Trade-Q2 GDP


Karim writes:

  • Real trade balance widens from -46bn in May to -54bn in June
  • Exports down 1.3% but imports up 3%
  • Even though civilian aircraft imports up 53% (after -49% prior month), imports up across the board
  • Consumer goods imports up 7.8% and capital goods up 1.2%
  • Even though the import data suggests final demand is holding up well, the final Q2 GDP print wont be pretty
  • Wholesale inventory data yesterday and trade data today were worse than initial BEA estimates for Q2 GDP
  • Headline GDP likely to be revised from initial estimate of 2.4% to somewhere in 1-1.5%. But final private demand may actually be revised up.

Yes, Q2 GDP to be revised down, but it’s been down. Q2 is history. Corporate earnings were based on the actual numbers- sales, costs, profits.

In other words, we know what the S&P were able to earn even with very modest headline GDP growth.

The higher final demand is also at least sustainable.
The relatively large and ongoing fiscal deficit that added that much income and savings to the non govt sectors allowed for the higher final demand AND higher savings.

While the QE from the Fed does nothing beyond causing term rates to be marginally lower than other wise, it does add some support for asset prices via implied discount rates.

As discussed earlier this year, markets are figuring out that the economy is flying without a net. All the Fed can do is alter interest rates which, with each passing day since the recession began, has been shown to not be able to support output and employment, or even prices and lending. (Just like Japan has shown for going on 20 years.)

And a Congress and Administration that thinks it’s run out of money and is dependent on borrowing and leaving the bill to our grand children to be able to spend is unlikely to provide meaningful fiscal adjustments to support aggregate demand.

So we muddle through with unthinkably high levels of unemployment and modest GDP growth waiting for an increase in private sector demand to kick in via credit expansion from the usual channels- cars and housing.

The risk to growth is now primarily proactive fiscal consolidation- spending cuts and/or tax hikes- in advance of private sector credit expansion. So far I haven’t seen anything meaningful enough to be of consequence. But the anti deficit rhetoric is certainly there, counterbalanced to some degree by the call for jobs.

So it remains a pretty good equity environment but a very ugly political environment.

CH News | Australia Has Record Trade Surplus on China Coal, Iron Demand

It’s good to be China’s coal mine.

Though it does make Australia one of the world’s largest contributors to the increasingly unpopular emissions issues.

Australia Has Record Trade Surplus on China Coal, Iron Demand


Australia Has Record Trade Surplus on China Coal, Iron Demand

By Jacob Greber

Aug. 4 (Bloomberg) — Australia’s trade surplus unexpectedly
reached a record in June as Chinese demand spurred exports of
coal and iron ore, while imports stagnated amid a slowdown in
domestic spending.

The excess of exports over imports reached A$3.54 billion
($3.2 billion), almost double the median forecast in a Bloomberg
News survey, a Bureau of Statistics report showed in Sydney
today. A separate report showed house-price gains decelerated in
the second quarter, underscoring the impact of the central
bank’s six interest-rate increases since early October.

EU

This is what I was writing about last week-

China and others buying euro to support exports to that region.

The euro member nations want their debt sold, but they don’t want the loss of ‘competitiveness’ that necessarily comes with it, as the moves to eliminate solvency issues continue to drive up the euro:

China offers vote of confidence in euro

(FT) China delivered a strong vote of confidence in the euro on Friday when Premier Wen Jiabao said that Europe would always be one of the main investment markets for China’s foreign exchange reserves. Mr Wen said “Europe will certainly overcome its difficulties”. “The European market has been in the past, is now and will be in the future one of the main investment markets for China’s foreign exchange reserves,” Mr Wen said. “I want to say that at this time, when some European countries are suffering sovereign debt crises, China has always held out a helping hand,” he added. “We believe that with the joint hard work of the international community, Europe will certainly overcome its difficulties,” he said. According to people familiar with Spain’s recent bond issue, China’s State Administration of Foreign Exchange was allocated up to €400m ($505m) of Spanish 10-year bonds in a debt deal last Tuesday.

euro zone issues


Asian players are a worry for eurozone

By Gillian Tett

July 14 (FT)

The saga behind next week’s stress test release is a case in point. During most of the past year, governments of countries such as Germany, Spain and France have resisted the idea of conducting US-style stress tests on their banks, in spite of repeated, entreaties from entities ranging from the International Monetary Fund to the Bank for International Settlements, and the US government.


