Jan 23 late update

Monoline problem addressed, stocks suddenly oversold as that risk fades.

Most earning look strong. Guidance may be soft but that’s at least partially a function of the expectation of a recession as per the media reporting and will get ignored as those fears continue to fade.

If initial claims tomorrow are around 325,000 as expected, and continuing claims are reasonably stable, it will indicate the labor markets may not have deteriorated from Q4 as feared.

Existing home sales are still winter numbers, but could surprise on the upside as anecdotal reports indicate aggressive selling of excess inventories.

The Fed and the stock market share the same fears. As the market’s fears fade so will the Fed’s, and the markets and the Fed could start to take away a the cut now priced in for the meeting next week.

This leaves FF futures and ED futures maybe 100 bp over priced, as the improving outlook will price in the possibility that fewer future cuts will be appropriate.

And the fiscal package is growing. This is the first time I’ve ever seen the Fed encouraging adding to the deficit, and in an election year it’s hard to imagine Congress and the President not taking advantage of that opening and in the spirit of bipartisan cooperation expanding the package so all get their favorite tax cut and spending initiative. $250-300 billion wouldn’t surprise me. And they need to do it quick before it’s discovered there is no recession problem, but instead an inflation problem.

Also note WTI and Brent crude have converged quite a bit in the sell off, which probably means WTI was sold off by speculators, and a bounce back to the Saudi’s target price (whatever that is) can be expected.

Exports are also likely to be underestimated in next week’s GDP preview, so there’s a good chance it will be revised up when December trade numbers are announced in February.

And without a rise in unemployment and a meaningful drop in personal income housing can come back very quickly from a very low base. Affordability is up nicely, and the production of new homes is down by maybe a million vs last year.


Summary of subprime bank losses

Spread around enough so no one went out of business, and most lost less then a quarter’s worth of earnings. And a chunk of it probably recoverable.

It’s been a year and the total has to be at the low end of expectations, but could be a lot more to surface in a lot of small pieces around the world.

Seems that only when the Fed sees signs of general progressive improvement vs the current perception of continuing deterioration will they stop cutting.

Subprime Bank Losses Reach $133 Billion, Led by Merrill: Table

by Yalman Onaran

Jan. 22 (Bloomberg) The following table shows the $133 billion in asset writedowns and credit losses since the beginning of 2007, including reserves set aside for bad loans, at more than 20 of the world’s largest banks and securities firms.

The charges stem from the collapse of the U.S. subprime mortgage market and its repercussions on the rest of the housing industry. The figures, from company statements and filings, incorporate some credit losses or writedowns of other mortgage assets caused by subprime crisis.

Analysts estimate additional writedowns and credit losses of $23.5 billion, which would bring the total to $157 billion. All figures are in billions and are net of financial hedges the firms used to mitigate their losses.

*T

Firm Writedown Credit Loss Total
Merrill Lynch $24.5 $24.5
Citigroup 19.6 2.5 22.1
UBS 14.4 14.4*
HSBC 0.9 9.8 10.7
Morgan Stanley 9.4 9.4
Bank of America 7 0.9 7.9
Washington Mutual 0.3 6.2 6.5**
Credit Agricole 4.9 4.9*
Wachovia 2.7 2 4.7
JPMorgan Chase 1.6 1.6 3.2
Canadian Imperial (CIBC) 3.2 3.2**
Barclays 2.7 2.7*
Bear Stearns 2.6 2.6
Royal Bank of Scotland 2.5 2.5*
Deutsche Bank 2.3 2.3
Wells Fargo 0.3 1.4 1.7
Lehman Brothers 1.5 1.5
Mizuho Financial Group 1.5 1.5
National City 0.4 1 1.4
Credit Suisse 1 1
Nomura Holdings 0.9 0.9
Societe Generale 0.5 0.5
Japanese banks
(excluding Mizuho, Nomura)
0.8 0.4 1.2
Canadian banks
(excluding CIBC)
1.4 0.1 1.5
____ _____ _____
TOTALS*** $107 $26 $133

* Includes losses the company expects to report in the fourth quarter of 2007.
** Includes losses the company expects to report in the first quarter of 2008.
***Totals reflect figures before rounding.
*T

–With reporting by Samar Srivastava in New York, Doug Alexander in Toronto. Editors: Steve Dickson, Dan Kraut.


Re: Will the cure be worse than the disease?

