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BoJ Gov Shirakawa – Japan’s Fiscal Situation “Very Severe”

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Because they think they could be the next Greece they *are* Japan.

BOJ’s Shirakawa Says Japan’s Fiscal Situation Is ’Very Severe’

By Mayumi Otsuma

March 23 (Bloomberg) — Bank of Japan Governor Masaaki Shirakawa said that while Japan’s fiscal situation is “very severe,” investors’ trust in the country’s policy makers is keeping bond yields low. He spoke in parliament today in Tokyo.

Japan Mulls Postwar-Style Reconstruction Agency, Adds Cash

By Takashi Hirokawa and Keiko Ujikane

March 23 (Bloomberg) — Japan may set up a reconstruction agency to oversee earthquake repairs, while data showed the central bank pumped record liquidity into lenders, as the nation grappled with its worst disaster since World War II.

Underwriting Bonds

“If a central bank starts to underwrite government bonds, there may be no problems at first, but it would lead to a limitless expansion of currency issuance, spur sharp inflation and yield a big blow to people’s lives and economic activities,” as has happened in the past, Shirakawa said.

By law, the central bank can directly buy JGBs only in extraordinary circumstances with the permission of the Diet. Vice Finance Minister Fumihiko Igarashi said in parliament that the government needed to be “cautious” in considering whether to have the BOJ make direct purchases.

Bond sales, cuts to other spending and tax measures could pay for reconstruction, Economic and Fiscal Policy Minister Kaoru Yosano said yesterday. Morgan Stanley MUFG Securities Co. analysts led by Robert Feldman in Tokyo wrote in a note this week that policy makers will likely implement “several” spending packages of 10 trillion yen or more.

Loan Programs

Fiscal spending won’t be the only channel for stimulus, according to Chotaro Morita, chief strategist at Barclays Capital Japan Ltd. in Tokyo.

“We expect the utilization of government lending” vehicles such as the Government Housing Loan Corporation and Finance Corporation for Municipal Governments, as was done in the wake of the 1995 Kobe earthquake, Morita wrote in a report to clients yesterday. This would help reduce the increase in government-bond issuance, he said.

In the wake of the devastation of World War II, Japan’s government set up the Economic Stabilization Board in August 1946. Among its duties was to ration commodities and oversee the revival of the nation’s industries.

To maintain short-term financial stability, BOJ policy makers have added emergency cash every business day since the quake. Lenders’ current-account balances at the central bank yesterday exceeded the 36.4 trillion yen record set in March 2004, when officials were implementing so-called quantitative easing measures to counter deflation. Deposits have climbed from about 17.6 trillion yen on March 10.

Japan Forecasts Earthquake Damage May Swell to $309 Billion

By Keiko Ujikane

March 23 (Bloomberg) — Japan’s government estimated the damage from this month’s record earthquake and tsunami at as much as 25 trillion yen ($309 billion), an amount almost four times the hit imposed by Hurricane Katrina on the U.S.

The destruction will push down gross domestic product by as much as 2.75 trillion yen for the year starting April 1, today’s report showed. The figure, about 0.5 percent of the 530 trillion yen economy, reflects a decline in production from supply disruptions and damage to corporate facilities without taking into account the effects of possible power outages.

The figures are the first gauge of the scale of rebuilding Prime Minister Naoto Kan’s government will face after the quake killed more than 9,000 people. Japan may set up a reconstruction agency to oversee the rebuilding effort and the central bank has injected record cash to stabilize financial markets.

Damages will probably amount to between 16 trillion yen and 25 trillion yen, today’s report said. It covers destruction to infrastructure in seven prefectures affected by the disaster, including damages to nuclear power facilities north of Tokyo.

Wider implications on the economy, including how radiation will affect food and water supply, are not included in the estimate.

Bank of Japan board member Ryuzo Miyao said today that it may take more time to overcome the damage of the quake than it did after the 1995 disaster in Kobe, western Japan.

Power Shortage

Tokyo’s power supply may fall 20,500 megawatts short of summer demand, or 34 percent less than the peak consumption last year, according to figures from Tokyo Electric Power Co. The utility is capable of supplying 37,500-megawatts and plans to add about 2,000 megawatts of thermal generation by the end of this month, company spokesman Naoyuki Matsumoto said by telephone today.

The government had previously projected growth of 1.5 percent for the year starting April 1 after growing an estimated 3.1 percent this year.

Bank of America Merrill Lynch cut its GDP projection for fiscal 2011 to 1 percent from 1.7 percent. RBS Securities and Nomura Securities Co. have also cut their forecasts while noting that the economy will still expand because the rebuilding will spur demand and help offset damage on growth in the period.

Rebuilding efforts in fiscal 2011 could push up GDP by 5 trillion yen to 7.75 trillion yen, the government said today.

Japan’s growth will return to normal “very soon” as reconstruction work starts, Justin Lin, the World Bank’s chief economist, said in Hong Kong today. At the same time, some are worried the boost won’t come soon enough.

Biggest Concern

“My biggest concern is that a positive impact from reconstruction may take a while to materialize,” said Akiyoshi Takumori, chief economist at Sumitomo Mitsui Asset Management Co. in Tokyo. “This earthquake and tsunami destroyed infrastructure and that will delay a recovery in production, a major driving force for the economy.”

The government maintained its assessment of the economy for March as the economic indicators released before the earthquake showed exports and production rebounding, while also voicing “concern” about the impact of the temblor on the economy.

