Efficiency of China’s economy ‘sliding’

More evidence the Chicago educated offspring have taken charge. Good luck to them…

Efficiency of China’s economy ‘sliding’

Feb 28 — The efficiency of China’s economy is slipping, with money flowing much slower betweendifferent sectors than in the past, according to analysts.

They said this is despite the fact that the nation has a considerable amount of social financing— an approach to managing money that delivers a social dividend and an economic return.

Liu Yuhui, director of the financial lab at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, agovernment think tank, said although financing activities in the country appear to be rampant,most of the newly borrowed money is used to repay debts instead of forming revenue amongcompanies.

“We can see that the ratio of money to gross domestic product has been increasing, whichmeans the economy needs increasing capital to promote than previously.”

Last year, social financing, which included bank and non-bank loans, bond issuance and stocksales, set a record high of nearly 16 trillion yuan ($2.54 trillion). The ratio of M2, a broadmeasure of money supply, against GDP stood at a record high of 188 percent at the end of lastyear.

The proportion of the increase in enterprises’ one-year deposits to total social financingdropped to 20 percent in 2012 from 40 to 50 percent seven years earlier, Liu said.

“Accumulation of debts is pushing up the leverage ratio among companies, with the wholeeconomy more difficult to shore up.”

He said that by adding loans extended to local governments through financing vehicles, theproblem becomes more severe.

Liu estimated local government debt in the financial system at somewhere between 13 trillionyuan and 14 trillion yuan, with interest rates to be paid each year standing at 700 billion yuanto 800 billion yuan.

Rolling over loans has become a widely adopted measure among Chinese banks since lastyear as lending extended during the financial crisis to stimulate economic growth graduallybecame due but could not be paid back on time.

According to a survey released by the China Banking Association at the end of last year, morethan half of the 850 bankers surveyed said they support the practice of rolling over matureloans, saying this offers a way to ensure projects have good cash flow and that the loans willeventually be repaid following a grace period.

Many banks would rather maintain the lending as long as interest rates could be paid, insteadof classifying the loans as non-performing assets, Liu said.

China’s M2 growth accelerated substantially to a 22-month high of 15.9 percent year-on-year inJanuary from 13.8 percent in December.

In January, commercial banks extended more than 1 trillion yuan in new loans, and bank off-balance-sheet and non-bank channels offered another 1.5 trillion yuan of new credit to theeconomy, according to data from the People’s Bank of China, the central bank.

Social financing reached 2.54 trillion yuan last month, up 1.56 trillion yuan year-on-year.

The increase in enterprises’ deposits in January, which stood at 117.9 billion yuan, was muchlower than that of individuals’ savings, which stood at 749.9 billion yuan.

Stephen Green, chief China economist at Standard Chartered Bank, warned last year that foran economy with an already high leverage level, “re-leveraging up” increases overall macrorisk, as many financial crises are foreshadowed by an increase in leverage.

Zhao Xijun, deputy dean of the school of finance at Renmin University of China in Beijing, saidthe current monetary condition basically matches well with the economy, judging by thefluctuation of consumer goods and asset prices.

“It’s very difficult to measure the impact after the central bank issued money, and controlswhere the capital flows into. Price levels could be a fair and final criteria to draw a conclusion.”

He said the declining proportion of companies’ deposits to total financing could also betranslated into their increasing involvement in asset transactions as the financial marketdevelops.

Formation of social capital contributed to more than 50 percent of GDP growth last year,maintaining a strong engine for the economy, although probably much of the money went intoasset transactions, Zhao said.

China Needs Tighter Monetary Policy, State Research Agency Says

The narratives of the last few months leave me not expecting a lot from China. Not long ago 7.5% growth was described as a ‘hard landing’ and it probably still means same.

The out of paradigm western educated kids are probably now well entrenched and we all know what that means.

China Headlines:

China Needs Tighter Monetary Policy, State Research Agency Says

Tells me they have serious inflation/corruption issues.

More Chinese cities ready for property tax pilots

Property taxes, functionally, are price increases, so while they keep headline prices and credit expansion in check, they don’t help affordability.

PBOC continues to drain liquidity from banks

Just offsetting operating factors to sustain rate targets.

China to tighten shadow banking rules

Worried about consumer fraud, corruption, and maybe inflation.

