Fed’s Plosser comments

They see it all about managing expectations.

So with the announcement they managed interest rate expectations a bit lower out to 2013.

But now they are concerned they managed expectations about economic growth and employment lower as well, which they believe works to lower actual growth and employment.

So now they are trying to adjust both a bit back in the other directions.

*DJ Fed’s Plosser: FOMC Statement On Econ Too Negative -Bloomberg Radio
*DJ Fed’s Plosser: Extending Policy To ’13 `Inappropriate’ -Bloomberg Radio
*DJ Fed’s Plosser: Expects Will Have To Raise Rates Before ’13 -Bloomberg Radio

Bernanke Admits Economy Slowing; No Hint of New Stimulus

In fact, no one on the FOMC has called for QE3, so it’s highly unlikely with anything short of actual negative growth.

So the question is, why the unamimous consensus?

I’d say it varies from member to member, with each concerned for his own reason, for better or for worse.

And I do think the odds of their being an understanding with China are high, particularly with China having let their T bill portfolio run off, while directing additions to reserves to currencies other than the $US, as well as evidence of a multitude of other portfolio managers doing much the same thing. This includes buying gold and other commodities, all in response to (misguided notions of) QE2 and monetary and fiscal policy in general. So the Fed may be hoping to reverse the (mistaken) notion that they are ‘printing money and creating inflation’ by making it clear that there are no plans for further QE.

Hence the ‘new’ strong dollar rhetoric: no more ‘monetary stimulus’ and lots of talk about keeping the dollar strong fundamentally via low inflation and pro growth policy. And the tough talk about the long term deficit plays to this theme as well, even as the Chairman recognizes the downside risks to immediate budget cuts, as he continues to see the risks as asymetric. The Fed believes it can deal with inflation, should that happen, but that it’s come to the end of the tool box, for all practical purposes, in their fight against deflation, even as they fail to meet either of their dual mandates of full employment and price stability to their satisfaction.

They also see downside risk to US GDP from China, Japan, and Europe for all the well publicized reasons.

And, with regard to statements warning against immediate budget cuts, I have some reason to believe at least one Fed official has read my book and is aware of MMT in general.

Bernanke Admits Economy Slowing; No Hint of New Stimulus

June 7 (Reuters) — Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke Tuesday acknowledged a slowdown in the U.S. economy but offered no suggestion the central bank is considering any further monetary stimulus to support growth.

He also issued a stern warning to lawmakers in Washington who are considering aggressive budget cuts, saying they have the potential to derail the economic recovery if cuts in government spending take hold too soon.

A recent spate of weak economic data, capped by a report Friday showing U.S. employers expanded payrolls by a meager 54,000 workers last month, has renewed investor speculation the economy could need more help from the Fed.

“U.S. economic growth so far this year looks to have been somewhat slower than expected,” Bernanke told a banking conference. “A number of indicators also suggest some loss in momentum in labor markets in recent weeks.”

He said the recovery was still weak enough to warrant keeping in place the Fed’s strong monetary support, saying the economy was still growing well below its full potential.

At the same time, Bernanke argued that the latest bout of weakness would likely not last very long, and should give way to stronger growth in the second half of the year. He said a recent spike in U.S. inflation, while worrisome, should be similarly transitory. Weak growth in wages and stable inflation expectations suggest few lasting inflation pressures, Bernanke said.

On the budget, Bernanke repeated his call for a long-term plan for a sustainable fiscal path, but warned politicians against massive short-term reductions in spending.

“A sharp fiscal consolidation focused on the very near term could be self-defeating if it were to undercut the still-fragile recovery,” Bernanke said.

“By taking decisions today that lead to fiscal consolidation over a longer horizon, policymakers can avoid a sudden fiscal contraction that could put the recovery at risk,” he said.

All Tapped Out?

The central bank has already slashed overnight interest rates to zero and purchased more than $2 trillion in government bonds in an effort to pull the economy from a deep recession and spur a stronger recovery.

With the central bank’s balance sheet already bloated, officials have made clear the bar is high for any further easing of monetary policy. The Fed’s current $600 billion round of government bond buying, known as QE2, runs its course later this month.

Sharp criticism in the wake of QE2 is one factor likely to make policymakers reluctant to push the limits of unconventional policy. They also may have concerns that more stimulus would face diminishing economic returns, while potentially complicating their effort to return policy to a more normal footing.

But a further worsening of economic conditions, particularly one that is accompanied by a reversal of recent upward pressure on inflation, could change that outlook.

The government’s jobs report Friday was almost uniformly bleak. The pace of hiring was just over a third of what economists had expected and the unemployment rate rose to 9.1 percent, defying predictions for a slight drop.

