Reuters: Putin hiking wages and pensions


[Skip to the end]

As suspected, the political response to high food prices is to assist with government funding.

Yes, it’s inflationary, but politically there is little choice.

In the case of a relatively rich exporter of energy like Russia, they are helping their citizens outbid poorer nations for food:

Russia’s Putin promises to hike wages, pensions

by Gleb Bryanski

(Reuters) Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin has said he will hike wages, pensions and social benefits to compensate people for rising prices and smooth the effects of anti-inflation policy.

“Through raising wages, pensions, social benefits and subsidies we will try to minimise negative consequences of our anti-inflation policy for the people,” Putin said in an interview with the French Le Monde daily attended by Reuters and released on Saturday.

Missing the annual inflation target by a wide margin has become the biggest policy failure of Putin’s last year as president in 2007 and is likely to turn into a major headache for his cabinet this year.

In his nomination speech in parliament this month, Putin said he was prepared to tolerate double-digit inflation for a few years. His cabinet has yet to present a comprehensive anti-inflation policy.

Putin said his cabinet was aware of inflation dangers and kept a close call on the situation. Inflation is running at 15 percent, making the cabinet’s goal of 10.5 percent for this year unlikely to be attained.

Seems Putin isn’t as worried about inflations as various critics would like him to be.

Russia’s inflation is a result of global food price rises but also a consequence of capital inflows from abroad as well as lavish budget spending ahead of parliamentary and presidential elections last year.

A more prudent budget policy would have helped Russia curb price growth this year but Putin signaled he was not yet prepared to risk his high popularity ratings. “We understand that this (rising wages) means an inflow of money into the economy but we are simply obliged to do it and we will do it,” Putin said.

Yes, politicians do respond to popularity ratings, and Putin is one of the best.

As I’ve written before, don’t underestimate Putin:

Wages grew by 28 percent year-on-year in April and some officials have warned that Russia risks falling into an inflationary spiral as Latin American countries did in the 1990s and have said that wage controls could be necessary.

Food makes up over 40 percent of the basket of goods and services used to calculate Russia’s consumer price index (CPI), a typical feature for poorer nations where the population spends a large proportion of income to feed themselves.

“We understand that food price growth hits those of our citizens who have low incomes. The share of their family budgets spent on food is big,” said Putin.

Putin, who is still coming to grips with his new role as premier, mentioned a recent rise of the refinancing rate — a symbolic ceiling of official interest rates hardly used in practice — among anti-inflation measures.

The central bank has little leverage over the economy, swelled with petrodollars, with its interest rate policy, but the market takes guidance from its deposit and repo rates rather than the refinancing rate.

Echoing his foreign policy statements, Putin blamed the West for Russia’s inflation problem too: “Inflation has been exported to Russia from developed economies, including Europe,” he said.


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Wed am recap

Mainstream economics says:

Get inflation right and that ‘automatically’ optimizes long-term growth and employment.

Adding to demand with a negative supply shock turns a ‘relative value story’ into an ‘inflation story.’

The ECB is following mainstream theory, while the Fed is not.

why?

The Fed sees looming systemic, deflationary tail risk at the door. At least up to now.

The panic of 1907 and the early 1930s deflationary collapse (both previous examples given by the Fed) were gold standard events.

With a gold standard (and/or other fixed rate regimes) there are direct supply side constraints on the reserve currency. Interest rates are market determined, and during a credit crunch rates spike higher ‘automatically.’ Even the treasury must fund itself and faces the same supply side constraints, thereby limiting fiscal responses. This continues in today’s fixed fx currencies.

With floating fx/non-convertible currency there are inherent no direct supply side constraints on bank lending, deposit creation, and credit in general. Any constraints are on the demand side, including financial capital where constraints are also on the demand side. The CB necessarily directly sets rates, not market forces, and government spending is not constrained by taxing, borrowing, etc., hence fiscal packages are subject only to political choice.

Today’s risks are much the same as previous financial crisis type risks like 1987 and 1998, where the government and its agencies have the open option of ‘writing the check’ as desired, with inflation the price to pay, not government solvency as with fixed fx regimes.

Just like the 1970s, the Saudis are acting the swing producer and setting price and letting quantity they pump adjust. This is also necessarily the case when one is single supplier at the margin with excess capacity. The alternative of pumping flat out and hitting bids in the spot market is not a functional option for any monopolist. Only price setting is.

Russia is also a monopoly supplier at the margin and probably is also acting as a swing producer. So crude prices go to where the higher of the two set them.

Mainstream theory has not yet publicly addressed this kind of negative supply shock.

One option is to match the domestic inflation rates to the price hikes to try to avoid declining real terms of trade.

This is both politically impossible, and it can quickly lead to accelerating inflation.

We have two choices, neither particularly attractive:

  1. Watch our real terms of trade continue to collapse as crude prices are continuously hiked.
  2. Try to inflate to moderate the drop in real terms of trade.

Ironically, we will chose the later as we did in the 1970s because inflation is not a function of interest rates in the direction CBs subscribe to.

Increasing nominal rates increases inflation via the cost and demand channels.

Costs of holding inventory and investment rise with rate hikes.

Governments are net payers of interest to the non-government sectors; so, rate hikes also increase government spending on interest to support incomes in the non-government sectors.

Good luck to us!

Bloomberg: Russian Oil Fund Should Be Tapped for Pensions

While relatively small, investing in pensions vs. ‘spending’ reduces aggregate demand. And ‘liquidity’ for the banking sector can readily be increased independently of these funds as needed.

Russian Oil Fund Should Be Tapped for Pensions, Kudrin Says

by Maria Levitov and Alex Nicholson

(Bloomberg) Russia’s Finance Minister Alexei Kudrin said the country’s oil fund should be used for financing pensions rather than boosting liquidity in the banking sector.

