Category Archives: Inflation

productivity up 9.5%

Posted on by


[Skip to the end]

Lower labor costs for the same sales (top lines were relatively flat) mean revenue is being shifted from compensation to profits, which carry a much lower propensity to consume than wages.

This reduces aggregate demand, which is a good thing, as it means, for example, we can cut taxes to sustain incomes, sales, output, and employment.

Unfortunately, our leaders don’t understand the monetary system and take no constructive action in the name of ‘fiscal responsibility,’ while the main stream forecasts project unemployment to linger around the 10% level for an extended period of time:

The Labor Department said non-farm productivity surged at a 9.5 percent annual rate, the quickest pace since the third quarter of 2003. Productivity grew at a 6.9 percent pace in the April-June period.

Hours worked fell at a 5 percent rate in the third quarter, the Labor Department said. Unit labor costs, a gauge of inflation and profit pressures closely watched by the Federal Reserve, fell 5.2 percent after declining 6.1 percent in the second quarter. Analysts had expected unit labor costs to fall 4 percent in the third quarter. Compensation per hour rose at a 3.8 percent pace and, adjusted for inflation, was up 0.2 percent.

Compared with the July-September quarter of 2008, non-farm productivity rose at a 4.3 percent rate. Unit labor costs fell 3.6 percent year-on-year.


[top]

Share

Short-Rate Thoughts: DEFLATION – Radical Thesis Turnaround

Posted on by


[Skip to the end]

Well stated!

*Not house view.

Since March I have been arguing that the world was a better place than people thought. I am now shifting my core view, which still might take several months to develop in the marketplace.

Skipping to the Conclusions

1. Deflation will be the surprise theme of 2010, when Congress will go into a pre-election deadlock; elections have only underscored this is the public direction

2. Excess Reserves will neither generate new lending nor generate inflation; actually, the quantity of reserves (M0) basically has no real economic effect

3. ZIRP and QE actually CONTRIBUTE to the deflation mostly by depriving the spending public of much-needed coupon income

4. When Federal Tax Rates increase in 2011 this problem will become even more severe

5. The overall level of public indebtedness (vs GDP) will not put upward pressure on yields in this backdrop and there will be a reckoning in the high-rates/deficit hawk community

6. Strong possibility that QE will actually be upsized next year rather than ended when the Fed observes these effects (and this might actually make things WORSE)

The Explanation (a Journey)

It seemed fairly intuitive and obvious for thousands of years that the Earth was at rest and the Sun moving around it. Likewise, it has seemed that the Fed controls the money supply, balances the economy by setting interest rates and fixing reserves which power bank lending, that more Fed money means less buying power per dollar (inflation), that the federal government needs to borrow this same money from The People in order to be able to spend, and that it needs to grow its way out of its debt burden or risks fiscal insolvency. I have, in just a fortnight, been COMPLETELY disabused of all these well-entrenched notions. Starting from the beginning, here is how I now think it works:

1. The first dollar is created when Treasury gives it to someone in exchange for something ammo, a bridge, labor. It is a coupon. In exchange for your bridge, here is something you or anyone you trade it with can give me back to cover your taxes. In the mean time, it goes from person A to person B, gets deposited in a bank, which then deposits it at the Fed, which then records the whole thing in a giant spreadsheet. Liability: One overnight reserve/demand deposit/tax coupon. Asset: IOU from Treasury general account. Tax day comes, Person A pulls his deposit, cashes in the coupon, the Treasury scraps it, and POOF, everything is back to even.

2. For various reasons (either a gold-standard relic or a conscious power restraint, depending who you ask), we make the Treasury cover its shortfall at the Fed and SWAP one type of tax-coupon (a deposit or reserve) for another by selling a Treasury note. Either the Fed (in the absence of enough reserves well get to this) or a Bank (to earn risk-free interest) or Person A (who sets a price for his need to save) is forced out his demand deposit dollar and into a treasury note at the auction clearing price. What about the fact that treasuries aren’t fungible like currency? On an overnight basis, that doesn’t really constrain anyones behavior. A reserve or a deposit means you get your money back the next day. Same thing with a treasury. Functionally its cash and wont influence your decision to buy a car. Likewise for the bank. In the overnight duration example, it does NOT affect their term lending decisions if they have more reserves and few overnight bills, or more bills and fewer reserves. Its even possible to imagine a world (W. J.Bryans dream) where the Fed, with its scorekeeping spreadsheet, combines the line-items we call treasuries and reserves.

