Chatter About the Fed/ECB CCY Swap Line

This one’s for the bloggers-

Dollar swap lines are functionally unsecured loans to foreign govts. that the Fed can do unilaterally. Congress only finds out well after the fact. Last time around they did $600 billion, including lending (unsecured) to nations Congress never would have approved.

The problem is the Fed Chairman insists they are secured because we get local currency deposits at the foreign central bank as collateral.

That’s like putting up your watch as collateral for a loan but you still wear it.

Chatter About the Fed/ECB CCY Swap Line
If reinstituted, it is a basic spot/forward FX trading line.

What this does is to give the ECB the power to lend USD in Europe. It
has 2 potential benefits:

1.Not all banks in Europe who require USD funding has access to the Fed
or the FF market

2.They don’t have to wait until NY opens if panic breaks out in Europe
over USD funding.

There is a third benefit. Politics. It let’s the market know that the
central banks are on the case, and the Fed doesn’t want to see the
FRA-OIS spread spin out of control.

what is gong on with swap spreads this am?

Fed also re opening swap lines to ECB – looks ready to do more unsecured dollar lending to them and maybe others.

They look to be doing what they did last time around to keep libor down – lend unsecured to bad credits. High risk but it does get rates down.

On Fri, Apr 30, 2010 at 12:23 PM, Jason wrote:

Confluence of events..


Month end bid for treasuries
Goldman stock down 14 and financial CDS wider creating some fears for financial sector
Greece flight to quality concerns going into the weekend

Fed to begin expanding the Term deposit facility which will remove excess cash and remove downward pressure on term LIBOR

LIBOR quoted for Monday as 35.375 / 35.5 +1

1y OIS-LIBOR 5 day chart:





Result

2y spreads leading the way wider +5 to 23.5

Still cheap though

Press Release
Release Date: April 30, 2010


For immediate release
The Federal Reserve Board has approved amendments to Regulation D (Reserve Requirements of Depository Institutions) authorizing the Reserve Banks to offer term deposits to institutions that are eligible to receive earnings on their balances at Reserve Banks. These amendments incorporate public comments on the proposed amendments to Regulation D that were announced on December 28, 2009.

Term deposits, which are deposits with specified maturity dates that are held by eligible institutions at Reserve Banks, will be offered through a Term Deposit Facility (TDF). Term deposits will be one of several tools that the Federal Reserve could employ to drain reserves when policymakers judge that it is appropriate to begin moving to a less accommodative stance of monetary policy. The development of the TDF is a matter of prudent planning and has no implication for the near-term conduct of monetary policy.

The amendments approved by the Board are a necessary step in the implementation of the TDF. As noted in the attached Federal Register notice, the Federal Reserve anticipates that it will conduct small-value offerings of term deposits under the TDF in coming months to ensure the effective operation of the TDF and to help eligible institutions to become familiar with the term-deposit program. More detailed information about the structure and operation of the TDF, including information on the steps necessary for eligible institutions to participate in the program, will be provided later.

The amendments will be effective 30 days after publication in the Federal Register, which is expected shortly.

BIS getting there (yet not fully)

Yes, his causation is off on the less important point of the central bank eliminating opportunity costs when in fact market forces eliminate opportunity cost as they express indifference levels to central bank rate policies.

But apart from that it’s very well stated and what we’ve been saying all along, thanks!!! The highlighted part is especially on message and hopefully becomes common knowledge.

Jaime Caruana, General Manager of the BIS says ‘unconventional
measures’ do not increase lending, nor are inflationary:

In fact, bank lending is determined by banks’ willingness to grant
loans, based on perceived risk-return trade-offs, and by the demand
for those loans. An expansion of reserves over and above the level
demanded for precautionary purposes, and/or to satisfy any reserve
requirement, need not give banks more resources to expand lending.
Financing the change in the asset side of the central bank balance
sheet through reserves rather than some other short-term instrument
like central bank or Treasury bills only alters the composition of the
liquid assets of the banking system. As noted, the two are very close
substitutes. As a result, the impact of variations in this composition
on bank behaviour may not be substantial.

