Category Archives: CBs

NYT: Fed to Give A.I.G. $85 bln Loan and Takeecon

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The Fed has a major strategic advantage over private sector buyers.

With the Fed making the loan, credit spreads in general should narrow.

This will add value to AIG’s short credit position which is where most of the mark to market losses are.

So the Fed’s actions to reduce systemic risk also increase the value of AIG once they take them over.

It’s good to be the Fed!

(not that it matters to the Fed itself financially one way or the other, but they probably don’t know that)

Fed Close to Deal to Give A.I.G. $85 Billion Loan


by Michael J. de la Merced and Eric Dash

In an extraordinary turn, the Federal Reserve was close to a deal Tuesday night to take a nearly 80 percent stake in the troubled giant insurance company, the American International Group, in exchange for an $85 billion loan, according to people briefed on the negotiations.

In return, the Fed will receive warrants, which give it an ownership stake. All of A.I.G.’s assets will be pledged to secure the loan, these people said.

The Fed’s action was disclosed after Treasury Secretary Henry M. Paulson and Ben S. Bernanke, president of the Federal Reserve, went to Capitol Hill on Tuesday evening to meet with House and Senate leaders. Mr. Paulson called the Senate majority leader, Harry Reid, Democrat of Nevada, about 5 p.m. and asked for a meeting in the Senate leader’s office, which began about 6:30 p.m.

The Federal Reserve and Goldman Sachs and JPMorgan Chase had been trying to arrange a $75 billion loan for A.I.G. to stave off the financial crisis caused by complex debt securities and credit default swaps . The Federal Reserve stepped in after it became clear Tuesday afternoon that the banking consortium would not be able to complete the deal.

Without the help, A.I.G. was expected to be forced to file for bankruptcy protection.

The need for the loans became necessary after the major credit ratings agencies downgraded A.I.G. late Monday, a move that likely to have forced the company to turn over billions of dollars in collateral to its derivatives trading partners worsening its financial health.

Until this week, it would have been unthinkable for the Federal Reserve to bail out an insurance company, and A.I.G.’s request for help from the Fed of just a few days ago was rebuffed.

But with the prospect of a giant bankruptcy looming – one with unpredictable consequences for the world financial system – the Fed abandoned precedent and agreed to let the money flow.


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Re: The Sunny Side

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(an email exchange)

>   
>   On Tue, Sep 16, 2008 at 10:24 AM, Tom wrote:
>   
>   Hi Coach,
>   
>   While financial markets are in a meltdown not unlike the post 9/11
>   experience,
>   

yes, major deleveraging going on

>   
>   the good news is that central banks around the world are providing
>   coordinated liquidity injections along with other positive actions that may
>   create a new basis for global financial rescues.
>   

yes, but all that does is set the fed funds rate and term fed funds rate. it’s about price, not quantity

>   
>   The creation of the League of Nations was an example of how the world
>   responded to WWI.
>   
>   Tom
>   
>   P.S. But it is still not time to buy stock.
>   

agreed!

watch for fiscal policy to do the heavy lifting to support GDP and employment.


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AS: Fed moves

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I’ve been recommending the following for the Fed for quite a while (see Proposals for the Fed):

  1. Lower the discount rate the Fed Funds rate and:
    1. Accept a pledge of any bank legal collateral from any member bank.
    2. Impose no restriction on quantity borrowed.
    3. Impose no restriction on the duration of any member bank borrowing.
  1. Likewise, remove collateral restrictions on the TAF operations.
    1. Set the maturity and interest rate for each TAF operation.
    2. Leave demand open-ended, rather than the current policy of limiting quantity.

Failure to implement the above shows a failure to understand fundamental monetary operations.

These policy changes would alleviate critical liquidity issues, and not, per se, alter net bank reserve demand (not that the size of the bank reserve ‘matters’).

Part of the current crisis is due to the failure to implement the above changes that would have:

  1. Normalized bank liquidity.
  2. Prevented the forced sales of investment grade, unimpaired, bank legal assets.
  3. Allowed banks to finance bank legal assets for third parties.
  4. Allowed markets to function to deleverage impaired assets.