In a Reuters poll of U.S. primary dealer banks conducted after the employment data, analysts saw only a 10 percent chance for another round of government bond purchases by the central bank over the next two years. Dealers also pushed back the timing of an eventual rate hike further into 2012.

The weakening in the U.S. recovery comes against a backdrop of uncertainty over the course of fiscal policy and bickering over the U.S. debt limit in Congress, with Republicans pushing hard for deep budget cuts.

Fragility is Global

Hurdles to better economic health have emerged from overseas as well. Europe is struggling with a debt crisis, while Japan is still reeling from the effects of a traumatic earthquake and tsunami.

In emerging markets, China is trying to rein in its red-hot growth to prevent inflation.

Fed policymakers have admitted to being surprised by how weak the economy appears, but none have yet called for more stimulus.

In an interview with the Wall Street Journal, Chicago Federal Reserve Bank President Charles Evans, a noted policy dove, said he was not yet ready to support a third round of so-called quantitative easing. His counterpart in Atlanta, Dennis Lockhart, also said the economy was not weak enough to warrant further support.

While Boston Fed President Eric Rosengren told CNBC Monday the economy’s weakness might delay the timing of an eventual monetary tightening, the head of the Dallas Federal Reserve Bank, Richard Fisher, said the Fed may have already done too much.

Evans and Fisher have a policy vote on the Fed this year while Rosengren and Lockhart do not.

FMOC Minutes

New Forecasts (central tendency and range of forecasts) in Table 1 below: Long-Run inflation forecast of 1.6-2.0% is basically their target; 2011 and 2012 unemployment forecasts revised up by 0.6-0.7%. Note that low-end of GDP forecast for 2011 is 2.5%. This is above many other forecasters.


Interesting Observations from FRB Staff; Outlook revised up, basically on assumption of improved financial conditions; and in turn inflation higher due to less slack and weaker $

The staff revised up its forecast for economic activity in 2011 and 2012. In light of asset market developments over the intermeeting period, which in large part appeared to reflect heightened expectations among investors that the Federal Reserve would undertake additional purchases of longer-term securities, the November forecast was conditioned on lower long-term interest rates, higher stock prices,
and a lower foreign exchange value of the dollar than was the staff’s previous forecast.

The downward pressure on inflation from slack in resource utilization was expected to be slightly less than previously projected, and prices of imported goods were anticipated to rise somewhat faster.

FOMC Members-Recap of debate of pros/cons of LSAPs; sizing LSAPs; and setting an inflation target, and setting a long-term interest rate target

Although participants considered it quite unlikely that the economy would slide back into recession, some noted that continued slow growth and high levels of resource slack could leave the economic expansion vulnerable to negative shocks. In the absence of such shocks, and assuming appropriate monetary policy

They do assume what they do has quite a bit of influence over the outcomes.

participants’ economic projections generally showed growth picking up to a moderate pace and the unemployment rate declining somewhat next year. Participants generally expected growth to strengthen further and unemployment to decline somewhat more rapidly in 2012 and 2013.

Several noted that the recent rate of output growth, if continued, would more likely be associated with an increase than a decrease in the unemployment rate.

While underlying inflation remained subdued, meeting participants generally saw only small odds of deflation, given the stability of longer-term inflation expectations

They remain steeped in inflation expectations theory as previously discussed.

and the anticipated recovery in economic activity.

Most saw the risks to growth as broadly balanced, but many saw the risks as tilted to the downside. Similarly, a majority saw the risks to inflation as balanced; some, however, saw downside risks predominating while a couple saw inflation risks as tilted to the upside.

Participants also differed in their assessments of the likely benefits and costs associated with a program of purchasing additional longer-term securities in an effort to provide additional monetary stimulus, though most saw the benefits as exceeding the costs in current circumstances. Most participants judged that a program of purchasing additional longer-term securities would put downward pressure on longer-term interest rates and boost asset prices; some observed that it could also lead to a reduction in the foreign exchange value of the dollar. Most expected these changes in financial conditions to help promote a somewhat stronger recovery in output and employment while also helping return inflation, over time, to levels consistent with the Committee’s mandate. In addition, several participants argued that the stimulus provided by additional securities purchases would help protect against further disinflation and the small probability that the U.S. economy could fall into persistent deflation–an outcome that they thought would be very costly. Some participants, however, anticipated that additional purchases of longer-term securities would have only a limited effect on the pace of the recovery; they judged that the economy’s slow growth largely reflected the effects of factors that were not likely to respond to additional monetary policy stimulus and thought that additional action would be warranted only if the outlook worsened and the odds of deflation increased materially. Some participants noted concerns that additional expansion of the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet could put unwanted downward pressure on the dollar’s value in foreign exchange markets. Several participants saw a risk that a further increase in the size of the Federal Reserve’s asset portfolio, with an accompanying increase in the supply of excess reserves and in the monetary base, could cause an undesirably large increase in inflation.

