The Trillion Dollar Day

The Trillion Dollar Day

Yesterday, $1.048 trillion dollars was printed out of thin air, which gave the globe its first Trillion Dollar Day.

Everyday, all government spending is ‘printed out of thin air’, and all payments to the government ‘vanish into thin air’.

However, there were no net payments yesterday for all practical purposes.

$506 bb was injected by the ECB into European Banks,

The uninformed language continues with ‘injected’ implying net funds ‘forced in’ somehow.

All that happened was the ECB offered funds at a lower interest rate to replace funds available from the ECB at higher interest rates. This has no effect on aggregate demand.

$518 bb was earmarked as an addon to the USA federal spending for 2008

Federal deficit spending does increase net financial assets of the ‘non government’ sectors. That is more properly called ‘injecting’ funds, as government exchanges credit balances for real goods and services (buy things), thereby adding to aggregate demand.

plus, $24 bb was taken by banks from other central banks to shore up reserves.

Not what happened. It was all about substituting one maturity for another.

Most importantly, 3 month Libor and Euro Dollar rates declined by only 15 – 20 basis points. The markets expected these rates to decline more as a sign of greater liquidity. The European and USA markets sold off over night and this morning in reaction to stubbornly high short-term rates.

When the CB’s fully understand their own reserve accounting and monetary operations, they will offer unlimited funds at or just over their target rates and maturities and also have a bid for funds at or just under their target.

An anonymous person from the ECB told Bloomberg this morning that the $518 bb was the single greatest injection of emergency lending in central bank history

Probably. Interesting thing to remember for trivial pursuits.

and that it was a climatic effort to free up inter-bank lending.

Should have been done long ago. CB’s main job as single supplier of net reserves is setting rates.

They also said it was all that they could do (for now).

It’s not all that they can do. Operationally, it’s simply debits and credits, for the most part totally offsetting with no net funds involved, not that it matters for the ECB anyway.

Here is my take on ECB efforts as I have discussed with members of our firm. Some bank(s) and/or investment bank(s) most likely have sustained huge market to market losses that they must bring onto their balance sheets soon, which are causing them and others who fear losses from counter parties in our $500 trillion plus derivatives market. My suspicion is that these losses include derivative losses that are not directly related to subprime.

OK. Point?

I also think that the FED and Central Banks have suspected the above since August 2007, which caused them to reverse course from fighting inflation to supply liquidity to save the banking and financial system.

Seems to be the mainstream view right now?

I also do not have much faith in central banks and government authorities ability to manage a widespread financial crisis because THEY created this crisis with their lose money and lax regulatory practices that have been rampant since 2002.

Point?

There is also evidence that USA government spending and deficits are much larger than actually reported since 2002. I have found reports from numerous ex-GOA officials and current GOA staff that have come clean with our BUDGET. Former government officials are now reporting that TSY SEC O’Neil was fired because he wanted to right the ship at GOA and report true numbers in his reports to Congress and the American public.

If they were larger than reporter and added more aggregate demand than appears on the surface, they are responsible for sustaining growth and employment.

Below is a take on this from John Williams. John also publishes the CPI using pre-1982 methods that show annualized CPI running 3-4% higher than reported under current methods.

I recall that debate and the results seemed very reasonable at the time. Can’t remember all the details now.

Here are adjusted Budget numbers for 2006-2007.

The results summarized in the following table show that the GAAP-based deficit, including the annual change in the net present value of unfunded liabilities for Social Security and Medicare narrowed to $1.2 trillion in 2007 from $4.6 trillion in 2006. The reported reduction in the deficit, however, was due to a one-time legislative-related accounting change in Medicare Part B that likely will be reversed, and, in any event, needs to be viewed on a consistent year-to-year accounting basis.

On a consistent basis, year-to-year, I estimate the 2007 deficit at $5.6 trillion, or worse, based on the government’s explanation of the process and cost estimates.

What matters from the macro level is the fiscal balance that adds/subtracts from the current year aggregate demand. This was learned the hard way in 1937 when, if I recall correctly, tax revenue from the new social security program was put in a trust fund and not counted as federal revenue for purposes of reporting fiscal balance and funds available for federal spending. The result was a fiscal shock/drop in demand that upped unemployment to 19% after having come down close to 10%.

