EU lends to itself to bail itself out – ECB remains sidelined

“While each component makes sense in its own narrow terms, the EU policy as a whole is madness for a currency union. Stephen Lewis from Monument Securities says Europe’s leaders have forgotten the lesson of the “Gold Bloc” in the second phase of the Great Depression, when a reactionary and over-proud Continent ground itself into slump by clinging to deflationary totemism long after the circumstances had rendered this policy suicidal. We all know how it ended.”

Ambrose Evans-Pritchard

The meeting took 14 hours and produced numbers large enough and rhetoric credible enough to trigger today’s short covering that might continue at least through half of tomorrow.

But all the actual announced funding comes from the same nations that are having the funding issues. There is no external funding of consequence of national govt borrowing needs coming any source other than the euro governments, nor can there be, as the the funding needs are in euro. And the ECB, the only entity that can provide the euro zone with the needed net financial assets, remains limited to ‘liquidity’ provision which does not address the core funding issue.

Yes, the funding needs have been move evenly distributed among the national governments. But even the financially strongest member, Germany, is structurally in need of continually borrowing increasing quantities of euro to roll over existing debt and fund continuing deficits, with no foreseeable prospects of even stabilizing its debt to GDP ratio or debt to revenue ratio. Adding this new financing burden only makes matters worse, and do the austerity measures now under way in all the member nations.

The one bright spot is the ‘whatever it takes’ language that presumably includes the only move that can make it work financially- actual funding of national govt. debt by the ECB either directly or indirectly through guarantees. But there can be no assurance, of course, that it’s just another bluff to buy time, hoping for a large enough increase in net exports which would be evidence of the rest of the world deciding to reduce its euro net financial assets via the purchase of goods and services from the euro zone.

And with a meaningful increase in exports likely to happen in a meaningful way only with a much lower euro, the terms and conditions of today’s announcements introduce conflicting forces. The austerity measures work to strengthen the euro to the extent they succeed, and to weaken it to the extent they result in increased national govt debt and changes in portfolio preferences.

My best guess is that market forces will soon be testing this new package and its core weaknesses.

corrected post on IMF operations

I now understand it this way:

The IMF creates and allocates new SDR’s to its members.

There is no other source of SDR’s.

SDR’s exist only in accounts on the IMF’s books.

SDR’s have value only because there is an informal agreement between members that they will use their own currency to lend against or buy SDR’s from members the IMF deems in need of funding who also accept IMF terms and conditions.

Originally, in the fixed exchange rate system of that time, this was to help members with balance of payments deficits obtain foreign exchange to buy their own currencies to keep them from devaluation.

The system failed and now the exchange rates are floating.

Currently SDR’s and the IMF are used by members needing help with foreign currency funding needs.

Looks to me like Greece will be borrowing euro from other euro nations using its SDR’s as collateral or selling them to other euro nations.

Either way it’s functionally getting funding from the other euro members.

Greece is also accepting IMF terms and conditions.

The only way the US is involved is if a member attempts to use its SDR’s to obtain $US.

The US is bound only by this informal agreement to accept SDR’s as collateral for $US loans, or to buy SDR for $US.

SDR’s have no intrinsic value and are not accepted for tax payments.

It’s a lot like the regional ‘currencies’ like ‘lets’ and ‘Ithaca dollars’ that are also purely voluntary and facilitate unsecured lending of goods and services with no enforcement in the case of default.

It’s a purely voluntary arrangement which renders all funding as functionally unsecured.

There is no IMF balance sheet involved.

While conceptually/descriptively different than what I erroneously described in my previous post, it is all functionally the same- unsecured lending to Greece by the other euro nations with IMF terms and conditions.

The actual flow of funds and inherent risk is as I previously described.

No dollars leave the Fed, euro are transferred from euro members to Greece.

I apologize for the prior incorrect descriptive information and appreciate any further information anyone might have regarding the actual current arrangements.