3. Total public sector dissavings is equal to private sector savings (plus overseas holdings) as a matter of accounting identity. This really means that the only money available to buy treasuries came from government itself (here I am being a bit loose combining Tres+Fed), from its own tax coupons. If there arent enough ready coupons at settlement time for those Treasuries, the Fed MUST supply them by doing a repo (trading deposits/coupons for a treasury by purchasing one themselves at least temporarily). They dont really have a choice in the matter, however, because if the reserves in the banking system didnt cover it, overnight rates would go to the moon. So in setting interest rates they MUST do a recording on their spreadsheet and the Fedwire and shift around some reserve-coupons (usable as cash) for treasury-coupons (usable for savings but functionally identical).

4. Thus monetizing the deficit is actually just the Feds daily recordkeeping combined with its interest rate targetting, just keeping the score in balance. However, duration is real, as only overnight bills are usable as currency, and because people (and pensions!) need savings, they need to be able to pay taxes or trade tax-coupons for goods when they retire, and so there is a price for long-term money known as interest rates. The Fed CAN affect this by settings rates and by shifting between overnight reserves, longer-term treasuries, and cash in circulation. When the Fed does a term repo or a coupon sale, they shift around the banking and private sectors duration, trading overnight coupons for longer-term ones as needed to keep the balance in order.

5. But all this activity doesnt influence the real economy or even the amount of money out there. The amount of money out there dictates the recordkeeping that the Fed must do.

6. This is where QE comes in to play. In QE, aside from its usual recordkeeping activities, the Fed converts overnight reserves into treasuries, forcing the private sector out of its savings and into cash. This is just a large-scale version of the coupon-passes it needed to do all along. Again, they force people out of treasuries and into cash and reserves.

7. The private sector is net saving, by definition. It has saved everything the Treasury ever spent, in cash and in treasuries and in deposits. In fact, Treasuries outstanding plus cash in circulation plus reserves are just the tangible record of the cumulative deficit spending, also by IDENTITY.

8. So when QE is going on, there is some combination of savers getting fewer coupons which constrains their aggregate demand just like a lower social security check would, and banks being forced out of duration instruments and into cash reserves. I do not think this makes them lend more their lending decision was not a function of their cashflow but rather a function of their capital and the opportunities out there (even when you judge a banks asset/equity capital ratio, there is no duration in accounting, so a reserve asset and a treasury asset both cost the same). If they had the capital and the opportunities, they would keep lending and force the Fed to give them the cash (via coupon passes and repos, which we then wouldnt call QE but rather preventing overnight rates from going to infinity). As far as I can tell, excess reserves is a meaningless operational overhang that has no impact on the economy or prices. The Fed is actually powering rates (cost of money) not supply (amount of money) which is coming from everyone else in the economy (Tres spending and private loan demand).

9. Ill grant there is a psychological component to inflation phenomenon, as well as a preponderance of ignorance about what reserves are, and that might result in some type of inflationary event in another universe, but not in the one we are in where interest rates are low and taxes are going up and the demand for savings is therefore rising rather than falling.

10. One can now retell history through this better lens. Big surpluses in 97-01, then a big tax cut in 03. Big surpluses in 27-30, then a huge deficit in 40-41. Was an aging Japanese public shocked into its savings rate or is that savings just the record of the recessionary deficit spending that came after 97? It will be interesting to watch what happens there as the demographic story forces households to live moreso off JGB income will this force the BOJ to push rates higher or will they never get it and force the deflation deeper?

11. There are, as always mitigating factors. Unlike in the Japan example, a huge chunk of US fixed income is held abroad, so lower rates are depriving less exported coupon income which is actually a benefit. There is of course some benefit from lower private sector borrowing rates as well MEW, lower startup costs for new capital investment, etc. Also, even if one denies that higher debt/gdp ratios are what weakened it (rather than Chinas decisions again something unavailable to Japan), the dollar IS weaker now which is inflationary. But this is all more than offset, I think, by ppls expectation that higher taxes are coming, and thats hugely deflationary and curbs aggregate demand via multiple channels.