“Although the Japanese economy is turning to pick up, its ability to self-sustain itself is weak,” the Cabinet Office said in a monthly report.

The U.S. National Hurricane Center in August 2006 calculated the damage of Hurricane Katrina, which slammed into New Orleans the year before, at $81 billion.

Future assessments will need to address damage to much of the northeast’s economy, and the disruptions to electricity and distribution systems that’s spread south to Tokyo and beyond.

Toyota Motor Corp. said yesterday it will halt car assembly in Japan through March 26. Sony Corp. said it shut five more plants.

Export Decline

Koji Miyahara, president of the Japanese Shipowners’ Association, said today exports may decline for six to 12 months after the earthquake, adding that the disaster won’t affect the industry in the longer term as reconstruction efforts take hold.

Kan is now faced with the challenge of finding ways to pay for the damage to the economy. BOJ Governor Masaaki Shirakawa has reiterated a reluctance to underwrite debt from the government and said today that nation’s fiscal situation is “very severe.”

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Japan- economic ramifications

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Nothing much to say here about the financial aspects. Need to see how they react.

Best I can tell this doesn’t effect the world economy all that much.

Oil demand may initially fall some, due to a temporary reduction in consumption and maybe a refinery shut down. And domestic demand in general may fall until the rebuilding starts.

The power lost by the nuclear plants shutting down may amount to maybe 1-2% of total electric power consumption, and will be replaced but a combo of different sources.

Replacing the nuclear plants will cost something but not a lot in the scheme of things, and the new ones are even safer than the older ones, which seem to have help up reasonably well, especially considering the extreme stresses.

Govt deficit spending may go up by a small % of GDP as will the spending of insurance company and other private reserves.
And insurance companies then replenishing their reserves does the reverse.

I’d guess they govt will direct most of the rebuilding contracts to domestic companies.

I don’t see anything that makes the yen stronger?

Japan should have more than adequate resources of all types immediately available as emergency services, shouldn’t need any help from anyone, though for political purpose they will certainly accept it.

They’ve been saying for years there’s nothing left for govt to buy, so they must have thousands of emergency helicopters, millions of emergency temporary housing trailers, etc. etc. ready to go?

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A few Boehnalities and other notables on the US going broke

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Cross currents of right and wrong but always for the wrong reasons.

Bonds Show Why Boehner Saying We’re Broke Is Figure of Speech

By David J. Lynch

March 7 (Bloomberg) — House Speaker John Boehner routinely offers this diagnosis of the U.S.’s fiscal condition: “We’re broke; Broke going on bankrupt,” he said in a Feb. 28 speech in Nashville.

Boehner’s assessment dominates a debate over the federal budget that could lead to a government shutdown. It is a widely shared view with just one flaw: It’s wrong.

“The U.S. government is not broke,” said Marc Chandler, global head of currency strategy for Brown Brothers Harriman & Co. in New York. “There’s no evidence that the market is treating the U.S. government like it’s broke.”

Wrong reason! Broke implies not able to spend.

The US spends by crediting member bank accounts at the Fed, and taxes by debiting member bank accounts at the Fed.

It never has nor doesn’t have any dollars.

The U.S. today is able to borrow at historically low interest rates, paying 0.68 percent on a two-year note that it had to offer at 5.1 percent before the financial crisis began in 2007.

That’s simply a function of where the Fed, a agent of Congress, has decided to set rates, and market perceptions of where it may set rates in the future. Solvency doesn’t enter into it.

Financial products that pay off if Uncle Sam defaults aren’t attracting unusual investor demand. And tax revenue as a percentage of the economy is at a 60-year low, meaning if the government needs to raise cash and can summon the political will, it could do so.

All taxing does is debit member bank accounts. The govt doesn’t actually ‘get’ anything.

To be sure, the U.S. confronts long-term fiscal dangers.

For example???

Over the past two years, federal debt measured against total economic output has increased by more than 50 percent and the White House projects annual budget deficits continuing indefinitely.

So?

“If an American family is spending more money than they’re making year after year after year, they’re broke,” said Michael Steel, a spokesman for Boehner.

So?
What does that have to do with govts ability to credit accounts at its own central bank?

$1.6 Trillion Deficit

A person, company or nation would be defined as “broke” if it couldn’t pay its bills, and that is not the case with the U.S. Despite an annual budget deficit expected to reach $1.6 trillion this year, the government continues to meet its financial obligations, and investors say there is little concern that will change.

Still, a rhetorical drumbeat has spread that the U.S. is tapped out. Republicans, including Representative Ron Paul of Texas, chairman of the House domestic monetary policy subcommittee, and Fox News commentator Bill O’Reilly, have labeled the U.S. “broke” in recent days.

Chris Christie, the Republican governor of New Jersey, said in a speech last month that the Medicare program is “going to bankrupt us.” Julian Robertson, chairman of Tiger Management LLC in New York, told The Australian newspaper March 2: “we’re broke, broker than all get out.”

A similar claim was even made Feb. 28 by comedian Jon Stewart, the host of “The Daily Show” on Comedy Central.

So much for their legacies.

Cost of Insuring Debt

Financial markets dispute the political world’s conclusion. The cost of insuring for five years a notional $10 million in U.S. government debt is $45,830, less than half the cost in February 2009, at the height of the financial crisis, according to data provider CMA data. That makes U.S. government debt the fifth safest of 156 countries rated and less likely to suffer default than any major economy, including every member of the
G20.