Prior post:

I understand it this way:

The US buys SDR’s in dollars.
those dollars exist as deposits in the IMF’s account at the Fed.

The euro members buy SDR’s in euro.
Those euro sit in the IMF’s account at the ECB

The IMF then lends those euro to Greece
They get transferred by the ECB to the Bank of Greece’s account at the ECB.

The IMF’s dollars stay in the IMF’s account at the Fed.

They can only be transferred to another account at the Fed by the Fed.

U.S. taxpayers are helping finance Greek bailout

By Senator Jim DeMint

May 6 — The International Monetary Fund board has approved a $40 billion bailout for Greece, almost one year after the Senate rejected my amendment to prohibit the IMF from using U.S. taxpayer money to bailout foreign countries.

Congress didn‚t learn their lesson after the $700 billion failed bank bailout and let world leaders shake down U.S taxpayers for international bailout money at the G-20 conference in April 2009. G-20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors asked the United States, the IMF‚s largest contributor, for a whopping $108 billion to rescue bankers around the world and the Obama Administration quickly obliged.
Rather than pass it as stand-alone legislation, President Obama asked Congress to fold the $108 billion into a war-spending bill to send money to our troops.

It was clear such an approach would simply repeat the expensive mistake of the failed Wall Street bailouts with banks in other nations. Think of it as an international TARP plan, another massive rescue package rushed through with little planning or debate. That‚s why I objected and offered an amendment to take it out of the war bill. But the Democrat Senate voted to keep the IMF bailout in the war spending bill. 64 senators voted for the bailout, 30 senators voted against it.

Only one year later, the IMF is sending nearly $40 billion to bailout Greece, the biggest bailout the IMF has ever enacted.

Right now, 17 percent of the IMF funding pool that the $40 billion bailout is being drawn from comes from U.S. taxpayers. If that ratio holds true, that means American taxpayers are paying for $6.8 billion of the Greek bailout. Although the $108 billion extra that Congress approved for the IMF in 2009 hasn‚t yet gone into effect, you can bet that once it does Greek bankers will come to the IMF again with their hat in hand. And, if other European Union countries see free money up for grabs they could ask the IMF for bailouts when they get into trouble, too. If we‚ve learned anything from the Wall Street bailouts it‚s that just one bailout is never enough.
To hide the bailout from Americans already angry with the $700 billion bank bailout, Congress classified it as an „expanded credit line.‰ The Congressional Budget Office only scored it as $5 billion because IMF agreed to give the United States a promissory note for the rest of the bill.
As the Wall Street Journal wrote at the time, „If it costs so little, why not make it $200 billion. Or a trillion? It‚s free!‰

Of course, money isn‚t free and there are member nations of the IMF that won‚t be in a hurry to pay it back. Three state sponsors of terrorism, Iran, Syria and Sudan, are a part of the IMF. Iran participates in the IMF‚s day-to-day activities as a member of its executive board.

If the failed bank bailout and stimulus bill wasn‚t enough to prove to Americans the kind of misguided, destructive spending that goes on in Washington this will: The Democrat Congress, aided by a few Republicans, used a war spending bill to send bailout money to an international fund that‚s partially-controlled by our enemies.

America can‚t afford to bail out foreign countries with borrowed dollars from China and certainly shouldn‚t allow state sponsors of terror a hand in that process.

This has to stop if we are going to survive as a nation. Congress won‚t act stop such foolishness on its own. The only way Americans can stop this is by sending new people to Washington in November who will.

Sen. Jim DeMint is a Republican U.S. Senator from South Carolina.

rotten to the core

Here we go, and this is without additional austerity measures already in progress from the euro zone and other economies:

Germany to Lose $61 Billion in Tax Revenue by 2014, Bild Says

By Tony Czuczka

May 6 (Bloomberg) — Tax revenue for German federal, state and local authorities will decline by a total of 48 billion euros ($61 billion) until 2014, the Bild newspaper reported, without saying how it got the information.

The German Finance Ministry plans to announce its latest tax-revenue estimate later today.

