Mosler Bonds for the ECB, and reasons why Greece will not be allowed to default

First, The ECB should turn the bonds it buys into Mosler bonds, by requiring the govt of issue to legally state that in the case of non payment, the bearer on demand can use those bonds for payment of taxes to the govt of issue.

The ECB holding Mosler bonds will shift the default option from the issuer to the ECB, as in the case of non payment,
the ECB would have the option to make it’s holdings available for sale to tax payers of that nation to offset their taxes.

Therefore, conversion to Mosler bonds will ensure that the ECB’s holdings of national govt debt are ‘money good’ without regard to external credit ratings, and give the ECB control over the default process.

Second, I see several substantial reasons Greece should not be allowed to default, which center around why it’s in the best interest of Germany for Greece not to default.

Sustaining Greece with ECB purchases of Greek debt costs German tax payers nothing.

The purchases are not inflationary because they are directly tied to reduced Greek spending and increased Greek taxes, which are both deflationary forces for the euro zone.

Funding Greece facilitates the purchase of German exports to Greece.

Funding Greece does not reward Greek bad behavior.
Instead, it exacts a price from Greece for its bad behavior.

With the ECB prospectively owning the majority of Greek debt, and, potentially, Greek Mosler bonds, Greece will be paying interest primarily to the ECB.

The funding of Greece by the ECB carries with it austerity measures that will bring the Greek budget into primary balance.

That means Greek taxes will be approximately equal to Greek govt expenditures, not including interest, which will then be largely payments to the ECB.

So if default is not allowed, the Greek govt spending will be limited to what it taxes, and additional tax revenues will be required as well to pay interest primarily to the ECB.

But if default is facilitated, Greece will still be required to spend only from tax revenues, but the debt forgiveness will mean substantially lower interest payments to the ECB than otherwise.

And while without default, it can be said that the holders of Greek bonds have been bailed out, the euro zone will be considering the following:

The ECB buys Greek bonds at a discount, indicating holders of those bonds have, on average, taken a loss.

The EU in general did not consider the purchase of Greek bonds as bad behavior that is rightly punished with a default.

In fact, it was EU regulation and guidelines that resulted in the initial purchases of Greek bonds by its banking system.

Therefore, I see the main reason Greece will not be allowed to default is that not allowing default serves the further purpose of Germany and the EU by every measure I can think of.

It sustains the transfer of control of fiscal policy to the ECB.
It’s deflationary which helps support the value of the currency.
It provides for an ongoing income stream from Greece to the ECB.

Note, however, that not long ago it was not widely recognized as it now is that the ECB can write the check without nominal limit.

Before the EU leaders recognized that fundamental of monetary operations, Greek default was serious consideration for financial reasons as it was believed the funding of Greece and subsequently the rest of the ‘weaker’ euro zone nations would threaten the entire euro zone’s ability to fund itself.

It is the realization that the ECB is the issuer of the currency, and is therefore not revenue constrained, that leads to the conclusion that not allowing Greece to default best serves public purpose.

(as always, feel free to distribute, repost, etc.)

Soft spot softening?

And if the US debt ceiling is not extended the drop in aggregate demand (spending) will take down most of the world economy:

Headlines:
Swiss Investor Sentiment Falls to Lowest in More Than 2 Years
Euro-Area Services, Manufacturing Gauge at Lowest Since 2009
Juncker Says Selective Default for Greece Is a Possibility
German output growth slowed sharply to its weakest in two years

and this:

China’s Manufacturing May Contract for First Time in a Year

July 21 (Bloomberg) — China’s manufacturing may contract for the first time in a year as output and new orders drop, preliminary data for a purchasing managers’ index indicated.

The gauge fell to 48.9 for July from a final reading of 50.1 for June, HSBC Holdings Plc and Markit Economics said in a statement today. The final July reading is due Aug. 1.

