Category Archives: Greece

From David Zervos

Posted on by

From David Zervos:

(BN) *ISDA SAYS CREDIT EVENT HAS OCCURRED WITH RESPECT TO GREECE


(BN) *GREECE CREDIT SWAPS AUCTION TO BE `EXPEDITED,’ ISDA SAYS

“I’ve always said publicly that default is out of the question,” – Trichet

“There will be no default.” – Rehn

“People fail to see the costs to both Greece and the eurozone of a restructuring: the cost to its citizens, the cost to its access to markets. If Greece restructures, why on earth would people invest in other peripheral economies? It would be a fundamental break to the unity of the eurozone.” – Papaconstantinou

Its been a great 2 years watching this thing unfold and listening to lie after lie from European officials. While it has been a calm response in global markets today, there is some justice in the world. Those folks who bought Greek bonds lost their shirts – both accrual and mark to market folks. This is a clear victory for the Euroskeptics and I have no doubt that we will see the letters “PSI” in the European headlines once again.

Share

Rest of Europe Shouldn’t Follow Greek Bailout: Dallara

Posted on by

In regard to the euro zone officials insisting there will be no further haircuts:

‘The lady doth protest too much, me thinks.’

Mr. Dallara and the rest of the euro mob have as yet not come up with any reason any one nation wouldn’t be better off, as evidenced by Greece, with a whopping big tax on bond holders vs the usual tax hikes and spending cuts otherwise demanded.

Rest of Europe Shouldn’t Follow Greek Bailout: Dallara

By Margo D. Beller

Mar 9 (CNBC) — Charles Dallara, who represented bond holders in the Greek debt talks, told CNBC Friday he doesn’t expect other troubled EU countries such as Italy, Portugal and Ireland to need a similar bond swap.

“I would strongly discourage other governments, other peoples of Europe from going this route,” he said, adding the Greek situation “cast a cloud over the entire euro zone.”

None of these other countries “have the same extraordinary high levels of debt and deficits and none of them have quite the same distortions in the economic system. They are on the right path and should maintain the path of reform.”

Greece’s problems were unique, he said, and the resulting financial crisis was “extremely painful for the citizens of Greece” and “prevented the building of confidence” throughout the euro zone.

Dallara, managing director of the U.S.-based Institute of International Finance, was the chief negotiator representing private-sector holders of Greek debt in the largest bond restructuring in history.

He said he was “quite pleased” that 83.5 percent of the bond holders voluntarily accepted losses of some 74 percent on the value of their investments in a deal that will cut more than 100 billion euros from Greece’s crippling public debt.

“To see so many bondholders voluntarily deliver their bonds into this exchange is remarkable” and speaks to the desire for Europe and investors to “turn the page” on the whole European sovereign debt problem, he added.

Athens had said it would enforce the deal on all its bondholders, activating collective action clauses on the 177 billion euros worth of bonds regulated under Greek law.

That would potentially trigger payouts on the credit default swaps that some investors held on the bonds, an event which would have unknown consequences for the market.

Dallara said activating the collective action clauses was “one of the unfortunate dimensions” of the debt swap, but stressed it shouldn’t stop foreign investment in European sovereign debt.

“The issue is not just one of legal risk in investing in sovereign debt, it’s better credit analysis,” he said. “You have to understand the underlying credit risks.”

Share

Will Greece Resolution Spark a Bigger Crisis?

Posted on by

Will Greece Resolution Spark a Bigger Crisis?

By John Carney

Mar 8 (CNBC) — Markets around the world were buoyed on hopes that Greece’s long and winding journey to debt restructuring may at last be its final port of call.

But some are warning that this may actually be the beginning of a new and more dangerous crisis.

The private sector is being asked to write off more than 70 percent of the face value of their Greek government bonds in return for new debt. This will help Greece meet its debt obligations and enable it to tap into bailout funds from the EU and IMF.

It seems likely that other nations burdened by heavy debt loads and high interest rates may seek to follow Greece’s path to debt relief. If Greece doesn’t have to pay what it owes, they might argue, why should we? Call it Haircut Contagion.

