Category Archives: Inflation

Professor John Taylor on the exploding debt

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From the good professor who brought us the ‘Taylor Rule’ for Fed funds:

Exploding debt threatens America

by John Taylor

May 26 — Standard and Poor’s decision to downgrade its outlook for British sovereign debt from “stable” to “negative” should be a wake-up call for the US Congress and administration. Let us hope they wake up.

And yet another black mark on the ratings agencies.

Under President Barack Obama’s budget plan, the federal debt is exploding. To be precise, it is rising – and will continue to rise – much faster than gross domestic product, a measure of America’s ability to service it.

Gdp is a measure of our ability to change numbers on our own spread sheet?

The federal debt was equivalent to 41 per cent of GDP at the end of 2008; the Congressional Budget Office projects it will increase to 82 per cent of GDP in 10 years. With no change in policy, it could hit 100 per cent of GDP in just another five years.

Almost as high as Italy and Italy does not even have its own currency.

“A government debt burden of that [100 per cent] level, if sustained, would in Standard & Poor’s view be incompatible with a triple A rating,” as the risk rating agency stated last week.

Now there’s quality support for an academic position…

I believe the risk posed by this debt is systemic and could do more damage to the economy than the recent financial crisis.

‘Believe’? Without even anecdotal support? Is that the best he can do? This is very poor scholarship at best.

To understand the size of the risk,

I think he means the size of the deficit, but is loading the language for effect.

Is that what serious academics do?

take a look at the numbers that Standard and Poor’s considers. The deficit in 2019 is expected by the CBO to be $1,200bn (€859bn, £754bn). Income tax revenues are expected to be about $2,000bn that year, so a permanent 60 per cent across-the-board tax increase would be required to balance the budget. Clearly this will not and should not happen. So how else can debt service payments be brought down as a share of GDP?

This presumes an unspoken imperative to bring them down. Again poor scholarship.

Inflation will do it. But how much? To bring the debt-to-GDP ratio down to the same level as at the end of 2008 would take a doubling of prices. That 100 per cent increase would make nominal GDP twice as high and thus cut the debt-to-GDP ratio in half, back to 41 from 82 per cent. A 100 per cent increase in the price level means about 10 per cent inflation for 10 years. But it would not be that smooth – probably more like the great inflation of the late 1960s and 1970s with boom followed by bust and recession every three or four years, and a successively higher inflation rate after each recession.

Ok. Inflation, if it happens as above, can bring down the debt ratio. How does this tie to his initial concern over solvency implied in his reference to the AAA rating being a risk for our ‘ability to service it?’

And still no reason is presented that 41% is somehow ‘better’ than 82%.

Nor any analysis of aggregate demand, and how the demand adds and demand leakages interact. Just an ungrounded presumption that a lower debt to GDP ratio is somehow superior in some unrevealed sense.

The fact that the Federal Reserve is now buying longer-term Treasuries in an effort to keep Treasury yields low adds credibility to this scary story, because it suggests that the debt will be monetised.

So what does ‘monetised’ mean? I submit it means absolutely nothing with non convertible currency and a floating fx policy.

That the Fed may have a difficult task reducing its own ballooning balance sheet to prevent inflation increases the risks considerably.

And the presumption that the Fed’s balance sheet per se with a non convertible currency and floating exchange rate policy is ludicrous. All central bankers worth any salt know that causation runs from loans to deposits and reserves, and never from reserves to anything.

And 100 per cent inflation would, of course, mean a 100 per cent depreciation of the dollar.

He’s got that math right- if prices remain where they are today in the other currencies and purchasing power parity holds. And he also knows both of those are, for all practical purposes, never the case.

Why has he turned from academic to propagandist? Krugman envy???

Americans would have to pay $2.80 for a euro; the Japanese could buy a dollar for Y50; and gold would be $2,000 per ounce. This is not a forecast, because policy can change;

And it assumes the above, Professor Taylor

rather it is an indication of how much systemic risk the government is now creating.

So currency depreciation is systemic risk?

Why might Washington sleep through this wake-up call? You can already hear the excuses.

“We have an unprecedented financial crisis and we must run unprecedented deficits.” While there is debate about whether a large deficit today provides economic stimulus, there is no economic theory or evidence that shows that deficits in five or 10 years will help to get us out of this recession.

Huh? None??? What’s he been reading other than his own writings and the mainstream tagalongs?

Such thinking is irresponsible. If you believe deficits are good in bad times, then the responsible policy is to try to balance the budget in good times.

Ahah, a logic expert!!! That makes no sense at all.

The CBO projects that the economy will be back to delivering on its potential growth by 2014. A responsible budget would lay out proposals for balancing the budget by then rather than aim for trillion-dollar deficits.

‘Responsible’??? As if there is a morality issue regarding the budget deficit per se???

“But we will cut the deficit in half.” CBO analysts project that the deficit will be the same in 2019 as the administration estimates for 2010, a zero per cent cut.

“We inherited this mess.” The debt was 41 per cent of GDP at the end of 1988, President Ronald Reagan’s last year in office, the same as at the end of 2008, President George W. Bush’s last year in office. If one thinks policies from Reagan to Bush were mistakes does it make any sense to double down on those mistakes, as with the 80 per cent debt-to-GDP level projected when Mr Obama leaves office?

The biggest economic mistake of our life time might have been not immediately reversing the Clinton surpluses when demand fell apart right after 2000. And, worse, spinning those years to convince Americans that the surpluses were responsible for sustaining the good times, when in fact they ended them, as they always do. Bloomberg reported the surplus that ended in 2001 was the longest since 1927-1930. Do those dates ring a bell???

The time for such excuses is over. They paint a picture of a government that is not working, one that creates risks rather than reduces them. Good government should be a nonpartisan issue. I have written that government actions and interventions in the past several years caused, prolonged and worsened the financial crisis.

Lack of a fiscal adjustment last July is what allowed the subsequent collapse

The problem is that policy is getting worse not better. Top government officials, including the heads of the US Treasury, the Fed, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and the Securities and Exchange Commission are calling for the creation of a powerful systemic risk regulator to reign in systemic risk in the private sector. But their government is now the most serious source of systemic risk.

Finally something I agree with. Our biggest risk is that government starts reigning in the deficits or fails to further expand them should the output and employment remain sub trend.

The good news is that it is not too late. There is time to wake up, to make a mid-course correction, to get back on track. Many blame the rating agencies for not telling us about systemic risks in the private sector that lead to this crisis. Let us not ignore them when they try to tell us about the risks in the government sector that will lead to the next one.

