IMPORTANT SIDEBAR ABOUT CENTRAL BANKING

Email from JJ Lando, now at Nomura:

“THE LTRO DIDN’T DO ANYTHING. ALL THE MONEY WOUND UP AS DEPOSITS AT THE ECB” “QE DIDN’T DO ANYTHING. ALL THE MONEY BECAME EXCESS RESERVES BACK AT THE FED.”
(Apologies in advance to all who have heard me give this one ten times before)

1. Central Banks, whenever they buy any asset (eg lend eg grow balance sheet) create new reserves.

2. Commercial banks and people do NOT have the capacity to destroy those reserves. Once the Fed or ECB wires the money or creates that asset line item on its spreadsheet, there is an equal and offsetting liability on its spreadsheet called reserves. This spreadsheet cannot be broken.

3. All that commercial banks can do is lending, which moves some of those reserves from ‘excess’ to ‘required’ but they are still there.

4. Commercial Banks make this lending decision based upon regulatory capital and profit motives, not based upon reserves. They have a ‘captive audience’ in their Central Banks, who MUST create the necessary reserves (a floored amount) to prevent interest rates from going to infinity.

5. When a Central Bank does a lot of Balance Sheet expansion in a short time, it’s going to wind up as deposits/excess NO MATTER WHAT. If the Fed does 1T of QE, Banks don’t suddenly ‘find’ the regulatory capital to make 10T of loans. And even if they did, there would be the SAME AMOUNT OF TOTAL RESERVES.

6. Bank lending to a 0% risk weighted sovereign actually does NOTHING to diminish excess reserves.

7. Simplified Illustration: ECB does a very large unsterilized LTRO. They take a lot of sov paper on balance sheet (temporarily), and they wire NEW FUNDS to thie member banks. Those member banks take some of the money and buy paper from the ITalian government. That government spends the money by wiring it to its pensioners. Those pensioners take it to buy food from the local grocer. The local grocer DEPOSITS IT IN HIS BANK. SOMEWHERE DOWN THE CHAIN the money winds up on deposit in some member bank, be the chain long or short. WHATEVER MONEY THE ECB CREATES WINDS UP ON DEPOSIT IN ITS MEMBER BANKS, WHETHER OR NOT IT IS ‘USED’ TO BUY SOVEREIGN DEBT, ‘USED’ TO MAKE LOANS, OR NOT USED AT ALL.

8. Please. I never wish to read again that ‘Central Bank money went unused because it wound up as deposits.’ IT HAS NO WHERE ELSE TO GO. THE BANKING SYSTEM IS A CLOSED LOOP. With the possible exception of someone making a withdrawal, taking the paper, and making a bonfire (actually not feasible in the hundreds of billions anyway bec there are constraints)

9. And that is probably how Italy just managed to borrow at 1.64%
Good luck!

Central Banks ‘Printing Money Like Gangbusters’: Gross

Can’t argue with success:

Central Banks ‘Printing Money Like Gangbusters’: Gross

By Margo D. Beller

Jan 11 (CNBC) — The world’s central banks are “printing money like gangbusters,” which could revive the threat of inflation , Pimco founder Bill Gross told CNBC Wednesday.

By putting “hundreds of billions” in currency in circulation, the central banks “can produce reflation—that’s why we’re seeing the pop in oil, gold” and other commodities, he said in a live interview.

At the same time, “there’s the potential for deflation if the private credit markets can’t produce some sort of confidence and solvency going forward,” Gross said. “So we’re at great risk here, not only in the U.S. but on a global basis.”

Gross has previously predicted a “paranormal” market in 2012 characterized by “credit and zero-bound interest rate risk” and fewer incentives for lenders to extend credit.

He said stock and bond investors must lower their expectations when it comes to returns, with 2 percent to 5 percent as good as they get this year.

He also told CNBC he expects the Federal Reserve will keep interest rates “exactly where it is at 25 basis points for the next three to four years.”

Gross’s Total Return Fund, the world’s largest bond fund, had over $10 billion in outflows in 2011, but Gross stressed the fund “started 2011 at $240 billion and ended it at $244 billion.”

He said he will run the Pimco Total Return Fund ETF , which starts March 1, the same way he runs the bond Total Return Fund, adding, “They’re twins.”