However, after a meeting of G20 leaders in Busan last month, those same eurozone governments performed a U-turn, by finally agreeing to publish the results of such tests.


Some observers have blamed the volte-face on lobbying inside the senior echelons of the European Central Bank. Others point the finger to American pressure. In particular, Tim Geithner, the US Treasury secretary, had some strongly worded discussions with some of his eurozone counterparts in Busan, where he urged – if not lectured – them to adopt these tests.

However, Europeans who participated in the Busan meeting say it was actually comments from Asian officials that created a tipping point. In the days before and after that G20 gathering, eurozone officials met powerful Asian investment groups and government officials who expressed alarm about Europe’s financial woes. And while those officials did not plan to sell their existing stock of bonds, they specifically said they would reduce or halt future purchases of eurozone bonds unless something was done to allay the fears about Europe’s banks.

That, in turn, sparked a sudden change of heart among officials in places such as Germany and Spain. After all, as one European official notes, the last thing that any debt-laden European government wants now is a situation where it is tough to sell bonds. “It was the Asians that changed the mood, not anything Geithner said,” says one eurozone official.

This raises some fascinating short-term issues about how the bond markets might respond to the stress tests. It is impossible to track bond purchase patterns with any precision in a timely manner in Europe, since there is no central source of consolidated data.

However, bankers say there are signs that Asian investors are returning to buy eurozone bonds. This week, for example, China’s State Administration of Foreign Exchange bid for €1bn (£1.27bn, £835m) of Spanish bonds, helping to produce a very successful auction.

Yes, it’s a two edged sword.

Asian nations want to accumulate euro net financial assets to facilitate exports to the euro zone.

Before the crisis euro nations were concerned that the strong euro, partially due to Asian buying, was hurting euro zone exports

However, as the crisis developed, euro nations got to the point where they were concerned enough about national govt solvency and the precipitous fall of the euro (which was in some ways welcomed by exporters but worrying with regards to a potential inflationary collapse) to agree to measures to support their national govt debt sales which also meant a stronger euro.

So now the pendulum is swinging the other way. Solvency issues have been sufficiently resolved by the ECB to avert default, but at the ‘cost’ of a resumption Asian buying designed to strengthen the euro to support Asian exports to the euro zone.

As before the crisis, however, the euro zone has no tools to keep a lid on the euro (apart from re introducing the solvency issue to scare away buyers, which makes no sense), as buying dollars and other fx is counter to their ideology of having the euro be the world’s reserve currency.

So the same forces remain in place that drove the euro to the 150-160 range, which kept net exports from climbing.

The export driven model is problematic enough without adding in the additionally problematic idiosyncratic financial structure of the euro zone.

As for the stress tests, as long as the ECB is funding bank liabilities and buying national govt debt banks and the national govts can continue to fund themselves with or without Asian buying.

I’d have to say at this point in time the euro zone hasn’t gotten that far in their understanding of their monetary system or they probably would not be making concessions to outside forces.

Why is North Dakota doing so well?

I looked into the North Dakota State Bank and didn’t see any reason that would make much of a difference, so I check out their ‘export’ industries:

https://www.dmr.nd.gov/oilgas/stats/DailyProdPrice.pdf

https://www.dmr.nd.gov/oilgas/stats/gasprodsoldchart.pdf

https://www.dmr.nd.gov/oilgas/stats/DrillStats.pdf

all found here:

https://www.dmr.nd.gov/oilgas/

And all with under 500,000 people.

ISM

Yes, I think we have a nice L shaped economy with modest GDP growth and modestly improving employment, so far mostly evidenced by the increased hours worked that you’ve been pointing out. Acceleration happens when/if some aspect of private sector credit growth takes off.