The writer, a professor of economics at Stanford and a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution, is the author of ‘Getting Off Track: How Government Actions and Interventions Caused, Prolonged, and Worsened the Financial Crisis’

It’s not too late for a payroll tax holiday, revenue sharing with the states on a per capita basis, and federal funding of an $8 hr job for anyone willing and able to work that includes federal health care, to restore agg demand from the bottom up, restoring output, employment, and ending the financial crisis as credit quality improves.


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China policy obamanation

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We do not need China or anyone else to buy our securities and we net benefit enormously from net imports in general.

The profoundly confused China policy comes from an administration that both does not understand the monetary system and does not understand that imports are real benefits and exports real costs:

Policies are being held hostage to Communist China’s demands.

by Adrian Van Eck

May 29 — The communist rulers of China have laid down a threat to the government of the United States of America. They are the largest foreign holders of treasury bonds. They say they fear that the huge Federal deficit this year – four times the record deficit set last year – will bring on inflation of such a magnitude as to threaten the buying power of their treasury holdings. They have said that if Washington does not stop this massive deficit spending (much of it financed with money created by Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke and the Federal Reserve)

All–not some, or most of government spending is a matter of ‘changing numbers in bank accounts at the fed’ (as per Bernanke’s statement last month).
Govt spending adds varying degrees of aggregate demand, government taxing reduces demand, and government borrowing supports interest rates. ‘Financing’ as the word is generally used does not apply to the issuer of a non convertible currency with a floating exchange rate.

they will protect their own interests by dumping all of their holdings of U.S. treasuries on the market for whatever price they can get for them. They say they will do so even if that collapses the U.S. dollar and pulls down not only the American economy but the economy of the entire world.

To date ‘their own interest’ has been that of supporting their export industries by suppressing their real wages.
So this statement would indicate they are threatening to move away from an export led strategy. Possible, but hard to believe and contradicts what follows here.

Apparently Washington has taken this threat seriously. All of a sudden China is being overrun by important officials from the U.S. Government. Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi is one of the Americans traveling to Beijing. In past years she has been well known in both the U.S, and China as one who dislikes the rulers of Mainland China. A few years ago she barely escaped being arrested by a pack of Party goons as she led a group of Americans protesting China’s policies toward the formerly independent nation of Tibet, which China overran and conquered soon after they won the Chinese Civil War some 60 years ago. A few days ago she was fawning over China’s Government leaders, telling them how we want to cooperate with them in working to protect the environment. (As usual they blamed America for polluting the Earth, ignoring the fact that it is China which is the worst polluter anywhere.) She must have almost gagged on her own sweet words as she talked.

The second important American Government official in China was Secretary of State Hillary Clinton. She has never been thought of as an enemy of China’s communist rulers, so it was easier for her to talk with them. (There were rumors that money from China helped fund her husband’s re-election campaign.) Unfortunately the visit came about as China’s neighbor and close ally – North Korea – exploded a nuclear device reported to be as powerful as the one America dropped on Hiroshima in 1945. They also fired off several rockets. All of this violated the terms of an agreement they signed in 2006 – an agreement that brought them enormous quantities of fuel oil and food. When the nations that negotiated that treaty protested the nuclear explosion, North Korea announced that it was renouncing its agreement to a truce that ended the war in the 1950’s. That again called for Secretary of State Clinton to try and patch up relations without pushing the virtual outlaw nation into crossing the border and attacking South Korea. This made the response to China in threatening America – a definite form of blackmail, as nations such as India and Japan agreed – a secondary issue with Hillary.

That left Treasury Secretary Geithner to absorb the heaviest verbal blows from China’s leaders during his own visit to Beijing. They knew that Geithner, as the president of the independent Federal Reserve Bank of New York, the largest and most important of the privately-owned regional Feds, had himself made threats to China shortly before being confirmed by the Senate to take over the top job at Treasury. He had told the Senate that if China did not stop manipulating the yuan in the foreign exchange market to gain an unfair advantage in its trade he would be in favor of America taking steps on its own to counter this in the foreign exchange market.

What sense does all this make?

China was buying dollars to keep the dollar strong and the yuan weak as part of their strategy to support exports by suppressing domestic costs vs rest of world costs.

Geithner was pushing for a weaker dollar as a way to reduce China’s exports by, in effect, causing prices of goods made in China at Wal-Mart to rise to the point where they wouldn’t sell as well.

Now China is threatening to do the opposite- push the dollar down by selling its USD financial assets, and Geithner is doing the opposite by trying to stop them.

He has since had to swallow those words and now he has to swallow as well threats against America by China.

This administration is in it way over its head and is pursuing a totally confused policy.

We thought it was fascinating that no one in the media mentioned Ben Bernanke or commented on his complete absence from the dialogue with China. So I will take it on myself to make such a comment. Bernanke is, after all, the one man closely tied to the creation of the money that so offends the communists in Beijing and one might have expected him to be involved in current talks with China’s rulers – under normal circumstances. A while back, he went to China as part of a delegation and he was asked to make a speech at a university where China trains many of its economists. Bernanke was brutally candid in his remarks. He pointed out precisely all of the mistakes he felt they were making in their centrally planned economy – and predicted that they were heading for trouble so bad that it might bring the ruling Party and the country down, just as a dozen prior dynasties had come crashing down during China’s long history. The woman who serves as China’s economics minister was livid with rage after his remarks. She took over and screamed insults at him for a half hour. Then she called President Bush and said that Bernanke was “persona non grata,” a diplomatic phrase meaning he would never again be welcomed to China. Months later when a Chinese delegation paid a return visit to Washington, they carefully avoided the Fed’s marble headquarters.

Not a whisper has escaped that anyone knows about from the ideas expressed by Tim Geithner concerning China’s threats if America does not sharply curb its deficit spending.

For China’s export strategy to ‘succeed’ they need high levels of aggregate demand in the US.

Yet it is clear from everything happening in Washington that this Administration has absolutely zero intention of stopping its near reckless abandon of any restraint in Federal spending.

In fact, the deficit spending has not even begun to get high enough to restore aggregate demand to levels where unemployment stops rising, never mind falling.

We need to remove a lot more fiscal drag to restore demand, now the unsustainable (non-government) credit chennels have been capped.

