LOCKHART SAYS MORE EASING NOT CALLED FOR AT THE MOMENT

I guess he’s ok with the output gap/unemployment…
And not that it matters, as they they only shoot blanks in any case.

*LOCKHART: COMMUNICATIONS, BALANCE SHEET ARE TOOLS
*LOCKHART: `WE HAVE NOT EXHAUSTED ALL OUR OPTIONS’
*LOCKHART: DEFLATION, DETERIORATING CONDITIONS COULD BE TRIGGER
*LOCKHART SAYS `STRESSED’ ECONOMY MIGHT REQUIRE EASING
*LOCKHART SAYS MORE EASING NOT CALLED FOR AT THE MOMENT

Dudley on interest income channel

From a friend:

At the conference on Friday, NY Fed President Dudley presented a chart that showed the long-term impact on the budget deficit of lower Fed remittances of interest income over time (his point was that it would lead to a larger deficit and the Treasury should not assume recent levels of Fed remittances).

I asked him in Q&A if he considered that in the short-term, the interest being accrued by the govt sector would typically be accrued by the non-govt sector and it could thus be viewed as a form of fiscal drag, and that maybe it should be offset by looser fiscal policy elsewhere if the economy warranted it due to a large output gap.

His response, not surprisingly, was:
‘You are factually correct, but’:

  • A lot of that interest income goes to non-u.s. investors, so its not like the U.S. economy loses all that interest income.
  • The propensity to consume of savers is lower than that of borrowers.
  • The drain on interest income is more than offset by easier financial conditions elsewhere (via equities, credit spreads, etc).

That’s just how their models work/they see the world.

How to fix the euro banking system

The banks need, and I propose, ECB deposit insurance for all euro zone banks.

Currently the member governments insure their own member bank deposits and do the regulation and supervision.

So to get from here to there politically they need to turn over banking supervision to the ECB.

Let me suggest that’s a change pretty much no one would notice or care about from a practical/operational point of view?

The political problem would come from losses from existing portfolios that, in the case of a bank failure due to losses in excess of equity capital, currently would be charged to the appropriate member nations.

So under my proposal, for the ECB to suffer actual losses a member bank that it supervises and regulates would have to suffer losses in excess of its capital.

And none of the member governments currently think that their banks have negative capital, especially if they assume member governments don’t default on their debt to the banks.

And this ‘fix’ for the banking system would help insure the member governments don’t default on their obligations to their banks.

The euro zone has three financial issues at this point. One is bank liquidity which this proposal fixes. Second is national government solvency, and third is the output gap.

They need to allow larger government deficits to narrow the output gap, but that first requires fixing the solvency issue.

The solvency issue can be addressed by having the ECB guarantee all of the member government debt, which then raises the moral hazard issue.

The moral hazard issue can be addressed by giving the EU the option of not having the ECB insure new government debt and forbidding its banks to buy new government debt as a penalty for violators of the debt and deficit limits of the Stability and Growth Pact.

Brazil Cuts Rates to Record Low as Economy Stalls

Another central bank may have it backwards as lower rates turn out to be deflationary and slow things down via interest income channels?

Brazil Cuts Rates to Record Low as Economy Stalls

May 30 (Bloomberg) — Brazil’s central bank cut interest rates on Wednesday for the seventh straight time to a record low 8.50 percent, moving into uncharted territory in a bid to shield a fragile recovery from a gloomy global outlook.

President Dilma Rousseff has made lower interest rates one of the top priorities of her government which is struggling to steer the economy back to the 4 percent-plus growth rates that made Brazil one of the world’s most attractive emerging markets in the last decade.

The central bank’s monetary policy committee, known as Copom, voted unanimously to lower the benchmark Selic rate 50 basis points from 9 percent, in line with market expectations.

“At this moment, Copom believes that the risks to the inflation outlook remain limited,” the bank said in a statement that accompanied the decision. The statement used the exact same language as the previous statement when the bank cut the Selic rate in April.

With Wednesday’s cut, the central bank has now lopped 400 basis points off the Selic rate since August 2011, when it surprised markets by starting an easing cycle despite widespread concerns at the time about surging consumer prices.

Inflation has eased since then with some help from a sluggish global economy, bringing the annual rate to well below the 6.5 percent ceiling of the central bank’s target range.

That has allowed the central bank to test the boundaries on interest rates, ushering in what some economists predict might be a new era of lower borrowing costs for Brazil.

The size of Wednesday’s rate cut marked a slowdown in the pace of easing after two straight reductions of 75 basis points in March and April. The central bank signaled after its April policy meeting that future rate cuts might be more cautious.