European officials insist that Greece is a one-time deal, not meant to set a precedent for other nations. But it is easy to see that minority parties in debt-burdened European nations could find a demand for relief an attractive platform. Imposing a “tax” on bondholders rather asking citizens to pay higher taxes while public services are cut might prove popular with voters.

Demands for debt relief could take many forms. Greece has been able to encourage bond holders to participate in the debt swap by enacting laws that incorporated “collective action clauses” into the 86 percent of bonds governed by Greek law. These clauses allow super-majorities of bond holders to force hold-outs to participate in swaps. Other countries in the euro zone could replicate this strategy.

“Effectively, this is a large gift from the Greeks to the parts of the euro zone that face debt crises. By conducting its debt exchange in the way it did, Greece has in effect resurrected the plausibility of purely voluntary debt-reduction operations in Europe,” Moody’s has explained.

Such demands would put new strains on the global financial system. While Europe’s banks and insurance companies can withstand losses on Greek debt, a series of similar haircuts might destabilize the system and render some institutions insolvent.

Warren Mosler, a trader based in the Virgin Islands who is credited with creating the euro-swap futures contract, fears that all it would take to set off a panic would be serious political discussion of widespread haircuts.

“The idea of Greek default transformed from being a Greek punishment to a gift, with the pending question: ‘If Greece doesn’t have to pay, why do I?’ — threatening a far more disruptive outcome that is yet to be fully discounted,” Mosler writes on his website, Mosler Economics. “That is, should Greek bonds be formally discounted, the consequences of merely the political discussion of that question will be all it takes to trigger a financial crisis rivaling anything yet seen.”

He has spelled out exactly what he thinks would happen in a Haircut Contagion crisis.

“Possible immediate consequences of that discussion include a sharp spike in gold, silver, and other commodities in a flight from currency, falling equity and debt valuations, a banking crisis, and a tightening of ‘financial conditions’ in general from portfolio shifting, even as it’s fundamentally highly deflationary. And while it probably won’t last all that long, it will be long enough to seriously shake things up,” Mosler writes.

A recent paper cited by Reuters took a much more sanguine approach to the likelihood of Haircut Contagion. The ratings agency figures that countries may attempt to receive modest debt relief in exchange for giving up their rights to unilaterally change the terms of their debt. They could do this, for example, by restructuring bonds governed by domestic law into foreign law bonds, mostly likely governed by English law.

“Holders of local-law governed bonds in other euro zone countries that are perceived to be at risk might want to make a trade for English-law governed bonds,” Jeromin Zettelmeyer, deputy chief economist at the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and Duke University Professor Mitu Gulati, wrote in the paper. “Depending on how much these bondholders would be willing to pay to make this trade, it could serve the interest of the country as well to make it.”

Of course, countries that agreed to make this swap would be sacrificing a lot of their future flexibility. Some might find it too high a price to pay. In a sense, converting their debt to foreign jurisdiction bonds would be like doubling-down on the structural problems with the euro zone. The countries that did this would sacrifice sovereignty over their debt to achieve lower interest rates, much like they sacrificed monetary sovereignty for the currency union.

And it’s not clear that this would be all that attractive to bondholders, either. After all, a country that cannot or will not pay its debt cannot be forced to, just because the bonds are subject to foreign law.

The hope of European leaders was that preventing a disorderly default in Greece would avoid a domino effect of sovereign debt defaults. The danger, however, is that debt relief for Greece could spark a new and unexpected Haircut Contagion crisis.

Share

Talk of other member nation haircuts slowly surfacing

Posted on by

Talk of widespread haircuts getting more serious. As previously discussed, this has the potential for catastrophic global financial meltdown.

Analysis: Greek default may be gift to other euro strugglers

By Mike Dolan

Mar 7 (Reuters) — Greece’s tortuous debt restructuring and threat of retroactive laws to compel reluctant creditors heaps regulatory risk onto investors but may make voluntary sovereign debt revamps more attractive and likely for other cash-strapped euro sovereigns and their creditors.