Quite the contrary, as new demands are made they are coming up with more plans to lavish Federal spending on recipients. For example, the latest we are hearing regarding General Motors is that the Federal Government may be willing to hand the company $50 billion on top of the money allocated to them already. But Washington would then want to gain 70% ownership in what critics are calling “Federal Motors.”

The problem here is the administrations looks for public purpose in the ‘input’ side rather than the output side. The public purpose of industry is the output it produces, not how the inputs, particularly labor, get rewarded.

Output is directed by markets working within institutional structure which can be modified to influence output towards public purpose while sustaining full employment at all times. But not with an administration that has it all backwards.

And now we have California’s demand that the Federal Government guarantee $18 billion in State borrowing to fund their own wild deficit spending. Political pressures are building to make this happen. If that does happen, a lot of other states will be lining up at the White House front door to demand the same treatment.

The answer here is to give all states $500 per capita of revenue sharing with no strings attached. California would get about $17 billion.

That way it’s ‘fair’ and there is no ‘moral hazard’ issue.
But, again, this hasn’t even been discussed.

This brings us to a topic that is being brushed aside as being too unlikely to even deserve treatment as a rumor. Thus it is being dismissed out of hand in the national media. Yet it is springing up from several key Washington sources and that makes us suspicious that where there is so much smoke there may be fire. What I am talking about, of course, is the sudden discussion of an American Value Added Tax – another name for a national sales tax. It would apply to goods and services alike. Most nations in the world including China itself now have such a VAT tax. It is called value added because each company is taxed only on the value it adds to raw materials or parts it buys and manufactures or assembles into a product. Trucks and hairdressers and even lawyers would be taxed under a VAT.

Even at a rate as low as 10%, which would be seen as very low in the world, it would raise a ton of money. Some are proposing a rate high enough to allow the income tax to be ended but that idea is being shot down by agents of the Administration. The idea would be sold to conservatives as a way to avoid the huge inflation that China is warning against… and also to make unlikely that America would be forced to go back to pre-Reagan Federal income tax rates of just about double those paid today. And industry would be told that – just as happens in other nations with a VAT – it would be forgiven on any goods or services marked for export. I think these VAT tax rumors are for real and I suggest you keep an eye on this. More next week. Adrian Van Eck.

The VAT is even more regressive than the payroll taxes still on the books.

And with consumption being the entire point of the economics it makes no sense to tax consumption in general.

‘Sin’ and ‘luxury’ taxes are different- the idea is to limit consumption of those items subject to the tax, and not to raise revenue. The success of the tax is then judged by how few dollars are collected, not how many as with the VAT.

Now more than ever the US would benefit from an administration that understood the monetary system and the simple fundamentals regarding imports and exports.

But this is not going to happen, and we will continue to pay the price.


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Obama – “US out of money”

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After a fiscal package that may or may not be sufficient to bring down unemployment, the president is now directly telling us that the next move is to dampen aggregate demand by reducing health care spending (and letting tax rates go higher.)

In a sobering holiday interview with C-SPAN, President Obama boldly told Americans: “We are out of money.”

C-SPAN host Steve Scully broke from a meek Washington press corps with probing questions for the new president.

SCULLY: You know the numbers, $1.7 trillion debt, a national deficit of $11 trillion. At what point do we run out of money?

OBAMA: Well, we are out of money now. We are operating in deep deficits, not caused by any decisions we’ve made on health care so far. This is a consequence of the crisis that we’ve seen and in fact our failure to make some good decisions on health care over the last several decades.

So we’ve got a short-term problem, which is we had to spend a lot of money to salvage our financial system, we had to deal with the auto companies, a huge recession which drains tax revenue at the same time it’s putting more pressure on governments to provide unemployment insurance or make sure that food stamps are available for people who have been laid off.

So we have a short-term problem and we also have a long-term problem. The short-term problem is dwarfed by the long-term problem. And the long-term problem is Medicaid and Medicare. If we don’t reduce long-term health care inflation substantially, we can’t get control of the deficit.


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Commodities speculation

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I’ve also hear reports that pension funds have been adding to passive commodity strategies:

The green shoots will grow slowly

by David Robertson

May 25 (Business 24/7) — By the middle of this month, copper prices were 60 per cent up on the start of the year and platinum was up by a third. The rebound has been driven by a conviction that these metals were oversold and as construction demand (copper) and automotive demand (platinum) pick up, the price of the metals will return to more sensible levels. However, I bring bad news. Industrial demand is not returning nearly as fast as the London Metal Exchange or London Stock Exchange would have us believe – and that means we are still some way off from seeing a return to the sort of growth levels achieved prior to 2008.

Two things are currently distorting metal prices: Chinese stockpiling and speculation. The Chinese have taken advantage of the low price of metals to fill their warehouses and this has been mistaken for a dramatic ramp up in “real” industrial demand. I have no doubt that Chinese demand from factories and construction companies has increased recently but at nothing like a rate that would support a 60 per cent surge in copper prices.

Speculation has also played a significant role in boosting prices as investors have piled into commodities, partly because they have been fooled by Chinese demand and partly because a lot of people are already thinking about where to stash their cash in the event of rampant inflation next year.

Last week Investec, the South African bank, highlighted the impact speculation was having on market-traded metals by focusing on commodities that are not easily traded. For example, ferrochrome, which is used to make stainless steel, actually fell 13 per cent in price between the first and second quarter of this year and it is off 63 per cent from its high at the end of last year. Manganese contract prices are off 70 per cent and the steel makers are pushing for a 45 per cent cut in iron ore contract prices.

There is no “hot money” in these commodities so they give us a better guide to real industrial demand – and clearly there is little to get excited about yet. As a result, I expect to see a repeat of last year’s oil bubble: everyone will shortly wake up and realise that the shoots are not quite as green as had been hoped and prices will fall back by 20 to 30 per cent (again).


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Britain looks to the land of the rising sun with envy

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Starts off good and then goes bad.

Britain looks to the land of the rising sun with envy

by Ambrose Evans-Pritchard

May 22 (Telegraph) — Perhaps most surprising is that Japan fell in 1998, though it was by then
the world’s top creditor with more than $1.5 trillion of net foreign assets
(now $3 trillion). Lender abroad, it is a mega-debtor at home, the result of
Keynesian pump-priming to fight perma-slump. The stimulus vanished into
those famously empty bridges in Hokkaido.

“The Japanese didn’t take the downgrade seriously,” said Russell Jones, of
RBC Capital, a Japan veteran from the 1990s. “They didn’t think they would
have any trouble funding their debt.”

