Category Archives: Greece

Dean Baker: Krugman Is Wrong: The United States Could Not End Up Like Greece

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Krugman Is Wrong: The United States Could Not End Up Like Greece

By Dean Baker

March 25 — It does not happen often, but it does happen; I have to disagree with Paul Krugman this morning. In an otherwise excellent column criticizing the drive to austerity in the United States and elsewhere, Krugman comments:

“But couldn’t America still end up like Greece? Yes, of course. If investors decide that we’re a banana republic whose politicians can’t or won’t come to grips with long-term problems, they will indeed stop buying our debt.”

Actually this is not right for the simple reason that the United States has its own currency. This is important because even in the worst case scenario, where the deficit in United States spirals out of control, the crisis would not take the form of the crisis in Greece.

Yes, precisely!

Greece is like the state of Ohio. If Ohio has to borrow, it has no choice but to persuade investors to buy its debt. Unless Greece leaves the euro (an option that it probably should be considering, at least to improve its bargaining position), it must pay the rate of interest demanded by private investors or meet the conditions imposed by the European Union/IMF as part of a bailout.

However, because the United States has its own currency it would always have the option to buy its own debt. The Federal Reserve Board could in principle buy an unlimited amount of debt simply by printing more money. This could lead to a serious problem with inflation, but it would not put us in the Greek situation of having to go hat in hand before the bond vigilantes.

This is also true under current institutional arrangements.

However, with regards to inflation, for all practical purposes the fed purchasing us treasury securities vs selling them to the public is inconsequential.

This distinction is important for two reasons. First, the public should be aware that the Fed makes many of the most important political decisions affecting the economy. For example, if the Fed refused to buy the government’s debt even though interest rates had soared, this would be a very important political decision on the Fed’s part to deliberately leave the country at the mercy of the bond market vigilantes. This could be argued as good economic policy, but it is important that the public realize that such a decision would be deliberate policy, not an unalterable economic fact.

True! And, again, for all practical purposes the decision is inconsequential with regards to inflation.

The other reason why the specifics are important is because it provides a clearer framing of the nature of the potential problem created by the debt. The deficit hawks want us to believe that we could lose the confidence of private investors at any moment, therefore we cannot delay making the big cuts to Social Security and Medicare they are demanding. However if we have a clear view of the mechanisms involved, it is easy to see that there is zero truth to the deficit hawks’ story.

Agreed!

Suppose that the bond market vigilantes went wild tomorrow and demanded a 10 percent interest rate on 10-year Treasury bonds, even as there was no change in the fundamentals of the U.S. economy. In this situation, the Fed could simply step in and buy whatever bonds were needed to finance the budget deficit.

Correct.

And this would result in additional member bank reserve balances at the Fed, with the Fed voting on what interest is paid on those balances.

Does anyone believe that this would lead to inflation in the current economic situation? If so, then we should probably have the Fed step in and buy huge amounts of debt even if the bond market vigilantes don’t go on the warpath because the economy would benefit enormously from a somewhat higher rate of inflation. This would reduce the real interest rate that firms and individuals pay to borrow and also alleviate the debt burden faced by tens of millions of homeowners following the collapse of the housing bubble.

However not to forget that the Fed purchases also reduce interest income earned by the economy, as evidenced by the Fed’s ‘profits’ it turns over to the treasury.

The other part of the story is that the dollar would likely fall in this scenario. The deficit hawks warn us of a plunging dollar as part of their nightmare scenario. In fact, if we ever want to get more balanced trade and stop the borrowing from China that the deficit hawks complain about, then we need the dollar to fall. This is the mechanism for adjusting trade imbalances in a system of floating exchange rates. The United States borrows from China because of our trade deficit, not our budget deficit.

True, but with qualifications.

China didn’t start out with any dollars. They get their dollars by selling things to us. When they sell things to us and get paid they get a credit balance in what’s called their reserve account at the Fed.

What we then call borrowing from China- China buying US treasury securities- is nothing more than China shifting its dollar balances from its Fed reserve account to its Fed securities account.

And paying back China is nothing more than shifting balances from their securities account at the Fed to their reserve account at the Fed.

Which account China keeps its balances in is of no further economic consequence,

And poses no funding risk or debt burden to our grandchildren.

Nor does it follow that the US is in any way dependent on China for funding.

Nor is balanced per se trade desirable, as imports are real economic benefits and exports real economic costs.

This also puts the deficit hawks’ nightmare story in a clearer perspective. Ostensibly, the Obama administration has been pleading with China’s government to raise the value of its currency by 15 to 20 percent against the dollar. Can anyone believe that China would suddenly let the yuan rise by 40 percent, 50 percent, or even 60 percent against the dollar? Will the euro rise to be equal to 2 or even 3 dollars per euro?

