Category Archives: Inflation

Fiscal Package

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Yes, at the better end of expectations, but still a small net tax increase as of year end. No actual relief for anyone.

And that’s best case. They haven’t actually passed it yet.

Austerity still going strong in the euro zone and the UK.

And China still working on slowing things down to fight inflation.

Oil prices are up which will slow things down some but not generate enough inflation for the Fed to care.

So doesn’t look like anything out there to move the needle on growth or inflation enough to get the Fed to hike any time soon.


Karim writes:

Definitely at the better end of expectations, for both the tax cuts and the unemployment benefits…

(CNN) — President Barack Obama presented congressional Democratic leaders Monday with a proposed deal with Republicans that would extend Bush-era tax cuts for two years and unemployment benefits for 13 months while also setting the estate tax at 35% for two years on inheritances worth more than $5 million, a senior Democratic source told CNN.

The deal also includes a temporary 2% reduction in the payroll tax to replace Obama’s “making work pay” tax credit from the 2009 economic stimulus package for lower-income Americans, the senior Democratic source said.

As currently crafted, the deal would prohibit amendments by either party, according to the source, who spoke on condition of not being identified by name.

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comments on inflation in China

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When the western educated offspring do what they’ve been taught to fight inflation it can all go very wrong.
Their main tool, whether they know it or not, directly or indirectly, is higher interest rates, which only directly makes the inflation worse
through the cost channel and interest income channel, which further weakens the currency/raises costs through the import channel as well.

And at the same time inflation tends to tighten up fiscal balance that can cause a crash.

Also, I received this comment today:

“The Chinese government will take every opportunity to blame foreigners for inflation (and any other problem that crops up) this a well worn strategy.

It is widely believed in China that QE2 has caused the current increase in inflation. The reality is that inflation is being caused by an increase in energy costs. Also because agriculture now uses much more energy than it once did as a result of modernization, food prices are now largely a derivative of energy prices. Taken together, food and energy make up most of the increase in the CPI.

Some more data points: I spoke with a cab driver here in Shanghai yesterday about the rumored across the board fare increase from 12 to 15 yuan and he said if it occurs it will be to offset higher energy costs. There is also news that several major domestic oil producers have been caught selling at prices above the allowed level.”

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Inflation in China

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What I see is more evidence of an inflation problem in China that they are now trying to blame on something other than themselves to prevent the historical regime change from inflations of the past.

The problem is, of course, the don’t fundamentally understand how a currency works, which reduces the odds of being able to reverse their inflation without a recession.

Beijing’s Focus on Food Prices Ignores Broader Inflation Risk

By Keith Bradsher

November 17 (NYT) — Zhou Xiaochuan, the governor of the central bank, had said earlier on Tuesday that the amount of money racing through the global economy was putting pressure on emerging economies that want to control inflation. And Yao Jian, a commerce ministry spokesman, said at a press conference on Tuesday that the government would tighten scrutiny of foreign investment so as to prevent too much money from pouring into China as foreign investors seek higher returns than are currently available in the West.

Imposing price controls and other administrative controls on the Chinese economy runs counter to the steps recommended by many Western experts. They have suggested that China should further deregulate its economy, let the renminbi appreciate and otherwise rely on market forces to tame inflation.

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ECB, ‘the euro’s monetary guardian’, confirms bond purchase strategy

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Yes, as discussed, looks like the ECB continues to facilitate funding by continuing the same bond purchase strategy, along with dictating terms and conditions.

For the member nations, compliance means continued funding.

Continued funding + compliance with deflationary austerity measures + no ECB buying of fx = euro strong enough to work to keep net exports from increasing.

And the possibility that the ECB decides to change course remains evidenced by the steep yield curves of member nations.

Trichet hints at bond purchase rethink

By Ralph Atkins in Frankfurt and Richard Milne and David Oakley in London

Published: November 30 2010 18:52 | Last updated: November 30 2010 18:52

Jean-Claude Trichet, European Central Bank president, has left open the possibility of the bank significantly expanding its government bond purchases and warned markets not to underestimate Europe’s determination to resolve the escalating eurozone crisis.