They were right. Yields on 10-year bonds fell to 1pc by the end of the
decade, and to 0.5pc in the deflation scare of 2003 – confounding those who
expected Japan’s emergency stimulus to stoke inflation and push up yields.

Eisuke Sakakibara, then the finance ministry’s “Mr Yen”, was insouciant
enough to swat aside the Moody’s downgrade as an irrelevance. “Personally, I
think if Moody’s continues to behave like that, the market evaluation of
Moody’s will go down,” he said.

Japan had a crucial advantage: its captive bond market. Some 95pc of
government debt was held by Japanese savers or the big pension funds.

Not! Does not matter. The funds to buy government securities ‘come
from’ the government deficit spending.

Deficit spending adds reserve balances at the central bank,
buying govt securities reduces reserve balances at the same central bank.

It is all a matter of data entry by the central bank its own spread sheet.

The foreign share of UK public debt has risen from 18pc to 34pc over the
past six years. The central banks of Asia, Russia and emerging economies
like gilts because they offered 1pc extra yield over bunds. This was the
“proxy euro” trade.

Does not matter.

“We’re far more vulnerable than Japan ever was,” said Albert Edwards, global
strategist at Société Générale.

Wrong!!!

“Japan had a huge current account surplus
and a strong currency. The UK is a deficit country, at risk of a sterling
collapse.

Yes, the currency might go down, but seems to be doing ok for the moment!

Years of UK macro-mismanagement have dragged the UK economy to the
edge of a precipice.”

As the BOE’s Charles Goodhart once responded,
Yes, they have been telling us that for 300 years.


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Dollar Is Dirt, Treasuries Are Toast, AAA Is Gone: Gilbert

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Dollar Is Dirt, Treasuries Are Toast, AAA Is Gone

by Mark Gilbert

May 21 (Bloomberg) —

The odds on the dollar, Treasury
bonds and the U.S. government’s AAA grade all heading for the
dumpster are shortening.

True, but for the wrong reason. There is no solvency issue, but markets are pricing it in anyway.

While currency forecasting is a mug’s game and bond yields
can’t quite decide whether to dive toward deflation or surge in
anticipation of inflation, every time I think about that credit
rating, I hear what Agent Smith in the “Matrix” movies called
“the sound of inevitability.”

Several policy missteps suggest that investors should stop
trusting — and lending to — the U.S. government. These include
the state’s pressure on Bank of America Corp. to buy Merrill
Lynch & Co.; the priority given to Chrysler LLC’s unions over
the automaker’s secured creditors; and the freedom that some
banks will regain to supersize executive bonuses by giving back
part of the government money bolstering their balance sheets.

When you buy treasury securities the government debits your transaction account and credits your securities account at the Fed.

When those securities mature the government debits your securities account and credits your transaction account. That is all there is too it.

There is no solvency issue at the operational level

Currency markets have been in a weird state of what looks
almost like equilibrium for the past couple of months. What’s
really going on is something akin to an evenly matched tug of
war that fails to move the ribbon tied around the center of the
rope, giving the impression of harmony while powerful forces do
silent battle until someone slips.

“All currencies are being debased dramatically by their
central banks at extraordinary speeds and so in relative terms
it appears there is no currency problem,” Lee Quaintance and
Paul Brodsky of QB Asset Management said in a research note
earlier this month. “In reality, however, paper money is highly
vulnerable to a public catalyst that serves to acknowledge it is
all merely vapor money.”

The ‘value’ is the purchasing power of real goods and services.
The largest and deepest thing for sale is labor.
Seems like currency still buys labor at pretty much the same price as the recent past,
And maybe even a bit more.

In fact, it may buy a bit more of just about everything vs a year ago. Particularly houses and land.

But yes, next year can always bring a different story.

Flesh Wounds

Why pick on the dollar, though? Well, not necessarily
because the U.S. economy is in worse shape than those of the
euro area, the U.K. or Japan. The biggest problem is that
external investors — particularly China — have more skin in
the dollar game than in euros, yen or pounds, which makes the
U.S. currency the most likely candidate to meet the cleaver in a
crisis of confidence about post-crunch government finances.

China owns about $744 billion of U.S. Treasury bonds in its
$2 trillion of foreign-exchange reserves.

Chinese exports, though, are dropping as the global economy
weakens, with overseas shipments declining 23 percent in
April from a year earlier, leaving a nation that has already
expressed concern about its U.S. investments with less to spend
in future.

China doesn’t ‘spend’ it’s dollars on real goods and services which is why they
Have a trade surplus in the first place.

They sold things in exchange for ‘dollar balances’ which are financial assets and
then exchanged some of those balances for alternative USD financial assets as they
accumulated $744 billion of financial assets.

‘Heavy Hand of Government’

Those kinds of concerns are starting to surface in a
steepening of the U.S. yield curve, driven by an increase in 10-
and 30-year U.S. Treasury yields.

True, though there is no economic imperative for the treasury to issue a 30 year security in the first place.

In fact, the treasury issuing securities and the Fed later buying them is functionally identical to the treasury never issuing them in the first place.

(note that Charles Goodhart of the Bank of England has recently been proposing the UK do exactly that- cease issuing long securities rather than issuing them and having the BOE buy them.)

The 10-year note currently
yields 3.23 percent, about 235 basis points more than the two-
year security, which marks a near doubling of the spread since
the end of last year.

Yes, though from very low flight to quality yields at the height of the fear of oblivion.

“When the government parks its tanks on capitalism’s
lawns, that spells trouble for those who invest, add value and
create jobs,” says Tim Price, director of investments at PFP
Wealth Management in London. “Trillion-dollar bailouts do not
only leave massive public-sector deficits in their wake, they
also leave the presence of the heavy hand of government all over
industry and markets, so the outlook for government bonds is
less promising than the economic textbooks on deflation would
have us believe.”

A totally confused chain of logic, though government does often reduce shareholder value when it intervenes. But that’s a different point.

Earlier this month, the U.S. reported the first budget
deficit for April in 26 years, with spending exceeding revenue
by $20.9 billion, even though that’s the month when taxpayers
have to stump up to the Internal Revenue Service and the
government’s coffers should be overflowing. So far this fiscal
year, the U.S. shortfall is $802.3 billion, more than five times
the $153.5 billion gap in the year-earlier period.