This can be seen another way. Recall that in order to finance balance
sheet policy through an expansion of reserves the central bank has to
eliminate the opportunity cost of holding them. In other words, it
must either pay interest on reserves at the positive overnight rate
that it wishes to target, or the overnight rate must fall to the
deposit facility floor (or zero). In effect, the central bank has to
make bank reserves sufficiently attractive compared with other liquid
assets. This makes them almost perfect substitutes, in particular for
other short-term government paper. Reserves become just another type
of liquid asset among many. And because they earn the market return,
reserves represent resources that are no more idle than holdings of
Treasury bills.

(…) What about the concern that large expansions in bank reserves
will lead to inflation – the second issue? No doubt more accommodative
financial conditions resulting from central bank lending and asset
purchases, insofar as they stimulate aggregate demand, can generate
inflationary pressures. But the point I would like to make here is
that there is no additional inflationary effect coming from an
increase in reserves per se. When bank reserves are expanded as part
of balance sheet policies, they should be viewed as simply another
form of liquid asset that is comparable to short-term government
paper. Thus funding balance sheet policies with reserves should be no
more inflationary than, for instance, the issuance of short-term
central bank bills.


(…) Ultimately, any inflationary concerns associated with
monetisation should be mainly attributed to the monetary authorities’
accommodating fiscal deficits by refraining from raising rates. In
other words, it is not so much the financing of government spending
per se – be it in the form of bank reserves or short-term sovereign
paper – that is inflationary, but its accommodation at inappropriately
low interest rates for too long a time. Critically, these two aspects
are generally lumped together in policy debates because the prevailing
paradigm has failed to distinguish changes in interest rate from
changes in the amount of bank reserves in the system. One is seen as
the dual of the other: more reserves imply lower interest rates. As I
explained earlier, this is not the case. While both the central bank’s
balance sheet size and the level of reserves will reflect an
accommodating policy, neither serves as a summary measure of the
stance of policy.

Fed on social value of interbank market

Excellent! About 6 months ago I handed out my ‘proposals,’ and we have made the below point on many occasions. Looks like real progress!

>   
>   (email exchange)
>   
>   On Sun, Apr 25, 2010 at 5:43 AM, Andrea wrote:
>   
>   It seems that Fed tries hard to see value in the interbank market but
>   they are close to admit it has none?
>   

FROM DIVORCING MONEY FROM MONETARY POLICY,
For example, market participants must monitor the
creditworthiness of borrowers. If the overnight market were
substantially less active, such monitoring may not take place on
a regular basis; this in turn could make borrowing even harder
for a bank that finds itself short of funds. Such monitoring may
also play a socially valuable role in exposing banks to market
discipline. It is important to bear in mind, however, that the
market for overnight loans of reserves differs from other
markets in fundamental ways. As we discussed, reserves are not
a commodity that is physically scarce; they can be costlessly
produced by the central bank from other risk-free assets.
Moreover, there is no role for socially useful price discovery
in this market, because the central bank’s objective is to set a
particular price. Weighing the costs and benefits of a reduction
in market activity is therefore a nontrivial task and an
important area for future research.

Altman is back

America’s disastrous debt is Obama’s biggest test

By Roger Altman

April 21 (FT) — The global financial system is again transfixed by sovereign debt risks. This evokes bad memories of defaults and near-defaults among emerging nations such as Argentina, Russia and Mexico.

Yes, all fixed FX blowups.

But the real issue is not whether Greece or another small country might fail. Instead, it is whether the credit standing and currency stability of the world’s biggest borrower, the US, will be jeopardised by its disastrous outlook on deficits and debt.

This comp completely misses the fundamental difference between the two. The Fed is an arm of the US govt, while the ECB is not an arm of greece.

America’s fiscal picture is even worse than it looks. The non-partisan Congressional Budget Office just projected that over 10 years, cumulative deficits will reach $9,700bn and federal debt 90 per cent of gross domestic product – nearly equal to Italy’s.

Another apples/oranges comp. This is less than poor analysis.

Global capital markets are unlikely to accept that credit erosion. If they revolt, as in 1979,

There was no ‘revolt’ in regards to the US in 1979.

ugly changes in fiscal and monetary policy will be imposed on Washington. More than Afghanistan or unemployment, this is President Barack Obama’s greatest vulnerability.

His greatest vulnerability is listening to this nonsense, and not recognizing that taxes function to regulate aggregate demand, and not to raise revenue.

The unemployment rate is all the evidence needed, screaming there is a severe shortage of aggregate demand, and a payroll tax holiday would restore private sector sales by which employment immediately returns.

Instead, the admin is listening to this nonsense and working to take measures to tighten fiscal policy which will work to reduce aggregate demand.