ECB meeting preview / ECB intervention?

In case you had not seen this.

If the ECB bought Greek bonds in the secondary market and issued an ECB bond as suggested below,

that could be a reasonable solution out of this mess?

They don’t need to issue the ecb bonds unless the money markets have excess reserves driving short rates below target rates

It doesn’t solve much any more than the Fed buying Lehman bonds in the secondary market would have helped Lehman.
It just lets some bond holders get out, presumably on the offered side of the market.

That’s why it’s allowed in the first place- it does not support the member nation and introduce that moral hazard.

To keep things fair, they could state that they would buy up to a maximum of a certain amount of bonds per capita (or even the average of the last 5 years of GDP) for all EUR denominated countries on a discretionary basis.

As above.

It sort of accomplishes what you suggested but with tools already in place and most importantly with the mainstream economists actually discussing it?

I don’t think so, as above. The member nations would still be in Ponzi, where they have to sell debt to make an expanding amount of debt payments.

The ECB might even make money if Greece paid off; just like the FED did with mortgages and bank stocks.

The ‘profits’ are similar to a tax, removing net financial assets form the private sector. They made money because the Federal deficit spending was sufficient to remove enough fiscal drag to allow the private sector to return to profitability.

The Fed and Tsy profits simply somewhat reduced the deficit spending.

— Original Sender: —

From our Economics Team…..

ECB meeting preview / ECB intervention

The current market action has prompted many questions on the ECB possible interventions and what Trichet might say/announce tomorrow at the ECB press conference. I think an ECB intervention is indeed now becoming very likely. Remember that the ECB “printed” 500Bn EUR in just 2 weeks in October 2008 to fund the money market which had became dysfunctional after Lehman. The primary mandate of a central bank is to maintain financial stability; hence the Oct 2008 change in repo rule and the 500Bn of money created; de facto, the ECB made teh clearing of the money market. The same might happen for the sovereign market.

Yes, but as above, it doesn’t address solvency or credit worthiness of a member nation in Ponzi, which is all of them.

The real problem is austerity probably won’t bring down deficits, as it weakens the economies, cutting into tax revenues and adding to transfer payments.

The following is a quick summary.

*** Fundamentals:

– The problem with Greece was a problem of sustainability of public finances. Lending more was not the solution, the solution was to cut dramatically the deficit to reduce it to a level at which public finances are sustainable. Hence the need for an IMF plan, i.e. loan and more importantly an ambitious fiscal consolidation.

Except that the cutting can actually increase deficits, as explained above.

– The other countries are in a very different economic and fiscal situation, the situation is manageable (for e.g. see our weekly last Friday comparing Greece and Portugal). So the problem for the other countries is essentially a problem of market liquidity. This means ECB intervention.

If that’s all it was, fine. But seems to me they also can’t bring down deficits with austerity, but only increase them, for the reasons above.

*** ECB intervention: When?
– Probably early next week.

– Usually markets react when money is provided, not when the plan is announced. This is what happened for e.g. with the TARP. So there is a case for waiting until the IMF plan is enacted to see market reaction and design the measures accordingly.

Agreed. And the IMF plan requires the member nations to buy SDR’s with ‘borrowed money’ to fund the IMF loans, so there is no help from the IMF balance sheet regarding credit worthiness.

No matter how they slice it, without the ECB doing the lending, any package for Greece diminishes the other member nation’s credit worthiness

– The German Parliament votes Friday. It is probably not desirable from the ECB perspective to act before.

They don’t have popular support as seems German’s don’t want to pay for Greek public employees salaries and benefits which are higher than their own.

*** ECB intervention: How?

There are probably an infinite number of intervention mechanisms available. The following bullet points list the most obvious ones. These bullet points are based on the note published Monday “Greece after the IMF plan”.

– The ECB could deploy its balance sheet, initiating expansionary liquidity provisioning. This would be pure QE with the ECB buying directly governments bonds. Note that this is not against the status of the ECB: the ECB (or any central bank of the Eurosystem) cannot “finance a public deficit” hence cannot buy on the primary market, but there is no limits on the secondary market.