Thaler’s Corner 19th Februaryy 2013: Positive Currency Wars!

The usual excellent post!

Positive Currency Wars!

19 February 2013


Financial markets are today being buffeted about by a slew of highly complex and changing influences. As readers may recall, at end-January (Thaler’s Corner 31/01: Too Cloudy), we advised people to favor Risk Off positions (references 2725 Euro Stoxx and 141.85 Bund), but this morning we returned to a neutralization of asset allocation biases (references 2635 and 142.85).

Not only do European markets seem to have lagged too far behind their American and Japanese peers, but, above all, I consider the current jitters about currency wars to be completely off the wall!

That said, there are still dark clouds hovering over Europe, mainly the eurozone, which is why we have yet to join the clan of the optimists.

Let us examine the macroeconomic situation area-by-area.

United States

The Fed is pursuing its easy money policies, the target QE, and I do not see them ending these policies any time soon. Despite the prevailing conventional wisdom, these policies are not boosting inflation at all, quite the contrary!

By continuously removing treasuries and MBS from the private sector via its QE asset-purchasing program and by replacing them with base money reserves, the Fed is in reality absorbing the interest that the private sector would have received on these bonds, as base money does not pay a coupon! The best illustration of the absorption carried out by the government is the amount of profits earned and transferred to the Treasury, a total of €335 billion since 2009!

This QE program functions like a tax, or more specifically, a savings tax somewhat like the French ISF or wealth tax (except that it is not at all progressive). It is nonetheless “progressive” in that it has helped the federal government, among others.

The 0% interest rate policy is certainly supposed to help reignite the American economy by making its easier for investment projects to achieve profitability, but at a time when the private sector feels overloaded with debt (deleveraging), its “inflationist” aspect is limited to the value of financial assets.

As long as US government budget policy remains frankly expansionist, with cumulative deficits totaling over $5 trillion since 2009, this deflationist aspect of the QE has little importance. However, not only have US budget deficits been trending downwards since 2009 (at a record high of $1.415 trillion), falling from 10.4% to 6.7% of GDP, but the latest budget measures raise concerns that the trend will accelerate.

In the first place, the hike in the payroll tax has had a direct impact on the American consumer. This 2% decrease in take-home income, for which employees were hardly prepared, led Wal-Mart Vice President Jerry Murray to declare February sales figures to be a “total disaster”:

“In case you haven’t seen a sales report these days, February MTD (month-to-date) sales are a total disaster. The worst start to a month I have seen in my seven years with the company. Where are all the customers? And where’s their money?”

Moreover, if sequester negotiations between Congress and the White House do not lead to a deal by the beginning of March, the ensuing decline in spending would represent about 1% of GDP and thus a new tightening of budget policy.

In contrast, the real estate market continues to give encouraging signs of a rebound. I will provide you the stats fresh February 22nd publication date.

The yen’s decline (currency wars) is a positive factor, which I will examine in the conclusion.

Europe

The eurozone is the world’s weakest economic zone, with the economic outlook as desperate as ever. The zone is suffering from an unfortunate mix of pro-cyclical budgetary policies and monetary policy, which refuses to use all the means available to counter recessive austerity.

Aside from their crazy devotion to Ricardian theories, supporters of “expansionist austerity” do not seem to take into account that the rare examples of such policies being successful are with very open small economies who, boasting their own currency, devalue their money and cut interest rates while defaulting on or restructuring foreign debt!

As for the distressed eurozone countries, which mainly trade with their neighbors, they not only lack their own currency and thus the possibility of devaluation, but also, in addition, suffer from a euro that remains high compared to the currencies of its trading partners!

And that’s leaving aside monetary policy and how its non-transmission to peripheral countries is making their economies even worse.

In addition, there are the problems specific to the zone, as exemplified by the Cypriot turmoil, the Italian elections, the protest movements in Spain and Portugal and the painful establishment of a common banking solution, etc.

But a ray of hope may be on the horizon, with the restructuring plan of the Promissory Notes just established by Ireland. Without going into the highly technical details, you can believe me when I say that this is the closest thing to fiscal financing ever carried out by a central bank on the eurozone or even in a developed country!

Quite simply, the Irish state has issued very long-term bonds, at very low interest rates, directly into the capital of the restructured bank, which then refinances it with the Irish central bank. The state thus skirts appealing to markets; this is monetary financing, albeit indirectly so. In any case, it would have had a hard time raising capital on such good terms with the public.