And, with imports as real economic benefits and exports as real economic costs, in my humble opinion, the Obama administration is negotiating counter to our best interests.

Also, inflation is a continuous change in the value of the currency, and not a ‘one time’ shift which is generally what happens when currencies adjust.

This story is absurd on its face. The U.S. market for imports from these countries would vanish and our exports would suddenly be hyper-competitive in their home markets. As long as we maintain a reasonably healthy industrial base (yes, we still have one), our trading partners have more to fear from a free fall of the dollar than we do. In short, this another case of an empty water pistol pointed at our head.

The deficit hawks want to scare us with Greece in order to push their agenda of cutting Social Security, Medicare and other programs that benefit the poor and middle class. This is part of their larger agenda for upward redistribution of income.

We should be careful to not give their story one iota of credibility more than it deserves. By implying that the United States could ever be Greece, Krugman commits this sin.

Agreed!

Addendum: In response to the Krugman post, which I am not sure is intended as a response to me, I have no quarrel with the idea that large deficits could lead to a serious problem with inflation at a point where the economy is closer to full employment. My point is that the problem with the U.S. would be inflation, not high interest rates, unless the Fed were to decide to allow interest rates to rise as an alternative to higher inflation.

Agreed!

Nor would today’s size deficits necessarily mean inflation should we somehow get to full employment.

It all depends on the ‘demand leakages’ at the time.

This point is important because the deficit hawk story of the bond market vigilantes is irrelevant in either case. In the first case, where we have inflation because we are running large deficits when the economy is already at full employment, the problem is an economy that is running at above full employment levels of output. The bond market vigilantes are obviously irrelevant in this picture.

In the second case, where the Fed allows the bond market vigilantes to jack up interest rates even though the economy is below full employment, the problem is the Fed, not the bond market vigilantes.

We have to keep our eyes on the ball. The deficit hawks pushing the bond market vigilante story are making things up, as Sarah Pallin would say, their arguments do not deserve to be treated seriously.

Agreed.

They should be unceremoniously refutiated!

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(APW) EU Considers Loans to Greece to Buy Back Bonds

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They EU may as well buy the Greek bonds themselves and save the legal fees.

And probably get a higher rate, and, of course, the option to forgive if it ever suits them.

Amazing anything like this ‘option’ even gets this far as a trial balloon.

But it does.

EU Considers Loans to Greece to Buy Back Bonds
2011-01-28 14:20:53.271 GMT
By GABRIELE STEINHAUSER
Brussels (AP) — Lending Greece money to buy back its bonds
on the open market is “one option” under discussion as eurozone
governments overhaul their euro440 billion ($603 billion)
bailout fund, a spokesman for the European Union’s executive
Commission said Friday
Greece’s bonds are currently trading below face value,
meaning the country could buy them back at a discount and cut
its mounting debt pile.
The European Commission raised that idea in an internal
“working document” on improving the response to the debt
crisis, said Amadeu Altafaj-Tardio, spokesman for EU Monetary
Affairs Commissioner Olli Rehn.
However, he emphasized that the document wasn’t a proposal
from the Commission, adding “It will be up to the member states
to see to it that our response (to the crisis) is more
effective in the future.”
Speaking to journalists at the World Economic Forum in
Davos, Greek Finance Minister George Papaconstantinou confirmed
that the idea of bond buybacks was being discussed, but
stressed that Greece wasn’t “engaged in any official way in
those discussions.”
Greece was saved from bankruptcy with a euro110 billion
rescue loan from its partners in the euro and the International
Monetary Fund in May, after investors worried about the
country’s high government debt sent its funding costs soaring.
In the wake of that bailout, the European Commission, eurozone
governments and the IMF set up a euro750 billion fund to help
other governments in financial troubles. That fund in November
extended a euro67.5 billion emergency loan to Ireland.
Eurozone governments are currently discussing new crisis
measures, after the bailout of Ireland failed to stop concerns
over debt levels from spreading to Portugal and much larger
Spain. At the center of these discussions is the eurozone’s
euro440 billion portion of the bailout fund — the European
Financial Stability Facility — and whether it should be
expanded and given more powers.
In a paper published Monday, London-based consultancy
Capital Economics calculated that an EFSF-funded bond buyback
program based on the market price of Greek bonds last week,
could cut Greece’s debt pile from about euro260 billion to
around euro194 billion. That would mean that at the end of this
year, the country’s debt would stand at 126 percent of economic
output as opposed to 154 percent, Capital Economics estimated.
However, even that reduction might not eliminate fears over
Greece’s ability to repay its debts, Ben May, European
economist at Capital Economics, said in an interview.
On top of that, telling investors that there is a buyer for
their bonds would likely push up bond prices and there is no
guarantee that all investors would be willing to sell their
bonds at a discount. “So the savings would be much less than
the current market price would suggest,” May said.
To make the buyback effective, any loans from the EFSF
would have to come at very low interest rates, said May. For
its current bailout, Greece has to pay interest of more than 5
percent. Germany and other key funders of the EFSF have so far
opposed lowering interest rates.
—
Masha Macpherson in Davos contributed to this report.

