Tag Archives: Treasury

2008-09-16 JN Highlights

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Highlights:

Aug Consumer Sentiment Hits Record Low For 3rd Month
Govt Panel To Call For Cutting Corporate Tax To 30% By FY15
Ota Reelected As New Komeito Leader For Another 2 Years
Extra Budget To Total 1.81tn Yen, Govt Eyes 400bn Yen Bonds
Lehman Failure Not To Mar Japan Financial System: Ibuki
BOJ Injects Y1.5tln To Calm Markets
New-Condo Offerings Tumble 38% In Tokyo, Rise 7% In Osaka For Aug
Forex Focus: Yen To Benefit From Banking Woes
Stocks: Slide To 3-Year Low As Banks, Insurers Tumble
Bonds: Surge After Lehman Bankruptcy, Market Turmoil

 

Note Japan’s proposed fiscal responses: cutting corp tax and extra budget, while the proposed increased consumption tax has been delayed.

Same in most nations around the world.

Fiscal responses ‘work’ while interest rate cuts don’t.

The US tax rebates worked while there is no econometric evidence the rate cuts did anything, except maybe make things worse as they reduced personal income and contributed psychologically to a USD sell off and spike in import prices that probably hurt consumers at least as much as it helped exporters.

The Fed could to anything today from unchanged to a 50 cut.

They seemed to have decided to use interest rates for ‘monetary policy’ and other tools for ‘market functioning’.

So for market functioning they just expanded the scope of the TAF and the Treasury lending facility, and may do more of that type of thing at today’s meeting, including adjusting the terms of the discount rate.

The question is whether falling commodities and the stronger USD will lead to a further rate cut.

What the Fed knows and has recognized since the Bear Stearns episode is that markets are going to open every day and do their thing, as the last week’s activity has demonstrated.

The Fed’s perceived risk of markets simply not opening and not trading has subsided.

Also, with the Treasury take over of the agencies mtg rates have dropped over 50 bp and availability of mortgage funding has been sustained.

The Fed considers this an ‘easing of financial conditions’ and is the move they’ve wanted to see to support housing, which has shown signs of stabilizing.

And the Treasury has shown it’s there to ‘write the check’ as it sees the need to prevent systemic risk.

So from that point of view there has already been a substantial ease in ‘financial conditions’, and the Fed may not see a need for further immediate ease.

Their forecasts will continue to show ‘moderating inflation and continued downside risks to growth’.

It all depends on their fear factor. They could leave fed funds unchanged or cut up to 50, depending on their concern regarding systemic risk.


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Thoughts on the bailout of Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae

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It comes down to public purpose.

The agencies were set up to provide low cost funding for moderate income home buyers.

They have done that reasonably well.

However, for probably 20 years I’ve been saying the agencies should fund themselves directly with the Treasury or Fed financing bank (same as Treasury). This both lowers their cost of funds, which would get passed through to the home mortgages they originate, and eliminates the possibility of a liquidity crisis.

Market discipline should not be on the liability side. It subjects them to risk of a ‘liquidity crisis’ where those funding you can decide to go play golf one day and cut you off for no reason and put you out of business. (And any entity subject to private sector funding to continue operations is subject to this kind of liquidity risk.) Regulation should focus instead on the asset side with assets and capital fully regulated.

This was done for the most part, and this is the same as the general banking model which works reasonably well. Yes, it blows up now and then as banks find flaws in the regulations, but the losses are taken, regulations adjusted, and life goes on.

The agencies made some loans to lower income borrowers as that went bad.

Even with this, most calculations show that at today’s rates of mortgage default they still have adequate capital to squeak by – the cash flow from the remaining mortgages and their capital is pretty much adequate to pay off their lenders (those who hold their securities).

But if defaults increase their ‘cash flow net worth’ could turn negative; hence, it would currently not be prudent for the private sector to fund them.

Paulson has now moved funding to the Treasury where it should have been in the first place.

This removes the possibility of a liquidity crisis and allows the agencies to continue to meet their congressional charge of providing home mortgages for moderate and lower income borrowers at low rates.

There was no operational reason for Paulson to do more than that, only political reasons.

The agencies could then have continued to function as charged by Congress.