“The fund should not ensure liquidity. This is not its aim,” Kudrin said in Moscow today. Investing the $33 billion National Wellbeing Fund abroad and using returns to finance pensions is “the only correct way to use the National Wellbeing Fund,” he said. The government would always help to restore liquidity if this was required, he said.

Russia will eventually invest a small portion of the National Wellbeing Fund on the domestic market, once it becomes more stable and less dependent on oil prices, Kudrin said. Five percent of the fund may be invested in Russian securities “in the future” and that amount could gradually be increased he said.

The fund will not be invested in the Russian market this year, he said.

2008-03-21: Valance Chart Review

Twin themes continue: weakness and higher prices.

A substantial pickup in net government spending beginning late Q2 and continued strong exports should keep GDP in positive territory.

Saudis/Russians continue as swing producers and should continue to hike prices.

Pension funds are also continuing to increase allocations to passive commodities and non-US equities.

2008-03-21 Capacity Utilization, ISM Manufacturing

2008-03-21 Philly Fed, Chicago PMI, ISM Manufacturing

2008-03-21 Philly Fed Backlog, Chicago PMI Backlog, ISM Manufacturing Backlog

All the above charts together indicate a continued slowing of demand that took a blip down for the worse right around year end. There are some signs of a small bounce back, but the general downward bias remains.Rent levels for Q1 suggest real GDP growth is near zero, after growth of 0.6% in Q4.

Also, survey results have been known to reflect current psychology rather than actual results.


2008-03-21 Wholesale Inventories, Business Inventories

Business inventories have been kept reasonably low (not typical of past recessions).


2008-03-21 Retail Sales, Total Vehicle Sales, Redbook Retail Sales

2008-03-21 Personal Spending, Personal Income

Retail sales have been decelerating over the last several months, though still up year over year.Personal income is a bit softer, though still growing and probably not softening as much as aggregate demand has softened and still sufficient to support nominal spending and nominal GDP growth.


2008-03-21 Non-farm Payrolls, Average Hourly Earnings, Average Weekly Hours, Unemployment Rate

2008-03-21 Total Hours Worked, Labor Participation Rate, Duration of Unemployment, Household Job Growth

2008-03-21 Initial & Continuing Claims

The labor data taken together tells the same story of a gradual decrease in demand since the middle of 2006, but not yet at previous recession levels.Also, the Fed expects the labor force participation rate to drift lower over time due to demographics.

This means employment growth is population limited, which limits non-inflationary GDP growth to something near productivity growth.

Also, the Fed considers 4.75% the non inflationary full employment level.

The current 4.8% unemployment rate is therefore very close to what the Fed considers to be full-employment.


2008-03-21 Durable Goods

These look reasonably good, especially considering manufacturing has been in decline for a long time.Exports have been picking up the slack in demand from weak housing and weak consumer spending.


2008-03-21 NAHB, Conference Board Homebuying Intentions

2008-03-21 Housing Starts, Building Starts, Housing Affordability

2008-03-21 MBA Mortgage Applications, OFHEO Home Prices

Housing has been the largest drag on GDP, subtracting about 1% for the last several quarters.Should it bottom at these historically very low levels it will stop subtracting from demand and begin to make a positive contribution.


2008-03-21 Fiscal Balance, Government Public Debt, Government Spending, Government Revenue

I expect net government spending to contribute perhaps an additional 2% to GDP vs 2007. The fiscal package will add about 1%, and it looks like 2007 spending may have been moved forward to 2008 as forecast increases in the deficit project additional net spending of 1%.


2008-03-21 Current Account Balance

2008-03-21 Trade Weighted Dollar

Exports have picked up much of the slack from housing and consumer spending, and look to be further accelerating as non-residents continue to desire to reduce their accumulation of USD financial assets.


2008-03-21 CPI, Core CPI

2008-03-21 PPI, Core PPI, Import Prices, Import Prices ex. Petro

2008-03-21 Export Prices, CRB Index, U. of Mich

2008-03-21 Empire Prices, Philly Fed Prices

All this is sending prices up to rates not seen since the great inflation of the 1970’s, especially when taking into consideration the changes to measurement of the CPI and other indexes.


2008-03-21 ABC

Confidence remains at the lows with a small blip up coinciding with slightly less bearish reporting from CNBC.


2008-03-21 Fed Funds Rate, 30Y Fixed Mortgage

2008-03-21 10Y Tips, Ratio of 10Y to 3M

Even as the Fed cuts the Fed Funds rate, mortgage rates remain unchanged, and the yield curve steepens, as markets anticipate higher rates from the Fed down the road when they expect the Fed to turn to fighting inflation.The lower tips rates indicate markets expect the Fed to keep relatively low real rates for quite a while, even when fighting inflation.

Bernanke and the beast: beware the MNOG!

4:20 pm Eastern time, March 6

2008-03-06 Tips 5y5y fwd

TIPS 5y5y fwd

Twin themes remain since Q2 2006: weakness and inflation.

Weakness:
The great repricing of risk continues driving credit spreads wider, bid/offer spreads wider, volumes lower, and market forces continue to drive a general, massive deleveraging in the financial sector.

Housing is very weak: sales and construction are down more than 50% from the highs.

Unemployment is up a few tenths, and domestic demand in general is subdued.

Overall, strong exports keep us out of recession, and the real economy muddles through with GDP near zero.

Inflation:
Crude back up through $105, and the $ index down big to all time lows, driving up import prices and external demand (and rising export prices), and our own pension funds are driving up commodity prices by allocating funds to passive commodities.

CPI is up about 4.5% year over year, and core is moving up towards 2.5% as well.