(an interoffice email)

> the only problem i have with Meltzer is that is the consensus view now,
> that inflation is a foregone conclusion-i think long term that may be
> right (long term paper currency devaluation) but you could easily
> correct commodity and energy prices if you have a reduction of
> speculator and investor demand (ie see 1970s chart of gold and crude
> oil-there years in which the price of those commodities corrected
> viciously in a long term up trend). Specs of today in a mark to market
> world i dont believe are immune from short term negative commodity
> marks…

Agreed.

Two things (as Reagan would say):

  1. Crude probably stays high as Saudis are selling 9 million bpd at current prices. no reason to cut price unless demand fall off and forces them to hit bids rather than getting offers lifted. And world inventories are relatively low so it would be hard to get a sell off from physical inventory liquidation. More likely for other commodities to underperform crude in a spec sell off. Might even be happening now. (And biofuels like crude and food costs.)
  1. Even if crude/food/import and export prices level off or even go down some, they are so far ahead of core CPI increases that core can continue to go up for several quarters to close the gap. And the Fed thinks that can dislodge expectations so can’t afford to let it happen.
  1. world employment/income seems to be holding up, so actual nominal demand for consumption of resources shouldn’t collapse without some major positive supplied side shock.

Meltzer is wrong as IMHO not much is a function of interest rates; so, he’s ‘blaming’ the wrong entity for ‘inflation’. But his story is the mainstream story; so, i expect a lot more of same.


♥

Will the cure be worse than the disease?

Will the cure be worse than the disease?

Right, the financial press will chop the Fed to ribbons if inflation continues higher, as I expect it will.

But Bernanke is setting the stage for an even bigger recession down the road. Just as the ultra-low rates of the early 2000s created many of the problems we’re experiencing today, pumping money into the system would probably stoke inflation, forcing the Fed to hike rates sharply in the near future. “It’s better to take a small recession and kill inflation immediately instead of facing high inflation and a really big recession later,” says Carnegie Mellon economist Allan Meltzer.

That’s the orthodox mainstream view. They are already starting to turn on Bernanke and his reinvention of monetary policy.

Meltzer, who is finishing the second volume of his history of the Federal Reserve, warns that Bernanke is risking a disastrous replay of the 1970s, when high oil prices fueled double-digit inflation. Every time the Fed started to tighten and unemployment jumped, chairmen G. William Miller and Arthur Burns lost their nerve. They lowered rates to boost job growth, and inflation inevitably revived, causing a vicious price spiral. The Fed let the disease rage for so long that it took draconian action by chairman Paul Volcker in the early 1980s to finally defeat inflation. The price was a deep recession, with unemployment hitting 11% in 1982. “The mentality is the same as in the 1970s,” says Meltzer. “‘As soon as we get rid of the risk of recession, we’ll do something about inflation.’ But that comes too late.”

Yes, that’s the mainstream story (not mine, of course) and likely to get a lot louder, and if inflation picks up, it could cost Bernanke his job.

Indeed, while the economy is sending mixed messages about growth, the signs of increasing inflation are flashing bright red. For 2007 the consumer price index rose 4.1%, the biggest annual increase in 17 years. Gold, historically a reliable harbinger of inflation, set an all-time high of more than $900 an ounce. The dollar is languishing at a record low against the euro and a weighted basket of international currencies. “Flooding the market with liquidity is a disaster for the purchasing power of the dollar,” says David Gitlitz, chief economist for Trend Macrolytics.

And the Fed knows this. And they know they are ‘way out of bounds’ of mainstream theory with current policy, including encouraging a fiscal package.

The Fed’s supporters tend to downplay those dangers. They contend that the inflation surge is being driven largely by energy costs. Since oil isn’t likely to rise from its near-$100 level, inflation is likely to tail off in 2008. “That argument is wrong,” says Brian Wesbury, chief economist with First Trust Portfolios, an asset-management firm. “As people spend less to drive to the golf course, they will spend the extra money on golf clubs or other products. The Fed wants to reflate the economy, so the money that went into higher oil prices will drive up the prices of other goods.”

That’s the mainstream story, and it’s lose/lose for the Fed.

Fed supporters also point out that the yield on ten-year Treasury bonds stands at just 3.8%, a figure that implies that investors expect inflation to be around 2% in future years. So if inflation is really expected to rage, why aren’t interest rates far higher? The explanation is twofold. First, government bonds are hardly a foolproof forecaster. For example, five years ago Treasury yields were predicting 2% inflation over the next five years, and the actual figure was 3%, or 50% higher.

Another point the mainstream will make: Fed foolishly relied on its forecasting models and ignored the obvious signs of inflation.