The Fed is slowly moving in that direction, but, unfortunately, not proactively to ‘fix’ a flawed institutional structure, but reactively as things fall apart in no small part due to lack of action:

Federal Reserve lowers standards for collateral from primary dealers

The collateral eligible to be pledged at the Primary Dealer Credit Facility (PDCF) has been broadened to closely match the types of collateral that can be pledged in the tri-party repo systems of the two major clearing banks. Previously, PDCF collateral had been limited to investment-grade debt securities.

The collateral for the Term Securities Lending Facility (TSLF) also has been expanded; eligible collateral for Schedule 2 auctions will now include all investment-grade debt securities. Previously, only Treasury securities, agency securities, and AAA-rated mortgage-backed and asset-backed securities could be pledged.

These changes represent a significant broadening in the collateral accepted under both programs and should enhance the effectiveness of these facilities in supporting the liquidity of primary dealers and financial markets more generally.

Also, Schedule 2 TSLF auctions will be conducted each week; previously, Schedule 2 auctions had been conducted every two weeks. In addition, the amounts offered under Schedule 2 auctions will be increased to a total of $150 billion, from a total of $125 billion. Amounts offered in Schedule 1 auctions will remain at a total of $50 billion. Thus, the total amount offered in the TSLF program will rise to $200 billion from $175 billion.

The Board also adopted an interim final rule that provides a temporary exception to the limitations in section 23A of the Federal Reserve Act. It allows all insured depository institutions to provide liquidity to their affiliates for assets typically funded in the tri-party repo market. This exception expires on January 30, 2009, unless extended by the Board, and is subject to various conditions to promote safety and soundness.


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Thoughts on the bailout of Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae

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It comes down to public purpose.

The agencies were set up to provide low cost funding for moderate income home buyers.

They have done that reasonably well.

However, for probably 20 years I’ve been saying the agencies should fund themselves directly with the Treasury or Fed financing bank (same as Treasury). This both lowers their cost of funds, which would get passed through to the home mortgages they originate, and eliminates the possibility of a liquidity crisis.

Market discipline should not be on the liability side. It subjects them to risk of a ‘liquidity crisis’ where those funding you can decide to go play golf one day and cut you off for no reason and put you out of business. (And any entity subject to private sector funding to continue operations is subject to this kind of liquidity risk.) Regulation should focus instead on the asset side with assets and capital fully regulated.

This was done for the most part, and this is the same as the general banking model which works reasonably well. Yes, it blows up now and then as banks find flaws in the regulations, but the losses are taken, regulations adjusted, and life goes on.

The agencies made some loans to lower income borrowers as that went bad.

Even with this, most calculations show that at today’s rates of mortgage default they still have adequate capital to squeak by – the cash flow from the remaining mortgages and their capital is pretty much adequate to pay off their lenders (those who hold their securities).

But if defaults increase their ‘cash flow net worth’ could turn negative; hence, it would currently not be prudent for the private sector to fund them.

Paulson has now moved funding to the Treasury where it should have been in the first place.

This removes the possibility of a liquidity crisis and allows the agencies to continue to meet their congressional charge of providing home mortgages for moderate and lower income borrowers at low rates.

There was no operational reason for Paulson to do more than that, only political reasons.

The agencies could then have continued to function as charged by Congress.

If there were any long-term cash flow deficiencies, they would be ‘absorbed’ by the Treasury as that would have meant some of the funding for new loans was in fact a Treasury expense as it transferred some funds to borrowers who defaulted.

Congress has always been free to change underwriting standards.

In fact, the program was all about easier underwriting for targeted borrowers.

If there were any ultimate losses, that was the cost of serving those borrowers.

To date there have been only profits, and the program has ‘cost’ the government nothing.

With Treasury funding and a review of underwriting standards the program could have continued as before, which it might still do.

The entire episode was a panic over a possible liquidity crisis due to the possibility of the Treasury not doing what it did, and what should have been done at inception.

I don’t think the Treasury getting 79.1% of the equity after making sure it took no losses and got a premium on any ‘investment’ it made served any non-political purpose.

There was no reason current equity holders could not have gotten the ‘leftovers’ after the government got its funds and a premium also determined by the government.

Equity IS the leftovers and could have been left alone. (It wouldn’t surprise me if some of the shareholders challenge this aspect of the move.)