There are two factors in default insurance. Ability to pay and willingness to pay. While the US always has the ability to pay, Congress does not always show a united willingness to pay. Hence the actual default risk.

Creditors regard Venezuela, Greece and Argentina as the three riskiest countries. Buying credit default insurance on a notional $10 million of those nations’ debt costs $1.2 million, $950,000 and $665,000 respectively.

“I think it’s very misleading to call a country ‘broke,'” said Nariman Behravesh, chief economist for IHS Global Insight in Lexington, Massachusetts. “We’re certainly not bankrupt like Greece.”

In any case, the euro zone member nations put themselves in the fiscal position of US states when they joined the euro.

That means a state like Illinois could be the next Greece, but not the US govt.

Less Likely to Default

CMA prices for credit insurance show that global investors consider it more likely that France, Japan, China, the United Kingdom, Australia or Germany will default than the U.S.

Pacific Investment Management Co., which operates the largest bond fund, the $239 billion Total Return Fund, sees so little risk of a U.S. default it may sell other investors insurance against the prospect. Andrew Balls, Pimco managing director, told reporters Feb. 28 in London that the chances the U.S. would not meet its obligations were “vanishingly small.”

Presumably a statement with regard to willingness of Congress to pay.

George Magnus, senior economic adviser for UBS Investment Bank in London, says the U.S. dollar’s status as the global economy’s unit of account means the U.S. can’t go broke.

That has nothing to do with it.

“You have the reserve currency,” Magnus said. “You can print as much as you need. So there’s no question all debts will be repaid.”

Any nation can do that with its own currency

The current concerns over debt contrast with the views of founding father Alexander Hamilton, the nation’s first Treasury secretary. At Hamilton’s urging, the federal government in 1790 absorbed the Revolutionary War debts of the states and issued new government securities in about the same total amount.

Alexander Hamilton

Unlike today’s debt critics, Hamilton “had no intention of paying off the outstanding principal of the debt,” historian Gordon S. Wood wrote in “Empire of Liberty: A History of the Early Republic 1789-1815.”

Instead, by making regular interest payments on the debt, Hamilton established the U.S. government as “the best credit risk in the world” and drew investors’ loyalties to the federal government and away from the states, wrote Wood, who won a Pulitzer Prize for a separate history of the colonial period.

Far be it from me to argue with a Pulitzer Prize winner…

From Oct. 1, 2008, the beginning of the 2009 fiscal year, through the current year, which ends Sept. 30, 2011, the U.S. will have added more than $4.3 trillion of debt. Despite White House forecasts of an additional $2.4 trillion of debt over the next three fiscal years, investors’ appetite for Treasury securities shows little sign of abating.

It’s just a reserve drain- get over it!

Govt spending credits member bank reserve accounts at the Fed

Tsy securities exist as securities accounts at the Fed.

‘Going into debt’ entails nothing more than the Fed debiting Fed reserve accounts and crediting Fed securities accounts and ‘paying off the debt’ is nothing more than debiting securities accounts and crediting reserve accounts

No grandchildren involved.

Longer-Term Debt

In addition to accepting low yields on two-year notes, creditors are willing to lend the U.S. money for longer periods at interest rates that are below long-term averages. Ten-year U.S. bonds carry a rate of 3.5 percent, compared with an average 5.4 percent since 1990. And U.S. debt is more attractive than comparable securities from the U.K., which has moved aggressively to rein in government spending. U.K. 10-year bonds offer a 3.6 percent yield.

“You are never broke as long as there are those who will buy your debt and lend money to you,” said Edward Altman, a finance professor at New York University’s Stern School of Business who created the Z-score formula that calculates a company’s likelihood of bankruptcy.

Who also completely misses the point.

Any doubts traders had about the solvency of the U.S. would immediately be reflected in the markets, a fact noted by James Carville, a former adviser to President Bill Clinton, after he saw how bond investors could determine the success or failure of economic policy.

No they can’t.

“I used to think if there was reincarnation, I wanted to come back as the president or the Pope or a .400 baseball hitter,” Carville said. “But now I want to come back as the bond market. You can intimidate everyone.”

Only those who don’t know any better.

Republican Dissenters

Republican assertions that the U.S. is “broke” are shorthand for a complex fiscal situation, and some in the party acknowledge the claim isn’t accurate.

“To say your debts exceed your income is not ‘broke,'” said Tony Fratto, former White House and Treasury Department spokesman in the George W. Bush administration.

The U.S. government nonetheless faces a daunting gap between its expected financial resources

It’s not about ‘financial resources’ when it comes to a govt that never has nor doesn’t have any dollars, and just changes numbers in our accounts when it spends and taxes

and promised future outlays. Fratto said the Obama administration’s continued accumulation of debt risked a future crisis, as most major economies also face growing debt burdens.

The burden is that of making data entries.

In the nightmare scenario, a crush of countries competing to simultaneously sell IOUs to global investors could bid up the yield on government debt and compel overleveraged countries such as the U.S. to abruptly slash public spending.

It could only compel leaders who didn’t know how it all worked to do that.

Not selling the debt simply means the dollars stay in reserve accounts at the Fed and instead of being shifted by the Fed to securities accounts. Why would anyone who knew how it worked care which account the dollars were in? Especially when spending has nothing, operationally, to do with those accounts.

Fratto dismissed the markets’ current calm, noting that until the European debt crisis erupted early last year, investors had priced German and Greek debt as near equivalents.