From Note 22 of the financial statements, under “SMI Part B Physician Update Factor:”

“The projected Part B expenditure growth reflected in the accompanying 2007 Statement of Social Insurance is significantly reduced as a result of the structure of physician payment updates under current law. In the absence of legislation, this structure would result in multiple years of significant reductions in physician payments, totaling an estimated 41 percent over the next 9 years. Reductions of this magnitude are not feasible and are very unlikely to occur fully in practice. For example, Congress has overridden scheduled negative updates for each of the last 5 years in practice. However, since these reductions are required in the future under the current-law payment system, they are reflected in the accompanying 2007 State of Social Insurance as required under GAAP. Consequently, the projected actuarial present values of Part B expenditure shown in the accompanying 2007 Statement of Social Insurance is likely understated (my emphasis).”

Since this was handled differently in last year’s accounting, the change reduced the reported relative deficit. The difference would be $4.4 trillion, per the government, if physician payment updates were set at zero. I used that estimate, tentatively, for the estimates of consistent year-to-year reporting, but such likely will be updated in the full analysis that follows in the December SGS.

With Social Security and Medicare liabilities ignored, the GAAP deficits for 2007 and 2006 were $275.5 billion and $449.5 billion, respectively. Those numbers contrast with the otherwise formal and accounting-gimmicked cash-based deficits of $168.8 billion (2007) and $248.2 billion (2006).

Yes, net government spending may increase over time and may lead to higher rates of reported inflation, but solvency is not the issue.

These ‘deficit terrorists’ totally miss the point; fore, if they did ‘get it’ they would be doing the work and projecting future inflation rates, not just deficit levels.

Furthermore, they ignore the demand drains, like pension fund contributions, IRA’s, insurance reserves, corporate reserves, etc. that also grow geometrically and help ‘explain’ how government can deficit spend as much as it does without excess demand driving nominal growth to hyper inflationary levels.


Libor rates & spreads: down in GBP & EUR, stable in US

Thanks, Dave, my thought are the Fed will also ‘do what it takes’ which means setting price and letting quantity for term funding float.

The ECB doing 500 billion without ‘monetary consequences’ beyond lowering the term rates should have been no surprise to anyone who understands monetary ops, and confirmation of same for those central bankers who may have needed it demonstrated.


Libor rates; no surprises, most of them are down, especially in longer expiries (3mth+) -see table below-. GBP3m -18bp helped by yesterday’s auction. EUR 3m -4.75bp and probably more tomorrow.

Libor spreads.- In 3mth -spot- rates, sharp declines in EUR (-6bp to 78bp) and GBP (-14bp to 76bp) while the US spread remains fairly stable at 80.3bp (-1bp).

It seems the BoE and ECB have taken bolder actions to provide liquidity (see this morning’s message on the ECB LTRO). Let’s see the results of the 1st $20bn TAF later today.

19-Dec
Libor Rate
18-Dec
Libor Rate
Change in
% Points
18-Dec
Libor
17-Dec
Libor
Change in
% Points
USD Overnight 4.34500% 4.40000% -0.05500% 4.40000% 4.41750% -0.01750%
USD 1 Week 4.38875% 4.38625% 0.00250% 4.38625% 4.36375% 0.02250%
USD 3 Month 4.91000% 4.92625% -0.01625% 4.92625% 4.94125% -0.01500%
USD 12 Month 4.41750% 4.47188% -0.05438% 4.47188% 4.51875% -0.04687%
EUR Overnight 3.86125% 3.82750% 0.03375% 3.82750% 3.98875% -0.16125%
EUR 1 Week 4.01000% 4.01625% -0.00625% 4.01625% 4.06625% -0.05000%
EUR 3 Month 4.80125% 4.84875% -0.04750% 4.84875% 4.94688% -0.09813%
EUR 12 Month 4.80250% 4.80750% -0.00500% 4.80750% 4.88313% -0.07563%
GBP Overnight 5.58750% 5.59750% -0.01000% 5.59750% 5.59750% 0.00000%
GBP 1 Week 5.61125% 5.63250% -0.02125% 5.63250% 5.64125% -0.00875%
GBP 3 Month 6.20563% 6.38625% -0.18062% 6.38625% 6.43125% -0.04500%
GBP 12 Month 5.88000% 5.94500% -0.06500% 5.94500% 5.96375% -0.01875%

ECB offers unlimited cash

Good to see the ECB seems to understand it’s about price and not quantity. The reporter isn’t quite there, however.