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Greece to Restructure Debts of Govt Pension Funds

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Looks like the govt is reducing the amount of euro they owe themselves,

But not reducing the liabilities those govt pension funds and other agencies owe others?

Greece to Restructure Debts of Pension Funds, Isotimia Reports

By Marcus Bensasson

January 17 (Bloomberg) — Greece’s Finance Ministry is planning to restructure debts of 30 billion euros ($39.9 billion) held by social security funds and state-run enterprises, Isotima said in a report, without saying where it got the information.

The government will replace existing debts with medium and long-term bonds with lower rates of interest than market rates, the Athens-based weekly newspaper reported yesterday.

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Hanke on Greece

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Hate to criticize someone proposing a payroll tax holiday- darn that Lerner’s law!


A Big Bang for Greece

There is a way out of the debt trap for Athens.

By Stece H. Hanke

June 30 (WSJ) — How did Greece get into the death spiral that it’s in? Unfunded entitlements. In other words, promise somebody something, don’t come up with the financing for it, and pretty soon you find yourself in a fiscal/debt crisis.

Yes, happens to those who are not the issuer of their currency all the time, including those with fixed fx arrangements. EU members, US States, corporations, households, Russia when fixed to the dollar, Mexico when fixed to the dollar, etc.

But never with issuers of the currency. They can always make payments as desired.

This is where Greece ended up, and in February, the Greek government called in some outside advisers (Joseph Stiglitz for one), and the blame game began. Prime Minister Papandreou, who is also president of Socialist International, started blaming everyone. First, it was the speculators. Then he went on a tear against his own colleagues in the European Union. The Germans really got whacked­ according to Mr. Papandreou, they were a big cause of Greece’s troubles.

Never would have happened under the drachma. Just would have been the usual inflation and currency depreciation.

But Greece is a user of the euro, not the issuer like the ECB is.

Ironically, after blaming outsiders for all their problems, the Greeks have called in the foreign doctors. In this case it isn’t just the IMF, but also the EU politicians and bureaucrats who are involved. But this may ultimately be a case in which the doctors kill the patient.

The problem ended for Greece and the entire eu in general only after the ECB agreed to ‘write the check’ and started buying greek bonds.

There was no other way.

To address the moral hazard issue that comes with ECB support, the ECB insisted on the ‘terms and conditions’ to contain inflation possibilities

They haven’t started with what they should be doing, but with a standard IMF-type austerity program. The government has promised to cut public expenditures. It has also raised taxes. Unlike neighboring Bulgaria, which did exactly the right thing by refusing to increase its VAT, Greece has increased its VAT twice since the crisis.

What should Greece have done? It should have started with a Big Bang, doing a number of things simultaneously a la New Zealand. In 1984, New Zealand elected a Labor government after Robert Muldoon’s National Party governments had made a complete mess of the economy. The Muldoon governments introduced, over the course of almost a decade, a socialist-style system in New Zealand. Labor, under finance minister Roger Douglas, introduced structural reforms centered on deregulation and competitiveness. As a consequence, New Zealand had a massive economic revolution after the ’84 election. Greece should adopt a New Zealand-type Big Bang.

The NZ gov was the issuer of its own currency and therefore didn’t face the solvency problem Greece did. otherwise it would have been an entirely different story.

As part of its Big Bang, Greece should have begun by rescheduling its debt. But it also should have implemented a supply-side fiscal consolidation. That means cutting government expenditures, but also changing the tax regime.

Without the ECB writing the check, that would have resulted in a systemic collapse of the euro member national govts and the payments system in general.

With the ECB writing the check there are other options.

Right now, Greece has very onerous payroll taxes that are paid by employers and, ultimately, labor. As part of a Big Bang, Greece should eliminate the employer contribution to payroll taxes, which is currently 28% of wages (employees pay a further 16% rate directly).

With funding entirely dependent on the good will of the ECB, those decisions are up to the ECB, not Greece. If they cross the ECB they get cut off and again face default.

At the same time, Greece should make its VAT rates uniform. Right now, there are three VAT rates in Greece. This is typical in Europe. You have the regular VAT, a VAT that is reduced by 50% for other categories, and, finally, a super-reduced VAT. I would eliminate the reduced and super-reduced rates, and just have one, uniform rate for the VAT one set below the current top VAT rate of 23%.