If there were any long-term cash flow deficiencies, they would be ‘absorbed’ by the Treasury as that would have meant some of the funding for new loans was in fact a Treasury expense as it transferred some funds to borrowers who defaulted.

Congress has always been free to change underwriting standards.

In fact, the program was all about easier underwriting for targeted borrowers.

If there were any ultimate losses, that was the cost of serving those borrowers.

To date there have been only profits, and the program has ‘cost’ the government nothing.

With Treasury funding and a review of underwriting standards the program could have continued as before, which it might still do.

The entire episode was a panic over a possible liquidity crisis due to the possibility of the Treasury not doing what it did, and what should have been done at inception.

I don’t think the Treasury getting 79.1% of the equity after making sure it took no losses and got a premium on any ‘investment’ it made served any non-political purpose.

There was no reason current equity holders could not have gotten the ‘leftovers’ after the government got its funds and a premium also determined by the government.

Equity IS the leftovers and could have been left alone. (It wouldn’t surprise me if some of the shareholders challenge this aspect of the move.)

Yes, holders of direct agency securities were ‘rescued’, but they were taking a below market rate to buy those securities due to the implied government backing and lines of credit to the government.

I don’t see it as a case of ‘market failure’ but instead poorly designed institutional structure with a major flaw that forced a change of structure.

It’s a failure of government to do it right the first time, probably due to politics, and much like the flaw in the eurozone financial architecture (no credible deposit insurance – another form of allowing the liability side of the banking system to be subject to market discipline), also due to politics.

As for compensation, that too was ultimately under the control of Congress, directly or indirectly.

Lastly, in the early 1970s, with only 215 million people, housing starts peaked at 2.6 million per year.

Today, with over 300 million people we consider 2 million starts ‘gangbusters’ and a ‘speculative boom’.

And in the early 1970s, all there were was bunch of passive S&Ls making home loans – no secondary markets, no agencies, etc.

Point is, we don’t need any of this ‘financial innovation’ to further the real economy.

Rather, the financial sector preys on they real sectors, in both financial terms and real terms via the massive brain drain from the real sectors to the financial sector.

At the macro level, we’d be better off without 90% or more of the financial sector.


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Monetary ops

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The larger point is that ANY assets banks are allowed to hold already have to be on the regulators approved list, and banks in any case can fund all their (legal) assets with with govt insured deposits.

So why should another arm of government, the Fed, not always provide funding for the same govt approved assets that the govt already provides funding for? Why did it take them so long to come up with the TAF and now with the security lending facility?

And even now only with partial measures?

Clearly they are still in the dark on the workings of monetary ops and reserve accounting?

You may recall my proposal back in August (long before that, actually):

Drop the discount rate to the FF rate and open it up to any bank legal assets.

This should have always been the case.

The Fed’s ‘job’ is to administer interest rates, and that’s how you do it.

It’s about price, not quantity. Fed operations don’t materially change any of the monetary aggregates, as many who should have known all along have been ‘discovering.’

Yes, in good times the system did function reasonably well, but the risk was always there that in a crisis it would break down.

My other proposals remains equally valid:

Let government agencies fund via the Fed Financing Bank (at Treasury rates). They exist for public purpose, shareholders remain at risk for default losses, and lower interest rates would get passed through to the housing markets.

The Treasury should open it’s lending facility and lend Treasury securities in unlimited size to primary dealers.

Lastly, this is a good time to get the Treasury out of the capital markets and limit them to the issuance of 3 month bills. This would lower long-term rates, which is the investment part of the curve.

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Proposal for mortgage ‘crisis’

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As previously proposed a few years back:

  1. Fund agencies (fnma/freddy) through the US Fed Financing Bank that funds directly with Treasury at Treasury rates.
    This lowers costs for the agencies that gets passed through to borrowers and removes liquidity issues for agencies.
    Shareholders are still at risk of mortgage defaults; so, market discipline is unchanged.
  1. Expand scope of the agencies to markets the Fed wants served – jumbos, etc.
    This eliminates the need for any kind of ‘repackaging’ .
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Central bank debate: Is it inflation or deflation?