John Carney on MMT and Austrian Economics

Another well stated piece from John Carney on the CNBC website:

Modern Monetary Theory and Austrian Economics

By John Carney

Dec 27 (CNBC) — When I began blogging about Modern Monetary Theory, I knew I risked alienating or at least annoying some of my Austrian Economics friends. The Austrians are a combative lot, used to fighting on the fringes of economic thought for what they see as their overlooked and important insights into the workings of the economy.

Which is one of the things that makes them a lot like the MMT crowd.

There are many other things that Austrian Econ and MMT share. A recent post by Bob Wenzel at Economic Policy Journal, which is presented as a critique of my praise of some aspects of MMT, actually makes this point very well.

The MMTers believe that the modern monetary system—sovereign fiat money, unlinked to any commodity and unpegged to any other currency—that exists in the United States, Canada, Japan, the UK and Australia allows governments to operate without revenue constraints. They can never run out of money because they create the money they spend.

This is not to say that MMTers believe that governments can spend without limit. Governments can overspend in the MMT paradigm and this overspending leads to inflation. Government financial assets may be unlimited but real assets available for purchase—that is, goods and services the economy is capable of producing—are limited. The government can overspend by (a) taking too many goods and services out of the private sector, depriving the private sector of what it needs to satisfy the people, grow the economy and increase productivity or (b) increasing the supply of money in the economy so large that it drives up the prices of goods and services.

As Wenzel points out, Murray Rothbard—one of the most important Austrian Economists the United States has produced—takes exactly the same position. He says that governments take “control of the money supply” when they find that taxation doesn’t produce enough revenue to cover expenditures. In other words, fiat money is how governments escape revenue constraint.

Rothbard considers this counterfeiting, which is a moral judgment that depends on the prior conclusion that fiat money isn’t the moral equivalent of real money. Rothbard is entitled to this view—I probably even share it—but that doesn’t change the fact that in our economy today, this “counterfeiting” is the operational truth of our monetary system. We can decry it—but we might as well also try to understand what it means for us.

Rothbard worries that government control of the money supply will lead to “runaway inflation.” The MMTers tend to be more sanguine about the danger of inflation than Rothbard—although I do not believe they are entitled to this attitude. As I explained in my piece “Monetary Theory, Crony Capitalism and the Tea Party,” the MMTers tend to underestimate the influence of special interests—including government actors and central bankers themselves—on monetary policy. They have monetary policy prescriptions that would avoid runaway inflation but, it seems to me, there is little reason to expect these would ever be followed in the countries that are sovereign currency issuers. I think that on this point, many MMTers confuse analysis of the world as it is with the world as they would like it to be.

In short, the MMTers agree with Rothbard on the purpose and effect of government control of money: it means the government is no longer revenue constrained. They differ about the likelihood of runaway inflation , which is not a difference of principle but a divergence of political prediction.

This point of agreement sets both Austrians and MMTers outside of mainstream economics in precisely the same way. They appreciate that the modern monetary system is very, very different from older, commodity based monetary systems—in a way that many mainstream economists do not.

In MM, CC & TP, I briefly mentioned a few other positions on the economy MMTers tend to share. Wenzel writes that “there is nothing right about these views.”

I don’t think Wenzel actually agrees with himself here. Let’s run through these one by one.

1. The MMTers think the financial system tends toward crisis. Wenzel writes that the financial system doesn’t tend toward crisis. But a moment later he admits that the actual financial system we have does tend toward crisis. All Austrians believe this, as far as I can tell.

What has happened here is that Wenzel is now the one confusing the world as it is with the world as he wishes it would be. Perhaps under some version of the Austrian-optimum financial system—no central bank, gold coin as money, free banking or no fractional reserve banking—we wouldn’t tend toward crisis. But that is not the system we have.

The MMTers aren’t engaged with arguing about the Austrian-optimum financial system. They are engaged in describing the actual financial system we have—which tends toward crisis.

They even agree that the tendency toward crisis is largely caused by the same thing, credit expansions leading to irresponsible lending.

2. The MMTers say that “capitalist economies are not self-regulating.” Again, Wenzel dissents. But if we read “capitalist economies” as “modern economies with central banking and interventionist governments” then the point of disagreement vanishes.