Maybe when the smoke clears and it turns out no net euros are involved the financial press will get it right. Or maybe they will accuse the ECB of ‘tricking the markets’ by ‘taking out what the put in’ or something equally silly.

Money Market Rates Fall After ECB Offers Unlimited Extra Cash

By Gavin Finch

Dec. 18 (Bloomberg) — The interest rates bank charge each other for two-week loans in euros fell after the European Central Bank said financial institutions can get unlimited emergency cash to ease a year-end shortage in money markets.

The euro interbank offered rate for the loans fell 50 basis points to 4.45 percent, after climbing 83 basis points in the past two weeks, the European Banking Federation said today. That’s 45 basis points more than the ECB’s benchmark interest rate. The three-month borrowing rate fell 7 basis points to 4.88 percent, down from near a seven-year high.

The ECB said late yesterday it will provide as much cash as banks want at or above 4.21 percent to keep interest rates close to its 4 percent refinancing rate. Central banks, led by the Federal Reserve, are seeking to restore confidence to money markets after the collapse of the U.S. subprime-mortgage market.

“It shows how alarmed the ECB is about the turn of the year and the strains” in the market more generally, said Kit Juckes, head of fixed-income research at Royal Bank of Scotland Group Plc in London.

Deposit rates fell earlier, with the amount banks pay on three-month cash in euros falling 15 basis points to 4.76 percent. Banks borrowed 2.435 billion euros ($3.5 billion) at 5 percent yesterday, the most since Sept. 26, the ECB said today.


Re: ffm questions

On Dec 18, 2007 1:09 AM, Scott Fullwiler wrote:
> Hi Warren
>
> A few questions on your take on fed funds market data–
>
> Std dev of fed funds rate is way up since summer compared to normal, but
> looking at the high-low numbers, the deviation (at least max deviation) is
> most significant on the low end (since August 15, it’s been more than 0.5
> below the target rate 54 times and more than 1% below 37 times) .  The high
> has only been more than 1% above the target a few times (7), though it’s
> been above 0.5% more than the target 26 times since mid-August (so much for
> doing away with frown costs).
>
> Anyway . . . what are your thoughts regarding how this persistent, sizable
> deviation on the low end is consistent with the story you’re generally
> telling? (i.e., Fed needs to lower discount rate to target and eliminate
> stigma)

Hi Scott,

My best guess is with the discount rate above the funds rate the NY Fed can’t keep the banks in a ‘net borrowed’ position or the bid for funds gaps up to something over the discount rate.  So instead, they are trying to target ‘flat’ and err on the side of letting banks be a bit long as evidenced by funds dipping below the target, and then acting to offset that move.

Also, the NY Fed sets a ‘stop’ on the repo rate when it intervenes, and with the spread between ff and repo fluctuating more than before ‘the crisis’ it may be more difficult for the NY desk to pick the right repo rate to correspond with their interest rate target.

When the discount rate was below the ff rate it was a lot easier – they just kept banks net borrowed which caused them bid funds up above the discount rate and the Fed allowed them to continue higher until the got about 1/8% above the ff target and then intervene to make reserves available via open market operations at the equiv. repo rate.

The NY Fed isn’t saying anything about what they see happening, and why there is so much variation, which doesn’t help either.  Here’s a spot where a little transparency and guidance can go a long way.

Further thoughts?

Warren

Is it as simple as saying there’s a lot more uncertainty in money
> markets and regarding the Fed’s reactions to the uncertainty?  Perhaps,
> since the effective rate has been above the target (37 times) almost as much
> as below (45 times).
>
> Thanks.
> Scott
>
> —
> ******************************

************************
> Scott T. Fullwiler, Ph.D.
> Associate Professor of Economics
> James A. Leach Chair in Banking and Monetary Economics
>
> Department of Business Administration and Economics
> Wartburg College
> 100 Wartburg Blvd
> Waverly, IA  50677

MBS Repo Markets

Thanks Pat, good report.

Yes, the Fed knows the assets won’t go away, and all they want is to see funding spreads narrow to help insure the banks aren’t forced to sell due to funding issues and thereby distort prices beyond prudent repricing of risk.


TAF auction (20bb) results announcement will come out tomorrow Wednesday 12/19 at 10:30am. Results of the program have had limited impact on repo rates but have reduced Libor rates by 20bps.Turn levels from Bank of America

UST GC= 2.80 / 2.40

AGCY MBS = 5.15

The problem with funding balance sheets hasn’t disappeared. The TAF and The Treasuries TTL programs have simply reduced the cost of funding but have not, and cannot, make an impact on balance sheet size or composition problems. Balance sheets are bloated with ABCP/ CLO / CDO / Enhanced Cash / Structured ABS / etc….