How bad is the outlook? The size of the federal debt will increase by nearly 250 per cent over 10 years, from $7,500bn to $20,000bn. Other than during the second world war, such a rise in indebtedness has not occurred since recordkeeping began in 1792.

Point? Govt deficit spending adds back the demand lost because of ‘non govt’ savings desires for dollar financial assets.

The cumulative govt ‘debt’ equals and is the net financial equity- monetary savings- of the rest of us.

You could change the name on the deficit clock in nyc to the savings clock and use the same numbers.

It is so rapid that, by 2020, the Treasury may borrow about $5,000bn per year to refinance maturing debt and raise new money; annual interest payments on those borrowings will exceed all domestic discretionary spending and rival the defence budget. Unfortunately, the healthcare bill has little positive budget impact in this period.

That just means our net savings is rising and the interest payments are helping our savings rise.

In fact, treasury securities are nothing more than dollar savings accounts at the fed. Savers include us residents and non residents like the foreign countries that save in dollars.

Why is this outlook dangerous?

Because it leads to backwards policies by people who don’t get it.

Because dollar interest rates would be so high as to choke private investment and global growth.

There is no such thing.

First, rates are set by the fed.

Second, there is no imperative for the tsy to issue longer term securities or any securities at all.

Third, there is no econometric evidence high interest rates do that. In fact, because the nation is a net saver of the trillions called the national debt, higher rates increase interest income faster than the higher loan rates reduce it (bernanke, sacks, reinhart, 2004 fed paper).

It is Mr Obama’s misfortune to preside over this.

It’s his misfortune to be surrounded by people who don’t understand monetary operations. Otherwise we’d have been at full employment long ago.

The severe 2009-10 fiscal decline reflects a continuation of the Bush deficits and the lower revenue and countercyclical spending triggered by the recession. His own initiatives are responsible for only 15 per cent of the deterioration. Nonetheless, it is the Obama crisis now.

It’s the obama crisis because taxes remain far too high for the current level of govt spending and saving desires.

Now, the economy is too weak to withstand the contractionary impact of deficit reduction. Even the deficit hawks agree on that.

It’s too weak because the deficit is too small. And yes, making it smaller makes things worse.

In addition, Mr Obama has appointed a budget commission with a December deadline. Expectations for it are low and no moves can be made before 2011.

Yes, and then to cut social security and medicare!!!!

Yet, everyone already knows the big elements of a solution. The deficit/GDP ratio must be reduced by at least 2 per cent, or about $300bn in annual spending. It must include spending cuts, such as to entitlements,

Here you go!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

and new revenue. The revenues must come from higher taxes on income, capital gains and dividends or a new tax, such as a progressive value added tax.

Yes, all working to cut aggregate demand and weaken the economy.

It will be political and financial factors that determine which of three budget paths America now follows.

Yes, the backwards understanding by our leaders.

The first is the ideal. Next year, leaders adopt the necessary spending and tax changes, together with budget rules to enforce them, to reach, for example, a truly balanced budget by 2020. President Bill Clinton achieved a comparable legislative outcome in his first term. But America is more polarised today, especially over taxes.

Clinton was ‘saved’ by the unprecedented increase in private sector debt chasing impossible balance sheets of the dot com boom, which was expanding at 7% of GDP, driving the expansion even as fiscal was allowed to go into a 2% surplus, which drained that much financial equity, and ending in a crash when incomes weren’t able to keep up.

The second possible course is the opposite: government paralysis and 10 years of fiscal erosion. Debt reaches 90 per cent of GDP. Interest rates go much higher, but the world’s capital markets finance these needs without serious instability.

Japan is well over 200% (counting inter govt holdings) with the 10 year JGB at 1.35%. Interest rates are primarily a function of expectations of future fed rate settings, along with a few technicals.

History suggests a third outcome is the likely one: one imposed by global markets.

There is no history that suggests that, just misreadings of history.

Yes, there may be calm in currency and credit markets over the next year or two. But the chances that they would accept such a long-term fiscal slide are low. Here, the 1979 dollar crash is instructive.

A dollar crash, whatever that means, is a different matter from the funding issues he previously implied.