Thursday could mark a climax of the Greek debt workout with private creditors due to respond to an offer that would see them effectively write off more than 70 percent of the face value of their bonds in return for new debt with a series of sweeteners.

With Greek government bonds currently trading at less than 20 cents in the euro and the risk of a total wipeout if Greece decided to unilaterally refuse all payments, a majority will likely go for it. Legally-binding majorities are another matter.

Athens said this week it aims for 90 percent acceptance but if the takeup is at least 75 percent then it would consider triggering so-called “collective action clauses” retroactively inserted into the bonds issued under Greek law — about 85 percent of the 200 billion euros being restructured.

Those clauses in practice force all affected creditors to comply.

But it’s this distinction between debt issued under domestic laws and that sold under internationally-accepted English law that some say has consequences for other troubled euro nations eyeing Greece’s so-called Private Sector Involvement, or PSI.

A GIFT FROM GREECE

In essence, English-law Greek bonds, as is the case for many emerging market sovereigns, trade as if they were senior to local-law debt — at almost twice the price in fact right now. That’s because the terms of foreign-law bonds cannot be altered by an Athens parliament, and agreement for debt swaps is needed bond-by-bond, unlike local laws that aggregate majorities across all debtors and make blocking minorities more difficult to muster.

A paper released this week by Jeromin Zettelmeyer, deputy chief economist at the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and Duke University Professor Mitu Gulati reckons this legal gulf could well encourage other debt-hobbled euro zone countries and their creditors into mutually acceptable and beneficial debt restructurings.

This would involve an agreed switch in the legal status of the debt in return for relatively modest haircuts.

“Holders of local-law governed bonds in other euro zone countries that are perceived to be at risk might want to make a trade for English-law governed bonds,” the economists wrote. “Depending on how much these bondholders would be willing to pay to make this trade, it could serve the interest of the country as well to make it.”

The sovereign gets a chance to reduce a crippling debt burden while bondholders get greater contractual protection in any future restructuring.

Given that the Greek precedent of retroactive legislation vastly increases the allure of foreign-law bonds, which credit rating firm Moody’s says now make up less than 10 percent of all euro zone government bonds, a window of opportunity may open up.

“Effectively, this is a large gift from the Greeks to the parts of the euro zone that face debt crises. By conducting its debt exchange in the way it did, Greece has in effect resurrected the plausibility of purely voluntary debt-reduction operations in Europe.”

Although Berlin, Paris and Brussels insist the Greek case is a one-off and European Central Bank liquidity has insulated the wider banking system, Portugal’s 10-year bonds still trade as low as 50 cents in the euro and many creditors reckon it will be very difficult for the country to avoid some restructuring.

Even the 10-year debt of fellow bailout recipient Ireland, which many investors reckon has the underlying economic capacity to go back to the markets next year, is still trading at less than 90 cents in the euro and many doubt its imminent market return.

“We still expect a sizeable growth undershoot and deficit overshoot and expect that Ireland will need a second financing package (which may include PSI) beyond 2013,” economists at Citi said on Monday.

What’s more, if Europe’s new fiscal pact is rejected by voters in a planned referendum there in the coming months, Ireland would lose access to the financial backstop of the European Stability Mechanism and likely unnerve many investors.

Yet voluntary debt swaps with some debt relief stemming from more modest haircuts than Greece may well be the best way to ensure these two countries avoid outright default and return to private financing in a reasonable amount of time.

And if such exchanges were wholly voluntary, it would also mean credit default swap insurance would not pay out — a stated aim for many euro policymakers concerned about the speculative nature of a market where it’s possible to buy insurance on something you don’t own.

One danger is that the prospect of countries opting for such a swap may scare creditors in larger countries like Italy and Spain where currently no bond haircut is expected by the market, thanks in large part to the ECB’s liquidity injections.

And the upshot for many economists is that there will be a longer-term price to pay for governments for tinkering with the rules of the game, as many investors view it, via the likes of retroactive bond legislation and obfuscation of CDS markets.

