Carney Says Intervention Needs Policy to Back It Up to Work


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CIBC Says Canada Should Consider ‘Bounded Float’ of Currency

This would help support exports. (But my first choice would instead be funding an $8/hr job for anyone willing and able to work and a tax cut to sustain domestic demand and optimize real terms of trade.)

Carney Says Intervention Needs Policy to Back It Up to Work

Oct. 27 (Bloomberg) — Bank of Canada Governor Mark Carney said today that central banks that try to affect the level of their currencies through market actions need to back the transactions with monetary policy to be effective.

Speaking to lawmakers, Carney said the bank could use tools, including quantitative easing, to implement policy with

the bank’s key interest rate as low as it can go.

Selling your own currency is the back up to your other, export oriented policy.

There is no limit to the amount of your own currency you can sell into a bid at that level.

The (operational) limit is how much the rest of world wants to buy at your selling price.

Quantitative easing has nothing to do with this.


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Carry trade


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The article completely misses the point.

There is no ‘cash pouring into’ anything.

Nor is there a constraint on lending/deposits in any non convertible currency.

It is not a matter of taking funds from one currency and giving them to another.

There is no such thing.

Yes, the interest rate differential may be driving one currency high in the near term (not the long term) due to these portfolio shifts.

But the nation with the currency seeing the appreciation has the advantage, not the other way around.

Imports are the real benefits, exports the real costs, which the author of this piece has backwards.

The nation with the stronger currency is experiencing improving real terms of trade- more imports in exchange for fewer exports.

The most common way to realize this benefit is for the government to use the currency strength to accumulate foreign currency reserves by ‘pegging’ its currency to sustain it’s exports. This results in the same real terms of trade plus foreign exchange accumulation which can be of some undetermined future real benefit.

Better still, however, is cut taxes (or increase govt. spending, depending on your desired outcome) and sustain domestic demand, employment, and output, so now the domestic population has sufficient spending power to buy all that can be produced domestically at full employment, plus anything the rest of the world wants to net export to you.

Unfortunately those pesky deficit myths always seem to get in the way of anyone implementing that policy, as evidenced by this
article below and all of the others along the same lines. Comments in below:

>   
>   Steve Keen pointed me to it. Talks about the carry trade in US$ over to AUD$.
>   There are not Federal unsecured swap lines, would be interested in your take.
>   

Foreign speculation on our currency is a bubble set to burst

By Kenneth Davidson

Oct. 26 (National Times) — The pooh-bahs running US and British hedge funds and the banks supporting them are more than capable of reading the minutes of the Reserve Bank of Australia board meetings and coming to the conclusion that RBA Governor Glenn Stevens is committed to pushing up the cash rate from the present 3.25 per cent to 4 to 5 per cent if necessary.

And they are already betting tens of billions of dollars on what has so far been a sure bet.

But is always high risk, and not permitted for US banks by our regulators, though no doubt some gets by.

These foreign financial institutions are up to their old tricks. After getting trillions of dollars out of their respective governments to avoid GFC-induced bankruptcy – which was largely engineered by their criminal greed – because they are ”too big to fail”, they are already using their influence to maintain ”business as usual”.
Why funnel the money gouged out of American and British taxpayers into lending to their national economies to maintain employment when there are richer pickings elsewhere?

As above, these transactions directly risk shareholder equity. The govt. is not at risk until after private capital has been completely eliminated.

Two of those destinations are Brazil and Australia. Their resource-rich economies are still doing well compared with most other countries because they are riding in the slipstream of the strong demand for commodities from China and India.

Cash is pouring into these economies, not for development, but to speculate on the local currency and the sharemarket. The rising value of the Brazilian real and the Australian dollar against the US dollar has had a disastrous impact on both countries’ non-commodity export and import competing industries.

Yes, except to be able to export less and import more is a positive shift in real terms of trade, and a benefit to the real standard of living.

Brazil’s popular and largely economically successful left-wing Government led by President Lula da Silva is meeting the problem head on. It has decided to impose a 2 per cent tax on all capital inflows to stop the real appreciating further.

Instead, it could cut taxes to sustain full employment if that’s the risk they are worried about.

Arguably, the monetary strategy adopted by Stevens has compounded Australia’s lack of international competitiveness for our manufacturing and service industries, especially tourism. Since the end of 2008 our dollar has appreciated 27 per cent (as of last week). This means that financial institutions that invested money at the beginning of January are enjoying an annual rate of return on their investments of 35 per cent.