Are we entitled to read “capitalist economies” in this way? I think we are. The MMTers are not, for the most part, attempting to argue with non-existent theoretical economies or describe the epic-era Icelandic political economy. They are dealing with the economy we have, which is usually called “capitalist.” Austrians can argue that this isn’t really capitalism—but this is a terminological quibble. When it comes down to the problem of self-regulation of our so-called capitalist system, the Austrians and MMTers are in agreement.

3. Next up is the MMT view (borrowed from an earlier economic school called “Functional Finance”) that fiscal policy should be judged by its economic effects. Wenzel asks if this means that this “supercedes private property that as long as something is good for the economy, it can be taxed away from the individual?”

Here is a genuine difference between the Austrians—especially those of the Rothbardian stripe—and the MMTers. The MMTers do indeed envision the government using taxes to accomplish what is good for the economy—which, for the most part, means combating inflation. They think that the government may need to use taxation to snuff out inflation at times. Alternatively, the government can also reduce its own spending to extinguish inflation.

Note that we’ve come across a gap between MMTers and Rothbardians that is far smaller than the chasm between either of them and mainstream economics, where taxation of private property and income is regularly seen as justified by the need to fund government operations. MMTers and Austrians both agree that under the current circumstances people in most developed countries are overtaxed.

4. Wenzel actually overlooks the larger gap between Austrians and MMTers, which has to do with the efficacy of government spending. Many MMTers believe that most governments in so-called capitalist economies are not spending enough. Most—if not all—Austrians think that these same government are spending too much.

The Austrian view is based on the idea that government spending tends to distort the economy, in part because—as the MMTers would agree—government spending in our age typically involves monetary expansion. The MMTers, I would argue, have a lot to learn from the Austrians on this point. I think that an MMT effort to more fully engage the Austrians on the topic of the structure of production would be well worth the effort.

5. Wenzel’s challenge to the idea of functional finance is untenable—and not particularly Austrian. He argues that the subjectivity of value means it is impossible for us to tell whether something is “good for the economy.” Humbug. We know that an economy that more fully reflects the aspirations and choices of the individuals it encompasses is better than one that does not. We know that high unemployment is worse than low unemployment. All other things being equal, a more productive economy is superior to a less productive economy, a wealthier economy is better than a more impoverished one.

Wenzel’s position amounts to nihilism. I think he is confusing the theory of subjective value with a deeper relativism. Subjectivism is merely the notion that the value of an economic good—that is, an object or a service—is not inherent to the thing but arises from within the individual’s needs and wants. This does not mean that we cannot say that some economic outcome is better or worse or that certain policy prescription are good for the economy and certain are worse.

It would be odd for any Austrian to adopt the nihilism of Wenzel. It’s pretty rare to ever encounter an Austrian who lacks normative views of the economy. These normative views depend on the view that some things are good for economy and some things are bad. I doubt that Wenzel himself really subscribes to the kind of nihilism he seems to advocate in his post.

Wenzel’s final critique of me is that I over-emphasize cronyism and underplay the deeper problems of centralized power. My reply is three-fold. First, cronyism is a more concrete political problem than centralization; tactically, it makes sense to fight cronyism. Second, cronyism is endemic to centralized government decisions, as the public choice economists have shown. They call it special interest rent-seeking, but that’s egg-head talk from cronyism. Third, I totally agree: centralization is a real problem because the “rationalization” involved necessarily downplays the kinds of unarticulated knowledge that are important to everyday life, prosperity and happiness.

At the level of theory, Austrians and MMTers have a lot in common. Tactically, an alliance makes sense. Intellectually, bringing together the descriptive view of modern monetary systems with Austrian views about the structure of production and limitations of economic planning (as well Rothbardian respect for individual property rights) should be a fruitful project.

So, as I said last time, let’s make it happen.

quick look at the 489 billion euro LTRO

When it comes to CB liquidity operations, as previously discussed, it’s about price- interest rates- and not quantities of funds. In other words, the LTRO is an ECB tool that assists in setting the term structure of euro interest rates. It helps the ECB set the term cost of funds for its banking system, with that cost being passed through to the economy on a risk adjusted basis, with the banking system continuing to price risk.