A quick survey of 4 dealers illustrates how balance sheet pressures and the liquidity of balance sheets have affected the bid for repo collateral. Usually dealers across the maturities dealers are within 5bps of each other. Currently the dispersion of bids is very wide.

At the same time we are finding dealers with balance sheet to lend. It’s just the prices of cash vary by dealer and by term and depend on which banks have bought term liquidity and what term they bought it for.

  1w 1m 3m 6m 9m 1y
MS 4.50 4.75 4.55 4.36   4.15
Citi 4.65 5.20 5.05 4.95 4.70 4.55
CSFB 4.45 4.90 4.80 4.70 4.60  
BoA 4.80 5.10 4.65 4.40 4.30 4.20
Ave 4.60 4.99 4.76 4.60 4.53 4.30
Range 0.35 0.45 0.50 0.59 0.40 0.40

The MBS spreads to LIBOR has narrowed as well. Agcy MBS had been trading as much as L-50 for 3m and longer terms. Now we are close to L-20. This seems to be a result of the TAF and CBK liquidity programs providing cheaper funds along the curve and reflects a relative downward move in LIBOR rates as the MBS and OIS markets are essentially unchanged from a week ago.


2007-12-18 US Economic Releases

2007-12-18 Housing Starts

Housing Starts (Nov)

Survey 1176K
Actual 1187K
Prior 1229K
Revised 1232K

2007-12-18 Building Permits

Building Permits (Nov)

Survey 1150K
Actual 1152K
Prior 1178K
Revised 1170K

While housing is still down and out, I’m going out on a limb and saying it’s not going to get much worse, and the next meaningful move is up, particularly if exports hold up. December, January, and February are slow months, and the data doesn’t tell me much; so, it will be ninety days before we get any clarity of where it’s actually going.


2007-12-18 ABC Consumer Confidence

ABC Consumer Confidence (Dec 16)

Survey n/a
Actual -17
Prior -23
Revised n/a

The CNBC Effect wearing off some?


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Libor Settings, Eur, and UK leading the way lower…

Currency TERM Today Monday Friday Thursday Wednesday Tuesday
USD ON 4.40 4.4175 4.3025 4.30 4.34 4.4325
  1M 4.94875 4.965 4.99625 5.0275 5.1025 5.20375
  3M 4.92625 4.94125 4.96625 4.99063 5.057 5.11125
EUR ON 3.8275 3.98875 3.85875 4.04625 4.055 4.05
  1M 4.58813 4.92375 4.93375 4.935 4.945 4.9225
  3M 4.84875 4.94688 4.94688 4.94938 4.9525 4.92688
GBP ON 5.5975 5.5975 5.600 5.60875 5.685 5.7000
  1M 6.49125 6.54125 6.5925 6.60375 6.74625 6.73875
  3M 6.38625 6.43125 6.49625 6.51375 6.62688 6.625

Seems coordinated – move working as expected.

The sizes should be unlimited- it’s about price and not quantity – the size of the operations doesn’t alter net reserve balances.

All they are doing/can do is offering a lower cost option to member banks, not additional funding.

Bank lending is not constrained by reserve availability in any case, just the price of reserves.

Bank lending is constrained by regulation regarding ‘legal’ assets and bank judgement of creditworthiness and willingness to risk shareholder value.

The Fed’s $ lines to the ECB allows the ECB to lower the cost of $ funding for it’s member banks. To the extent they are in the $ libor basket that move serves to help the Fed target $ libor rates.

Regarding the $:

As per previous posts, when a eurozone bank’s $ assets lose value, they are ‘short’ the $, and cover that short by selling euros to buy $.

The ECB also gets short $ if it borrows them to spend. So far that hasn’t been reported. There has been no reported ECB intervention in the fx markets, nor is any expected.

When the ECB borrows $ to lend to eurozone banks it is acting as broker and not getting short $ per se. It is helping the eurozone banks to avoid forced sales/$ losses of $ assets due to funding issues. If the assets go bad via defaults and $ are lost that short will then get covered as above.

‘Borrowing $ to spend’ is ‘getting short the $’ regardless of what entity does it. So the reduction in credit growth due to sub prime borrowers no longer being able to borrow to spend was ‘deflationary’ and eliminated a source of $ weakness.