If Greece did those two things, it would end up generating more revenue than it is generating right now. Even when based on a static, simple-minded analysis, that would put Greece ahead of the revenue game.

At the macro level for the EU it’s about the right fiscal balance needed to sustain growth and employment, which is probably a deficit higher than the growth rate. But at the micro level it’s about credit worthiness which means a deficit lower than the growth rate. So the members need to be tighter than the union needs to be. This requires a central govt/ECB that runs the needed deficits to make it all work efficiently. Much like the US states balance and the fed govt runs the deficits.

But more importantly, it would also substantially reduce its economy’s labor costs overnight. Employers’ social security contributions are about 7.8% of GDP. Eliminating the employer contribution would yield about a 22% reduction in the overall Greek wage bill as a percentage of GDP. This would make the Greek economy more competitive­ without the currency devaluation that some commentators claim is necessary. These changes would also, obviously, reduce consumption, increase savings, and reduce the level of debt in the country.

Allow me to make a comment about devaluation. There are some people who are wringing their hands and saying, “Well, the problem with Greece is that it put itself into a euro straitjacket and it can’t devalue the drachma anymore. So, Greece is in a trap. There’s nothing it can do!”

Yes, but note devaluing was never a policy tool. It was the consequence of policy. Today the consequence of the same policy is default rather than currency depreciation.

But there is something the Greeks can do. They can reduce the economy’s total labor cost by 22%, simply by eliminating the employer contribution to payroll taxes. To see what the size of a devaluation would have to be to generate a positive competitiveness shock of this magnitude, let’s assume that 50% of a devaluation would be passed through to the economy in the form of increased inflation­ reasonable assumption about a small, open economy like Greece’s.

In this case, Greece would have to have a 44% devaluation to be equivalent, in terms of competitiveness, to the positive shock that would accompany the elimination of the employer contribution to payroll taxes.

So, with the elimination of the employer contribution to the payroll tax, Greece would enhance its competitiveness. The enhancement would be equal to roughly a 44% devaluation. Moreover, the supply-side generated competitiveness would not be accompanied by the inflation and widespread private-sector bankruptcy that a devaluation would provoke.

Needless to say, neither Greece nor its international partners are contemplating a voluntary debt restructuring,

That would also require a restructuring of the banking system as the loss of capital would require some kind of adjustment as well.

let alone a supply-side Big Bang, which makes it more likely that Greece will remain stuck in a trap. But don’t let anyone tell you there’s nothing Greece could do. It’s not too late to change course. What’s more, other countries in Europe that are facing down a possible debt crisis could likewise try a similar approach­reschedule debt, cut taxes on labor to improve competitiveness and spur job creation, while raising some consumption taxes to keep the revenue coming in. There is a way out of the Greek trap.

Mr. Hanke is a professor of applied economics at the Johns Hopkins University in Baltimore and a senior fellow at the Cato Institute in Washington, D.C. This article is adapted from remarks made at the Cato Institute’s Policy Forum, “Europe’s Economic Crisis and the Future of the Euro,” on May 11, 2010, Washington, D.C.

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Greenspan in WSJ: U.S. Debt and the Greece Analogy

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History will not be kind to the former Fed Chairman with regard to his understanding of monetary operations.

He understands solvency is not an issues which does seem to put him ahead of most. But he lacks a critical understanding of interest rate determination, particularly with regard to how the entire term structure of risk free rates is set by Fed policy (or lack of it), with US Treasury securities functioning to alter those risk free rates, and not funding expenditures per se:

“The U.S. government can create dollars at will to meet any obligation,
and it will doubtless continue to do so. U.S. Treasurys are thus free of
credit risk. But they are not free of interest rate risk. If Treasury
net debt issuance were to double overnight, for example, newly issued
Treasury securities would continue free of credit risk, but the Treasury
would have to pay much higher interest rates to market its newly issued
securities.”

U.S. Debt and the Greece Analogy

By Alan Greenspan

June 18 (WSJ) —Don’t be fooled by today’s low interest rates. The
government could very quickly discover the limits of its borrowing capacity.

An urgency to rein in budget deficits seems to be gaining some traction
among American lawmakers. If so, it is none too soon. Perceptions of a
large U.S. borrowing capacity are misleading.

Despite the surge in federal debt to the public during the past 18
months-to $8.6 trillion from $5.5 trillion-inflation and long-term
interest rates, the typical symptoms of fiscal excess, have remained
remarkably subdued. This is regrettable, because it is fostering a sense
of complacency that can have dire consequences.