The Fed
The Fed strategy has been to cut rates as an expression of doing what’s necessary to help the financial sector’s problems from spreading to the real economy.

The Fed sees a risk of a massive, 1930’s like, output gap and deflation. They see no reason to worry about the current 4.5% inflation when a potential 10%+ deflation/depression is looming, and with their models forecasting lower inflation.
And as they see inflation expectations remaining now ‘reasonably well anchored,’ and futures markets indicating lower prices for the out months vs the spot months, the Fed’s models continue to forecast lower inflation in the months and years ahead.

Policy is necessarily formed on forecasts, not rear view mirror observations, even if those forecasts have been continuously wrong for the last year. As a point of logic, there is no choice but to continue to forecast to the best of their ability and to continue to formulate policy around those forecasts.

Unfortunately, things have gone awry.

Rather than adding to demand and supporting GDP through the anticipated monetary and credit channels, the Fed’s rate initial rate cuts instead have seemingly driven the $US down and raised the price of imports, particularly energy.

With nominal wages ‘reasonably well anchored’ this has acted as a tax on the consumer and further reduced domestic demand. Falling real wages did coincide with increased exports, but not enough to keep GDP from falling ‘below trend’ and the output gap somewhat wider than it was previously.

Further rate cuts did the same – drove the $ down/prices up further, and reduced real wages and domestic demand. And further increased exports just enough to keep GDP near zero.

And the ‘credit crisis’ continues.

And inflation expectations have elevated. Note the attached chart of 5 year TIPS 5 years forward. The Fed has indicated this is one of their important indicators of inflation expectations and was taking comfort that it had been reasonably well anchored up to a few months ago. Now it’s just passed previous all time highs.

Even the Fed doves have recently said inflation is above their comfort zones, and they have been qualifying their support for rate cuts with statements like ‘if oil prices fall or remain at current levels’ when crude was around $100 or less.

Here’s the problem for the Fed:
They rely on output gaps to bring inflation down to their comfort zones. When they see even tail risk of major deflationary forces setting in they feel more than justified in addressing that risk of an excessive output gap that would not only slow inflation but bring on outright deflation.

But as inflation persists and expectations become less well anchored, the Fed believes the required output gap to bring inflation back down increases substantially, as their most recent studies show that it takes ever larger moves in interest rates to alter unemployment, and ever larger moves in unemployment to alter inflation.

Should housing simply stop contracting, and housing prices only level off, tail risk of an output gap large enough to cause a massive deflation fades.

Suddenly, the forecast output gap, while positive, is far too low to bring inflation and inflation expectations back into the Fed’s comfort zones.

The Fed is already out on the fringes of mainstream economics, including the text books Bernanke and Mishkin have written.

Mainstream economics says that if you are at full employment (believed by the Fed to be a 4.75% unemployment rate) when faced with rising energy costs that drive up prices and reduce consumer demand, leave it alone.

Don’t cut rates and add to demand, and turn a relative value story into an inflation story.

Instead, let demand weaken, let GDP fall, so that other prices will remain stable and and only relative value adjusts as markets allocate by price.

If you do support demand with rate cuts, you only drive inflation higher, real wages fall anyway, inflation expectations elevate, and the real cost of then stopping/reversing this process and bringing inflation back down is far higher than if you had left it alone.

In fact, that’s what all Fed members said continuously up to last August. In recent testimony, for example (see recent postings on this website), Bernanke said the Fed didn’t cut rates because there was an inflation problem.

If crude stays at current levels or continues higher (which I suggest it will as Saudis/Russians continue to act as swing producers, and demand remains far higher than needed for them to continue to support prices at current levels), all inflation measures will continue to march higher.

And with oil producers and other foreigners now spending their $ revenues rather than holding $US financial assets, exports keep rising and keep the current output gap from widening.

For the Fed, this means the MNOG (minimum non-inflationary output gap) needed to bring inflation down to comfort zones goes up substantially.

Their current MNOG could now very well be substantially higher than the current output gap (unemployment was last reported at 4.9%).

And this MNOG beast seems to be growing by the day.

So today’s news of initial claims coming down some, retail sales showing some Feb recovery vs Jan, pending home sales flattening, muni markets reorganizing and selling bonds again, and the ISM bouncing back yesterday, and mainstream companies in general reporting reasonably good to excellent current earnings, all indicate the MNOG is growing faster than the current output gap is growing.

And less than 60 days away are the $150 billion in tax rebate checks.

For the Fed, however, ‘deflationary spiral’ tail risk remains, particularly if you see the risks as those of the 1930’s gold standard days. Back then, the supply side of credit would abruptly shut down for both the private and the public sector, and financial sector issues were immediately transmitted to the real economy. (It doesn’t work that way with today’s non convertible currency and floating exchange rate regime, where public sector spending is not operationally constrained, but the Fed doesn’t yet seem to see it that way.)

Today’s equity markets contribute to the Fed’s tail risk fears- they see the stock market as a reliable leading indicator.

The equity markets are under pressure from both directions: a weak economy is bad for business and a rebound means higher interest rates from the Fed.

And with a Fed that believes the only tool it has to fight tail risk deflation is changing interest rates (see Bernanke testimony), it is rational for markets to expect the Fed to toss another big chunk of raw meat to the MNOG with another big fed fund rate cut after the March 18 meeting.

Data dependent, of course.

Payrolls tomorrow. Jan revision probably more relevant than the Feb number, as the pattern has been for substantial revisions a month after the initial announcement.

Central bank debate: Is it inflation or deflation?

Here’s how the inflation can persist indefinitely:

  1. In addition to the India/China type story for resource demand, this time around nominal demand for commodities is also coming from our own pension funds who are shifting more of their financial assets to passive commodity strategies.

