable in size to the European and the American bloc. And then it would not be so much the question of . . . the U.S. and Europe bashing China” or other rising economies.

He totally misses the roll of aggregate demand.

These three currency blocs, he predicts, would be large enough to weather wide swings in their exchange rates. But the swings would still do economic damage, so “the best thing you could do is to stabilize them, and that’s where the global currency comes in.”

Could it happen? Mr. Mundell allows that three decades may pass, but predicts that like the euro and the Reagan revolution before it, the global currency’s time, too, will come. Any skeptics might want to review the last few decades before betting against him.

I agree the world might do something counter productive like that. Unless there’s something worse they could do that pops up.

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Re: Demand destruction


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(an email exchange)

On Thu, Jun 19, 2008 at 10:38 PM, Russell wrote:
>   
>   
>   SUV sales may be falling off the cliff in the US, but in China, they are red hot.
>   Sales of the large vehicles in China rose by 40% in the first four months of this
>   year. That is twice the growth rate for the Chinese passenger car market.
>   
>   Its no surprise why: The costs of petrol and diesel in China is as much as 40%
>   cheaper than US levels (which are nearly half of European prices).
>   
>   China, the second-biggest fuel consumer after the U.S, has been encouraging
>   SUV purchases via subsidized fuel.
>   
>   That now appears to be changing: The Chinese government will “increase
>   gasoline and diesel prices by 1,000 yuan ($145.50) a ton, the National
>   Development and Reform Commission said,” according to a Bloomberg report.
>   This represents a 17% price increase for gasoline and 18% for diesel. China is
>   also scheduled to raise jet-fuel prices by 1,500 yuan a ton (~25%).
>   
>   The response in Crude futures was immediate: Crude Oil fell almost $5, spurring
>   gains in the broad averages.
>   
>   Demand Destruction is now clearly upon us. Its a cliche, but its true: The best
>   cure for high prices are high prices.
>   
>   

Yes, but…
   
This also means rationing by price which means only the world’s richest get to drive SUV’s and the lower income groups have to take the bus.
   
Distribution of consumption gets skewed towards the top.
   
Interesting that much of the political left wants higher prices to discourage consumption, as its counteragenda regarding their distributional desires.

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Competing for fuel


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Here’s what I see happening at the macro level:

The US, for all practical purposes, was able to successfully compete for the world’s fuel supply such that nearly everyone in the US could afford to drive.

Now other populations/regions of the world where almost no one could afford to drive are increasing their ‘wealth’ and competing with us for fuel.

In these nations, like China, India, Brazil, much like in the west, the majority of the ‘wealth’ flows to the top.

These people at the top are increasingly able to afford to outbid us for fuel as they bid up the price.

Our lowest income individuals get outbid first, and it works its way up from there as total world fuel output stagnates.

This process continues as their wealth increases and a larger number of their ‘rich’ outbid our ‘poor.’

A small percentage of their much larger populations gaining wealth means a larger percentage of our smaller population gets out bid.

And rising fuel prices/declining real terms of trade further foster this effect.

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From Obama’s economic advisor


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Why Deficits Still Matter

by Austan Goolsbee

Chief economic adviser to Obama.

The United States has run massive budget deficits every year the Bush administration has been in office. The latest budget projections from the White House show annual deficits in the $250 billion range for the rest of the president’s term, at which point nearly $3 trillion will have been added to the national debt.

And thereby added to aggregate demand, non-government income, and ‘savings’ of financial assets.

1
In fact, George W. Bush has presided over the biggest fiscal deterioration in American history—a sorry legacy considering his predecessor left him a healthy budget surplus projected to be $5 trillion over 10 years.

The budget surplus drained the savings of net financial assets of the non-government sectors, and thereby ended the recovery triggered by the large deficits of the early 1990s.

The Bush fiscal reversal helped restore aggregate demand, growth, and employment.

Austan Goolsbee is a senior economist for PPI and the Democratic Leadership Council. This did not happen by accident. White
House officials have repudiated the Clinton administration’s view that fiscal responsibility lays the groundwork for sustained economic growth.

And rightly so.

Government deficit = Non-government ‘surplus’ (savings of financial assets) as a matter of accounting, not theory.

Often identified with former Treasury Secretary Robert Rubin, this view held that by running massive deficits

Adding to aggregate demand.

and borrowing heavily,

‘Borrowing’ only ‘offsets operating factors’ to give non-interest bearing deposits created by deficit spending and ‘borrowing’ only ‘offsets operating factors’ to give non-interest bearing deposits created by deficit spending as interest bearing alternative in order to keep the Fed Funds rate at the FOMC’s target level.

the federal government drove up the cost of capital.

The Fed votes on the interest rate, and the cost of capital includes a risk adjustment as well.

NOTE: A few years ago, Japan had a debt of 150% of GDP, annual deficits of 7%, and 10-year interest rates under 1%.

By cutting the deficit, it could bring interest rates down

Only if it causes a slowdown that causes the Fed to cut rates.

and thereby stimulate new waves of private investment.

No, a slowdown does not encourage private investment.

The economic boom of the 1990s seemed to prove Rubinomics right.

No. The high deficits of the early 1990s triggered the expansion, and the surplus of the late 1990s ended it.

But Republicans have nonetheless rejected that approach. Glenn Hubbard, formerly President Bush’s top economic adviser, said in a December 2002 speech: “One can hope that the discussion will move away from the current fixation with linking budget deficits with interest rates.” When pressed on the point, he responded: “That’s Rubinomics, and we think it’s completely wrong.”

Hubbard is right on that point, but he still favors lower deficits; so, he’s ultimately wrong as well.

2
More recently, in an editorial marking the 25th anniversary of Ronald Reagan’s inauguration, the conservative Wall Street Journal opined that Rubinomics was a failure, and argued that history had vindicated the supply-side line that tax cuts are the most important policy that government can undertake.

They think tax cuts are good because through growth they ‘raise more revenue than they cost’ and bring down the deficit that way.

Their goal is the same: to bring down deficits.

3
Meanwhile, the Bush White House has pointed to higher-than-expected tax revenues in the last two years as further proof that we do not need to worry about fiscal responsibility in the near future.

Right, both believe lower deficits are ‘better’; both miss the point.

Times have changed since 1992, and the economic case for fiscal discipline has changed, too. But it remains strong.

Wrong.