The roots of the apparent debt market calm are clear enough. The
financial crisis, triggered by the unexpected default of Lehman Brothers
in September 2008, created a collapse in global demand that engendered a
high degree of deflationary slack in our economy. The very large
contraction of private financing demand freed private saving to finance
the explosion of federal debt. Although our financial institutions have
recovered perceptibly and returned to a degree of solvency, banks,
pending a significant increase in capital, remain reluctant to lend.

Beneath the calm, there are market signals that do not bode well for the
future. For generations there had been a large buffer between the
borrowing capacity of the U.S. government and the level of its debt to
the public. But in the aftermath of the Lehman Brothers collapse, that
gap began to narrow rapidly. Federal debt to the public rose to 59% of
GDP by mid-June 2010 from 38% in September 2008. How much borrowing
leeway at current interest rates remains for U.S. Treasury financing is
highly uncertain.

The U.S. government can create dollars at will to meet any obligation,
and it will doubtless continue to do so. U.S. Treasurys are thus free of
credit risk. But they are not free of interest rate risk. If Treasury
net debt issuance were to double overnight, for example, newly issued
Treasury securities would continue free of credit risk, but the Treasury
would have to pay much higher interest rates to market its newly issued
securities.

In the wake of recent massive budget deficits, the difference between
the 10-year swap rate and 10-year Treasury note yield (the swap spread)
declined to an unprecedented negative 13 basis points this March from a
positive 77 basis points in September 2008. This indicated that
investors were requiring the U.S. Treasury to pay an interest rate
higher than rates that prevailed on comparable maturity private swaps.

(A private swap rate is the fixed interest rate required of a private
bank or corporation to be exchanged for a series of cash flow payments,
based on floating interest rates, for a particular length of time. A
dollar swap spread is the swap rate less the interest rate on U.S.
Treasury debt of the same maturity.)

At the height of budget surplus euphoria in 2000, the Office of
Management and Budget, the Congressional Budget Office and the Federal
Reserve foresaw an elimination of marketable federal debt securities
outstanding. The 10-year swap spread in August 2000 reached a record 130
basis points. As the projected surplus disappeared and deficits mounted,
the 10-year swap spread progressively declined, turning negative this
March, and continued to deteriorate until the unexpected euro-zone
crisis granted a reprieve to the U.S.

The 10-year swap spread quickly regained positive territory and by June
14 stood at a plus 12 basis points. The sharp decline in the euro-dollar
exchange rate since March reflects a large, but temporary, swing in the
intermediate demand for U.S. Treasury securities at the expense of euro
issues.

The 10-year swap spread understandably has emerged as a sensitive proxy
of Treasury borrowing capacity: a so-called canary in the coal mine.

I grant that low long-term interest rates could continue for months, or
even well into next year. But just as easily, long-term rate increases
can emerge with unexpected suddenness. Between early October 1979 and
late February 1980, for example, the yield on the 10-year note rose
almost four percentage points.

In the 1950s, as I remember them, U.S. federal budget deficits were no
more politically acceptable than households spending beyond their means.
Regrettably, that now quaint notion gave way over the decades, such that
today it is the rare politician who doesn’t run on seemingly costless
spending increases or tax cuts with borrowed money. A low tax burden is
essential to maintain America’s global competitiveness. But tax cuts
need to be funded by permanent outlay reductions.

The current federal debt explosion is being driven by an inability to
stem new spending initiatives. Having appropriated hundreds of billions
of dollars on new programs in the last year and a half, it is very
difficult for Congress to deny an additional one or two billion dollars
for programs that significant constituencies perceive as urgent. The
federal government is currently saddled with commitments for the next
three decades that it will be unable to meet in real terms. This is not
new. For at least a quarter century analysts have been aware of the
pending surge in baby boomer retirees.

We cannot grow out of these fiscal pressures. The modest-sized
post-baby-boom labor force, if history is any guide, will not be able to
consistently increase output per hour by more than 3% annually. The
product of a slowly growing labor force and limited productivity growth
will not provide the real resources necessary to meet existing
commitments. (We must avoid persistent borrowing from abroad. We cannot
count on foreigners to finance our current account deficit
indefinitely.)

Only politically toxic cuts or rationing of medical care, a marked rise
in the eligible age for health and retirement benefits, or significant
inflation, can close the deficit. I rule out large tax increases that
would sap economic growth (and the tax base) and accordingly achieve
little added revenues.

With huge deficits currently having no evident effect on either
inflation or long-term interest rates, the budget constraints of the
past are missing. It is little comfort that the dollar is still the
least worst of the major fiat currencies. But the inexorable rise in the
price of gold indicates a large number of investors are seeking a safe
haven beyond fiat currencies.

The United States, and most of the rest of the developed world, is in
need of a tectonic shift in fiscal policy. Incremental change will not
be adequate. In the past decade the U.S. has been unable to cut any
federal spending programs of significance.