    Pension funds contributions have traditionally been invested primarily in financial assets, making them ‘unspent income’ and therefore ‘demand leakages.’ Other demand leakages include IRAs (individual retirement accounts), corporate reserve funds, and other income that goes ‘unspent’ on goods and services.

    Supporting these demand leakages are all kinds of institutional structure, but primarily tax incentives designed to increase ‘savings’.

    These come about due to the ‘innocent fraud’ that savings is necessary for investment, a throwback to the gold standard days of loanable funds and the like.

    A total of perhaps $20 trillion of this ‘unspent income’ has accumulated in the various US retirement funds and reserves of all sorts.

    This has ‘made room’ for the government deficit spending we’ve done to not be particularly inflationary. In general terms, the goods and services that would have gone unsold each year due to our unspent income have instead been purchased by government deficit spending.

    But now that is changing, as a portion of that $20 trillion is being directed towards passive commodity strategies. While the nature of these allocations varies, a substantial portion is adding back the aggregate demand that would have otherwise stayed on the sidelines.

    That means a lot less government deficit spending might be needed to sustain high levels of demand than history indicates.

    And, of course, the allocations directly support commodity prices.
  1. We are faced with the same monopoly supplier/swing producer of crude oil as in the 1970’s.

    Back then the oil producers simply accumulated $ financial assets and were the source of a massive demand leakage that caused widespread recession in much of the world. And didn’t end until there was a supply response large enough to end the monopoly pricing power.

    But it did persist long enough for the ‘relative value story’ of rising crude prices to ‘turn into an inflation story’ as costs were passed through the various channels.

    And a general inflation combined with the supply response served to return the real terms of trade/real price of crude pretty much back to where they had been in the early 1970’s.
  1. This time around rather than ‘hoard’ excess oil revenues the producers seem to be spending the funds, as evidence by both the trillions being spent on public infrastructure as well as the A380’s being built for private use, and the boom in US exports- 13% increase last month.

    This results in increased exports from both the US and the Eurozone to the oil producing regions (including Texas) that supports US and Eurozone GDP/aggregate demand.

    At the macro level, it’s the reduced desire to accumulate $US financial assets that is manifested by increasing US exports.

    (This reduced desire comes from perceptions of monetary policy toward inflation, pension fund allocations away from $US financial assets, Paulson calling CBs who buy $US currency manipulators and outlaws, and ideological confrontation that keeps some oil producers from accumulating $US, etc. This all has weakened the $ to levels where it makes sense to buy US goods and services – the only way foreigners can reduce accumulations of $US is to spend them on US goods and services.)

    The channels are as follows:

    1. The price of crude is hiked continuously and the revenues are spent on imports of goods and services.
    2. This is further supported by an international desire to reduce accumulation of $US financial assets that lowers the $ to the point where accumulated $ are then spent on US goods and services.

    For the US this means the export channel is a source of inflation. Hence, the rapid rise in both exports and export prices along with a $ low enough for US goods and services (and real assets) to represent good value to to foreigners.

  1. This is not a pretty sight for the US. (Exports are a real cost to the US standard of living, imports a real benefit.)

    Real terms of trade are continually under negative pressure.

    The oil producers will always outbid domestic workers for their output as a point of logic.

    Real wages fall as consumers can find jobs but can’t earn enough to buy their own output which gets exported.

    Foreigners are also outbidding domestics for domestic assets including real estate and equity investments.
  1. The US lost a lot off aggregate demand when potential buyers with subprime credit no longer qualified for mortgages.

    Exports picked up the slack and GDP has muddled through.

    The Fed and Treasury have moved in an attempt to restore domestic demand. Interest rate cuts aren’t effective but the fiscal package will add to aggregate demand beginning in May.

    US export revenues will increasingly find their way to domestic aggregate demand, and housing will begin to add to GDP rather than subtract from it.

    Credit channels will adjust (bank lending gaining market share, municipalities returning to uninsured bond issuance, sellers ‘holding paper,’ etc.) and domestic income will continue to be leveraged though to a lesser degree than with the fraudulent subprime lending.

    Pension funds will continue to support demand with their allocations to passive commodity strategies and also directly support prices of commodities.
  1. Don’t know how the Fed responds – my guess is rate cuts turn to rate hikes as inflation rises, even with weak GDP.
  1. We may be in the first inning of this inflation story.

    Could be a strategy by the Saudis/Russians to permanently disable the west’s monetary system, shift real terms of trade, and shift world power.

Bernanke testimony

Mercantilism is alive and well

Most telling statement when asked about what he wanted for the economy-

moderate domestic consumption, more investment, and more exports to eliminate the trade deficit.
(I’m looking for the transcript now to get the exact quotes.)

This fits with the policy of a lower interest rates, lower $, lower domestic real consumption due to higher import prices, and higher exports to sustain demand (at the ‘expense’ of the country you are exporting to who ‘loses’ demand for its products). This can be done for as long as nominal domestic wages remain ‘well anchored’ thereby reducing real wages, particularly vs our intended markets.

This is the old ‘beggar thy neighbor’ policy last seen in the 1930’s. The purpose was to accumulate the world’s gold supply, and increase ‘national savings.’ The policy was called mercantilism. It’s the logical end that follows from being on a gold standard.
A trade surplus tended to increase gold reserves, while a trade deficit tended to drain gold reserves.

Today we have non convertible currency, so government accumulation of its own currency per se is meaningless. However, we have retained some of the gold standard accounting nomenclature, such as ‘national savings’ which still features govt. accumulation of it’s own currency (as well as foreign exchange, which at least does represent value).

Fed Chairman Bernanke, the student of the great depression of the 30’s, sees the tail risk as that of gold standard deflationary collapses, and is cutting interest rates to bring the $ down and increase exports. He deems trade deficits ‘bad’ and ‘unsustainable,’ trade surpluses ‘good’ and ‘wealth enhancing,’ and increasing ‘national savings’ the mark of success.