The hint that the ECB could recalibrate its response to the unfolding crisis came as the premiums that Italy and Spain pay over Germany benchmark interest rates hit fresh highs since the launch of the euro. The euro’s monetary guardian had already stepped up purchases of Portuguese bonds, traders reported.

Nov-30

The ECB’s bond purchase programme has been controversial within its governing council since its launch in May, with Axel Weber, president of Germany’s Bundesbank, voicing his opposition publicly.

But the pace at which the crisis has spread has altered the debate within the ECB, which could justify stepping up its intervention by arguing governments’ borrowing costs were far out of line with fundamentals, signalling dysfunctioning markets.

Speaking in the European parliament on Tuesday, Mr Trichet would not comment “at this stage” on the bond programme “in the light of the current situation”. But the programme was “on-going” and decisions on its future would be taken by the 22-strong governing council, which next meets on Thursday. He also refused to rule out the possibility of eurozone governments issuing joint bonds, although the ECB was not endorsing such a step.

Since May, the ECB has spent just €67bn under its bond purchase programme. Financial markets, however, see the ECB increasingly as the only institution with pockets deep enough pockets to ease the crisis.

The ECB thinks financial markets are badly mis-pricing risk. Mr Trichet said that “pundits are under-estimating the determination of governments”. Eurozone growth was proving surprisingly strong, and Ireland’s bail-out at the weekend had shown the EU was capable of responding to crisis. “I don’t think that financial stability in the eurozone, given what I know, could really be called into question,” he said.

Willem Buiter, chief economist at Citi, said: “The involvement of the ECB is likely to rise, despite its statements – and probably wishes – to the contrary.” He argued recently that the ECB backed by governments could give the new European bail-out fund a €2,000bn loan.

Gary Jenkins, head of fixed income at Evolution Securities, argued the ECB could try “real quantitative easing” through purchases of €1,000bn-€2,000bn of bonds. “It might be politically unpalatable. But it would be an immediate way of creating a firebreak.”

Mr Trichet has insisted repeatedly that the ECB is not engaged in “quantitative easing” as it has withdrawn liquidity from the financial system equal to the amounts it has spent on bonds, neutralizing any inflationary risks. That policy would almost certainly continue under an expanded scheme.

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euro update and why no one is leaving (yet)

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As before, all that’s been done in euro land is highly deflationary.

No new euro will be spent by any govt as a result of the latest goings ons.

In fact, it’s more austerity.

And the ECB continues to do just enough to keep it all muddling through (including dictating that the new facilities be set up and activated) as it dictates terms and conditions.

And with euro zone gdp still growing (modestly) austerity still has room to slow growth before it sends it into reverse.

So why isn’t there more clamor to leave?

Simple, it’s not obvious that the currency arrangements per se are the problem.

Inflation is reasonably low, and interest rates are low, so (to the uninformed, non MMT world) how can that be the problem?

For most, the problem is obvious- same old story- their corrupt, worthless, self serving govts grossly over spent, dished it out to their banker buddies, insiders, etc., on most everything they were involved in, and now the entire nation is paying the price.

And thank goodness there were market forces in place to shut them down and stop them from turning it all into a Weimar scenario!

And this time at least they haven’t had the usual massive inflation where everyone loses their purchasing power, including those still working.

For example, those in Spain with savings can buy a lot more house than before.

The ‘good’ (prudence is considered a virtue) have sort of been rewarded.

etc.

And look how good Germany has it.

Unemployment down to 7%, driven by exports, no inflation, and they have near total fiscal domination/control (via the ECB) over the other members where they get to force austerity.

What more could they ask for?

It’s their dream come true.

So it could soon be back to strong euro, slowing growth, muddling through, until they push too far.

But even negative growth is sustainable without insolvency for as long as the ECB keeps funding it all.

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euro endgame

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On Sun, Nov 28, 2010 at 7:24 PM, wrote:

I’ve tried to think of a happy ending here and there simply isn’t one.

That’s like thinking for the endgame of the US if you believe the federal budget needs to be balanced. There isn’t one in that case either.

The end game is always for the fiscal authority to run a deficit. Which means the ECB in the euro zone.

