BERNANKE’S OP ED WSJ: THE FED’S EXIT STRATEGY


[Skip to the end]

The big concern is managing inflation expectation not realizing that inflation is not a function of inflation expectations:

The Fed’s Exit Strategy

By Ben Bernanke

July 21 (WSJ) — The depth and breadth of the global recession has required a highly accommodative monetary policy. Since the onset of the financial crisis nearly two years ago, the Federal Reserve has reduced the interest-rate target for overnight lending between banks (the federal-funds rate) nearly to zero. We have also greatly expanded the size of the Fed’s balance sheet through purchases of longer-term securities and through targeted lending programs aimed at restarting the flow of credit.

These actions have softened the economic impact of the financial crisis.

There is no evidence of that.

They have also improved the functioning of key credit markets, including the markets for interbank lending, commercial paper, consumer and small-business credit, and residential mortgages.

Yes. Though the measures taken missed the direct approach and instead involved a myriad of complex and expensive programs that burned through precious political capital and delayed the repair of those markets.

My colleagues and I believe that accommodative policies will likely be warranted for an extended period. At some point, however, as economic recovery takes hold, we will need to tighten monetary policy to prevent the emergence of an inflation problem down the road.

They continue to believe that lower interest rates fan inflation and higher interest rates fight inflation.

I suggest theory and econometric evidence show that with current institutional arrangements the opposite is true.

The Federal Open Market Committee, which is responsible for setting U.S. monetary policy, has devoted considerable time to issues relating to an exit strategy. We are confident we have the necessary tools to withdraw policy accommodation, when that becomes appropriate, in a smooth and timely manner.

Nothing could be easier. This is a non issue.

The exit strategy is closely tied to the management of the Federal Reserve balance sheet. When the Fed makes loans or acquires securities, the funds enter the banking system and ultimately appear in the reserve accounts held at the Fed by banks and other depository institutions. These reserve balances now total about $800 billion, much more than normal. And given the current economic conditions, banks have generally held their reserves as balances at the Fed.

What else could they do? Lending doesn’t diminish reserve balances in aggregate. This is accounting, not theory. And clearly the FOMC doesn’t know this.

But as the economy recovers, banks should find more opportunities to lend out their reserves.

Again, that doesn’t diminish total reserves held by the banks at the fed.

That would produce faster growth in broad money (for example, M1 or M2) and easier credit conditions, which could ultimately result in inflationary pressures—

Only if the borrowing to spend increases aggregate demand, which is certainly possible.

unless we adopt countervailing policy measures.

Those would be rate hikes, which add income to the non govt sectors and can add to inflation via the cost channel as well as the fiscal channel.

When the time comes to tighten monetary policy, we must either eliminate these large reserve balances or, if they remain, neutralize any potential undesired effects on the economy.

They have no effect on the economy in any case.

To some extent, reserves held by banks at the Fed will contract automatically, as improving financial conditions lead to reduced use of our short-term lending facilities, and ultimately to their wind down. Indeed, short-term credit extended by the Fed to financial institutions and other market participants has already fallen to less than $600 billion as of mid-July from about $1.5 trillion at the end of 2008. In addition, reserves could be reduced by about $100 billion to $200 billion each year over the next few years as securities held by the Fed mature or are prepaid.

These are just exchanges of financial assets which have no effect on the economy.

However, reserves likely would remain quite high for several years unless additional policies are undertaken.

Even if our balance sheet stays large for a while, we have two broad means of tightening monetary policy at the appropriate time: paying interest on reserve balances and taking various actions that reduce the stock of reserves. We could use either of these approaches alone; however, to ensure effectiveness, we likely would use both in combination.

Yes, increasing interest rates is a simple matter operationally.

Congress granted us authority last fall to pay interest on balances held by banks at the Fed. Currently, we pay banks an interest rate of 0.25%. When the time comes to tighten policy, we can raise the rate paid on reserve balances as we increase our target for the federal funds rate.

Yes.

Banks generally will not lend funds in the money market at an interest rate lower than the rate they can earn risk-free at the Federal Reserve. Moreover, they should compete to borrow any funds that are offered in private markets at rates below the interest rate on reserve balances because, by so doing, they can earn a spread without risk.

Thus the interest rate that the Fed pays should tend to put a floor under short-term market rates, including our policy target, the federal-funds rate. Raising the rate paid on reserve balances also discourages excessive growth in money or credit, because banks will not want to lend out their reserves at rates below what they can earn at the Fed.