The previous low for the Selic was set in 2009, when the central bank in the administration of former President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva slashed the rate to 8.75 percent to fend off the global financial crisis.

Secret Greek Fund Revealed

Except it’s just about an ‘allowable entry’, not a ‘fund’.

The BOG, functionally a ‘branch’ of the ECB, just ‘accounts for’ negative member bank balances as loans.

Presumably on a ‘legally’ collateralized basis.

That’s what CB’s do in the normal course of business.

CB’s don’t ‘have funds’ in their currency of issue any more than the scorekeeper in a card game has any points.

Europe Shares Seen Higher; Secret Greek Fund Revealed

By Matthew West

May 22 (CNBC) — European shares were set to open higher on Tuesday as investors came to the conclusion that the markets were most likely over-sold and news emerged overnight of around 100 billion euros ($127 billion) of liquidity provided by the European Central Bank to the Greek central bank to prop up Greece’s financial system.

U.K.’s Quantitative Easing Has Worked, BOE’s Bean Writes in FT

We know part of the precise impact:
We know the $80 billion per year the Fed has been turning over to the Treasury would have otherwise remained in the economy.

U.K.’s Quantitative Easing Has Worked, BOE’s Bean Writes in FT

May 3 (Bloomberg) — Studies of the Federal Reserve’s large-scale asset purchases provide corroboration that quantitative easing has been effective, Bank of England Deputy Governor Charlie Bean writes in the Financial Times.


The precise impact of QE is uncertain and it’s “plausible that the effectiveness of the policy depends on the state of the economy,” Bean writes.

People who reject free lunches are fools: Liquidity trap – part II

Fiscal and monetary policy in a liquidity trap – part II

By Martin Wolf

Output is produced by work.
Work is a cost, not a benefit.
It is in that sense that there is no free lunch.

Might fiscal expansion be a free lunch? This is the question addressed in a thought-provoking paper “Fiscal Policy in a Depressed Economy”, March 2012, by Brad DeLong and Larry Summers, the most important conclusion of which is obvious, but largely ignored: the impact of fiscal expansion depends on the context. *

In normal times, with resources close to being fully utilised, the multiplier will end up very close to zero; in unusual times, such as the present, it could be large enough and the economic benefits of such expansion significant enough to pay for itself.

‘Paying for itself’ implies there is some real benefit to a lower deficit outcome vs a higher deficit outcome. With the govt deficit equal to the net financial assets of the non govt sectors, ‘Paying for itself’ implies there is a real benefit to the non govt sectors have fewer net financial assets.

In a liquidity trap fiscal retrenchment is penny wise, pound foolish.

I would say it’s penny foolish as well, as it directly reduces net financial assets of the non govt sectors with no economic or financial benefit to either the govt sector or the non govt sectors.

Indeed, relying on monetary policy alone is the foolish policy: if it worked, which it probably will not, it does so largely by expanding stretched private balance sheets even further.

Agreed.

As the authors note: “This paper examines the impact of fiscal policy in the context of a protracted period of high unemployment and output short of potential like that suffered by the United States and many other countries in recent years. We argue that, while the conventional wisdom rejecting discretionary fiscal policy is appropriate in normal times, discretionary fiscal policy where there is room to pursue it has a major role.”

There are three reasons for this.

1. First, the absence of supply constraints means that the multiplier is likely to be large.

Why is a large multiplier beneficial?

A smaller multiplier means the fiscal adjustment can be that much larger.

That is, the tax cuts and/or spending increases (depending on political preference) can be that much larger with smaller multipliers.

It is likely to be made even bigger by the fact that fiscal expansion may well raise expected inflation and so lower the real rate of interest, when the nominal rate is close to zero.

However the ‘real rate of interest’ is defined. Most would think CPI, which means the likes of tobacco taxes move the needle quite a bit.

And with the MMT understanding that the currency itself is in fact a simple public monopoly, and that any monopolist is necessarily ‘price setter’, the ‘real rate of interest’ concept doesn’t have a lot of relevance.

2. Second, even moderate hysteresis effects of such fiscal expansion, via increases in the likely level of future output, have big effects on the future debt burden.

Back to the errant notion of a public sector debt in its currency of issue being a ‘burden’.

3. Finally, today’s ultra-low real interest rates at both the short and long end of the curve, suggest that monetary policy is relatively ineffective, on its own.

Most central bank studies show monetary policy is always relatively ineffective.