If euro solvency risks are indeed fading, it should be back to an ok market for stocks (which could have a large one time shift upwards to reflect the reduced euro risk), and low rates from the Fed until something changes.

Like Japan, the budget deficit may be large enough to keep it all from collapsing but not enough for the kind of growth that would trigger higher rates from the Fed.


Karim writes:

Data off recent peaks but still firmly in expansion territory:
Anecdotes mixed:

  • “Component lead times are increasing sharply.” (Computer & Electronic Products)
  • “Market had begun to change, but it is now declining again.” (Wood Products)
  • “BP oil spill will impact business conditions over the next few months.” (Fabricated Metal Products)
  • “The economy continues to be sluggish, with orders 8 percent to 10 percent below last year.” (Nonmetallic Mineral Products)
  • “Retail sales are strong for both the domestic and international markets.” (Food, Beverage & Tobacco Products)


June May
Index 56.2 59.7
Prices paid 57.0 77.5
Production 61.4 66.6
New Orders 58.5 65.7
Inventories 45.8 45.6
Employment 57.8 59.8
Exports orders 56.0 62.0
Imports 56.5 56.5

EU Daily | European Industrial Orders Increase for Third Month

As previously discussed, it is possible their deficits already got high enough and the euro low enough to support very modest growth when market forces intervened to stop further fiscal expansion.

One problem now is proactive cuts can set them back if a combination of private sector credit and exports doesn’t expand at the same time.

And expanding exports remains problematic as that would tend to strengthen the currency to the point where net exports remain relatively low, and there is nothing they can do to keep the euro down should that happen.

Another problem is the market forces that are working to limit their fiscal expansion will continue to hamper their ability to fund themselves, especially with continuing talk of ‘restructuring’ which, functionally, is a form of default.

I’ve read the ECB is now buying about 10 billion euro/week of national govt bonds in the secondary markets and ‘learning and demonstrating’ that it is not inflationary, doesn’t cause a currency collapse, and poses no operational risk to the ECB as some feared it might. As they all become ‘comfortable’ with this look for market forces to ‘force’ them to expand the buying geometrically as happened with their funding of their banking system, where much of the ‘risk’ is now at the ECB as they accept collateral for funding from their member banks that no one else will.

Operationally the ECB can fund the whole shooting match. And if they can address the moral hazard the usual way via the growth and stability pact, this time with the leverage of being able to threaten to cut off ECB funding to punish non compliance.

This ‘solution’ of the ECB buying national govt debt in the secondary markets is conceptually/functionally nearly identical to my proposal of per capita distributions to the national govts by the ECB. The difference is my proposal would not have ‘rewarded bad behavior’ as theirs does, but that’s a relatively minor consideration for them at the moment, and if they continue doing what they are doing, they have ‘saved the euro,’ even though having the ECB fund all the banks and national govts wasn’t their original idea of how it all would end up.

European Industrial Orders Increase for Third Month

Trichet Says Current Situation Requires ‘Credible Measures’

ECB’s Trichet Says Italian Budget Cuts Go in ‘Right Direction’

German debt agency asked to issue bonds

Schäuble defends German austerity

German Government Won’t Turn to Tax Cuts Amid Deficit Reduction

S&P’s Kraemer Sees No ‘Serious Risk’ of Euro Break Up

Merkel Defends Spending Cuts, Gets Backing From Trichet

Germany Sees Jobless Numbers at Under 3 Million

French Consumer Spending Gains on Signs Job Market Is Improving

French Economy to Expand 1.4% This Year on Exports, Insee Says

Zapatero Says Not Cutting Deficit Would Raise Interest Costs

Service Sector ISM//NFP


Karim writes:

Similar to manufacturing, service sector ISM stabilizing at high levels; Large increase in backlogs also bodes well for future activity.

With employment index now also crossing the 50 level, adds to upside potential in NFP tomorrow; look for headline NFP up ~600k; with ex-census up ~225k.