The Iranian oil embargo, stagflation and a weakening dollar were roiling markets. Amid this nervousness, President Jimmy Carter submitted his budget, incorporating a larger than expected deficit. This triggered a further, panicky fall in the dollar that destabilised markets. This forced Mr Carter to resubmit a tighter budget and the Fed to raise interest rates. Both actions harmed the economy and severely injured his presidency.

The problem was the policy response to the ‘dollar crash.’ rates went up because the fed raised them with a vote. Market forces aren’t a factor in the level of rates per se. They are part of the Fed’s reaction function, which is an entirely different matter.

America’s addiction to debt poses a similar threat now. To avoid an imposed and ugly solution, Mr Obama will have to invest all his political capital in a budget agreement next year. He will be advised that cutting spending and raising taxes is too risky for his 2012 re-election. But the alternative could be much worse.

So it’s all about avoiding a dollar crash?

So why are we pressing china to revalue their currency upward which means reducing the value of the dollar? Can’t have it both ways?

Altman was in the Clinton admin confirms they were in the ‘better lucky than good’ category.

Feel free to distribute, thanks.

ECB monetizing or not ?

>   
>   (email exchange)
>   
>   On Thu, Apr 15, 2010 at 3:29 PM, John wrote:
>   
>   Warren, I can’t tell from this article if the European Central Bank is
>   issuing new currency in exchange for national government bonds or not?
>   

This in fact is a very good article.

Yes, the ECB is funding its banks, and yes, they do accept the securities of the member nations as collateral.

However that funding is full recourse. If the bonds default the banks that own the securities take the loss.

The reason a bank funds its securities and other assets at the Central Bank is price. Banks fund themselves where they
are charged the lowest rates. And the Central Bank, the ECB in this case, sets the interbank lending rate by offering funds at its
target interest rate, as well as by paying something near it’s target rate on excess funds in the banking system. That is, through its various ‘intervention mechanisms’ the ECB effectively provides a bid and an offer for interbank funds.

In the banking system, however, loans ‘create’ deposits as a matter of accounting, so the total ‘available funds’ are always equal to the total funding needs of the banking system, plus or minus what are called ‘operating factors’ which are relatively small. These include changes in cash in circulation, uncleared checks, changes in various gov. account balances, etc.

This all means the banking system as a whole needs little if any net funding from the ECB. However, any one bank might need substantial funding from the ECB should other banks be keeping excess funds at the ECB. So what is happening is that banks who are having difficulty funding themselves at competitive rates immediately use the ECB for funding by posting ‘acceptable collateral’ to fund at that lower rate.

One reason a bank can’t get ‘competitive funding’ in the market place is its inability to attract depositors, generally due to risk perceptions. While bank deposits are insured, they are insured only by the national govts, which means Greek bank deposits are insured by Greece. So as Greek and other national govt. solvency comes into question, depositors tend to avoid those institutions, which drives them to fund at the ECB. (actually via their national cb’s who have accounts at the ECB, which is functionally the same as funding at the ECB)

As with most of today’s banking systems, liabilities are generally available in virtually unlimited quantities, and therefore regulation falls entirely on bank assets and capital considerations. As long as national govt securities are considered ‘qualifying assets’ and banks are allowed to secure funding via insured deposits of one form or another and the return on equity is competitive there is no numerical limit to how much the banking system can finance.

So in that sense the EU is in fact financially supporting unlimited credit expansion of the national govts. They know this, but don’t like it, as the moral hazard issue is extreme. Left alone, it becomes a race to the bottom where the national govt with the most deficit spending ‘wins’ in real terms even as the value of the euro falls towards 0. When the national govts were making ‘good faith efforts’ to contain deficits, allowing counter cyclical increases through ‘automatic stabilizers’ and not proactive increases, it all held together. However what Greece and others appear to have done is ‘call the bluff’ with outsize and growing deficits and debt to gdp levels, threatening the start (continuation?) of this ‘race to the bottom’ if they are allowed to continue.

The question then becomes how to limit the banking system’s ability to finance unlimited national govt. deficit spending. Hence talk of Greek securities not being accepted at the ECB. Other limits include the threat of downgraded bonds forcing banks to write down their capital and threaten their solvency. And once the banking system reaches ‘hard limits’ to what they can fund a system that’s already/necessarily a form ‘ponzi’ faces a collapse.

The other problem is that when the euro was on the way up due to portfolio shifts out of the dollar, many of those buyers of euro had to own national govt paper, as their is nothing equiv. to US Treasury securities or JGB’s, for example. That helped fund the national govs at lower rates during that period. That portfolio shifting has largely come to an end, making national govt funding more problematic.