This is allowed for a good reason- it doesn’t do much, as described above.

Note also that the intervention can be sterilized, the ECB has the possibility (although it never used it so far) to issue a bond, it could thus issue an ECB bond of the same size as its intervention on the market; having then a zero effect on the net liquidity provided. We though QE was unlikely given past ECB policy, but under the current circumstances it would definitely be a possible option.

‘Liquidity’ only matters if it drives the overnight rate below ecb target rates. They can then ‘offset operating factors’ as they call it as needed to keep the interbank rate on target.

This is purely technical and of no monetary or economic consequence.

– In theory, the ECB could deploy reserves under management, about €350Bn, to buy bonds of the country at-risk. Here, however, we doubt the ECB would respond in this fashion. The fund would be limited and it would imply that a disproportionate part of the reserves would be invested in the “trouble” countries.

Operationally they can readily buy anything they want.

– Rather, most ECB policy intervention is channeled through banks. Various options are available to the ECB, including adjusting repo rules or collateral rules on existing sovereign paper. One option would be to accept the paper at par instead of accepting it at market value. This would mean that a bank could buy a sovereign paper at 70cents and repo it at 100cents.

Yes, but still full recourse- the bank remains on the hook if the collateral goes bad, and it has to report its net capital accordingly- recognizing full ownership of the collateral.

Another option would be to argue current market failure and, as a consequence, repo at the average price of the past year (same logic, note that this option has been used for e.g. by the SFEF in the financing of French banks). The ECB could also accept as collateral banks loans to governments.

Bank liquidity is not an issue. The price of the repo is of no consequence until bank liquidity is an issue.

– Financing could even be channeled via supranational institutions. In that case the intervention would not need to need to be made public.

*** ECB press conference tomorrow: what will Trichet say?

– Difficult to preannounce the measures and give details even if ECB is planning an intervention.

– Impossible to say nothing about the current situation.

– Trichet is likely to say “we have the tools to intervene and will not hesitate to do so”.

Agreed!

This is unlikely to calm the market much.

Agreed!

The question is, does he care? The ECB still has the single mandate of price stability.

Technically they would intervene to stop deflation, or something like that.

But with higher prices pouring in through the fx window that’s now problematic as well.

Warren Mosler

UTFITF (unheard tree falling in the forest)

Goodhart Says Greek Deal May Collapse as Crisis Tests Euro

I like the way he puts it below:

“…if they actually cut back the deficit as fast as is being required they’re just going to go into appalling deflation.”

Goodhart Says Greek Deal May Collapse as Crisis Tests Euro

By Svenja O’Donnell and Andrea Catherwood

May 4 (Bloomberg) — Greece’s bailout “might collapse” and the nation’s debt crisis makes it “hard to see” how the euro will survive in its current form, former Bank of England policy makerCharles Goodhart said.

“If this financing deal should collapse, and it might for one reason or another, then there would be a question of what the Greeks could possibly do,” Goodhart said in an interview with Bloomberg Television in London today. “Default would be totally disastrous for them and leaving the euro would equally be disastrous.”

Euro-region ministers on May 2 agreed to a 110 billion-euro ($145 billion) bailout with the International Monetary Fund to prevent a Greek default, after investor concern sparked a rout in Portuguese and Spanish bonds last week and sent stock markets tumbling. The Greek crisis shows the need for more integration within the euro as a common currency, Goodhart said.

“It’s very hard to see how this is going survive this particular test,” he said. “The euro system has either got to have much more integration or parts of it will fall by the wayside.”

Standard & Poor’s last week cut Greece’s credit rating to the junk level of BB+, lowered Spain’s grade by one level to AA and downgraded Portugal by two steps to A-. Greece has now agreed to budget-cutting measures worth 13 percent of gross domestic product.