Today’s data adds to evidence that growth in the world’s second-largest economy is slowing on Premier Wen Jiabao’s campaign to tame consumer and property prices. The International Monetary Fund said in a report released late yesterday in Washington that risks for the economy include the threat of faster-than-expected inflation, a real-estate bubble, and bad loans from stimulus spending.

“The data are another sign that the monetary tightening measures that commenced last October are biting,” said Tim Condon, the Singapore-based head of Asia research at ING Groep NV. “If there is a concern that growth is slowing too much, past practice is that there will be a pause in the tightening.”

Stocks in China fell for a fourth day. The benchmark Shanghai Composite Index closed 1 percent lower at 2,765.89, the biggest decline since July 12.

The yuan rose to a 17-year high after the central bank set the strongest reference rate since a dollar peg was scrapped exactly six years ago. It was 0.12 percent stronger at 6.4516 per dollar at 3:28 p.m. in Shanghai, the biggest advance in a week, according to the China Foreign Exchange Trade System.

Cost Pressure

Lu Ting, a Hong Kong-based economist at Bank of America Merrill Lynch, said the HSBC survey may be “more downward- biased” than an official PMI because the average size of the businesses covered is smaller. Such companies “are under increasing pressure” from labor costs and to secure capital, Lu said. He advised investors to “not overly respond” to the data.

The government has raised interest rates five times since mid-October, boosted lenders’ reserve requirements to a record level and imposed curbs on property investment and home purchases.

Inflation, which has breached the government’s 2011 target of 4 percent every month this year, accelerated to 6.4 percent in June from a year earlier, the highest level in three years.

The IMF said in the report that China’s economy “remains on a solid footing, propelled by vigorous domestic and external demand.” The Washington-based lender’s 24 directors also “generally agreed” that a stronger yuan would help rebalance the China’s economy toward domestic demand.

Slowing Demand

HSBC’s preliminary index, known as the Flash PMI, is based on 85 percent to 90 percent of responses to a survey of executives in more than 400 companies. Output in July contracted at a faster rate, export orders shrank at a slower pace and the gauge of new orders dropped below 50, the dividing line between expansion and contraction, today’s data showed.

Manufacturing in some industries is being hit by slowing demand. Li Ning Co., China’s largest sportswear maker and retailer, said July 7 its first-half sales dropped by about 5 percent. The China Association of Automobile Manufacturers said July 8 that vehicle sales may increase about 5 percent this year, compared with an earlier estimate for 10 percent to 15 percent growth, due to lower demand for commercial autos.

The preliminary number has matched the final reading twice since HSBC began publishing the series in February. If it’s confirmed on Aug. 1, the index will have dropped to its lowest level since March 2009. It last fell below 50 in July 2010.

EU stance shifts on Greece default

Mosler bonds issued to both address current funding requirements and buy back discounted Greek govt debt would further enhance the credit worthiness of those bonds by further and substantially reducing Greek govt interest expense.

Interesting how the word now coming out on the French plan, which initially was greeted with a near celebration, is now entirely negative to the point where it’s being dismissed.

And default discussions now moving to the front burner is telling, as just last week that was proclaimed ‘out of the question’

EU stance shifts on Greece default

By Peter Spiegel and Patrick Jenkins

July 10 (FT) — European leaders are for the first time prepared to accept that Athens should default on some of its bonds as part of a new bail-out plan for Greece that would put the country’s overall debt levels on a sustainable footing.

The new strategy, to be discussed at a Brussels meeting of eurozone finance ministers on Monday, could also include new concessions by Greece’s European lenders to reduce Athens’ debt, such as further lowering interest rates on bail-out loans and a broad-based bond buyback programme. It also marks the possible abandonment of a French-backed plan for banks to roll-over their Greek debt.

“The basic goal is to reduce the debt burden of Greece both through actions of the private sector and the public sector,” said one senior European official involved in negotiations.

Officials cautioned the new tack was still in the early stages, and final details were not expected until late summer. But if the strategy were agreed, it would mark a significant shift in the 18-month struggle to contain the eurozone debt crisis.