Second, investors are so skittish about most stocks and corporate bonds that they’re paying a huge premium for safe investments, chiefly U.S. Treasuries. “It’s all about a flight to safety,” says Meltzer. Stand by for a major rise in yields as the reality of looming inflation sinks in.

So what is the right course for the Fed? Bernanke should hold the Fed funds rate exactly where it is now, at 4.25%. Standing pat might well push the economy into a recession. But the Fed’s newfound vigilance on inflation would boost the dollar, effectively lowering the prices of oil and other imports. America would suffer a short downturn and restore price stability, paving the way to a strong recovery in 2010 or 2011.

Sadly, the Fed has already chosen sides. It’s likely to lower rates every time growth slows or joblessness rises. As a result, it will never tame inflation until it becomes a clawing, bellowing threat. Then we’ll have to suffer a real recession, the kind we suffered in the aftermath of a time we should study and shouldn’t forget – the 1970s.

Says it all.

Hard to say why the Fed hasn’t played it that way, but they haven’t and will pay the price if inflation keeps rising.


♥

Meltdown?, continued..

Weakness:

  • Equity markets still heading down.
  • Commodity markets anticipate slowing demand.
  • Credit markets anticipate additional rate cuts.

First, a word on the bond insurers:

A Fed rate cut won’t address the risk that an insurer failure could trigger panic selling by bond holders that require AAA ratings to hold their bonds.

The Fed could offer to provide supplemental insurance to investors holding the bonds for a fee (maybe a point), and discount the strike of the put a few points as well. The insurer would continue in first loss position. This would allow investors to ‘pay the price’ to the Fed if they want to keep the AAA rating. Additionally the Fed would take measures to make sure this doesn’t happen again.

Second, commodity markets:

Story today that OPEC still sees demand increasing 1.3 million bpd, even with a slowdown. Not good. Means they retain pricing power.

The unknown is whether they agreed to cut prices in response to the Bush visit.

Third, equities:

Dupont earnings way above expectations on world demand, and price increases on their cost side were more than passed through.

And bank earnings off but all still in positive territory for Q4, indicating losses during what is likely the largest quarter for writeoffs were less than earnings. I’ve seen worse…

Equity markets relatively flat from yesterday, earning look good, particularly ex financial writedowns, as core earnings of the financials look OK as well.

One of the problems with equities continues to be shareholder vulnerability to converts and other dilutions as corporate structure/law rewards management for this kind of recapitalization. This shifts wealth from existing shareholder to new shareholders.

Initial claims estimated at 325,000 for Thursday. If so, I still don’t see much damage to the real economy. Q4 may sink or swim on December export numbers that will be released in February.

The jobless recovery ends with a full employment recession?
♥

I’ve been wrong on the Fed

> Hi
>
> You’ve been looking for this kind of financial trouble for a bit over in Europe. Good call Warren.
>
> Bobby.
>

Thanks, yes, I called it from mid 2006 – weakness due to deficit too small to support the credit structure, but inflation racing up as food/fuel rise due to Saudis acting the swing producer and biofuels burning up our food supply.

My error was in thinking the inflation would keep the fed from cutting. Been totally wrong on that!

Never would have thought a CB would act this way in the face of a triple negative supply shock – food/fuel/importand export prices all ratcheting up.

And looks like another 50 cut or maybe even 75 or 100 on Jan 30 even as core inflation goes through their ‘comfort zone,’ and Bernanke’s pushing Congress to hike the deficit! Never imagined the Fed would be keen to send a strong ‘we don’t care about inflation’ message, regardless of GDP in the short run. Goes against every aspect of mainstream monetary theory. But they sure are doing it!

And still no major weakness in the real economy, apart from some possible weakness late December if exports fell off. That won’t be out for a while.

All I can come with are three things:

  1. They’ve been misusing futures prices for oil and food to predict inflation will fall.
  2. They are afraid of fixed exchange rate/gold standard types of monetary collapses, even though we have a floating exchange rate policy, where that doesn’t happen and for all practical purposes can’t happen with floating fx.
  3. They are relying on their forecasts for weakness to bring down inflation when it’s coming from a combination of producer price
    setting, biofuels, and Paulson’s weak $ policy chasing foreign central banks away from $US financial assets.

And yes, watch out for a system wide failure of the payments system in the Eurozone if deposit insurance gets tested by a major bank failure.

Also, the $US remains fundamentally strong, but Paulson and to some degree the Fed are scaring investors away from $US financial assets, including US and other pension funds, which keeps the $ cheap enough to drive increasing US exports.

warren


♥

Re: meltdown?