The weakening euro and rising oil prices raises the risk of ‘inflation’ flooding in through the import and export channels. With a weak economy and national govt credit worthiness particularly sensitive to rising interest rates, the ECB may find itself in a bind, as it will tend to favor rate hikes as prices firm, yet recognize rate hikes could cause a financial collapse. And should a govt like Greece be allowed to default the next realization could be that Greek depositors will take losses, and, therefore, the entire euro deposit insurance lose credibility, causing depositors to take their funds elsewhere. But where? To national govt. or corporate debt? The problem is there is nowhere to go but actual cash, which has been happening. Selling euro for dollars and other currencies is also happening, weakening the euro, but that doesn’t reduce the quantity of euro deposits, even as it drives the currency down, though the ‘value’ of total deposits does decrease as the currency falls.

It’s all getting very ugly as it all threatens the value of the euro. The only scenario that theoretically helps the value of the euro is a national govt default, which does eliminate the euro denominated financial assets of that nation, but of course can trigger a euro wide deflationary debt collapse. The ‘support’ scenarios all weaken the euro as they support the expansion of euro denominated financial assets, to the point of triggering the inflationary ‘race to the bottom’ of accelerating debt expansion.

Bottom line, it’s all an ‘unstable equilibrium’ as we used to say in engineering classes 40 years ago, that could accelerate in either direction. My proposal for annual ECB distributions to member nations on a per capita basis reverses those dynamics, but it’s not even a distant consideration.

Where are ‘market forces’ taking the euro? Low enough to increase net exports sufficiently to supply the needed net euro financial assets to the euro zone, which will come from a drop in net financial assets of the rest of world net importing from the euro zone. This, too, can be a long, ugly ride.

As a final note, the IMF gets its euros from the euro zone, so using the IMF changes nothing.

Comments welcome!

The Next Global Problem: Portugal

By Peter Boone and Simon Johnson

Peter Boone is chairman of the charity Effective Intervention and a research associate at the Center for Economic Performance at the London School of Economics. He is also a principal in Salute Capital Management Ltd. Simon Johnson, the former chief economist at the International Monetary Fund, is the co-author of 13 Bankers.

April 15 (NYT) — The bailout of Greece, while still not fully consummated, has brought an eerie calm in European financial markets.

It is, for sure, a huge bailout by historical standards. With the planned addition of International Monetary Fund money, the Greeks will receive 18 percent of their gross domestic product in one year at preferential interest rates. This equals 4,000 euros per person, and will be spent in roughly 11 months.

Despite this eye-popping sum, the bailout does nothing to resolve the many problems that persist. Indeed, it probably makes the euro zone a much more dangerous place for the next few years.

Next on the radar will be Portugal. This nation has largely missed the spotlight, if only because Greece spiraled downward. But both are economically on the verge of bankruptcy, and they each look far riskier than Argentina did back in 2001 when it succumbed to default.

Portugal spent too much over the last several years, building its debt up to 78 percent of G.D.P. at the end of 2009 (compared with Greece’s 114 percent of G.D.P. and Argentina’s 62 percent of G.D.P. at default). The debt has been largely financed by foreigners, and as with Greece, the country has not paid interest outright, but instead refinances its interest payments each year by issuing new debt. By 2012 Portugal’s debt-to-G.D.P. ratio should reach 108 percent of G.D.P. if the country meets its planned budget deficit targets. At some point financial markets will simply refuse to finance this Ponzi game.

The main problem that Portugal faces, like Greece, Ireland and Spain, is that it is stuck with a highly overvalued exchange rate when it is in need of far-reaching fiscal adjustment.

For example, just to keep its debt stock constant and pay annual interest on debt at an optimistic 5 percent interest rate, the country would need to run a primary surplus of 5.4 percent of G.D.P. by 2012. With a planned primary deficit of 5.2 percent of G.D.P. this year (i.e., a budget surplus, excluding interest payments), it needs roughly 10 percent of G.D.P. in fiscal tightening.

It is nearly impossible to do this in a fixed exchange-rate regime — i.e., the euro zone — without vast unemployment. The government can expect several years of high unemployment and tough politics, even if it is to extract itself from this mess.