(Mainstream economics, with all its shortcomings, does recognize the differences between convertible and non convertible currency regimes that Bernanke seems to be missing.)

Additionally Chairman Bernanke made it clear today that he sees lower futures prices for crude oil, a non perishable commodity, as indicative of market expectations for future prices, and is making decisions on that basis.

Ironically, the backwardated crude market is the result of the Saudis/Russians acting as swing producer setting price and letting quantity adjust (imperfect competition), which is functionally an engineered spot ‘shortage’ that supports price.

This brings us back to the present condition of the US economy-

Weak domestic real demand due to ‘well anchored nominal wages’ and falling real wages,

GDP muddling through with the support of booming export demand and a falling trade deficit,

And cost push inflation accelerating.

However,

Based on today’s testimony, the FOMC seems fine with the lower $ and the associated rising costs of imports, as the weak $ supports export growth.

It will get concerned about inflation when it sees signs unit labor costs are accelerating.

Inflation, growth, and Fed policy

Stocks up big, oil up big, dollar down big, and interest rates lower. How does this happen?

Review

Twin themes remain

  • weakness
  • inflation

Sources of weakness

  1. Shrinking gov budget deficit caused the financial obligations ratio to get too high by Q2 2006 to support the private sector credit growth needed to sustain previous levels of aggregate demand.
  2. Subprime business plan failed (mainly due to lender fraud) and removed that bid from the housing market.
  3. Lower interest rates reduce personal/household income.

Supporting GDP

  1. Exports booming due to a reduced desire of non residents to accumulate $US financial assets. (This drives the $US down to levels where non residents are spending them on US goods and services.)
    1. Paulson branding any country that buys $ a ‘currency manipulator’
    2. Apparent lack of Fed concern about inflation discouraging holders of $US financial assets
    3. Bush policies discouraging ‘less then friendly’ oil producers from accumulating $US financial assets
  2. Govt. spending moved forward from 07 to 08 now kicking in.
  3. Fiscal package begins to distribute funds in May.
  4. Pension funds adding to allocations for passive commodity strategies

Sources of Inflation

  1. Sufficient demand for Saudis/Russians to act as swing producers and set crude prices as high as they want to
  2. Biofuels linking energy prices to food prices as we burn up the world’s food supply for fuel
  3. Govt. payrolls and transfer payments indexed to CPI
  4. Weak $US policies driving higher import and export prices
  5. Pension funds adding to allocations for passive commodity strategies
  6. Pension funds contributing to the $ decline by allocating funds away from domestic equities to foreign equities
  7. Sovereign wealth funds allocating to passive commodity strategies

An export economy looks like this

  1. Weak domestic demand and domestic consumption
  2. Exports strong enough to sustain reasonable levels of employment (but generally not full employment)
  3. Employment and output stays reasonably high.
  4. Domestic prices are high enough relative to domestic wages to subdue domestic consumption.
  5. Foreigners ‘outbid’ domestics for the remaining output that thereby gets exported.
  6. The domestic economy works more and consumes less (lower standard of living), with the difference accounted for as ‘rising savings.’

Mainstream history (not mine) will show the following errors made by the Fed

  1. They ‘paused’ a couple of years ago as the great commodity boom was hitting it’s stride, monetizing (whatever that is) the price increases, and allowing a relative value story to turn into an inflation story.
  2. They cut aggressively into a triple negative supply shock exacerbating the monetization (whatever that is) process due to the following fundamental errors of judgement:
    1. They read futures prices in food and energy as ‘expectations’ of lower prices in the future, rather than as indicators of current inventory conditions.
    2. They assumed gold standard tail risks to a non convertible currency regime.
    3. They failed to recognize the source of rising crude prices was foreign monopoly pricing.
    4. They delayed introducing the TAF for several months.
    5. They pushed the President and Congress into increasing the budget deficit with an inflationary cash give handout.
  3. Failure to recognize the influence of pension funds on inflation and aggregate demand
  4. Failed to understand reserve accounting and liquidity issues
    1. Thought open market operations altered functional quantitative measures, not just interest rates
    2. Delayed implementing the TAF for several months to accept additional bank assets as collateral
    3. Failed to recognize that the liability side of Fed member banks is not an appropriate source of market discipline

Back to the present

  • Stocks are up as financial risks ease with the monolines sorting things out, and energy and export businesses boom.
  • Stocks are up as markets believe the Fed doesn’t care about inflation and will leave rates low for an extended period of time.
  • Crude is up as Saudis/Russians continue to hike prices.
  • The falling dollar results in higher import prices including gold, silver, copper, and most everything else.

Interest rates are down as markets read the Kohn speech as saying the Fed expects inflation to come down so there’s no need to be concerned or take action. And inflation is a lagging indicator that historically comes down after the Fed cuts rates when the economy weakens.

Kohn speech

After the speech, crude up $1.61 and back over $100.
Yields down on fixed income as markets anticipate Fed won’t respond to inflation anytime soon:

February 26, 2008

The U.S. Economy and Monetary Policy

(SNIP)

Several major developments are shaping current economic performance, the outlook, and the conduct of monetary policy. The most prominent of these developments is the contraction in the housing market that began in early 2006. Both the prices and pace of construction of new homes rose to unsustainable levels in the preceding few years. For a time, the resulting correction was largely confined to the housing market, but the consequences of that correction have spread to other sectors of the economy.

The financial markets are playing a key role in the transmission of the housing downturn to the rest of the economy.

(SNIP)

The result has been a substantial tightening in credit availability for many firms and households.