(an interoffice email)

> … He’s here w/me now & also is very concerned over the entire
> spectrum, especially all the 5/1 ARM’s & 2nd mgtg paper most
> refinancing this year. Ie: orginally good credits, now not. A ton of
> 5/1 Arm paper was done w/ escalations up 40/50% payment wise.

Presumably the borrowers qualified at the time based on the higher payments?

And I see refi’s ratcheting up nicely. Unemployment is about the same, incomes are up, so most borrowers should qualify for refis,
apart from the ones that slipped by with substandard credit in the first place?

> Guess w/these Insurance Cos being downgraded tomorrow will be BLACK Tuesday.
> So, how do we fix a crisis of CONFIDENCE? BB isn’t too convincing these days.

The risk is mark to market risk if there is forced selling by investors that must have rated credits and were relying on the insurance to comply with their ratings criteria.

Forced selling is disruptive for sure- sellers lose, buyers gain as prices go lower than economic and/or recovery value.

Not much the Fed or Congress can do apart from bailing out the bond holders by taking over some piece of the insurance, and operationally it’s hard to see them doing that on a timely basis. But it would ‘cost’ the govt. a relatively small amount of $ to do that, as first loss would still be the shareholders of the ins. companies, and the govt could insure maybe only 95% of the rest, limiting default losses for bond holders to 5 pts max, for example.

As before, none of this directly alters the real economy, apart from psychological effects that might slow demand for a while. This much like the crash of 87- large financial losses but the real economy muddled through until the Bush tax hikes…

All the best!

warren

Lacker speech (edited)

NOTE: Particularly the last 3 paragraphs on inflation, as he has always been hawkish:

Remarks by Jeffrey M. Lacker President, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond
The Economic Outlook for 2008 Risk Management Association Richmond, Virginia

January 18, 2008

Home prices increased significantly during the long boom, particularly in local markets with restricted supply. Existing home prices increased about 90 percent between 1995 and 2005 for the nation as a whole. In the Washington, D.C., market, prices increased 148 percent from 1995 to 2005 and rose another 11 percent in 2006. Here in Richmond, prices climbed by 85 percent over the same 10-year period and increased by another 12 percent in 2006. Of course, rapid increases in real quality-adjusted prices are not indefinitely sustainable for any asset, and in the case of housing, potential buyers eventually get priced out of the market. In many markets, prices changed course quickly, but in others, prices have continued to increase. Average prices for the nation as a whole fell in the third quarter of 2007 by 0.4 percent, which is the first national price decline since 1994. And in formerly hot markets, the declines have been larger, with prices falling over 5 percent in San Diego, for example. Prices also have fallen significantly in areas with weak regional economies, like Michigan and northern Ohio. Richmond has avoided an outright decline in prices, although appreciation has slowed significantly, with third-quarter growth of just less than 1 percent.

(snip)

Against this back-drop, the Federal Reserve introduced a new mechanism for providing term funding to financial institutions. The Term Auction Facility, or TAF, makes 28-day loans of a predetermined total amount at a rate set by auction. These loans are otherwise similar to discount window loans made by a bank’s regional Reserve Bank against collateral posted with that Reserve Bank. Since these auctions began, near the end of December, spreads on interbank term loans have fallen significantly, although they still remain elevated by historical standards. It will be difficult to determine the extent to which the TAF contributed to this easing of rates in the term funding market, since the counterfactual will never be observed. An earlier instance of elevation in term spreads, peaking in early September, abated without such action by the Fed.

As one would expect, revised assessments of mortgage lending risk have resulted in a tightening of credit standards. Many lenders are requiring larger down payments, and mortgage rate spreads have increased significantly for riskier borrowers and riskier products. Mortgage rates have come down since December the rate on conventional 30-year fixed-rate mortgages has fallen about 50 basis points. And even though the spread between jumbo and conforming mortgages has widened a bit, jumbo rates have also eased in recent weeks, coming down about 30 basis points. Spreads on investment-grade corporate bonds have widened over the last month, but still, the level of yields on such debt has fallen. On the other hand, interest rates on high-yield debt and commercial mortgage-backed securities moved up in the last half of 2007, and have increased further since the beginning of the year. The strong differentiation in the response of lending spreads across borrower classes suggests that increasing spreads have been driven mainly by changing risk assessments rather than bank funding pressures. Higher risk spreads and generally tighter lending terms will tend to restrict spending in the near term. But the fall in short- and long-term Treasury rates over the last few months has offset the upward movement in higher spreads for a wide range of borrowers. The net effect has been lower rates for all but the highest risk borrowers.