‘Appalling Deflation’

“If the current bailout is put in place, it will be enough to meet their immediate financing problems not only this year but for the next year or two,” Goodhart said. “The problem is that it doesn’t meet their adjustment problems. It doesn’t deal with the problem the Greeks, in part from having too large a deficit and too large a debt ratio, are very uncompetitive and if they actually cut back the deficit as fast as is being required they’re just going to go into appalling deflation.”

Greek 10-year bonds yielded 8.7 percent, about 566 basis points more than German bunds, as of 11:32 a.m. in London. That spread is down from as high as 800 basis points last week, the biggest gap since the euro’s introduction 11 years ago.

Should the deal fail, Greece “might do a kind of dual currency in which they use their scarce euros to meet their external commitments and in the meantime use an internal IOU, rather as Californian and some of the Argentinian states did, in order to meet their internal commitments” Goodhart said. “It would be a dual currency and the internal currency would fluctuate compared to the euro.”

Such an exercise would be “very messy,’ he added.

Merkel’s Coalition Steps Up Calls for EU ‘Orderly Insolvencies’

It doesn’t get any more ominous than this.

This would insure an orderly default of the entire currency union.
Which is already in progress.

Germany is concerned that the Greek situation resulted in larger deficits for the other members, and wants something in place so defaults don’t result in this type of fiscal expansion for the rescuers.

If they are in fact looking seriously at this new proposal for a default friendly institutional structure its all coming to an end in a deflationary debt implosion, accelerated by their desire for the pro cyclical fiscal policy of smaller national government deficits.

The next event should be the bank runs that force a shut down of the payments system.

It’s a human tragedy that doesn’t have to happen. I’ve proposed two obvious and constructive fixes that are not even being considered. It’s almost like ‘they’ want this to happen, but I now have no idea who ‘they’ are or what ‘their’ motives are.

As always, feel free to distribute.

Merkel’s Coalition Steps Up Calls for EU ‘Orderly Insolvencies’

By Tony Czuczka

May 4 (Bloomberg) — German Chancellor Angela Merkel’s coalition stepped up calls for allowing the “orderly” default of euro-region member states to avoid any repeat of the Greek fiscal crisis.

The parliamentary leaders of the three coalition parties agreed in Berlin today to put a resolution to parliament alongside the bill on Greek aid calling for the European Union to revise rules for the euro to put pressure on countries that run deficits.

Merkel said in an interview with ARD television late yesterday that it’s time to learn lessons from the Greek bailout and raised the option of “an orderly insolvency” as a way to make sure creditors participate in any future rescue.

“We want to move from crisis management to crisis prevention,” Birgit Homburger, the parliamentary head of Merkel’s Free Democratic coalition partner, told reporters in Berlin after the coalition leaders meeting. “We have to do everything we can to ensure we never get into such a situation again.”

Volker Kauder, the floor leader of Merkel’s Christian Democrats, said that the European Commission, the EU’s executive body, must be able to better examine the finances of member states to avert any rerun of what happened in Greece.

“We quite urgently need something for the members of European Monetary Union that we also didn’t have during the banking crisis two years ago,” Finance Minister Wolfgang Schaeuble told reporters yesterday. “Namely the possibility of a restructuring procedure in the event of looming insolvency that helps prevent systemic contagion risks.”

my euro essay from 2001

I wrote this in 2001, the euro has been an accident waiting to happen.

It’s an unstable equilibrium, as Mike just reminded me I used to say.

Like balancing a marble on top of an upside down bowl, if it starts to go it accelerates downward

Vs the dollar, a stable equilibrium system, which is like placing a marble in a bowl right side up, and any movement meets forces which brings it back to the starting point.

And like many ponzi schemes, it works just fine on the way up, and can go on a long time before it crumbles.