Until now, European leaders have been reluctant to back any plan categorised as a default for fear it could lead to a flight by investors from all bonds issued by peripheral eurozone countries – including Italy and Spain, the eurozone’s third and fourth largest economies.

Yields on Italian bonds, which move inversely to prices, rose sharply last week due to the Greek uncertainty. Senior European leaders – including Jean-Claude Trichet, European Central Bank chief, and Jean-Claude Junker, head of the euro group – are to meet top European Union officials ahead of Monday’s finance ministers’ gathering amidst growing fears of contagion.

A German-led group of creditor countries has for weeks been attempting to get “voluntary” help from private bondholders to delay repayment of Greek bonds, a move they hoped would lower Greece’s overall debt while avoiding a default.

But in recent days, debt rating agencies warned any attempt to get bondholders to participate would represent a selective default. Rather than abandon bondholder buy-ins, however, several European leaders have decided to return to a German-backed plan to push current Greek debt holders to swap their holdings for new, longer-maturing bonds.

The move essentially scraps a French proposal unveiled last month, which many analysts believed would only add to Greek debt levels by offering expensive incentives for banks that hold Greek debt to roll over their maturing bonds.

Officials said the Institute of International Finance, the group representing large banks holding Greek debt, has gradually moved away from the French plan and begun to embrace elements of the German plan.

“There’s some convergence in the banking community towards a more realistic plan than the French plan, which was out of this world,” said the senior European official. The plan criticised as being self-serving for the banks.

According to executives involved in the IIF talks, banks have pushed for a Greek bond buyback plan in return for agreeing to a restructuring programme, arguing that only if Greece’s overall debt were reduced could a sustainable recovery occur.

European officials said there was support for the proposal in government circles. The plan, originally pushed by German investors, including Deutsche Bank, could see as much as 10 per cent of outstanding Greek debt repurchased on the open market.

Since Greek bonds are currently trading below face value, such purchases would essentially be a voluntary “haircut”, since bondholders would accept payment for far less than the bonds are worth.

It remains unclear how a buyback would be financed, however. The European Commission has long pushed for the eurozone’s €440bn bail-out fund to be used for buybacks, but Berlin blocked the proposal.

The Mosler Plan for Greece

The Mosler Plan, as previously posted on this website, is now making the rounds in Europe as an alternative to the French Plan that is currently under serious consideration:

Abstract
The following is an outline for a proposed new Greek government bond issue to provide all required medium term euro funding for Greece on very attractive terms.

The new bond issue includes an addition to the default provisions that eliminates the risk of loss to investors. The language added to the default provisions states that while in default, and only in the case of default, these transferable securities can be used directly, by the bearer on demand, at face value plus accrued interest, for payment of any debts, including taxes, owed to the Greek government.

By eliminating the risk of loss, Greece will be able to independently fund all required financial obligations in the market place for the foreseeable future. The immediate benefits are both reduced interest costs that substantially contribute to deficit reduction, and the elimination of the need for the funding assistance from the European Union and the IMF.

Introduction- Restoring National Sovereignty
Current institutional arrangements have resulted in Greece being faced with escalating interest costs when it attempts to fund itself in the market place, to the point where timely funding is not currently available without external assistance. This requirement for external assistance to avoid default has further resulted in a loss of sovereignty, with the EU and IMF offering funding only on their approval of deficit reduction plans by the Greek government that meet specific requirements. Compliance with these demands from the EU and IMF not only include tax increases, spending cuts, and privatizations, but also include aggressive time lines for achieving their deficit reduction goals. It is also understood by all parties that the immediate near term consequences of these imposed austerity measures will include further slowing of the economy, and rising unemployment.

Greece will restore national sovereignty, and regain control of the process of full compliance with the general EU requirements for all member nations, only when it restores its financial independence. Financial independence will allow Greece to again be master of its own destiny, on an equal basis with the other EU members. And the lower interest rate that result(s) from this proposed bond issue will itself be a substantial down payment on the required deficit reduction, easing the requirements for tax increases, spending cuts, and privatizations.