It is true that the globalization of capital markets in the last 15 years means that America no longer displaces an inordinate percentage of the world’s capital when it borrows heavily from abroad.

We have no imperative to borrow from abroad. He has it all backwards, as does most everyone else. In fact, US domestic credit funds foreign savings.

Therefore, the interest rates that the U.S. government has to pay for its massive borrowing are not as high as they might be

The Fed sets the rates by voting on them.

The left and the right have gone far astray from the economic fundamentals.

otherwise. In addition, governments and central banks have helped our situation. Lending countries such as China and the world’s oil exporting nations seemingly have been willing to hold U.S. debt even though higher returns might be available elsewhere.

Yes, to support their exports. But now that Paulson and Bush have ‘successfully’ caused them to change policy by calling them currency manipulators and outlaws, they no longer are accumulating USD financial assets at previous rates.

This has caused the USD to begin falling to the levels that coincide with rising US exports and falling imports.

It won’t stop until the US trade gap gets to levels that equate it with desired USD accumulation levels of foreigners. Could be near zero.

Of course, it is nice to be able to borrow money without having to worry much about the impact on interest rates.

That’s what all governments with non-convertible currency and floating fx do in the normal course of business.

But if globalization has made borrowing from abroad easier, it also exacts new penalties for fiscal profligacy. In fact, there are three big reasons why Americans should still be concerned with big budget deficits: (1) they have unfair distributional consequences between generations;

No, this is inapplicable.

When our children build twenty million cars in 2030, will they have to send them back to 2008 to pay off their debt?

Are we sending goods and services back to 1945 to pay for WWII?

No, each generation gets to consume whatever it produces, and it also can decide the distribution of its consumption.

(2) they make it harder for our government to respond to fiscal crises;

No, government can buy whatever is offered for sale to it. Government spending is not constrained by revenue.

and (3) they subject America’s economic well-being to the potential whims of foreign governments and central banks.

Only to the extent that we might lose the benefits of high real imports.

Imports are real benefits; exports are real costs.

Before looking at each of these, however, it is important to address the administration’s claim that our current fiscal position is basically healthy.

‘Healthy’ is undefined and inapplicable.

The recently released budgets of the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) and of the president show the government going back into surplus by 2012, which makes it sound as though the problem has been solved.

No, sounds like a recession would quickly follow if they press those results.

4
A closer look at the numbers, however, reveals that the positive news is overstated.

Thank goodness – might continue to muddle through and avoid recession after all!

The CBO’s projections, for example, assume that all the Bush tax cuts will expire; that the Alternative Minimum Tax (AMT) will affect a growing fraction of people earning between $75,000 and $100,000 over the next five years; that federal spending will grow only with inflation, rather than with population or GDP growth; and, most importantly, that the federal government will go on raiding the Social Security trust fund “lock-box.” The president, by requesting hundreds of billions of dollars in further tax cuts, has painted himself into such a tight corner that he cannot produce a fiscally responsible budget without leaning heavily on such dubious assumptions.

Hoping he doesn’t succeed!

A more realistic analysis shows very significant deficits for at least the next several years, after which the baby boomers’ exploding health and retirement costs will make the fiscal picture dramatically worse.

He means ‘better’ but doesn’t realize yet.

Make no mistake: Deficits still matter. A balanced budget may be less central to economic growth today than in the 1990s. But deficit reduction now functions as a crucial insurance policy against global financial shocks and over-reliance on foreign lenders,

There is no reliance on foreign lenders. Government is best thought of as spending first, then borrowing to support interest rates.

as well as national emergencies such as Hurricane Katrina’s devastation of the Gulf Coast.

Government can spend however much it wants at any time it wants, unconstrained by revenues.

The constraint is inflation, not revenues, but the author never even mentions inflation.

It should not be a goal in and of itself—pain for pain’s sake. Fiscal responsibility should be our goal because it remains an important foundation of economic justice and growth.

Justice???

Here is a closer look at the adverse social and economic consequences of the Bush administration’s irresponsible fiscal policies.

Who Will Pay for the Bush Deficits?
Although fiscal policy is seldom viewed through the lens of economic fairness, the first and biggest problem with fiscal irresponsibility is distributional. When we borrow money without paying it back, we are leaving our children and grandchildren a legacy of much higher tax rates and much lower public benefits than we enjoy, because they will have to foot our bill.

As above, they will get to consume whatever they produce, debt or no debt.

Real wealth is not the issue.

And government can distribute current year output any way it wants.

Economists use what is known as “generational accounting” to calculate how much of the nation’s debt burden will need to be borne by later generations compared to ours and previous generations as a function of today’s large fiscal imbalances. The results are stark:

And totally inapplicable.

As a share of their income, future generations will have to pay about twice the taxes as today’s workers have paid or else they will receive around one-half the public spending.

The living will still get all the output, no matter what tax rate they elect to charge themselves.

The money we spend beyond our means today takes away the money our children will have for Social Security benefits, Medicare, Medicaid, and every other spending priority.

And who gets the money that is ‘taken away’ – dead people of the past???

Is he that dense or is this blatant propaganda? Both???

The interest payments on the country’s growing debt—already accounting for approximately 10 percent of the federal budget, pushing $300 billion dollars—will ultimately become the government’s biggest budget item. The payments for the spending of the past will increasingly crowd out the spending priorities of the present.

Crowd out – figured he’d slip that in our of left field.

The country is in for a double disappointment because all these new deficits have not been used for investments. It is one thing to run deficits to invest in activities that might improve productivity or standards of living for future generations. This, after all, is what FDR did to pull America out of the Great Depression and win World War II. A bigger economy would allow us to soften the distributional blow of deficit financing. But that is not what the Bush administration has done. It borrowed to finance huge tax cuts for a fortunate few, and most of the money went straight into consumer spending with little lasting impact on the kids who will one day have to pay the bills for this splurge.

Savings is the accounting record of investment.

In general, investment is a function of demand – nothing like a backlog of orders to spur expansion of output.

Also, technology and cost savings drives investment.

And the point of investment is future output and future consumption.

The whole point of economics is to maximize consumption in the general sense.

How Deficits Handcuff U.S. Policymakers
The second major problem with running big deficits is that it diminishes the government’s ability to respond to crises.

Not. As above.

It eats up the rainy day fund, if you will.

No such thing. Inapplicable. Government spends by crediting accounts.

This is not constrained by revenues.

