2008-09-26 EU News Highlights


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France and the eurozone are looking pretty grim.

Exports are weak as demand from the US for imports slows.

Rising prices from energy prices that have driven up ‘inflation’ are in the hands of the Saudis and Russians.

Rising budget deficits are both necessary to sustain growth and threatening national solvency.

The eurozone has used a chronic shortfall of domestic demand to drive exports and sustain growth. When they had their own currencies, they used to buy USD to keep their currencies down and real wages low.
(This culture of exports keeps the standard of living down but it does keep people working.)

With the new single currency, the ECB can’t (ideologically) buy USD to keep their real wages low. So now they are losing their export channel and need to sustain domestic demand to sustain employment. Lower interest rates don’t do that. ECB rate cuts won’t matter.

Just like Fed, rate cuts didn’t sustain US demand, and zero rates didn’t sustain demand in Japan. And fiscal balance in the eurozone is strictly at the national level, where deficits risk solvency. And their banks are at risk of insolvency as well, with deposit insurance also at the national level.

This is true systemic risk. Things can deteriorate very quickly, and the entire payments system shut down, if external demand is too low to sustain growth and employment.

Operationally the ‘solution’ is quite simple; the ECB or the Euro Parliament can write any size check they want (in euros) to support any size fiscal response they want. But legally (and ideologically) this can’t happen without a change in the treaty.

And add to this the fact that the ECB has been increasingly borrowing USD from the Fed to support its banking system that somehow has been caught short USD, probably due to making USD loans that they funded in USD. While this is relatively small (maybe $120 billion), it could snowball, and ultimately, at the macro level, it may wind down with euro agents selling euros to buy and repay the USD and trigger a currency collapse.

Right now it’s all going the wrong way in the eurozone.


Highlights

FRENCH ECONOMY SHRANK IN SECOND QUARTER AS ECONOMIC CRISIS
SocGen, Barclays Say ECB to Cut Rates to 3.5%
German Import Price Inflation Holds at Fastest Pace Since 2000
European Central Banks Offer More Dollars From Fed
Consumer Prices Decline in Two German States, Increase in Hesse
French Consumer Confidence Rises on Oil Price Decline
ECB’s Gonzalez-Paramo Says Markets Still `in Middle’ of Crisis
One-Month Euro Borrowing Rate Climbs to 8-Year High, EBF Says
Sarkozy Pushes Back Deficit Reduction as Growth Slows
French Budget Deficit Wider Than Estimated, Woerth Says
Spanish Mortgage Lending Falls 29 Percent, 12th Monthly Decline
ECB’s Ordonez Says Spain Wage-Indexation Toxic
Euro-Area Economy Is at Standstill, Bank of Italy Index Shows
European Government Bonds Rise as U.S. Bank-Rescue Plan Stalls

 
 
Articles

FRENCH ECONOMY SHRANK IN SECOND QUARTER AS ECONOMIC CRISIS

(dpa) – The French economy contracted by 0.3 per cent in the second quarter of the year, the first quarter of negative GDP growth since 2002, the government’s statistical office INSEE announced on Friday.

The announcement could be the first of a series of bad news for France’s economy. French radio reported Friday that the unemployment figures to be made public on Monday will be the worst in 10 years, with up to 40,000 adults added to the jobless rolls in August.

On Thursday, in a speech on the current economic crisis, French President Nicolas Sarkozy said that the turmoil in the American finance sector would affect French economic growth, joblessness and purchasing power.

He also suggested that the country could be heading for a recession, which is defined as two consecutive quarters of negative economic growth.

According to INSEE, the economic contraction in the second quarter was due in part to the second consecutive decline in household spending and a 1.7 per cent fall in exports. dpa sm sc

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SocGen, Barclays Say ECB to Cut Rates to 3.5%

(Bloomberg) The European Central Bank will cut its benchmark interest rate to 3.5 percent next year as the financial market crisis deepens the economic slowdown and slows inflation, economists at Societe Generale SA and Barclay’s Capital said, revising earlier calls.

“A deeper corporate sector correction is now under way in Europe that will only be exacerbated by the financial turmoil,”

James Nixon, an economist at Societe Generale in London wrote in a note to clients. “Weaker growth and falling inflation will now finally open the door to a series of gradual interest-rate cuts.”

Business confidence in the euro area’s three largest economies fell this month more than economists forecast as financial turmoil in the U.S. imperiled growth around the world.

The ECB has so far said slowing growth isn’t enough to overcome concern that the fastest inflation in 16 years will become entrenched through a wage-price spiral.

Nixon forecasts three quarter-percent cuts in March, June and September, bringing the ECB key rate to 3.5 percent from 4.25 percent. He previously predicted rates would remain unchanged throughout 2009.

Barclays Capital’s chief European economist, Julian Callow, expects the bank to start cutting rates in December and then lower borrowing costs again in March and June.

Callow conceded that the first cut may be delayed as ECB policy makers await the outcome of Germany’s IG Metall wage round, raising the “risk of a 50 basis-points cut in March.”

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German Import Price Inflation Holds at Fastest Pace Since 2000

(Bloomberg) Import-price inflation in Germany, Europe’s largest economy, held at the fastest pace in almost eight years in August led by higher energy costs.

Prices rose 9.3 percent from a year earlier, the Federal Statistics Office in Wiesbaden said today, unchanged from July and the highest level since November 2000. Economists expected an increase of 9.1 percent, the median of 21 forecasts in a Bloomberg News survey showed. In the month, prices fell 0.8 percent, less than economists expected.

While the price of oil has retreated about a third from its July record, easing pressure on consumer and company purses, a barrel of crude is still over 30 percent more expensive than a year ago. The European Central Bank expects past oil price gains to result in pipeline pressures that could unleash an inflationary wage-price spiral. Policy makers say preventing these so-called second round-effects overrides any anxiety over faltering economic growth and the financial market crisis.

“While the price of oil may have dropped significantly from July, it’s still high and other commodities are slower to follow,” said Alexander Koch, an economist at UniCredit Markets and Investment in Munich. “There are still pipeline pressures that will keep the ECB on inflation alert until the end of the year.”

ECB Vice President Lucas Papademos said in an interview with Italy’s Il Sole 24 Ore published today that there are “clear indications” of faster wage increases and that the bank “cannot exclude renewed increases in oil and commodity prices.”

Rising Prices
German inflation probably slowed to 2.9 percent in August from 3.3 percent in the previous month, when measured using a harmonized European Union method, a Bloomberg survey shows. That’s still well above the ECB’s 2 percent limit. The Federal Statistics Office in Wiesbaden may publish September inflation data today.

Prices for gas rose 55.4 percent in the year and oil was 50.3 percent more expensive, today’s report showed. The cost of coal increased 84.3 percent from August 2007. Excluding energy, import prices rose 4.1 percent in the year.

Business confidence in the euro area’s three largest economies fell more this month than economists forecast as financial turmoil in the U.S. imperiled growth around the world, industry surveys showed yesterday. The economy of the 15 nations sharing the euro is already struggling to recover from a second- quarter contraction.

In the past two weeks, Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. collapsed and the U.S. government took over American International Group Inc. The world’s biggest financial companies have posted more than $520 billion in writedowns and credit losses since the start of last year after record defaults on housing loans to consumers with poor credit histories, pushing up borrowing costs as banks became reluctant to lend to each other.

The ECB raised its key rate to a seven year-high of 4.25 percent in July after record oil prices pushed the inflation rate to the highest in 16 years. Annual price gains have decelerated, even if, at 3.8 percent, they are still almost twice the ECB’s 2 percent limit.

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European Central Banks Offer More Dollars From Fed

(Bloomberg) European central banks will for the first time let banks borrow dollars from them for a week in an effort to ease drum-tight money markets at the end of the quarter.

With the cost of borrowing dollars over three months yesterday jumping by the most since 1999, the European Central Bank, Bank of England and Swiss National Bank said today they will auction a total of $74 billion in one-week funding. The Federal Reserve assisted by providing the ECB and SNB with access to $13 billion more of its currency, boosting the amount of dollars it makes available to counterparts to $290 billion.

“These operations are designed to address funding pressures over quarter end,” the central banks said in statements.

“Central banks continue to work together closely and are prepared to take further steps as needed to address the ongoing pressure in funding markets.”

The central banks are tweaking the timeframes over which they auction dollars as banks remain reluctant to lend to each other even after the Fed more than quadrupled the amount of dollars that can be sold around the world. Concern a U.S. rescue plan to ease the worsening financial crisis won’t be implemented fast enough may strain markets again today.

“The money markets will remain tense until the U.S. package is agreed and starts to be implemented,” said Holger Schmieding, chief European economist at Bank of America Corp. in London.

Switch to Weekly
Having sold dollars for a day for the first time last week, the ECB will today offer $35 billion in funds for a week. It will reduce its sale of overnight dollars by $10 billion to $30 billion. The Swiss National Bank will auction $9 billion over seven days, while paring the amount it offers overnight to $7 billion from $10 billion.

The Bank of England, which has held six overnight dollar auctions for $40 billion, will now sell $30 billion for a week and $10 billion in overnight auctions. The U.K. bank will also hold weekly auctions for pounds against extended collateral including mortgage securities.

Central bankers are stepping in as a source of dollars as $522 billion in writedowns and losses tied to the U.S. mortgage market and questions about the credit-worth of counterparties prompt bankers to hoard cash to meet their own funding needs.

Banks in the euro region deposited more than 1 billion euros with the ECB for a sixth day running yesterday, the longest such stretch since the introduction of the euro in 1999.

Swap Lines
The Fed is providing counterparts with dollars through so- called swap lines, enabling them to auction the U.S. currency in their own markets in return for collateral. It last week extended links established in December with the ECB and Swiss National Bank by $70 billion, and created $110 billion in new facilities with central banks in Japan, the U.K. and Canada. Yesterday, it agreed to channel $30 billion to Norway, Sweden, Denmark and Australia.