This flies in the face of any understanding of banking and actual monetary operations, as well as recent Fed research.

However, it was noted that the Committee had in place tools that would enable it to remove policy accommodation quickly if necessary to avoid an undesirable increase in inflation.


Participants expressed a range of views about the potential costs and benefits of quantifying the Committee’s interpretation of its statutory mandate to promote price stability by adopting a numerical inflation objective or a target path for the price level. In the end, participants noted that the longer-run projections contained in the Summary of Economic Projections, which is released once per quarter in conjunction with the minutes of four of the Committee’s meetings, convey considerable information about participants’ assessments of their statutory objectives. Participants discussed whether it might be useful for the Chairman to hold occasional press briefings to provide more detailed information to the public regarding the Committee’s assessment of the outlook and its policy decision making than is included in Committee’s short post-meeting statements.


In their discussion of the relative merits of smaller and more frequent adjustments versus larger and less frequent adjustments in the Federal Reserve’s intended securities holdings, participants generally agreed that large adjustments had been appropriate when economic activity was declining sharply in response to the financial crisis. In current circumstances, however, most saw advantages to a more incremental approach that would involve smaller changes in the Committee’s holdings of securities calibrated to incoming data.


Finally, participants discussed the potential benefits and costs of setting a target for a term interest rate. Some noted that targeting the yield on a term security could be an effective way to reduce longer-term interest rates and thus provide additional stimulus to the economy. But participants also noted potentially large risks, including the risk that the Federal Reserve might find itself buying undesirably large amounts of the relevant security in order to keep its yield close to the target level.

No mention at all of the interest income channels, which act to reduce interest income in the economy as rates fall.

Payrolls


Karim writes:

Headline near consensus and also very consistent with trend of recent months; but details on soft side

  • Headline payrolls -95k; private payrolls +64k; payrolls ex-census workers -20k
  • The 83k drop in state and local govt payrolls likely skewed by seasonals related to education (-50k jobs)
  • Avg weekly earnings unch and hours worked unch; so personal income will be soft in Sep (though it was strong in prior mths)
  • Unemployment rate 9.579% from 9.642%
  • Notable swings by sector: construction -52k; manufacturing -22k; leisure/hospitality +18k; Retail +8k
  • Median duration of unemployed up from 19.9 to 20.4; U6 measure up from 16.7% to 17.1%
  • Diffusion index drops from 54.1 to 49.8 (first month below 50 since January).

Data consistent with moderate growth which is not enough to materially lower unemployment rate and as such, further lowers the bar for more aggressive LSAPs in November.

Census jobs still being lost. State and local cuts will also probably continue.

Also, 65,000 private sector jobs is about 100,000 short of what I’d guess will be the norm with initial and continuing claims now drifting lower.

GDP growing faster than jobs indicates productivity still doing well, which is positive for profits.

Lower interest rates also continuing to support valuations.

Bullard on CNBC shows FOMC still not up to speed on monetary operations.

TIPS 5 year 5 years fwd

This used to be one of the Fed’s major concerns as they are steeped in inflation expectations theory.

It could still signal a need to keep a modestly positive ‘real rate’ though the large ‘output gap’ is telling them otherwise.

History says they’ll put most of the weight on the output gap, though a negative real rate is problematic for most FOMC members.

Should core inflation measures go negative, they will be a lot more comfortable with the current zero rate policy.

Interesting that the employment cost was just reported up 1.8% which shows how little it went down even in the face of
a massive rise in unemployment.

FOMC minutes on swap lines


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The FOMC doesn’t seem to treat the swap lines any differently than the domestic lending arrangements:

In view of a further widening in financial market strains internationally, the Committee considered proposals to establish temporary reciprocal currency (“swap”) arrangements with several additional foreign central banks. Members unanimously approved the following resolution, which effectively permitted the Foreign Currency Subcommittee to establish a swap line with the Reserve Bank of New Zealand.

“The FOMC amends paragraph 1.A. of the Authorization for Foreign Currency Operations to include the New Zealand dollar in the list of foreign currencies in which the Federal Reserve Bank of New York may transact for the System Open Market Account.”

