Congressional confusion


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Congress seems confused over who are the bad guys that need to be punished.

They seem to be leaning towards punishing shareholders if their management decides to accept any form of federal assistance under the new plan.

This puts management in a bind: sell a few securities to the Treasury and let shareholders lose value to the government, or muddle through and don’t dilute the shareholders.

Management is likelty to do what’s best for management, and sell securities to the Treasury and sell the shareholders up (down?) the river. Just like they do when they issue a convert when stock prices fall, to shore up capital.

But Congress also thinks management needs to be punished with some form of salary and bonus caps. This would discourage management from utilizing whatever new facilities Congress comes up with. Which also makes shares less valuable.

Looks like a lose/lose for the shareholders?

It seems to me if Congress finds anyone at fault (whatever that means) it would be managers rather than shareholders.

What have shareholders done wrong, even in theory? It’s a stretch to come up with anything.

And who are the shareholders? Pension funds, ira’s, individuals? Why are they the objects of Congressional wrath?

With each government intervention, shareholders have been a favorite target to justify the utilization of ‘taxpayer money’ (whatever that means with an asset purchase).

Congress isn’t looking at who’s at fault, they are only looking to minimize risk to ‘taxpayer money’, even if that means taking funds from innocent shareholders.

Congress can be counted on to do what they think is best for them politically. So with something like 75% of the voters owning shares, it seems odd that they are the target.

And, of course, none of this address aggregate demand which is the key to output and employment (the drivers of corporate prosperity) and share holder value.


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Bernanke


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Karim writes:

Most of testimony explaining actions of recent weeks. Direct comments on economy below. Focus on enabling financial conditions to improve ‘for a protracted period’ means that in Bernanke’s mind that hikes are off the table for a ‘protracted period’ and cuts may be on the table if inflation cooperates.

Notably, stresses in financial markets have been high and have recently intensified significantly. If financial conditions fail to improve for a protracted period, the implications for the broader economy could be quite adverse.

While perhaps manageable in itself, Lehman’s default was combined with the unexpectedly rapid collapse of AIG, which together contributed to the development last week of extraordinarily turbulent conditions in global financial markets. These conditions caused equity prices to fall sharply, the cost of short-term credit–where available–to spike upward, and liquidity to dry up in many markets. Losses at a large money market mutual fund sparked extensive withdrawals from a number of such funds. A marked increase in the demand for safe assets–a flight to quality–sent the yield on Treasury bills down to a few hundredths of a percent. By further reducing asset values and potentially restricting the flow of credit to households and businesses, these developments pose a direct threat to economic growth.


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2008-09-23 USER


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ICSC-UBS Store Sales YoY (Sep. 23)

Survey n/a
Actual 1.3%
Prior 1.3%
Revised n/a

 
Holding steady off the lows.

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ICSC-UBS Store Sales WoW (Sep 23)

Survey n/a
Actual -1.00%
Prior -1.60%
Revised n/a

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Redbook Store Sales Weekly YoY (Sep 23)

Survey n/a
Actual 1.2%
Prior 1.4%
Revised n/a

 
Steady and off the lows as well.

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Redbook Store Sales MoM (Sep 23)

Survey n/a
Actual -1.20%
Prior -1.10%
Revised n/a

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ICSC-UBS Redbook Comparison TABLE (Sep 23)

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Richmond Fed Manufacturing Index (Sep)

Survey -12
Actual -18
Prior -16
Revised n/a

 
Worse than expected and looking very weak.

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Richmond Fed Manufacturing Index ALLX (Sep)

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House Price Index MoM (Jul)

Survey -0.2%
Actual -0.6%
Prior 0.0%
Revised -0.3%

 
Weaker than expected but still off the lows and seems to be working it’s way irregularly higher.

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House Price Index YoY (Jul)

Survey n/a
Actual -5.3%
Prior -5.0%
Revised n/a

 
Losing 5.3% year over year is a lot for this index.

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House Price Index TABLE (Jul)


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2008-09-22 Weekly Credit Graph Packet

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As this goes down, the value of AIG (and probably Lehman) goes up.