The non resident sector is, however, going the other way as they are increasing imports from the US and reducing their deflationary practice of selling in the US and not spending their incomes.

Portfolio shifts- both by domestics and foreigners- out of the $ driven by management decision (not trade flows) drive down the currency to the point where buyers are found. The latest shift seems to have moved the $ down to where the the real buyers have come in due to ppp (purchasing power parity) issues, which means that in order to get out of the $ positions the international fund managers had to drive the price down sufficiently to find buyers who wanted $ US to
purchase US domestic production.

These are ‘real buyers’ who are attracted by the low prices of real goods and services created by the portfolio managers dumping their $ holdings. They are selling their euros, pounds, etc. to obtain $US to buy ‘cheap’ real goods, services, real estate, and other $US denominated assets.

Given the tight US fiscal policy and lack of sub prime ‘short sellers’ borrowing to purchase (as above), these buyers can create a bottom for the $ that could be sustained and exacerbated by some of those managers (and super models) who previously went short ‘changing their minds’ and reallocated back to the $US.

Seems US equity managers are vulnerable to getting caught in this prolonged short squeeze as well.

It’s been brought to my attention that over the last several years equity allocations us pension funds- private, state, corporate, etc – have been gravitating to ever larger allocations to non US equities, and are now perhaps 65% non US.

This is probably a result of the under performance of the US sector, and once underway the portfolios are sufficiently large to create a large, macro, ‘bid/offer’ spread. The macro bid side for the trillions that were shifted/reallocated over the last several years was low enough to find buyers for this shift out of both the $ and the US equities to the other currencies. And the shift from $ to real assets also added to agg demand and was an inflationary bias for the $US.

Bottom line – changing portfolio ‘desires’ were accommodated by these portfolios selling at low enough prices to attract ‘real buyers’ which is the macro ‘bid’ side of ‘the market.’

When portfolio desires swing back towards now ‘cheap’ $US assets and these desires accelerate as these assets over perform they only way they can be met in full is to have prices adjust to the ‘macro offered side’ where real goods and services, assets, etc. are reallocated the other direction by that same price discovery process.

more later!


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Greenspan sees early signs of U.S. stagflation

Agree, if food/crude/import&export prices keep rising, there will be serious fireworks between congress and the fed. This will include blaming the fed for the high gasoline prices, for example.

Greenspan sees early signs of U.S. stagflation

U.S. economy is showing early signs of stagflation as growth threatens to stall while food and energy prices soar, former U.S. Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan said on Sunday.

In an interview on ABC’s “This Week with George Stephanopoulos,” Greenspan said low inflation was a major contributor to economic growth and prices must be held in check.

“We are beginning to get not stagflation, but the early symptoms of it,” Greenspan said.

“Fundamentally, inflation must be suppressed,” he added. “It’s critically important that the Federal Reserve is allowed politically to do what it has to do to suppress the inflation rates that I see emerging, not immediately, but clearly over the intermediate and longer-term period.”


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Re: liquidity or insolvency–does it matter?

(email with Randall Wray)

On Dec 15, 2007 9:05 PM, Wray, Randall wrote:
> By ________
>
> This time the magic isn’t working.
>
> Why not? Because the problem with the markets isn’t just a lack of liquidity – there’s also a fundamental problem of solvency.
>
> Let me explain the difference with a hypothetical example.
>
> Suppose that there’s a nasty rumor about the First Bank of Pottersville: people say that the bank made a huge loan to the president’s brother-in-law, who squandered the money on a failed business venture.
>
> Even if the rumor is false, it can break the bank. If everyone, believing that the bank is about to go bust, demands their money out at the same time, the bank would have to raise cash by selling off assets at fire-sale prices – and it may indeed go bust even though it didn’t really make that bum loan.
>
> And because loss of confidence can be a self-fulfilling prophecy, even depositors who don’t believe the rumor would join in the bank run, trying to get their money out while they can.

If there wasn’t credible deposit insurance.

>
> But the Fed can come to the rescue. If the rumor is false, the bank has enough assets to cover its debts; all it lacks is liquidity – the ability to raise cash on short notice. And the Fed can solve that problem by giving the bank a temporary loan, tiding it over until things calm down.

Yes.

> Matters are very different, however, if the rumor is true: the bank really did make a big bad loan. Then the problem isn’t how to restore confidence; it’s how to deal with the fact that the bank is really, truly insolvent, that is, busted.

