Saudi output

Saudis set price and let their clients buy all they want at the price settings, so their output continually adjusts to equal global demand net of all others producers.

What’s clear is that said net global demand has fluctuated very little, obviating the notion that the price collapse was somehow a function of a collapse of demand.

saudi-output-march

macro update

Let’s look at the Saudi price cuts in the context of the accounting identity that states that for everyone who spent less than his income, another must must have spent more than her income or that much output would not have been sold. ;)

The price cut itself shifts income from producers to consumers. And to the extent that consumers have a higher propensity to spend that gain than the amount the producers will cut spending more output will get sold. So the analysts who are forecasting a net gain for the US economy are hanging their hats on consumers spending more of their fuel savings than producers who lose that much income cutting back on their spending. Not to forget the potential loss of US exports that are sold to non residents spending their incomes earned from oil production, and the new US consumer spending that will be spent on imports. In other words, there may not be a whole lot of difference in total spending.

And there is another factor. While new oil related investment was partially financed from earnings it was also funded via agents ‘spending more than their incomes’ through bank loans and other forms of debt.

That is, part of the ‘spending more than income’ that was critical to the support of US domestic demand was coming from the energy sector. And much of that support is fading fast, as reports of reduced capex, falling rig counts, etc. continue to accelerate.

Additionally, to the same point, a deflationary environment tends to subdue bank lending, as previously discussed. And housing prices, for example, were already softening prior to the oil price cuts.

Therefore, to the extent that the ‘borrowing to spend’ falls back more than the oil consumers vs producers propensity to spend increases, aggregate demand/sales/GDP/employment falls.

Not to mention the oil price itself goes into the GDP calculation to the extent the oil price drop exceeds the GDP deflator.

I was already looking for a weak Q4 and beyond due to the deficit being too small for the current degree of credit expansion, and now this makes it a whole lot worse…

Oil futures show spot shortage, not surplus, Cuts, PCR on jobs

When there is a surplus of physical supply the nearby contracts trade at lower prices, with prices going higher as you go further out to discount storage charges. That is, with a physical glut of supply the storage facilities fill up and the price of storage goes up.

Likewise, when spot is in short supply, it trades higher than the out months, indicating refiners are willing to pay more to get what they immediately need.

Also note that buyers of futures are matched by sellers who are either getting outright short, or are buying spot and selling futures due to a favorable spread called the ‘carry’ that rewards them for taking delivery and redelivering in the future at the higher price. So again, the wide ‘contango’ as its called, with futures higher than spot, is the evidence of a spot surplus of supply. This contango can be over $1/month, depending on the size of the surplus.

So the markets are telling us price is going down without any sign of a surplus of actual output, as further confirmed by Saudi output figures posted previously.

It all comes down to the supplier of last resort, the Saudis, setting the price, also as previously described.

cl-1

cl-2

Cuts happening fast!!!

Oil giant BP is accelerating plans to cut hundreds of jobs within its back-office departments – many of them based in the UK and US.

Dec 7 (BBC) — The company, which has been downsizing since the oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico in 2010, said it had long planned the cuts, but is speeding up the process due to falling oil prices.

Crude prices have fallen by almost 40% this year, reducing oil firms’ margins.

BP employs almost 84,000 people worldwide, and some 15,000 in the UK.

In the US, the firm employs 20,000 people, many of whom are based in Texas.

“The fall in oil prices has added to the importance of making the organisation more efficient,” a BP spokesman told the BBC, “and the right size for the smaller portfolio we now have”.

Earlier on Sunday, The Sunday Times newspaper quoted BP’s finance director, Brian Gilvary, as saying “headcounts are starting to come down across all our activities”.

He added that the cuts would apply to “essentially the layers above operations”.

Comments on crude pricing, the economy, and the banking system

Crude pricing

The Saudis are the ‘supplier of last resort’/swing producer. Every day the world buys all the crude the other producers sell to the highest bidder and then go to the Saudis for the last 9-10 million barrels that are getting consumed. They either pay the Saudis price or shut the lights off, rendering the Saudis price setter/swing producer.

Specifically, the Saudis don’t sell at spot price in the market place, but instead simply post prices for their customers/refiners and let them buy all they want at those prices.

And most recently the prices they have posted have been fixed spreads from various benchmarks, like Brent.