Meeting participants also discussed a proposal to set up temporary liquidity-related swap arrangements with the central banks of Mexico, Brazil, Korea, and Singapore. In their remarks, participants focused on the outlook for complementarity between these swaps and the new short-term liquidity facility that the International Monetary Fund was considering; on the governance and structure of the swap lines; and on the particular countries included. Several participants pointed to the international reserves held by the countries and the importance of ensuring that these temporary swap lines, like the others that had been established during this period, be used only for the purposes intended. On balance, the Committee concluded that in current circumstances the swap arrangements with these four large and systemically important economies were appropriate, and it unanimously approved the following resolutions.

“The FOMC directs the Federal Reserve Bank of New York to establish and maintain a reciprocal currency arrangement (“swap arrangement”) for the System Open Market Account with each of (i) the Banco Central do Brasil, (ii) the Bank of Korea, (ii) the Banco de Mexico, and (iv) the Monetary Authority of Singapore. Each such swap arrangement would be for an aggregate amount not to exceed $30 billion. Drawings under the arrangement require approval. Unless extended by the Committee, each such swap arrangement shall expire on April 30, 2009.

The FOMC amends paragraph 1.A. of the Authorization for Foreign Currency Operations to include the Brazilian real, the Korean won, and the Singapore dollar in the list of foreign currencies in which the Federal Reserve Bank of New York may transact for the System Open Market Account.

The FOMC delegates to the Foreign Currency Subcommittee the authority to approve individual drawing requests of up to $5 billion under each of the aforementioned swap arrangements with the Banco Central do Brasil, the Bank of Korea, the Banco de Mexico, and the Monetary Authority of Singapore.”

In addition, to address the sizable demand for dollar funding in foreign jurisdictions, the FOMC authorized the expansion of its existing swap lines with the European Central Bank and Swiss National Bank; by the end of the intermeeting period, the formal quantity limits on these lines had been eliminated. The quantity limits were also lifted on new swap lines set up with the Bank of Japan and the Bank of England. The FOMC authorized new swap lines with five other central banks during the period. In domestic markets, the Federal Reserve raised the regular auction amounts of the 28- and 84-day maturity Term Auction Facility (TAF) auctions to $150 billion each. Also, the Federal Reserve announced two forward TAF auctions for $150 billion each, to be conducted in November to provide funding over year-end. In total, up to $900 billion of TAF credit over year-end was authorized.

Despite the substantial provision of liquidity by the Federal Reserve and other central banks, functioning in many credit markets remained very poor, a situation that reflected market participants’ uncertainty about their liquidity needs and their future access to funding as well as concerns about the health of many financial institutions. To strengthen confidence in U.S. financial institutions, the Treasury, the Federal Reserve, and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) issued a joint statement on October 14, which included several elements. First, the Treasury announced a voluntary capital purchase plan under which eligible financial institutions could sell preferred shares to the U.S. government. Second, the FDIC provided a temporary guarantee of the senior unsecured debt of all FDIC-insured institutions and their holding companies, as well as all balances in non-interest-bearing transaction deposit accounts. The statement included notice that nine major financial institutions had agreed to participate in both the capital purchase program and the FDIC guarantee program. Third, the Federal Reserve announced details of the CPFF, which was scheduled to begin on October 27. After this joint statement and the announcements of similar programs in a number of other countries, financial market pressures appeared to ease somewhat, though conditions remained strained.

The expansion of existing liquidity facilities as well as the creation of new facilities contributed to a notable increase in the size of the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet. The amount of primary credit outstanding rose considerably over the intermeeting period, with both foreign and domestic depository institutions making use of the discount window. TAF credit outstanding more than doubled over the period. Credit extended through the Primary Dealer Credit Facility rose rapidly ahead of quarter-end; although it subsided subsequently, the amount of credit outstanding remained well above the levels seen before mid-September. The Term Securities Lending Facility (TSLF) auctions conducted over the intermeeting period had very high demand; in addition, dealers exercised most of the options for TSLF loans spanning the September quarter-end.


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Banking model


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Once again, we are seeing that using the liability side of banking for market discipline doesn’t work.

That’s why deposit insurance exists in every sustainable banking system in the world.

It’s also why a floating foreign exchange rate is ‘superior’ to a fixed foreign exchange rate. With fixed foreign exchange rates, there is no such thing as credible deposit insurance.

The remaining weak link in US banking system liquidity is the interbank market.

The reason we have an interbank market is the remaining institutional structure that utilizes the liability side of banking for market discipline.

This includes the $100,000 cap on FDIC insured bank deposits and the Fed demanding collateral from banks when it lends.

Remove these two remaining obstacles for Fed member banks, and bank liquidity normalizes with no ‘cost’ or additional risk to government.

Unfortunately, no one in government seems to comprehend basic monetary operations and reserve accounting.