So what does locking in their funds via LTRO do for most banks? Not much. Helps keep interest rate risk off the table, but they’ve always had other ways of doing that. It takes away some liquidity risk, but not much, as the banks haven’t been euro liquidity constrained. And banks still have the same constraints due to capital and associated risks.

To it’s credit, the ECB has been pretty good on the liquidity front all along. I’d give it an A grade for liquidity vs the Fed where I’d give a D grade for liquidity. Back in 2008 the ECB was quick to provide unlimited euro liquidity to its member banks, while the Fed dragged its feet for months before expanding its programs sufficiently to ensure its member banks dollar liquidity. And the FDIC did the unthinkable, closing WAMU for liquidity rather than for capital and asset reasons.

But while liquidity is a necessary condition for banking and the economy under current institutional arrangements, and while aggregate demand would further retreat if the CB failed to support bank liquidity, liquidity provision per se doesn’t add to aggregate demand.

What’s needed to restore output and employment is an increase in net spending, either public or private. And that choice is more political than economic.

Public sector spending can be increased by simply budgeting and spending. Private sector spending can be supported by cutting taxes to enhance income and/or somehow providing for the expansion of private sector debt.

Unfortunately current euro zone institutional structure is working against both of these channels to increased aggregate demand, as previously discussed.

And even in the US, where both channels are, operationally, wide open, it looks like FICA taxes are going to be allowed to rise at year end and work against aggregate demand, when the ‘right’ answer is to suspend it entirely.

comments on the new long term ECB funding policy for member banks

The talk is that the new ECB longer term euro funding policy will mean euro member banks will suddenly start buying member nation euro debt and thereby ease the funding issue.

That doesn’t make sense to me. I see the 20 billion euro/wk bond purchases as possibly being enough to stabilize things, but not this.

Here’s my take:

So even if a bank officer now wants to buy, say, Italian debt out to 3 years because he can get ECB funding for that term, he probably has to go to an investment committee, so it is unlikely to happen overnight.

And the investment committees go something like this.

Investment officer:

‘now that we can get 3 year term funding from the ECB, i recommend we add to our italian debt position and make a 3% spread, which is a 30% return on equity’

committee responses:

‘why does the availability of term funding alter our current policy of reducing holdings to reduce credit risk?
what are the regulatory limits?
will the regulators allow us to own more?
what about the risk of downgrade which could force a sale?
what about repo haircuts if prices fall?
what if it’s decided Italy is unsustainable and the euro ministers vote on private sector haircuts?
how will taking on this risk affect our ability to raise capital?’

etc.

While banks may indeed buy more euro member nation debt due to the availability of the new term funding, I don’t think that new funding is enough to cause them to make that decision.

I do think the term funding will be used by banks with problems obtaining term funding to lock in the term cost of funds.

ECB Wants New Capital Rules Amid Credit Crunch Fears

It’s supports the notion that they understand that for govt debt to go down with the current institutional structure they need private sector debt (and/or exports) to increase.

However with the private sector necessarily pro cyclical (which is what Minsky boils down to),
at best this policy will keep mainly keep things from getting worse than otherwise.

ECB Wants New Capital Rules Amid Credit Crunch Fears

December 15 (MNI) — The European Central Bank, fearful of a looming credit crunch, is pushing regulators to alter new recapitalization rules in a way that will dissuade banks from shrinking their balance sheets to reach the 9% core tier 1 ratio required by the middle of next year, well-placed Eurosystem sources told Market News International.

In late October, the European Banking Authority (EBA) said it was requiring the region’s biggest banks to establish an exceptional and temporary buffer: the ratio of their highest quality capital to the assets on their balance sheet, weighted for risk, must reach 9% by the end of June 2012.

Eurosystem central bank officials as well as some EU governments are concerned that this new capital requirement could lead to a massive deleveraging by banks in Europe, which would entail selling off assets and significantly tightening conditions for lending.

There is widespread fear that such a development would depress loans to households and businesses. Some say it is already partly to blame for the big selloff in sovereign government bonds last month that led to sharply higher borrowing costs for Italy and Spain.

The original idea behind the EBA directive was that banks would need to maintain a constant 9% ratio over the entire period during which the requirement was in force. They could do so either by raising new capital — a big challenge in current market conditions — or by dumping assets and not acquiring new ones, which turned out to be the easier route.