They won’t let the Euro collapse which means Germany leaving is out of the question. But Germany won’t just become the funding source for all of these periphery nations.

Right, it has to be the ECB. Just like Texas can’t fund the other states.

I think they should just vote to remove Ireland and Greece with a partial debt restructuring. They’d actually be doing them a huge favor while also avoiding massive collateral damage in the banking system.

Likewise, the ECB has to fund the deposit insurance to make it credible and workable.

Then they could target their efforts on saving Spain and the Euro.

Problem is, they all need to be saved.

As credit sensitive entities like the US states their debt to gdp ratios need to be below 20% to be ‘stand alone.’

The reason Luxembourg is that low is because they never did have their own currency, and so never could get higher than where they were.

The other national govts had their own currencies before joining the euro, and therefore had deficits appropriate for being the currency issuer, which is equal to non govt savings desires. Problem was they joined the euro, turned over the currency management to the ECB, and kept their old debt ratios. The informed way to have merged would have been to have the ECB take over their national debts, and let them start clean. But it happened the way it happened and now they have to move forward from here.

Ireland and Greece go it alone, the world panics for a few months and then everyone realizes that we’re all better off. Then the Euro continues to exist until it causes another crisis in 15 years (assuming no central funding system is created)….

They already have a central funding system in place- the ECB buying nat govt bonds in the secondary markets. While far from my first choice on how to do things for a variety of economic and political reasons, it does function to keep member nations solvent, for as long as the ECB keeps doing it.

My proposal remains the most sensible but not even a consideration- per capita ECB annual distributions to the govts to pay down debt of the member nations beginning with an immediate 10% of GDP distribution. To do this they first have to understand why it’s not inflationary, which means they have to understand inflation on the demand side is a function of spending, and the distribution does not increase govt spending.

That’s a big leap from their inflation expectations theory of inflation. They believe that anything that increases people’s expectation of inflation is what actually causes inflation. And they believe that because they have still failed to recognize that the currency itself is a (simple) public monopoly.

That means the price level is a function of prices paid by the govt of issue when it spends, whether it knows it or not, and not a function of expectations.

So while in fact it is the economy that needs the govt’s funds to pay its taxes, and therefore the economy is ‘price taker’, they instead believe that it is the govt that needs the economy’s funds to be able to spend.

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FMOC Minutes

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New Forecasts (central tendency and range of forecasts) in Table 1 below: Long-Run inflation forecast of 1.6-2.0% is basically their target; 2011 and 2012 unemployment forecasts revised up by 0.6-0.7%. Note that low-end of GDP forecast for 2011 is 2.5%. This is above many other forecasters.


Interesting Observations from FRB Staff; Outlook revised up, basically on assumption of improved financial conditions; and in turn inflation higher due to less slack and weaker $

The staff revised up its forecast for economic activity in 2011 and 2012. In light of asset market developments over the intermeeting period, which in large part appeared to reflect heightened expectations among investors that the Federal Reserve would undertake additional purchases of longer-term securities, the November forecast was conditioned on lower long-term interest rates, higher stock prices,
and a lower foreign exchange value of the dollar than was the staff’s previous forecast.

The downward pressure on inflation from slack in resource utilization was expected to be slightly less than previously projected, and prices of imported goods were anticipated to rise somewhat faster.

FOMC Members-Recap of debate of pros/cons of LSAPs; sizing LSAPs; and setting an inflation target, and setting a long-term interest rate target

Although participants considered it quite unlikely that the economy would slide back into recession, some noted that continued slow growth and high levels of resource slack could leave the economic expansion vulnerable to negative shocks. In the absence of such shocks, and assuming appropriate monetary policy

They do assume what they do has quite a bit of influence over the outcomes.

participants’ economic projections generally showed growth picking up to a moderate pace and the unemployment rate declining somewhat next year. Participants generally expected growth to strengthen further and unemployment to decline somewhat more rapidly in 2012 and 2013.

Several noted that the recent rate of output growth, if continued, would more likely be associated with an increase than a decrease in the unemployment rate.