Neither Greek nor Portuguese political leaders are prepared to make the needed cuts. The Greeks have announced minor budget changes, and are now holding out for their 45 billion euro package while implicitly threatening a messy default on the rest of Europe if they do not get what they want — and when they want it.

The Portuguese are not even discussing serious cuts. In their 2010 budget, they plan a budget deficit of 8.3 percent of G.D.P., roughly equal to the 2009 budget deficit (9.4 percent). They are waiting and hoping that they may grow out of this mess — but such growth could come only from an amazing global economic boom.

While these nations delay, the European Union with its bailout programs — assisted by Jean-Claude Trichet’s European Central Bank — provides financing. The governments issue bonds; European commercial banks buy them and then deposit these at the European Central Bank as collateral for freshly printed money. The bank has become the silent facilitator of profligate spending in the euro zone.

Last week the European Central Bank had a chance to dismantle this doom machine when the board of governors announced new rules for determining what debts could be used as collateral at the central bank.

Some anticipated the central bank might plan to tighten the rules gradually, thereby preventing the Greek government from issuing too many new bonds that could be financed at the bank. But the bank did not do that. In fact, the bank’s governors did the opposite: they made it even easier for Greece, Portugal and any other nation to borrow in 2011 and beyond. Indeed, under the new lax rules you need only to convince one rating agency (and we all know how easy that is) that your debt is not junk in order to get financing from the European Central Bank.

Today, despite the clear dangers and huge debts, all three rating agencies are surely scared to take the politically charged step of declaring that Greek debt is junk. They are similarly afraid to touch Portugal.

So what next for Portugal?

Pity the serious Portuguese politician who argues that fiscal probity calls for early belt-tightening. The European Union, the European Central Bank and the Greeks have all proven that the euro zone nations have no threshold for pain, and European Union money will be there for anyone who wants it. The Portuguese politicians can do nothing but wait for the situation to get worse, and then demand their bailout package, too. No doubt Greece will be back next year for more. And the nations that “foolishly” already started their austerity, such as Ireland and Italy, must surely be wondering whether they too should take the less austere path.

There seems to be no logic in the system, but perhaps there is a logical outcome.

Europe will eventually grow tired of bailing out its weaker countries. The Germans will probably pull that plug first. The longer we wait to see fiscal probity established, at the European Central Bank and the European Union, and within each nation, the more debt will be built up, and the more dangerous the situation will get.

When the plug is finally pulled, at least one nation will end up in a painful default; unfortunately, the way we are heading, the problems could be even more widespread.

My alternative proposal on trade with China

We can have BOTH low priced imports AND good jobs for all Americans

Attorney General Richard Blumenthal has urged US Treasury Secretary Geithner to take legal action to force China to let its currency appreciate. As stated by Blumenthal: “By stifling its currency, China is stifling our economy and stealing our jobs. Connecticut manufacturers have bled business and jobs over recent years because of China’s unconscionable currency manipulation and unfair market practices.”

The Attorney General is proposing to create jobs by lowering the value of the dollar vs. the yuan (China’s currency) to make China’s products a lot more expensive for US consumers, who are already struggling to survive. Those higher prices then cause us to instead buy products made elsewhere, which will presumably means more American products get produced and sold. The trade off is most likely to be a few more jobs in return for higher prices (also called inflation), and a lower standard of living from the higher prices.

Fortunately there is an alternative that allows the US consumer to enjoy the enormous benefits of low cost imports and also makes good jobs available for all Americans willing and able to work. That alternative is to keep Federal taxes low enough so Americans have enough take home pay to buy all the goods and services we can produce at full employment levels AND everything the world wants to sell to us. This in fact is exactly what happened in 2000 when unemployment was under 4%, while net imports were $380 billion. We had what most considered a ‘red hot’ labor market with jobs for all, as well as the benefit of consuming $380 billion more in imports than we exported, along with very low inflation and a high standard of living due in part to the low cost imports.

The reason we had such a good economy in 2000 was because private sector debt grew at a record 7% of GDP, supplying the spending power we needed to keep us fully employed and also able to buy all of those imports. But as soon as private sector debt expansion reached its limits and that source of spending power faded, the right Federal policy response would have been to cut Federal taxes to sustain American spending power. That wasn’t done until 2003- two long years after the recession had taken hold. The economy again improved, and unemployment came down even as imports increased. However, when private sector debt again collapsed in 2008, the Federal government again failed to cut taxes or increase spending to sustain the US consumer’s spending power. The stimulus package that was passed almost a year later in 2009 was far too small and spread out over too many years. Consequently, unemployment continued to rise, reaching an unthinkable high of 16.9% (people looking for full time work who can’t find it) in March 2010.