“Investors will expect a premium for bearing this regulatory risk,” Morgan Stanley’s Manoj Pradhan told clients in a note, adding that only central bank liquidity floods were now obscuring the resultant higher financing costs and there would be a dangerous blurring of lines between macro and market risks.

But given that indiscriminate cheap lending was seen as at least partly responsible for the credit binge and bust of the past five years, maybe higher risk premia are not all bad.

Share

GS: ECB Preview

Posted on by

I agree that the ECB is ‘backing off’ and will only again engage if it gets bad enough.

Back to the analogy of watering the flower only when it’s about to die.

They don’t realize that it needs continuous watering in the normal course of events.

14 more days to the Greek payment date.

Unfortunately, looking like darned if you do and darned if you don’t.

ECB after the LTROs: It is up to governments now

After the implementation of the second 3-year LTRO last week, the ECB now is likely to believe it has done enough to stabilise the Euro area’s financial system and, implicitly, the funding situation for peripheral governments. Any announcement of further non-standard measures seems unlikely at this stage, as the Governing Council now views the ball as being squarely in the court of governments.

Share

Japan Not Immune To Debt Crisis, BOJ Kamezaki Says

Posted on by

Not to be outdone by the rest of the world’s central bankers:

Japan Not Immune To Debt Crisis, BOJ Kamezaki Says

By Tatsuo Ito

February 28 (DJ) — A Bank of Japan policy board member said Wednesday that Japan is not immune to a Europe-style debt crisis as confidence in the country’s government bonds could quickly weaken if concerns over its fiscal state mount.

The European crisis “is not a fire on the other side of the river,” Hidetoshi Kamezaki told business leaders in Fukuoka, western Japan, using an phrase frequently employed by Japanese policy makers over the last few months to warn that a Europe-style crisis could spread to Japanese shores.

“It’s not appropriate to assume there won’t be concerns about JGBs,” in the future just because the bonds continue to be smoothly bought in the market, Kamezaki said, adding that confidence in government debt can change unexpectedly.

Japan’s fiscal conditions are the worst among developed nations, with a gross public debt of around 200% of its annual economic output, but the country has so far avoided a Greece-style crisis as domestic investors hold almost all of its debt.

An ample and steady flow of funds from overseas in the form of a surplus in its current account — which includes trade — has financed the debt, but recent data suggest that could be changing.

Japan recorded a trade deficit for all of last year, meaning that if the trend were to continue, the country may need to rely on foreign capital to finance its debt, like many of the European countries being hit by the debt crisis.

Kamezaki played down the possibility of Japan’s current account moving into the red, saying flows of income stemming from the country’s external assets worth Y250 trillion could be maintained.

“The trend of Japan’s current account surplus will not change for a while unless the trade deficit grows rapidly,” Kamezaki said.

At around 0030 GMT, the benchmark 10-year government bond yield was at 0.965%.

Kamezaki also said the central bank should keep actively implementing policies to ensure the Japanese economy can overcome deflation and achieve sustainable growth with price stability.

“The BOJ should continue to pro-actively implement policies needed to achieve these purposes,” Kamezaki said.

The BOJ on Feb. 14 surprised the markets by boosting the size of its asset purchase program–the main tool for credit easing amid near zero interest rates–to Y65 trillion from Y55 trillion by increasing purchases of Japanese government bonds. It also clarified a near-term inflation goal for overcoming deflation.

The financial markets have reacted positively to the BOJ’s actions, with the dollar briefly hitting a nine-month high of Y81.66 on Monday and the stock market rallying.

Share

GEI article is up

Posted on by

Eurozone: How to Drive an Economy in Reverse

By Warren Mosler

February 27 — The situation in Greece brings me back to the conclusion that merely resolving solvency issues in the Eurozone doesn’t fix the economy. Solvency must not be an issue, but if there is negative growth, solvency math simply doesn’t work for any of the Euro members.

Without growth in the Eurozone the resolution (for now) of the Greek crisis will simply result in the focus moving on to one of the next weaker sisters. As this happens the risk remains that other countries in trouble will ask for haircuts on their debt (similar to Greece) as part of their rescue. And that could trigger a general, global, catastrophic financial meltdown.