The financial crisis, which deepened this month after Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. filed for bankruptcy and the U.S. government took over American International Group Inc., is entering a new stage as lawmakers squabble over a $700 billion rescue of the U.S. banking system. Negotiations stalled yesterday after Republicans in the U.S. House of Representatives undercut the Bush administration and left it to congressional leaders to hammer out a compromise.

Concern the plan may be diluted yesterday spurred money- market rates around the world. The three-month London interbank offered rate, or Libor, that most banks charge each other for dollar loans rose 29 basis points to 3.77 percent.

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Consumer Prices Decline in Two German States, Increase in Hesse

(Bloomberg) Consumer prices in two German states eased in September as the cost of food and package vacations declined. Prices rose in the state of Hesse.

Prices in Brandenburg and Saxony fell 0.1 percent from August, the state statistics offices in Kamenz and Potsdam said today. In the year, prices gained 2.8 percent in Brandenburg and 3 percent in Saxony. In Hesse, consumer prices rose 0.1 percent from August and 3.3 percent in the year.

While the cost of oil has fallen from a July record it’s still 30 percent higher than a year ago. The European Central Bank expects past gains in food and commodity prices could still unleash an inflationary wage-price spiral. ECB President Jean- Claude Trichet said on Sept. 11 that inflation is the main worry of European citizens.

“Energy prices still drive inflation in Germany,” said Matthias Rubisch, an economist at Commerzbank AG in Frankfurt.

“The ECB will remain concerned as inflation will recede only slightly in the coming months.”

Economists expect German inflation to slow to 2.9 percent in September from 3.3 percent using a harmonized European Union method, the median of 15 forecasts in a Bloomberg News survey shows. The Federal Statistics Office in Wiesbaden is scheduled to report pan-German inflation figures later today.

Energy prices in Brandenburg rose 0.6 percent from the previous month while prices for package vacations fell 7 percent and costs for holiday accommodation decreased 27.4 percent.

Seasonal food prices dropped 2.5 percent. In Hesse, food prices fell 0.3 percent from August while household energy costs rose 1.4 percent in the month and 13.3 percent in the year.

Import Price Pressure
Import-price inflation in Germany, Europe’s largest economy, held at the fastest pace in almost eight years in August led by higher energy costs, the Federal Statistics Office in Wiesbaden said today. Excluding energy, import prices rose 4.1 percent in the year.

ECB Vice President Lucas Papademos said in an interview with Italy’s Il Sole 24 Ore published today that there are “clear indications” of faster wage increases and that the bank “cannot exclude renewed increases” in oil and commodity prices. “The outlook for inflation over the medium term will fundamentally depend on future unit labor cost growth.”

Germany’s IG Metall labor union, representing 3.2 million workers, is seeking the biggest pay increase in 16 years for staff at companies such as ThyssenKrupp AG and Siemens AG. The union, Germany’s biggest, wants wages to rise 8 percent next year, Chairman Berthold Huber said this week.

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French Consumer Confidence Rises on Oil Price Decline

(Bloomberg) French consumer confidence unexpectedly rose for the first time in more than a year in September after falling fuel prices left people with more to spend on food and clothing.

A gauge of consumer sentiment rose to minus 44 from a revised record-low minus 47 in July, the last month reported, the Paris- based national statistics office, Insee, said in a statement today. Economists expected a reading of minus 47, according to the median of 20 forecasts in a Bloomberg News survey.

The price of oil has fallen by almost a third from its record in July. Still, crude remains at more than $100 a barrel and is 33 percent higher than a year ago. At the same time, a deepening crisis in global financial markets may dim consumers’ willingness to spend in coming months.

“Whether it’s consumption, investment or exports, all the engines of French growth are stopped, or even in reverse,” said Marc Touati, chief economist at Global Equities in Paris, before the report.

Earlier this month, Finance Minister Christine Lagarde pared her prediction for 2008 economic growth to around 1 percent from a previous forecast of at least 1.7 percent. Those forecasts may prove optimistic as the worst U.S. housing slump since the Great Depression has pushed up the cost of credit globally and roiled financial markets, threatening to further pare global growth.

Growth Declines
The French economy shrank 0.3 percent in the second quarter, the first contractions in more than five years, a separate report confirmed today. Household spending fell 0.1 percent, while exports declined 1.7 percent, from an increase of 2.6 percent in the first three months. The European Commission predicted Sept. 10 that the economy will stall in the third quarter, barely skirting a recession.

“It’s possible France’s GDP will shrink in the third quarter; even zero growth would be good,” Frederik Ducrozet, an economist at Credit Agricole SA in Paris, said on Bloomberg Television.

The gain in French confidence mirrored advances in Germany and Italy as the lower oil prices fueled optimism that record inflation rates would ease. Confidence among consumers in Germany, Europe’s biggest economy, unexpectedly rose for the first time in five months, a report showed yesterday. Italian confidence advanced from a 15-year low in August.

Manufacturers were less optimistic. Confidence among French producers dropped to a five-year low in September, Insee said on Sept. 24, suggesting that the turmoil in markets fueled by the collapse of Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. has overshadowed declines in oil and the dollar. Crude has fallen 27 percent decline since a July 11 record of $147.27 and the euro also declined from a peak against the dollar the same month.

French President Nicolas Sarkozy said in a speech on the economy yesterday that the turmoil in financial markets will be lasting and the fallout will hurt growth, employment and spending.

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ECB’s Gonzalez-Paramo Says Markets Still `in Middle’ of Crisis

(Bloomberg) European Central Bank Executive Board member Jose Manuel Gonzalez-Paramo comments on the global financial market turmoil. He spoke today at a conference in Chicago.

“I would have much preferred to be here under somewhat different circumstances. The international financial system has reached a crossroad. Large financial institutions have failed or have to be taken over by others. Major bank models have been put into question. Important markets exhibit high volatility and low liquidity. Together with other economic developments, the financial turmoil has significantly increased the uncertainty surrounding the outlook for growth and inflation in the short- and medium-term both in the euro area and in the U.S.”

“We still seem to be in the middle of” the financial turmoil.

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One-Month Euro Borrowing Rate Climbs to 8-Year High, EBF Says

(Bloomberg) The cost of borrowing in euros for one month rose to the highest level since December 2000, according to the European Banking Federation.

The euro interbank offered rate, or Euribor, climbed 3 basis points to 5.01 percent, EBF figures show today. It was at 4.63 percent a week ago. The three-month rate increased 2 basis points to 5.14 percent, the highest level since the introduction of the euro in 1999.

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Sarkozy Pushes Back Deficit Reduction as Growth Slows

(Bloomberg) French President Nicolas Sarkozy, facing the slowest economic expansion in at least five years, shelved deficit-reduction plans in his second budget released today.

The budget is based on a growth forecast for this year and next of 1 percent, less than half the 2007 pace, which will leave the government with less revenue and higher welfare costs. To keep the shortfall under the European Union limit, France may cap spending, not replace half of retiring civil servants, and raise taxes to fund incentives for the unemployed to return to work.

“It’s easy to explain: tax receipts are shrinking,” Budget Minister Eric Woerth said today on RTL radio. “Less growth means less fiscal revenue.” He cited the higher cost of debt and high inflation as other factors pushing up the deficit.

Sarkozy’s 8 billion euros ($11.7 billion) of tax cuts this year were not enough to buoy growth as surging commodities prices fanned inflation and global demand cooled amid a year-long credit crisis. The euro region’s second-largest economy contracted and shed jobs in the second quarter, sending consumer confidence to a record low and curbing spending.

Deficit Widening
The new budget plan forecasts the deficit will hold at last year’s level of 2.7 percent of gross domestic product this year and next, remaining below the EU threshold of 3 percent. The government initially planned to narrow the shortfall to 2.5 percent this year and 2 percent next year.

“If there’s one European country in a problematic situation regarding the 3 percent, it’s France,” said Natacha Valla, an economist at Goldman Sachs Group Inc. in Paris.

The higher deficit and slower growth will force an increase in borrowing. The government plans to sell $135 billion euros of bonds and notes next year, up from $116.5 billion euros worth this year. Total debt will rise to 66 percent of GDP from 65.3 percent this year.

The budget plan is based on the assumption that the cost of oil will average $100 a barrel in 2009 and the euro will be worth on average $1.45. Crude oil reached a peak of $147.27 in July and the euro hit a record $1.6038 in the same month.

Sarkozy, who’s been in office since May 2007, has faced growing popular discontent as gasoline and food prices rose.

Sixty-two percent of those surveyed by BVA polling company this month found his economic policy “bad” or “very bad.”

Public Support
“The reason why Sarkozy was elected president is that he’d promised to deliver on economic and social issues at a time of pessimism,” said Gael Sliman, deputy director at BVA. Now “the bad economic news condemn him to be unpopular during all the difficult period of 2008 and part of 2009.”

Sarkozy yesterday said he wouldn’t impose austerity policies as the turmoil in financial markets hurts economic growth, job creation and household purchasing power.

“If activity were to strongly and lastingly recede, I wouldn’t hesitate to take necessary steps to underpin it,” the French president said in a speech in Toulon, France. “Telling the truth to the French is saying that the crisis isn’t over, its consequences will be lasting.”

Sarkozy’s political opposition, said he was using the world economic crisis to divert attention from his policy failures.

`Using’ the Crisis
“The president is using the crisis as an excuse to justify the acceleration of an austerity policy towards the middle class” and the least well off, Michel Sapin a former Socialist Finance Minister, said in a statement.

The government has little leeway to act, especially with France holding the rotating EU presidency. Two weeks ago, Finance Minister Christine Lagarde and her European counterparts pledged to pursue financial discipline. European Central Bank President Jean-Claude Trichet called for them to deliver on their promise.