The economic outlook for 2008 has worsened in response to the developments of the last six months, and the recent flow of data has heightened the downside risks. The housing sector has been and will continue to be affected by the tightening we’ve seen in lending standards. Home construction is unlikely to bottom out this year, and I expect housing investment to continue to be a drag on growth through at least year-end. Business investment has contributed positively to growth over the last year, but I expect it to grow less robustly than in 2007, since some firms may see a higher cost of capital and some firms may face a decline in the demand for their products. Exports are likely to remain a source of strength next year, however, as a weaker dollar and relatively healthy economies overseas support demand for U.S. goods and services. Accordingly, I expect the trade deficit to continue to narrow, providing modest support to real GDP growth.

The main story in the forecast, though, remains household spending, which accounts for 70 percent of GDP. Consumer spending held up quite well up until the end of last year, having grown at over 3 percent in real terms during the three months ending in November. Higher energy prices and falling home prices are cited often as factors that could dampen consumer spending, and these are legitimate concerns. In addition, we could see more moderate growth in household income in the year ahead. Job growth slowed somewhat over the course of 2007, and in December employment was reported to have expanded by a meager 18,000 jobs, with the unemployment rate rising by three-tenths of a percentage point to 5 percent. Payroll employment is a fairly choppy series from month to month, however, and over the last three months payrolls grew by 97,000 jobs per month, on average. So while employment has certainly decelerated over the last 12 months, I continue to expect moderate job growth in 2008. With wage gains outpacing inflation now, and thus real incomes continuing to expand, I believe the most likely scenario is for reasonably solid income growth next year that will support some gains in consumer spending.

Putting it all together, I expect growth to be very weak for several more months, but to improve toward the end of this year. Clearly, the most cogent risks to the growth outlook are on the downside. With the strains in housing persisting, a substantial slowdown in business spending could raise the odds of a recession. This risk would be heightened if December’s job market weakness proved persistent, pulling down prospects for personal income and household spending. Nevertheless, I believe the most likely outcome is for growth to continue and to improve. I should note that m baseline outlook does not depend on an overly sanguine view of financial market conditions, which are, after all, a significant source of uncertainty right now. Much remains to be learned about the magnitude of ultimate losses in various mortgage market segments and on various related securities. Episodes of turmoil could recur in response to new information. But I believe that financial market participants will find ways to work through problems as the year progresses. Financial intermediaries will re-adjust balance sheets and continue to replenish capital as needed, and investors’ desire for transparency will help shape the next generation of financial innovations.

Risks are not limited to the outlook for real economic growth. Inflation has stepped up recently. As measured by the 12-month change in the PCE price index, inflation was 3.5 percent ending in June 2006. That measure of inflation fell to 1.8 percent in August 2007. Similarly, core inflation, which omits volatile food and energy prices, was 2.5 percent in August 2006, and then declined to 1.8 percent in August 2007. Those declines were heartening, and when the financial market turmoil intensified in August the improving inflation picture allowed even an inflation hawk to endorse an easier monetary policy stance. Since then, however, the inflation picture has deteriorated. From August through November, the overall PCE price index rose at a 4.8 percent annual rate, and the core index rose at a 2.9 percent rate. Judging by the closely related consumer price index, the numbers for December will not be any better. Now these numbers do display transitory swings, so I wouldn’t extrapolate them forward indefinitely. Still, I have to say that I am uncomfortable with the inflation picture, and disappointed that the improvement we saw earlier this year was not more lasting.

I am also troubled by the lengthy divergence we’ve seen between overall and core inflation. Some of you may recall that core inflation was devised in the 1970s to filter out some of the more volatile consumer prices to get a better read on inflation trends. For several decades, core inflation seemed to work well due to the fact that food and energy prices had no clear trend relative to the overall price level. In the last few years, though, overall inflation has been persistently above core inflation, and few observers expect oil prices to go back below $20 per barrel. Because the job of a central banker is to protect the purchasing power of currency, it is overall inflation that we need to keep down, not just core inflation. Going forward, markets expect oil prices to back off slightly from their current level, and I hope they are right this time.