Those are the ‘automatic stabilizers’ at work, which, fortunately, are out of the hands of
Congress. While they work the ugly way- falling employment and rising transfer payments- they do work to restore net financial assets to the private, non government sectors and thereby reverse the contraction.

Budget deficits = non govt ‘savings’ of financial assets
To the penny
It’s even an accounting identity. Not theory. Ask anyone at the CBO.

Deathly Deficit

For the fiscal year ending Sept. 30, the Congressional
Budget Office forecasts a record deficit of $1.75 trillion,

That includes the purchase of financial assets which doesn’t add to aggregate demand.

Up until now the fed has always bought the financial assets when government wanted to do that and that hasn’t ‘counted’ as deficit spending for exactly that reason.

This time around the treasury bought financial assets and confused things, much like 1936 when social security first started and was accounted for off budget rather than consolidated as we quickly figured out was the right way to do it and it’s fortunately been done that way ever since.

almost four times the previous year’s $454.8 billion shortfall
and about 13 percent of gross domestic product. Bear in mind
that the target demanded of European nations wanting to join the
euro was a deficit no greater than 3 percent of GDP.

Yes, which is responsible for their poor economic performance as well.

David Walker, a former U.S. comptroller general,

And foremost US deficit terrorist

wrote in
the Financial Times on May 12 that the U.S.’s top credit rating
looks incompatible with “an accumulated negative net worth” of
more than $11 trillion and “additional off-balance-sheet
obligations” of $45 trillion. “One could even argue that our
government does not deserve a triple A credit rating based on
our current financial condition, structural fiscal imbalances
and political stalemate,” he wrote.

As if government payments are operationally constrained by revenues.

They are not, as chairman Bernanke made clear a few weeks ago
when he explained how he makes payments by changing numbers in bank accounts.

That is the only way there is for government to spend in its own currency, which
is nothing more than the process of making spread sheet entries on its own books.

Any constraints on the US ability to make payments in dollars is necessarily self imposed (and
can just as readily be removed by those wanting to spend the money.)

Said another way, government checks don’t bounce unless government decides to bounce its own checks.

If you want to claim govt won’t pay because it will vote not to pay, fine.

But not because ‘deficits can’t be financed’ or any other nonsense like that.

No Default

It is undeniable that the U.S. government’s ability to
finance its borrowing commitments has deteriorated as its
deficit has ballooned.

The ability to deficit spend is the ability to make entries on its own spreadsheets.
Nothing more.
The idea that that can ‘deteriorate’ indicates a fundamental lack of understanding of monetary operations.

Dropping the U.S. from the top rating
grade, though, wouldn’t mean the nation is about to default on
its debt obligations; there’s a subtle distinction between
ability to pay and propensity to fail to pay.

And a less subtle distinction between knowing how it works and not knowing how it works.

There’s also a
compelling argument that no government should be enjoying the
benefits of a top credit grade in the current financial climate.

There’s nothing to ‘enjoy’ or even care about.

Note Japan was heavily downgraded with a debt to GDP ratio triple the US,
With no ill effects as three month rates remained near 0 for the last
15 years and 10 year Japanese govt bonds fluctuated between .5 and 1.5%

Using the definitions outlined by Standard & Poor’s, a one-
step cut into the AA rated category would nudge the U.S.’s
creditworthiness into a “very strong” capacity to fulfill its
commitments, just weaker than the “extremely strong”
capabilities demanded of AAA rated borrowers.

S&P cannot change the actual creditworthiness of the US, or any other
issuer of its own currency. There can be no solvency issue no matter what they do.

That seems an
appropriately nuanced sanction — albeit one that the rating
companies might turn out to be too cowardly to impose.

(Mark Gilbert is a Bloomberg News columnist. The opinions
expressed are his own.)


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Dallas Fed interview

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Don’t Monetize the Debt

by Mary Anastasia O’Grady

May 23 (WSJ) — From his perch high atop the palatial Dallas Federal Reserve Bank, overlooking what he calls “the most modern, efficient city in America,” Richard Fisher says he is always on the lookout for rising prices. But that’s not what’s worrying the bank’s president right now.

His bigger concern these days would seem to be what he calls “the perception of risk” that has been created by the Fed’s purchases of Treasury bonds, mortgage-backed securities and Fannie Mae paper.

Mr. Fisher acknowledges that events in the financial markets last year required some unusual Fed action in the commercial lending market. But he says the longer-term debt, particularly the Treasurys, is making investors nervous. The looming challenge, he says, is to reassure markets that the Fed is not going to be “the handmaiden” to fiscal profligacy. “I think the trick here is to assist the functioning of the private markets without signaling in any way, shape or form that the Federal Reserve will be party to monetizing fiscal largess, deficits or the stimulus program.”

If he actually understood it I would expect him to say the concept is inapplicable with a non convertible currency and floating exchange rate regime.

Richard Fisher.

The very fact that a Fed regional bank president has to raise this issue is not very comforting. It conjures up images of Argentina. And as Mr. Fisher explains, he’s not the only one worrying about it. He has just returned from a trip to China, where “senior officials of the Chinese government grill[ed] me about whether or not we are going to monetize the actions of our legislature.” He adds, “I must have been asked about that a hundred times in China.”

Without knowing the right answer which is that lending is in no case reserve constrianed.
Causation runs from loans to deposits and reserves, and not from reserves to loans.

A native of Los Angeles who grew up in Mexico, Mr. Fisher was educated at Harvard, Oxford and Stanford.

Must have skipped the classes in reserve accounting.

He spent his earliest days in government at Jimmy Carter’s Treasury. He says that taught him a life-long lesson about inflation. It was “inflation that destroyed that presidency,” he says. He adds that he learned a lot from then Fed Chairman Paul Volcker, who had to “break [inflation’s] back.”

Deregulating natural gas in 1978 is what broke the back of inflation as utilities switched from crude to natural gas and even cuts of 15 million barrels per day by OPEC were not enough to keep control of prices.

Mr. Fisher has led the Dallas Fed since 2005 and has developed a reputation as the Federal Open Market Committee’s (FOMC) lead inflation worrywart. In September he told a New York audience that “rates held too low, for too long during the previous Fed regime were an accomplice to [the] reckless behavior” that brought about the economic troubles we are now living through. He also warned that the Treasury’s $700 billion plan to buy toxic assets from financial institutions would be “one more straw on the back of the frightfully encumbered camel that is the federal government ledger.”