12. Additionally, there seems to be a finite amount of political capital that can be spent via the deficit, and that amount seems to be rapidly running out. See https://portal.gs.com/gs/portal/home/fdh/?st=1&d=8055164. The period of deficit stimulus is mostly behind us. Instead, people are depending upon ZIRP and the Fed to stimulate the economy, and in fact there is marginal, and possible negative, stimulation coming from that channel. The Fed is taking away the social security checks knowns as coupon interest.

13. Finally, there is a huge caveat that I cant get around, which is whether we are measuring inflation correctly. It happens that I don’t think we are strange effects like declining inventory will provide upward pressure and lagged-accounting for rents providing downward pressure in the CPI. This is an unfortunate, untradeable fact about the universe that I think will be offset by other indicators (Core PCE) sending a better signal. But this is part of the reason this whole story will take time to develop in the marketplace. As a massive importer of goods and exporter of debts we are not quite Japan, but the path of misunderstanding is remarkably similar.

* Credit due Warren Mosler and moslereconomics.com for guiding my logic.

J. J. Lando


[top]

Share

Goldman- Excess Reserves Irrelevant and the FED does not need to execute Reverse Repos with Non-Primary Dealers

Posted on by


[Skip to the end]
Hopefully, when Goldman talks, people listen:
Clarification from author Franesco Cafagna: Views expressed in this piece are his own and are not necessarily reflect the view of Goldman Sachs

1. Do excess reserves really matter and does the FED really need to drain them?

The short answer is: I don’t think so. The total amount of reserves currently in the banking system is the sum of all Required Reserves (including a certain amount that banks hold for precautionary reasons) and Excess Reserves. The FED HAS to provide the banking system with the amount of Required Reserves it needs otherwise rates spike higher (potentially to infinity if the discount window or other forms of “marginal lending facilities” did not exist): the amount required is the result of banks’ individual credit decisions (how many loans they make) and the FED’s job is to estimate that amount and provide it to the system. But the FED does not control this number. When it comes to Excess Reserves, lots of people worry about the potential long-term inflationary impact they may have. The truth is that they don’t matter because they bear no weight in banks’ credit decisions (how many new loans they make). They simply appear on banks’ balance sheets as an Asset that gets “invested” every night in the form of a deposit that they leave at the FED and on which they currently get a 25bps remuneration. If the FED decided to drain excess reserves via Reverse Repo the impact on the system as a whole would be zero because the system as a whole is “self contained”. To understand this let’s think of the most extreme case: the FED drains all excess reserves via one giant Overnight Reverse Repo executed with all the
banks in the banking system. At a macro level all that’s happened is that each bank has changed its Excess Reserve asset (which is effectively an O/N asset) into and O/N Reverse Repo and the two are virtually identical. Another way to think of this is that Excess Reserves are ALREADY being drained every night because banks leave them on their account at the FED every night. The only thing that will change is the liquidity profile of banks IF the FED decided to execute Reverse Repos longer than 1 day: in that case a 1-day assets (excess reserve) would be transformed into a longer asset (Reverse Repo longer than 1 day). Whilst this may affect individual institutions, the system as a whole is unaffected because this amount “extra cash” in the system (excess reserves) is NOT being used for anything. It just sits at the FED every night. So effectively it’s being “drained” already every night. So all this talk about excess reserves and their potential inflationary impact seems misplaced: they are just irrelevant and the FED simply does not need to drain them because they are “self-drained” every night anyway.