The Fed has responded to the slowing economy with a cumulative reduction in the federal funds rate of 100 basis points. A slowing economy requires a lower real interest rate because it means softer relative demand for resources now compared to the future. And the current downside risks mean that further slowing, and thus further easing, is quite possible. But inflation also presents risks. Throughout the period since 2005, when inflation rose, eased off, then rose again, longer-term inflation expectations have remained fairly stable. If energy and food prices continue to push overall inflation above core inflation, then this higher overall trend could work its way into expectations, further complicating monetary policy in 2008.

1This is a revised and expanded version of a speech I gave to the Charlotte Chamber of Commerce on December 19, 2007. I am grateful to Roy Webb for help in preparing this speech.

2Edward M. Gramlich, Subprime Mortgages: America’s latest Boom and Bust, Urban Institute Press, Washington D.C., 2007.


Fed’s Fisher

Doesn’t get any more hawkish than this.

Well worth a quick read.

Richard W. Fisher
Challenges for Monetary Policy in a Globalized Economy
Remarks before the Global Interdependence Center
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
January 17, 2008

Thank you, Charlie [Plosser]. I am grateful for the invitation to speak to the Global Interdependence Center.

(NON ECON INTRO SNIPPED)

You’d be hard pressed to find an economist or market operator in this city or anywhere else on the planet who is not concerned about waning U.S. economic growth. Some analysts and commentators sound like Chicken Littles. Others are less excitable, but are nevertheless assuming a defensive crouch. Most are mindful of recent developments in employment patterns, uneven retail sales and downward shifts in shipping, rail and trucking indexes, industrial activity, business capex plans, credit card payables, purchasing manager activity and other carefully watched indicators. These stresses follow on the severe housing downturn and the liquidity bind. There is an increasingly insistent drumbeat urging the Fed not only to not impose contractionary policy on a weakening economy, but indeed to get “ahead of the curve” through further monetary accommodation.

Chairman Bernanke spoke last week and made it clear that the FOMC stands “ready to take substantive action needed to support growth and provide insurance against downside risks,” adding that “additional policy easing may well be necessary.” In short, he made clear that the FOMC does not intend to just squat and wait should economic data and sound risk management signal that monetary accommodation is required.

It needs to be underscored that being proactive and not passive in doing our job does not mean that we will abandon prudent decisionmaking. We are the central bank of the United States, the bellwether economy of the world. Our job is not to bail out imprudent decisionmakers or errant bankers, nor is it to directly support the stock market or to somehow make whole those money managers, financial engineers and real estate speculators who got it wrong. And it most definitely is not to err on the side of Wall Street at the expense of Main Street.

In fact, to benefit Main Street, we have a duty to maintain a financial system that enables American capitalism to do its magic. To this end, we have recently taken steps designed to circumvent
bottlenecks in interbank lending—steps that include changing the operation of our discount window and opening a new term auction facility. This facility has provided $70 billion in funds in roughly a
month and will soon provide another $30 billion, and perhaps even more over time if needed.

In setting broader monetary policy and the fed funds target rate, the Fed operates under a dual mandate. We are charged by Congress with creating the monetary conditions for sustainable, noninflationary employment growth. Put more simply, our mandate is to grow employment and to contain inflation. Unstable prices are incompatible with sustainable job growth. Some critics worry that we have forgotten that axiom. We haven’t.

Let me give you my personal view.

In discharging our dual mandate, we must be mindful that short-term fixes often lead to long-term problems. The Fed occupies a unique place in the pantheon of government institutions. It was deliberately designed to be calm and steady, untainted by the passion of the moment and immune to political exigency and influence. Because monetary policy’s effects spread into the economy slowly and accumulate over time, having an itchy trigger finger with monetary policy risks shooting everyone in the foot. Our policy mandate must be discharged with careful and deliberate aim.

In the attention-deficit world of television and Internet commentary, where so-called “instant analysis”—an oxymoron if there ever was one—makes headlines, it is easy to understand why one might think that the effect of a change in the fed funds rate would immediately alter the dynamic of the economy. To be sure, movement in the fed funds rate, or even no movement at all, may have an immediate psychological effect and influence expectations for future monetary policy action. But the act of changing or not changing the fed funds target rate, in and of itself, has no immediate effect on the economy. Like a good single malt whiskey, the ameliorating or stimulating influence kicks in only with a lag.

The lag time necessary for inflation to respond to policy is especially long. As a policymaker discharging our dual mandate, I am always mindful that in providing the monetary conditions for employment growth, we must not also sow the seeds of inflation that will eventually choke off the very employment growth we seek to encourage. You do not have to be an inflation “hawk” to recognize that would be a Faustian bargain.