In a speech at the Kennedy School of Government in February, he wrung his hands about “the very deep hole [our political leaders] have dug in incurring unfunded liabilities of retirement and health-care obligations” that “we at the Dallas Fed believe total over $99 trillion.”

Hopefully he is worried about possible inflation and not solvency.

In March, he is believed to have vociferously objected in closed-door FOMC meetings to the proposal to buy U.S. Treasury bonds. So with long-term Treasury yields moving up sharply despite Fed intentions to bring down mortgage rates, I’ve flown to Dallas to see what he’s thinking now.

Hopefully he is concerned with the purchases possibly lowering interest rates too much for his liking and not about the size of the fed’s balance sheet.

Regarding what caused the credit bubble, he repeats his assertion about the Fed’s role: “It is human instinct when rates are low and the yield curve is flat to reach for greater risk and enhanced yield and returns.” (Later, he adds that this is not to cast aspersions on former Fed Chairman Alan Greenspan and reminds me that these decisions are made by the FOMC.)

“The second thing is that the regulators didn’t do their job, including the Federal Reserve.” To this he adds what he calls unusual circumstances, including “the fruits and tailwinds of globalization, billions of people added to the labor supply, new factories and productivity coming from places it had never come from before.” And finally, he says, there was the ‘mathematization’ of risk.” Institutions were “building risk models” and relying heavily on “quant jocks” when “in the end there can be no substitute for good judgment.”

Never does mention the role of fiscal policy. Like the massive 2003 retro tax cuts and spending increases that drove the next few years, including housing. Helped of course by the lender fraud.

What about another group of alleged culprits: the government-anointed rating agencies? Mr. Fisher doesn’t mince words. “I served on corporate boards. The way rating agencies worked is that they were paid by the people they rated. I saw that from the inside.” He says he also saw this “inherent conflict of interest” as a fund manager. “I never paid attention to the rating agencies. If you relied on them you got . . . you know,” he says, sparing me the gory details. “You did your own analysis. What is clear is that rating agencies always change something after it is obvious to everyone else. That’s why we never relied on them.” That’s a bit disconcerting since the Fed still uses these same agencies in managing its own portfolio.

Agreed. Can’t have it both ways. And now they are threatening to downgrade the US government as well

I wonder whether the same bubble-producing Fed errors aren’t being repeated now as Washington scrambles to avoid a sustained economic downturn.

He surprises me by siding with the deflation hawks. “I don’t think that’s the risk right now.” Why? One factor influencing his view is the Dallas Fed’s “trim mean calculation,” which looks at price changes of more than 180 items and excludes the extremes. Dallas researchers have found that “the price increases are less and less. Ex-energy, ex-food, ex-tobacco you’ve got some mild deflation here and no inflation in the [broader] headline index.”

Mr. Fisher says he also has a group of about 50 CEOs around the U.S. and the world that he calls on, all off the record, before almost every FOMC meeting. “I don’t impart any information, I just listen carefully to what they are seeing through their own eyes. And that gives me a sense of what’s happening on the ground, you might say on Main Street as opposed to Wall Street.”

It’s good to know that a guy so obsessed with price stability doesn’t see inflation on the horizon. But inflation and bubble trouble almost always get going before they are recognized. Moreover, the Fed has to pay attention to the 1978 Full Employment and Balanced Growth Act — a.k.a. Humphrey-Hawkins — and employment is a lagging indicator of economic activity. This could create a Fed bias in favor of inflating. So I push him again.

“I want to make sure that your readers understand that I don’t know a single person on the FOMC who is rooting for inflation or who is tolerant of inflation.” The committee knows very well, he assures me, that “you cannot have sustainable employment growth without price stability. And by price stability I mean that we cannot tolerate deflation or the ravages of inflation.”

Mr. Fisher defends the Fed’s actions that were designed to “stabilize the financial system as it literally fell apart and prevent the economy from imploding.” Yet he admits that there is unfinished work. Policy makers have to be “always mindful that whatever you put in, you are going to have to take out at some point. And also be mindful that there are these perceptions [about the possibility of monetizing the debt], which is why I have been sensitive about the issue of purchasing Treasurys.”

Yes, seems the Fed is worried about perceptions they know not to be true, but struggles to come with a way to communicate the operational realities.

He returns to events on his recent trip to Asia, which besides China included stops in Japan, Hong Kong, Singapore and Korea. “I wasn’t asked once about mortgage-backed securities. But I was asked at every single meeting about our purchase of Treasurys. That seemed to be the principal preoccupation of those that were invested with their surpluses mostly in the United States. That seems to be the issue people are most worried about.”

As I listen I am reminded that it’s not just the Asians who have expressed concern. In his Kennedy School speech, Mr. Fisher himself fretted about the U.S. fiscal picture. He acknowledges that he has raised the issue “ad nauseam” and doesn’t apologize. “Throughout history,” he says, “what the political class has done is they have turned to the central bank to print their way out of an unfunded liability. We can’t let that happen. That’s when you open the floodgates. So I hope and I pray that our political leaders will just have to take this bull by the horns at some point. You can’t run away from it.”

Does not sound like he understands, operationally, what that is currently all about, but instead still uses gold standard rhetoric.

Voices like Mr. Fisher’s can be a problem for the politicians, which may be why recently there have been rumblings in Washington about revoking the automatic FOMC membership that comes with being a regional bank president. Does Mr. Fisher have any thoughts about that?

This is nothing new, he points out, briefly reviewing the history of the political struggle over monetary policy in the U.S. “The reason why the banks were put in the mix by [President Woodrow] Wilson in 1913, the reason it was structured the way it was structured, was so that you could offset the political power of Washington and the money center in New York with the regional banks. They represented Main Street.

Yes, there is a power struggle going on in the Fed

“Now we have this great populist fervor and the banks are arguing for Main Street, largely. I have heard these arguments before and studied the history. I am not losing a lot of sleep over it,” he says with a defiant Texas twang that I had not previously detected. “I don’t think that it’d be the best signal to send to the market right now that you want to totally politicize the process.”

Speaking of which, Texas bankers don’t have much good to say about the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP), according to Mr. Fisher. “Its been complicated by the politics because you have a special investigator, special prosecutor, and all I can tell you is that in my district here most of the people who wanted in on the TARP no longer want in on the TARP.”

At heart, Mr. Fisher says he is an advocate for letting markets clear on their own. “You know that I am a big believer in Schumpeter’s creative destruction,” he says referring to the term coined by the late Austrian economist. “The destructive part is always painful, politically messy, it hurts like hell but you hopefully will allow the adjustments to be made so that the creative part can take place.” Texas went through that process in the 1980s, he says, and came back stronger.