2. Does the FED really need to execute Reverse Repos with Non-Primary dealers?

This item has gained press coverage following the Fed’s release of the last Fomc minutes in which it was clear that it debated the possibility of executing large scale reverse repo operations with non-primary dealers: the motivation behind this discussion is the perceived balance-sheet capacity constraint that the 16 Primary dealers might face (a Reverse Repo increases the assets of the broker-dealer entity facing the Fed). This statement by the Fed has created all kind of debate across the street with various dealers coming up with all kinds of estimates of the overall size that the Primary dealers can handle (with some estimates being as low as 100-150bn out of a total of over 800bn that the Fed might want to execute). Leaving aside the actual need to execute Reverse Repo in the first place (point 1 above) and assuming that the Fed will, in fact, choose to execute these operations because it has stated that they are part of the exit strategy policy, I think the alleged Primary Dealers’ balance sheet capacity constraint has been VASTLY exaggerated. It’s true that a Reverse Repo increases the assets of a broker-dealer entity, but this is an issue only for stand-alone broker-dealers (Jeffreys and alike). For Primary Dealers with big commercial banks operations (JPM, Citi, BOA) I don’t believe that this is an issue at all: since they are already sitting on big amounts of Excess Reserves and because 23A (which regulates the activity between a bank entity and its affiliates) does not impose any restriction on the amount of UST, Agencies and Agencies MBS repos that a bank can execute with an affiliate broker-dealer entity, this means that the JPMs of the world could potentially execute reverse repo operations with the Fed up to the amount of excess reserves they are already sitting on without increasing their balance sheet by 1 single cent: it would simply be a transformation of an asset (excess reserves of the bank entity) into another (reverse repo of the broker-dealer entity). So, in my view, the conclusion has to be that the Primary Dealers can in fact absorb a much bigger amount of Reverse Repo than originally thought even by the Fed itself and that realistically the only other counterparties that the Fed might engage directly for these kind of operations are the GSEs: but in this case the reason would not be balance sheet driven but would be driven by the distortion that the GSEs’ participation in the fed funds mkt creates (call me if you would like to discuss this further).

By Franesco Cafagna


[top]

Share

Valance Weekly Economic Chart Book

Posted on by


[Skip to the end]

Valance Weekly Economic Chart Book

A bit disorganized, but these are my impressions as of month end.
(Look for the usual couple of days or so of month end allocations driving the technicals.)

I don’t see much to get encouraged about on almost all of these charts.

In general, demand was trending lower since maybe mid 2006, took a sharp dip in mid 2008 with the great Mike Masters Inventory Liquidation that ended in late Dec 2008, after which the rate of decline stopped accelerating (second derivative change), and now were are, for the most part, back on the ‘trend line’ of the slow decline in demand that started in mid 2006.

Personal income looks very weak, hurt by falling interest income as previously discussed. The clunker lift has reversed, and housing remains very week with no real signs of recovery yet. (about 2% of GDP was clunkers and inventories)

The deficit got large enough due to the automatic stabilizers around year end, market functioning returned as the Fed eventually accepted enough different kinds of collateral from its banks to adequately fund them. (should have been lending unsecured to its member banks all along, etc.)

But while the Obama fiscal package added some demand, and GDP stabilized, the zero interest rate policy continued to shift savings incomes to widening bank net interest margins, and the Fed’s $2 T portfolio began draining another maybe 60 billion a year in private sector interest income. Additionally, interest rates on tsy secs have declined sharply with the Fed rate cuts. (While I fully support a zero rate policy I also recognize the need to sustain demand with a payroll tax holiday, per capita revenue sharing, and an $8/hr fed funded job for anyone willing and able to work.)

And now with productivity higher than real GDP growth, employment continues to fall, though at a lower rate, and capacity utilization in general remains at very low levels. Prices remain very weak, apart from gold, which could be a bubble driven by the misconception that the Fed’s ‘quantitative easing’ policy is inflationary. In fact, it’s nothing but an asset shift that modestly reduces term interest rates at the cost of draining billions in interest income from the private sector.

If gold does turn out to have been a bubble and collapse, it could be highly demoralizing as it would reveal the Fed does not have the tools to ‘reflate’ at will. Dollar shorts could start covering, further taking away the bid from stocks (also as previously discussed). And if the Saudis have left the prices to their refiners below current levels, crude and products will fall as well.

All major foreign govts. seem to be continuing to favor export led growth, which will also keep US domestic demand in check.

And, in general, it looks like most of the world is looking to tighten up fiscal policy, believing in the like of the ‘debt trap’ and also that monetary policy is expansionary and inflationary.


[top]

Share

Conservatives Say Low Rates Are U.K.’s Best Route Out of Slump

Posted on by


[Skip to the end]

Earlier this year I thought the UK was on track with their understanding of their monetary system.

Recent headlines don’t look so promising:

Conservatives Say Low Rates Are U.K.’s Best Route Out of Slump

By Robert Hutton and Jennifer Joan Lee

Oct. 28 (Bloomberg) — Philip Hammond, a lawmaker who speaks on Treasury policy for the Conservatives, said the opposition party wants the Bank of England to keep interest rates low and will cut the deficit to allow this to happen.