Tourism is an export industry. Instead of working caring for tourists a nation is better served taking care of its people’s needs.
And those profits are from foreign capital paying ever higher prices for the currency.

US and British commercial banks can borrow from their central banks at a rate less than 1 per cent. The equivalent RBA rate is 3.25 per cent and many pundits are forecasting the rate could go to 3.75 per cent before the end of 2009. This will increase the differential between Australian and British and US interest rates and make the scope for speculative profits even higher.

They are risking their shareholder’s capital if they do that, not their govt’s money, at least not until all the private equity is lost.
And the regulators are supposed to be on top of that.

Since the beginning of the year, $64 billion has poured into Australia in the form of direct and portfolio (share) investment and foreign lenders have switched $80 billion of foreign debt payable in foreign currencies to Australian currency. Most of the portfolio investment ($41 billion) has gone into bank shares. Banks now represent 40 per cent of the value of shares traded on the stock exchange, and while shares in the big four bank shares have increased by about 80 per cent (as measured by CBA shares), the Australian Stock Exchange Index has risen by only 30 per cent.

When anyone buys shares someone sells them. There are no net funds ‘going into’ anything.

Also, portfolio mangers do diversify globally, and I’d guess a lot of managers went to higher levels of cash last year, and much of this is the reversal. And it’s also likely, for example, that Australian managers have increased their holdings of foreign securities as well.

Foreigners have shifted out of Australian fixed interest debt and into equities because as interest rates go up, the capital value of fixed debt declines. By driving up interest rates to curb inflationary expectations and the prospect of a housing price bubble the RBA is in far greater danger of creating a stock exchange asset price bubble as well as an Australian dollar bubble. Once foreigners believe interest rates have peaked, the bubbles are likely to be pricked as financial speculators attempt to realise their gains. This could lead to a stampede out of Australian denominated securities.

Markets do fluctuate for all kinds of reasons, both short term and long term. The Australian dollar has probably reacted more to resource prices than anything else. But again, the issue is real terms of trade, and domestic output and employment.

With unemployment expected to continue to rise, and the level of unemployment disguised by growing numbers of workers being forced to work part-time, there is little chance of the underlying inflation rate, already below 2 per cent, increasing as a result of a wages break-out. The last wages breakout (leaving aside the explosive growth in executive salaries in the past three decades) occurred in 1979.

This gives the govt. cause to increase domestic demand with fiscal adjustments, including Professor Bill Mitchell’s ‘Job Guarantee’ proposal which is much like my federally funded $8/hr job for anyone willing and able to work proposal.

The world has moved on but the obsessive debate about wage inflation and union powers hasn’t. Since the beginning of the ’80s, the problem has been periodic bouts of asset price inflation. It is the biggest danger now.

Instead of controlling the unions, there should be control of financial institutions. The Australian dollar bubble and the incipient housing bubble should be micro-managed. Capital inflow could be dampened by a compulsory deposit of 1 to 2 per cent to be redeemed after a year to stop speculative inflow. Home ownership has become a tax shelter. The steam could be taken out of the rise in house prices if negative gearing was limited to new housing. This would obviate the need for higher interest rates that affect everyone.

The Job Guarantee offers a far superior price anchor vs our current use of unemployment as a price anchor. Also, I strongly suspect that the mainstream has it wrong, and that it is lower rates that are deflationary.


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April 10 2006 post


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Worth a quick look at how I saw it in April 2006.

Turns out I was right about demand weaking from that date, but wrong about the Fed reaction function.

I thought they’d follow the mainstream view and respond to elevating inflation expectations.

Instead, Bernanke and Kohn subsequently looked past sharply elevating inflation expectations to the output gap when they first cut rates.

Link


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reaching the limits of dollar weakness?


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Yes, first recent sign of direct intervention to keep domestic wages down and support exports.

If foreign limits of tolerance for the appreciation of their currencies have been met and they start buying
dollars to support exports to the US it could trigger a dollar short covering rally/gold sell off/equity sell off/bond rally, etc.

Govt may ‘freeze’ rand – report

Oct. 22 — Cape Town – Ebrahim Patel, Minister of Economic Development, is preparing to propose “radical” economic policy adjustments after the considerable strengthening of his support base in the past 48 hours.