Yes, holders of direct agency securities were ‘rescued’, but they were taking a below market rate to buy those securities due to the implied government backing and lines of credit to the government.

I don’t see it as a case of ‘market failure’ but instead poorly designed institutional structure with a major flaw that forced a change of structure.

It’s a failure of government to do it right the first time, probably due to politics, and much like the flaw in the eurozone financial architecture (no credible deposit insurance – another form of allowing the liability side of the banking system to be subject to market discipline), also due to politics.

As for compensation, that too was ultimately under the control of Congress, directly or indirectly.

Lastly, in the early 1970s, with only 215 million people, housing starts peaked at 2.6 million per year.

Today, with over 300 million people we consider 2 million starts ‘gangbusters’ and a ‘speculative boom’.

And in the early 1970s, all there were was bunch of passive S&Ls making home loans – no secondary markets, no agencies, etc.

Point is, we don’t need any of this ‘financial innovation’ to further the real economy.

Rather, the financial sector preys on they real sectors, in both financial terms and real terms via the massive brain drain from the real sectors to the financial sector.

At the macro level, we’d be better off without 90% or more of the financial sector.


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NYT: China central bank is short of capital

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Main Bank of China Is in Need of Capital

by Keith Bradsher

HONG KONG — China’s central bank is in a bind.

It has been on a buying binge in the United States over the last seven years, snapping up roughly $1 trillion worth of Treasury bonds and mortgage-backed debt issued by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.

This was part of a ‘weak yen’ policy designed to support exports by keeping real domestic wages in check.

Those investments have been declining sharply in value when converted from dollars into the strong yuan,

Why should they care?

What matters from an investment point of view is what the USD can buy now, what the yuan can buy.

casting a spotlight on the central bank’s tiny capital base. The bank’s capital, just $3.2 billion, has not grown during the buying spree, despite private warnings from the International Monetary Fund.

Doesn’t matter what currency the bank’s capital is denominated in because he doesn’t know it matters.

The government has infinite yuan to spend without operational constraint; so, stated yuan capital doesn’t matter.

Now the central bank needs an infusion of capital.

Why? That’s a self-imposed constraint. Operationally central banks don’t need a local currency capital.

Central banks can, of course, print more money, but that would stoke inflation.

Operationally, this makes no sense. There is no such thing as ‘printing money’ apart from actually printing a pile of bills and leaving them on a shelf, which does nothing.

If they spend those bills, that’s government deficit spending with the same effect as any other government deficit spending.

‘Printing money’ has nothing to do with anything.

Instead, the People’s Bank of China has begun discussions with the finance ministry on ways to shore up its capital, said three people familiar with the discussions who insisted on anonymity because the subject is delicate in China.

Yes, there are self-imposed constraints imposed on various agencies of the government.

There are no operational constraints.

The central bank’s predicament has several repercussions. For one, it makes it less likely that China will allow the yuan to continue rising against the dollar, say central banking experts.

The way they keep a strong currency down is by buying more USD.

A weak currency goes down on its own.

To make a weak currency rise, you have to see your USD.

This could heighten trade tensions with the United States.

Yes.

The Bush administration and many Democrats in Congress have sought a stronger yuan to reduce the competitiveness of Chinese exports and trim the American trade deficit.

Yes, but if the yuan has turned fundamentally weak, the way for the US to keep it from falling is for the US Treasury to buy yuan.

The central bank has been the main advocate within China for a stronger yuan.

They want to fight inflation by keeping nominal input costs down.

But it now finds itself increasingly beholden to the finance ministry, which has tended to oppose a stronger yuan.

Right, they want to support exports by keeping real wages down.

As the yuan slips in value, China’s exports gain an edge over the goods of other countries.

The two bureaucracies have been ferocious rivals. Accepting an injection of capital from the finance ministry could reduce the independence of the central bank, said Eswar S. Prasad, the former division chief for China at the International Monetary Fund.

“Central banks hate doing that because it puts them more under the thumb of the finance ministry,” he said.

True.

This matters for foreign exchange policy. In the US, Japan, and others, the Treasury makes the foreign exchange decisions, not the Central Bank. And this if far more potent than interest rate policy.