The argument is set out in a simple example. “Imagine a demand-constrained economy where the fiscal multiplier is 1.5, and the real interest rate on long-term government debt is 1 per cent. Finally, assume that a $1 increase in GDP increased tax revenues and reduces spending by $0.33. Assume that the government is able to undertake a transitory increase in government spending, and then service the resulting debt in perpetuity, without any impact on risk-premia.

“Then the impact effect of an incremental $1.00 of spending is to raise the debt stock by $0.50. The annual debt service needed on this $0.50 to keep the real debt constant is $0.005. If reducing the size of the current downturn in production by $1.50 avoids a 1 per cent as large fall in future potential output – avoids a fall in future potential output of $0.0015 – then the incremental $1.00 of spending now augments future tax-period revenues by $0.005. And the fiscal expansion is self-financing.”

This is a very powerful result.

Yes, it tells you that the ‘automatic fiscal stabilizers’ must be minded lest the expansion reduce the govt deficit and, by identity, reduce the net financial assets of the non govt sectors to the point of aborting the economic recovery. Which, in fact, is how most expansion cycles end.

For the non govt sectors, net financial assets are the equity that supports the credit structure.

So when a recovery driven by a private sector credit expansion (which is how most are driven), causes tax liabilities to increase and transfer payments to decrease (aka automatic fiscal stabilizers)- reducing the govt deficit and by identity reducing the growth of private sector net financial assets- private sector/non govt leverage increases to the point where it’s unsustainable and it all goes bad again.

It rests on the three features of the present situation: high multipliers; low real interest rates; and the plausibility of hysteresis effects.

A table in the paper (Table 2.2) shows that at anything close to current real interest rates fiscal expansion is certain to pay for itself even with zero multiplier and hysteresis effects: it is a “no-brainer”.

And, if allowed to play out as I just described, the falling govt deficit will also abort the expansion.

Why is this? It is because the long-term real interest rate paid by the government is below even the most pessimistic view of the future growth rate of the economy. As I have argued on previous occasions, the US (and UK) bond markets are screaming: borrow.

The bond markets are screaming ‘the govt. Will never get its act together and cause the conditions for the central bank to raise rates.’

Of course, that is not an argument for infinite borrowing, since that would certainly raise the real interest rate substantially!

Infinite borrowing implies infinite govt spending.

Govt spending is a political decision involving the political choice of the ‘right amount’ of real goods and services to be moved from private to public domain.

Yet, more surprisingly, the expansion would continue to pay for itself even if the real interest rate were to rise far above the prospective growth rate, provided there were significantly positive multiplier and hysteresis effects.

I’d say it this way:
Providing increasing private sector leverage and credit expansion continues to offset declines in govt deficit spending.

Let us take an example: suppose the multiplier were one and the hysteresis effect were 0.1 – that is to say, the permanent loss of output were to be one tenth of the loss of output today. Then the real interest rate at which the government could obtain positive effects on its finances from additional stimulus would be as high as 7.4 per cent.

Thus, state the authors, “in a depressed economy with a moderate multiplier, small hysteresis effects, and interest rates in the historical range, temporary fiscal expansion does not materially affect the overall long-run budget picture.” Investors should not worry about it. Indeed, they should worry far more about the fiscal impact of prolonged recessions.

They shouldn’t worry about the fiscal impact in any case. The public sector deficit/debt is nothing more than the net financial assets of the non govt sectors. And these net financial assets necessarily sit as balances in the central bank, as either clearing balances (reserves) or as balances in securities accounts (treasury securities). And ‘debt management’ is nothing more than the shifting of balances between these accounts.

(and there are no grandchildren involved!)
(and all assuming floating exchange rate policy)

Are such numbers implausible? The answer is: not at all.

Multipliers above one are quite plausible in a depressed economy, though not in normal circumstances. This is particularly true when real interest rates are more likely to fall, than rise, as a result of expansion.

The ‘multipliers’ are nothing more than the flip side of the aggregate ‘savings desires’ of the non govt sectors. And the largest determinant of these savings desires is the degree of credit expansion/leverage.

Similarly, we know that recessions cause long-term economic costs. They lower investment dramatically: in the US, the investment rate fell by about 4 per cent of gross domestic product in the wake of the crisis. Businesses are unwilling to invest, not because of some mystical loss of confidence, but because there is no demand.

Again, we know that high unemployment has a permanent impact on workers, both young and old. The US, in particular, seems to have slipped into European levels of separation from the labour force: that is to say, the unemployment rate is quite low, given the sharp fall in the rate of employment. Workers have given up. This is a social catastrophe in a country in which work is effectively the only form of welfare for people of working age.

Not to mention the lost real output which over the last decade has to be far higher than the total combined real losses from all the wars in history.