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Here’s how the inflation can persist indefinitely:

  1. In addition to the India/China type story for resource demand, this time around nominal demand for commodities is also coming from our own pension funds who are shifting more of their financial assets to passive commodity strategies.

    Pension funds contributions have traditionally been invested primarily in financial assets, making them ‘unspent income’ and therefore ‘demand leakages.’ Other demand leakages include IRAs (individual retirement accounts), corporate reserve funds, and other income that goes ‘unspent’ on goods and services.

    Supporting these demand leakages are all kinds of institutional structure, but primarily tax incentives designed to increase ‘savings’.

    These come about due to the ‘innocent fraud’ that savings is necessary for investment, a throwback to the gold standard days of loanable funds and the like.

    A total of perhaps $20 trillion of this ‘unspent income’ has accumulated in the various US retirement funds and reserves of all sorts.

    This has ‘made room’ for the government deficit spending we’ve done to not be particularly inflationary. In general terms, the goods and services that would have gone unsold each year due to our unspent income have instead been purchased by government deficit spending.

    But now that is changing, as a portion of that $20 trillion is being directed towards passive commodity strategies. While the nature of these allocations varies, a substantial portion is adding back the aggregate demand that would have otherwise stayed on the sidelines.

    That means a lot less government deficit spending might be needed to sustain high levels of demand than history indicates.

    And, of course, the allocations directly support commodity prices.
  1. We are faced with the same monopoly supplier/swing producer of crude oil as in the 1970’s.

    Back then the oil producers simply accumulated $ financial assets and were the source of a massive demand leakage that caused widespread recession in much of the world. And didn’t end until there was a supply response large enough to end the monopoly pricing power.

    But it did persist long enough for the ‘relative value story’ of rising crude prices to ‘turn into an inflation story’ as costs were passed through the various channels.

    And a general inflation combined with the supply response served to return the real terms of trade/real price of crude pretty much back to where they had been in the early 1970’s.
  1. This time around rather than ‘hoard’ excess oil revenues the producers seem to be spending the funds, as evidence by both the trillions being spent on public infrastructure as well as the A380’s being built for private use, and the boom in US exports- 13% increase last month.

    This results in increased exports from both the US and the Eurozone to the oil producing regions (including Texas) that supports US and Eurozone GDP/aggregate demand.

    At the macro level, it’s the reduced desire to accumulate $US financial assets that is manifested by increasing US exports.

    (This reduced desire comes from perceptions of monetary policy toward inflation, pension fund allocations away from $US financial assets, Paulson calling CBs who buy $US currency manipulators and outlaws, and ideological confrontation that keeps some oil producers from accumulating $US, etc. This all has weakened the $ to levels where it makes sense to buy US goods and services – the only way foreigners can reduce accumulations of $US is to spend them on US goods and services.)

    The channels are as follows:

    1. The price of crude is hiked continuously and the revenues are spent on imports of goods and services.
    2. This is further supported by an international desire to reduce accumulation of $US financial assets that lowers the $ to the point where accumulated $ are then spent on US goods and services.

    For the US this means the export channel is a source of inflation. Hence, the rapid rise in both exports and export prices along with a $ low enough for US goods and services (and real assets) to represent good value to to foreigners.

  1. This is not a pretty sight for the US. (Exports are a real cost to the US standard of living, imports a real benefit.)

    Real terms of trade are continually under negative pressure.

    The oil producers will always outbid domestic workers for their output as a point of logic.

    Real wages fall as consumers can find jobs but can’t earn enough to buy their own output which gets exported.

    Foreigners are also outbidding domestics for domestic assets including real estate and equity investments.
  1. The US lost a lot off aggregate demand when potential buyers with subprime credit no longer qualified for mortgages.

    Exports picked up the slack and GDP has muddled through.

    The Fed and Treasury have moved in an attempt to restore domestic demand. Interest rate cuts aren’t effective but the fiscal package will add to aggregate demand beginning in May.

    US export revenues will increasingly find their way to domestic aggregate demand, and housing will begin to add to GDP rather than subtract from it.

    Credit channels will adjust (bank lending gaining market share, municipalities returning to uninsured bond issuance, sellers ‘holding paper,’ etc.) and domestic income will continue to be leveraged though to a lesser degree than with the fraudulent subprime lending.