And Mario Draghi’s apparent nod to this operation, limiting himself to stating the ECB board had unanimous taken note of the deal, augurs well! We will not be surprized to hear the screams of alarm from Mr Weidmann and the Bundesbank, but they seem to have definitely lost control.

In short, while the euro’s rise is a drag on European exporters in the short term, reflecting more far more restrictive monetary and budgetary policies than those of our trading partners, this is also a case of the tree hiding the forest, as I will explain in the case of the Land of the Rising Sun.

Japan

This is where things are really going to play out!

The latest comments by Japanese government officials suggest that the next BoJ President will not only be a lot more dovish than his predecessors but that he will also work much more closely with the government.

Such coordination is absolutely necessary in times of deflation when the country has been faced with 0 Lower Bound for so many years. Check out the excellent paper written by Paul McCulley and Zoltan Pozsar on this topic in MG.

If a country in the midst of severe deflation/recession, like Japan, whose trade balance has deteriorated so abruptly since 2011, does not have the right to use all the tools at its disposal to pull itself out of this quagmire, who does?

I would farther than the prevailing discourse, with its focus on Japanese-style quantitative easing, and say flat out that the country should electronically print money!

Screams of a Weimer situation aside, such an approach would technically change little, since it would amount to injecting the budget deficit into the economy in the form of Monetary Financing instead of JGBs (Bonds Financing), which are nearly identical to cash (floor rate and possibility of going through the repo market).

In contrast, one thing is for sure: the fears generated by such an announcement would be enough to send the yen back to 110 vis-à-vis the dollar, which is in no way catastrophic. Bear in mind that this parity averaged 118.40 between the two shocks of 1987 and 2008!

These jitters would also fuel inflationist expectations, which is precisely the goal of a country in which the latest statistics show the economy stuck in deflation.

But the main reason I say that such a monetary and budgetary turnabout by Japan would be good for the rest of the world is that one of its main goals is to reignite domestic consumption, a natural corollary of easier monetary conditions and higher inflationist expectations.

And that would also benefit its foreign trading partners!

We are not witnessing so much a race to competitive devaluation (currency wars) as a race to more accommodative monetary policies, under the impulsion of the Fed and the BoJ, not to mention the BoE and the SNB, among others.

And all this will end up influencing the ECB, which, if it does not change its policies, will end up with a euro climbing toward 140 against the yen and 1.45 against the dollar. Let’s not forget that in 2007-2008, the euro was trading at 170 against the yen and 1.60 against the dollar, mainly due to the ECB’s intransigence, with the results we all know.

As Mr Draghi has declared that he will take the euro’s level into consideration, not as a target, but as a variable in monetary policy, we can only hope that it will continue to appreciate and thus force our central banks to carry out its own Copernican revolution and enter into concertation with the world’s central banks managing modern currencies.

In conclusion, thanks to these monetary hopes stemming from the Japanese initiatives, I have decided to put between parentheses the still heavy clouds, cited above, and advise clients this morning to abandon the Risk Off bias to capture profits offered by the last market shifts and to, at minimum, put ourselves in a position of maximum reactivity.

Surge in Chinese credit raises fears

All else equal, a reduction of state sponsored lending gets ‘replaced’ by non govt lending to the extent it can be sustained by incomes, collateral values, etc.

And not to forget, likewise, the private sector is necessarily pro cyclical.

The western educated kids at the name mainstream schools may not have brought that home with them…

Surge in Chinese credit raises fears

(FT) Chinese credit issuance surged to a record high in January on the back of a boom in shadow banking. Total new financing last month reached Rmb2.5tn ($400bn). Up more than twofold from the same month last year, eclipsing even the start of 2009 when China unleashed stimulus spending to fight off the global financial crisis. The explosion in financing was only partly driven by banks, which made Rmb1.07tn in loans. The rest of the new credit – 60 per cent of the total – came from corporate bonds, loans by investment companies, direct lending from companies to other companies and banker’s acceptances. Since December regulators have started to tap the brakes on shadow banking – in one important move they restricted the financing sources available to local governments.

China Loan Share at Record Low Shows Financing Risks

Lending by state banks there- shelling out funds without much concern about getting them back- is functionally a lot like deficit spending here, and both probably have similarly high multiples as well.