Indeed, we can see hysteresis effects at work in the way in which forecasters, including official forecasters, mark down potential output in line with actual output: a self-fulfilling prophecy if ever there was one. This procedure has been particularly marked in the UK, where the Office for Budget Responsibility has more or less eliminated the notion that the UK is in a recession. Yet such effects are not God-given; they are man-chosen. They are the product of fundamentally misguided policies.

This is an important paper. It challenges complacent “do-nothingism” of policymakers, let alone the “austerians” who dominate policy almost everywhere. Policy-makers have allowed a huge financial crisis to impose a permanent blight on economies, with devastating social effects. It makes one wonder why the Obama administration, in which prof Summers was an influential adviser, did not do more, or at least argue for more, as many outsiders argued.

The private sector needs to deleverage.

It’s no coincidence that with a relatively constant trade deficit, private sector net savings, as measured by net financial $ assets, has increased by about the amount of the US budget deficit.

In other words, the $trillion+ federal deficits have added that much to domestic income and savings, thereby reducing private sector leverage.

However, as evidenced by the gaping output gap, for today’s credit conditions, it’s been not nearly enough.

The government can help by holding up the economy. It should do so. People who reject free lunches are fools.

Global themes

  • Austerity everywhere keeps domestic demand in check and export channels muted
  • Non govt credit expansion pretty much stone cold dead in the US and Europe
  • Rising oil energy prices subduing global aggregate demand
  • US federal deficit just about enough to muddle through with modest GDP growth
  • Rest of world public deficits also insufficient to close output gaps, including China which has calmed down considerably
  • Zero rate policies/QE/etc. in the US, Japan, and Europe doing their thing to keep aggregate demand down and inflation low as monetary authorities continue to get that causation backwards
  • All good for stocks and shareholders, not good for most people trying to work for a living
  • Europe still in slow motion train wreck mode, with psi bond tax risk keeping investors at bay and ECB waiting for things to get bad enough before intervening

So still looking to me like a case of

‘Because we fear becoming the next Greece, we continue to turn ourselves into the next Japan’

The only way out at this point is a private sector credit expansion, which, in the US, traditionally comes from housing, but doesn’t seem to be happening this time. Past cycles have seen it come from the sub prime expansion phase, the .com/y2k boom, the S&L expansion phase, and the emerging market lending boom.

But this time we’re being more careful of ‘bubbles’ (just like Japan has done for the last two decades). So I don’t see much hope there.

Still watching for the euro bond tax idea to surface, which I see as the immediate possibility of systemic risk, but no real sign yet.

Central bank gold buying

Cutting spending, hiking taxes, and no qualms about buying gold…

Gold up on central bank buying talk but outlook weak

By Frank Tang and Amanda Cooper

Three weeks of upbeat U.S. data have made investors more confident about the economy and less eager to hold gold as insurance against another slowdown. The resulting steep rise in benchmark 10-year U.S. Treasury yields has weighed on gold.

Central banks have also reportedly been active buyers of gold in recent weeks, having bought as much as 4 metric tons of metal, according to an industry source and theFinancial Times on Friday.

They were net buyers of gold last year for a second straight year with a 439.7 tonnes purchase in 2011. In the two decades prior to 2010, central banks as a group had consistently been net sellers of gold. Analysts said that talk of official-sector gold buying should bolster investor confidence as central banks tend to be very long-term owners of the precious metal.

LTRO birdie telling me maybe the BOJ gave the nod to its banks

Just a hunch now, but Italian, Spanish, and related bond yields began falling coincident with the first ECB LTRO. The question is why, as I saw no operative channel of consequence from ECB liquidity provision of 3 year funds on a floating rate basis to the term structure of rates.

So it seemed to me that also coincident to the LTRO was some entity giving the nod to its banks to buy those bonds, or some reason sellers of those bonds backed off.

I’m now thinking it may have been the BOJ giving the nod to its member banks to buy euro member debt denominated in euro and keep the fx risk on their books, with the assurance govt policy would keep the yen weak and guarantee the banks an fx profit.

We learned after the fact that Japan had been selling yen well before they announced their new weak yen stance. And having their banks buy euro member euro denominated debt directly weakens the yen vs the euro.

The timing of the events- the LTRO/yen sell off/yen policy change- is close enough to get my attention.

So Japan managed to weaken the yen and firm euro member debt prices all under the cover of the ECB LTRO operation which they gladly allowed to take the credit.

In any case, I don’t expect any more from this next LTRO than I expected from the last, but I am keeping a close eye on the yen.

oil