    Pension funds will continue to support demand with their allocations to passive commodity strategies and also directly support prices of commodities.
  1. Don’t know how the Fed responds – my guess is rate cuts turn to rate hikes as inflation rises, even with weak GDP.
  1. We may be in the first inning of this inflation story.

    Could be a strategy by the Saudis/Russians to permanently disable the west’s monetary system, shift real terms of trade, and shift world power.
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Why I expect US exports to continue to be very strong..

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The desire to accumulate $US financial assets has been diminished for at least the following reasons:

  1. Treasury policy – Paulson is actively pushing both a strong yuan and threatening any other CB that buys $US with the label of ‘currency manipulator.’ CB’s had been perhaps the largest source of $US financial assets accumulation and are now limited to compounding of interest.
  2. US foreign policy is probably driving CB’s in less than friendly nations to diversify their reserves away from $US financial assets.
  3. Fed policy has the appearance of a ‘beggar thy neighbor’/’inflate your way out of debt’ policy, as the Fed aggressively cuts rates in the face of inflation not seen in 25 years.

This all sets in motion a downward pricing of the $US as non residents sell them to each other at lower and lower prices in this effort to lower their rate of accumulation of $US financial assets. But these financial assets can only ‘go away’ when they get spent or invested in the US, when US prices are low enough to cause this to happen. The rapid rise in exports and accelerated non resident buying of US real estate and other assets is anecdotal evidence this is taking place as theory predicts.

This is a very large cyclical force that should continue to drive rapidly rising exports for perhaps a year or more. Weak foreign economies should have little effect on this process, as that weakness doesn’t reduce the desire of portfolio managers to shift out of $US financial assets.

This is also highly inflationary for the US. This buying by non residents both drives down the $US and drives up the prices of US exports, now rising at a 7% clip last I checked.

The desired shift is probably well over $1 trillion which means exports will increase by a good part of that to facilitate this transfer.

This can sustain US GDP in the face of falling domestic demand, which will stay relatively low until housing picks up. Employment will remain reasonably good, but standards of living fall as we produce as much, but export more and consume less. We get paid to work but can buy less due to high prices, with our remaining production exported to those wishing to reduce their accumulated $US financial assets.

We’ve been talking about this possibility about a long time, but seems our trade negotiators have finally got their wish.

Meanwhile, Saudis continue to act the swing producer. In fact, they told Bush today they have 2 million bpd capacity in reserve, and that markets are well supplied. At their price, of course.

Probably have been some year end allocations out of crude by pension funds as with the price hikes they would need to sell some to keep the same ‘weight’ in their portfolios. That should be ending soon.

And I agree with Karim, the Fed is not likely to act on inflation until core starts to rise or their measures of inflation expectations start to rise, despite the fact that mainstream theory clearly says if any of that happens it’s too late. Seems to me the senior FOMC members are putting their jobs on the line by taking that kind of systemic risk, which their own theory tells them is far higher than the risk of any lost output from a .

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Strong $ AND strong yuan?

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Reminds me of the guy who loves money and wants to abolish taxes.

I do think the push is now for a stronger $, however, and we’ll see tomorrow if the Fed is on board.

As a friend of mine pointed out, a firming $ will likely trigger domestic and international portfolio reallocations back towards US equities.

Paulson Push for Stronger Yuan Weakened by Global M&A (Update3)

By Aaron Pan and Belinda CaoDec. 10 (Bloomberg)

As U.S. Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson visits China this week to push for faster appreciation of the yuan, the bigger issue may be what China is doing to strengthen the dollar.

Paulson’s fifth trip to the nation as Treasury Secretary has taken on added urgency as the U.S. grows more dependent on the dollar’s decline to lift exports and keep the economy out of recession. While the pace of the yuan’s gains tripled in the past 15 months, Chinese officials now plan to increase investments in America that may boost the U.S. currency instead.

“China at this stage needs to be looking to opportunities provided by the weakening U.S. dollar,” Ha Jiming, chief economist in Beijing at China International Capital Corp., the nation’s largest investment bank, said in an interview last week. “Very recently the government is becoming more interested in channeling money out of the country.”

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