While underlying inflation remained subdued, meeting participants generally saw only small odds of deflation, given the stability of longer-term inflation expectations

They remain steeped in inflation expectations theory as previously discussed.

and the anticipated recovery in economic activity.

Most saw the risks to growth as broadly balanced, but many saw the risks as tilted to the downside. Similarly, a majority saw the risks to inflation as balanced; some, however, saw downside risks predominating while a couple saw inflation risks as tilted to the upside.

Participants also differed in their assessments of the likely benefits and costs associated with a program of purchasing additional longer-term securities in an effort to provide additional monetary stimulus, though most saw the benefits as exceeding the costs in current circumstances. Most participants judged that a program of purchasing additional longer-term securities would put downward pressure on longer-term interest rates and boost asset prices; some observed that it could also lead to a reduction in the foreign exchange value of the dollar. Most expected these changes in financial conditions to help promote a somewhat stronger recovery in output and employment while also helping return inflation, over time, to levels consistent with the Committee’s mandate. In addition, several participants argued that the stimulus provided by additional securities purchases would help protect against further disinflation and the small probability that the U.S. economy could fall into persistent deflation–an outcome that they thought would be very costly. Some participants, however, anticipated that additional purchases of longer-term securities would have only a limited effect on the pace of the recovery; they judged that the economy’s slow growth largely reflected the effects of factors that were not likely to respond to additional monetary policy stimulus and thought that additional action would be warranted only if the outlook worsened and the odds of deflation increased materially. Some participants noted concerns that additional expansion of the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet could put unwanted downward pressure on the dollar’s value in foreign exchange markets. Several participants saw a risk that a further increase in the size of the Federal Reserve’s asset portfolio, with an accompanying increase in the supply of excess reserves and in the monetary base, could cause an undesirably large increase in inflation.

This flies in the face of any understanding of banking and actual monetary operations, as well as recent Fed research.

However, it was noted that the Committee had in place tools that would enable it to remove policy accommodation quickly if necessary to avoid an undesirable increase in inflation.


Participants expressed a range of views about the potential costs and benefits of quantifying the Committee’s interpretation of its statutory mandate to promote price stability by adopting a numerical inflation objective or a target path for the price level. In the end, participants noted that the longer-run projections contained in the Summary of Economic Projections, which is released once per quarter in conjunction with the minutes of four of the Committee’s meetings, convey considerable information about participants’ assessments of their statutory objectives. Participants discussed whether it might be useful for the Chairman to hold occasional press briefings to provide more detailed information to the public regarding the Committee’s assessment of the outlook and its policy decision making than is included in Committee’s short post-meeting statements.


In their discussion of the relative merits of smaller and more frequent adjustments versus larger and less frequent adjustments in the Federal Reserve’s intended securities holdings, participants generally agreed that large adjustments had been appropriate when economic activity was declining sharply in response to the financial crisis. In current circumstances, however, most saw advantages to a more incremental approach that would involve smaller changes in the Committee’s holdings of securities calibrated to incoming data.


Finally, participants discussed the potential benefits and costs of setting a target for a term interest rate. Some noted that targeting the yield on a term security could be an effective way to reduce longer-term interest rates and thus provide additional stimulus to the economy. But participants also noted potentially large risks, including the risk that the Federal Reserve might find itself buying undesirably large amounts of the relevant security in order to keep its yield close to the target level.

No mention at all of the interest income channels, which act to reduce interest income in the economy as rates fall.

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European Debt/GDP ratios – the core issue

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Review:

Financially, the euro zone member nations have put themselves in the position of the US States.

Their spending is revenue constrained. They must tax or borrow to fund their spending.

The ECB is in the position of the Fed. They are not revenue constrained. Operationally, they spend by changing numbers on their own spread sheet.

Applicable history:

The US economy’s annual federal deficits of over 8% of gdp, Japan’s somewhere near there, and the euro zone is right up there as well.

And they are still far too restrictive as evidenced by the unemployment rates and excess capacity in general.

So why does the world require high levels of deficit spending to achieve fiscal neutrality?

It’s the deadly innocent fraud, ‘We need savings to have money for investment’ as outlined in non technical language in my book.