Mr. Prasad said that during his trips to Beijing on behalf of the I.M.F., he had repeatedly cautioned China over the enormous scale of its holdings of American bonds, emphasizing that it left China vulnerable to losses from either a strengthening of the yuan or from a rise in American interest rates. When interest rates rise, the prices of bonds fall.

Those are not risks, as above.

Officials at the central bank declined to comment, while finance ministry officials did not respond to calls or questions via fax seeking comment. Data in a study by the Bank of International Settlements based in Basel, Switzerland, sometimes called the central bank for central banks, shows that many central banks had small capital bases relative to foreign reserves at the end of 2002,

They don’t need any capital base relative to foreign exchange holdings.

Foreign exchange holding are themselves capital.

though few were as low as the People’s Bank of China.

Given the poor performance of foreign bonds, the Chinese government could decide to shift some of its foreign exchange reserves into global stock markets.

If they shift to financial assets denominated in other currencies, this serves to shift the value of the yuan vs those currencies.

Stocks vs bonds is an investment decision only.

The central bank started making modest purchases of foreign stocks last winter, but has kept almost all of its reserves in bonds, like other central banks.

The finance ministry, however, has pushed for investments in overseas stocks. Last year, it wrested control of the $200 billion China Investment Corporation, which had been bankrolled by the central bank. That corporation’s most publicized move, a $3 billion investment in the Blackstone Group in May of last year, has lost more than 43 percent of its value.

The central bank’s difficulties do not, by themselves, pose a threat to the economy, economists agree. The government has ample resources and is running a budget surplus. Most likely, the finance ministry would simply transfer bonds of other Chinese government agencies to the bank to increase its capital. But even in a country that strongly discourages criticism of its economic policies, hints of dissatisfaction are appearing over China’s foreign investments.

For instance, a Chinese blogger complained last month, “It is as if China has made a gift to the United States Navy of 200 brand new aircraft carriers.”

Bankers estimate that $1 trillion of China’s total foreign exchange reserves of $1.8 trillion are in American securities. With aircraft carriers costing up to $5 billion apiece, $1 trillion would, in theory, buy 200 of them.

By buying United States bonds, the Chinese government has been investing a large chunk of the country’s savings in assets earning just 3 percent annually in dollars. And those low returns turn into real declines of about 10 percent a year after factoring in inflation and the yuan’s appreciation against the dollar.

The yuan has risen 21 percent against the dollar since China stopped pegging its currency to the dollar in July 2005.

The actual declines in value of the central bank’s various investments are a carefully guarded state secret.

Still China finds itself hemmed in. If it were to curtail its purchases of dollar-denominated securities drastically, the dollar would likely fall and American interest rates could soar.

China spent more than one-eighth of its entire economic output last year on foreign bonds, and then picked up the pace during the first half of this year. Chinese officials have suggested in recent comments that they are increasingly interested in stopping the yuan’s rise, and thus are willing to continue buying foreign securities to support the dollar. In fact, the yuan weakened slightly against the dollar last month after 26 consecutive months of gains.

Along with Treasuries, China has invested heavily in mortgage-backed bonds from Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the struggling mortgage finance giants that are sponsored by the United States government. Standard & Poor’s estimates China’s holdings at $340 billion.

Some bond traders suspect that the central bank has scaled back its purchases of these securities, as have China’s commercial banks. But the central bank trades this debt through many third parties in many countries, making its activity opaque to outside analysts.

The central bank has gone to great lengths to maintain its foreign purchases. The money to buy foreign bonds has come from the reserves required that commercial banks must deposit with the central bank. In effect, China’s commercial banks have been lending the central bank more than $1 trillion at an interest rate of less than 2 percent.

To keep the banks strong when they were getting such little interest on their reserves, the central bank has kept deposit rates low. The gap between what banks are paying on deposits and the rates they are charging ordinary customers to borrow is several percentage points. This amounts to a transfer of wealth from ordinary Chinese savers to the central bank and on to Americans who are selling their debt to the Chinese.

The central bank is now under considerable pressure to reduce the commercial banks’ reserve requirements to encourage growth as the Chinese economy shows signs of slowing.

Victor Shih, a specialist in Chinese central banking at Northwestern University, said that when he visited the People’s Bank of China for a series of meetings this summer, he was surprised by how many officials resented the institution’s losses.