Those of you who follow my speeches—probably a very small number of you with way too much time on your hands—will recall that I like neither the term “hawk” nor “dove.” I like to think that all FOMC
members are best metaphorically described in ornithological terms as “owls”—wise women and men seeking to achieve the right balance in carrying out our dual mandate. To be owlish, and to avoid the
imbalance of emphasis that gave rise to needed harsh discipline imposed by the Volcker FOMC, one has to bear in mind that the seeds of inflation, once planted, can lie fallow for some time, then suddenly burst through the economic topsoil like kudzu, requiring a near-toxic dose of countermeasures to overcome.

In the pre-Volcker era, the Fed had a less-than-admirable record of keeping inflation at bay. But over the past few decades, we have done well enough to both contain inflation and engender growth that far outpaced other advanced economies for a sustained period with only a smattering of short recessions. In short, the Fed has delivered on its mandate.

To be sure, we have been profoundly impacted by the shifting economic dynamics that have complicated our efforts to continue delivering on our mandate. I need not try to convince members and supporters of the Global Interdependence Center that we are living in a globalized world. Increasingly, globalization is blurring economic boundaries. On the inflation front, for example, we have extensive economic playbooks that tell us how to treat the wage–price spiral or cost-push forces in a closed economy. In a closed environment, one would ordinarily expect that a weakening economy would lead, in turn, to a diminution in price pressures. But we have less experience with prescribing policy in an open economy where demand-pull forces come from beyond our borders—such as the burgeoning demand for commodities and food from rapidly growing and newly consequential economies like China, India, Latin America and the countries liberated from the oppression of Soviet communism. These faraway places play an ever-increasing role in determining prices here at home.

Writing in last Sunday’s New York Times, Ben Stein noted this and that the Fed does not have much power to influence the price of oil.[1] He is right. And for that matter, we can’t do much about the external demand impacting the price of food—which, by the way, carries twice the weight of energy in the consumer basket of personal consumption expenditures. But the dynamics of production and demand among the new participants in the global economy nonetheless impact us in different ways at different times. As these new participants joined the global economy, they provided significant tailwinds, helping us grow by providing cost savings, new sources of productivity enhancement and new sources of demand, helping fatten both the top line and bottom line of our businesses while also holding down inflation. Under such conditions, the Fed could operate with a more accommodative monetary policy than what might have been appropriate in a closed economy, without putting upward pressure on inflation. And that is what the Fed did, although some argue—with the benefit of hindsight—it did so for too long.

I think it is now clear that the winds have shifted. The growing appetite for raw inputs from the new participants in the global economy represents an inflationary headwind that is unlikely to soon abate. The so-called “income elasticity of demand” for energy is 1.2 across a wide range of countries, which is a fancy way of saying that economic theory should lead one to conclude that the demand for energy in, say, China, for example, would begin to grow faster than China’s income growth, which continues to increase at a rapid rate. Put more simply, income growth in China and India and elsewhere, even if it slows from its torrid pace, is likely to continue raising demand for food and energy. There is a risk that upward price pressures will continue to affect American producers and consumers of energy and food products and a continuing danger that overall inflation expectations will drift upward as a result.

If I am correct, then the situation today is the flip side of the 1990s and early 2000s: In delivering on our mandate to be monetary policy “owls,” we will have to err on the side of running tighter policy than would otherwise be justified if we wish to limit upward inflation pressures.

I mentioned single malt whiskey earlier to describe the effective time lags of monetary policy. I realize it is only lunchtime, but let’s return to the economics liquor cabinet for a moment. Inflation is like absinthe. The narcotic allure of inflation is a dangerous thing. It might seem like the remedy to bail out a government or a bad book of business and forget your troubles. Yet our experience in the past has taught us only too well that inflation is a dangerous elixir that ultimately proves debilitating for businesses, consumers, investors—including those foreign investors who have lately come to the aid of some large balance sheets here—and especially for the poor, the elderly and people on fixed incomes. It even inculcates bad financial behavioral patterns in the young by encouraging spending rather than investment and saving. Inflation is bad for Main Street and Wall Street and even for Sesame Street.

Yet we central bankers also traverse Lombard Street, and we know from Walter Bagehot that in times of crisis, liquidity is key. As a voter on the FOMC this year, I stand ready to take substantive action to support growth and provide insurance against downside risk, as long as inflation expectations remain contained.