Saudi spread pricing works like this:
Assume, for purposes of illustration, Saudi crude would sell at a discount of $1 vs Brent (due to higher refining costs etc.) if they let ‘the market’ decide the spread by selling a specific quantity at ‘market prices’/to the highest bidder. Instead, however, they announce they will sell at a $2 discount to Brent and let the refiners buy all they want.

So what happens?
The answer first- this sets a downward price spiral in motion. Refiners see the lower price available from the Saudis and lower the price they are willing to pay everyone else. And everyone else is a ‘price taker’ selling to the highest bidder, which is now $1 lower than ‘indifference levels’. When the other suppliers sell $1 lower than before the Saudi price cut/larger discount of $1, the Brent price drops by $1. Saudi crude is then available for $1 less than before, as the $2 discount remains in place. Etc. etc. with no end until either:
1) The Saudis change the discount/raise their price
2) Physical demand goes up beyond the Saudis capacity to increase production

And setting the spread north of ‘neutral’ causes prices to rise, etc.

Bottom line is the Saudis set price, and have engineered the latest decline. There was no shift in net global supply/demand as evidenced by Saudi output remaining relatively stable throughout.

The Global Economy

If all the crude had simply been sold to the highest bidder/market prices, in a non monetary relative value world the amount consumed would have been ‘supply limited’ based on the real marginal cost, etc. And if prices were falling do to an increased supply offered for sale, the relative price of crude would be falling as the supply purchased and consumed rose. This would represent an increase in real output and real consumption/real GDP(yes, real emissions, etc.)

However, that’s not the case with the Saudis as price setter. The world was not operating on a ‘quantity constrained’ basis as the Saudis were continuously willing to sell more than the world wanted to purchase from them at their price. If there was any increase in non Saudi supply, total crude sales/consumption remained as before, but with the Saudis selling that much less.

Therefore, with the drop in prices, at least in the near term, output/consumption/GDP doesn’t per se go up.

Nor, in theory, in a market economy/flexible prices, does the relative value of crude change. Instead, all other prices simply adjust downward in line with the drop in crude prices.

Let me elaborate.
In a market economy (not to say that we actually have one) only one price need be set and with all others gravitating towards ‘indifference levels’. In fact, one price must be set or it’s all a ‘non starter’. So which price is set today? Mainstream economists ponder over this, and, as they’ve overlooked the fact that the currency is a public monopoly, have concluded that the price level exists today for whatever ‘historic’ reasons, and the important question is not how it got here, but what might make it change from today’s level. That is, what might cause ‘inflation’. That’s where inflation expectations theory comes in. For lack of a better reason, the ‘residual’ is that it’s inflation expectations that cause changes in the price level. And not anything else, which are relative value stories. And they operate through two channels- workers demanding higher wages and people accelerating purchases. Hence the fixation on wages as the cause of inflation, and using ‘monetary policy’ to accelerate purchases, etc.

Regardless of the ‘internal merits’ of this conclusion, it’s all obviated by the fact that the currency itself is a simple public monopoly, rendering govt price setter. Note the introduction of monetary taxation, the basis of the currency, is coercive, and obviously not a ‘market expense’ for the taxpayer, and therefore the idea of ‘neutrality’ of the currency in entirely inapplicable. In fact, since the $ to pay taxes and buy govt secs, assuming no counterfeiting, ultimately come only from the govt of issue, (as they say in the Fed, you can’t have a reserve drain without a prior reserve add), the price level is entirely a function of prices paid by the govt when it spends and/or collateral demanded when it lends. Said another way, since we need the govt’s $ to pay taxes, the govt is, whether it knows it or not, setting ‘terms of exchange’ when it buys our goods and service.

Note too that monopolists set two prices, the value of their product/price level as just described above, and what’s called the ‘own rate’/how it exchanges for itself, which for the currency is the interest rate, which is set by a vote at the CB.

The govt/mainstream, of course, has no concept of all this, as inflation expectations theory remains ‘well anchored.’ ;)

In fact, when confronted, argues aggressively that I’m wrong (story of my life- remember, they laughed at the Yugo…)

What they have done is set up a reasonably deflationary purchasing program, of buying from the lowest bidder in competition, and managed to keep federal wages/compensation a bit ‘behind the curve’ as well, partially indexed to their consumer price index, etc.