This is doubtless why, with Washington taking on a larger role in the American economy every day, the worries linger. On the wall behind his desk is a 1907 gouache painting by Antonio De Simone of the American steam sailing vessel Varuna plowing through stormy seas. Just like most everything else on the walls, bookshelves and table tops around his office — and even the dollar-sign cuff links he wears to work — it represents something.

He says that he has had this painting behind his desk for the past 30 years as a reminder of the importance of purpose and duty in rough seas. “The ship,” he explains, “has to maintain its integrity.” What is more, “no mathematical model can steer you through the kind of seas in that picture there. In the end someone has the wheel.” He adds: “On monetary policy it’s the Federal Reserve.”

Ms. O’Grady writes the Journal’s Americas column.


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My 2002 letter on the ratings agencies downgrading of Japan

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Hi David- been a long time, seems nothing has changed!

(See my 2002 letter to you below)

You downgraded Japan below Botswana, their debt/GDP went to over 150% with annual deficits over 8%, and all with a zero or near zero interest rate policy for over a decade, cds traded up, and 10 year JGB’s were continually issued in any size they wanted at the lowest rates in the world.

This is no accident. It’s inherent in monetary operations with non convertible currency and floating exchange rates. Your analysis is applicable only to fixed exchange rate regimes regarding defaulting on their conversion clauses.

Do the world a favor, reverse your position, and explain the reason for your current and prior errors, thanks!

All the best,

Warren

AN OPEN LETTER TO THE RATINGS AGENCIES

Flawed Logic Destabilizing the World Financial System


Repeated downgrades of Japan by the ratings agencies due to flawed logic have been destabilizing both Japan and the financial world in general. Their monumental error can be traced to a lack of understanding the operational realities of a Government that issues its own currency. For the Government of Japan, payment in yen, its currency of issue, is a simple matter of crediting a member bank account at the BOJ (Bank of Japan). There is no inherent operational constraint for this process. Simply stated, Government checks (payable in yen) will not bounce. The BOJ has the ABILITY to clear any MOF check for ANY size, simply by adding a credit balance to the member bank account in question. Yes, the BOJ could be UNWILLING to clear ANY check, but that is an entirely different matter than being UNABLE to credit an account. Operationally, concepts of the BOJ not having ‘sufficient funds’ to credit member accounts are functionally inapplicable.

As a point of logic, the concept of ABILITY to pay being inherently revenue constrained is not applicable to the issuer of a currency. Any such constraints are necessarily self-imposed (including various ‘no overdraft’ legislation in some countries for the Treasury at the Central Bank). The issuer can always make payment of its currency by crediting the appropriate account or by issuing actual paper currency if demanded by the counter party.

An extreme example is Russia in August 1998. The ruble was convertible into $US at the Russian Central Bank at the rate of 6.45 rubles per $US. The Russian government, desirous of maintaining this fixed exchange rate policy, was limited in its WILLINGNESS to pay by its holdings of $US reserves, since even at very high interest rates holders of rubles desired to exchange them for $US at the Russian Central Bank. Facing declining $US reserves, and unable to obtain additional reserves in international markets, convertibility was suspended around mid August, and the Russian Central Bank has no choice but to allow the ruble to float.

All throughout this process, the Russian Government had the ABILITY to pay in rubles. However, due to its choice of fixing the exchange rate at level above ‘market levels’ it was not, in mid August, WILLING to make payments in rubles. In fact, even after floating the ruble, when payment could have been made without losing reserves, the Russian Government, which included the Treasury and Central Bank, continued to be UNWILLING to make payments in rubles when due, both domestically and internationally. It defaulted on ruble payment BY CHOICE, as it always possessed the ABILITY to pay simply by crediting the appropriate accounts with rubles at the Central Bank.

Why Russia made this choice is the subject of much debate. However, there is no debate over the fact that Russia had the ABILITY to meet its notional ruble obligations but was UNWILLING to pay and instead CHOSE to default.

Note that even Turkey, with lira debt in quadrillions, interest rates in the neighborhood of 100%, annual currency depreciation in the neighborhood of 50%, little ‘faith’ in government, and only inflation keeping the debt to gdp ratio from rising, has never missed a lira payment and never had a lira ‘funding crisis.’ Turkey has had problems with its $US debt, but not with its ability to spend lira. Government spending of lira is limited only by the desire to purchase what happens to be offered for sale. It is not and cannot be ‘revenue constrained.’ Operationally, Turkey has the same unlimited ABILITY to pay in its own currency as does Japan, the US, or any other issuer of its own currency.

The Turkish example, and many others, makes it quite obvious that ABILITY to pay in local currency is, in practice as well as in theory, unlimited. ‘Deteriorating debt ratios’ and the like do not inhibit a sovereign’s ABILITY to pay in its currency of issue.

So why have the ratings agencies implied that default risk for holders of Japan’s yen denominated debt has increased to the point of deserving a downgrade? Do they understand that ABILITY to pay is beyond question, and therefore are basing their downgrade on the premise that Japan may at some point be UNWILLING to pay? If so, they have never mentioned that in their country reports.

A few years back, due to political disputes, the US Congress decided to default on US Government debt. The only reason the US Government did not default was because Treasury Secretary Robert Rubin was able to make payment from an account balance undisclosed to Congress. The US Government clearly showed an UNWILLINGNESS to pay that Japan has NEVER shown or even hinted at. Furthermore, again unlike Japan, the US continues this behavior just about every time the self imposed US ‘debt ceiling’ is about to be breached. And yet the ratings agencies have never even considered downgrading the US on WILLINGNESS to pay.

Therefore, one can only conclude 1) Japan has been downgraded on ABILITY to pay, and 2) The logic of the ratings agencies is flawed. In a world where currently there are serious ‘real’ financial problems to address, the ratings agencies have introduced a ‘contrived’ financial problem of substantial magnitude, as many regulations regarding the holdings of securities specify ratings assigned by the leading ratings agencies. Governments have chosen to rely on the ratings agencies for credit analysis, and downgrades often compel banks, insurance companies, pension plans, and other publicly regulated institutions to liquidate the securities in question.

Japan’s yen denominated debt qualifies for a AAA rating. ABILITY to pay is beyond question. WILLINGNESS to pay has never been questioned, even by the agencies engaged in recent downgrades. The destabilizing downgrades are the result of flawed logic.