These include a controversial proposal to freeze South Africa’s currency at a predetermined exchange rate, so that the economy can benefit from the stability of the rand, which is coupled to an external standard.

Patel is apparently working closely with Dr Blade Nzimande, Minister of Higher Education & Training, a political ally of his, in formulating a series of interventions to adjust the economic growth rate in favour of accelerated job creation.


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reaching the limits of dollar weakness?

King Comments on rate paid Bank Reserves


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Might be secretly worried about the relatively strong currency.

Many of them still think rates matter for the level of their currency even though the BOE research says they don’t matter.

>   
>   (email exchange)
>   
>   On Tue, Sep 15, 2009 at 5:34 AM, Dave wrote:
>   
>   BOE King states that BoE will look at reducing deposit rate on reserves
>   
>   Front end rallies, 1*1 at 2.565% currently, had traded as high as 2.68%
>   prior to announcement
>   

  • KING SAYS LOWER RATE COULD MEAN MORE BUYING OF S-TERM GILTS
  • KING SAYS IT MAYBE A USEFUL SUPPLEMENT, WON’T BE MAJOR CHANGE
  • KING SAYS BOE WILL REFLECT ON LOWERING DEPOSIT RATE
  • KING SAYS YOU COULD HAVE LOWER REMUNERATION RATE FOR RESERVES
  • KING SAYS BOE IS LOOKING AT REDUCING DEPOSIT RATE FOR RESERVES
  • KING SAYS THERE’S LIMIT TO HOW FAR BOE CAN GO ON RESERVES
  • KING SAYS BOE DOESN’T WANT RESERVES UNNECESSARILY HIGH
  • KING SAYS ASSET PURCHASES AUTOMATICALLY RAISE BANK RESERVES


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NPR discussion


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>   
>   (email exchange)
>   
>   On Mon, Sep 14, 2009 at 10:45 AM, wrote:
>   
>   By the way, you didn’t hear NPR this morning, but there was the usual hagiography
>   about how the Fed averted a Great Depression last year because it “created”
>   trillions of dollar to support the banking system.
>   
>   But my understanding is that ONLY the Treasury creates money and the Fed simply
>   tries not very successful) to determine a price for the money that is created by
>   TSY.
>   
>   When you look at it this way, the narrative changes considerably.
>   

Yes!

The Fed did loan to banks and act as broker of last resort between banks who had Fed funds and banks who needed them, but that should always be done in the normal course of business.

So I do give them credit for figuring out how to do what they were charged to do from inception in 1913, since Bernanke et al had to play the cards they were dealt.

But even now they haven’t figured out they should just trade Fed funds in unlimited quantities with member banks, at their target rate, and instead use an alphabet soup of programs to get that done indirectly.


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Lehman downfall triggered by mix-up


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Yes, the financial system can come apart from time to time for all kinds of reasons.

My point continues to be that it doesn’t need to lead to a system wide drop in output and employment as aggregate demand can readily and immediately be supported with a tax cut (and/or spending increase, depending on your politics).

A full payroll tax holiday and per capita revenue sharing anytime during Q3 08 would have prevented the subsequent fall off in output and rise in unemployment.

And those same initiatives can still be applied to restore same.

Lehman downfall triggered by mix-up between London and Washington

By Larry Elliot and Jill Treanor

Communication breakdown revealed in first-hand accounts of bank collapse

Blame game goes on as G20 ministers prepare for crucial London talks

September 4 (Guardian) — A breakdown in communications at the highest level between the US and the UK led to the shock collapse of the investment bank Lehman Brothers in September last year, a Guardian/Observer investigation has revealed.

The downfall of Lehman, which triggered the biggest banking crisis since the Great Depression, came after a rescue bid by the high street bank Barclays failed to materialise.

In London, the Treasury, the Bank of England and the Financial Services Authority all believed that the US government would step in with a financial guarantee for the troubled Wall Street bank. The tripartite authorities insist that they always made it clear to the Americans that a possible bid from Barclays could go ahead only if sweetened by US money.

But in Washington, the former Treasury secretary Hank Paulson has blamed Lehman’s demise on Alistair Darling’s failure to let Washington know of his misgivings until it was too late. Paulson has told journalists that during a transatlantic phone call the chancellor said he was not prepared to import the American “cancer” into Britain – something Darling strongly denies.