Considerable international experience suggests that paying interest on reserves effectively manages short-term market rates. For example, the European Central Bank allows banks to place excess reserves in an interest-paying deposit facility. Even as that central bank’s liquidity-operations substantially increased its balance sheet, the overnight interbank rate remained at or above its deposit rate. In addition, the Bank of Japan and the Bank of Canada have also used their ability to pay interest on reserves to maintain a floor under short-term market rates.

Yes, for many, many years. It’s the obvious way to go.

Despite this logic and experience, the federal-funds rate has dipped somewhat below the rate paid by the Fed, especially in October and November 2008, when the Fed first began to pay interest on reserves. This pattern partly reflected temporary factors, such as banks’ inexperience with the new system.

However, this pattern appears also to have resulted from the fact that some large lenders in the federal-funds market, notably government-sponsored enterprises such as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, are ineligible to receive interest on balances held at the Fed, and thus they have an incentive to lend in that market at rates below what the Fed pays banks.

Yes, someone in government who did not understand reserve accounting and monetary operations excluded those accounts at the Fed.

Under more normal financial conditions, the willingness of banks to engage in the simple arbitrage noted above will tend to limit the gap between the federal-funds rate and the rate the Fed pays on reserves. If that gap persists, the problem can be addressed by supplementing payment of interest on reserves with steps to reduce reserves and drain excess liquidity from markets—the second means of tightening monetary policy. Here are four options for doing this.

First, the Federal Reserve could drain bank reserves and reduce the excess liquidity at other institutions by arranging large-scale reverse repurchase agreements with financial market participants, including banks, government-sponsored enterprises and other institutions. Reverse repurchase agreements involve the sale by the Fed of securities from its portfolio with an agreement to buy the securities back at a slightly higher price at a later date.

Yes, offers interest bearing alternatives to reserve balances.

Second, the Treasury could sell bills and deposit the proceeds with the Federal Reserve. When purchasers pay for the securities, the Treasury’s account at the Federal Reserve rises and reserve balances decline.

Yes, offers interest bearing alternatives to reserve balances.

The Treasury has been conducting such operations since last fall under its Supplementary Financing Program. Although the Treasury’s operations are helpful, to protect the independence of monetary policy, we must take care to ensure that we can achieve our policy objectives without reliance on the Treasury.

Why??? It’s all the same government.

Third, using the authority Congress gave us to pay interest on banks’ balances at the Fed, we can offer term deposits to banks—analogous to the certificates of deposit that banks offer their customers. Bank funds held in term deposits at the Fed would not be available for the federal funds market.

Yes, and, more important, this can be used to set the term structure of rates the same way treasury securities do. They are functionally identical.

Fourth, if necessary, the Fed could reduce reserves by selling a portion of its holdings of long-term securities into the open market.

Yes, which also support longer term rates at higher levels.

Each of these policies would help to raise short-term interest rates and limit the growth of broad measures of money and credit, thereby tightening monetary policy.

And only limits the growth of broad money (which presumably matters even though the fed stopped publishing M3 because they found no evidence it did matter) if the higher rates limit borrowing.

Overall, the Federal Reserve has many effective tools to tighten monetary policy when the economic outlook requires us to do so. As my colleagues and I have stated, however, economic conditions are not likely to warrant tighter monetary policy for an extended period. We will calibrate the timing and pace of any future tightening, together with the mix of tools to best foster our dual objectives of maximum employment and price stability.

—Mr. Bernanke is chairman of the Federal Reserve.


[top]

U.K. June Mortgage Lending Rises 17% From May


[Skip to the end]

Deficit spending may be ‘working’
Who would have thought???…

On Mon, Jul 20, 2009 at 5:41 AM, Milo wrote:

  • U.K. Mortgage Lending May Gain After Approvals Rose, BOE Says
  • U.K. June Mortgage Lending Rises 17% From May, CML Says
  • U.K. Office Demand Rises for First Time in Two Years
  • U.K. Property Asking Prices Rebound, Rightmove Says
  • Nissan to Build Battery-Manufacturing Plants in U.K., Portugal


[top]

Repost: Comments on Krugman


[Skip to the end]

Originally posted March 9th, 2009

Yes, but unspoken is the automatic stabilizers are quietly adding to the deficit with each move down, and the curves will cross and the economy start to improve when the deficit gets large enough, whether it’s the ugly way via falling revenues and rising transfer payments, or proactively via a proactive fiscal adjustment.

With income and spending turning mildly positive in January and other indicators such as the commodities also beginning to move sideways as the deficit passes through 5% before the latest fiscal adjustment kicks in, we may be seeing GDP headed towards 0 by q3 or sooner as most forecasters now predict. Unemployment, however, will continue to rise until real growth exceeds productivity growth.