“Markets can make mistakes,” Fratto said.

So can he. That all applies to the US states, not the federal govt.

$9.4 Trillion Outstanding

If recent budgetary trends continue unchanged, the U.S. risks a fiscal day of reckoning, slower growth or both.

No it doesn’t.

Altman notes that the U.S. debt outstanding is “enormous.” As of the end of 2010, debt held by the public was $9.4 trillion or 63 percent of gross domestic product — roughly half of the corresponding figures for Greece (126.7 percent) and Japan (121 percent) and well below countries such as Italy (116 percent), Belgium (96.2 percent) and France (78.1 percent).

Once a country’s debt-to-GDP ratio exceeds 90 percent, median annual economic growth rates fall by 1 percent, according to economists Kenneth Rogoff and Carmen Reinhart.

Wrong, that’s for convertible currency/fixed exchange rate regimes, not nations like the US, Uk, and Japan which have non convertible currencies and floating exchange rates.

The Congressional Budget Office warns that debt held by the public will reach 97 percent of GDP in 10 years if certain tax breaks are extended rather than allowed to expire next year and if Medicare payments to physicians are held at existing levels rather than reduced as the administration has proposed.

So???

AAA Rating

For now, Standard & Poor’s maintains a stable outlook on its top AAA rating on U.S. debt, assuming the government will “soon reveal a credible plan to tighten fiscal policy.” Debate over closing the budget gap thus far has centered on potential spending reductions. S&P says a deficit-closing plan “will require both expenditure and revenue measures.”

Measured against the size of the economy, U.S. federal tax revenue is at its lowest level since 1950. Tax receipts in the 2011 fiscal year are expected to equal 14.4 percent of GDP, according to the White House. That compares with the 40-year average of 18 percent, according to the Congressional Budget Office. So if tax receipts return to their long-term average amid an economic recovery, about one-third of the annual budget deficit would disappear.

Likewise, individual federal income tax rates have declined sharply since the top marginal rate peaked at 94 percent in 1945. The marginal rate — which applies to income above a numerical threshold that has changed over time — was 91 percent as late as 1963 and 50 percent in 1986. For 2011, the top marginal rate is 35 percent on income over $373,650 for individuals and couples filing jointly.

Not Overtaxed

Americans also aren’t overtaxed compared with residents of other advanced nations. In a 28-nation survey, only Chile and Mexico reported a lower total tax burden than the U.S., according to the Organization for Economic Development and Cooperation.

In 2009, taxes of all kinds claimed 24 percent of U.S. GDP, compared with 34.3 percent in the U.K., 37 percent in Germany and 48.2 percent in Denmark, the most heavily taxed OECD member.

“By the standard of U.S. history, by the standard of other countries — by the standard of where else are we going to get the money — increased tax revenues have to be a part of the solution,” said Jeffrey Frankel, an economist at Harvard University who advises the Federal Reserve Banks of Boston and New York.

So much for his legacy.

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Excellent post on the MMT controversy

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Straw Men (And Women)

By Peter Cooper

This post is for all the MMT foot soldiers out there in cyberspace, including myself and most readers (prominent MMT economists who are kind enough to drop in from time to time excepted, of course).

Come on, we know who we are. Battling it out in diverse message forums, matching wits with fellow participants who, judging from their arguments, mostly appear to read our posts with their eyes shut and their fingers in their ears to block out the sounds of our linked video presentations. This navel-gazing exercise may seem self-indulgent to the crustier MMT old-timers among us, but, hey, rationalize it, we deserve it!

The post is also for readers who have not yet made up their minds about MMT. Think of this as a small taste of the kind of self-congratulatory back slapping you too will be able to enjoy at heteconomist if you decide to join the ranks of the foot soldiers. Enjoy! You also deserve it!

Straw Men in Cyberspace

On a private message forum I often visit, a regular participant – who is very bright, and a good contributor on many topics – recently posted a criticism of the MMT position on budget deficits that went something like this:

Budget deficits increase demand in some areas and decrease it in others. To illustrate the point I will show an extreme example. Say Honest Annie has $10,000 in savings. Mr Lucky is given $100,000,000 to stimulate the economy. Oh look, now Annie can produce more goods because Mr Lucky can afford to buy them. Of course, look at poor Annie’s real disposition. This new demand comes with the devaluation of her hard-earned savings. What is changing is that now she has to produce more to be able to afford more goods. The government has tricked her into having to work more because her savings have been devalued due to inflation. Sure, Mr Lucky is happy because Annie is producing more goods for him, but there are two sides to the coin.

Clearly the government should not adopt such a ridiculous policy in which it randomly gives one person $100 million in an economy where a typical person has savings of $10,000. But even in terms of the ludicrous example, the poster’s logic is lacking.

If Mr Lucky spent some of the money to buy stuff from Honest Annie, and she had the available time and resources to respond to the additional demand at current prices, she would receive some of Mr Lucky’s money in payment and also have increased spending power to purchase output from Mr Lucky or somebody else. The deficit expenditure can increase demand in some areas without reducing it in others provided the economy is operating below full capacity.

The question is whether there are idle resources that people would willingly put to use if there was demand for the resulting output, and whether this additional output could be supplied in a non-inflationary manner.

No one in the MMT camp is suggesting the government should net spend more than is necessary to enable the purchase of potential output at current prices.