With finance ministers and central bank governors from the G20 countries meeting in London on Saturday, the first-hand accounts of those handling last year’s events underline a rift between London and Washington over who was to blame for the demise of Lehman, which triggered a month of mayhem on the financial markets.

Lehman’s demise sent shock waves around an already fragile financial system and raised fears that any bank, anywhere in the world was vulnerable to collapse. Within three days, HBOS had been rescued by Lloyds TSB. A month later RBS, HBOS and Lloyds were propped up with an unprecedented £37bn of taxpayer funds.

Hector Sants, the chief executive of the Financial Services Authority, said: “I have sympathy for the US authorities given the complexity of the problems they faced that weekend but I do believe it was a mistake to let Lehman’s fail.” As well trying to find a solution for Lehman, the US authorities were also aware that Merrill Lynch was on the brink and that weekend it was taken over by Bank of America.

While admitting the UK authorities had botched Northern Rock a year earlier, Sants said the collapse of Lehman had more dire consequences. “Without the future market shock created by Lehman Brothers’ collapse, RBS may not have failed,” said Sants.

“Was Lehman the cause or was it the manifestation? It was our view that if Lehman had been supported you would not have seen such a dramatic reduction in liquidity.”

Sir John Gieve, deputy governor of the Bank of England last September, said: “It was a catastrophic error. It caused a loss of confidence in the [US] authorities’ ability to handle the financial crisis which really did change things and proved hugely costly.”

The UK tripartite authorities – the FSA, the Bank of England and the Treasury – had expected the US government to stand behind Lehman in the way that it had backed two crucial mortgage lenders the previous week and helped to orchestrate the bailout for Bear Stearns in March.

No explanation has ever been given for the lack of government funds offered in the final weeks of the Bush administration, which had to step in to prop up the insurance company AIG days after Lehman’s demise.

The UK tripartite authorities were concerned about the financial system in the spring of 2007 and asked their American counterparts to participate in a “war game” to prepare for the collapse of a major US bank and develop a response to a financial crisis. However, the war game, which was to have included the UK, Switzerland, the Netherlands and the US, never took place because of a lack of willingness to participate by the US regulatory bodies.


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Fed understands fiscal stimulus but not its own operations


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Glad they are getting up to speed on fiscal.

Sorry to see they are still out to lunch on the ramifications of their balance sheet.

The Fed on Stimulus: Seems To Be Helping

Fiscal stimulus — the tax cuts and spending increases passed by Congress to boost the economy – isn’t the province of the Federal Reserve, but fiscal policy affects the economy and monetary policy has to take it into account.

When the Fed’s policy committee — the Federal Open Market Committee — convened Aug. 11 and 12, the topic came up. ”A number of participants noted that fiscal policy helped support the stabilization in economic activity, in part by buoying household incomes and by preventing even larger cuts in state and local government spending,” the just-released minutes of the meeting record.

“Participants generally anticipated that fiscal stimulus already in train would contribute to growth in economic activity during the second half of 2009 and into 2010, but the stimulative effects of policy would fade as 2010 went on and would need to be replaced by private demand and income growth,” the Fed added.

But that’s not the only risk. “Participants noted concerns among some analysts and business contacts that the sizable expansion of the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet and large continuing federal budget deficits ultimately could lead to higher inflation if policies were not adjusted in a timely manner,” the minutes noted.


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St. Louis Fed Pres Bullard


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Bullard is indicating rates should be left low until the Fed’s balance sheet is reduced.

This would mean longer rates would likely go higher before the Fed allows short rates to rise.

(It also shows he’s very confused on monetary operations but that’s a different issue.)

Fed officials say must not ignore exit policy

By Alister Bull

St. Louis Federal Reserve Bank President James Bullard said the central bank would need to think about scaling back its economic support in the months ahead, while Richmond Fed chief Jeffrey Lacker said it should weigh whether to carry through with all of its current stimulus plans.

“As we head to 2010, the Fed will shift its focus to implementing an exit strategy in order to avoid any potential inflation threats to the economy,” Bullard said in prepared remarks.

“Monetary policy is still very accommodative and the (Fed) intends to keep the fed funds target near zero for an extended period,” he said, according to a summary of his presentation on the economic outlook at the College of Business at the University of Arkansas-Little Rock.

Bullard emphasized that the exit ought to mean allowing the Fed balance sheet to shrink, perhaps by selling assets that it purchased this year to counter the worst recession since the Great Depression, rather than speedy rate hikes.


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