And consequently, govt has defacto advocated pricing power to the active monopolist, the Saudis, which explains why changes in crude prices and ‘inflation’ track as closely as they do.

Therefore, the way I see it is the latest Saudi price cuts are revaluing the dollar (along with other currencies with similar policies, which is most all of them) higher. A dollar now buys more oil and, to the extend we have a market economy that reflects relative value, more of most everything else. That is, it’s a powerful ‘deflationary bias’ (consequently rewarding ‘savers’ at the expense of ‘borrowers’) without necessarily increasing real output.

In fact, real output could go lower due to an induced credit contraction, next up.

Banking

Deflation is highly problematic for banks. Here’s what happened at my bank to illustrate the principle:

We had a $6.5 million loan on the books with $11 million of collateral backing it. Then, in 2009 the properties were appraised at only $8 million. This caused the regulators to ‘classify’ the loan and give it only $4 million in value for purposes of calculating our assets and capital. So our stated capital was reduced by $2.5 million, even though the borrower was still paying and there was more than enough market value left to cover us.

So the point is, even with conservative loan to value ratios of the collateral, a drop in collateral values nonetheless reduces a banks reported capital. In theory, that means if the banking system needs an 8% capital ratio, and is comfortably ahead at 10%, with conservative loan to value ratios, a 10% across the board drop in assets prices introduces the next ‘financial crisis’. It’s only a crisis because the regulators make it one, of course, but that’s today’s reality.

Additionally, making new loans in a deflationary environment is highly problematic in general for similar reasons. And the reduction in ‘borrowing to spend’ on energy and related capital goods and services is also a strong contractionary bias.

UPDATE: Saudi Arabia cuts all oil prices to U.S., Asia – Bloomberg (OIL)

Dec 4 — Saudi Arabia cuts all oil prices to U.S. and Asia, according to Bloomberg headlines.

UPDATE: Reports have the message issued by Saudi Aramco — the state-owned oil and gas giant — now recalled.

ADP, mtg purch apps, Productivity, ISM, oil and gas well permits

Remember, this is their forecast for Friday, not hard data from their subscribers:

ADP Employment Report
eco-1
Highlights
ADP’s estimate for private payroll growth for November is 208,000 vs the Econoday consensus for 225,000 and against a revised 233,000 for October. The corresponding Econoday consensus for Friday’s jobs report from the government is 225,000 vs October’s 209,000.

Both ADP and the BLS data have shown new jobs working their way lower after peaking earlier in the year after dipping for the cold winter and at the same time absorbing some of the 1.2 million who lost benefits at year end and subsequently took menial jobs:
eco-2

Mtg purchase apps still down year over year and moving sideways at best:

MBA Purchase Applications
eco-3
Highlights
The purchase index snapped back in the holiday shortened November 28 week, rising 3.0 percent after falling 10.0 percent in the prior week. The gain helped the year-on-year reading which improved to minus 4.0 percent from minus 10.0 percent. The refinance index, however, continues its long run in negative trend, down a steep 13.0 percent for a sixth straight decline. Rates were mostly lower in the week with the average 30-year mortgage for conforming loans ($417,000 or less) down 7 basis points in the week to 4.08 percent.
eco-4

The decline in unit labor costs might be of interest to the Fed:

Productivity and Costs
eco-5
Highlights
Nonfarm productivity growth for the third quarter was revised up to an annualized 2.3 percent from the first estimate of 2.0 percent and following a 2.9 percent boost in the second quarter. Unit labor costs were revised down notably to minus 1.0 percent from a first estimate of up 0.3 percent after falling an annualized 3.7 percent in the second quarter.

Output growth slowed to 4.9 percent in the third quarter, following a 5.5 percent jump the prior quarter. Compensation growth in the third quarter was up 1.3 percent annualized after a dip of 0.9 percent the previous period.

Year-on-year, productivity was up 1.0 percent in the third quarter, down from 1.3 percent in the second quarter. Year-ago unit labor costs were up 1.2 percent, compared to up 0.7 percent in the second quarter.