Woerth said today that government has reined in spending.

“It’s going to be a status-quo budget,” said Laurence Boone, an economist at Barclays Capital in Paris. “They have no room for maneuver if they want to stay within the EU limits” of a deficit of less than 3 percent of gross domestic product.

The tax cuts announced by Sarkozy last year, including a mortgage-interest deduction, the elimination of most inheritance levies and a wealth-tax rebate for people investing in small companies will extend into next year. They also include the elimination of most taxes on overtime hours, which may not be as effective because of the slowdown, Barclays’ Boone said.

Legislative Victories
Sarkozy won a string of legislative victories before the summer recess. Lawmakers in recent past months passed measures proposed by the government to boost retail competition, toughen jobseekers’ benefit rules and increase work hours.

“Structural reforms have been launched,” Goldman’s Valla said. “What the economy needs are very precise and fast spending measures, but France doesn’t have the means to do it.”

The president has promised to eliminate a tax on companies’ sales. At the same time, he is planning new levies on private health and retirement insurers and on corporate profits distributed to employees as part of a plan to erase the health- care system deficit by 2011.

He also said last month he will impose a new capital-gains tax to fund incentives for the unemployed to go back to work, a measure backed by 65 percent of French people, the BVA poll showed.

According to Medef, France’s biggest business lobby, overall levies on companies are going to rise “slightly” in 2008 and “strongly” next year.

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French Budget Deficit Wider Than Estimated, Woerth Says

(Bloomberg) France’s budget gap this year will be wider than estimated, Budget Minister Eric Woerth said, adding that he sees the deficit in 2009 at 2.7 percent of gross domestic product.

Woerth said the deficit will rise to about 49 billion euros ($72 billion) this year, up from a 41.4 billion-euro initial forecast. He said 2009’s deficit will widen to 52 billion euros.

“It’s easy to explain,” he said. “Tax receipts are shrinking. Less growth means less fiscal revenue.”

He cited the higher cost of debt and rising inflation among other reasons for the widening French deficit.

Woerth said France will not drop the government goal of balancing its budget in 2012.

“It is not out of reach,” he said.

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Spanish Mortgage Lending Falls 29 Percent, 12th Monthly Decline

(Bloomberg) Mortgage lending in Spain fell for the 12th month in July as the collapse of a decade-long housing boom pushed the Spanish economy toward recession.

Mortgage lending, in terms of the amount of money disbursed, fell 29 percent from a year earlier, and the number of mortgages issued for homes declined 29 percent, the Madrid-based National Statistics Institute said in an e-mailed statement today. In June mortgage lending fell 37 percent from a year earlier.

The housing boom helped Spain grow faster than the euro- region for more than a decade. The global credit crunch has increased borrowing costs and contributed to pushing construction and real estate companies into bankruptcy, and Spain is now expected to follow Ireland into a recession, according to the European Commission.

Housing transactions fell 26 percent from a year earlier, the institute said.

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ECB’s Ordonez Says Spain Wage-Indexation Toxic

(Bloomberg) European Central Bank Governing Council member Miguel Angel Fernandez Ordonez comments on Spanish wage-indexation and the ECB’s inflation-fighting policy. He spoke in Seville, Spain, today.

On Spanish wage-indexation:
“Clauses linking pay settlements to inflation in collective- bargaining agreements are especially toxic when inflation has increased due to external shocks.

“It’s not surprising that the unemployment rate has increased in the past year.

“It’s much more important than in the past to activate all mechanisms that can allow agents to limit cost increases and improve productivity gains.

“Until now, employment has been the main variable that adjusts at times of crisis.

“Unemployment has seen an intense increase.

“The most important thing is not to give in to the temptation of adopting policies that try to avoid the adjustment.”

“The damage of unemployment is much worse” than a salary decline.

On Spanish inflation:
“Inflation will probably be much closer to the euro-region average in 2009 and 2010.”

On the ECB’s inflation-fighting credentials:
“It’s essential that the European Central Bank is fully focused on the objective it been set to maintain inflation at a very moderate pace and in this respect I think the ECB is fully fulfilling its mission.

“There is full confidence that the ECB will return inflation to its objective, and that is helping to mitigate somewhat the current uncertainties regarding the financial system, economic growth and other variables.”

On money-market interest rates:
“It’s difficult to predict if this tightening will keep increasing, though clearly interest rates in money markets, the fundamental reference for Spanish mortgages, already include a substantial risk premium over the ECB’s official interest rates.”

On the global economy:
“Unlike a few months ago, no one is defending the possibility of decoupling now.”

The effects of the crisis “have touched everyone.”

On U.S. rescue plan:
“We should be grateful that with the money of U.S. taxpayers they improve the international financial situation.”

On how the European banking sector compares to U.S.:
“So far, the situation in the European banking system isn’t the same, except one country outside the euro region that is facing considerable problems.”

On Spanish real estate:
“We have a problem in real estate, but it is far from what is being seen in the U.S.”

“U.S. subprime has 16 percent default rates. We haven’t seen that in the worst moments of crisis.”

On Spanish banks:
“If construction is going to be reduced then the Spanish financial system has to adjust to the new situation.”

“What they have in front of them is a complicated task.”

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Euro-Area Economy Is at Standstill, Bank of Italy Index Shows

(Bloomberg) The European economy has stalled, an index co-produced by the Bank of Italy showed.

The EuroCoin index measuring economic expansion fell this month to a record low of 0.04 from 0.17 in August, the London- based Center for Economic Policy Research said in a report today.

“The most recent figure was negatively affected by the sharp fall of firms’ confidence and the recent financial markets retreat,” the report said.

The economy of the 15 nations that share the euro contracted in the second quarter for the first time since the single currency was introduced in 1999.

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European Government Bonds Rise as U.S. Bank-Rescue Plan Stalls

(Bloomberg) European government bonds rose, with yields on two-year notes headed for the biggest weekly decline in eight months, as investors sought the safest assets after negotiations on a U.S. financial-rescue plan stalled.

Investors piled into short-dated debt as lawmakers in the U.S. prepared to meet for a second day after talks yesterday ended without an agreement. A group of House Republicans led by Eric Cantor of Virginia said they wouldn’t back a plan based on the approach outlined by Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson and supported by President George W. Bush and Democratic leaders.

Washington Mutual Inc. was taken over by JPMorgan Chase & Co., in the biggest U.S. bank failure in history.

“The market is reminded once again that this is not a simple piece of legislation,” Luca Jellinek, a London-based strategist at Royal Bank of Scotland Group Plc, wrote in a note today. “The news is uniformly friendly” to the bond market.

The yield on the two-year note dropped 9 basis points to 3.75 percent as of 10:25 a.m. in London. The 4 percent note due September 2010 rose 0.17, or 1.7 euros per 1,000-euro ($1,458) face amount, to 100.46. Were the note to close at that level, it would be the biggest weekly decline in the yield since the five days ended Feb. 8.

The yield on the 10-year German bund, the euro region’s benchmark government-debt security, fell 3 basis points to 4.20 percent. Yields move inversely to bond prices.

The gains pushed the difference in yield, or spread, between two- and 10-year notes to the widest in five months as investors raised bets the financial crisis in the U.S. will crimp economic growth in Europe.

Outperform Treasuries
European bonds have outperformed U.S. Treasuries this quarter as the bailout plan fuelled speculation that it will add to the U.S. government’s fiscal burden. Bonds in the euro region handed investors a 2.97 percent return since the end of June, compared with 1.91 percent from their U.S. counterparts, according to Merrill Lynch & Co.’s EMU Direct and Treasury Master indexes.

Demand for government bonds was also boosted as stocks declined and the cost of protecting European corporate bonds from default rose. The Dow Jones Stoxx 600 Index fell 1.3 percent. Contracts on the Markit iTraxx Crossover Index of 50 companies with mostly high-risk, high-yield credit ratings increased 15 basis points to 590, according to JPMorgan Chase & Co., indicating a deterioration in the perception of credit quality.

The European Central Bank, Swiss National Bank and Bank of England said today they will auction a combined $74 billion in one-week funding to counter the seizure in money markets. The Federal Reserve assisted by providing the ECB and SNB with access to $13 billion more of its currency, boosting the amount of dollars it makes available to counterparts to $290 billion.

Money-market interest rates around the world soared yesterday on concern that Paulson’s plan will be diluted as it makes its way through Congress, causing banks to hoard cash. The three-month London interbank offered rate, or Libor, that banks charge each other for dollar loans jumped by the most since 1999 and the euro rate rose to the highest level since November 2000.


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Bloomberg: Bank run in HK


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This happens all the time with fixed exchange rates and currency boards.

The only way for banks to get ‘real’ (convertible) $HK for their depositors is to buy them from the monetary authority with $US. That usually means banks have to borrow $US to meet withdrawals of $HK, and most banks won’t have $US lines of more than a relatively small percentage of their deposits. With a strict currency board arrangement the monetary authority isn’t allowed to lend (convertible) $HK or its $US reserves, though in HK they sometimes do. But even those reserves are finite, and way smaller than total bank liabilities.

Historically the result has been a deflationary mess, with GDP dropping double digits, high unemployment, bank failures, and collapsing property and other asset prices.

At the macro level, the only way the island can get the $US it needs to buy $HK from the monetary authority is to net export (or sell assets for $US). The value of the $HK can’t go down (the monetary authority has more than enough $US reserves to buy back all the real $HK it’s sold), so the way costs of production go down is via local deflation due to the collapse in aggregate demand until prices are low enough to drive the needed exports.