At the same time, continued sizable increases in the prices of food, energy, and other commodities have raised inflation. To some extent, those increases have resulted from strong demand in rapidly growing emerging-market economies, like China and India. But the increases likely also reflect conditions such as adverse weather in some parts of the world, the use of agricultural commodities to produce energy, and geopolitical developments that threaten supplies in some petroleum-producing centers. The higher prices have eroded the purchasing power of household income, adding to restraint on spending.

(SNIP)

Recent Economic and Financial Developments

The pace of real economic activity stepped down sharply toward the end of last year and has remained sluggish in recent months. Real gross domestic product (GDP) is estimated to have risen only slightly in the fourth quarter. The contraction in the housing market continues to drag down economic growth. Declines in real residential investment subtracted nearly 1 percentage point from the overall increase in real GDP in 2007. Even so, the inventory of unsold new homes remains unusually high, because the demand for housing has fallen about as rapidly as the supply. Problems in the subprime market have virtually cut off financing in this sector. Prime jumbo mortgages are being made, but the lack of a secondary market has caused the spread between rates on these mortgages and on those that have been eligible for purchase by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to widen substantially. Even the standards for conforming mortgages have been tightened of late. Weak demand, in turn, is leading to widespread declines in the actual and expected prices of houses, further discouraging buyers. Starts of new single-family homes continued to fall in January, dropping to fewer than 750,000 units–a level of activity more than 1 million units below the peak in early 2006. Judging from the further decline in permits last month, additional cutbacks in construction are likely. It appears that the correction in the housing market has further to go.

For the better part of the past two years, the trouble in the housing market was contained; however, over the past several months, the weakness appears to have spread to other sectors of the economy. Tighter credit, reductions in housing and equity wealth, higher energy prices, and uncertainty about economic prospects seem to be weighing on business and household spending. Labor demand has softened in recent months. Private nonfarm payrolls were little changed in January, and the unemployment rate moved up to 4.9 percent, on average, during December and January, after remaining around 4-1/2 percent from late 2006 through most of 2007. The higher level of weekly claims for unemployment insurance suggests continued softness in employment this month.

Agreed, the economy has hit the ‘soft spot’ previously forecast by the Fed and private economists.

Apart from the labor market, the hard data on economic activity in the first quarter are limited, but, on the whole, the data suggest economic activity has remained very sluggish. Retail sales were up moderately in nominal terms in January, but after adjusting for the rise in prices of consumer goods, real spending on non-auto goods appears to have been little changed last month. In addition, unit sales of new motor vehicles weakened. Total industrial production rose just 0.1 percent in January for a second consecutive month, and manufacturing output was unchanged. Much of the other information about the current quarter has come in the form of surveys of business and consumers–and most all of it has been downbeat. That said, I can still see a few bright spots. One is that the level of business inventories does not appear worrisome at present. Another is that international trade continued to be a solid source of support for the economy through the end of last year. The worsening financial conditions and slower growth in the United States have had some effect on the rest of the world, but the prospects for foreign growth remain favorable.

Agreed, weak domestic demand supported by rising exports.

The most recent news on inflation–the January report on the consumer price index (CPI)–was disappointing. Once again, total or headline CPI was boosted by a jump in energy prices and relatively large increases in food prices; last month’s rise left the twelve-month change in the overall CPI at 4.3 percent–twice the pace a year ago. In addition, the January increase of 0.3 percent in the CPI excluding food and energy was slightly higher than the average monthly rate in 2007. Nonetheless, the twelve-month change in this measure of core inflation, at 2-1/2 percent, was still slightly below the rate one year earlier. The recent readings on core inflation suggest that the higher costs of energy, a pickup in prices of imported goods, and, perhaps, the persistent upward price pressures in commodity markets may be passing through a bit to core consumer prices.

Headline passing through to core – not good.

The Implications of Financial Stress for the Economic Outlook

(SNIP)

The pressures from the financial turmoil have been most intense for those financial intermediaries that have been exposed to losses on mortgages and other credits that are repricing, as well as for those institutions now required to bring onto their balance sheets loans that previously would have been sold into securities markets. As those intermediaries take steps to protect themselves from further losses and conserve capital, and as investors more broadly have responded to the evolving risks, spreads on household and business debt in securities markets have widened, the availability of bank credit has decreased, and equity prices have weakened.

In addition to the drying up of large portions of mortgage finance that I referred to previously, conditions have firmed on loans for a variety of other purposes. Responses to our Senior Loan Officer Opinion Survey in January showed that banks have tightened terms and standards for household and commercial mortgages, commercial and industrial loans, and consumer loans.

The Fed puts a lot of weight on this and reads it differently than I do. Yes, they have tightened standards, but that doesn’t mean those who had previously qualified no longer qualified under the new standards. For example, requiring a larger down payment is considered tightening, and there’s no evidence yet that would be borrowers don’t simply put more money down. Same with other ‘tightening standards’ issues.

In corporate bond markets, spreads have been widening on both investment- and speculative-grade issues. Lenders are demanding much higher risk premiums for commercial real estate loans. And equity prices have fallen substantially over the past seven months, reducing household wealth and increasing the cost of raising equity capital for businesses.

All true, but part of the great repricing of risk. Arguably spreads were unsustainably narrow a year ago.

To be sure, the easing of monetary policy that I will be discussing in a minute has, quite deliberately, been intended to offset the effect of this tightening, resulting in some borrowers seeing lower interest rates. But financing costs have risen, on balance, for riskier credits, and almost all borrowers are dealing with more cautious lenders who have adopted more stringent standards. Those financial market developments are, in many respects, a healthy correction to previous excesses.

Yes, agreed with that.

But, in some cases, they may represent an overreaction, or at least positioning for the small probability of very adverse economic conditions. In any case, they have the potential to adversely affect household and business spending.