“It is essential that in the recovery we are able to continue to keep monetary policy relatively loose,” Hammond said in an interview at Bloomberg’s office in London. “We will only be able to do that if we have got the deficit under control.”

The focus on monetary policy contrasts with Prime Minister Gordon Brown’s argument that maintaining government spending is the best bring Britain out of the worst recession since World War II.

With an election due within seven months, the question of how and when to cut spending is at the heart of the debate between the ruling Labour Party and the opposition. Brown argues that maintaining spending and cutting taxes are the best ways to return to growth. The Conservatives say those steps risk lifting inflation and interest rates, choking off recovery.

“What has got Britain through the recession so far has been the activist monetary policy at the Bank of England, keeping interest rates low, supporting the economy through quantitative easing,” Hammond said. “We will only be able to do that if we have sent a clear signal to the markets that we intend to execute a plan to get the deficit under control. We need to make a start in 2010.”

‘Active Monetary Policy’

Conservative leader David Cameron yesterday said he was “a great believer in an active monetary policy,” a step away from previous comments that the bank’s quantitative easing program would have to end soon.

Cameron told journalists that a speech he’d made at the start of the month had been misunderstood. “The point I was making was about how easy or difficult to fund our debt, because the market for gilts hasn’t really been tested yet, because of QE,” he said. He repeated his point that the intervention will have to end some time. “You can’t go on indefinitely.”

Policy makers at the central bank will decide next week whether to extend their asset purchase program, which is pumping

175 bln pounds ($286 bln) in newly created money into the economy.

The program has increased demand for U.K. government bonds, known as gilts, as the Treasury sells a record 220 bln pounds of debt this year.

The Conservatives have repeatedly warned this year that Brown’s spending plans are putting the U.K.’s AAA debt rating at risk. Hammond’s boss, George Osborne, told an audience of financiers on Monday that it was only the likelihood of a Conservative victory at the next election that was keeping Britain’s debt costs down. Conservatives have led Labour in polls for two years.


[top]

Share

Roubini Says Carry Trades Fueling ‘Huge’ Asset Bubble

Posted on by


[Skip to the end]

Again, maybe right but for the wrong reason.

My take is the gold and commodity bubble is due to people (Roubini included) believing Fed policy is inherently inflationary – printing money and all that – when it’s not.

When those funds are done being committed, it can all end very badly in a deflationary tumble.

Roubini Says Carry Trades Fueling ‘Huge’ Asset Bubble

By Michael Patterson

Oct. 27 (Bloomberg) — Investors worldwide are borrowing dollars to buy assets including equities and commodities, fueling “huge” bubbles that may spark another financial crisis, said New York University professor Nouriel Roubini.

“We have the mother of all carry trades,” Roubini, who predicted the banking crisis that spurred more than $1.6 trillion of asset writedowns and credit losses at financial companies worldwide since 2007, said via satellite to a conference in Cape Town, South Africa. “Everybody’s playing the same game and this game is becoming dangerous.”


[top]

Share

Carry trade

Posted on by


[Skip to the end]

The article completely misses the point.

There is no ‘cash pouring into’ anything.

Nor is there a constraint on lending/deposits in any non convertible currency.

It is not a matter of taking funds from one currency and giving them to another.

There is no such thing.

Yes, the interest rate differential may be driving one currency high in the near term (not the long term) due to these portfolio shifts.

But the nation with the currency seeing the appreciation has the advantage, not the other way around.

Imports are the real benefits, exports the real costs, which the author of this piece has backwards.

The nation with the stronger currency is experiencing improving real terms of trade- more imports in exchange for fewer exports.

The most common way to realize this benefit is for the government to use the currency strength to accumulate foreign currency reserves by ‘pegging’ its currency to sustain it’s exports. This results in the same real terms of trade plus foreign exchange accumulation which can be of some undetermined future real benefit.

Better still, however, is cut taxes (or increase govt. spending, depending on your desired outcome) and sustain domestic demand, employment, and output, so now the domestic population has sufficient spending power to buy all that can be produced domestically at full employment, plus anything the rest of the world wants to net export to you.