To that point, if you pay your taxes in cash, the government tosses the cash into a shredder. Clearly it has no use for revenue per se.

When the government operates without the fiscal cushion that budget surpluses provided in the late 1990s, it is hard-pressed to respond to emergencies, such as Hurricane Katrina, or even fulfill more basic commitments.

Only if it’s ignorant of monetary operations and the working of the payment system. (So, maybe he’s right???)

It is especially troubling today that despite an economy in full-blown recovery, record-smashing corporate profits, low interest rates, and strong productivity growth, the country’s budget deficits have still been in the $250 to $400 billion range.

The rising deficit is what’s supporting GDP above recession levels currently.

On top of that, the true size of the fiscal mess is masked by the fact that we are dipping into the Social Security surplus to finance current consumption. Since 2001, we have effectively borrowed almost $1 trillion from the trust fund, and the CBO forecasts another $200 billion or so every year for the foreseeable future. Our true annual deficits have been in the $400 billion to $600 billion range and are forecast to continue in that range for the rest of the Bush term.

Point? Social Security payments are operationally not revenue constrained, just like the rest of government spending.

It’s about inflation, not solvency, but he never mentions that.

What are we going to do in the event of another recession, a decrease in corporate profits, another Hurricane Katrina, a collapse of the Pension Benefit Guarantee Corporation, or another major war? And how will we finance future Social Security and Medicare benefits? The probable answer is, we’ll borrow more—but this will only postpone the day of reckoning and make it more severe.

The government can always ‘write the check’ with any size deficit or surplus. Doesn’t matter, apart from inflationary consequences.

The United States has a strategic petroleum reserve to guard against unforeseen disruptions in our oil supply. It is not a long-term solution. It is crisis insurance. Similarly, cutting the deficit would give us a strategic fiscal reserve.

Inapplicable concept with a non-convertible currency and floating fx.

Should bowling allies carry a reserve of ‘score’ to make sure you get your score if you knock the pins down???

Without it, the country must either raise taxes to deal with a crisis or else significantly increase the federal debt burden, which already totals almost $80,000 for every household in America.

So???

Foreign Leverage Over the U.S. Economy
The third risk of today’s fiscal irresponsibility is the negative impact it has on our international position—both economic and, potentially, geopolitical. Our economic position is seriously undermined by a low savings rate—and the deficit is like an anchor that drags our national savings rate down.

Not the ‘national savings’ rhetoric again!!!

That’s a gold standard construct. Back then, when the US went into debt, it was obligated to repay in gold certificates and ultimately gold itself.

Borrowing was getting short gold and/or depleting our gold reserves.

Our national savings was defined as our gold reserves.

This is ALL no longer applicable and no longer presents a fiscal constraint.

We need to get our low savings rate up.

Inapplicable.

One of the stated goals of the big tax cuts the president pushed through a compliant GOP Congress—including dividend tax cuts, capital gains tax cuts, estate tax cuts, and top-bracket income tax cuts—was to increase incentives for high-income people to save. On the most practical level imaginable, this policy—call it Supply Side 101—has failed. The savings of high-income people have not increased dramatically, certainly not enough to offset the plunge in the national savings rate that the big Bush deficits represent (because a nation’s savings rate combines personal, corporate, and government savings). For a country to maintain investment by entrepreneurs and companies when there is not enough domestic capital to be had,

Savings is not ‘domestic capital to be had’

He is shamelessly mixing metaphors.

Loans create deposits. Capital grows endogenously. He should know that.

it must by necessity borrow from abroad.

Wrong. Loans create deposits. Not the reverse as he implies.

It is a good sign for the economy that our investment rate—the part of GDP spent on machinery, capital, buildings, factories, and the like—has finally recovered from the recession of the early 2000s.

Due to the $700 billion fiscal shift from surplus to deficit.

But because that investment has been coupled with low national savings, the United States has had to borrow an astounding amount of money from foreign countries.

He has the causation backwards.

Domestic credit creation funds foreign savings, not vice versa.

Foreign ownership of U.S.
Treasuries alone increased $1.2 trillion dollars in the first five years of the Bush administration, after falling more than $200 billion in the last two and a half years of the Clinton administration. Most often it is foreign governments and central banks that own our debt. That is what raises the potential threat to America’s geopolitical position.

How??? The risk is theirs, not ours!

It is certainly less concrete than the impact on the savings rate, but the impact of borrowing on America’s geopolitical posture might be important in the event of a crisis. Because America has had to borrow from abroad,

It doesn’t ‘have to’ at all. There is no such thing, as above.

it has ended up owing a great deal of money to governments whose interests do not always mesh with our own. Our government owes China some $350 billion, for example, and we owe oil exporting countries such as Saudi Arabia, Libya, Algeria, Venezuela, and Qatar a combined $100 billion more.

That’s their problem, not ours. We already got the real goods and services from them. They are holding undefined ‘paper’.

Most of the time, it does not matter who holds a country’s debt. Investors around the world, no matter who they are, simply respond to market forces. But in times of crisis, if investors happen to be the governments and central banks of other countries—as is predominantly the case today with U.S. debt—then lenders can have inordinate influence over a borrower’s international policies.

Hard pressed to find an example if he uses this one:

Take one example from our own history: the Suez crisis of 1956. Britain—which was heavily indebted to the United States—joined with France and Israel in an invasion of Egypt after Egypt’s president, Gamel Abdel Nasser, nationalized the Suez canal. The Eisenhower administration, which had lambasted the Soviet Union’s invasion of Hungary that same year, was determined to keep its anti-colonial credentials intact by opposing the British-French venture. The United States refused to float its World War II ally further loans to
support their currency—and even threatened to dump its holdings to precipitate a currency crisis. The British, desperate to avoid a devaluation of the pound,

There’s the rub – they had a fixed exchange rate they wanted to support.

With floating fx, this isn’t the case.

caved in, and the Suez misadventure heralded the end of European colonialism in the Arab world. Could other countries exercise the same kind of economic leverage over the United States? Hopefully, we are a long way from having that sort of situation in reverse—where
our foreign policy goals are stymied because of financial pressures from our debt holders—but it is not inconceivable that we would be forced to choose between our geopolitical goals and financing the debt we owe foreign countries.

It should be inconceivable because it is inapplicable with floating fx.