So while ‘normal’ deficit spending is reportedly going up in China, temper that by this kind of decrease in ‘shadow’ deficit spending.

China Loan Share at Record Low Shows Financing Risks

January 9 (Bloomberg) — Chinas bank loans as a share of funding in the economy may have fallen to a record low, highlighting the growth of alternative financing channels that have prompted warnings of rising credit risks.

New yuan loans probably dropped 14 percent last month from a year earlier, according to the median projection in a Bloomberg News survey of 37 analysts ahead of data due by Jan. 15. That would give bank lending a 55 percent share of aggregatefinancing for 2012, based on UBS AG estimates, the least in figures dating to 2002.

The decline underscores the waning ability of official loan data to capture the scale of debt in the worlds second-largest economy as borrowers and investors turn to less-regulated, higher-return shadow-banking products. The Peoples Bank ofChina is putting greater emphasis on aggregate financing and the International Monetary Fund says the growth of nonbank credit poses new challenges to financial stability.

Chinas economic performance in 2013 will be significantly affected by how seriously Chinese regulators are going to treat non-bank financing, said Shi Lei, a Beijing- based analyst with broker Founder Securities Co., who has provided research advice to Chinas securities regulator. While a hands-off approach will help the economy, a crackdown would be really bad for growth.

The PBOC lending figures are among December data in the coming days that will show whether an economic rebound that began in September picked up or slowed last month after a seven- quarter growth slowdown. Trade figures due tomorrow may show exports rose at a faster pace and a Jan. 11 report may indicate inflation accelerated.

Comments from Mervyn King on LCR changes

Global banking rules make no sense at all to me.
Each CB need only mind the banks its insures.

But until that’s understood we have to suffer through this nonsense.

“This was a compromise between competing views from around the world,” Bank of England Governor Mervyn King said at a briefing following yesterday’s meeting. King chairs the Group of Governors and Heads of Supervision, or GHOS, which decides on global bank rules. “For the first time in regulatory history we have a truly global minimum standard for bank liquidity.”

Banks and top officials such as European Central Bank President Mario Draghi pushed for changes to the LCR, arguing that it would choke interbank lending and make it harder for authorities to implement monetary policies. Lenders have warned that the measure might force them to cut back loans to businesses and households.

“The new liquidity standard will in no way hinder the ability of the global banking system to finance a global recovery,” King said. “It’s a realistic approach. It certainly did not emanate from an attempt to weaken the standard.”

ecb getting there?

>   
>   (email exchange)
>   
>   On Jan 6, 2013 6:41 AM, Andrea wrote:
>   
>   Some interesting points made by Ulrich Bindseil and Adalbert Winkler (ECB) in
>   their October 2012 paper
>   
>   How about these authors rethinking fiscal policy in the light of this?
>   ;-)
>   

The results of our analysis are as follows:

A central bank that operates under a paper standard with a flexible exchange rate and without a monetary financing prohibition and other limits of borrowings placed on the banking sector is most flexible in containing a dual liquidity crisis.

• Raising interest rates to attract funding / capital inflows, while being the standard economic mechanism in normal times, may fail to equilibrate demand and supply in a confidence crisis as higher interest rates make it less likely that borrowers will be able to serve the debt. As a result, within any international monetary system characterized by some sort of a fixed exchange rate, the availability of inter-central bank credit determines the elasticity of a crisis country’s central bank in providing liquidity to banks and financial markets, notably government bond markets. Thus, the sustainability of fixed exchange rate systems depends on the elasticity of inter-central bank credit, i.e. the ability and willingness of the central banks of “safe haven countries” to provide loans to central banks of countries in financial distress (gold standard and peg to another country’s currency) and on the elasticity of liquidity provision by the common central bank (monetary union).

• In a monetary union, like the euro area, international arrangements are replaced by a common central bank that provides lender-of-last-resort lending to banks. In the institutional set-up of the euro area where national central banks are in charge of the actual conduct of central bank operations with a country’s banking system, this provision of liquidity is reflected in the “TARGET2 balances”. At the same time, the comparison of a central bank of a euro area type monetary union with a country central bank operating under flexible exchange rates and a paper standard, like the US Federal Reserve, shows that central banks under the former framework have a similar capacity in managing dual liquidity crises as long as the integrity of the monetary union is beyond any doubt.