The author of the example is influenced by the Austrian school, so some of his reasoning is defensible within that framework. In particular, as I discussed here and here, the Austrian definition of inflation is different from the one used by other economists. For everyone but the Austrians, inflation means a persistent rise in the general price level (the weighted average of all prices of final goods and services), not an expansion of broader money per se.

This can lead to differences between Austrians and non-Austrians in their assessments of whether inflation is occurring. If there is a rise in general prices, there will typically be an expansion of broader money to accommodate it unless real potential output shrinks due to a supply shock. In this case, both Austrians and non-Austrians alike will observe inflation. But it is possible for the broader money supply to expand (inflation for Austrians) without general prices rising (no inflation for other economists) whenever the economy is operating below full capacity. This means that from the Austrian perspective, it makes sense to suggest deficit expenditure will reduce the value of money even if, for other economists, there is no inflation.

Differences such as this can be discussed as part of a healthy debate. What is more annoying is the practice of creating straw-man arguments, such as the suggestion that MMT economists are advocating mindless spending out of all proportion to the actual demand deficiency or without any thought to the allocation of that net spending. The tactic often appears to be deliberate, in that there is a wilful misinterpretation of the argument to make it easier to ridicule or criticize. No matter how many times the point is clarified, the wilful (and convenient) misinterpretation will be repeated as if nothing has changed. The result is a discussion that fails to advance beyond irrelevant mischaracterizations and attempts to set (reset) the record straight.

As a practical matter for foot soldiers, we need to balance the need to deal with such mischaracterizations with the desire to develop the argument further for those not thrown by the mischaracterizations or to present the same argument elsewhere. At some point, it is probably best to assume that intelligent readers have been provided with enough clarification to make up their own minds about the merits of the straw-man argument, and just get on with advancing the discussion, or if the point has been made, move on to other forums. There is no need to convince every person in every forum.

MMT – and heterodox approaches, in general – seem more susceptible to this kind of straw-man treatment because its proponents have to make the running. In debates with critics or skeptics, the aim of the MMT proponent is usually to explain why the current dominant understanding of the economy is lacking, and why an alternative may offer an improvement in understanding.

A skeptic who is only interested in a better understanding of the economy has no motive to mischaracterize MMT arguments. The motive for engaging in discussion for such a person would be to understand the approach to enable an informed assessment of it. But when a skeptic or critic is more interested in defending a preconceived view of the world – possibly for psychological, political, or careerist reasons – their motive may not be to understand but to obfuscate, sidetrack, or otherwise hold up the discussion in ways that at least muddies the waters enough to make it difficult for others, who may be trying to understand without prejudging positions, to separate nonsense from valid argument, especially if they do not have a training in economics.

Consider journalists who write on economic matters, for example. In a way, it is hard to blame them for erring on the side of the orthodoxy when in doubt if they don’t have sufficient confidence in their own understanding of the subject. When in doubt, it is surely safer to go with the view of a Nobel Prize recipient or Professor from an Ivy League university over the views of a heterodox economist, even if the heterodox position seems to make more sense.

Opponents of the heterodox position can take advantage of this, knowing that they do not have to win arguments, or even engage in them in many cases, provided there is sufficient doubt over the heterodox position, whether because of perception, status, obfuscation or deliberately disruptive tactics, which on the internet can of course be done anonymously.

Straw Men in Academia

Straw-man argumentation is not limited to the orthodoxy or the internet. Heterodox schools use this tactic in disputes among themselves. For example, Marx’s theory of value was widely claimed to be “internally inconsistent” for eighty years on the basis of a straw man (the dominant dual-system, simultaneist interpretation of his theory) before a group of economists were finally able to demonstrate that Marx’s work could be interpreted in a way that not only gave it internal coherence but reproduced all of his results on value, including the long-run tendency of the rate of profit to fall, which had supposedly been “disproved” by Okishio’s theorem.

It wasn’t until the 1980s that papers began to be published by economists adhering to the so-called “temporal single-system interpretation” of Marx, demonstrating the theoretical coherence – validity, not necessarily correctness – of his theory of value when interpreted in a temporal and “single-system” way. It took another twenty-five years of persistence by these economists before Sraffians (who were the most prominent antagonists) and other critics grudgingly stopped dismissing Marx’s theory in pat phrases repeated over and over again without any authority other than the insinuation of authority.

One of the leading protagonists in this debate, Andrew Kliman, has written an accessible book for the generalist reader documenting the history of the debate and summarizing the major findings. For anyone interested in the debate over Marx’s theory of value, it is well worth reading, and eye-opening in bringing to light the extent of intellectual dishonesty in academia, including within the heterodoxy.

The straw-man tactic of the Sraffians served to discredit Marx and help to create a justification for alternative theories (e.g. Sraffianism) to replace or “correct” Marx’s theory. The tactic was also employed by developers of an array of alternative, though short-lived, value theories, such as the New Interpretation, Simultaneous Single-System Interpretation, Value Form theory, etc. A certain career benefit and “respectability” no doubt also comes from distancing oneself from Marx’s theory of value in a capitalist society.

The straw-man attack on Marx’s theory was effective partly because Marxism is outside the orthodoxy and Marxists have little to no presence in academic economics, let alone clout. Another reason for its effectiveness may be that Marxist thought is critical of the capitalist system itself. It is not merely reformist. This is not exactly the most career-savvy research program for an up-and-coming academic.