While this proposal restores Greek national sovereignty, and eases funding burdens, we recognize that it is only the first step in restoring the Greek economy. Even with funding independence and low interest rates the Greek government still faces a monumental task in bringing Greece into full compliance with EU requirements and restoring economic output and employment. However, it should also be recognized that financial independence and low cost funding are the critical first steps to long term success.

The Bond Issue- No Risk of Financial Loss
Market based funding at the lowest possible interest rates requires investors who understand there is no ultimate risk of financial loss, and that the promise to pay principal and interest by the issuer is credible. To be credible, a borrower must have the means to meet all contractual euro obligations on a timely basis. For Greece this has meant investors must have the confidence that Greece can generate sufficient revenues through taxing and borrowing to repay its debts.

The credit worthiness of any loan begins with the default provisions. While there may be unconditional promises to pay, investors nonetheless value what their rights are in the event the borrower does not pay. Corporate debt often includes rights to specific collateral, priorities in specific revenues, and other credit enhancing support.

The new proposed Greek bond issue, with its provision that in the event of default the bonds can be used at face value, plus interest, for the payment of taxes by the bearer on demand, gives the bond holder absolute assurance that full maturity value in euro can always be achieved. And with this absolute assurance that these new securities are necessarily ‘money good’ the ability to refinance is established which dramatically reduces the risk of the default provisions actually being triggered. And, again, should there be a default event, the investor will still get full value for his investment as the entire euro value of the defaulted securities can be used at any time for the payment of Greek taxes. So while this discussion concerns the case of default, the removal of the risk of loss means there will always be demand for them at near risk free market interest rates, and that the default discussion is, for all practical purposes, hypothetical.

These new Greek government bonds will be of particular interest to banks, which, again, encourages bank ownership, which makes default that much more remote a possibility. This is because, in the case of default, a bank holding any of these defaulted securities will be able to use them for payment of taxes on behalf of bank clients (using that bank for payment of their taxes). Under these circumstances, a bank depositor client making payment of euro would, in effect, simultaneously buy the defaulted securities from the bank and use them to pay the Greek government taxes due. Again, the fact that the bank would be fully paid for its defaulted securities in the process of depositors paying their taxes means there will be no default in the first place, as these favorable consequences mean there will be continuous demand for new securities of this type at competitive market interest rates, to facilitate all Greek refinancing requirements.

The new ‘money good’ Greek bonds will be attractive to all global investors, both private and public. This will include international banks, insurance companies, pension funds, and other private investors, as well as sovereign wealth funds and foreign central banks which are accumulating euro reserves.

Fiscal Responsibility
As a member in good standing of the European Union, Greece, like all the member nations, is required to be in full compliance of all EU requirements. Therefore, while this proposal will restore national sovereignty, financial independence, and lower interest rates for Greece, austerity measures will continue to be required to bring Greece into EU compliance. However, Greece will gain substantial flexibility with regard to timing and other specific detail, and will be able to work to achieve its goals in an organized, orderly manner, without the continued pressures of default risk and without the specific terms and conditions currently being demanded by the EU and the IMF. Nor will the ECB be required to buy Greek bonds in the market place, obviating those demands as well.

Greece on the slippery slope

First, I think there isn’t enough political or popular support to leave the euro and go back to the drachma.

As previously discussed, it’s not obvious to the population or the political leadership that there is anything wrong with the euro itself.

Instead, it probably seems obvious the problem is the result of irresponsible leadership, and now they are all paying the price.

So staying with the euro, Greece has two immediate choices:

1. Negotiate the best austerity terms and conditions they can, and continue to muddle through.

2. Don’t accept them and default

Accepting the terms of the austerity package offered means some combination of spending cuts, tax hikes, assets sales, etc. that still leaves a sizable deficit for the next few years, with a glide path to some presumably sustainable level of deficit spending.