“If you combine [asset] disposals with an aggressive fiscal tightening, you are creating the conditions for a sharp contraction,” a Eurozone central banker warned. He projected that the combined hit on GDP from fiscal tightening and bank retrenchment could be as much as two full percentage points. “That means a recession next year,” he said.

In recent public comments, ECB President Mario Draghi expressed concern about the potentially pernicious impact of bank deleveraging to meet the new capital targets. “We want to make absolutely sure that this process does not aggravate the credit tightening that is going on now,” the ECB president said. “It is important that banks raise capital, but not in a way that affects lending.”

Sources said that under a new proposal intended to address this problem, banks would be required not to reach a 9% ratio but to raise a specified, fixed amount of capital by the mid-2012 deadline.

Based on figures banks provided to the EBA as of end-September, the regulators would calculate the amount of capital a bank would have needed to hit the 9% capital ratio at that time. Banks would then be required to raise that level of capital regardless of what they had done with their assets since then or what they might do with them in the future.

Because banks would be required to raise the same amount of core tier one capital regardless of subsequent balance sheet moves, they would no longer have the same incentive to dump assets as a means of meeting the capital requirement.

A senior EU source said that a recent letter from the chairman of the EBA and the Polish EU presidency had noted that bank deleveraging was hurting the recovery, and it laid out a plan by which the 9% ratio would be calculated on the basis of risk-weighted assets on banks’ books as of September 30.

If the plan is approved, “you won’t see a change to the actual ratios or the sums [to be raised], but there will be a clarification that this should not be achieved through asset disposal,” this source said. “It should slow the aggressive [asset] disposal, which many people think is killing any chance of an upswing.”

After releasing new figures last Thursday on the total capital shortfall of European banks, totaling E114.7 billion, the EBA told banks to raise the money from investors, retained earnings and lower bonuses. Banks may only sell assets if the disposals do not limit overall lending to the economy, the EBA said.

However, it is not clear how bank regulators and supervisors would enforce this and whether there would be a level playing field, a well-placed Eurosystem source said. A new EBA requirement of the type now being discussed could address this issue, he said.

The decision on whether to switch from a capital ratio to a fixed amount of capital that each bank must raise lies in the hands of supervisors and regulators. It is too early to tell whether regulators will adopt the recommendation, since deliberations are still going on, another Eurosystem source said.

In its own effort to ensure the Eurozone’s economy won’t be starved for credit, the ECB last week announced a radical set of new liquidity measures, including a looser collateral framework and refinancing operations with a maturity of three years.

MMT to the ECB- you can’t inflate, even if you wanted to

With the tools currently at their immediate disposal, including providing unlimited member bank liquidity,lowering the interbank rate, and buying euro national govt debt, the ECB has no chance of causing any monetary inflation, no matter how hard it might try. There just are no known channels, direct or indirect, in theory or practice, that connects those policies to the real economy. (Note that this is not to say that removing bank liquidity and national govt credit support wouldn’t be catastrophic. It’s a bit like engine oil. You need a gallon or two for the engine to run correctly, but further increasing the oil in the sump isn’t going to alter the engine’s performance.)

Lower rates sure doesn’t do the trick. Just look to Japan for going on two decades, the US going on 3 years, and the ECB’s low rate policies of recent years. There’s not a hint of monetary inflation/excess aggregate demand or inflationary currency weakness from low rates. If anything, seems to me the depressing effect on savers indicates low rates from the CB might even, ironically, promote deflation through the interest income channels, as the non govt sector is necessarily a net receiver of interest income when the govt is a net payer. (See Bernanke, Reinhart, and Sacks 2004 Fed paper on the fiscal effect of changes in interest rates.)

And if what’s called quantitative easing was inflationary, Japan would be hyperinflating by now, with the US not far behind. Nor is there any sign that the ECB’s buying of euro govt bonds has resulted in any kind of monetary inflation, as nothing but deflationary pressures continue to mount in that ongoing debt implosion. The reason there is no inflation from the ECB bond buying is because all it does is shift investor holdings from national govt debt to ECB balances, which changes nothing in the real economy.