He said the officials blamed the United States and believed the controversial assertions set forth in the book “Currency War,” a Chinese best seller published a year ago. The book suggests that the United States deliberately lured China into buying its securities knowing that they would later plunge in value.

“A lot of policy makers in China, at least midlevel policy makers, believe this,” Mr. Shih said.


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Agency take over

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Recap:

  1. If I’m reading it right, the agencies will fund directly through the Treasury. I’ve been suggesting this for many years. This lowers the cost of funds for housing, the point of the entire program, by removing a premium that’s been paid by the lack of an explicit guarantee.
  1. Agency portfolios being phased out, to be replaced by direct purchasing of the MBS (mortgage-backed securities) by the Treasury. This has no real implications for the non government sectors, just accounting on ‘their’ side of the ledger. But it does mean lending can continue and funds will be available for all eligible borrowers.
  1. Some kind of government preferred stock coming between profits and the remaining shareholders of various classes. This should leave stocks with some value depending on actual portfolio losses, unless I’m missing something.

 
I’d guess most markets have been pricing in worse outcomes than this.


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Re: Roach motel

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(a casual email exchange)

>   
>   On 8/24/08, Russell wrote:
>   
>   I found this an interesting read. Roach argues that economies and the US
>   economy has generally been built on a consumption binge.
>   

Right, consumption is the whole point of working.

Some of the output is consumed, some ‘invested’ for future consumption to be greater than otherwise, but it’s all consumption based. There’s no other point.

>   
>   And the reason why it happened was that the consumption was not based on
>   income, but instead since 1999 is has been based on appreciating asset values
>   and easy access to credit.
>   

The budget surpluses of the late 1990s removed that much income and financial equity (net financial assets) from the non govt sectors.

The only way the economy could continue was accelerating non govt debt. Private sector domestic credit expansion was around 7% of gdp by 2000 before it collapsed due to lack of income and financial equity to support that kind of credit structure.

1% interest rates didn’t turn it around. It was the tax cuts/spending increases/larger govt. deficit that turned it in 03. And as that tail wind was allowed to blow out it all slowed down right up to today. There was a small burst due to the private sector deficit spending due to the sub prime fraud, where lender’s equity fraudulently got spent on houses.

And, again, it was the fiscal package that supported gdp in q2 and q3, along with exports, which resulted from foreign cb’s cutting their accumulation of $US financial assets.

>   
>   Sees a slower global commodity market in the next couple of years as ASIA GDP
>   slows as a result of a slowdown in US consumption.
>   

Consumption will slowdown if agg demand isn’t supported by govts as they all implement demand draining tax advantaged savings incentives (pension funds, ira’s, ins reserves, etc.) that require deficit spending for some other entities sustain demand.

And govt deficits are the only ones that are independently sustainable. Non govt entities have limits they hit periodically.

>   
>   
>   
>    The key question going forward is whether an adaptive and
>   
>    increasingly interrelated global system learns the tough lessons
>   
>    of this macro upheaval. At the heart of this self-appraisal must
>   
>    be a greater awareness of the consequences of striving for
>   
>    open-ended economic growth. The US couldn’t hit its growth
>   
>    target the old fashioned way by relying on internal income
>   
>    generation, so it turned to a new asset- and debt-dependent
>   
>    growth model. Export dependent Developing Asia took its
>   
>    saving-led growth model to excess: Unwilling or unable to
>   
>    stimulate internal private consumption, surplus capital was
>   
>    recycled into infrastructure and dollar-based assets – in effect,
>   
>    forcing super-competitive currencies and exports to become
>   
>    the sustenance of a new development recipe.
>   
>   


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The Daily Telegraph: Bank borrowing from ECB

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[written on Sunday]

While not a problem in the US for the Fed to do this and more (in fact it should be standard operating procedure), the eurozone has self imposed treaty issues that make it very problematic.

If there are defaults its the national governments that will probably be called on to repay the ECB for any losses, but given the national governments didn’t approve the transactions the result will be chaotic at best.

Without bank defaults it will probably all muddle through indefinitely.

As before, the systemic risk is in the eurozone.