None of this is to suggest that Sraffianism or any of the other alternative theories are not valid approaches in their own right. It is simply to insist that the developers of these theories were not entitled to assert the invalidity of Marx’s theory almost like a religious mantra when the argument relied on a straw man.

The unjustified but highly successful eighty-year banishment of Marx’s theory can be contrasted with the lack of impact the Cambridge Capital Controversy has had on the dominance of neoclassical economics. This time the position of the Sraffians in theoretical terms was very strong, and their central points were conceded by Paul Samuelson and other leading neoclassical participants in the debate, yet the victory has so far had little impact on the status quo in academic economics.

The strategically effective response of the neoclassical orthodoxy to heterodox critiques drawing on the results of the Cambridge Capital Controversy has been simply not to respond through debate but rather ignore the implications, stop publishing heterodox work in the top journals, and cease hiring heterodox economists in the most prestigious universities or leading policymaking institutions (see Nobel-nomics for a polemical take on the aftermath of the Capital Debates).

When aimed at the orthodoxy, even legitimate criticism struggles to make a dent. For the heterodoxy, the very strongest arguments take a long time to break through.

Eventually, though, as MMT commentator rvm often reminds me, truth will out. Advances in understanding in many areas of human endeavor have faced the same kind of opposition throughout history. Even now, some heterodox advances in economics eventually slip in through the back door of neoclassical economics.

For example, there appears to be an increasing recognition among monetary researchers that some traditional concepts are untenable. Recent notable examples apply to the money-multiplier theory and money endogeneity. Understanding of these points has been well established in Post Keynesian economics for a long time. Now, slowly, some of the ideas are creeping in to mainstream analysis (usually without appropriate credit being given to earlier heterodox work).

All this is a longwinded way of saying that the road is uphill, but the only option is to keep plugging away. Some of the leading proponents of MMT have been grinding away for thirty years now. As internet foot soldiers, we can follow their lead. Sooner or later, perhaps long after we’re all dead, society will wake up to reality, strengthen conceptual understanding, and implement sensible policies.

Ancient historians of twentieth and twenty-first century economic thought will look back and realize that much of the truth was worked out by Kalecki, Keynes, Lerner, CofFEE, UMKC, TCOTU, etc. From their vantage point of 5000 AED (five thousand years After Environmental Destruction), orthodox historians will wonder how the clear and cogent answers of MMT could possibly have been ignored by so many experts of the era, who seemed inexplicably fond of straw men. These orthodox thinkers of the future will know with utter certainty that they could never be so close-minded!

A Comment on MMT Internet Discussions

There is one particular straw man that is repeatedly erected by critics of MMT. I’m sure most foot soldiers reading this will have noticed it. It is one that I find especially grating. The best (i.e. most irritating) phrase I’ve seen to encapsulate the nuances of this particular straw man is the refrain:

MMT claims we can print prosperity.

The phrase “print prosperity” is shorthand for the common message board accusation that MMT ignores real resources and gets bamboozled by money as if it is magic. The accusation is very common. The term “print prosperity” was coined, to the best of my knowledge, by a Math Professor, no less, who happens to be keen on the kind of “fiscal conservatism” advocated by the Concord Coalition.

I consider it a perverse injustice that, in online discussions, MMT sympathizers are frequently reproached for imagining that “we can print prosperity” when in fact it is us who constantly stress as a fundamental point that the only true constraints are resource based, not financial or monetary in nature. We are the ones insisting that if we have the resources, we can put them to use. It is the neoclassical orthodoxy and others who try to make out that we can’t use resources, even if they are available, because of some magical, mysterious monetary or financial constraint. Just who is it that believes in magic here?

MMT shows clearly that if we have the resources, money is no obstacle to a government that issues its own flexible exchange-rate fiat currency. It is not saying that creating money magically creates goods and services. It is saying that it is nonsense – superstitious nonsense – to think affordability for such a government could be about money rather than resources.

Obviously, anyone is entitled to disagree with the MMT position. But they are not entitled purposefully to misrepresent MMT as suggesting that it is oblivious to real resource constraints when it is alternative theories that attempt to obfuscate matters by conjuring up fictitious “financial constraints” (e.g. the neoclassical “government budget constraint” framework).

Take the debate over how to address the aging population for example. It should be obvious – and is obvious in MMT – that the only way to address this issue is to increase future productive capacity. This involves the application of real resources now to research, infrastructure development, education (including in areas relevant to servicing an aging population), etc.

Clearly, MMT is not, as many internet critics claim, saying that creating money solves the problem. It is really the MMT critics who are falling into the trap of thinking money rather than the application of real resources is the solution, despite their frequent protestations to the contrary. They are the ones who think that if the government “saves” money now, this will somehow help to address the needs of the aging population in, let’s say, twenty years time.

Yet, these same people also stress that you can’t “print prosperity”. Well, if you can’t “print prosperity” – and we all agree on that – what good is that money the government supposedly should stash away going to be twenty years from now? It won’t help to provide the infrastructure and technological knowledge that was not developed in the preceding twenty years because governments preferred to “save” money for the future rather than apply resources to the real task of raising productive capacity.

Oh well. We shrug and move on. Such are the trials and tribulations of an internet foot soldier.

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FMOC Minutes

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New Forecasts (central tendency and range of forecasts) in Table 1 below: Long-Run inflation forecast of 1.6-2.0% is basically their target; 2011 and 2012 unemployment forecasts revised up by 0.6-0.7%. Note that low-end of GDP forecast for 2011 is 2.5%. This is above many other forecasters.