This debt is primarily owned by governments with political motives, not just economic ones. If these governments decided to dump U.S. treasuries, we could plunge into crisis mode. Since there is not enough domestic savings to cover our investment, either our investment rate would need to fall, or interest rates might need to shoot up in order to attract capital from somewhere else.

There is no imperative to ‘attract foreign capital’.

This is just plain wrong.

Either way, it would be bad news for the U.S. economy.

Maybe for inflation, but he never goes there.

Further, as the risks associated with our accumulating debt grow, oil exporting countries will be tempted to sign their contracts in euros or yen rather than dollars, as they do now.

Doesn’t matter; it’s just a numeraire.

If that happens, then anything that devalues the dollar—including policy initiatives designed to reduce the trade deficit—will directly increase the price of energy rather markedly.

Saudis are price setters in crude for other reasons – that’s the source of crude price hikes.

A Legacy for Future Generations
Given the hazards of continuing down the current path of fiscal excess, Congress should act soon to get things under control. That does not mean immediately balancing the budget by draconian cuts to necessary investments. Small deficits—say on the order of 1 percent of GDP—will not run the economy into the ground and occasional big expenses on emergencies like Hurricane Katrina are a fact of modern life.

Too small to sustain aggregate demand. Probably need around 5% deficits from the evidence of the last twenty years.

But we know that entitlement spending will grow dramatically in the next 20 years and we need to make space in the trunk for a few very large suitcases, as it were. We should not be filling up the space before those bags even arrive.

Inapplicable.

The debt our generation accumulates becomes part of the legacy we leave to the next generation. The “greatest generation” that fought WWII sacrificed a great deal for the next generation—for us, their children and grandchildren. Not only did some give their lives, but over the next 20 years they largely paid off all of the massive debt they had to accumulate during the war.

We’ve averaged 3-5% deficits for a long time which have supported growth and employment, and avoided a depression.

At the end of the war, America’s debt exceeded its entire GDP. By the Kennedy administration, the ratio was back down to the same level it was before the war.

But the nominal amount continued to grow, and when it didn’t, the economy suffered.

Opportunity, not debt, was the legacy our grandparents wanted to leave behind.


Endnotes
1
“Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 2008,” Office of Management and Budget, http://
www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2008/budget.html.
2
Chait, Jonathan,”Deficit Reduction,” The New Republic, January 13, 2003.
3
“Still Morning in America: Reaganomics 25 Years Later,” Wall Street Journal Editorial, January 20, 2006, http://
www.opinionjournal.com/editorial/feature.html?id=110007843.
4
See:”Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 2008,” op cit., and “The Budget and Economic Outlook:
Fiscal Years 2008 to 2017,” Congressional Budget Office, http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/77xx/doc7731/01-24-
BudgetOutlook.pdf.


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Mexico’s poor get food cash bonus

Right, this was also suggested in a prior email- the political response towards a food shortage would be cash distributions.
Assuming there actually is a world food shortage and the prices are indicative of a world market allocating by price, this doesn´t create any new food but simply adds upward pressure on prices, triggering an international inflation.

Politically, there is no other choice but to add to inflation like this to at least be seen to be doing something.

Mexico’s poor get food cash boost

The Mexican government is to give its poorest citizens a monthly cash payment of 120 pesos ($11.55; £5.85) to help them cope with rising food prices.

The news came a day after the country said it would cut tariffs on imported crops such as corn, wheat and rice.

In a further sign of the impact of rising food and fuel costs, inflation in Vietnam jumped to 25% in May, the highest rate for 10 years.
Average food costs have risen by 42.4% in a year, the Statistics Office said.

Growing demand
In Mexico, official figures show consumer prices rose by 4.55% – the fastest rate for three years – in the 12 months to 30 April, led by increases in the cost of tomatoes, chicken and cooking oil.

Growing demand from fast-expanding countries such as India and China has been blamed for spiralling food prices, along with record fuel costs and the use of grain to produce bio-fuels.

Governments around the world are under pressure to intervene to help the poorest cope with the sharp food price rises.

There have been public demonstrations about food prices in a number of countries including Egypt and South Africa.

Mexico’s monthly cash payment, which will go to 26 million people in the Latin American country, equates to just over twice the national daily minimum wage of 50 pesos.

The government faced street protests last year when the price of tortillas doubled.

Rice restrictions
Vietnam has seen the price of rice, its staple food, jump 67.8% in the last 12 months, according to government figures.

One of Vietnam’s most important sources of imported rice, Cambodia, stopped exporting the grain in March.

It is one of a number of rice-producing countries, including India, Egypt and Indonesia, to have either banned or restricted exports in recent months to secure supply for domestic customers.

On Tuesday, Cambodia was set to resume exports of rice after its two-month ban ended.

Prime Minister Hun Sen said only rice that was not needed for domestic consumption could be sold for overseas consumption until the new harvesting season began in December.

Last year, that amounted to 1.6 million tons of milled rice.

Fed minutes – longish version


[Skip to the end]

I cut quite a bit, but still a lot worth a quick read:

In view of continuing strains in interbank and other financial markets, the Committee took up proposals to expand several of the liquidity arrangements that had been put in place in recent months. Chairman Bernanke indicated his intention to increase the overall size of the Term Auction Facility under delegated authority from the Board of Governors, and he proposed increases in the swap lines with the European Central Bank and Swiss National Bank to help address pressures in short-term dollar funding markets.

Still problems with USD funding in the eurozone.

By unanimous votes, the Committee approved the following three resolutions:

The Federal Open Market Committee directs the Federal Reserve Bank of New York to increase the amount available from the System Open Market Account under the existing reciprocal currency arrangement (“swap” arrangement) with the European Central Bank to an amount not to exceed $50 billion. Within that aggregate limit, draws of up to $25 billion are hereby authorized. The current swap arrangement shall be extended until January 30, 2009, unless further extended by the Federal Open Market Committee.

The Federal Open Market Committee directs the Federal Reserve Bank of New York to increase the amount available from the System Open Market Account under the existing reciprocal currency arrangement (“swap” arrangement) with the Swiss National Bank to an amount not to exceed $12 billion. Within that aggregate limit, draws of up to $6 billion are hereby authorized. The current swap arrangement shall be extended until January 30, 2009, unless further extended by the Federal Open Market Committee.