The latest productivity report points to positive company profits and mild gains in consumer income.
eco-6

Good news on the ISM survey, though the employment index fell:

ISM Non-Mfg Index
eco-7
Highlights
ISM’s non-manufacturing sample reports very solid conditions, at a composite 59.3 in November vs 57.1 in October. Aside from August’s 59.6, November is a recovery high going back more than 9 years. New orders are very strong, up 2.3 points in the month to 61.4 with backlog orders up 4.0 points to 55.5 in a reading last matched in April 2011. Strength in orders is keeping up business activity which rose 4.4 points to a very strong 64.4. Employment remains solid but did slow 2.9 points from October’s near record of 59.6. Deliveries slowed noticeably, which is another sign of strength, while inventories rose. Pressures on input prices rose a bit to 54.4 which, however, is still benign for this reading. A look at industries shows the retail sector at top, which of course is very good news going into the holidays, and construction right behind which is also very good news. This report points to solid year-end acceleration for the economy.

eco-8

Meanwhile, the oil drilling slowdown might be on the high side of expectations:

Exclusive: New U.S. oil and gas well November permits tumble nearly 40 percent

By Kristin Hays

Dec 2 (Reuters) — Plunging oil prices sparked a drop of almost 40 percent in new well permits issued across the United States in November, in a sudden pause in the growth of the U.S. shale oil and gas boom that started around 2007.

Data provided exclusively to Reuters on Tuesday by industry data firm Drilling Info Inc showed 4,520 new well permits were approved last month, down from 7,227 in October.

The pullback was a “very quick response” to U.S. crude prices, which settled on Tuesday at $66.88 CLc1, said Allen Gilmer, chief executive officer of Drilling Info.

New permits, which indicate what drilling rigs will be doing 60-90 days in the future, showed steep declines for the first time this year across the top three U.S. onshore fields: the Permian Basin and Eagle Ford in Texas and North Dakota’s Bakken shale.

The Permian Basin in West Texas and New Mexico showed a 38 percent decline in new oil and gas well permits last month, while the Eagle Ford and Bakken permit counts fell 28 percent and 29 percent, respectively, the data showed.

Crude break evens for drillers, construction spending

If you can buy oil cheaper in the fwd and futures markets why bother to drill for it?
;)

Charts from Citi:
co-be-1

co-be-2

Construction Spending
cs-oct-table
Highlights
Construction outlays rebounded significantly on public outlays and the private residential component. Construction spending jumped 1.1 percent in October after a 0.1 percent dip in September. Market expectations were for a 0.6 percent boost.

October’s increase was led by public outlays which rebounded 2.3 percent after a 1.6 percent fall in September. Private residential spending gained 1.3 percent, following an increase of 0.8 percent the month before.

Private nonresidential construction spending slipped 0.1 percent, following a rise of 0.2 percent in September.

Note that the year over year growth rate is declining, and looks like it isn’t growing as fast this year as last year:

cs-oct

personal income and consumption charts and comments, and a word on oil

This is after tax personal income not adjusted for inflation. Note that there was anticipation of an acceleration from the first quarter, but now it looks like the growth has slowed and rolled over:

11-28-1

Here you can see how it was growing steadily, then shifted down when my payroll tax holiday expired, sort of resumed growing at the same rate, and now may be falling off, even with what the mainstream call ‘solid’ payroll growth:

11-28-2
Likewise, there’s been a lid on the growth personal consumption expenditures where the growth rate dipped for the cold winter, recovered, and then fell off some:

11-28-3

11-28-4

Adjusted for inflation/cpi the pattern is the same:

11-28-5

Oil- Not all that much to it.

The Saudis remain price setter as a simple point of logic.

No telling what their price target may be at any time, but they simply set price for their refiners and let them buy all they want at that price. And no one else has the excess capacity to do that.

Possible motives?

Put high priced producers out of business with $trillions of losses to make sure that when the subsequently raise prices to 150(?) new investment in high priced crude will then be considered to risky for anyone to finance?

And/or it’s not illegal for insiders to have gotten short for their personal accounts prior to the price cuts and subsequently covering prior to increasing prices, functionally transferring a bit of wealth from the state to private accounts?

Ramifications for the US:

US consumers helped a bit- about $100 billion/year last I heard?

Capex gets hurt by at least that much?

Trillions in value lost from loans and investments going south?

Thousands of high paying jobs lost in North Dakota, etc. due to reduced capex?

(EU not so much as they don’t invest nearly as much in high priced energy exploration/production?)

Canada, Mexico, Venezuela, Australia etc. economies and related securities/investments toast?

etc.