IG On-the-Run Spreads (Sep 22)

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IG6 Spreads (Sep 22)

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IG7 Spreads (Sep 22)

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IG8 Spreads (Sep 22)

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IG9 Spreads (Sep 22)


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Re: Impressions regarding the financial crash


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>   
>   On Mon, Sep 22, 2008 at 7:40 AM, Dawn wrote:
>   
>   Amen! 30% of homes in Riviera Beach are in foreclosure because mortgage
>   companies wrote loans to anyone with a heart beat. We are now stuck with
>   three fairly new housing developments along Congress Avenue that are quickly
>   turning into ghettos.
>   

Hi Dawn, good to hear that from someone on the inside!

Somehow the mainstream has mysteriously ignored the prime role of fraudulent applications, loan officers working on a commission basis, etc. all to make loans by misleading the lenders and the ratings agencies.

>   
>   Do you think banks would be amenable to providing low money down/low
>   interest rate mortgages to municipal employees with at least a five year
>   employment history, proper credit, etc? Mortgage payment could be deducted
>   from pay checks. This would allow police officers, firefighters, etc to have a
>   vested interest in the community and help the banks get the real estate off
>   their books.
>   

Yes, I don’t see why not?

They are still in business to make profits by making loans to credit worthy borrowers. Try speaking to the local lenders and mortgage bankers?

Thanks!

Warren

>   
>   Thx
>   
>   Dawn
>   


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Treasury plan cont’d


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This is what was submitted:

Treasury fact sheet on asset plan

Treasury will have authority to issue up to $700 billion of Treasury securities to finance the purchase of troubled assets. The purchases are intended to be residential and commercial mortgage-related assets, which may include mortgage-backed securities and whole loans. The Secretary will have the discretion, in consultation with the Chairman of the Federal Reserve, to purchase other assets, as deemed necessary to effectively stabilize financial markets. Removing troubled assets will begin to restore the strength of our financial system so it can again finance economic growth.

While this won’t alter bank capital, bank asset sales shrink balance sheets and ‘make room’ for new lending.

In fact, that was the ‘originate to sell’ model.

This will support output and employment only to the extent it has been constrained by limited capability of banks to lend.

The major effect of having these problematic assets on the books has been in the secondary markets, including interbank lending, which have lesser and only indirect consequence for output and employment.

Supporting the housing agencies ability to lend at lower rates to any credit worthy borrowers directly supports housing and other sectors.

What banks need most is an increase in aggregate demand sufficient enough to increase employment and output.

This proposal for the Treasury to buy bank assists will have little direct effect on aggregate demand.

The timing and scale of any purchases will be at the discretion of Treasury and its agents, subject to this total cap. The price of assets purchases will be established through market mechanisms where possible, such as reverse auctions.

The question of price is problematic.

This is vague as the Treasury doesn’t have clarity on how this might work. It is doubtful that Congress will either. Reverse auctions can result in gross overpricing, which they do not want to happen.

And note the congressional discussion on salary caps for institutions that sell assets to the Treasury – no telling how that will shake out!

The dollar cap will be measured by the purchase price of the assets. The authority to purchase expires two years from date of enactment. Asset and Institutional Eligibility for the Program. To qualify for the program, assets must have been originated or issued on or before September 17, 2008. Participating financial institutions must have significant operations in the U.S., unless the Secretary makes a determination, in consultation with the Chairman of the Federal Reserve, that broader eligibility is necessary to effectively stabilize financial markets.


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Reverse auction proposed


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Under this proposal from treasury, they would ask for offerings from the banks and then take the lowest prices for up to $50 billion at a time.

This means they will be paying more and more for each round of purchases, driving up the prices from current market value.

And if the plan is to spend the entire $700 billion they could drive prices up through the roof.

They would need to limit the prices they are willing to pay somehow.


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The Mosler plan


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  1. Money fund issue:

    Remove the $100,000 cap on insured bank deposits. This adds no risk to government. And it will eliminate the need for money funds which the cap created in the first place.