Follow up:
Monetary and Fiscal Expansion are Needed

My first order proposal remains an ECB distribution on a per capita basis to the euro member nations of maybe 10% of euro zone GDP per year to put the solvency issue behind them. Along with relaxed budget rules, maybe allowing deficits up to 6% of GDP annually, further supported by the ECB funding a transition job at a non disruptive wage to facilitate the transition from unemployment to private sector employment. I might also recommend deficits be increased by suspending VAT as a way to increase aggregate demand and lower prices at the same time.

Alternatively, the ECB could simply guarantee all national government debt and rely on the growth and stability pact for fiscal discipline, which would probably require enhanced authorities.

And rather than trying to bring Greece’s deficit down to current target levels, they could instead relax the growth and stability pact limits to something closer to full employment levels. And, again, I’d look into suspending VAT to both increase aggregate demand and lower prices.

Strong Euro First

However, all policies seem to be ‘strong euro’ first. And the ‘success’ of the euro continues to be gauged by its ‘strength’.

The haircuts on the Greek bonds are functionally a tax that removes that many net euro financial assets. Call it an ‘austerity’ measure extending forced austerity to investors.

Other member nations will likely hold off on turning towards that same tax until after Greece is a ‘done deal’ as early noises could work to undermine the Greek arrangements, and take the ‘investor tax’ off the table.

Like most other currencies, the euro has ‘built in’ demand leakages that fall under the general category of ‘savings desires’. These include the demand to hold actual cash, contributions to tax advantaged pension contributions, contributions to individual retirement accounts, insurance and other corporate ‘reserves’, foreign central bank accumulations of euro denominated financial assets, along with all the unspent interest and earnings compounding.

Offsetting all of that unspent income (private savings) is, historically, the expansion of debt, where agents spend more than their income. This includes borrowing for business and consumer purchases, which includes borrowing to buy cars and houses. In other words, net savings of financial assets are increased by the demand leakages and decreased by credit expansion. And, in general, most of the variation is due to changes in the credit expansion component.

Austerity in the euro zone consists of public spending cuts and tax hikes, which have both directly slowed the economies and increased net savings desires, as the austerity measures have also reduced private sector desires to borrow to spend. This combination results in a decline in sales, which translates into fewer jobs and reduced private sector income. Which further translates into reduced tax collections and increased public sector transfer payments, as the austerity measures designed to reduce public sector debt instead serve to increase it.

Now adding to that is this latest tax on investors in Greek debt, and if the propensity to spend any of the lost funds of those holders was greater than zero, aggregate demand will see an additional decline, with public sector debt climbing that much higher as well.

All of this serves to make the euro ‘harder to get’ and further support the value of the euro, which serves to keep a lid on the net export channel. The ‘answer’ to the export dilemma would be to have the ECB, for example, buy dollars as Germany used to do with the mark, and as China and Japan have done to support their exporters. But ideologically this is off the table in the euro zone, as they believe in a strong euro, and in any case they don’t want to build dollar reserves and give the appearance that the dollar is ‘backing’ the euro.

Three Reverse Thrusters in Use

This works to move all the euro member nation deficits higher as the ‘sustainability math’ of all deteriorate as well, increasing the odds of the ‘investor tax’ expanding to the other member nations – and that continues the negative feedback loop.

Given the demand leakages of the institutional structure, as a point of logic, prosperity can only come from some combination of increased net exports, a private sector credit expansion, or a public sector credit expansion.

And right now it looks like they are still going backwards on all three. And with the transmission in reverse, pressing the accelerator harder only makes you go backwards that much faster.

Share

Someone is still worried about the US becoming the next Greece

Posted on by

Sorry to see this happen.

Whatever.

First, it’s not a debt burden.
Debt management is just shifting $ between Fed reserve accounts to Fed securities accounts.

Second, the trick is for a given size govt to keep taxes at the right level.