Hopefully nothing comes of it this time around. But it hasn’t been that kind of year…

Hong Kong Savers Fret as Bank East Asia Fights Rumors

by Kelvin Wong and Theresa Tang

Sept. 25 (Bloomberg) For the first time since the Asian financial crisis more than a decade ago, Hong Kong has faced a bank run.

Hundreds of depositors lined up at the city’s third-largest lender Bank of East Asia Ltd. yesterday as the bank hit out at “malicious rumors,” and Chairman David Li rushed back to Hong Kong from the U.S. to reassure clients and investors. The city’s central bank jumped to BEA’s defense and police said they’re investigating phone text messages questioning its health.


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NYT: Fed to Give A.I.G. $85 bln Loan and Takeecon


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The Fed has a major strategic advantage over private sector buyers.

With the Fed making the loan, credit spreads in general should narrow.

This will add value to AIG’s short credit position which is where most of the mark to market losses are.

So the Fed’s actions to reduce systemic risk also increase the value of AIG once they take them over.

It’s good to be the Fed!

(not that it matters to the Fed itself financially one way or the other, but they probably don’t know that)

Fed Close to Deal to Give A.I.G. $85 Billion Loan


by Michael J. de la Merced and Eric Dash

In an extraordinary turn, the Federal Reserve was close to a deal Tuesday night to take a nearly 80 percent stake in the troubled giant insurance company, the American International Group, in exchange for an $85 billion loan, according to people briefed on the negotiations.

In return, the Fed will receive warrants, which give it an ownership stake. All of A.I.G.’s assets will be pledged to secure the loan, these people said.

The Fed’s action was disclosed after Treasury Secretary Henry M. Paulson and Ben S. Bernanke, president of the Federal Reserve, went to Capitol Hill on Tuesday evening to meet with House and Senate leaders. Mr. Paulson called the Senate majority leader, Harry Reid, Democrat of Nevada, about 5 p.m. and asked for a meeting in the Senate leader’s office, which began about 6:30 p.m.

The Federal Reserve and Goldman Sachs and JPMorgan Chase had been trying to arrange a $75 billion loan for A.I.G. to stave off the financial crisis caused by complex debt securities and credit default swaps . The Federal Reserve stepped in after it became clear Tuesday afternoon that the banking consortium would not be able to complete the deal.

Without the help, A.I.G. was expected to be forced to file for bankruptcy protection.

The need for the loans became necessary after the major credit ratings agencies downgraded A.I.G. late Monday, a move that likely to have forced the company to turn over billions of dollars in collateral to its derivatives trading partners worsening its financial health.

Until this week, it would have been unthinkable for the Federal Reserve to bail out an insurance company, and A.I.G.’s request for help from the Fed of just a few days ago was rebuffed.

But with the prospect of a giant bankruptcy looming – one with unpredictable consequences for the world financial system – the Fed abandoned precedent and agreed to let the money flow.


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NYT: China central bank is short of capital


[Skip to the end]

Main Bank of China Is in Need of Capital

by Keith Bradsher

HONG KONG — China’s central bank is in a bind.

It has been on a buying binge in the United States over the last seven years, snapping up roughly $1 trillion worth of Treasury bonds and mortgage-backed debt issued by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.

This was part of a ‘weak yen’ policy designed to support exports by keeping real domestic wages in check.

Those investments have been declining sharply in value when converted from dollars into the strong yuan,

Why should they care?

What matters from an investment point of view is what the USD can buy now, what the yuan can buy.

casting a spotlight on the central bank’s tiny capital base. The bank’s capital, just $3.2 billion, has not grown during the buying spree, despite private warnings from the International Monetary Fund.

Doesn’t matter what currency the bank’s capital is denominated in because he doesn’t know it matters.

The government has infinite yuan to spend without operational constraint; so, stated yuan capital doesn’t matter.

Now the central bank needs an infusion of capital.

Why? That’s a self-imposed constraint. Operationally central banks don’t need a local currency capital.

Central banks can, of course, print more money, but that would stoke inflation.

Operationally, this makes no sense. There is no such thing as ‘printing money’ apart from actually printing a pile of bills and leaving them on a shelf, which does nothing.

If they spend those bills, that’s government deficit spending with the same effect as any other government deficit spending.

‘Printing money’ has nothing to do with anything.

Instead, the People’s Bank of China has begun discussions with the finance ministry on ways to shore up its capital, said three people familiar with the discussions who insisted on anonymity because the subject is delicate in China.

Yes, there are self-imposed constraints imposed on various agencies of the government.

There are no operational constraints.

The central bank’s predicament has several repercussions. For one, it makes it less likely that China will allow the yuan to continue rising against the dollar, say central banking experts.

The way they keep a strong currency down is by buying more USD.

A weak currency goes down on its own.

To make a weak currency rise, you have to see your USD.

This could heighten trade tensions with the United States.

Yes.

The Bush administration and many Democrats in Congress have sought a stronger yuan to reduce the competitiveness of Chinese exports and trim the American trade deficit.

Yes, but if the yuan has turned fundamentally weak, the way for the US to keep it from falling is for the US Treasury to buy yuan.

The central bank has been the main advocate within China for a stronger yuan.

They want to fight inflation by keeping nominal input costs down.

But it now finds itself increasingly beholden to the finance ministry, which has tended to oppose a stronger yuan.

Right, they want to support exports by keeping real wages down.

As the yuan slips in value, China’s exports gain an edge over the goods of other countries.

The two bureaucracies have been ferocious rivals. Accepting an injection of capital from the finance ministry could reduce the independence of the central bank, said Eswar S. Prasad, the former division chief for China at the International Monetary Fund.

“Central banks hate doing that because it puts them more under the thumb of the finance ministry,” he said.

True.

This matters for foreign exchange policy. In the US, Japan, and others, the Treasury makes the foreign exchange decisions, not the Central Bank. And this if far more potent than interest rate policy.

Mr. Prasad said that during his trips to Beijing on behalf of the I.M.F., he had repeatedly cautioned China over the enormous scale of its holdings of American bonds, emphasizing that it left China vulnerable to losses from either a strengthening of the yuan or from a rise in American interest rates. When interest rates rise, the prices of bonds fall.

Those are not risks, as above.

Officials at the central bank declined to comment, while finance ministry officials did not respond to calls or questions via fax seeking comment. Data in a study by the Bank of International Settlements based in Basel, Switzerland, sometimes called the central bank for central banks, shows that many central banks had small capital bases relative to foreign reserves at the end of 2002,

They don’t need any capital base relative to foreign exchange holdings.

Foreign exchange holding are themselves capital.

though few were as low as the People’s Bank of China.

Given the poor performance of foreign bonds, the Chinese government could decide to shift some of its foreign exchange reserves into global stock markets.

If they shift to financial assets denominated in other currencies, this serves to shift the value of the yuan vs those currencies.

Stocks vs bonds is an investment decision only.

The central bank started making modest purchases of foreign stocks last winter, but has kept almost all of its reserves in bonds, like other central banks.

The finance ministry, however, has pushed for investments in overseas stocks. Last year, it wrested control of the $200 billion China Investment Corporation, which had been bankrolled by the central bank. That corporation’s most publicized move, a $3 billion investment in the Blackstone Group in May of last year, has lost more than 43 percent of its value.

The central bank’s difficulties do not, by themselves, pose a threat to the economy, economists agree. The government has ample resources and is running a budget surplus. Most likely, the finance ministry would simply transfer bonds of other Chinese government agencies to the bank to increase its capital. But even in a country that strongly discourages criticism of its economic policies, hints of dissatisfaction are appearing over China’s foreign investments.

For instance, a Chinese blogger complained last month, “It is as if China has made a gift to the United States Navy of 200 brand new aircraft carriers.”

Bankers estimate that $1 trillion of China’s total foreign exchange reserves of $1.8 trillion are in American securities. With aircraft carriers costing up to $5 billion apiece, $1 trillion would, in theory, buy 200 of them.

By buying United States bonds, the Chinese government has been investing a large chunk of the country’s savings in assets earning just 3 percent annually in dollars. And those low returns turn into real declines of about 10 percent a year after factoring in inflation and the yuan’s appreciation against the dollar.

The yuan has risen 21 percent against the dollar since China stopped pegging its currency to the dollar in July 2005.

The actual declines in value of the central bank’s various investments are a carefully guarded state secret.

Still China finds itself hemmed in. If it were to curtail its purchases of dollar-denominated securities drastically, the dollar would likely fall and American interest rates could soar.

China spent more than one-eighth of its entire economic output last year on foreign bonds, and then picked up the pace during the first half of this year. Chinese officials have suggested in recent comments that they are increasingly interested in stopping the yuan’s rise, and thus are willing to continue buying foreign securities to support the dollar. In fact, the yuan weakened slightly against the dollar last month after 26 consecutive months of gains.

Along with Treasuries, China has invested heavily in mortgage-backed bonds from Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the struggling mortgage finance giants that are sponsored by the United States government. Standard & Poor’s estimates China’s holdings at $340 billion.

Some bond traders suspect that the central bank has scaled back its purchases of these securities, as have China’s commercial banks. But the central bank trades this debt through many third parties in many countries, making its activity opaque to outside analysts.

The central bank has gone to great lengths to maintain its foreign purchases. The money to buy foreign bonds has come from the reserves required that commercial banks must deposit with the central bank. In effect, China’s commercial banks have been lending the central bank more than $1 trillion at an interest rate of less than 2 percent.

To keep the banks strong when they were getting such little interest on their reserves, the central bank has kept deposit rates low. The gap between what banks are paying on deposits and the rates they are charging ordinary customers to borrow is several percentage points. This amounts to a transfer of wealth from ordinary Chinese savers to the central bank and on to Americans who are selling their debt to the Chinese.

The central bank is now under considerable pressure to reduce the commercial banks’ reserve requirements to encourage growth as the Chinese economy shows signs of slowing.