The information reviewed at the April meeting, which included the advance data on the national income and product accounts for the first quarter, indicated that economic growth had remained weak so far this year. Labor market conditions had deteriorated further, and manufacturing activity was soft. Housing activity had continued its sharp descent, and business spending on both structures and equipment had turned down. Consumer spending had grown very slowly, and household sentiment had tumbled further. Core consumer price inflation had slowed in recent months, but overall inflation remained elevated.

The stronger than expected April numbers hadn’t been released yet, including the drop in the unemployment rate to 5.0%.

Although industrial production rose in March, production over the first quarter as a whole was soft, having declined, on average, in January and February. Gains in manufacturing output of consumer and high-tech goods in March were partially offset by a sharp drop in production of motor vehicles and parts and by ongoing weakness in the output of construction-related industries. The output of utilities rebounded in March following a weather-related drop in February, and mining output moved up after exhibiting weakness earlier in the year. The factory utilization rate edged up in March but stayed well below its recent high in the third quarter of 2007.

Real consumer spending expanded slowly in the first quarter. Real outlays on durable goods, including automobiles, were estimated to have declined in March, but expenditures on nondurable goods were thought to have edged up, boosted by a sizable increase in real outlays for gasoline. For the quarter as a whole, however, real expenditures on both durable and nondurable goods declined. Real disposable personal income also grew slowly in the first quarter, restrained by rapidly rising prices for energy and food. The ratio of household wealth to disposable income appeared to have moved down again in the first quarter, damped by the appreciable net decline in broad equity prices over that period and by further reductions in house prices. Measures of consumer sentiment fell sharply in March and April; the April reading of consumer sentiment published in the Reuters/University of Michigan Survey of Consumers was near the low levels posted in the early 1990s.

That’s how it goes in an export driven economy. They haven’t recognized that yet:

Residential construction continued its rapid contraction in the first quarter. Single-family housing starts maintained their steep downward trajectory in March, and starts of multifamily homes declined to the lower portion of their recent range. Sales of new single-family homes declined in February to a very low rate and dropped further in March. Even though production cuts by homebuilders helped to reduce the level of inventories at the end of February, the slow pace of sales caused the ratio of unsold new homes to sales to increase further. Sales of existing homes remained weak, on average, in February and March, and the index of pending sales agreements in February suggested continued sluggish activity in coming months. The recent softening in residential housing demand was consistent with reports of tighter credit conditions for both prime and nonprime borrowers.

Recent signs of housing stabilizing haven’t materialized yet.

The U.S. international trade deficit widened in February. Imports rose sharply, more than offsetting continued robust growth of exports. Most major categories of non-oil imports increased in February, and imports of natural gas, automobiles, and consumer goods surged. Imports of services continued to rise at a robust pace. By contrast, oil imports moved down. Increases in exports in February were concentrated in agricultural goods, automobiles, and industrial supplies, particularly fuels. Exports of capital goods declined for the second consecutive month, with weakness evident across a wide range of products.

The March numbers weren’t out yet, and they bounced back strongly, resulting in upward revisions to Q1 GDP.

Real economic growth in the major advanced foreign economies was estimated to have slowed further in the first quarter and consumer and business sentiment was generally down. In Japan, business sentiment fell significantly and indicators of investment remained weak. In the euro area, growth was estimated to have remained subdued in the first quarter, with Germany and France faring better than Italy and Spain. Growth in the United Kingdom slowed in the first quarter, as credit conditions tightened. Available data for Canada indicated a continued substantial drag from exports in the first quarter, although domestic demand appeared relatively robust. In emerging market economies, economic growth slowed some in the fourth quarter and was estimated to have held about steady in the first quarter. In emerging Asia, real economic growth was estimated to have picked up in the first quarter from a robust pace in the fourth quarter, led by brisk expansions in China and Singapore. Growth in other emerging Asian economies generally remained subdued. The pace of expansion in Latin America likely declined some in the first quarter, largely because the Mexican economy slowed in the wake of softer growth in the United States.

Headline inflation in the United States was elevated in March. Although the increase in food prices slowed in March relative to earlier in the year, energy prices rose sharply. Excluding these categories, core inflation rose at a relatively subdued rate again in March. The core personal consumption expenditures (PCE) price index increased at a somewhat more moderate rate in the first quarter than in the fourth quarter of 2007. Survey measures of households’ expectations for year-ahead inflation rose further in early April, but survey measures of longer-term inflation expectations moved relatively little. Average hourly earnings increased in March at a somewhat slower pace than in January and February. This wage measure rose significantly less over the 12 months that ended in March than in the previous 12 months. The employment cost index for hourly compensation continued to rise at a moderate rate in the first quarter.

Food and energy have since gone up further than forecast at the meeting.

At its March 18 meeting, the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) lowered its target for the federal funds rate 75 basis points, to 2-1/4 percent. In addition, the Board of Governors approved a decrease of 75 basis points in the discount rate, to 2-1/2 percent. The Committee’s statement noted that recent information indicated that the outlook for economic activity had weakened further; growth in consumer spending had slowed, and labor markets had softened. It also indicated that financial markets remained under considerable stress, and that the tightening of credit conditions and the deepening of the housing contraction were likely to weigh on economic growth over the next few quarters. Inflation had been elevated, and some indicators of inflation expectations had risen, but the Committee expected inflation to moderate in coming quarters, reflecting a projected leveling-out of energy and other commodity prices and an easing of pressures on resource utilization.

Which didn’t happen.

Still, the Committee noted that uncertainty about the inflation outlook had increased, and that it would be necessary to continue to monitor inflation developments carefully. The Committee said that its action, combined with those taken earlier, including measures to foster market liquidity, should help to promote moderate growth over time and to mitigate the risks to economic activity. The Committee noted, however, that downside risks to growth remained, and indicated that it would act in a timely manner as needed to promote sustainable economic growth and price stability.

Conditions in U.S. financial markets improved somewhat, on balance, over the intermeeting period, but strains in some short-term funding markets increased. Pressures on bank balance sheets and capital positions appeared to mount further, reflecting additional losses on asset-backed securities and on business and household loans. Against this backdrop, term spreads in interbank funding markets and spreads on commercial paper issued by financial institutions widened significantly. Financial institutions continued to tap the Federal Reserve’s credit programs. Primary credit borrowing picked up noticeably after March 16, when the Federal Reserve reduced the spread between the primary credit rate and the target federal funds rate to 25 basis points. Demand for funds from the Term Auction Facility stayed high over the period. In addition, the Primary Dealer Credit Facility drew substantial demand through late March, although the amount outstanding subsequently declined somewhat. Early in the period, historically low interest rates on Treasury bills and on general-collateral Treasury repurchase agreements indicated a considerable demand for safe-haven assets. However, Federal Reserve actions that increased the availability of Treasury securities to the public apparently helped to improve conditions in those markets. In five weekly auctions beginning on March 27, the Term Securities Lending Facility provided a substantial volume of Treasury securities in exchange for less-liquid assets. Yields on short-term Treasury securities and Treasury repurchase agreements moved higher, on balance, following these auctions; nonetheless, “haircuts” applied by lenders on non-Treasury collateral remained elevated, and in some cases increased somewhat, toward the end of the period.