Interesting Observations from FRB Staff; Outlook revised up, basically on assumption of improved financial conditions; and in turn inflation higher due to less slack and weaker $

The staff revised up its forecast for economic activity in 2011 and 2012. In light of asset market developments over the intermeeting period, which in large part appeared to reflect heightened expectations among investors that the Federal Reserve would undertake additional purchases of longer-term securities, the November forecast was conditioned on lower long-term interest rates, higher stock prices,
and a lower foreign exchange value of the dollar than was the staff’s previous forecast.

The downward pressure on inflation from slack in resource utilization was expected to be slightly less than previously projected, and prices of imported goods were anticipated to rise somewhat faster.

FOMC Members-Recap of debate of pros/cons of LSAPs; sizing LSAPs; and setting an inflation target, and setting a long-term interest rate target

Although participants considered it quite unlikely that the economy would slide back into recession, some noted that continued slow growth and high levels of resource slack could leave the economic expansion vulnerable to negative shocks. In the absence of such shocks, and assuming appropriate monetary policy

They do assume what they do has quite a bit of influence over the outcomes.

participants’ economic projections generally showed growth picking up to a moderate pace and the unemployment rate declining somewhat next year. Participants generally expected growth to strengthen further and unemployment to decline somewhat more rapidly in 2012 and 2013.

Several noted that the recent rate of output growth, if continued, would more likely be associated with an increase than a decrease in the unemployment rate.

While underlying inflation remained subdued, meeting participants generally saw only small odds of deflation, given the stability of longer-term inflation expectations

They remain steeped in inflation expectations theory as previously discussed.

and the anticipated recovery in economic activity.

Most saw the risks to growth as broadly balanced, but many saw the risks as tilted to the downside. Similarly, a majority saw the risks to inflation as balanced; some, however, saw downside risks predominating while a couple saw inflation risks as tilted to the upside.

Participants also differed in their assessments of the likely benefits and costs associated with a program of purchasing additional longer-term securities in an effort to provide additional monetary stimulus, though most saw the benefits as exceeding the costs in current circumstances. Most participants judged that a program of purchasing additional longer-term securities would put downward pressure on longer-term interest rates and boost asset prices; some observed that it could also lead to a reduction in the foreign exchange value of the dollar. Most expected these changes in financial conditions to help promote a somewhat stronger recovery in output and employment while also helping return inflation, over time, to levels consistent with the Committee’s mandate. In addition, several participants argued that the stimulus provided by additional securities purchases would help protect against further disinflation and the small probability that the U.S. economy could fall into persistent deflation–an outcome that they thought would be very costly. Some participants, however, anticipated that additional purchases of longer-term securities would have only a limited effect on the pace of the recovery; they judged that the economy’s slow growth largely reflected the effects of factors that were not likely to respond to additional monetary policy stimulus and thought that additional action would be warranted only if the outlook worsened and the odds of deflation increased materially. Some participants noted concerns that additional expansion of the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet could put unwanted downward pressure on the dollar’s value in foreign exchange markets. Several participants saw a risk that a further increase in the size of the Federal Reserve’s asset portfolio, with an accompanying increase in the supply of excess reserves and in the monetary base, could cause an undesirably large increase in inflation.

This flies in the face of any understanding of banking and actual monetary operations, as well as recent Fed research.

However, it was noted that the Committee had in place tools that would enable it to remove policy accommodation quickly if necessary to avoid an undesirable increase in inflation.


Participants expressed a range of views about the potential costs and benefits of quantifying the Committee’s interpretation of its statutory mandate to promote price stability by adopting a numerical inflation objective or a target path for the price level. In the end, participants noted that the longer-run projections contained in the Summary of Economic Projections, which is released once per quarter in conjunction with the minutes of four of the Committee’s meetings, convey considerable information about participants’ assessments of their statutory objectives. Participants discussed whether it might be useful for the Chairman to hold occasional press briefings to provide more detailed information to the public regarding the Committee’s assessment of the outlook and its policy decision making than is included in Committee’s short post-meeting statements.


In their discussion of the relative merits of smaller and more frequent adjustments versus larger and less frequent adjustments in the Federal Reserve’s intended securities holdings, participants generally agreed that large adjustments had been appropriate when economic activity was declining sharply in response to the financial crisis. In current circumstances, however, most saw advantages to a more incremental approach that would involve smaller changes in the Committee’s holdings of securities calibrated to incoming data.


Finally, participants discussed the potential benefits and costs of setting a target for a term interest rate. Some noted that targeting the yield on a term security could be an effective way to reduce longer-term interest rates and thus provide additional stimulus to the economy. But participants also noted potentially large risks, including the risk that the Federal Reserve might find itself buying undesirably large amounts of the relevant security in order to keep its yield close to the target level.

No mention at all of the interest income channels, which act to reduce interest income in the economy as rates fall.

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Zoellick Sees ‘Elephant,’ Not Endorsing Gold Standard

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Back pedaling from yesterday’s remarks, but just getting the fish hook in deeper.

Gold is a non financial asset,not an ‘alternative monetary asset’

Starting to look like the QE fairy dust is wearing off.
The dollar selling was the focus of the ‘risk on’ hysteria, and it looks like the dollar may have stopped going down.

From what I see, the risk positions mostly look like short dollar bets, including long gold, commodities, and commodity currencies, etc. And long equity trades have had support from weak dollar assumptions as well.