  1. Broker/dealers:

    Let them go. If they don’t survive, at worst their assets will be distributed by the bankruptcy court if it goes that far. They do nothing that I know of that serves public purpose and/or the real economy that banks can’t do. And the banks are already regulated and supervised.

  1. Insurance companies:

    Policy holders should be government insured and insurance company assets, and capital regulation should be updated. You will know insurance regulation doesn’t go far enough if there are too many government losses to make policy holders whole.

    AIG got short credit (sold insurance on securities at low prices) and lost all their capital as risk and the price of insurance went up. Looks to me like a failure of regulation that allowed that much risk.

  1. Home ownership:

    Continue to fund the agencies via the Treasury to keep costs of funds at a minimum.

    Have the agencies ‘buy and hold’ new originations, and thereby eliminate that portion of the secondary markets. The secondary markets serve no public purpose, beyond working past flaws in the institutional structure that should instead be addressed.

    Increase and enforce criminal penalties for mortgage application fraud. Its functionally the same as robbing a bank.

  1. Banks:

    Lower the discount rate to the fed funds target rate and eliminate the need for collateral. This is how it should have been anyway.

    Bank assets and solvency are already highly regulated, and how they are funded doesn’t alter the risk of loss due to insolvency for the government.

    An interbank market serves no public purpose. Eliminate it out to six months by offering discount lending out to 6 months.

    In addition to the FOMC setting the fed funds rate target, it can also set the rate for 3 and 6 month borrowing at the discount window. This both gets the job done and also replaces the TAF and TSLF type of experiments.

  1. Growth and employment:

    Offer (directly or indirectly) a Federally funded $8 per hour full time job to anyone willing and able to work that includes health care benefits. An employed buffer stock is a more effective stabilizer and price anchor. It’s also less costly in real terms, than the unemployed buffer stock we currently maintain.

    Eliminate the various payroll taxes as needed to sustain demand.

    Implement needed infrastructure upgrades and repairs.

    Eliminate health care as a marginal cost of production. People aren’t more likely to get ill if they are employed; in fact, the opposite is likely the case.

    The current system distorts pricing, and results in a suboptimal outcome for the economy’s ability to sustain prosperity.

If you in general agree with the above, please forward this to all your contacts in high places asap, thanks.


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Posted in USA

U.S. Treasury announces plan to insure money-market holdings


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On Fri, Sep 19, 2008 at 9:44 AM, Scott asks:

These moves HAVE to be bad for the dollar, no?

Not much effect per se.

Immediate effect is higher interest rates/stronger stocks which very near term helps the USD.

But it seems saudis are hiking price which, if it continues, will again send the dollar down.

Also, the Fed showed some concern about exports softening, which they probably attribute to the recent USD strength.

So seems the Fed and Treasury probably don’t want the dollar to get too strong.

Major equity short covering rally in progress.

When it runs its course, the US economy will still be weak and higher crude prices will be problematic as well.


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Re: Comments on Thoughts on Treasury plan


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(an interoffice email exchange)

>   
>   On Fri, Sep 19, 2008 at 9:50 AM, David wrote:
>   So creating liquidity for toxic assets RTC style.
>   

maybe, jury is still out on how that might work

>   
>   Make the government a little money and inspire confidence in banks, ok.
>   
>   We are thinking that this is overtly inflationary for financial assets (maybe all
>   assets?)
>   

supports a lot of equity value by removing a large element of risk, but cost to shareholders still unknown

fixed income going higher in yield, prices there going down

>   
>   Should I expect this to re-inflate the commodity asset bubble in the medium
>   term???
>   

not directly. crude price up to the Saudis.

>   
>   Do you think the dollar’s rally will help cap any commodity asset price rise???
>   

yes, in the competitive markets. crude is not a competitive market. saudis merely set price and let quantity adjust

>   
>   PS- I expected to come in today to $110+ crude, $8+ gas, and $900+ gold.
>   

as above. crude up even with dollar up, but gold down.

warren


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