May April
PMI 55.4 55.4
Activity 61.1 60.3
Prices Paid 60.6 64.7
New Orders 57.1 58.2
Backlogs 56.0 49.5
Employment 50.4 49.5
Export Orders 53.5 57.0
Imports 56.5 56.5

Anecdotes below seem to bode well for corporate profits: demand improving and costs controlled.

  • “Our business continues to grow. We are significantly above last year’s pace.” (Information)
  • “Business is steady right now — not the normal spring for construction, but improving.” (Construction)
  • “Outlook is still generally flat for the remainder of this year, with signs that orders and activity will be picking up.” (Professional, Scientific & Technical Services)
  • “Continuing our pattern of cautious optimism. Consumers appear to be coming out of hibernation and willing to spend. We expect that if this trend can remain solid, we’ll in turn spend additional dollars to support and drive sales activities.” (Retail Trade)
  • “Customers’ activity is improving in some parts of the country.” (Wholesale Trade)
  • “We continue to ‘staff to volume’ in order to control labor and supply costs.”(Health Care & Social Assistance)

Yes, looking like we’re modestly improving domestically with the risks mainly external including spillover weakness form China and the euro zone.

Export growth down a touch but not serious to this point.

Krugman: We’re Not Greece

We’re Not Greece

By Paul Krugman

It’s an ill wind that blows nobody good, and the crisis in Greece is making some people — people who opposed health care reform and are itching for an excuse to dismantle Social Security — very, very happy. Everywhere you look there are editorials and commentaries, some posing as objective reporting, asserting that Greece today will be America tomorrow unless we abandon all that nonsense about taking care of those in need.

True. I just finished a week in dc fighting back against the bipartisan move to cut social security.

The truth, however, is that America isn’t Greece — and, in any case, the message from Greece isn’t what these people would have you believe.

So, how do America and Greece compare?

Both nations have lately been running large budget deficits, roughly comparable as a percentage of G.D.P. Markets, however, treat them very differently: The interest rate on Greek government bonds is more than twice the rate on U.S. bonds, because investors see a high risk that Greece will eventually default on its debt, while seeing virtually no risk that America will do the same. Why?

One answer is that we have a much lower level of debt — the amount we already owe, as opposed to new borrowing — relative to G.D.P.

That has nothing to do with it. Japan’s debt is near triple ours, and their 10 year rates are about 1.3% for example.

True, our debt should have been even lower. We’d be better positioned to deal with the current emergency if so much money hadn’t been squandered on tax cuts for the rich and an unfunded war.

Not true. With us govt spending not operational revenue constrained the way greece is, we are always able to spend (or cut taxes) however much we want to. It’s a political decision without external constraints.

But we still entered the crisis in much better shape than the Greeks.

Yes, because we are the issuer of the dollar and greece is not the issuer of the euro. Greece is like a us state in that regard.

Even more important, however, is the fact that we have a clear path to economic recovery, while Greece doesn’t.

For the same reason. We can manage our aggregate demand because our fiscal policy is not operationally constrained by revenue the way Greece is.

The U.S. economy has been growing since last summer, thanks to fiscal stimulus

Yes, mostly the automatic stabilizers with some help from the proactive measures congress has taken, however misguided.

and expansionary policies by the Federal Reserve.

I don’t agree with this but that’s another story.

I wish that growth were faster; still, it’s finally producing job gains — and it’s also showing up in revenues.

True, however the output gap is finally stable at best as it remains tragically wide.

Right now we’re on track to match Congressional Budget Office projections of a substantial rise in tax receipts. Put those projections together with the Obama administration’s policies, and they imply a sharp fall in the budget deficit over the next few years.

Yes, with our only hope for lower unemployment being an increase in private sector debt that exceeds that. Not my first choice in mending what ails us.

Greece, on the other hand, is caught in a trap. During the good years, when capital was flooding in, Greek costs and prices got far out of line with the rest of Europe. If Greece still had its own currency, it could restore competitiveness through devaluation.

Should have been said this way-

‘If Greece had its own currency and was running its deficits in local currency market forces would have caused the currency to depreciate.’