The problem is that no one of political consequence understands that monetary savings is nothing more than the accounting record of investment.

And, therefore, it’s investment that ’causes’ savings.

Not only don’t we need savings to fund investment, there is no such thing.

But all believe we do. And they also believe we need more investment to drive the economy (another misconception of causations, but that’s another story for another post).

So the US, Japan, and the euro zone has set up extensive savings incentives, which, for all practical purposes, function as taxes, serving to remove aggregate demand (spending power). These include tax advantaged pension funds, insurance and other corporate reserves, etc.

This means someone has to spend more than their income or the output doesn’t get sold, and it’s business that goes into debt funding unsold inventory. Unsold inventory kicks in a downward spiral, with business cutting back, jobs and incomes lost, lower sales, etc. until there is sufficient spending in excess of incomes to stabilize things.

This spending more than income has inevitably comes from automatic fiscal stabilizers- falling revenues and increased transfer payments due to the slowdown- that automatically cause govt to spend more than its income.

And so here we are:

The stabilization at the current output gap has largely come from the govt deficit going up due to the automatic stabilizers, though with a bit of help from proactive govt fiscal adjustments.

Note that low interest rates, both near 0 short term rates and lower long rates helped down a bit by QE, have not done much to cause consumers and businesses to spend more than their incomes- borrow to spend- and support GDP through the credit expansion channel.

I’ve always explained why that always happened by pointing to the interest income channels. Lower rates shift income from savers to borrowers, and the economy is a net saver. So, overall, lower rates reduce interest income for the economy. The lower rates also tend to shift interest income from savers to banks, as net interest margins for lenders seem to widen as rates fall. Think of the economy as going to the bank for a loan. Interest rates are a bit lower which helps, but the economy’s income is down. Which is more important? All the bankers I’ve ever met will tell you the lower income is the more powerful influence.

Additionally, banks and other lenders are necessarily pro cyclical. During a slowdown with falling collateral values and falling incomes it’s only prudent to be more cautious. Banks do strive to make loans only to those who can pay them back, and investors do strive to make investments that will provide positive returns.

The only sector that can act counter cyclically without regard to its own ability to fund expenditures is the govt that issues the currency.

So what’s been happening over the last few decades?

The need for govt to tax less than it spends (spend more than its income) has been growing as income going to the likes of pension funds and corporate reserves has been growing beyond the ability of the private sector to expand its credit driven spending.

And most recently it’s taken extraordinary circumstances to drive private credit expansion sufficiently for full employment conditions.

For example, In the late 90’s it took the dot com boom with the funding of impossible business plans to bring unemployment briefly below 4%, until that credit expansion became unsustainable and collapsed, with a major assist from the automatic fiscal stabilizers acting to increase govt revenues and cut spending to the point of a large, financial equity draining budget surplus.

And then, after rate cuts did nothing, and the slowdown had caused the automatic fiscal stabilizers had driven the federal budget into deficit, the large Bush proactive fiscal adjustment in 2003 further increased the federal deficit and the economy began to modestly improve. Again, this got a big assist from an ill fated private sector credit expansion- the sub prime fraud- which again resulted in sufficient spending beyond incomes to bring unemployment down to more acceptable levels, though again all to briefly.

My point is that the ‘demand leakages’ from tax advantaged savings incentives have grown to the point where taxes need to be lot lower relative to govt spending than anyone seems to understand.

And so the only way we get anywhere near a good economy is with a dot com boom or a sub prime fraud boom.

Never with sound, proactive policy.

Especially now.

For the US and Japan, the door is open for taxes to be that much lower for a given size govt. Unfortunately, however, the politicians and mainstream economists believe otherwise.

They believe the federal deficits are too large, posing risks they can’t specifically articulate when pressed, though they are rarely pressed by the media who believe same.

The euro zone, however has that and much larger issues as well.

The problem is the deficits from the automatic stabilizers are at the member nation level, and therefore they do result in member nation insolvency.

In other words, the demand leakages (pension fund contributions, etc.) require offsetting deficit spending that’s beyond the capabilities of the national govts to deficit spend.