• Collateral constraints matter systematically under all monetary frameworks. As a result, a central bank confronted with a dual liquidity crisis has to be in a position to adjust collateral constraints in order to enhance the elasticity of its liquidity provision and to limit bank defaults and a deepening of the crisis. If done prudently, this may actually reduce central bank risk taking.

• Banks and securities markets can be subject to a liquidity crisis. However, while lender of last resort activities vis-à-vis banks are a widely accepted toolkit of a central bank, outright purchases of securities have been a controversial tool of central bank liquidity provision in financial crisis since the days of the real bills doctrine. Monetary financing prohibitions (regarding Governments) are a specific case of banning direct lending or primary market purchases of securities, namely securities issued by governments. If the central bank is either not allowed, or it is unwilling to conduct outright purchases of securities, the banking sector – supported by the central bank – can in principle act as the lender of last resort for debt securities markets. However, this is subject to additional constraints, i.e. the banks’ ability and willingness to perform this role. Moreover, it has specific drawbacks as, for instance, the possibility of diabolic solvency loops between banks, the issuers of debt securities, including the government and the real economy may arise.

• Borrowing limits of banks, i.e. quantitative credit constraints deliberately imposed by the central bank to limit the borrowing of banks from the central bank, accelerate a crisis because – if enforced – they signal to banks and markets that at those limits the central bank’s elasticity of liquidity provision ends. As a result, those limits push all banks (potentially) affected into a state of fear of becoming illiquid and hence into a state of strict liquidity hoarding.

Japan- Foreign countries have no right to lecture us

This confirming much of what’s been previous discussed.

The remaining question whether there already has been direct intervention, as evidenced by rising fx reserves.

Interestingly, with floating fx it’s operationally easy for Central Banks to offset each other’s intervention. For example, if the BOJ buys dollars the Fed could simply buy the yen. Each CB would have a deposit on the other’s books and the (global) economy wouldn’t know the difference.

Also interestingly, all governments currently miss the point that exports are real (real vs nominal) costs and imports are real benefits.

So the CB that weakens its currency is in fact gifting the world superior real terms of trade via lower export prices via lower domestic real wages, etc. as it reduces its own real terms of trade.

Japan Rebuke to G-20 Nations May Signal More Moves to Weaken Yen

By Eunkyung Seo and Masaki Kondo

December 31 (Bloomberg) — Japanese purchases of foreign bonds to weaken the yen may become more likely as the nation rejects trading partners’ rights to criticize its currency policies.

“Foreign countries have no right to lecture us,” Finance Minister Taro Aso told reporters at a briefing in Tokyo on Dec. 28. He said that the U.S. should have a stronger dollar and questioned whether major Group of 20 nations had stuck to pledges from 2009 to avoid competitive currency devaluations.

Japan’s new Prime Minister Shinzo Abe may accept trade friction as a cost of spurring growth and countering deflation through a looser monetary policy and weaker yen. The currency is set to complete its biggest annual decline in seven years after Abe’s Liberal Democratic Party secured a landslide victory in this month’s lower-house election. During his campaign, Abe said foreign-bond purchases were a possible monetary tool.

“The LDP wants to boost stock prices before the upper- house election in July next year, and the easiest option for them is to weaken the currency,” said Satoshi Okagawa, a senior global-markets analyst in Singapore at Sumitomo Mitsui Banking Corp., a unit of Japan’s second-biggest bank by market value. “The explicit policy to weaken the yen is likely to upset the U.S. and China.”

The yen was at 86.08 per dollar as of 7:30 a.m. in London after touching 86.64 on Dec. 28, the weakest since August 2010. It traded at 113.53 per euro.

Currency Promises

The currency has dropped more than 10 percent versus the greenback since the end of 2011, set to complete the biggest annual slump since 2005. At the same time, the yen remains about 30 percent higher than it was five years ago.

In his Dec. 28 comments, Aso, a former prime minister, said that Japan and other countries made “a promise not to resort to competitive currency devaluations” at a G-20 meeting in 2009. “How many countries have kept the promise? The U.S. should have a stronger dollar. What about the euro?” he asked. “Foreign countries have no right to lecture us” as Japan is the only major economy to keep the pledge, Aso said.