Bottom line, there will be a recovery with or without a proactive fiscal adjustment. the difference is how bad it gets before it turns north.

Behind the Curve

by Paul Krugman

Mar 8 (NYT) — President Obama’s plan to stimulate the economy was a massive, giant, enormous. So the American people were told, especially by TV news, during the run-up to the stimulus vote. Watching the news, you might have thought that the only question was whether the plan was too big, too ambitious.

Yet many economists, myself included, actually argued that the plan was too small and too cautious. The latest data confirm those worries  and suggest that the Obama administration’s economic policies are already falling behind the curve.


[top]Rep

Federal Taxation (for Dummies)

Federal Taxation (for Dummies)

So why does the Federal Government tax us?

No, not to get money to spend!

In fact, if you pay your taxes with actual cash, they give you a receipt, a thank you, and then throw that cash into a shredder.

True!!!

So how does taking your cash and shredding it pay for anything??? It doesn’t!

And suppose you pay by check.

When the check clears, all the Federal Government does is change the numbers in your checking account downward for the amount of the check. They don’t get anything.

And so how does the Federal Government actually spend?

When they write you a check, and when the check is deposited, they change the numbers in your bank account upward by the amount of the check. This doesn’t use up anything.

They just change numbers.

Just like when you score a touchdown and get 6 points. The stadium gives you 6 points. But those points doesn’t come from anywhere and the stadium isn’t using up some pile of points it has when it gives you 6 of them.

Federal Reserve Chairman Bernanke made this exact point when Congress asked him where the money for the banks was coming from. He told them the Fed just changes the numbers in their Fed bank accounts.

So this means, operationally, Federal spending is in no case dependent on tax revenues (or borrowing).

The Federal Government can’t run out of money as the President has been telling us. It doesn’t have any to run out of. All it does is change numbers in our bank accounts.

So then why does the Federal Government tax us?

Answer: to take away some of our spending power.

Why would it want to do that?

Because if it didn’t, then our spending of all the income and profits we make, plus all the Federal Government’s spending, would overwhelm the markets and cause prices to go higher and higher. There would be too much spending power chasing too few goods for sale. That’s called inflation.

So what does the government do?

They tax us to take away some of our spending power, so their spending, combined with our spending, doesn’t cause inflation.

That’s why the Federal Government taxes us. Not to get money for them to spend. They don’t use money when they spend. They just change numbers in our bank accounts.

So what’s the right amount to tax?

If they tax too much, we don’t have enough spending power to buy what’s left for sale after the Federal Government is done with its spending.

And that’s exactly what’s happening now. We can build a lot more cars and houses and other goods and services that we’d then like to buy.

But the Federal Government has taxed away too much of our spending power, so sales are way down and unemployment sky high.

Can the Federal Government go broke or run out of money if it taxes less then it spends and runs a deficit?

How can it? It’s just changing numbers in our bank accounts in its own monetary system run by its own Federal Reserve.

Why do they say deficits are bad?

Because they don’t understand their own monetary system and it’s ruining our lives!

Will lower taxes today mean higher taxes later?

Every year, taxes can be adjusted to make sure we have enough spending power to buy whatever we can produce and want to have.

Taxes only have to be raised if we have too much spending power, and the economy is doing so well and unemployment is so low we want to cool things down with a tax increase, to keep inflation where we want it.

So lower taxes today mean prosperity today, and higher taxes later only if things get too good and we get worried about inflation.

Progress!


[Skip to the end]

Deficits saved the world

By Paul Krugman

July 15 (NYT) — Jan Hatzius of Goldman Sachs has a new note (no link) responding to claims that government support for the economy is postponing the necessary adjustment. He doesn’t think much of that argument; neither do I. But one passage in particular caught my eye:

    The private sector financial balance—defined as the difference between private saving and private investment, or equivalently between private income and private spending—has risen from -3.6% of GDP in the 2006Q3 to +5.6% in 2009Q1. This 8.2% of GDP adjustment is already by far the biggest in postwar history and is in fact bigger than the increase seen in the early 1930s.


That’s an interesting way to think about what has happened — and it also suggests a startling conclusion: namely, government deficits, mainly the result of automatic stabilizers rather than discretionary policy, are the only thing that has saved us from a second Great Depression.

The following figure makes the argument:

Here I show the private sector surplus and the public sector deficit, both as functions of GDP; the private sector line is upward-sloping because higher GDP means higher income and more savings, the public-sector line is downward-sloping because higher GDP means higher revenues. In equilibrium the private surplus equals the government deficit (not strictly true for any one country if you add in international capital flows, but think of this as a picture for the world economy). To make the figure cleaner I’ve shown an initial position of balance in both sectors, but this isn’t important.