Fed closes the bank, declares it insolvent, ‘sells’ the assets, and transfers the liabilities to another bank, sometimes along with a check if shareholder’s equity wasn’t enough to cover the losses, and life goes on. Just like the S and L crisis.

>
> My story about a basically sound bank beset by a crisis of confidence, which can be rescued with a temporary loan from the Fed, is more or less what happened to the financial system as a whole in 1998. Russia’s default led to the collapse of the giant hedge fund Long Term Capital Management, and for a few weeks there was panic in the markets.
>
> But when all was said and done, not that much money had been lost; a temporary expansion of credit by the Fed gave everyone time to regain their nerve, and the crisis soon passed.

More was lost then than now, at least so far. 100 billion was lost immediately due to the Russian default and more subsequently. So far announced losses have been less than that, and ‘inflation adjusted’ losses would have to be at least 200 billion to begin to match the first day of the 1998 crisis (August 17).

>
> In August, the Fed tried again to do what it did in 1998, and at first it seemed to work. But then the crisis of confidence came back, worse than ever. And the reason is that this time the financial system – both banks and, probably even more important, nonbank financial institutions – made a lot of loans that are likely to go very, very bad.

Same in 1998. It ended only when it was announced Deutsche Bank was buying Banker’s Trust and seemed the next day it all started ‘flowing’ again.

>
> It’s easy to get lost in the details of subprime mortgages, resets, collateralized debt obligations, and so on. But there are two important facts that may give you a sense of just how big the problem is.
>
> First, we had an enormous housing bubble in the middle of this decade. To restore a historically normal ratio of housing prices to rents or incomes, average home prices would have to fall about 30 percent from their current levels.

Incomes are sufficient to support the current prices. That’s why they haven’t gone down that much yet and are still up year over year. Earnings from export industries are helping a lot so far.

>
> Second, there was a tremendous amount of borrowing into the bubble, as new home buyers purchased houses with little or no money down, and as people who already owned houses refinanced their mortgages as a way of converting rising home prices into cash.

Yes, there was a large drop in aggregate demand when borrowers could no longer buy homes, and that was over a year ago. That was a real effect, and if exports had not stepped in to carry the ball, GDP would not have been sustained at current levels.

>
> As home prices come back down to earth, many of these borrowers will find themselves with negative equity – owing more than their houses are worth. Negative equity, in turn, often leads to foreclosures and big losses for lenders.

‘Often’? There will be some losses, but so far they have not been sufficient to somehow reduce aggregate demand more than exports are adding to demand. Yes, that may change, but it hasn’t yet. Q4 GDP forecasts were just revised up 2% for example.

>
> And the numbers are huge. The financial blog Calculated Risk, using data from First American CoreLogic, estimates that if home prices fall 20 percent there will be 13.7 million homeowners with negative equity. If prices fall 30 percent, that number would rise to more than 20 million.

Not likely if income holds up. That’s why the fed said it was watching labor markets closely.

And government tax receipts seem OK through November, which is a pretty good coincident indicator incomes are holding up.

>
> That translates into a lot of losses, and explains why liquidity has dried up. What’s going on in the markets isn’t an irrational panic. It’s a wholly rational panic, because there’s a lot of bad debt out there, and you don’t know how much of that bad debt is held by the guy who wants to borrow your money.

Enough money funds in particular have decided to not get involved in anyting but treasury securities, driving those rates down. That will sort itself out as investors in those funds put their money directly in banks ans other investments paing more than the funds are now earning, but that will take a while.

>
> How will it all end?

This goes on forever – I’ve been watching it for 35 years – no end in sight!

> Markets won’t start functioning normally until investors are
> reasonably sure that they know where the bodies – I mean, the bad
> debts – are buried. And that probably won’t happen until house prices
> have finished falling and financial institutions have come clean about
> all their losses.

And by then it’s too late to invest and all assets prices returned to ‘normal’ – that’s how markets seem to work.

> All of this will probably take years.
>
> Meanwhile, anyone who expects the Fed or anyone else to come up with a plan that makes this financial crisis just go away will be sorely disappointed.

Right, only a fiscal response can restore aggregate demand, and no one is in favor of that at the moment. A baby step will be repealing the AMT and not ‘paying for it’ which may happen.

Meanwhile, given the inflationary bias due to food, crude, and import and export prices in genera, a fiscal boost will be higly controversial as well.


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