The U.S. criticized Japan for undertaking unilateral sales of the yen in August and October last year, after Group of Seven economies earlier jointly intervened to weaken the currency in the aftermath of an earthquake and tsunami.

“Rather than reacting to domestic ‘strong yen’ concerns by intervening to try to influence the exchange rate, Japan should take fundamental and thoroughgoing steps to increase the dynamism of the domestic economy,” the Treasury Department said in a report in December last year.

Shrinking Economy

The Liberal Democratic Party faces the task of reviving growth after the economy contracted for the past two quarters, meeting the textbook definition of a recession. The nation’s industrial output tumbled more than forecast in November to the lowest level since the aftermath of last year’s record quake.

At the same time, stock prices are climbing, with Toyota Motor Corp. at a more than two-year high, as a weaker yen and prospects for central-bank easing brighten the outlook for exporters. Such improvements may cause concern for some of Japan’s Asian neighbors.

“South Korea is one of the countries most vulnerable to the weak yen policy as many export items are in direct competition, such as cars and electronic goods,” said Lee Sang Jae, a Seoul-based economist at Hyundai Securities Co. “Japan will try whatever it can to stop the deflation and to weaken the yen for export growth.”

Shirakawa’s Caution

After a Dec. 28 call with U.S. Treasury Secretary Timothy F. Geithner, Aso said he had told Geithner that the yen was making some corrections from one-sided moves and Aso would keep monitoring changes in the currency.

Bank of Japan (8301) Governor Masaaki Shirakawa, whose five-year term ends in April, has rejected suggestions that the bank buy foreign bonds and called for respect for the BOJ’s independence. Such a policy would amount to currency intervention, which is the responsibility of the finance minister, he says.

At the same time, the Nikkei newspaper on Dec. 29 cited Shirakawa as saying that central bank and government must work together to overcome deflation. Abe is pressing for the Bank of Japan to adopt a 2 percent inflation target, compared with a current goal of 1 percent. Consumer prices excluding fresh food fell 0.1 percent in November from a year earlier, showing the central bank is struggling to fulfil even the lesser ambition.

The LDP proposed in its campaign manifesto establishing a joint BOJ, Ministry of Finance and private sector fund to buy foreign bonds. Takatoshi Ito, a former finance ministry official and a possible contender to become central-bank governor, said in a Dec. 6 interview that the BOJ “can and should buy foreign bonds,” adding that such a move is possible if the finance minister publicly declares support for it.

In a note this month, Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd. said that foreign bond purchases are contrary to the legislation governing the BOJ. At the same time, it’s possible that the government may cajole the central bank into putting money into a proposed private-public vehicle for investment in foreign asssets, the lender said.

Bitcoins join global bank network

Been looking at Bitcoins for a while and seems it’s not a currency but a payments system.

For example, a acquaintance of mine who wanted to buy an item arranged with the seller to do it via Bitcoins to ‘save’ on vat taxes.

Say the Bitcoin happened to be valued at $12, the buyer wanted to pay $120 dollars.(Note that the value per se was of no consequence for this transaction.)

What the buyer of the item did was buy 10 Bitcoins for the $120, while simultaneously the seller sold 10 bit coins for $120.

The buyer then then bought the item by transferring his 10 Bitcoins to the seller via the exchange, who ‘delivered’ them to the exchange for his prearranged $120.

Bitcoins facilitate untaxed and anonymous transactions. The value of a Bitcoin is of no particular consequence to the buyer and seller in the case of transactions like this, and will fluctuate as a function of the policies of the exchange management.

And seems the right to ‘operate as a bank’ now officially sanctions this type of activity.

Virtual cash exchange becomes bank

** Bitcoins join global bank network **

A currency exchange that specialises in the virtual currency known as bitcoins has won the right to operate as a bank.