Rites of Passage

The Child of Consensus

Conceived in post WWII politics, and baptized in the political waters of the 90’s, a new common currency- the euro- assumed its position on January 1, 1999. Representatives of the prospective member nations masterfully achieved political consensus by both the absence of objectionable clauses and the inclusion of national constraints, as manifested in the Treaty of Maastricht. During that tumultuous process, with deep pride, the elders grasped and shielded the credit sensitive heel of the infant euro. The ‘no bailout’ directive for the new ECB (European Central Bank) emerged as a pillar of the political imperative to address the ‘moral hazard’ issue that so deeply concerned the political leadership, and, two years later, that same rhetoric of fiscal responsibility continues to ring at least as loudly when the merits of the EMU (European Monetary Union) are proclaimed. Unfortunately, however well intended as protection from a genetic proclivity toward fiscal irresponsibility, the naked heel is but a magnet for the financial market’s arrows of our hero’s mortal demise.

As Apollo’s chariot adeptly carries its conflagration from east to west, the European Monetary Union carries its members on the path of economic growth. Unlike the path of the sun, however, the path of an economy continuously vacillates, including occasional dips into negative territory. And, like the sign most rental car agencies post by the entrance for returning cars about to drive over a one way bump strip, the new EMU, with its lurking unidirectional bias, could do a service to it members with a similar posting – WARNING- DO NOT BACK UP!

The Dynamics of the Instability

The euro-12 nations once had independent monetary systems, very much like the US, Canada, and Japan today. Under EMU, however, the national governments are now best thought of financially as states, provinces, or cities of the new currency union, much like California, Ontario, and New York City. The old national central banks are no longer the issuers of their local currency. In their place, the EMU has added a new central bank, the ECB, to manage the payments system, set the overnight lending rate, and intervene in the currency markets when appropriate. The EP (European Parliament) has a relatively small budget and limited fiscal responsibilities. Most of the governmental functions and responsibilities remain at the national level, having not been transferred to the new federal level. Two of those responsibilities that will prove most problematic at the national level are unemployment compensation and bank deposit insurance. Furthermore, all previous national financial liabilities remain at the national level and have been converted to the new euro, with debt to GDP ratios of member nations as high as 105%, not including substantial and growing unfunded liabilities. These burdens are all very much higher than what the credit markets ordinarily allow states, provinces, or cities to finance.

Since inception a little over two years ago the euro-12 national governments have experienced moderate GDP growth, declining unemployment, and moderate tax revenue growth. Fiscal deficits narrowed and all but vanished as tax revenues grew faster than expenditures, and GDP increased at a faster rate than the national debts, so that debt to GDP ratios declined somewhat. Under these circumstances investors have continued to support national funding requirements and there have been no substantive bank failures. Furthermore, it is reasonable to assume that as long as this pattern of growth continues finance will be readily available. However, should the current world economic slowdown move the euro-12 to negative growth, falling tax revenues, and concerns over the banking system’s financial health, the euro-12 could be faced with a system wide liquidity crisis. At the same time, market forces can also be expected to exacerbate the downward spiral by forcing the national governments to act procyclically, either by cutting national spending or attempting to increase revenue.

For clues to the nature and magnitude of the potential difficulties, one can review the US Savings and Loan crisis of the 80’s, with the difference being that deposit insurance would have been a state obligation, rather than a federal responsibility. For example, one could ask how Texas might have fared when faced with a bill for some $100 billion to cover bank losses and redeem depositors? And, once it was revealed that states could lack the borrowing power for funds to preserve depositors insured accounts, how could any bank have funded itself? More recently, if Bank of America’s deposit insurer and lender of last resort were the State of California rather than the Federal Reserve, could it have funded itself under the financial cloud of the state’s ongoing power crisis and credit downgrade? And, if not, would that have triggered a general liquidity crisis within the US banking system? Without deposit insurance and lender of last resort responsibilities the legal obligation of a non-credit constrained entity, such as the Federal Reserve, is systemic financial risk not ever present?