The only possible answer (as I’ve discussed in previous writings, and gotten ridiculed for on CNBC) is for the ECB to directly or indirectly ‘write the check’ as has been happening with the ECB buying of member nation debt in the secondary markets.

But this is done only ‘kicking and screaming’ and not as a matter of understanding that this is a matter of sound fiscal policy.

So while the ECB’s buying is ongoing, so are the noises to somehow ‘exit’ this policy.

I don’t think there is an exit to this policy without replacing it with some other avenue for the required ECB check writing, including my continuing alternative proposals for ECB distributions, etc.

The other, non ECB funding proposals could buy some time but ultimately don’t work. Bringing in the IMF is particularly curious, as the IMF’s euros come from the euro members themselves, as do the euro from the other funding schemes. All that the core member nations funding the periphery does is amplify the solvency issues of the core, which are just as much in ponzi (dependent on further borrowing to pay off debt) as all the rest.

So what we are seeing in the euro zone is a continued muddling through with banks and govts in trouble, deposit insurance and member govts kept credible only by the ECB continuing to support funding of both banks and the national govts, and a highly deflationary policy of ECB imposed ‘fiscal responsibility’ that’s keeping a lid on real economic growth.

The system will not collapse as long as the ECB keeps supporting it, and as they have taken control of national govt finances with their imposed ‘terms and conditions’ they are also responsible for the outcomes.

This means the ECB is unlikely to pull support because doing so would be punishing itself for the outcomes of its own imposed policies.

Is the euro going up or down?

Many cross currents, as is often the case. My conviction is low at the moment, but that could change with events.

The euro policies continue to be deflationary, as ECB purchases are not yet funding expanded member nation spending. But this will happen when the austerity measures cause deficits to rise rather than fall. But for now the ECB imposed terms and conditions are keeping a lid on national govt spending.

The US is going through its own deflationary process, as fiscal is tightening slowly with the modest GDP growth. Also the mistaken presumption that QE is somehow inflationary and weakens the currency has resulted in selling of the dollar for the wrong reasons, which seems to be reversing.

China is dealing with its internal inflation which can reverse capital flows and result in a reduction of buying both dollars and euro. It can also lead to lower demand for commodities and lower prices, which probably helps the dollar more than the euro. And a slowing China can mean reduced imports from Germany which would hurt the euro some.

Japan is the only nation looking at fiscal expansion, however modest. It’s also sold yen to buy dollars, which helps the dollar more than the euro.

The UK seems to be tightening fiscal more rapidly than even the euro zone or the US, helping sterling to over perform medium term.

All considered, looks to me like dollar strength vs most currencies, perhaps less so vs the euro than vs the yen or commodity currencies. But again, not much conviction at the moment, beyond liking short UK cds vs long Germany cds….

Happy turkey!

(Next year in Istanbul, to see where it all started…)

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Fighting inflation in China

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Inflation is a political problem, especially in China, where it can mean regime change.

Inflation itself is not so much an economic problem- it doesn’t hurt growth and employment.
But fighting inflation can very much hurt growth and employment.

The first thing the monetarists do is hike rates, which actually more likely makes inflation worse through the cost and interest income channels.

But inflation also generally causes fiscal tightening as nominal incomes, spending, and therefore taxes of all kinds
tend to increase faster than govt spending. (In the US, for example, this led to Carter’s small surplus in 1979.)

And the budget deficit falling as a % of GDP works against domestic demand.
As does the various types of credit controls govts sometimes resort to.

The currency depreciates but trade probably doesn’t go anywhere as costs go up pretty much lock step.

So in the case of China, growth probably slows with the relative fiscal tightening and state lending curbs.

The currency could ‘naturally’ fall and if it does, China will be accused of using it as tool to support exports, so it may intervene some and spend some if its reserves to support it at times.

Not a major problem for the US, but very problematic for the euro zone even if China just stops buying euro debt, never mind sell some to support its own currency.

And, China may be an important factor in commodity prices…

All looking good for the dollar, which is still probably way oversold due to unwarranted QE fears.

Looking ok for bonds as well, not so good for stocks.

(Yes, this post is a bit forced and preliminary.
Haven’t been able to quite see it all through yet.
More later as things develop.)

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