My response to a post on an Italian Keynes blog

Warren Mosler comments on Keynes blog, Italy

warren mosler 8 dicembre 2012 alle 15:33

First, let me remind that MMT was originally ‘Mosler Economics’ which began with ‘Soft Currency Economics’ (1993) which can be found at https://moslereconomics.com. Also, highlights of the ‘history of MMT’ are in ‘The 7 Deadly Innocent Frauds of Economic Policy’ free online also on my website. Note too that ‘Soft Currency Economics’ was a result of my first hand experience after 20 years in banking and monetary operations. I had never read Keynes, or even heard of Lerner, Knapp, or had any knowledge of any ‘post Keynesians’. So while it may be true that MMT can be derived from one school of thought or another, it didn’t happen that way. And, for example, when I put forward my ‘real vs nominal’ discussion of fiscal transfers in a monetary union earlier this year, explaining how the production of public goods and services for the benefit of the entire union is in fact a real cost to the region that receives the funding to produce these public goods and services, that was also ‘original MMT thought’ (fully recognizing the shortcomings of such a statement!).

Second, if there is a ‘fundamental’ contribution of MMT to ‘the literature’ it’s the explicit recognition that a currency like the dollar is in fact a simple public monopoly, and all the rest follows. Along those lines I have lectured on the long standing ‘Keynes vs the Classics’ discussion, where the Classics argued there can be no unemployment without monopoly, and Keynes argues there in fact can be persistent unemployment even without monopoly, due to the effects of unspent income, etc. in the monetary system. My response is they both failed to explicitly recognize the currency itself is a public monopoly. Notional demand is from taxation and from savings desires, and notional supply from state spending and/or state lending. And unemployment is the evidence of a restriction in supply from the monopolist- the failure to spend enough to satisfy the need to pay taxes and the desires to net save in that unit of account. So the classics were right in that unemployment does come from monopoly, but they failed to recognize the applicable monopoly. And Keynes was right, the problem was on the monetary side, but he failed to recognize the currency itself was a simple public monopoly, even though he described it much along those lines. If Keynes had recognized the currency was a monopoly, he surely would have explicitly said so in this discussion, and many other places as well to support many of his contentions. I’ll post this and then go on with additional response to the above blog.

warren mosler 8 dicembre 2012 alle 15:50

With regard to circuit theory, when I first met the Post Canadians ;) in the mid 1990’s who I very much respect, especially the M&M’s (Mario and Marc), and read a bit of circuit theory, it seemed so ‘intuitively obvious’- a case of ‘goes without saying’- I wondered why it was even worth writing about! And my first comment was that while I fully agreed with what they were saying, it didn’t ‘start from the beginning’ in that it began with firms borrowing to pay workers, but never discussed why anyone would work for the currency in the first place. I explained to them that it about the currency being a simply public monopoly, with tax liabilities the ‘driving force’ behind the ‘government circuit’ where, at the macro level, taxation creates sellers of real goods and services, including labor, which is why people work for businesses, etc. Professor Alain Parguez immediately picked up on this and added it to his model in his next paper, only to be severely criticized and isolated by much of the ‘Circuitist’ community for many years! Most came around to accept it over the years, though some continue to fail to do so.

warren mosler 8 dicembre 2012 alle 16:16

Next:

“I think it’s worth remembering that this thesis is a rigorous foundation of the theory of relative prices and distribution in the development of the so-called “theory of production”, which, among others, Leontief and Sraffa have made outstanding contributions above (see Pasinetti 1975; Kurz and Salvadori 1995, cf. Petri also 2004). In particular, in the light of the theory of production and the above-mentioned argument and its implications can be extended to so-called “long term”, and the objections of Krugman (2011) to the MMT can be effectively criticized.”

Relative prices, yes, but MMT reveals the source of absolute nominal prices. And it’s very simple. As everyone knows, a monopolist is ‘price setter’ rather than ‘price taker’.

And a monopolist is price setter for two prices. The first what Marshall called the ‘own rate’ which how his ‘item’ exchanges for itself. With a currency this is the rate of interest, which we know is set by the CB and not ‘the market’ as we know the CB is monopoly supplier of reserves to its banking system, and therefore is price setter as it prices the banking system’s marginal cost of funds. The second is how the monopolist’s ‘item’ exchanges for other goods and services, which we call ‘the general price level’

I say it this way- the price level is necessarily a function of prices paid by the issuer when it spends, and/or collateral demanded when it lends.

warren mosler 8 dicembre 2012 alle 16:28

Next:

“However, as Lavoie has shown, it is derived from a simple accounting convention: some modern monetary theorists analyze the central bank and the state as if they were a single sector consolidation. The mystery is easily solved, then. However, it should also add that this consolidation, in the current political and institutional reality, does not exist.” First, I do very well know, recognize, and account for the institutional realities at all times. As I do know that no matter how you look at it, spending comes first before taxing of borrowing for the issuer of the currency, which includes his designated agents.