The inherent instability can be expressed as a series of questions:
*Will the euro-12 economy slow sufficiently to automatically increase national deficits via the reduction of tax revenues and increased transfer payments?
*Will such a slowdown cause the markets to dictate terms of credit to the credit sensitive national governments, and force procyclical responses?
*Will the slowdown lead to local bank failures?
*Will the markets allow national governments with heavy debt burdens, falling revenues and rising expenses the finance required to support troubled banks?
*Will depositors lose confidence in the banking system and test the new euro-12 support mechanism?
*Can the entire payments system avoid a shutdown when faced with this need to reorganize?

Conclusion

Water freezes at 0 degrees C. But very still water can be cooled well below that and stay liquid until a catalyst, such as a sudden breeze, causes it to instantly solidify. Likewise, the conditions for a national liquidity crisis that will shut down the euro-12’s monetary system are firmly in place. All that is required is an economic slowdown that threatens either tax revenues or the capital of the banking system.
A prosperous financial future belongs to those who respect the dynamics and are prepared for the day of reckoning. History and logic dictate that the credit sensitive euro-12 national governments and banking system will be tested. The market’s arrows will inflict an initially narrow liquidity crisis, which will immediately infect and rapidly arrest the entire euro payments system. Only the inevitable, currently prohibited, direct intervention of the ECB will be capable of performing the resurrection, and from the ashes of that fallen flaming star an immortal sovereign currency will no doubt emerge.

Warren Mosler
May 1, 2001

Greece Bailout Plan Will Include Support Fund for Domestic Banks, EU Says…

The size Greece ‘needed’ implies the others will need numbers beyond euro zone capacity, especially as the Greek deal used up euro zone capacity.

So this means Greece is the last rescue possible- the rest are on there own.

They wanted to stop the contagion, but that would have had to be done by showing they could save Greece without weakening themselves, and in a manner that shows they can help any and all.

They didn’t do that.

Instead they showed the effort necessary save Greece was so large that they don’t have the means to save anyone larger than Greece.

So now they are performing without a net.

And, as Marshall put it, the austerity measures are likely to increase rather than decrease deficits, making it all that much worse.

This euro zone problem is not going away.

From: Marshall
Sent: Sunday, May 02, 2010 8:23 PM


Well, it’s early, but euro is weakening again in early FX trading in Australia and US bonds are much stronger. Still early, but that’s very telling. And frankly, as good as the data has “looked” in the US, I don’t believe it myself. The gasoline consumption numbers in California that I saw last week were terrible and California is a good lead indicator. I started getting bullish on the equity markets (or at least less bearish) in Jan. 2009 when the California housing data started to pick up. And regardless of whether Greece is “saved”, the events of the past few weeks have been profoundly DEFLATIONARY for the entire euro zone. How can the global economy not be affected by the downturn in the second most important economic bloc in the world?


Combine that with a legal and political attack against Wall Street that gives every indication of INTENSIFYING and I think you have to say that things are definitely changing for the worst at the margin.

Hey, the data post the Bear Stearns rescue looked pretty good for a while as well until the whole foundation came tumbling down. The termites never look like their making much progress until the structure suddenly collapses.

Then again, I’m usually more bearish than Warren, so take what I say with a grain of salt.

Greece CAN go it alone

Greece CAN Go it Alone
Yesterday at 5:00pm
By Marshall Auerback and Warren Mosler

Greece can successfully issue and place new debt at low interest rates. The trick is to insert a provision stating that in the event of default, the bearer on demand can use those defaulted securities to pay Greek government taxes. This makes it immediately obvious to investors that those new securities are ‘money good’ and will ultimately redeem for face value for as long as the Greek government levies and enforces taxes. This would not only allow Greece to fund itself at low interest rates, but it would also serve as an example for the rest of the euro zone, and thereby ease the funding pressures on the entire region.