Victor Shih, a specialist in Chinese central banking at Northwestern University, said that when he visited the People’s Bank of China for a series of meetings this summer, he was surprised by how many officials resented the institution’s losses.

He said the officials blamed the United States and believed the controversial assertions set forth in the book “Currency War,” a Chinese best seller published a year ago. The book suggests that the United States deliberately lured China into buying its securities knowing that they would later plunge in value.

“A lot of policy makers in China, at least midlevel policy makers, believe this,” Mr. Shih said.


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Cliff’s Speech


[Skip to the end]

(the blockquotes represent powerpoint slides)

September 10th, 2007:
Speech given at the Foundations and Endowments Investment Summit

pdf version

How Modern Money Operates and the Consequent Investment Implications

by Cliff Viner, III Associates

I’m taking a great risk here today. I’m taking a great risk in presenting statements that may be exactly contrary to what you’ve been led to believe by the media, well known economists, and even by former Fed Governors and chairmen. I know this is a risk because my partner Warren Mosler, as well as myself and our firm, have been actively advancing these ideas for the past 15 years. We have been widely disregarded, with the exception of Cambridge in the UK, and the University of Missouri at Kansas City, being amongst the few notable successes where 40 PhD’s are now training in our program. I personally have been rebuffed at the University of Pennsylvania and the Wharton School, where I graduated undergrad in 1970 and the graduate division in 1972.

But I’m going to take this risk because it’s important to our economic futures, to recognize how things actually work, and because it has policy and investment implications for all of our business decisions. I’m taking the risk because I do not want all of you, who have taken your valuable time out to hear this talk, to have the experience of spending all this time, and not learn anything new of value.

Let’s start with some incredibly simple, but incredibly powerful concepts. All the major currencies in the world are no longer backed by anything. They are not commodity-based or commodity-backed currencies anymore. The only thing the Fed will give you for a 10 dollar bill is two fives. This is called fiat money and this is what we have.

So why do today’s currencies have any value? Simple question. We’re all veteran money managers and we should have the answer. You’ve probably heard answers like it’s the medium of exchange, or a storehouse of value, or the most widely given answer, faith in the currency, which was the only answer given to me when I asked the entire Economics faculty at a major University. So do you believe that the entire multi-trillion dollar world dollar economy is built on faith, as well as the yen and Turkish lire denominated economies?

The answer to why this fiat currency has value is actually on the money. It says “This note is legal tender for all debts, public and private”. The key word is public. The dollar is the only medium for extinguishing tax liabilities to the sovereign government. Money is tax driven, and that’s why it’s valuable.

“Fiat Money derives its value solely from its ability to extinguish tax obligations.”

That’s why we care about dollars, the Japanese care about yen, and why the Turks care about Turkish lire. When the Mexican peso blew up and all faith was gone, why did it only go from 3:1 (dollar) to about 10:1, instead of 100:1 or a million:1, or just vanish completely? When the ruble lost all faith, it only went from 6:1 to about 28:1, it didn’t go worthless or vanish. As long as there are enforceable taxes due, payable in a particular currency, it will have value.

This concept was perfectly understood centuries ago, but forgotten during the commodity money phase. The great Commonwealth of Virginia, established four centuries ago, knew this. They wanted to establish a currency to facilitate commerce. The government could issue currency, or spend in a new currency, but people would laugh and think why should I accept this piece of paper? The first thing Virginia did was establish a tax, let’s just say a 100 card tax per person per year. Now people would ask what they had to do to earn the currency, to be able to pay the tax, and not go to prison. The need for the cards makes the people willing sellers of goods, services, and their labor to get the cards, and avoid penalty for non payment. In this manner, the state can use its otherwise worthless paper to provision itself. The government established the amount of value of the currency, by what it demanded in exchange for these cards. The government is the monopoly issuer. Fiat currencies are tax driven.

Now that we’ve established our state, our tax, and our fiat currency made of these pieces of paper to pay taxes, let’s go further. Let’s say we’re going to be fiscally responsible in our new sovereign state. We’re going to run a budget surplus. We’re going to tax 100 cards, and we’re only going to spend 90.

What is going to happen? There are not enough cards to pay the tax. People will be offering their possessions and their labor for sale to try and get the cards to pay the tax, but sufficient cards are not in circulation to meet their needs. The result is called deflation; people scramble to sell anything to get cards that in the aggregate do not exist.

Okay, so you as Governor of Virginia notice this crisis going on, and you realize your mistake and say, I’ll tax 100 cards and I’ll spend 100 cards. I’ll run a balanced budget. Great. But let’s say I wanted to put one card in my savings account, or keep one around for spending money. I can’t. There are no cards left. The government has spent 100 cards and taxed 100 cards. There is nothing left for what I very carefully call net financial savings.

So let’s talk about savings, or maybe put another way, making money. How can we save money? We see the problem in old Virginia, no cards to save, but it’s the same exact notion for the U.S. dollar savings today. Let’s say that I represent all domestic dollar holders (individuals, pensions, ins cos, banks) and I have a total of one net dollar, meaning net of borrowing. Let’s say you represent all foreign net dollar holders (Toyota, central banks, any foreigners who have net dollars), and you have a total of one net dollar. So there is a total of two net dollars in the world. How are we as a group, going to save money? I guarantee you, that no matter what we do, at the end of the year we’ll all have two net dollars total. You may have $1.50, while I have $0.50, but we’re stuck, the total is two dollars. It’s the same problem as in old Virginia. So, how do we get net financial savings? The answer is, the only way to add to dollar net financial savings, is for the sovereign government to spend money, and not ask for it back in taxes. In other words, deficit spend.

“Budget Deficits are the only source of adding to private sector net financial assets.

Surpluses reduce net financial assets.”

Deficit spending is the source of worldwide net new U.S. dollar financial savings. The national income accounting identity is: the Government deficit EQUALS the non government accumulation of net financial assets.

Budget Deficit = Domestic and Foreign Accumulation of U.S. $ Net Financial Assets”

Notice the word equals. Not approximately, but equals. So when you hear that the deficit is draining our savings, or they show you the National Debt Clock, it’s really the World Dollar Savings Clock. We’ll do more on deficits in a little bit.

Let’s get back to our new sovereign state. We notice that people want to save some cards each year. So as the wise Governor, we decide to tax 100 cards each year, but we will now spend 105 cards. Let’s say that people seem to want to save about 5 cards per year. So here is what’s interesting. We will be deficit spending 5 cards per year, but people want to save these cards, not spend them. Therefore, there is some noninflationary level of the deficit related to the desire to accumulate net financial assets. You can run a deficit without causing inflation if it matches savings desires.

Let’s talk about those 5 cards. At the end of every day, someone is going to have those cards. I could have lent them to you, and you could lend them to a corporation, or even to a bank. But at the end of the day, someone has the cards. How are they going to earn interest overnight? They can’t, not unless the sovereign says, if you give me those 5 cards, I’ll give you a different card, a promise card to pay back those 5 cards with interest. Looks like a Treasury bill to me.

But let’s think about it. Did the sovereign borrow the money to spend? Did the sovereign go begging to the markets for money to be able to spend? No, it’s actually the other way around. The sovereign spends first, and the market begs the sovereign for a security so it can earn interest.

“Sovereign Governments with Fiat Currencies Do Not Borrow in Order to Spend.”

In Fed speak, securities are offered to drain excess reserves, which are called offsetting operating factors. Sound familiar? This is the way all these fiat currency systems operate. The U.S. government does issue securities, but only to support an interest rate, not to borrow and spend. That’s why the “credit” is good. If that’s too much to believe, think of Turkey. Turkey’s annual lire deficit had been running over a quadrillion lire, inflation was 100% per year, triple digit interest rates, and there was huge currency depreciation. Not much faith there. How come they never defaulted? Either they are the greatest borrowers ever known to man, or it’s simply a reserve drain of extra cards.

Let’s continue with old Virginia and the cards. We just saw how the government can create Treasury bills, which are very much like money, and are really just time deposits at the Fed. So we have Treasury bills. But where do bank deposits come from? Again, the answer is from the very first week of any Money and Banking course, and yet very few people recognize the answer. The answer is that all deposits come from loans as a matter of system accounting. Loans create deposits. Most people believe you need funds, deposits, or savings to lend. Absolutely not true. The loan immediately creates its own deposit. That’s how the accounting of the banking system works. You start a bank with $10 in capital and are allowed to leverage to make about $150 of loans. The bank balance sheet includes $150 of loan assets and $150 of deposit liabilities. Loans create all bank deposits.

So now let’s bring in the Federal Reserve. I have very limited time here, so I’m just going to say that we hear about the Fed injecting reserves, pumping in money, printing money, pumping in liquidity to the banking system, and funds not getting distributed to the right people. This is utter misrepresentation and has no application to the non government sector. The Fed’s only tool is a price tool, the fed funds rate. It has no quantity tools.

“The Fed Can Control Only Interest Rates, Not the Quantity of Money”

The Fed has no direct control, over the quantity of bank deposits being created, or the quantity of any other form of credit. All this reserve management from the Fed, adding or subtracting reserves, is just the management of clearing checks at the bank’s segregated Fed accounts. The Fed acts when system or Treasury operating factors may make some of the pluses and not offset the minuses, or the unusual situation like recently, when banks might be afraid to trade their reserves with another bank in the fed funds market.

The Fed does not supply money the banks use for lending, does not directly affect the quantity of bank lending or what is casually known as money supply, and can’t reflate and pump money to banks or anyone else.

Note that when Barclay’s borrowed from the Bank of England 10 days ago, it was because of a clearing house settlement problem at the Central bank.

Please see me later so I can explain what the Fed did on 8/17. They lowered the discount rate only to control the funds rate better and to raise the funds rate from low levels where it was trading. I’ll show you the 8/16 email which shows exactly this recommendation which we communicated to the Fed.