Yes, they have that potential. And regulatory over reach is also a problem he doesn’t address, as the OCC is unnecessarily making things more difficult for small banks to function ‘normally’.

The recovery in financial markets is likely to be a prolonged process. The length of the recuperation will depend importantly on the course of the economy, particularly on developments in the housing market. If the deterioration in the housing market were greater than expected in coming months, the losses borne by financial institutions would be even greater, and lenders might further reduce credit availability. More widespread macroeconomic weakness could make lenders more cautious and could cause the financial problems to spread further. The recent problems of financial guarantors, with possible implications for municipal bond markets as well as for bank balance sheets, are an indication that the financial sector remains vulnerable.

Agreed that parts of the financial sector remains vulnerable, while others are doing exceptionally well.

Even in a more favorable economic environment, some time is likely to be required to restore the functioning and liquidity of a number of markets.

(SNIP)

The Monetary Policy Response

(SNIP)

As the deterioration in financial markets increasingly has threatened to hold down spending and employment, the FOMC has eased monetary policy, reducing the federal funds rate target by 2-1/4 percentage points since the turmoil erupted in August. Those actions have been intended to counteract the effects on the overall economy of tighter terms and conditions in credit markets, the drop in equity and housing wealth, and the steep decline in housing activity. Our objective has been to promote sustainable growth and maximum employment over time.

(SNIPS BELOW)

What policy can do is attempt to limit the fallout on the economy from this adjustment.

Lower interest rates should support aggregate demand over time, even in the face of widespread contraction in the supply of credit.


Among other things, lower rates should facilitate the refinancing of mortgage loans, and they will hold down the cost of capital to business.

Easier policy should also support asset prices–or at least cushion declines that otherwise would have occurred.

And expected policy easing likely contributed to the drop in the foreign exchange value of the dollar, which is bolstering our exports.

Yes, the ‘inflate your way out of debt’ approach. Highly unusual for a central bank to aggressively do this. Harks back to the ‘beggar thy neighbor’ policies of the 1930s.

The extent of the financial adjustment, as I mentioned previously, is itself highly dependent on how housing and the economy evolve. Part of the rise in risk spreads, reduction in credit availability, and the declines in stock prices in the past few months reflect investor efforts to protect themselves against the potential for very adverse economic outcomes–that is, the exposures and losses that would accompany a persistent steep decline in house prices and a significant recession. Of course, these actions–reducing exposures, tightening credit standards, demanding extra compensation for taking risk–themselves make these “tail risk” scenarios even more likely. In circumstances like these, the decisions of policymakers must take account of not only the most likely course of the economy, but also the possibility of very unfavorable developments.

Not including inflation?

Doing so should reduce the odds on an especially adverse outcome not only by having policy a little easier than otherwise, but also by reassuring lenders and spenders that the central bank recognizes such a possibility in its policy deliberations. Whether the Federal Reserve has done enough in this regard is a question this policymaker will be weighing carefully over coming months.

Even as we respond to forces currently weighing on real activity, we must also set policy to resist any tendency for inflation to increase on a sustained basis. Allowing elevated rates of inflation to become entrenched in inflation expectations would be costly to reverse, constrain our ability to cushion further downward shocks to spending, and result over time in lower and less stable economic expansion. Inflation expectations generally have appeared reasonably well anchored, giving the FOMC room to focus on supporting economic growth. Moreover, as I will explain below, for a variety of reasons, I do not expect the recent elevated inflation rates to persist. In my view, the adverse dynamics of the financial markets and the economy have presented the greater threat to economic welfare in the United States. But the recent information on prices underlines the need to continue to monitor the inflation situation very carefully.

The Outlook for Economic Activity and Inflation

How long the adjustment in financial markets will take and the consequences of that adjustment for economic activity are subject to considerable uncertainty. In my view, the most likely scenario is one in which the economy experiences a period of sluggish growth in demand and production in the near term that is accompanied by some further increase in joblessness.

New building activity will continue to decline until the overhang of inventories of unsold homes has been substantially reduced, and the demand side of the market is not likely to revive appreciably until buyers sense that price declines are abating and financing conditions for mortgages are improving. Consumer spending will be damped by the effects on real incomes of a weak labor market and rising energy prices and by the effects of declines in the stock market and home prices on household wealth. Business spending on capital equipment should be held down by slower sales and production and by caution in a very uncertain economic environment. Nonresidential construction is likely to lose some momentum in the wake of both weak growth in overall economic activity and tighter credit. Some modest offset to these areas of weakness should come from export demand, which should be boosted by the lagged effects of recent declines in the dollar and supported by still-solid growth abroad.

Seems he doesn’t realize export demand is part of the cause of higher prices, as non-residents compete with residents to buy the US output of goods and services. That’s what an export economy looks like, and this will continue for as long as non-resident desires to accumulate $US financial assets continues to fall.

By midyear, economic activity should begin to benefit from several factors. One is the fiscal stimulus package that the Congress recently enacted. The rebates that households are scheduled to begin to receive in May should provide a temporary boost to consumption. Although the timing and the magnitude of the spending response is uncertain, economic studies of the previous experience suggest that a noticeable proportion of households are quite sensitive to temporary cash flow. The potential effects of the business incentives are perhaps more uncertain. Although economic theory suggests that they should bring forward some capital spending, past experience has been mixed.

Second, the decline in residential investment should begin to abate later this year as the overhang of unsold homes is worked off, reducing what has been a significant drag on economic growth over the past two years. Finally, the declines in interest rates that began last summer should be supporting activity over coming quarters, and their effects should show through more clearly to improvements in economic activity as the stress in financial markets dissipates.