We recognize, of course, that this proposal would also introduce a ‘moral hazard’ issue. This newly found funding freedom, if abused, could be highly inflationary and further weaken the euro. In fact, the reason the ECB is prohibited from buying national government debt is to allow ‘market discipline’ to limit member nation fiscal expansion by the threat of default. When that threat is removed, bad behavior is rewarded, as the country that deficit spends the most wins, in an accelerating and inflationary race to the bottom.
It is comparable to a situation where a nation like the US, for example, did not have national insurance regulation. In this kind of circumstance, the individual states got into a race to the bottom, where the state with the laxest standards stood to attract the most insurance companies, forcing each State to either lower standards or see its tax base flee. And it tends to end badly with AIG style collapses.

Additionally, the ECB or the Economic Council of Finance Ministers (ECOFIN) effectively loses the means to enforce their austerity demands and keep them from being reversed once it’s known they’ve taken the position that it’s too risky to let any one nation fail.

What Europe’s policy makers would like to do is find a way to isolate Greece and mitigate the contagion effect, while maintaining the market discipline that comes from the member nations being the credit sensitive entities they are today; hence, the mooted “shock and awe” proposals now being leaked, which did engender an 8% jump in the Greek stock market on Thursday.

But these proposals don’t really get to the nub of the problem. Any major package weakens the others who have to fund it in the market place, because the other member nations are also revenue dependent, credit sensitive entities. Much like the US States, they do not control central bank operations, and must have good funds in their accounts or their checks will bounce.

The euro zone nations are all still in a bind, and their mandated austerity measures mean they don’t keep up with a world recovery. And Greek financial restructuring that reduces outstanding debt reduces outstanding euro financial assets, strengthening the euro, and further weakening output and employment, while at the same time the legitimization of restructuring risk weakens the credit worthiness of all the member nations.

It does not appear that the markets have fully discounted the ramifications of a Greek default. If you use a Chapter 11 bankruptcy analogy, large parts of the country would be shut down and the “company” (i.e. Greece Inc) could spend only its tax revenues. But the implied spending cuts represent a further substantial cut in aggregate demand and decreased revenues, in a most un-virtuous spiral that ends only with an increase in exports or privation driven revolt.

The ability of Greece to use the funds from the rescue package as a means to extinguish Greek state liabilities would improve their financial ratios and stave off financial collapse, at least on a short term basis, with the side effect of a downward spiral in output and employment, while the sovereign risk concerns are concurrently transmitted to Spain, Portugal, Ireland, Italy, and beyond. Those sovereign difficulties also morph into a full-scale private banking crisis which can quickly extend to bank runs at the branch level.

Our suggestion will rescue Greece and the entire euro zone from the dangers of national government insolvencies, and turn the euro zone policy maker’s attention 180 degrees, back to their traditional role of containing the potential moral hazard issue of excessive deficit spending by the national governments through the Stability and Growth Pact. If the member states ultimately decide that the Stability and Growth Pact ratios need to be changed, that’s their decision. But the SGP represents the euro zone’s “national budget”, precisely designed to prevent the hyperinflationary outcome that the “race to the bottom” could potentially create. At the very least, our proposal will mitigate the deflationary impact of markets disciplining credit sensitive national governments and halting the potential spread of global financial contagion, without being inflationary.

Chatter About the Fed/ECB CCY Swap Line

This one’s for the bloggers-

Dollar swap lines are functionally unsecured loans to foreign govts. that the Fed can do unilaterally. Congress only finds out well after the fact. Last time around they did $600 billion, including lending (unsecured) to nations Congress never would have approved.

The problem is the Fed Chairman insists they are secured because we get local currency deposits at the foreign central bank as collateral.

That’s like putting up your watch as collateral for a loan but you still wear it.

Chatter About the Fed/ECB CCY Swap Line
If reinstituted, it is a basic spot/forward FX trading line.

What this does is to give the ECB the power to lend USD in Europe. It
has 2 potential benefits:

1.Not all banks in Europe who require USD funding has access to the Fed
or the FF market

2.They don’t have to wait until NY opens if panic breaks out in Europe
over USD funding.

There is a third benefit. Politics. It let’s the market know that the
central banks are on the case, and the Fed doesn’t want to see the
FRA-OIS spread spin out of control.