When Japan pumped 30 trillion of excess reserves into the system, this did absolutely nothing, except insure that the overnight funds rate stayed at zero. All the BOJ did, was not offer any JGBs for sale or normal repo operations. People wanted JGBs. The MOF bill auctions were hundreds of times oversubscribed at a yield of 1bp! Go check it out. People wanted to earn something rather than nothing. People wanted their reserves drained. When the reserves were drained and quantitative easing ended, all the BOJ did was offer JGBs to the banks. The economists talked about how the transmission mechanism of this excess liquidity was not making it a real economy. It can’t. Bank lending to the private sector is never reserve constrained. Bank reserves are inside money at accounts at the Fed, and have nothing to do with lending to the non government sector. Remember, lending creates its own deposits. You don’t need reserves or funds.

Let’s talk about money a little more. Everyone talks about money, money supply, and M1, M2, M3. What are these measures? They are basically deposits in the banking system. So we watch the aggregates grow, creating more money. But is it the stuff of the quantity theory of money? If money is doubled, prices are doubled. Remember, all deposits come from loans. All the money supply is not net money, or the net financial assets I talked about at the beginning, its gross money. You get borrowed money in your account, no net money. People are long or short.

So where else do we see this exact relation of longs and shorts? All this gross money is really like the open interest on the Merc. There’s a long (the guy with the money) and a short (the guy who borrowed the money and spent it). When we analyze wheat prices, yes, we do look at open interest. But we look much more closely at current net stocks of wheat, and whether there will be a good new crop. So let’s think about that. We’d like to know about the current stock of net money. But, we said earlier this stock of net money comes from past deficit spending and becomes Treasury securities, and we’d like to know about the new crop. The new crop of net money comes from new deficits. A budget surplus is not only no new crops at all; it’s burning up some of the stocks in the silos. Take a look at the past dollar fx squeezes during budget surpluses.

If you have huge open interest, or huge open interest growth, in this case, huge growth of bank deposits, that circumstance is probably much more sustainable when the net money is growing to support it. The private sector may be able to sustain large borrowing and spending for extended periods. Without the net money growing beneath it, by definition the system leverage gets higher and the potential debt service burdens get progressively more difficult. This has profound implications for how to look at money, credit expansion, and business cycle phases, overextension and contraction.

So now let’s look at this notion of net money and business activity. The entire World Net Dollar Balance is just the opposite of the U.S. Government Dollar Balance. That’s what we just said about deficits providing net dollar savings. This is accounting, not theory. This is not in dispute.

But, if we’re just talking about the U.S. Domestic sector’s net dollar balance, that equals the opposite of the U.S. Government balance plus or minus the foreign account balance.

Domestic Net $ Balance = U.S. Budget Balance and Foreign Net $ Balance”

So a U.S. Government deficit and a U.S. trade surplus would both add to U.S. Domestic savings. Again, this is not in dispute. It’s an accounting identity, not theory. But so many major economists forget about this basic equation and what it means. What does it mean?

Let’s look at the chart. The first conclusion is to notice that if the U.S. foreign account balance is a bigger negative than the savings we get from U.S. government deficit spending, then the U.S. must reduce its net financials assets (generally borrowing) to finance our current consumption. This again, is an accounting identity.

This next chart shows the course of what’s happened. Look at the recent increases in the financial obligations burden to keep our consumption and aggregate demand growing. The U.S. budget deficit is too small to provide enough net financial savings to U.S. domestics to offset our foreign trade balance. This can persist for awhile, but it is ultimately not a sustainable process.

Let’s talk more about savings. The generally accepted notion is that we have to boost savings to be able to boost investment. Good for the economy. Let’s create more savings plans. Remember, saving is not spending your income. If my wife, inexplicably, decides not to spend our income, and not to buy any more cars, is GM or is Toyota going to invest in a new plant? No way. The paradox of savings has been known for centuries, but forgotten. As a matter of fact, the act of saving will reduce effective demand, not stimulate investment, leave inventory unsold (you produced but didn’t buy all the output) and will most likely reduce employment and income.

So what does happen? Savings does equal investment, but it doesn’t happen that you need savings to make the investment.

“Savings Cannot be Altered to Alter Investment.

You Can Encourage Investment
-Which Will Alter Savings-
but Not The Other Way Round.”

It is the act of investment that creates both real and financial savings. Savings are the accounting record of an investment having been made. By definition, investment is spending money to produce a capital good that is not able to be currently bought or consumed. There is nothing to buy, so you must save. The workers have the money they were paid, and their only choice is to save and invest, directly or indirectly, in the capital good. You can individually try to save, but as a whole we can not determine to save. The level of investments will determine the level of saving.

Let’s talk about U.S. saving. You at this conference are the driving force in the powerful structure of incentives to save in the U.S. A large portion of personal income is encouraged to go, and does go, to IRAs, Keoghs, life insurance reserves, pension fund income, endowment income, and other money that compounds continuously and is not spent. Even much of what foreigners get, such as foreign Central Bank dollar accumulation is not spent. We call all this savings demand leakage. This U.S. structure of tax advantaged savings has probably caused the U.S. private sector to desire to be a net saver.

There are two important things about this situation. We do not need these savings for investment. So there’s no need to promote all these plans and incentives. Sorry guys. As we previously pointed out, this desire to not spend will reduce aggregate demand and result in unsold output, causing declining economic activity and declining prices. So what has happened? All these savings plans have allowed the government to deficit spend, to offset all this structurally reduced aggregate demand, without causing inflation. Once we recognize that savings does not cause investment, it follows that the solution to unemployment or low capacity utilization, is not to encourage more savings.

Let’s continue to talk about foreign balance. If we’re running a trade deficit, foreigners are sending us goods and we are sending them dollars. We’re buying their stuff instead of domestic stuff. For that amount of demand, our employment and output is being reduced. So we get underemployment in the U.S. unless we manage to keep domestic demand sufficiently high as we have been doing. When we do that, the notion of comparative advantage is at work and we have a net gain. We’ve been benefiting from this process and should not be fighting imports.

Now remember our identity of the domestic balance is the government plus foreign balances. If we have a 5% foreign trade deficit, but the government is giving us savings with a 5% budget deficit, we’re still only at zero net financial savings. The implication is that now the government can spend a 5% deficit to fully employ our resources without inflation. The government could deficit spend even more to satisfy the desire for positive net financial savings.

Let’s explore this trade deficit for a little bit. There’ so much talk of how vulnerable we are because foreigners won’t keep financing our foreign trade deficit. There is no such thing as foreigners financing the trade deficit.

“The U.S. is NOT Dependent on Foreign Finance For Our Trade Deficit”

I go to Citibank and I borrow money. My account is credited with 50K in deposits and Citi has an asset of 50K in loans. I take my deposit, buy a car. The foreign seller of the car has the money, first as a deposit at a U.S. bank. Everyone is happy, no imbalances and there is no borrowing of foreign capital. Citibank financed the borrowing for my purchase. The foreigner has dollar savings. Domestic credit creation funds this entire foreign savings, all $700 billion. There is no imported capital to fund the trade gap.

Let’s examine this trade deficit further. The U.S. government is begging China to revalue their currency upwards. Are we nuts? Why do we want to pay more for Chinese goods? Why do we want to give the Chinese a pay raise? We don’t allow our own workers minimum wage raises, and yet we want to give those raises to the Chinese.

They’re selling their goods below fair value which is dumping, and what we know to be an unfair trade. Let’s examine that. Dumping is a political problem, not an economic problem. Let’s put aside the issues of whether they’re incurring pollution costs or other social costs, counterfeiting, patent infringement and the like. Let’s say the Chinese are dumping, selling us goods at 35% of fair value. Here in the U.S. we complain. But what is selling us goods at 35% of fair value? It’s selling us 35 goods at fair value and 65 goods for nothing. There is no way, in the aggregate, that we can be worse off when they take their resources, capital, labor, technology and education and sell us goods for nothing. We are better off. The problem, as I said, is a political problem. Because they sell us goods for nothing, there are workers in the U.S. without incomes. But as we showed before, the U.S. government can now deficit spend so we can get the Chinese goods for nothing, and employ or reemploy these workers in the same, or different areas of the economy, to reestablish employment and aggregate demand without causing inflation.

Just two more comments on the foreign trade balance. We are so worried. We’re worried that they own all these paper assets and might sell them. But let’s think of who is at risk. We have the goods and they have these pieces of paper. They have no idea what those pieces of paper are going to be worth in the future. If they dump dollar assets, the value of their remaining holdings is going to fall dramatically. Who’s at risk? We have the cars, clothes and golf clubs. They have the indeterminate value of the paper.

The conventional wisdom is we want the Chinese and the Japanese to start spending on consumer goods, solve the unsustainable world trade imbalances. I don’t. Who wants to be competing for goods with 1.4 billion Chinese? What will happen to the price of all the items we’re consuming once there is competition for those goods? Nope, I want them to work 16 hours a day, sell us everything we need for nothing, have them never buy anything from anyone, and we play golf all day. The conceptual summation of all this is that exports are a cost and imports a benefit. Think about it.

So let’s conclude with some thoughts about the U.S. economic outlook. My partner Warren Mosler, who focuses on economic analysis and has an exceptional command of these dynamics, has helped offer some of these thoughts about the situation.

The U.S. budget deficit continues to contract. As our little identity equation showed before, the result is that net financial assets are not being added fast enough to support the gross dollars and credit structure, to help both support aggregate demand, and to satisfy the desire for savings engendered by all the incentive savings plans represented by this audience. It calls for budget balancing only making all of this worse.