The problem is we are conducting Federal policy on the mistaken belief that the Federal government must get the dollars it spends through taxes, and what it doesn’t get from taxes it must borrow in the market place, and leave the debts for our children to pay back. It is this errant belief that has resulted in a policy of enormous, self imposed fiscal drag that has devastated our economy.

My three proposals for removing this drag on our economy are:

1. A full payroll tax (FICA) holiday for employees and employers. This increases the take home pay for people earning $50,000 a year by over $300 per month. It also cuts costs for businesses, which means lower prices as well as new investment.

2. A $500 per capita distribution to State governments with no strings attached. This means $1.75 billion of Federal revenue sharing to the State of Connecticut to help sustain essential public services and reduce debt.

3. An $8/hr national service job for anyone willing and able to work to facilitate the transition from unemployment to private sector employment as the pickup in sales from my first two proposals quickly translates into millions of new private sector jobs.

Because the right level of taxation to sustain full employment and price stability will vary over time, it’s the Federal government’s job to use taxation like a thermostat- lowering taxes when the economy is too cold, and considering tax increases only should the economy ‘over heat’ and get ‘too good’ (which is something I’ve never seen in my 40 years).

For policy makers to pursue this policy, they first need to understand what all insiders in the Fed (Federal Reserve Bank) have known for a very long time- the Federal government (not State and local government, corporations, and all of us) never actually has nor doesn’t have any US dollars. It taxes by simply changing numbers down in our bank accounts and doesn’t actually get anything, and it spends simply by changing numbers up in our bank accounts and doesn’t actually use anything up. As Federal Reserve Chairman Bernanke explained in to Scott Pelley on ’60 minutes’ in May 2009:

(PELLEY) Is that tax money that the Fed is spending?
(BERNANKE) It’s not tax money. The banks have– accounts with the Fed, much the same way that you have an account in a commercial bank. So, to lend to a bank, we simply use the computer to mark up the size of the account that they have with the Fed.

Therefore, payroll tax cuts do NOT mean the Federal government will go broke and run out of money if it doesn’t cut Social Security and Medicare payments. As the Fed Chairman correctly explained, operationally, spending is not revenue constrained.

We know why the Federal government taxes- to regulate the economy- but what about Federal borrowing? As you might suspect, our well advertised dependence on foreigners to buy US Treasury securities to fund the Federal government is just another myth holding us back from realizing our economic potential.


Operationally, foreign governments have ‘checking accounts’ at the Fed called ‘reserve accounts,’ and US Treasury securities are nothing more than savings accounts at the same Fed. So when a nation like China sells things to us, we pay them with dollars that go into their checking account at the Fed. And when they buy US Treasury securities the Fed simply transfers their dollars from their Fed checking account to their Fed savings account. And paying back US Treasury securities is nothing more than transferring the balance in China’s savings account at the Fed to their checking account at the Fed. This is not a ‘burden’ for us nor will it be for our children and grand children. Nor is the US Treasury spending operationally constrained by whether China has their dollars in their checking account or their savings accounts. Any and all constraints on US government spending are necessarily self imposed. There can be no external constraints.


In conclusion, it is a failure to understand basic monetary operations and Fed reserve accounting that caused the Democratic Congress and Administration to cut Medicare in the latest health care law, and that same failure of understanding is now driving well intentioned Americans like Atty General Blumenthal to push China to revalue its currency. This weak dollar policy is a misguided effort to create jobs by causing import prices to go up for struggling US consumers to the point where we buy fewer Chinese products. The far better option is to cut taxes as I’ve proposed, to ensure we have enough take home pay to be able to buy all that we can produce domestically at full employment, plus whatever imports we want to buy from foreigners at the lowest possible prices, and return America to the economic prosperity we once enjoyed.

Found one buyer of euro- Swiss Nat Bank

Seems they are willing to take the credit risk to support their exporters at the expense of the macro economy, rather than cut taxes to sustain domestic demand:

(Dow Jones) — A Swiss National Bank official reiterated Sunday that the central bank will act decisively to prevent excessive appreciation of the Swiss franc against the euro, adding the central bank is taking into account the development of the economy in its entirety.