Nor does bank liquidity provision have anything to do with monetary inflation, currency depreciation, or bank lending. As all monetary insiders know, bank lending is never reserve constrained. Constraints on banking come from regulation, including capital requirements and lending standards, and, of course credit worthy entities looking to borrow. With the ECB providing unlimited liquidity for the last several years, wouldn’t you think if there was going to be some kind of monetary problem it would have happened by now?

So the grand irony of the day is, that while there’s nothing the ECB can do to cause monetary inflation, even if it wanted to, the ECB, fearing inflation, holds back on the bond buying that would eliminate the national govt solvency risk but not halt the deflationary monetary forces currently in place.

So where does monetary inflation come from? Fiscal policy. The Weimar inflation was caused by deficit spending on the order of something like 50% of GDP to buy the foreign currencies demanded for war reparations. It was no surprise that selling that many German marks for foreign currencies in the market place drove the mark down as it did. In fact, when that policy finally ended, so did the inflation. And there was nothing the central bank could do with interest rates or buying and selling securities or anything else to stop the inflation caused by the massive deficit spending, just like today there is nothing the ECB can do to reverse the deflationary forces in place from the austerity measures.

So here we are, with the ECB demanding deflationary austerity from the member nations in return for the limited bond buying that has been sustaining some semblance of national govt solvency, not seeming to realize it can’t inflate with its monetary policy tools, even if it wanted to.

Post script:

The only way the ECB could inflate would be to buy dollars or other fx outright, which it doesn’t do even when it might want a weaker euro, as ideologically they want the euro to be the reserve currency, and not themselves build fx reserves that give the appearance of the euro being backed by fx.

China News

Reads to me like policy is moving back towards growth and ‘inflation?’

I don’t expect runaway inflation but enough to continue to fundamentally continue to weaken the currency.

China’s currency has been fundamentally weakened for the last couple of years, while being supported vs the dollar by foreign investment, speculation, and what looks to me like the indirect expenditure of dollar reserves. Should the currency starts falling against the dollar it will tell me those factors have run their course.

Hu Pledges More China Imports as IMF’s Zhu Sees ‘Soft Landing’
China’s Stocks Rise Most in 3 Weeks on Bank Loans, CPI Outlook
China’s Hu pushes for larger global role
Obama warns Hu of U.S. frustrations on trade
Major yuan rise no cure for U.S. economic ills-China’s Hu
China’s Imports Rise Sharply, While Export Growth Slows
China New Loans Rise More Than Expected in Loosening Signal
Former China Banking Regulator Says China 2011 Growth Above 9%
China’s economy on right track: IMF
IMF See Little Decrease in Incentives for Saving in China
Former PBOC Adviser: China’s Economy May Grow 8%-8.5% Annually Over Next 10 Years – Report
China’s Property Market Experiencing ‘Soft Landing’, Fan Says

Galbraith on Keynes vs Hayek

Well worth a quick read.

John Maynard Keynes Knew What Occupy Wall Street Tells Us Today: “Banks and bankers are by nature blind.”

By James Galbraith

November 11 (Alternet) — Economist Friedrich Hayek is the darling of conservatives. Progressives prefer John Maynard Keynes. But when it comes to sensible policy, there’s really no contest.

Weidmann comments for MMT on Zero Hedge

ECB’s Weidmann Spoils The Party: Says Leveraging EFSF Violation Of EU Treaty, Warns Of Hyperinflation

By Tyler Durden

November 8 (Zero Hedge) — Trust the Germans in the ECB (those who have not yet resigned that is) in this case Jesn Weidmann, to come in and spoil the party:

  • Weidmann, speaking in Berlin, says hyperinflation shows why monetizing debt wrong
  • Prohibition on monetary financing an important achievement.
  • Euro treaty rightly forbids monetary financing
  • Stable prices should be key goal of ECB
  • Leveraging EFSF with currency reserves prohibited
  • Says monetary analysis may gain importance at ECB

  • And for all our MMT friends:

  • “One of the severest forms of monetary policy being roped in for fiscal purposes is monetary financing, in colloquial terms also known as the financing of public debt via the money printing press:” Weidmann
  • Prohibition of monetary financing in the euro area “is one of the most important achievements in central banking” and “specifically for Germany, it is also a key lesson from the experience of hyperinflation after World War I”

  • Summary from Bloomberg