Defaulting means no more borrowing at all for most likely a considerable period of time, which means at least for a while they will only be able to spend the actual tax revenue they take in, which means immediately going to a 0 deficit.

What matters to Greece, on a practical level, is how large a deficit they are allowed to run. This makes default a lot more painful than any austerity package that allows for the funding of at least some size deficit.

Therefore it’s makes the most sense for Greece to accept the best package they can negotiate, rather than to refuse and default.

Additionally, the funding Greece will need to keep going is probably funding to pay for goods and services from Germany and some of the other euro member nations.

In other words, if Germany wants to get paid for its stream of exports to Greece it must approve some kind of funding package.

Reminds me of a an old story Woody Allen popularized a while back:

Doctor: So what’s the problem?

Patient: It’s my brother. He thinks he’s a chicken.

Doctor: Have you tried to talk to him about it?

Patient: No

Doctor: Why not?

Patient: Well, we need the eggs

Likewise the euro zone needs the eggs, and so the most likely path continues to be some manner of ECB funding of the banking system and the national govt’s, as needed, last minute, kicking and screaming about how they need an exit strategy, etc. etc. etc. And the unspoken pressure relief valve is inflation, with a falling euro leading the march. It’s unspoken because the ECB has a single mandate of price stability, which is not compatible with a continuously falling euro, and because a strong euro is an important part of the union’s ideology. But a weak euro that adjusts the price level, as a practical matter, is nonetheless the only pressure relief valve they have for their debt issues in general. And, also as previously discussed, it looks like market forces may be conspiring to move it all in that direction.

Euro Central Banks Step Up Bond Buying, Traders Say

Euro Central Banks Step Up Bond Buying, Traders Say

By Paul Dobson

June 29 (Bloomberg) — Euro-region central banks stepped up purchases of Greek, Portuguese and Irish government securities today, traders said, deepening efforts to support the region’s bond market in the wake of the sovereign-debt crisis.

The purchases focused on maturities of five years and below, with some buying interest also shown for longer-maturity Greek bonds, said the traders, who declined to be identified because the transactions are confidential. The extra yield, or spread, investors demand to hold the nations’ securities instead of benchmark German debt narrowed.

The European Central Bank took the unprecedented decision to start buying government bonds last month to help the European Union contain the Greek debt crisis. The ECB said yesterday it bought 4 billion euros ($5 billion) of bonds last week, taking the total purchases as of June 25 to 55 billion euros. Greek debt spreads had been widening, approaching their levels before the EU rescue was announced in early May, amid speculation funds that track bond indexes were selling the debt.

Central banks “are more active than they have been of late,” said Huw Worthington, a fixed-income strategist at Barclays Capital in London. “There has been a lot of volatility in a lot of the spreads, and some concerns of selling ahead of the month end.”

Greek two-year notes rose, sending the yield down 41 basis points to 10.19 percent as of 3:43 p.m. in London. The yield spread with German two-year notes fell 39 basis points to 1001 basis points. The yield on 10-year Greek bonds fell 41 basis points to 10.57 percent.

Greek securities will leave indexes managed by Citigroup Inc., Barclays Plc and the Markit iBoxx index at the end of this month after they were downgraded to junk by Moody’s Investors Service, potentially triggering sales by managers in so-called passive funds.

The Irish two-year bond yield fell 11 basis points to 2.88 percent and equivalent-maturity Portuguese yields dropped nine basis points to 3.61 percent.

ECB Purchases

ECB purchases of govt bonds for last week amounted to EUR 4 billion,
matching previous week and bringing total to EUR 55 billion:

Week     Purchases    Total
1           16.5            16.5
2           10.0            26.5
3           8.5              35.0
4           5.5              40.5
5           6.5              47.0
6           4.0              51.0
7           4.0              55.0

That’s a lot of greek bonds, presumably the ECB is buying enough to support rates sufficiently so they can refi themselves.