What we’ve had is a sharp increase in the desired private surplus at any given level of GDP, due to a combination of higher personal saving and reduced investment demand. This is shown as an upward shift in the private-surplus curve.

In the 1930s the public sector was very small. As a result, GDP basically had to shrink enough to keep the private-sector surplus equal to zero; hence the fall in GDP labeled “Great Depression”.

This time around, the fall in GDP didn’t have to be as large, because falling GDP led to rising deficits, which absorbed some of the rise in the private surplus. Hence the smaller fall in GDP labeled “Great Recession.”

What Hatzius is saying is that the initial shock — the surge in desired private surplus — was if anything larger this time than it was in the 1930s. This says that absent the absorbing role of budget deficits, we would have had a full Great Depression experience. What we’re actually having is awful, but not that awful — and it’s all because of the rise in deficits. Deficits, in other words, saved the world.


[top]

new pecora open letter


[Skip to the end]

The ‘finanical crisis’ is not an economic concern per se. Particularly as the financial sector contributes no value added to the real economy and for the most part serves no public purpose.

However, when aggregate demand falls short of politcal goals, as evidenced by the unemployment rate, capacity utilization, and other measures, government has the immediate option of a fiscal adjustment of any size necessary to meet those political output and employment goals.

What caused the sudden drop in aggregate demand last July is therefore less important than what it is that continues to delay an appropriate fiscal response to immediately restore output and employment.

The answer is that an unwarrented fear of Federal deficits per se has taken the readily available option of using a fiscal adjustment to fully restore employment and output completely off the table.

As our politcal leaders, opinion leaders, and leading economists struggle to determine how the economy can be ‘saved’ with the least possible amount of Federal deficit spending, and none challenge the President’s statement that the nation has ‘run out of money,’ the unemployment rate continues to rise and millions of Americans needlessly depreciate in the unemployment lines.

It’s really quite simple. Taxation functions to reduce aggregate demand. It does not function to give the Federal governent ‘something to spend.’ In fact, if you pay your taxes at the Fed with actual cash they take your money, give you a receipt, and then throw the bills in a shredder. If you pay by check they change the number in your bank account to a lower number. The government doesn’t actually get anything to spend.

When the Federal government spends, numbers in bank accounts get changed by government to higher numbers from lower numbers. As Chairman Bernanke told Congress in May, when asked where the funds come from that he’s giving the banks, the Fed simply changes numbers in the member bank’s account at the Fed.

Federal spending is obviously not operationally constrained by revenues. There is no such thing as the Federal government ‘running out of money.’ The only constraints on nominal spending are self imposed.

So what does the statement ‘higher deficits today mean higher taxes later’ actually state? The reason taxes would be higher ‘later’ would be if aggregate demand is deemed too high at the time- unemployment too low and capicity utilization too high- and a tax hike proposed to cool down an overheating economy.

So does that statement not mean that higher deficits today will cause aggregate demand to increase, unemployment come down, and capacity utilization go up, to the point a tax increase might be called for?

And how does the Federal government pay off it’s debt? When Treasury securities mature the Fed debits the holder’s security account at the Fed and credits his reserve account at the Fed. End of story.

The risks of deficit spending are inflation, not insolvency or even higher interest rates. Yet the public debate is paralyzed by fears of Federal insolvency, and ratings agencies only add to that fear with threats of downgrades.

This misinformation IS the problem, and it isn’t rocket science. There will always be something that causes a surprise drop in aggregate demand. And, in fact I have made numerous recommendations for banking and the financial sector over the last several years that would have prevented most of the subsequent problems, and drastically scaled back the entire financial sector to limit it to areas of direct public purpose.

The greater problem, however, is the inability of our political leaders to respond appropriately when aggregate demand does fall, for any reason.

Therefore I urge you to redirect this project to instead promote an understanding of how a currency actually functions, and the operational reality of monetary operations and reserve accounting.

Determining ‘what went wrong’ will do nothing to enlighten policy makers as to their available fiscal options that can immediately restore the American economy to desired levels of employment and output. In fact, the effort will only delay a favorable outcome as energies get diverted from the more urgent issue of restoring demand.