Including most if not all of the FOMC and the Treasury Secretary.


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U.S. Treasury announces plan to insure money-market holdings


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On Fri, Sep 19, 2008 at 9:44 AM, Scott asks:

These moves HAVE to be bad for the dollar, no?

Not much effect per se.

Immediate effect is higher interest rates/stronger stocks which very near term helps the USD.

But it seems saudis are hiking price which, if it continues, will again send the dollar down.

Also, the Fed showed some concern about exports softening, which they probably attribute to the recent USD strength.

So seems the Fed and Treasury probably don’t want the dollar to get too strong.

Major equity short covering rally in progress.

When it runs its course, the US economy will still be weak and higher crude prices will be problematic as well.


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NYT: Treasury bills program


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>   
>   On Thu, Sep 18, 2008 at 4:21 PM, Eric Tymoigne wrote:
>   
>   One former FOMC member at least gets it (From the NYT) (well, at least if you
>   replace “can create money” by “can create reserve”):
>   

I’ve heard him before, and he definately doesn’t quite get it. See my comments below:

September 18, 2008, 3:15 pm

Will Government Bailouts Lead to Inflation?

by Catherine Rampell

A reader asks about inflation concerns, and finds a divided response from our panel:

I’m worried about how much the government is intervening. It appears that the last remaining weapon the government will have is printing more money. Is hyperinflation a real concern down the road? — Geoffrey Bell

The question is about hyperinflation.

From Bob McTeer of the National Center for Policy Analysis:

All the offsets do is to alter the resulting interest rate. The offsets have nothing to do with inflation. Fed operations are about pricing, not about inflation per se. The only connection Fed policy has regarding inflation is the further effect of the interest rate they select. It has nothing to do with quantity.

The Fed’s ability to lend is limitless because it can create money.

All Fed lending is ‘creating money’ (changing a number in a member bank’s reserve account).

So it’s not that it’s limitless because it ‘can’ ‘create money,’ it’s limitless because it always/only does ‘create money’.

Its ability to offset the lending is limited by its portfolio. Hence, its request to the Treasury to sell some extra Treasury bills. — Bob McTeer

Yes, and this is a self imposed constraint put on by government.

Functionally and operationally, a treasury security is nothing more than a credit balance in a security account.

Current law doesn’t allow the Fed to take funds into a securities account of its own creation.

This is one of many self-imposed constraints by government that are contributing to ‘the problem’.

warren


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NYT: Fed to Give A.I.G. $85 bln Loan and Takeecon


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The Fed has a major strategic advantage over private sector buyers.

With the Fed making the loan, credit spreads in general should narrow.

This will add value to AIG’s short credit position which is where most of the mark to market losses are.

So the Fed’s actions to reduce systemic risk also increase the value of AIG once they take them over.

It’s good to be the Fed!

(not that it matters to the Fed itself financially one way or the other, but they probably don’t know that)

Fed Close to Deal to Give A.I.G. $85 Billion Loan


by Michael J. de la Merced and Eric Dash

In an extraordinary turn, the Federal Reserve was close to a deal Tuesday night to take a nearly 80 percent stake in the troubled giant insurance company, the American International Group, in exchange for an $85 billion loan, according to people briefed on the negotiations.

In return, the Fed will receive warrants, which give it an ownership stake. All of A.I.G.’s assets will be pledged to secure the loan, these people said.

The Fed’s action was disclosed after Treasury Secretary Henry M. Paulson and Ben S. Bernanke, president of the Federal Reserve, went to Capitol Hill on Tuesday evening to meet with House and Senate leaders. Mr. Paulson called the Senate majority leader, Harry Reid, Democrat of Nevada, about 5 p.m. and asked for a meeting in the Senate leader’s office, which began about 6:30 p.m.

The Federal Reserve and Goldman Sachs and JPMorgan Chase had been trying to arrange a $75 billion loan for A.I.G. to stave off the financial crisis caused by complex debt securities and credit default swaps . The Federal Reserve stepped in after it became clear Tuesday afternoon that the banking consortium would not be able to complete the deal.

Without the help, A.I.G. was expected to be forced to file for bankruptcy protection.

The need for the loans became necessary after the major credit ratings agencies downgraded A.I.G. late Monday, a move that likely to have forced the company to turn over billions of dollars in collateral to its derivatives trading partners worsening its financial health.

Until this week, it would have been unthinkable for the Federal Reserve to bail out an insurance company, and A.I.G.’s request for help from the Fed of just a few days ago was rebuffed.

But with the prospect of a giant bankruptcy looming – one with unpredictable consequences for the world financial system – the Fed abandoned precedent and agreed to let the money flow.


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