As such, the financial obligations ratio rises to where the U.S. consumer can no longer continue borrowing at previous growth rates. Allocations to passive commodities by pension and endowment institutions actually exacerbated aggregate demand in the past two years. You are all supposed to buy stocks or bonds, but wound up buying all sorts of commodities. Now this phenomenon is cresting, and should also slow aggregate demand. Exports should be a help as they are picking up, but will probably not accelerate sufficiently to maintain fast GDP growth.

On the inflation front, we still see inflation as a problem despite U.S. economic weakness. It is our view that the Saudis basically set the price of oil and let quantity vary. They are the swing producer. They are comfortable with oil in this price range, so we do not expect price declines. Cost push of these prices is still occurring throughout the U.S. and world economy. Agricultural commodities are now linked to energy sector prices through the biofuels industry and are causing a second wave of food inflation. The Fed is very concerned about inflation, and that’s overall inflation, not just core inflation. If we have 0.2 month to month CPI increases for the balance of the year, YOY headline inflation will be well above 4%. The Fed is adamant about the importance of expectations, and those types of CPI numbers will worry the Fed about losing the 25 years of inflation progress they’ve made. With the labor market still tight, low levels of unemployment and high levels of capacity and resource utilization, the Fed is actually hoping for growth to slow substantially to contain this inflation. It may take much more slowing than that or a significant fall in energy and gasoline prices, for the Fed to ease.

With regard to the all important credit structure, I believe there is a very significant shift underway. In the recent past, lending (gross money) has been made easily available for all sorts of lending, business plans, assets and other leveraged ventures. These gross dollars have fueled both current cyclical economic activity and the rise in dollar asset prices around the world. I believe this is changing through both a repricing of the cost of assuming lending risk, and in a change of the simple willingness to lend or the availability of credit. Remember, loans create all deposits. No loans, no deposit growth. The Fed may be willing to oversee this significant contraction. Why? All of us, and the Fed, watched all these non-regulated lending or investment entities with much higher risk parameters go out and snub their noses at regulated entities and seemingly pass them by in good times. The Fed is not likely to want to provide a safety net and reward them for this type of frowned upon behavior. The Fed will probably be happy to see assets come back to the banking system, under their rules, regulations, and purview. In addition, the Fed will be happy for the greater stability it will bring to the capital structure of the markets and economy because the funding on bank’s balance sheets is anchored by FDIC insured deposits that don’t flee. The U.S. learned this lesson in 1934 with the establishment of deposit insurance to prevent runs on bank funding. The current voluntary termination of lending agreements (loans roll off), or withdrawal of CP deposits, and even withdrawals from hedge funds, highlight the system fragility of highly leveraged enterprises that are subject to liquidity redemptions. The sectors of the market and economy that relied upon these lending and securitization structures for funding will likely suffer, and the lending or credit participants in these sectors will likely be replaced by banks and GSEs.

Fiat currency sovereign issuers are not at risk. However, corporations, municipalities, leveraged loan and investment structures (LBO, private equity), and foreign countries issuing in denominations other than their fiat currency are at risk.

I’ll even present the notion that European government debt is at risk because a strict reading of Maastricht has created municipalities, not sovereigns, without the ECB to provide support. Did you notice that Saachsen Bank had to be bailed out by the German Savings Bank Society?

However, I have one note of caution or caveat to this notion of contraction and rationality. The financial engineering genie is out of the bottle. Financial engineering really began to accelerate when I entered the bond side of the business in the late 1970s with the advent of GNMA futures, Treasury bond and bill futures, currency and stock futures, and then the monumental creation of the interest rate swap, that became the foundation for modern derivatives such as caps, floors, swaptions, total return swaps, all variety of structured notes and even the recent explosion of credit derivatives. These instruments provide the ability to create huge notional exposures, with notional exposures in this credit arena that are hundreds of times the risk in the real economy. IBM used to have 1BB of bonds outstanding. That was the credit risk. Now the credit risk exposure taken by participants can be hundreds or thousands of times the size of the bond issue itself. While the risk may be more diversified or less concentrated, the huge notional size causes great market dislocations. But what I’m saying, is that in cycle after cycle, because it’s so difficult to make real spreads make real returns or real alpha, investors will again seek out the new product, the new leverage, the new derivative (like CDOs, CLOs, CDS) that allow the investor to greatly leverage to seemingly earn superior returns, only to see the eventual risks come to roost and the underlying risks exposed. It will happen again, the form will be different, but it will happen again.

I want to thank everyone for their great courtesy in attending today, and I hope this time together has accomplished something towards my goal, that you won’t be looking at the world economic scene in quite the same way again, and that maybe with a new understanding you’ll be an instrument for positive change in how we should conduct our economic lives.

Thank you very much.


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2008-08-13 US Economic Releases


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MBA Mortgage Applications (Aug 8)

Survey n/a
Actual -1.5%
Prior 2.8%
Revised n/a

Muddling through on the low side as mortgage bankers lose market share to banks.

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MBA Purchasing Index (Aug 8)

Survey n/a
Actual 315.2
Prior 315.2
Revised n/a

Flat at low levels.

May do better as the seasonal adjustments get easier.

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MBA Refinancing Index (Aug 8)

Survey n/a
Actual 1074.6
Prior 1121.8
Revised n/a

Slowing, as bulk of resets are past and rates are doing nothing.

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MBA ALLX 1 (Aug 8)

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MBA ALLX 2 (Aug 8)

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Bloomberg Global Confidence (Aug)

Survey n/a
Actual 14.10
Prior 10.30
Revised n/a

Low, but improving.

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Import Price Index MoM (Jul)

Survey 1.0%
Actual 1.7%
Prior 2.6%
Revised 2.9%

Scary stuff if you are responsible for the value of the currency.

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Import Price Index YoY (Jul)

Survey 20.4%
Actual 21.6%
Prior 20.5%
Revised 21.1%

‘Inflation’ flooding in through the open window.

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Import Price Index ALLX 1 (Jul)

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Import Price Index ALLX 2 (Jul)

Karim writes:

Import prices continue uptrend

  • Headline +1.7% m/m; ex-petroleum up 0.9% m/m

Yes and ex petro 8% year over year and still rising. And this takes time to pass through to core CPI.

  • Expect headline to be below core for the next few mths though

Yes, if gasoline stays down.

But rental vacancies took a small turn down, and owner equivalent rent already printed a 0.3%, and seems with starts so far down there has to be a shortage of actual units available to live in. Also, lots of catching up to do in other core measures, like medical and others which had some prints on the low side.

All of their costs are rising and push up prices with various lags.

And Russia has demonstrated they can do whatever they want and there’s nothing anyone can do about it.

Not good…

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Advance Retail Sales MoM (Jul)

Survey -0.1%
Actual -0.1%
Prior 0.1%
Revised 0.3%

Down some as expected due to weak car sales, but prior month revised up.

Sometimes if people don’t buy cars they buy other things…

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Advance Retail Sales YoY (Jul)

Survey n/a
Actual 2.6%
Prior 3.4%
Revised n/a

Still looks to be moving off a bottom.

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Retail Sales Less Autos MoM (Jul)

Survey 0.5%
Actual 0.4%
Prior 0.8%
Revised 0.9%

Looks okay, a tenth below expectations but prior month revised up the same tenth.

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Retail Sales Less Autos YoY (Jul)

Survey n/a
Actual 6.0%
Prior 6.4%
Revised n/a

Looking reasonably firm.

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Advance Retail Sales ALLX (Jul)

On Wed, Aug 13, 2008 at 8:54 AM, Karim writes:

Retail sales generally weak but in line with expectations

  • Headline -0.1% m/m; ex-gas -0.2% m/m; ex-autos +0.4%; control group +0.3%
  • Rebate checks did trickle in through July so some help from there
  • Looks like real PCE off to flat start in Q3, perhaps explaining Fisher’s remark yesterday that ‘we will broach zero growth’ in the second half of the year

The FOMC now has a multi year history of underestimating GDP and inflation.

Seems with Q2 GDP now looking like 3% or more, and the first half therefore averaging maybe over 2%, and year over year gdp still pushing 3%, they would either adjust or downgrade their GDP forecasting model.

Same with their inflation forecasting model, as cpi moves through 5% and core elevates from levels not long ago forecast at not a lot more than half that.

Looking more and more like the real economy did bottom in Q4 2007, as private forecasters are now starting to project positive gdp for Q3 and Q4, and some for Q1 2009 as well.

And even if the saudis keep crude at current levels core cpi should continue to march higher for many more quarters as it all catches up to the shift from $20 crude to $100+ crude.

Yes, the financial sector continues to have issues, may severe, but blood is flowing around the clot as the real economy moves forward.

Housing starts peaked in the early 1970s at 2.6 million with only 215 million people and no secondary market or housing agencies- just a bunch of dumb s and l’s taking in deposits and making mortgages (is used to work at one back then).

Today with 50% more people we call 2 million units gangbusters.

The financial innovation is all predatory at the macro level, though at the micro level we’d grown dependent on it for sure.

Yes, US exports are reducing foreign GDP growth, but their are signs they are moving to support domestic demand with fiscal measures, including Japan, the UK, and even some talk from the eurozone, and even china announced lower inflation numbers to justify supporting growth.

And Saudi crude output shows no sign of world net supply going up. Current price action just some kind of massive ‘inventory adjustment’.

Yes, that can change but hasn’t yet.

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Business Inventories MoM (Jun)

Survey 0.5%
Actual 0.7%
Prior 0.3%
Revised 0.4%

3% Q2 GDP means more inventory is needed.

Also, this and previous inventory data for June higher than expected which means Q2 might be revised up that much more as very low inventory levels were estimated with the initial 1.9% release for Q2 GDP.

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Business Inventories YoY (Jun)

Survey n/a
Actual 5.6%
Prior 5.3%
Revised n/a

Not the usual recession pattern.

The real sector seems well managed.