I believe the fears of budget contraction inducing a renewed decline of
economic activity are misplaced. The current spending momentum is so
pressing that it is highly unlikely that any politically feasible fiscal
constraint will unleash new deflationary forces. I do not believe that
our lawmakers or others are aware of the degree of impairment of our
fiscal brakes. If we contained the amount of issuance of Treasury
securities, pressures on private capital markets would be eased.

Fortunately, the very severity of the pending crisis and growing
analogies to Greece set the stage for a serious response. That response
needs to recognize that the range of error of long-term U.S. budget
forecasts (especially of Medicare) is, in historic perspective,
exceptionally wide. Our economy cannot afford a major mistake in
underestimating the corrosive momentum of this fiscal crisis. Our policy
focus must therefore err significantly on the side of restraint.

Mr. Greenspan, former chairman of the Federal Reserve, is president of
Greenspan Associates LLC and author of “The Age of Turbulence:
Adventures in a New World” (Penguin, 2007).

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Krugman: We’re Not Greece

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We’re Not Greece

By Paul Krugman

It’s an ill wind that blows nobody good, and the crisis in Greece is making some people — people who opposed health care reform and are itching for an excuse to dismantle Social Security — very, very happy. Everywhere you look there are editorials and commentaries, some posing as objective reporting, asserting that Greece today will be America tomorrow unless we abandon all that nonsense about taking care of those in need.

True. I just finished a week in dc fighting back against the bipartisan move to cut social security.

The truth, however, is that America isn’t Greece — and, in any case, the message from Greece isn’t what these people would have you believe.

So, how do America and Greece compare?

Both nations have lately been running large budget deficits, roughly comparable as a percentage of G.D.P. Markets, however, treat them very differently: The interest rate on Greek government bonds is more than twice the rate on U.S. bonds, because investors see a high risk that Greece will eventually default on its debt, while seeing virtually no risk that America will do the same. Why?

One answer is that we have a much lower level of debt — the amount we already owe, as opposed to new borrowing — relative to G.D.P.

That has nothing to do with it. Japan’s debt is near triple ours, and their 10 year rates are about 1.3% for example.

True, our debt should have been even lower. We’d be better positioned to deal with the current emergency if so much money hadn’t been squandered on tax cuts for the rich and an unfunded war.

Not true. With us govt spending not operational revenue constrained the way greece is, we are always able to spend (or cut taxes) however much we want to. It’s a political decision without external constraints.

But we still entered the crisis in much better shape than the Greeks.

Yes, because we are the issuer of the dollar and greece is not the issuer of the euro. Greece is like a us state in that regard.

Even more important, however, is the fact that we have a clear path to economic recovery, while Greece doesn’t.

For the same reason. We can manage our aggregate demand because our fiscal policy is not operationally constrained by revenue the way Greece is.

The U.S. economy has been growing since last summer, thanks to fiscal stimulus

Yes, mostly the automatic stabilizers with some help from the proactive measures congress has taken, however misguided.

and expansionary policies by the Federal Reserve.

I don’t agree with this but that’s another story.

I wish that growth were faster; still, it’s finally producing job gains — and it’s also showing up in revenues.

True, however the output gap is finally stable at best as it remains tragically wide.

Right now we’re on track to match Congressional Budget Office projections of a substantial rise in tax receipts. Put those projections together with the Obama administration’s policies, and they imply a sharp fall in the budget deficit over the next few years.

Yes, with our only hope for lower unemployment being an increase in private sector debt that exceeds that. Not my first choice in mending what ails us.

Greece, on the other hand, is caught in a trap. During the good years, when capital was flooding in, Greek costs and prices got far out of line with the rest of Europe. If Greece still had its own currency, it could restore competitiveness through devaluation.

Should have been said this way-

‘If Greece had its own currency and was running its deficits in local currency market forces would have caused the currency to depreciate.’

But since it doesn’t, and since leaving the euro is still considered unthinkable, Greece faces years of grinding deflation and low or zero economic growth. So the only way to reduce deficits is through savage budget cuts, and investors are skeptical about whether those cuts will actually happen.

True. And worse. The proactive cuts and tax hikes can slow the economy to the point the deficit doesn’t come down, and might even increase, making matters even worse.

It’s worth noting, by the way, that Britain — which is in worse fiscal shape than we are, but which, unlike Greece, hasn’t adopted the euro — remains able to borrow at fairly low interest rates. Having your own currency, it seems, makes a big difference.

It is all the difference.

Hard to see why that isn’t obvious. US, UK, Japan, etc. Etc. With one’s own non convertible currency and floating exchange rates, interest rates are necessarily set by the central bank, not by markets.