You will note the operative qualifying words there were “as long as inflation expectations remain contained.” Each of us looks to different indicators for a sense of inflation’s direction. Some peruse markets for signs of shifting expectations, looking, say, to the yield on Treasury Inflation-Protected Securities, or TIPS, or to the spread between yields in the forward markets between TIPS and nominal Treasuries at different points of the yield curve or all along the entire curve. Personally, as a former market operator, I am wary of relying on Treasury spot or futures indicators during a flight to quality or at times when liquidity is at a premium, as investors may have other preoccupations that trump or distort conventional inflation concerns.

Others look to surveys of consumers and professional forecasters, like those conducted by the University of Michigan and the Philadelphia Fed. The latest, the University of Michigan survey, released in December, is forecasting headline Consumer Price Index (CPI) inflation of 3.4 percent, which is hardly comforting. The Philadelphia Fed survey, released last November, provides a more palatable forecast of 2.4 percent for the next four quarters; yet if you plot that survey against actual headline inflation obtained for the last four years, it has more often than not underestimated inflation’s true path.

The brow of a central banker considering further accommodation furrows further when looking at the inflation measures that form the basis for Main Street’s inflationary expectations—the CPI and the Personal Consumption Expenditures (PCE) deflator. On a 12-month basis, the most recent CPI, released yesterday, was running at a rate of 4.1 percent. The last PCE deflator, released in December, was 3.6 percent. The Trimmed Mean PCE Deflator, which the Dallas Fed tracks in an effort to eliminate “noise from signal” and as a basis for projecting inflation, is no longer trending downward. Even the so-called “Core PCE,” which I personally consider least useful because it eliminates food and energy prices, is rising rather than declining.

Of course, what matters most is the future direction of inflation, not the past. In the course of preparing for each FOMC meeting, I regularly consult directly with some 30-plus CEOs to develop a sense of future business activity, including cost and pricing developments. I have found this rigorous exercise to be extremely helpful in placing our staff’s econometric analysis in context as I have prepared for FOMC meetings in the past, and I will be listening especially carefully to these business operators’ reports on inflation-related developments as I prepare for upcoming FOMC meetings.

In my view, the degree of substantive action to support economic growth and insure against downside risk will be conditioned by what we see coming down the inflation pike. To deliver on its dual mandate, the Fed must keep one ear cocked toward signs that inflationary expectations are drifting upward as we execute additional monetary measures.

Let me bring this home to Philadelphia. In 1748, Benjamin Franklin wrote an “Advice to a Young Tradesman.” In it, he speaks in the language of the day of the concepts of opportunity cost and of the power of compound interest—pretty precocious stuff for those times. Of the money supply, he wrote that “the more there is of it, the more it produces [at] every turning, so that the profits rise quicker and quicker.” Yet he also warns in earthy terms of the dangers of being too prolific. “He that kills a breeding sow,” Franklin warned, “destroys all her offspring to the thousandth generation. He that murders a crown [the currency of the day], destroys all that it might have produced….”

The late Dame Mary Douglas was no Ben Franklin. Nor was she a Philadelphian. She was a brilliant British economic anthropologist who wrote a pathbreaking book titled Purity and Danger. In it, she wrote something that Franklin or Stephen Girard or any good central banker since the onset of time has understood implicitly: “Money can only perform its role of intensifying economic interaction if the public has faith in it. If that faith is shaken, the currency is useless.”

Like Charlie and my other colleagues, I have every desire to use monetary policy to intensify economic interaction, to keep breeding jobs and growing our economy, so that we might keep America strong to the thousandth generation. I have no intention of being party to any action that might shake faith in the dollar. The challenge to monetary policy, as I see it, is to achieve the growth part of our mandate in the short term and get “ahead of the curve” without shaking faith in the currency over the long term.

I know that the GIC has other things on its mind than just monetary policy. So let me stop there and answer any questions you might have.

About the Author

Richard W. Fisher is president and CEO of the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas.


Bernanke

Fed/Bernanke probably concerned about core CPI going so high and making ‘popular’ headlines and is worried about cutting 50 into the triple negative supply shock of food/fuel/import-export prices.

And with today’s claims number showing, there may not be as much slack in the labor markets as the last unemployment number indicated. The fed has been counting on slack in the labor markets to keep wage demands in check and not transmitting headline inflation to core inflation via higher wages.

And now that core has in fact started to move, he’s pushing for a fiscal package (which goes against the mainstream grain/fiscal responsibility, etc.) as an alternative to future rate cuts which carry, in mainstream theory, an inflation price.

He would very much like the planned January 30 cut to be the last one needed. He doesn’t want to be the next Miller or the next Volcker.