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Macroeconomic Review

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Briefly, in mid 2006, I had written that the Fed’s financial obligations ratios suggested that the federal deficit had gotten too small to sustain the kind of growth we’d been seeing, and that aggregate demand would moderate until the economy got weak enough to get the federal deficit to probably about 5% of GDP as had been the case in most previous cycles.

And, at the same time, rising crude prices due to monopoly pricing power would drive up CPI.

I had also thought the Fed would keep rates steady or increase them as inflation expectations rose, and that the higher interest rates would further drive up CPI and support incomes through the interest income channel as the non government sectors are large (equal to the size of the outstanding Treasury securities) net savers.

GDP growth did start declining and CPI did start climbing, as did inflation expectations. However I was wrong about the Fed’s reaction as they cut rates long before CPI peaked. Ironically they made the right move regarding inflation, but the rate cuts did remove interest income and contribute to the decline in aggregate demand. The Q2 08 fiscal package more than offset that, however, and real GDP remained positive for the first half of 08.

The end of the fiscal package coincided with the Great Mike Masters Inventory Liquidation which was larger than I had ever imagined, lasting to year end, and driving GDP to unheard of post war negative numbers, particularly in the housing sector.

By year end the rapid increase in unemployment and the decline in tax revenues combined to increase the federal deficit to over 5% of GDP, boosting the USD net financial equity of the monetary system and slowing the decline of personal income to the point of ending the inventory liquidation and reversing the decline in the rate GDP some time during Q1.

Q2 GDP is currently looking to be somewhere near flat and maybe positive, with housing slowly on the mend as well, and with inventories starting from extremely low levels.

My proposals for fiscal policy once the inventory liquidation was in progress were the payroll tax holiday, revenue sharing for the states, and funding a job for anyone willing and able to work that included health care. This would have eliminated the need for unemployment to rise and GDP to fall as the means of restoring the federal budget deficit to levels necessary to sustain output and employment.

All with the caveat that energy prices would resume their climb as soon as stability was restored if there was not a credible plan in place to immediately cut US domestic crude oil consumption.

The Obamaboom is now underway due to the ‘automatic stabilizers’ described above, and the additional fiscal adjustments are now kicking in as well. Unfortunately we got here that ugly way, via rising unemployment and falling taxable incomes- a real and tragic cost that is, sadly, water under the bridge.

And, unfortunately, our crude consumption has dropped only modestly and is already increasing as GDP stabilizes, even at current levels of unemployment. As a consequence, crude prices are headed north again, and will support headline and eventually core CPI through the cost structure, as cost push ‘inflation’ resumes after pausing for the inventory liquidation. While off of last year’s highs, food prices are now rising from levels that are about double those of a few years ago and crude prices nearly triple earlier levels.

The US fiscal expansion is also likely to drive imports, with rising crude prices increasing the US import bill as well.

This keeps a lid on domestic employment as unemployment remains high and real wages stagnate, meaning increases in real consumption and wealth due to productivity increases and (some) employment gains necessarily flow to the ‘top.’

It also means US dollars will be ‘easier to get’ overseas which puts downward pressure on the USD. The Fed and Administration is prone to look at this as a ‘good thing’ as they view increased ‘competitiveness’ that drive increased exports ‘necessary’ to ‘balance the trade account.’

For the real economy, rising prices of imports while nominal wages are contained decreases real standards of living as workers use up their take home pay on food and energy and export a greater share of their output rather than consume it. This is what happens with an administration that doesn’t understand that exports are real costs and imports real benefits.

The Fed will soon be looking at sub trend GDP, unacceptably high unemployment, a falling dollar, rising headline CPI and rising inflation expectations.

Recent history says they will keep rates low as long as they perceive an continuing output gap.

The administration will see the same data and be hesitant to blame the Fed for inflation, for fear of triggering higher interest rates.

Ironically, this disturbing scenario is currently a historically a near ideal environment for nominal equity prices, so the administration will also be seeing increasing wealth in the financial sectors, at the senior management level, and in the investor classes in general, while pondering what to do about unemployment in the face of rising inflation.


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Bernanke

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Karim writes:

Bernanke Testimony (All quotes in italics)

  • We are likely to see further sizable job losses and increased unemployment in coming months
  • Recent data also suggest that the pace of contraction may be slowing, and they include some tentative signs that final demand, especially demand by households, may be stabilizing. In coming months, households’ spending power will be boosted by the fiscal stimulus program, and we have seen some improvement in consumer sentiment. Nonetheless, a number of factors are likely to continue to weigh on consumer spending, among them the weak labor market and the declines in equity and housing wealth that households have experienced over the past two years. In addition, credit conditions for consumers remain tight.
  • The housing market, which has been in decline for three years, has also shown some signs of bottoming
  • The available indicators of business investment remain extremely weak.
  • Conditions in the commercial real estate sector are poor.
  • We continue to expect economic activity to bottom out, then to turn up later this year.
  • The supply of mortgage credit is still relatively tight, and mortgage activity remains heavily dependent on the support of government programs or the government-sponsored enterprises.
  • Investors seemed to adopt a more positive outlook on the condition of financial institutions after several large banks reported profits in the first quarter, but readings from the credit default swap market and other indicators show that substantial concerns about the banking industry remain.

The section below appears to warn about the impact of rising rates, wider credit spreads, and weaker equities. i.e., the Fed wont be looking to snuff out any rallies. Also, slack to expand even after recovery takes hold, meaning disinflation continues, with ‘expectations’ being main factor preventing deflation.

  • An important caveat is that our forecast assumes continuing gradual repair of the financial system; a relapse in financial conditions would be a significant drag on economic activity and could cause the incipient recovery to stall.
  • Even after a recovery gets under way, the rate of growth of real economic activity is likely to remain below its longer-run potential for a while, implying that the current slack in resource utilization will increase further. We expect that the recovery will only gradually gain momentum and that economic slack will diminish slowly. In particular, businesses are likely to be cautious about hiring, implying that the unemployment rate could remain high for a time, even after economic growth resumes.
  • In this environment, we anticipate that inflation will remain low. Indeed, given the sizable margin of slack in resource utilization and diminished cost pressures from oil and other commodities, inflation is likely to move down some over the next year relative to its pace in 2008. However, inflation expectations, as measured by various household and business surveys, appear to have remained relatively stable, which should limit further declines in inflation.


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