I’ve yet to see any fundamental reason for the dollar weakness apart from misunderstanding QE. In fact, the firming US economy continues to lower the US budget deficit modestly, which tightens things up a bit, and also attracts foreign direct investment and financial investment. (I recall in the late 90’s reading that US FDI was the highest in the world, and it sure wasn’t due to cheap labor.)

So I’m watching for what’s potentially a dramatic dollar reversal here and all the other reversals that will come with it.

Zoellick Sees ‘Elephant,’ Not Endorsing Gold Standard

By Robin Knight

November 10 (Bloomberg) — Gold is the “elephant in the room” that must be addressed by policymakers, as it’s being used as an alternative monetary asset because of unease about the strength of developed economies, Robert Zoellick, president of the World Bank, told CNBC Wednesday.

What “the price of gold has been telling people is that there is a lack of confidence in some of the fundamentals growth policies,” Zoellick said.

“The golden elephant in the room, whether people recognize it or not, is being used as an alternative monetary asset,” he said.

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Paul Krugman Blog – NYTimes.com

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The way I read it, he’s agreed that it’s about inflation, not solvency.

That is, in ratings agency speak, willingness to pay could be an issue, but not ability to pay.

That’s enough for me to declare victory on that key issue, and move on.

Not that I at all agree with his descriptions of monetary operations or his ‘inflation channels.’ I just see no reason to rehash all that and risk loss of focus on the larger point he’s conceded.

This reads like a true breakthrough. Hopefully this opens the flood gates and the remaining deficit doves pile on, and July 17, 2010 is remembered as the day MMT broke through and turned the tide.

And in the real world it’s all about celebrity status.

With Jamie’s credentials and definitive response to the sustainability commission, Paul finally had a sufficiently ‘worthy’ advocate which gave him the opening to respond and concede.


I Would Do Anything For Stimulus, But I Won’t Do That (Wonkish)

By Paul Krugman

It’s really not relevant to current policy debates, but there’s an issue that’s been nagging at me, so I thought I’d write it up.

Right now, the real policy debate is whether we need fiscal austerity even with the economy deeply depressed. Obviously, I’m very much opposed — my view is that running deficits now is entirely appropriate.

But here’s the thing: there’s a school of thought which says that deficits arenever a problem, as long as a country can issue its own currency. The most prominent advocate of this view is probably Jamie Galbraith, but he’s not alone.

Now, Jamie and I are, I think, in complete agreement about what we should be doing now. So we’re talking theory, not practice. But I can’t go along with his view that

So long as U.S. banks are required to accept U.S. government checks — which is to say so long as the Republic exists — then the government can and does spend without borrowing, if it chooses to do so … Insolvency, bankruptcy, or even higher real interest rates are not among the actual risks to this system.

OK, I don’t think that’s right. To spend, the government must persuade the private sector to release real resources. It can do this by collecting taxes, borrowing, or collecting seignorage by printing money. And there are limits to all three. Even a country with its own fiat currency can go bankrupt, if it tries hard enough.

How does that work? A bit of modeling under the fold.

Let’s think in terms of a two-period model, although I won’t need to say much about the first period. In period 1, the government borrows, issuing indexed bonds (I could make them nominal, but then I’d need to introduce expectations about inflation, and we’ll end up in the same place.) This means that in period 2 the government owes real debt service in the amount D.

The government may meet this debt service requirement, in whole or in part, by running a primary surplus, an excess of revenue over current spending. Let’s suppose, however, that there’s an upper limit S to the feasible primary surplus — a limit imposed by political constraints, administrative issues (if taxes are too high everyone will evade), or the sheer fact that tax collections can’t exceed GDP.

But the government also has a printing press. The real revenue it collects by using this press is [M(t) – M(t-1)]/P(t), where M is the money supply and P the price level.

What determines the price level? Let’s assume a simple quantity theory, with the price level proportional to the money supply:

P(t) = V*M(t)

By assuming this, I’m actually making the most favorable assumption about the power of seignorage, since in practice, running the printing presses leads to a fall in the real demand for money (people start using lumps of coal or whatever as substitutes.)

OK, now let’s ask what happens if the government has run up enough debt that the upper limit on the primary surplus is a binding constraint, and it’s necessary to run the printing presses to make up the difference. In that case,

[M(t) – M(t-1)]/P(t) = D – S

But P is proportional to M, so this becomes

[M(t) – M(t-1)]/VM(t) = D – S

Rearrange a bit, and we have

M(t)/M(t-1) = 1/[1 – V[D-S]]

And what does this imply? Since the price level is, by assumption, proportional to M, this tells us that the higher the debt burden, the higher the required rate of inflation — and, crucially, that as D-S heads toward a critical level, this implied inflation heads off to infinity. That is, it looks like this:

So there is a maximum level of debt you can handle. In practice, if it makes sense to say such a thing with regard to a stylized model, at some point lower than the critical level implied by this model the government would decide that default was a better option than hyperinflation.

And going back to period 1, lenders would take this possibility into account. So there are real limits to deficits, even in countries that can print their own currency.

Now, I’m sure I’m about to get comments and/or responses on other blogs along the lines of “Ha! So now Krugman admits that deficits cause hyperinflation! Peter Schiff roolz” Um, no — in extreme conditions they CAN cause hyperinflation; we’re nowhere near those conditions now. All I’m saying here is that I’m not prepared to go as far as Jamie Galbraith. Deficits can cause a crisis; but that’s no reason to skimp on spending right now.

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