Valve repair tomorrow, going to try to smuggle in a knife under my gown to even the odds…

Bank borrowing from ECB is out of control

by Ambrose Evans-Pritchard

The European Central Bank has issued the clearest warning to date that it cannot serve as a perpetual crutch for lenders caught off-guard by the severity of the credit crunch.

Not Wellink, the Dutch central bank chief and a major figure on the ECB council, said that banks were becoming addicted to the liquidity window in Frankfurt and were putting the authorities in an invidious position.

“There is a limit how long you can do this. There is a point where you take over the market,” he told Het Finacieele Dagblad, the Dutch financial daily.

“If we see banks becoming very dependent on central banks, then we must push them to tap other sources of funding,” he said.

While he did not name the chief culprits, there are growing concerns about the scale of ECB borrowing by small Spanish lenders and ‘cajas’ with heavy exposed to the country’s property crash. Dutch banks have also been hungry clients at the ECB window.

One ECB source told The Daily Telegraph that over-reliance on the ECB funds has become an increasingly bitter issue at the bank because the policy amounts to a covert bail-out of lenders in southern Europe.

“Nobody dares pinpoint the country involved because as soon as we do it will cause a market reaction and lead to a meltdown for the banks,” said the source.

This “soft bail-out” is largely underwritten by German and North European taxpayers, though it is occurring in a surreptitious way. It has become a neuralgic issue for the increasingly tense politics of EMU.

The latest data from the Bank of Spain shows that the country’s banks have increased their ECB borrowing to a record €49.6bn (£39bn). A number have been issuing mortgage securities for the sole purpose of drawing funds from Frankfurt.

These banks are heavily reliant on short-term and medium funding from the capital markets. This spigot of credit is now almost entirely closed, making it very hard to roll over loans as they expire.

The ECB has accepted a very wide range of mortgage collateral from the start of the credit crunch. This is a key reason why the eurozone has so far avoided a major crisis along the lines of Bear Stearns or Northern Rock.

While this policy buys time, it leaves the ECB holding large amounts of questionable debt and may be storing up problems for later.

The practice is also skirts legality and risks setting off a political storm. The Maastricht treaty prohibits long-term taxpayer support of this kind for the EMU banking system.

Few officials thought this problem would arise. It was widely presumed that the capital markets would recover quickly, allowing distressed lenders to return to normal sources of funding. Instead, the credit crunch has worsened in Europe.

Not to miss out, Nationwide recently announced that it was setting up operations in Ireland, partly in order to be able to take advantage of ECB liquidity if necessary. Any bank can tap ECB funds if they have a registered branch in the eurozone, although collateral must be denominated in euros.

Jean-Pierre Roth, head of the Swiss National Bank, complained this week that lenders were getting into the habit of shopping for funds from those authorities that offer the best terms. The practice is playing havoc monetary policy.

“What we should avoid is some kind of arbitrage by banks, which say they are going to go to central bank X, instead of central bank Y, because conditions are more attractive,” he said.


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Bloomberg: Paulson continues weak USD policy

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Seems Paulson is still blocking foreign CBs from accumulating USD financial assets. This is a negative for the USD and a negative for US real terms of trade.

It does support US exports and reduces the need to add to domestic demand, even as US consumption remains low.

Yuan Rises Most in 3 Weeks After Paulson Calls for Appreciation

by Kim Kyoungwha and Belinda Cao

(Bloomberg) The yuan climbed by the most in three weeks after U.S. Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson urged China to let its currency appreciate to curb inflation and deter Congress from introducing trade penalties. Bonds gained.


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2008-08-13 UK News Highlights

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Highlights:

BoE Cuts Growth Forecasts, Jobless Climbs
U.K. Unemployment Rose the Most Since 1992 in July
Surge in credit card debt charge-offs
U.K. Homebuilders Fall as Unemployment Rise May Worsen Slump

 
 
Article snip:

BoE Cuts Growth Forecasts, Jobless Climbs (Bloomberg) The BoE cut its forecast for U.K. economic growth and held out the prospect of lower interest rates as unemployment rose the most in almost 16 years in July. Governor Mervyn King said the inflation rate will fall below the 2 % target in two years if policy makers keep the benchmark interest rate at 5 %.

But not if they cut is the implication as well.


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