Although a firming in the growth of economic activity after midyear now appears the most likely scenario, the outlook is subject to a number of important risks. Further substantial declines in house prices could cut more deeply into household wealth and intensify the problems in mortgage markets and for those intermediaries holding mortgage loans. Financial markets could remain quite fragile, delaying the restoration of more normal credit flows. As observed in the minutes of its most recent meeting, the FOMC has expressed a broad concern about the possibility of adverse interactions among weaker economic activity, stress in financial markets, and credit constraints.

I expect the run-up in headline inflation to be reversed and core inflation to edge lower over the next few years. This projection assumes that energy and other commodity prices will level out, as suggested by the futures markets.

No other reasons? Not much to bet the ranch on? And futures prices for non perishables are not about expectations, but about inventory conditions. Contango indicates a surplus of desired spot inventories and backwardation a shortage of desired spot inventories.

The current backwardated term structure of oil and other futures is indicating shortages, which, if anything, tell me the risk is more to the upside than the downside, as well as support my position that the Saudis/Russians are acting as swing producers and setting price.

Moreover, greater slack in the economy should reduce pressure on prices and wages.

Maybe, but also a risky stance.

Rising import prices are in fact rising real wages for US, as many imports have high labor contents.

And given rising import prices of labor intensive goods and services due to the weak $, lower US domestic real wages shift production back to domestic firms, who support US nominal wages and keep employment firmer than otherwise.

Despite high resource utilization over the past couple of years and periods of elevated headline inflation, labor cost increases have remained quite moderate, and inflation expectations remain reasonably well anchored.

As above, rising import prices represent rising labor costs, and inflation expectations have dropped to only ‘reasonably’ well anchored.

Nonetheless, policymakers must remain very attentive to the outlook for inflation. As I mentioned earlier, the recent uptick in core inflation may reflect some spillover of the higher costs of food, energy, and imports into core prices.

To the mainstream economists, this is a serious development.

And the prices of crude oil and other commodities have moved up further in recent weeks. A related concern is that inflation expectations might drift higher if the current rapid rates of headline inflation persist for longer than anticipated or if the recent easing in monetary policy is misinterpreted as reflecting less resolve among Committee members to maintain low and stable inflation over the medium run. Persistent elevated inflation would undermine the performance of the economy over time.

Worse, to a mainstream economist, including Governor Kohn, it’s a necessary condition for optimal growth and employment.

Conclusion

These have been difficult times for the U.S. economy. The correction of excesses in sectors of the economy and financial markets has spilled over more broadly. Growth has slowed, and unemployment has increased; both borrowers and lenders are facing problems, and the functioning of the financial markets has been disrupted. At the same time, inflation has risen.

Yes, weakness and higher prices.

I believe we will see a return to stronger growth, lower unemployment, lower inflation and improved flows in financial markets, but it probably will take a little while.

This ‘belief’ is at best scantily supported in this speech. Lower inflation because futures are lower? Lower employment/output gap and bringing inflation down to comfort zone at the same time?

And adverse risks to this most likely scenario abound: Uncertainty could trigger an even greater withdrawal from risk-taking by households, businesses, and investors, resulting in more pronounced and prolonged economic weakness; events beyond our borders could continue to put upward pressure on inflation rates.

Yes.

But we should not lose sight of some fundamental strengths of our economy. Our markets have proven to be flexible and resilient, able to absorb shocks, and quick to adapt to changing circumstances. Those markets reward entrepreneurship and risk-taking, and many people are looking for opportunities to buy distressed assets and restructure and strengthen businesses to take advantage of the economic rebound that will occur. Monetary policy has proven itself, under a wide variety of circumstances, very effective in recent decades in damping inflation when needed

Yes, but only by hiking rates. There is no other policy option for bringing down inflation.

and in stimulating demand and activity when that has been appropriate. Our job at the Federal Reserve is to put in place those policies that will promote both price stability and growth over time. We have the tools.

They have one tool – setting the interbank interest rates and other rates as desired.

They have no way of directly increasing or decreasing aggregate demand. That requires direct buying or selling of actual goods and services, not just financial assets.

Treasury spending/taxing directly add/removes demand.

As Chairman Bernanke often emphasizes: We will do what is needed.

Yes, to the best of their knowledge and ability.

This is a relatively neutral speech with more inflation talk than in previous, dovish speeches.

Conclusion:
High February CPI numbers before the next meeting will make it very difficult for the FOMC to vote on a cut without a more than anticipated decline of economic activity.

Lukoil cuts German oil exports by pipeline on pricing

Russia exercising it’s pricing power as a swing producer as well.

Lukoil Cuts German Oil Exports by Pipeline on Pricing (Update1)

by Torrey Clark and Thom Rose

(Bloomberg) OAO Lukoil, Russia’s largest independent oil producer, may cut March shipments of crude oil to Germany by pipeline, continuing the halt ordered yesterday because of a pricing dispute.

Lukoil stopped February exports through the Druzhba pipeline and will consider cutting March sales while demanding higher prices from traders in Germany, spokesman Dmitry Dolgov said by phone today. The Moscow-based oil producer has reserved space in the pipeline for next month, he said.

“Why should we sell oil cheap?” Dolgov said. “We have found alternatives.”

German refineries tapped fuel from alternative sources last year to supply their customers when Druzhba shipments fell as Lukoil and Sunimex Handels-GmbH, the dominant oil trader, clashed over prices in July and August. PCK Raffinerie GmbH in Schwedt said the disputes haven’t affected output.

“We haven’t had any problems or production cuts,” PCK Schwedt spokesman Karl-Heinz Schwelnus said today by telephone.

Lukoil will renew attempts to sell oil directly to the refineries, Dolgov said. The company isn’t breaking any contracts by cutting shipments and the refineries are unlikely to run short of crude, he said.

“German drivers have nothing to worry about,” Dolgov said.