FYI – the Roosevelt Institute is launching a major new initiative around the new Pecora Commission – we have been posting significant commentary on www.newdeal20.org (thank you for the great overview launch piece Bill), we have a partnership with Huffington and have created a Big News page around it, have investigative reporters in the works to track the commission, are considering a shadow commission, etc. As part of that, we have written an open letter to the commission that we will launch publicly the minute it gets announced – the open letter pushes for the three criteria that Bill discusses. We have several prominent economists and historians signing it (Stiglitz, Galbraith, Robert Reich, Bill, etc). The goal is to have 50-100 major econ/historians and then push it publicly once the commission members are formally announced (possibly in a day or two according to my sources). You can see the open letter here www.whatcausedthecrisis.com – if you are willing to sign the open letter, please let me know – please send me your name and affiliation so I can list you appropriately. We are also planning a media push around it so if you can speak on it or want to blog, please let me know

Thank you –

And if you can sign the letter, please let me know soon – I think this is happening in a day or two.


[top]

IMF Says U.K. Can’t Afford 2010 Stimulus


[Skip to the end]

This says a lot more about the IMF than the UK:

IMF Says U.K. Can’t Afford 2010 Stimulus, Telegraph Reports

The U.K. is alone with Argentina as the only members of the Group of 20 that cannot budget for temporary spending increases next year to aid economic growth, the Sunday Telegraph cited the International Monetary Fund as saying. The Washington-based fund presented a paper at a G-20 meeting in Basel saying the average fiscal stimulus among member countries will be 1.6 % next year, the Telegraph reported. Britain’s fiscal position has left it unable to budget for an increase in expenditure or tax cuts in 2010 to boost the economy, the Telegraph cited the IMF as saying.


[top]

‘no one saw this coming’ : understanding financial crises through accounting models


[Skip to the end]

Objections to deficit spending-

1. Deficits now mean higher taxes later.

Response — Taxes function to regulate aggregate demand, not raise revenue per se.
Taxes will go up ‘later’ only if aggregate demand is ‘too high’ later which means unemployment becomes ‘too low.’
that is exactly the point of deficits today- to bring down unemployment and excess capacity

So what that statement actually says is that deficits ‘work’ and will bring down unemployment and close the output gap, hopefully to the point that taxes need be raised to cool things down.

2. How will the govt pay back all that debt?

Response — When treasury securities mature the BOE debits the holders security account and credits his transactions account.
End of story.

3. The currency will go down.

Response — maybe, maybe not, but in any case the level of the currency does not alter the real wealth of the nation. It is only an internal distributional issue and those issues can be addressed with other domestic policies.

4. We need to wait for the lower interest rates and quantitative easing to work.

Response — It is working- policy makers have it backwards- it reduces aggregate demand

Quantitative easing increases the BOE’s balances sheet as it buys securities.
It removes higher yielding securities from the private sector and replaces them with lower yielding balances at the BOE,
this reduces non government incomes and accumulations of net financial assets, and thereby reduces aggregate demand.

Lower rates reduces savers incomes more than borrowers as borrowing rates remain high due to credit concerns.
Banks net interest margins increase adding to bank earnings which have a 0 marginal propensity to consume.
Therefore lower rates reduce aggregate demand.

5. What can be done?

Response — Immediate suspension of VAT at least until aggregate demand is restored to desired levels.
However, income tax receipts will ‘automatically’ increase as GDP recovers which will ‘automatically’ moderate aggregate demand.

Keep the BOE rate at 0 to keep costs of production and investment low and thereby help control prices and promote supply to areas of demand. (removing VAT also keeps prices lower than otherwise.)

Use taxes to moderate demand when excess demand becomes a problem, not to raise revenue per se.


[top]

Earnings season coming


[Skip to the end]

I am thinking earnings season should be pretty good this quarter.

Fiscal policy has been more than supportive since year end, fiscal consolidation is currently still all talk.

Negative shock risks are still there, however, California, eurozone banks and/or governments, nukes, etc.

Not sure on timing.

World Outlook: Recovery ahead

For the first time since the beginning of the downturn we have revised up our forecasts for economic growth. We now expect global growth to rise to 2.5% in 2010 compared to 2.0% envisaged in our previous World Outlook from 30 March 2009. The upward revision is due entirely to better prospects for industrial countries, where growth next year is now seen reaching 1.0% compared to 0.3% before.

Most of the upward revision to global growth in 2010 results from a stronger outlook for investment growth (which has risen to 2.0% from 0.1%) and export growth (up to 4.1% from -2.2% before). The improved prospects for exports and investment reflect greater confidence in the effectiveness of authorities’ efforts to restore stability in the financial sector.

In our view the global economic and financial crisis has had two key drivers: (1) the breakdown of the global growth model of the past decade or so, which led to unsustainable international current account imbalances; and (2) the financial crisis, which ensued when the inability of debtors to repay their creditors became evident. As a result, we can expect to see lower trend growth and higher economic volatility, the opposite of what the world economy experienced during the era of the Great Moderation.


[top]