The financial sector is another story. They don’t count mbs inventory, for example, in this series…

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Business Inventories TABLE 1 (Jun)

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Business Inventories TABLE 2 (Jun)


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NYPost: Lost Sovereignity – There’s a new land grab


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Hope they don’t dig it up and take it home!

Lost Sovereignity

Oil-rich Fund Eyeing Foreclosed US Homes


By Teri Buhl

There’s a new land grab starting in America.

Foreign money, which up to now has focused its attention on investing in iconic commercial real estate – like Barneys New York and the Chrysler Building – is now moving to scoop up tens of thousands of discounted foreclosed homes across the country.

One sovereign fund, said to have earmarked $29 billion to purchase foreclosed residential real estate, recently hired a West Coast mortgage broker and is starting to search for bargains, The Post has learned.

The search, which is being carried out, in part, by Field Check Group mortgage consultant Mark Hanson, who was retained by the broker, Steve Iversen, is concentrating on single- and multi-family REO (real estate owned) homes, or homes that have already been taken over by the mortgagee.

Neither Iversen nor Hanson would disclose the name of the client, but sources told The Post it’s a sovereign fund.

The unidentified fund joins individual US investors, hedge funds and Wall Street banks in kicking the tires of REO homes, which have fallen in value so much that they are now tempting investments.

A sovereign fund would have two distinct advantages over other investors – the depressed value of the US dollar makes the homes a bargain, and sovereign funds have deeper pockets.

The sovereign fund of Abu Dhabi, for example, has a reported $875 billion in assets, while Norway has $391 billion, Singapore has $303 billion and Kuwait has $264 billion in their sovereign funds, which are funded by proceeds from oil sales.

The Abu Dhabi Investment Authority is expected to announce next month what type of US distressed assets they will be investing in and real estate is at the top of the list, according to a report in Financial Times last week.

ADIA did not respond to an e-mail question about REO investments.

So far, prices on bulk sales of REO properties vary based on location and are selling from 60 cents to 80 cents on the dollar. Hanson started out offering 40 cents on the dollar for about $2.5 billion worth of California properties owned by IndyMac and Washington Mutual but was turned down. The banks refused to comment.

Hanson is now willing to pay 50 cents to 60 cents on the dollar for a collection of California REOs worth at least $500 million.

In fact, this week Hanson’s team negotiated a $2 billion package mixed with homes across the country for 31 cents on the dollar. While progress seems slow, Hanson reminds us this is only a nine-month old industry.

Some market experts think such deeply discounted REOs, like the deal Hanson just closed, are more fiction than fact.

“The size and discount of that type of deal isn’t the norm yet,” said Robert Pardes, with Recourse Recovery Management Services, a provider of mortgage advisory services.

“The critical mass of bulk REO is in well-capitalized institutions that don’t need to sell yet in bulk at a deep discount because they are better off not taking substantial hits to the capital just to get the assets off their books,”

This may change, should the market become more crowded with bank failures and distressed institutions, he said.

Enoch Lawrence, senior vice president of CB Richard Ellis, says “This type of bulk buy would make an impact on the market. They are in a unique position because they have a long time horizon to invest and a cheap cost of capital. It’s actually a perfect time for them to acquire these REO assets.”


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NYT: Too big to fail?


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Too Big to Fail?


by Peter S Goodman

Using public money to spare Fannie and Freddie would increase the public debt, which now exceeds $9.4 trillion. The United States has been financing itself by leaning heavily on foreigners, particularly China, Japan and the oil-rich nations of the Persian Gulf.

This is ridiculous, of course. The US, like any nation with its own non-convertible currency, is best thought of as spending first, and then borrowing and/or collecting taxes.

Were they to become worried that the United States might not be able to pay up, that would force the Treasury to offer higher rates of interest for its next tranche of bonds.

Also ridiculous. Japan had total debt of 150% of GDP, 7% annual deficits, and were downgraded below Botswana, and they sold their 3 month bills at about 0.0001% and 10 year securities at yields well below 1% while the BOJ voted to keep rates at 0%. (Nor did their currency collapse.)

The CB sets the rate by voice vote.

And that would increase the interest rates that Americans must pay for houses and cars, putting a drag on economic growth.

As above.

For one thing, this argument goes, taxpayers — who now confront plunging house prices, a drop on Wall Street and soaring costs for food and fuel — will ultimately pay the costs. To finance a bailout, the government can either pull more money from citizens directly,

Yes, taxing takes money directly, and it’s contradictionary.

But when the government sells securities they merely provide interest bearing financial assets (treasury securities) for non-interest bearing financial assets (bank deposits at the Fed). Net financial assets and nominal wealth are unchanged.

or the Fed can print more money — a step that encourages further inflation.

This is inapplicable.

There is no distinction between ‘printing money’ and some/any other way government spends.

The term ‘printing money’ refers to convertible currency regimes only, where there is a ratio of bill printed to reserves backing that convertible currency.

Skip to next paragraph “They are going to raise the cost of living for every American,”

True, that’s going up!


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AFP: British finances


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The deficit will go higher. The only question is whether it will go higher the nice way (proactive spending or tax cut to restore demand and growth), or the ugly way (revenues fall and transfer payments go up until the deficit is large enough to restore financial equity and aggregate demand).
Solvency is not an issue. The choice is purely political.

British finance minister paints bleak picture of economy

Britain’s economic downturn is worse than previously thought and there is no extra money available for public spending, Chancellor of the Exchequer Alistair Darling said in an interview published Saturday.

There’s the problem. They’ve got it backwards – the money to pay taxes comes from government spending, not vice versa as they think.

Darling also told The Times newspaper that taxpayers were at the limit of what they were willing to pay, a day after official data showed a record deficit in Britain’s public finances, and reports that the government might bend its budget rules.

“At Christmas most people remained hopeful there would be an improvement by the autumn,” he said.

“Most people would now say it’s far more profound. It’s affecting every economy and everybody. I can’t say how long it will last.”

He added: “We are going through a very, very difficult time.”

Yes, and the government is making it worse.

Darling said that the economic picture was “at the bottom end of my range” set out in his annual budget in March.

On public spending, the finance minister said he has been “very clear with my colleagues that there is no point them writing in saying, ‘Can we have some more money?’ because the reply is already on its way and it’s a very short reply.”

“I told them at the last meeting of Cabinet they’ve got to manage within the money they’ve got.”

Again, they’ve got it backwards – the money to pay taxes comes from govt spending, not vice versa as they think.

The Office for National Statistics said on Friday that public sector debt at the end of June was at 38.3 percent of GDP, but increased to 44.2 percent when the impact of nationalised mortgage lender Northern Rock is included.

Japan’s been at 150%. Doesn’t matter. It’s all a function of private/non-government savings desires which are a function of institutional structure, including tax advantages for not spending income for the likes of pension fund contributions, ins reserves, etc.

Public finances were at a record deficit of 15.5 billion pounds in June compared with the same time last year, well over market expectations of a 12.3-billion-pound deficit.

So? If demand is deemed too low it’s not enough, whatever it is.

The Financial Times, meanwhile, reported that finance ministry officials were working on plans to revise the rules to allow for increased borrowing without raising taxes amid the current economic downturn.

In actual fact they spend first, then borrow, but they don’t know that either.

One of the fiscal rules sets a government borrowing limit of 40 percent of national income.

Yes, a self imposed constraint not inherent in the system.

In The Times interview, Darling played down the report and reiterated comments made Friday that the Treasury constantly reviews its fiscal rules.

He noted, however, that while voters will “pay their fair share … you can’t push that.”

“My judgment is that there are a lot of people in this country who feel they work hard, they make their contribution and they’re feeling squeezed.”

Yes they are, but the deficit isn’t the problem.


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Re: Alt A downgrades


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(An email exchange)

On Wed, Jun 4, 2008 at 12:57 AM, Eric wrote:
>     I guess you have seen this article.
>
>      Primes going down too.
>
>
>      More generally look at the attached graphs, they suggest that IOs and other
>      exotic mortgage are clearly a major cause of the problems, independently of
>      the quality of the loans. I think there is here a pretty good argument to make
>      that non-fixed mortgages, and more especially exotic mortgage have structural
>      characteristics that make them prone to speculative and ponzi structure. The
>      borrowers expect to be able to refinance at one point once interest rate reset or
>      the principal become due. Warren you were saying that proof of ability to pay
>     “libor plus 3 or whatever” was necessary to qualify. This margin of safety
>      (expected ability to pay libor +3 even though now borrower pay only teaser rate)
>      may have been destroyed in several ways.
>
>      – the interest rate may have reset at a higher rate than libor + 3, so that people
>      cannot afford the mortgage anymore.
>
>      – ARMs reinforce the probability of the previous effect, especially when libor when
>      up sky high after the crisis
>
>     – Income of borrowers felt short of expectations, expecially with the economic
>     slowdown (here fiscal policy is clearly a big player)
>
>     – The margin of safety thinned. Maybe previously they had to prove libor + 5 but
>     progressively borrower only had to prove libor + 4 then libor + 3. This would qualify
>      more borrowers and make the deal more sensitive to shock in product and financial
>      markets
>
>      In all this case the affordability of the mortgage is questioned Þ need to refinance Þ
>      if not available then sell the house (short sale or foreclosure). Fixed-rate mortgage
>      eliminate three of the previous reason (only income expectations is a problem).
>
>      Éric

agreed with all.

add to that food and energy prices taking income from home mtg payments, which could be the larger short term effect.

the fed has been taking some heat for this under the theory that the low rates have hurt the $ and thereby hurt the financial sector via the above channel, rather than helped the financial sector via lower rates ‘easing’ conditions via the lower payments channel.

the fed has argued this isn’t the case, insisting the lower rates have helped more than hurt.

also, the fiscal package could soften some of the delinquency increases for a few months.


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