And govt securities function to support interest rates and not to fund expenditures

And note the uk economy is on the mend. Even housing has found a bid, with the main risk being a govt that doesn’t get it and tries to balance the budget.

In short, we’re not Greece. We may currently be running deficits of comparable size, but our economic position — and, as a result, our fiscal outlook — is vastly better.

Wrong reason- we are the issuer of our own currency, the dollar, while Greece is the user of the euro and not the issuer.

That said, we do have a long-run budget problem. But what’s the root of that problem? “We demand more than we’re willing to pay for,” is the usual line. Yet that line is deeply misleading

First of all, who is this “we” of whom people speak? Bear in mind that the drive to cut taxes largely benefited a small minority of Americans: 39 percent of the benefits of making the Bush tax cuts permanent would go to the richest 1 percent of the population.

Wasn’t my first choice of which tax to cut to support the private sector. I’d have cut fica taxes and i continue to propose that.

And bear in mind, also, that taxes have lagged behind spending partly thanks to a deliberate political strategy, that of “starve the beast”: conservatives have deliberately deprived the government of revenue in an attempt to force the spending cuts they now insist are necessary.

And liberals have artificially constrained themselves with the misguided notion that spending is operationally constrained by revenues, and fail to understand the ‘right sized’ deficit is the one that coincides with full employment and desired price stability.

Meanwhile, when you look under the hood of those troubling long-run budget projections, you discover that they’re not driven by some generalized problem of overspending. Instead, they largely reflect just one thing:

An understanding of national income account and monetary operations shows deficits are driven by ‘savings desires’ and any proactive attempt to increase deficits beyond savings desires results in inflation.

the assumption that health care costs will rise in the future as they have in the past. This tells us that the key to our fiscal future is improving the efficiency of our health care system — which is, you may recall, something the Obama administration has been trying to do, even as many of the same people now warning about the evils of deficits cried “Death panels!”

Wrong causation. What he calls our ‘fiscal future’ is the size of future deficits and they will always reflect future ‘savings desires.’ if we proactively get them smaller than that the evidence will always be unemployment.

So while cutting health care costs may be a ‘good thing,’ when the time comes, future deficits need to reflect future savings desires to keep us fully employed.

So here’s the reality:

The mistaken, political reality.

America’s fiscal outlook over the next few years isn’t bad. We do have a serious long-run budget problem,

Unfortunately, this kind of talk makes him part of the problem, not part of the answer.

which will have to be resolved with a combination of health care reform and other measures, probably including a moderate rise in taxes.

Wonderful, with screaming shortfall in aggregate demand as evidenced by tragic levels of unemployment, the celebrity voice from the left is calling for spending cuts and tax hikes not to cool an over heating economy, but to reduce non govt savings of financial assets.

(govt deficit = non govt savings of financial assets to the penny as a matter of national income accounting, etc)

But we should ignore those who pretend to be concerned with fiscal responsibility, but whose real goal is to dismantle the welfare state — and are trying to use crises elsewhere to frighten us into giving them what they want.

This is one of the current iteration of the ‘deficit dove’ position.

It does not cut it.

It is part of the problem, not part of the answer.

Doing the best i can to get the word out.

Please distribute to the max!

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Greece Bailout Plan Will Include Support Fund for Domestic Banks, EU Says…

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The size Greece ‘needed’ implies the others will need numbers beyond euro zone capacity, especially as the Greek deal used up euro zone capacity.

So this means Greece is the last rescue possible- the rest are on there own.

They wanted to stop the contagion, but that would have had to be done by showing they could save Greece without weakening themselves, and in a manner that shows they can help any and all.

They didn’t do that.

Instead they showed the effort necessary save Greece was so large that they don’t have the means to save anyone larger than Greece.

So now they are performing without a net.

And, as Marshall put it, the austerity measures are likely to increase rather than decrease deficits, making it all that much worse.

This euro zone problem is not going away.

From: Marshall
Sent: Sunday, May 02, 2010 8:23 PM


Well, it’s early, but euro is weakening again in early FX trading in Australia and US bonds are much stronger. Still early, but that’s very telling. And frankly, as good as the data has “looked” in the US, I don’t believe it myself. The gasoline consumption numbers in California that I saw last week were terrible and California is a good lead indicator. I started getting bullish on the equity markets (or at least less bearish) in Jan. 2009 when the California housing data started to pick up. And regardless of whether Greece is “saved”, the events of the past few weeks have been profoundly DEFLATIONARY for the entire euro zone. How can the global economy not be affected by the downturn in the second most important economic bloc in the world?


Combine that with a legal and political attack against Wall Street that gives every indication of INTENSIFYING and I think you have to say that things are definitely changing for the worst at the margin.