Unfortunately those pesky deficit myths always seem to get in the way of anyone implementing that policy, as evidenced by this
article below and all of the others along the same lines. Comments in below:

>   
>   Steve Keen pointed me to it. Talks about the carry trade in US$ over to AUD$.
>   There are not Federal unsecured swap lines, would be interested in your take.
>   

Foreign speculation on our currency is a bubble set to burst

By Kenneth Davidson

Oct. 26 (National Times) — The pooh-bahs running US and British hedge funds and the banks supporting them are more than capable of reading the minutes of the Reserve Bank of Australia board meetings and coming to the conclusion that RBA Governor Glenn Stevens is committed to pushing up the cash rate from the present 3.25 per cent to 4 to 5 per cent if necessary.

And they are already betting tens of billions of dollars on what has so far been a sure bet.

But is always high risk, and not permitted for US banks by our regulators, though no doubt some gets by.

These foreign financial institutions are up to their old tricks. After getting trillions of dollars out of their respective governments to avoid GFC-induced bankruptcy – which was largely engineered by their criminal greed – because they are ”too big to fail”, they are already using their influence to maintain ”business as usual”.
Why funnel the money gouged out of American and British taxpayers into lending to their national economies to maintain employment when there are richer pickings elsewhere?

As above, these transactions directly risk shareholder equity. The govt. is not at risk until after private capital has been completely eliminated.

Two of those destinations are Brazil and Australia. Their resource-rich economies are still doing well compared with most other countries because they are riding in the slipstream of the strong demand for commodities from China and India.

Cash is pouring into these economies, not for development, but to speculate on the local currency and the sharemarket. The rising value of the Brazilian real and the Australian dollar against the US dollar has had a disastrous impact on both countries’ non-commodity export and import competing industries.

Yes, except to be able to export less and import more is a positive shift in real terms of trade, and a benefit to the real standard of living.

Brazil’s popular and largely economically successful left-wing Government led by President Lula da Silva is meeting the problem head on. It has decided to impose a 2 per cent tax on all capital inflows to stop the real appreciating further.

Instead, it could cut taxes to sustain full employment if that’s the risk they are worried about.

Arguably, the monetary strategy adopted by Stevens has compounded Australia’s lack of international competitiveness for our manufacturing and service industries, especially tourism. Since the end of 2008 our dollar has appreciated 27 per cent (as of last week). This means that financial institutions that invested money at the beginning of January are enjoying an annual rate of return on their investments of 35 per cent.

Tourism is an export industry. Instead of working caring for tourists a nation is better served taking care of its people’s needs.
And those profits are from foreign capital paying ever higher prices for the currency.

US and British commercial banks can borrow from their central banks at a rate less than 1 per cent. The equivalent RBA rate is 3.25 per cent and many pundits are forecasting the rate could go to 3.75 per cent before the end of 2009. This will increase the differential between Australian and British and US interest rates and make the scope for speculative profits even higher.

They are risking their shareholder’s capital if they do that, not their govt’s money, at least not until all the private equity is lost.
And the regulators are supposed to be on top of that.

Since the beginning of the year, $64 billion has poured into Australia in the form of direct and portfolio (share) investment and foreign lenders have switched $80 billion of foreign debt payable in foreign currencies to Australian currency. Most of the portfolio investment ($41 billion) has gone into bank shares. Banks now represent 40 per cent of the value of shares traded on the stock exchange, and while shares in the big four bank shares have increased by about 80 per cent (as measured by CBA shares), the Australian Stock Exchange Index has risen by only 30 per cent.

When anyone buys shares someone sells them. There are no net funds ‘going into’ anything.

Also, portfolio mangers do diversify globally, and I’d guess a lot of managers went to higher levels of cash last year, and much of this is the reversal. And it’s also likely, for example, that Australian managers have increased their holdings of foreign securities as well.

Foreigners have shifted out of Australian fixed interest debt and into equities because as interest rates go up, the capital value of fixed debt declines. By driving up interest rates to curb inflationary expectations and the prospect of a housing price bubble the RBA is in far greater danger of creating a stock exchange asset price bubble as well as an Australian dollar bubble. Once foreigners believe interest rates have peaked, the bubbles are likely to be pricked as financial speculators attempt to realise their gains. This could lead to a stampede out of Australian denominated securities.