In longer-term credit markets, yields on investment-grade corporate bonds rose, but their spreads relative to Treasury securities decreased a bit from recent multiyear highs. In contrast, yields on speculative-grade issues dropped, and their spreads relative to Treasury yields narrowed significantly. Gross bond issuance by nonfinancial firms was robust in March and the first half of April and included a small amount of issuance by speculative-grade firms. Supported by increases in business and residential real estate loans, commercial bank credit expanded briskly in March despite the report of tighter lending conditions in the Senior Loan Officer Opinion Survey on Bank Lending Practices conducted in April. Part of the strength in commercial and industrial loans was apparently due to increased utilization of existing credit lines, the pricing of which reflects changes in lending policies only with a lag.

Also, though standards were ‘tightened’, that doesn’t mean most borrowers can’t meet those standards.

Some banks surveyed in April reported that they had started to take actions to limit their exposure to home equity lines of credit, draws on which had grown rapidly in recent months. After having tightened considerably in March, conditions in the conforming segment of the residential mortgage market recovered somewhat. Spreads of rates on conforming residential mortgages over those on comparable-maturity Treasury securities decreased, and credit default swap premiums for the government-sponsored enterprises declined substantially. Broad stock price indexes increased markedly over the intermeeting period, mainly in response to earnings reports and announcements of recapitalizations from major financial institutions that evidently lessened investors’ concerns about the possibility of severe difficulties materializing at those firms.

Conditions in the money markets of major foreign economies remained strained, particularly in the United Kingdom and the euro area. Term interbank funding spreads rose in these areas, despite steps taken by their central banks to help ease liquidity pressures. Yields on sovereign debt in the advanced foreign economies moved up in a range that was about in line with the increases in comparable Treasury yields in the United States. The trade-weighted foreign exchange value of the dollar against major currencies rose.

The dollar is back down now.

M2 expanded briskly again in March, as households continued to seek the relative liquidity and safety of liquid deposits and retail money market mutual funds. The increases in these components were also supported by declines in opportunity costs stemming from monetary policy easing.

Over the intermeeting period, the expected path of monetary policy over the next year as measured by money market futures rates moved up significantly on net, apparently because economic data releases and announcements by large financial firms imparted greater confidence among investors about the prospects for the economy’s performance in coming quarters. Futures rates also moved up in response to both the Committee’s decision to lower the target for the federal funds rate by 75 basis points at the March 18 meeting, which was a somewhat smaller reduction than market participants had expected, and the Committee’s accompanying statement, which reportedly conveyed more concern about inflation than had been anticipated.

Yes.

The subsequent release of the minutes of the March FOMC meeting elicited limited reaction. Consistent with the higher expected path for policy and easing of safe-haven demands, yields on nominal Treasury coupon securities rose substantially over the period, and the Treasury yield curve flattened. Measures of inflation compensation for the next five years derived from yields on inflation-indexed Treasury securities were quite volatile around the time of the March FOMC meeting and on balance increased somewhat over the intermeeting period, although they remained in the lower portion of their range over the past several months. Measures of longer-term inflation compensation declined, returning to around the middle of their recent elevated range.

They seem to continue to give these quite a bit of weight.

In the forecast prepared for this meeting, the staff made little change to its projection for the growth of real gross domestic product (GDP) in 2008 and 2009. The available indicators of recent economic activity had come in close to the staff’s expectations and had continued to suggest that a substantial softening in economic activity was under way. The staff projection pointed to a contraction of real GDP in the first half of 2008 followed by a modest rise in the second half of this year, aided in part by the fiscal stimulus package.

Doesn’t look like there will be a contraction; so, GDP is likely to be higher than staff forecasts.
The forecast showed real GDP expanding at a rate somewhat above its potential in 2009, reflecting the impetus from cumulative monetary policy easing, continued strength in net exports, a gradual lessening in financial market strains, and the waning drag from past increases in energy prices. Despite this pickup in the pace of activity, the trajectory of resource utilization anticipated through 2009 implied noticeable slack. The projection for core PCE price inflation in 2008 as a whole was unchanged; it was reduced a bit over the first half of the year to reflect the somewhat lower-than-expected readings of recent core PCE inflation and raised a bit over the second half of the year to incorporate the spillover from larger-than-anticipated increases in prices of crude oil and non-oil imports since the previous FOMC meeting.
Here’s where the subsequent talk of headline measures passing into core was discussed.

The forecast of headline PCE inflation in 2008 was revised up in light of the further run-up in energy prices and somewhat higher food price inflation; headline PCE inflation was expected to exceed core PCE price inflation by a considerable margin this year. In view of the projected slack in resource utilization in 2009 and flattening out of oil and other commodity prices, both core and headline PCE price inflation were projected to drop back from their 2008 levels, in line with the staff’s previous forecasts.

They are relying on slack in 2009 to bring down this year’s inflation.

In conjunction with the FOMC meeting in April, all meeting participants (Federal Reserve Board members and Reserve Bank presidents) provided annual projections for economic growth, the unemployment rate, and inflation for the period 2008 through 2010. The projections are described in the Summary of Economic Projections, which is attached as an addendum to these minutes.

These were all before subsequent ‘better than expected’ releases, higher crude prices, and a falling USD.

In their discussion of the economic situation and outlook, FOMC participants noted that the data received since the March FOMC meeting, while pointing to continued weakness in economic activity, had been broadly consistent with their expectations. Conditions across a number of financial markets were judged to have improved over the intermeeting period, but financial markets remained fragile and strains in some markets had intensified. Although participants anticipated that further improvement in market conditions would occur only slowly and that some backsliding was possible, the generally better state of financial markets had caused participants to mark down the odds that economic activity could be severely disrupted by a further substantial deterioration in the financial environment.