Hey, the data post the Bear Stearns rescue looked pretty good for a while as well until the whole foundation came tumbling down. The termites never look like their making much progress until the structure suddenly collapses.

Then again, I’m usually more bearish than Warren, so take what I say with a grain of salt.

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Greece CAN go it alone

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Greece CAN Go it Alone
Yesterday at 5:00pm
By Marshall Auerback and Warren Mosler

Greece can successfully issue and place new debt at low interest rates. The trick is to insert a provision stating that in the event of default, the bearer on demand can use those defaulted securities to pay Greek government taxes. This makes it immediately obvious to investors that those new securities are ‘money good’ and will ultimately redeem for face value for as long as the Greek government levies and enforces taxes. This would not only allow Greece to fund itself at low interest rates, but it would also serve as an example for the rest of the euro zone, and thereby ease the funding pressures on the entire region.

We recognize, of course, that this proposal would also introduce a ‘moral hazard’ issue. This newly found funding freedom, if abused, could be highly inflationary and further weaken the euro. In fact, the reason the ECB is prohibited from buying national government debt is to allow ‘market discipline’ to limit member nation fiscal expansion by the threat of default. When that threat is removed, bad behavior is rewarded, as the country that deficit spends the most wins, in an accelerating and inflationary race to the bottom.
It is comparable to a situation where a nation like the US, for example, did not have national insurance regulation. In this kind of circumstance, the individual states got into a race to the bottom, where the state with the laxest standards stood to attract the most insurance companies, forcing each State to either lower standards or see its tax base flee. And it tends to end badly with AIG style collapses.

Additionally, the ECB or the Economic Council of Finance Ministers (ECOFIN) effectively loses the means to enforce their austerity demands and keep them from being reversed once it’s known they’ve taken the position that it’s too risky to let any one nation fail.

What Europe’s policy makers would like to do is find a way to isolate Greece and mitigate the contagion effect, while maintaining the market discipline that comes from the member nations being the credit sensitive entities they are today; hence, the mooted “shock and awe” proposals now being leaked, which did engender an 8% jump in the Greek stock market on Thursday.

But these proposals don’t really get to the nub of the problem. Any major package weakens the others who have to fund it in the market place, because the other member nations are also revenue dependent, credit sensitive entities. Much like the US States, they do not control central bank operations, and must have good funds in their accounts or their checks will bounce.

The euro zone nations are all still in a bind, and their mandated austerity measures mean they don’t keep up with a world recovery. And Greek financial restructuring that reduces outstanding debt reduces outstanding euro financial assets, strengthening the euro, and further weakening output and employment, while at the same time the legitimization of restructuring risk weakens the credit worthiness of all the member nations.

It does not appear that the markets have fully discounted the ramifications of a Greek default. If you use a Chapter 11 bankruptcy analogy, large parts of the country would be shut down and the “company” (i.e. Greece Inc) could spend only its tax revenues. But the implied spending cuts represent a further substantial cut in aggregate demand and decreased revenues, in a most un-virtuous spiral that ends only with an increase in exports or privation driven revolt.

The ability of Greece to use the funds from the rescue package as a means to extinguish Greek state liabilities would improve their financial ratios and stave off financial collapse, at least on a short term basis, with the side effect of a downward spiral in output and employment, while the sovereign risk concerns are concurrently transmitted to Spain, Portugal, Ireland, Italy, and beyond. Those sovereign difficulties also morph into a full-scale private banking crisis which can quickly extend to bank runs at the branch level.

Our suggestion will rescue Greece and the entire euro zone from the dangers of national government insolvencies, and turn the euro zone policy maker’s attention 180 degrees, back to their traditional role of containing the potential moral hazard issue of excessive deficit spending by the national governments through the Stability and Growth Pact. If the member states ultimately decide that the Stability and Growth Pact ratios need to be changed, that’s their decision. But the SGP represents the euro zone’s “national budget”, precisely designed to prevent the hyperinflationary outcome that the “race to the bottom” could potentially create. At the very least, our proposal will mitigate the deflationary impact of markets disciplining credit sensitive national governments and halting the potential spread of global financial contagion, without being inflationary.

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It’s not too late for Greece

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It remains my contention that Greece can dramatically upgrade its new securities simply by putting a provision in the default section that states that in the case of default the bearer, on demand, can use the securities at maturity value plus accrued interest to pay Greek government taxes. This makes the debt ‘money good’ for as long as there is a Greek government that levies taxes.

This would allow Greece to fund itself a low interest rates. It would also be an example for the rest of the euro zone and thereby ease the funding pressures on the entire region.

However, it would also introduce a new ‘moral hazard’ issue as this newly found funding freedom, if abused, could be highly inflationary and further weaken the euro.

Spread the word!

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