Congress is the issuing authority, and has assigned various tasks to the Treasury and Fed to carry out its will.

The Fed operates a spread sheet that contains the accounts of its member banks, as well as an account for the Treasury.

I begin, for purposes of this discussion, at inception, with no balances in any accounts.

Any payment of taxes would require the Fed to debit a member bank account and credit the account of the treasury.

This is impossible with no balances in the member bank accounts, unless they are permitted to have negative balances.

However, negative balances- overdrafts- are functionally loans from the Fed, an agent of Congress. This means paying taxes via overdraft is paying taxes via obtaining a loan from the Fed. That is, in this example, the Fed must lend the dollars that it accounts for as payment of taxes.

The way ‘insiders’ say it, there can’t be a ‘reserve drain’ without a ‘reserve add’

That is, the dollars to pay taxes and to buy treasury securities necessarily ‘come from’ govt. spending and/or lending.

There is no way around it. Any issuer must issuer before he can collect the thing he issues as a simple point of logic.

warren mosler 8 dicembre 2012 alle 16:36

regarding trade, with a floating exchange rate there is ‘continuous balance.’ For example, in the case of the US, with perhaps a $400 billion trade deficit, it can be said that we have the goods and services we imported, and non residents are holding the additional $400 billion of $US financial assets they received in payment, and at this point in time there is that ‘balance’ which has resulted in the current exchange rate martix.

So I see only ‘balance’ at any given point in time, never ‘imbalance’, as a point of logic. Am I missing something? If so, rather than I write about every possible question I can imagine you might raise, can I ask for any of you to give me an example of why this is a ‘problem’ so to speak? Thanks!

warren mosler 8 dicembre 2012 alle 16:45

“In a period in which the theme of the insertion of foreign capital in the ownership and control seems to go beyond the scope of the last strategic assets in public hands and even get to lick the banking system, it would be good to do a lot more clarity on this point .”

Yes, at any time I see public purpose in sourcing matters of strategic purpose domestically. For example, you do not want to outsource the programming of your military software which could render it useless in time of war. And I see public purpose in producing goods and services with strategic military purpose domestically, like the steel that goes into maintaining the military, and domestic sources of energy, food, etc. etc. Again, government is there for public infrastructure that serves public purpose, which includes strategic planning.

On the other hand, I don’t see the public purpose in not allowing non residents to sell us most of what we call ‘consumer goods and services’ where, for example, a cut off in time of war would not alter the outcome of the war.

Along these lines, I see a serious problem with the euro zone’s dependence on Russian energy supplies, even though Russia has ‘promised’ never to cut them off.

That and $20 will get you a cup of coffee in Rome…

I see the euro zone as paying a heavy price in regards to real terms of trade with Russia and others, due to arrangements that I don’t see serving public purpose, though the certainly do serve influential private purpose.

warren mosler 8 dicembre 2012 alle 16:53

Remember, economically speaking, employment is a real cost to the worker. He is selling his time. The real benefit is the output. So I suggest you look at real consumption with regard to the euro members, to see who’s winning and losing economically. But yes, any monetary union needs a system of fiscal transfers to ensure full employment and price stability. And I suggest the reason it doesn’t happen is because it’s not widely understood that if a region is assigned the production of public goods and services, in real terms that process is a real cost to that region, as it’s employed to produce real goods and services that other parts of the union are consuming. Instead, because that region gets funding, it’s assumed that region is benefiting in real terms. In other words, fiscal transfers can be effected to use the areas of higher unemployment to produce goods and services that are exported to the rest of the union. This all comes back to exports being real costs, and imports real benefits, etc.

warren mosler 8 dicembre 2012 alle 17:00

let me conclude today that as a matter of simple game theory labor is not a fair game, and if not supported in some manner real wages will stagnate at very low levels. This is because people must ‘work to eat’ while business hire only if they can make a desired return on investment.

For me it suits public purpose to make sure people actually working for a living and producing real goods and services consumed by the majority are worthy of being supported with high levels of education, health care, and other such publlc services, as well as being fed, housed, and clothed at levels that make feel proud to be members of that society. The proposals on my website are intended to work to that end.