But since it doesn’t, and since leaving the euro is still considered unthinkable, Greece faces years of grinding deflation and low or zero economic growth. So the only way to reduce deficits is through savage budget cuts, and investors are skeptical about whether those cuts will actually happen.

True. And worse. The proactive cuts and tax hikes can slow the economy to the point the deficit doesn’t come down, and might even increase, making matters even worse.

It’s worth noting, by the way, that Britain — which is in worse fiscal shape than we are, but which, unlike Greece, hasn’t adopted the euro — remains able to borrow at fairly low interest rates. Having your own currency, it seems, makes a big difference.

It is all the difference.

Hard to see why that isn’t obvious. US, UK, Japan, etc. Etc. With one’s own non convertible currency and floating exchange rates, interest rates are necessarily set by the central bank, not by markets.

And govt securities function to support interest rates and not to fund expenditures

And note the uk economy is on the mend. Even housing has found a bid, with the main risk being a govt that doesn’t get it and tries to balance the budget.

In short, we’re not Greece. We may currently be running deficits of comparable size, but our economic position — and, as a result, our fiscal outlook — is vastly better.

Wrong reason- we are the issuer of our own currency, the dollar, while Greece is the user of the euro and not the issuer.

That said, we do have a long-run budget problem. But what’s the root of that problem? “We demand more than we’re willing to pay for,” is the usual line. Yet that line is deeply misleading

First of all, who is this “we” of whom people speak? Bear in mind that the drive to cut taxes largely benefited a small minority of Americans: 39 percent of the benefits of making the Bush tax cuts permanent would go to the richest 1 percent of the population.

Wasn’t my first choice of which tax to cut to support the private sector. I’d have cut fica taxes and i continue to propose that.

And bear in mind, also, that taxes have lagged behind spending partly thanks to a deliberate political strategy, that of “starve the beast”: conservatives have deliberately deprived the government of revenue in an attempt to force the spending cuts they now insist are necessary.

And liberals have artificially constrained themselves with the misguided notion that spending is operationally constrained by revenues, and fail to understand the ‘right sized’ deficit is the one that coincides with full employment and desired price stability.

Meanwhile, when you look under the hood of those troubling long-run budget projections, you discover that they’re not driven by some generalized problem of overspending. Instead, they largely reflect just one thing:

An understanding of national income account and monetary operations shows deficits are driven by ‘savings desires’ and any proactive attempt to increase deficits beyond savings desires results in inflation.

the assumption that health care costs will rise in the future as they have in the past. This tells us that the key to our fiscal future is improving the efficiency of our health care system — which is, you may recall, something the Obama administration has been trying to do, even as many of the same people now warning about the evils of deficits cried “Death panels!”

Wrong causation. What he calls our ‘fiscal future’ is the size of future deficits and they will always reflect future ‘savings desires.’ if we proactively get them smaller than that the evidence will always be unemployment.

So while cutting health care costs may be a ‘good thing,’ when the time comes, future deficits need to reflect future savings desires to keep us fully employed.

So here’s the reality:

The mistaken, political reality.

America’s fiscal outlook over the next few years isn’t bad. We do have a serious long-run budget problem,

Unfortunately, this kind of talk makes him part of the problem, not part of the answer.

which will have to be resolved with a combination of health care reform and other measures, probably including a moderate rise in taxes.

Wonderful, with screaming shortfall in aggregate demand as evidenced by tragic levels of unemployment, the celebrity voice from the left is calling for spending cuts and tax hikes not to cool an over heating economy, but to reduce non govt savings of financial assets.

(govt deficit = non govt savings of financial assets to the penny as a matter of national income accounting, etc)

But we should ignore those who pretend to be concerned with fiscal responsibility, but whose real goal is to dismantle the welfare state — and are trying to use crises elsewhere to frighten us into giving them what they want.

This is one of the current iteration of the ‘deficit dove’ position.

It does not cut it.

It is part of the problem, not part of the answer.

Doing the best i can to get the word out.

Please distribute to the max!