Their concern of systematic tail risk has gone down substantially.

Economic activity was anticipated to be weakest over the next few months, with many participants judging that real GDP was likely to contract slightly in the first half of 2008. GDP growth was expected to begin to recover in the second half of this year, supported by accommodative monetary policy and fiscal stimulus, and to increase further in 2009 and 2010. Views varied about the likely pace and vigor of the recovery through 2009, although all participants projected GDP growth to be at or above trend in 2010. Incoming information on the inflation outlook since the March FOMC meeting had been mixed. Readings on core inflation had improved somewhat, but some of this improvement was thought likely to reflect transitory factors, and energy and other commodity prices had increased further since March. Total PCE inflation was projected to moderate from its current elevated level to between 1-1/2 percent and 2 percent in 2010, although participants stressed that this expected moderation was dependent on food and energy prices flattening out and critically on inflation expectations remaining reasonably well anchored.

As per Kohn’s latest speech, they have seen these inflation expectations begin to elevate.

Conditions across a number of financial markets had improved since the previous FOMC meeting. Equity prices and yields on Treasury securities had increased, volatility in both equity and debt markets had ebbed somewhat, and a range of credit risk premiums had moved down. Participants noted that the better tone of financial markets had been helped by the apparent willingness and ability of financial institutions to raise new capital. Investors’ confidence had probably also been buoyed by corporate earnings reports for the first quarter, which suggested that profit growth outside of the financial sector remained solid,

Yes, they have noted that outside the financial sector and housing the economy looks pretty good.

and also by the resolution of the difficulties of a major broker-dealer in mid-March.

Probably Bear Stearns.

NOTE: They didn’t refer to it by name.

Moreover, the various liquidity facilities introduced by the Federal Reserve in recent months were thought to have bolstered market liquidity and aided a return to more orderly market functioning. But participants emphasized that financial markets remained under considerable stress, noted that the functioning of many markets remained impaired, and expressed concern that some of the recent recovery in markets could prove fragile. Strains in short-term funding markets had intensified over the intermeeting period, in part reflecting continuing pressures on the liquidity positions of financial institutions. Despite a narrowing of spreads on corporate bonds, credit conditions were seen as remaining tight. The Senior Loan Officer Opinion Survey on Bank Lending Practices conducted in April indicated that banks had tightened lending standards and pricing terms on loans to both businesses and households. Participants stressed that it could take some time for the financial system to return to a more normal footing, and a number of participants were of the view that financial headwinds would probably continue to restrain economic activity through much of next year. Even so, the likelihood that the functioning of the financial system would deteriorate substantially further with significant adverse implications for the economic outlook was judged by participants to have receded somewhat since the March FOMC meeting.
The housing market had continued to weaken since the previous meeting, and participants saw little indication of a bottoming out in either housing activity or prices. Housing starts and the demand for new homes had declined further, house prices in many parts of the country were falling faster than they had towards the end of 2007, and inventories of unsold homes remained quite elevated. A small number of participants reported tentative signs that housing activity in a few areas of the country might be beginning to pick up, and a narrowing of credit risk spreads on AAA indexes of sub-prime mortgages in recent weeks was also noted. Nonetheless, the outlook for the housing market remained bleak, with housing demand likely to be affected by restrictive conditions in mortgage markets, fears that house prices would fall further, and weakening labor markets. The possibility that house prices could decline by more than anticipated, and that the effects of such a decline could be amplified through their impact on financial institutions and financial markets, remained a key source of downside risk to participants’ projections for economic growth.

There have been subsequent glimmers of hope that housing has stabilized and may be turning.

Growth in consumer spending appeared to have slowed to a crawl in recent months and consumer sentiment had fallen sharply. The pressure on households’ real incomes from higher energy prices and the erosion of wealth resulting from continuing declines in house prices likely contributed to the deceleration in consumer outlays. Reports from contacts in the banking and financial services sectors indicated that the availability of both consumer credit and home equity lines had tightened considerably further in recent months and that delinquency rates on household credit had continued to drift upwards. Consumer sentiment and spending had also been held down by the softening in labor markets–nonfarm payroll employment had fallen for the third consecutive month in March and the unemployment rate had moved up. The restraint on spending emanating from weakness in labor markets was expected to increase over coming quarters, with participants projecting the unemployment rate to pick up further this year and to remain elevated in 2009.

Subsequently, the unemployment rate fell.

Consumption spending was likely to be supported in the near term by the fiscal stimulus package, which was expected to boost spending temporarily in the middle of this year. Some participants suggested that the weak economic environment could increase the propensity of households to use their tax rebates to pay down existing debt and so might diminish the impact of the package. However, it was also noted that the tightening in credit availability might mean a significant number of households may be credit constrained and this might increase the proportion of the rebates that is spent. The timing and magnitude of the impact of the stimulus package on GDP was also seen as depending on the extent to which the boost to consumption spending is absorbed by a temporary run-down in firms’ inventories or by an increase in imports rather than by an expansion in domestic output.

The jurry is still out on this. My guess is the rebates will add more to GDP than forecasted.

The outlook for business spending remained decidedly downbeat. Indicators of business sentiment were low, and reports from business contacts suggested that firms were scaling back their capital spending plans. Several participants reported that uncertainty about the economic outlook was leading firms to defer spending projects until prospects for economic activity became clearer. The tightening in the supply of business credit was also seen as holding back investment, with some firms apparently reluctant to reduce their liquidity positions in the current environment. Spending on nonresidential construction projects continued to slow, although the extent of that slowing varied across the country. A few participants reported that the commercial real estate market in some areas remained relatively firm, supported by low vacancy rates.

Yes.

The strength of U.S. exports remained a notable bright spot. Growth in exports, which had been supported by solid advances in foreign economies and by declines in the foreign exchange value of the dollar, had partially insulated the output and profits of U.S. companies, especially those in the manufacturing sector, from the effects of weakening domestic demand. Several participants voiced concern, however, that the pace of activity in the rest of the world could slow in coming quarters, suggesting that the impetus provided from net exports might well diminish.

The March numbers subsequently released showed further acceleration of exports.

The information received on the inflation outlook since the March FOMC meeting had been mixed. Recent readings on core inflation had improved somewhat, although participants noted that some of that improvement probably reflected transitory factors. Moreover, the increase in crude oil prices to record levels, together with rapid increases in food and import prices in recent months, was likely to put upward pressure on inflation over the next few quarters. Prices embedded in futures contracts continued to point to a leveling-off of energy and commodity prices.