Markets do fluctuate for all kinds of reasons, both short term and long term. The Australian dollar has probably reacted more to resource prices than anything else. But again, the issue is real terms of trade, and domestic output and employment.

With unemployment expected to continue to rise, and the level of unemployment disguised by growing numbers of workers being forced to work part-time, there is little chance of the underlying inflation rate, already below 2 per cent, increasing as a result of a wages break-out. The last wages breakout (leaving aside the explosive growth in executive salaries in the past three decades) occurred in 1979.

This gives the govt. cause to increase domestic demand with fiscal adjustments, including Professor Bill Mitchell’s ‘Job Guarantee’ proposal which is much like my federally funded $8/hr job for anyone willing and able to work proposal.

The world has moved on but the obsessive debate about wage inflation and union powers hasn’t. Since the beginning of the ’80s, the problem has been periodic bouts of asset price inflation. It is the biggest danger now.

Instead of controlling the unions, there should be control of financial institutions. The Australian dollar bubble and the incipient housing bubble should be micro-managed. Capital inflow could be dampened by a compulsory deposit of 1 to 2 per cent to be redeemed after a year to stop speculative inflow. Home ownership has become a tax shelter. The steam could be taken out of the rise in house prices if negative gearing was limited to new housing. This would obviate the need for higher interest rates that affect everyone.

The Job Guarantee offers a far superior price anchor vs our current use of unemployment as a price anchor. Also, I strongly suspect that the mainstream has it wrong, and that it is lower rates that are deflationary.


[top]

Share

April 10 2006 post

Posted on by


[Skip to the end]

Worth a quick look at how I saw it in April 2006.

Turns out I was right about demand weaking from that date, but wrong about the Fed reaction function.

I thought they’d follow the mainstream view and respond to elevating inflation expectations.

Instead, Bernanke and Kohn subsequently looked past sharply elevating inflation expectations to the output gap when they first cut rates.

Link


[top]

Share

Canada ready to buy $US on weakness

Posted on by


[Skip to the end]

While he’s a bit shaky on his understanding of monetary operation his intentions are clear enough:

Bank of Canada talks tough on rising dollar

By Kevin Carmichael

Oct. 3 (The Globe and Mail ) — Bank of Canada Governor Mark Carney is done with nuance. His new message for those who doubt he’s prepared to weaken the dollar if Canada’s recovery veers too far off track: Just watch me.

Despite stronger than expected growth in the second half, the central bank has actually reduced its outlook for the next two years, saying that’s when the current appreciation of the currency will show up in growth figures.

Given that backdrop, Mr. Carney said he would have no choice but to act if international investors continue to push the dollar higher – something they’ve been quite willing to do, in part because most analysts and investors are skeptical a central bank that hasn’t intervened in currency markets since 1998 is willing to back up its talk with action.

But if the currency continues to surge, Mr. Carney stressed that he retains “considerable flexibility” to stoke the demand required to get inflation back to the 2-per-cent target. His options would include creating money to buy U.S.-dollar denominated assets or direct intervention in foreign exchange markets.


[top]

Share

UK GDP SURPRISES ON THE DOWNSIDE; RISK OF MORE QE

Posted on by


[Skip to the end]

Risk of ‘quantitative easing’ which does nothing, both in theory and now in practice, but no ‘risk’ of ‘VAT holiday’ – eliminating the value added taxes – which would end the recession and lower prices?

And they are largely energy independent, as least in the short term.

UK: GDP SURPRISES ON THE DOWNSIDE; RISK OF MORE QE

The range of forecasts for GDP in Q3 was from unchanged to up
0.7% qoq. Not a single forecaster had expected negative growth,
but today’s figures showed the economy continuing to contract in
Q3. Growth has been negative now for 6 straight quarters – some-
thing we have never seen before in the UK. Output is down by 6%
since the peak – a similar fall to the contraction we saw in the
early 1980s recession. In its August Inflation Report, the BoE
had been forecasting growth of roughly 0.1% for Q3 – in other
words this is a 0.5pp downside surprise. This will, all things
being equal, raise the amount of spare capacity in the economy
and push down on the Bank’s inflation forecasts going forward.
The chance of more QE in Nov has been increased substantially.


[top]

Share