Still misreading the info implied from futures prices:

Although these futures contracts probably remained the best basis for projecting movements in commodity prices, participants emphasized the considerable uncertainty attending the likely path of commodity prices and cautioned that commodity prices in recent years had often advanced more quickly than had been implied by futures contracts. Several participants reported that business contacts had expressed growing concerns about the increase in their input costs and that there were signs that an increasing number of firms were seeking to pass on these higher costs to their customers in the form of higher prices. Other participants noted, however, that the extent of the pass-through of higher energy and food prices to core retail prices appeared relatively limited to date, and that profit margins in the nonfinancial sector remained reasonably high, suggesting that there was some scope for firms to absorb cost increases without raising prices. Available data and anecdotal reports indicated that gains in labor compensation remained moderate, and some participants suggested that wage growth was unlikely to pick up sharply in coming quarters if, as anticipated, labor markets remained relatively soft. However, several participants were of the view that wage inflation tended to lag increases in prices and so may not provide a useful guide to emerging price pressures.

Agreed!

On balance, participants expected the recent increases in oil and food prices to continue to boost overall consumer price inflation in the near term; thereafter, total inflation was projected to moderate, with all participants expecting total PCE inflation of between 1-1/2 percent and 2 percent by 2010. Participants stressed that the expected moderation in inflation was dependent on the continued stability of inflation expectations.

One can’t overstate the weight they all put on inflation expections, which are now seen as elevating.

A number of participants voiced concern that long-term inflation expectations could drift upwards if headline inflation remained elevated for a protracted period or if the recent substantial policy easing was misinterpreted by the public as suggesting that Committee members had a greater tolerance for inflation than previously thought.

This was again expressed recently by Vice Chair Kohn in his speech.

The possibility that inflation expectations could increase was viewed as a key upside risk to the inflation outlook. However, participants emphasized that appropriate monetary policy, combined with effective communication of the Committee’s commitment to price stability, would mitigate this risk.

‘Appropriate monetary policy’ opens the door for rate hikes.

Participants stressed the difficulty of gauging the appropriate stance of policy in current circumstances. Some participants noted that the level of the federal funds target, especially when compared with the current rate of inflation, was relatively low by historical standards. Even taking account of current financial headwinds, such a low rate could suggest that policy was reasonably accommodative. However, other participants observed that the pronounced strains in banking and financial markets imparted much greater uncertainty to such assessments and meant that measures of the stance of policy based on the real federal funds rate were not likely to provide a reliable guide in the current environment. Several participants expressed the view that the easing in monetary policy since last fall had not as yet led to a loosening in overall financial conditions, but rather had prevented financial conditions from tightening as much as they otherwise would have in response to escalating strains in financial markets. This view suggested that the stimulus from past monetary policy easing would be felt mainly as conditions in financial markets improved.

Seems there are three ‘camps’ on this point.

In the Committee’s discussion of monetary policy for the intermeeeting period, most members judged that policy should be eased by 25 basis points at this meeting. Although prospects for economic activity had not deteriorated significantly since the March meeting, the outlook for growth and employment remained weak and slack in resource utilization was likely to increase. An additional easing in policy would help to foster moderate growth over time without impeding a moderation in inflation.

There hasn’t been any forward looking sign of moderation since that meeting.

Moreover, although the likelihood that economic activity would be severely disrupted by a sharp deterioration in financial markets had apparently receded, most members thought that the risks to economic growth were still skewed to the downside. A reduction in interest rates would help to mitigate those risks. However, most members viewed the decision to reduce interest rates at this meeting as a close call.

Interesting statement!

The substantial easing of monetary policy since last September, the ongoing steps taken by the Federal Reserve to provide liquidity and support market functioning, and the imminent fiscal stimulus would help to support economic activity. Moreover, although downside risks to growth remained, members were also concerned about the upside risks to the inflation outlook, given the continued increases in oil and commodity prices and the fact that some indicators suggested that inflation expectations had risen in recent months. Nonetheless, most members agreed that a further, modest easing in the stance of policy was appropriate to balance better the risks to achieving the Committee’s dual objectives of maximum employment and price stability over the medium run.
The Committee agreed that that the statement to be released after the meeting should take note of the substantial policy easing to date and the ongoing measures to foster market liquidity. In light of these significant policy actions, the risks to growth were now thought to be more closely balanced by the risks to inflation. Accordingly, the Committee felt that it was no longer appropriate for the statement to emphasize the downside risks to growth. Given these circumstances, future policy adjustments would depend on the extent to which economic and financial developments affected the medium-term outlook for growth and inflation. In that regard, several members noted that it was unlikely to be appropriate to ease policy in response to information suggesting that the economy was slowing further or even contracting slightly in the near term, unless economic and financial developments indicated a significant weakening of the economic outlook.

In other words, no thought of more rate cuts without that change in outlook.

Votes for this action: Messrs. Bernanke, Geithner, Kohn, Kroszner, and Mishkin, Ms. Pianalto, Messrs. Stern and Warsh.

Votes against this action: Messrs. Fisher and Plosser.

Messrs. Fisher and Plosser dissented because they preferred no change in the target federal funds rate at this meeting. Although the economy had been weak, it had evolved roughly as expected since the previous meeting. Stresses in financial markets also had continued, but the Federal Reserve’s liquidity facilities were helpful in that regard and the more worrisome development in their view was the outlook for inflation. Rising prices for food, energy, and other commodities; signs of higher inflation expectations; and a negative real federal funds rate raised substantial concerns about the prospects for inflation. Mr. Plosser cited the recent rapid growth of monetary aggregates as additional evidence that the economy had ample liquidity after the aggressive easing of policy to date. Mr. Fisher was concerned that an adverse feedback loop was developing by which lowering the funds rate had been pushing down the exchange value of the dollar, contributing to higher commodity and import prices, cutting real spending by businesses and households, and therefore ultimately impairing economic activity. To help prevent inflation expectations from becoming unhinged, both Messrs. Fisher and Plosser felt the Committee should put additional emphasis on its price stability goal at this point, and they believed that another reduction in the funds rate at this meeting could prove costly over the longer run.

By notation vote completed on April 7, 2008, the Committee unanimously approved the minutes of the FOMC meeting held on March 18, 2008.


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