Yes, some day circumstances could possibly warrant much higher taxes, though in my 40 years of experience I’ve never seen excess demand. But yes, anything is possible. And a bit of forecasting of demand leakages along with deficits might be at least somewhat enlightening, and if history is any guide, probably show future deficits still aren’t large enough for full employment.

But even if you know you have to make a turn 20 miles down the road- that is, even if you do know that 20 years from now aggregate demand could be too high- you don’t turn the wheel now.

Can America Become the Next Greece?

By John Carney

February 27 (CNBC) — When conservatives worry about the size of the federal government’s budget deficits and the national debt, liberals tend to point out that “America is not Greece.”

This is certainly true. The U.S. economy is far healthier than the economy of Greece. We aren’t locked into a currency union that deprives us of monetary flexibility. Our government can never run out of money to service its debt because the debt is denominated in currency the government creates.

The most important difference between the U.S. and Greece, however, is not where we are in our economic cycle or our monetary system.

It’s the gap between the productivity of the American economy and the Greek economy.

The core reason why Greece is unable to service its debt without aid from its neighbors is that its economy does not generate enough wealth. Even if Greece somehow put an end to the habitual tax-avoidance of its people, it could not service its debt without truly impoverishing its citizens through unsustainable wealth confiscation.

The dearth of productivity and competitiveness explains, ironically, why Greece’s debts got so large to begin with. It’s people and government wanted to live beyond their means, to spend more than they produced. This is only possible if someone is willing to lend you the money to buy the excess goods and services.

Most Greeks never really realized how unproductive their economy had become. In some sense, access to debt had concealed their long-running economic slump. It seemed that things were humming along just fine.

This is one of the reasons Greeks are so shocked by what is being required by their creditors. It feels as if they are being looted, bossed around, sent orders from German and French bureaucrats. The Greeks just never internalized how dependent their economy had become on the capacity and willingness of more productive economies to lend to them.

The productivity gap, of course, is not the result of nature or the wrath of some angry gods. It is the result of years of policies that made investing in productivity — both through capital investment and increases in skills — irrational. The generosity of the Greek government and the regulatory burdens placed on businesses made the relative rewards from business investment meager.

This is important to keep in mind when considering the proposition that “America is not Greece.” It tells us we must zealously guard our productivity, protect our culture of competition and enshrine market processes almost as if they were the gifts of benevolent gods.

America is not Greece. But if our productivity is sapped by too much regulation, by misbegotten monetary policy, by taxes that undermine incentives to earn, or by government spending that rewards business meeting political rather than market demand, we can become Greece.

America can never be forced to default for lack of money. But our debt burden can become unsustainable — requiring either inflation or voluntary default — if our productivity does not improve as our debt grows.

Share

More on Greece and the euro

Posted on by

As previously discussed, all policies seem to be ‘strong euro’ first.

And the ‘success’ of the euro continues to be gauged by its ‘strength’.

The haircuts on the Greek bonds are functionally a tax that removes that many net euro financial assets. Call it an ‘austerity’ measure extending forced austerity to investors.

Other member nations will likely hold off on turning towards that same tax until after Greece is a ‘done deal’ as early noises could work to undermine the Greek arrangements, and take the ‘investor tax’ off the table.

Like most other currencies, the euro has ‘built in’ demand leakages that fall under the general category of ‘savings desires’. These include the demand to hold actual cash, contributions to tax advantaged pension contributions, contributions to individual retirement accounts, insurance and other corporate ‘reserves’, foreign central bank accumulations euro denominated financial assets, along with all the unspent interest and earnings compounding.

Offsetting all of that unspent income is, historically, the expansion of debt, where agents spend more than their income. This includes borrowing for business and consumer purchases, which includes borrowing to buy cars and houses. In other words, net savings of financial assets are increased by the demand leakages and decreased by credit expansion. And, in general, most of the variation is due to changes in the credit expansion component.

Austerity in the euro zone consists of public spending cuts and tax hikes, which have both directly slowed the economies and increased net savings desires, as the austerity measures have also reduced private sector desires to borrow to spend. This combination results in a decline in sales, which translates into fewer jobs and reduced private sector income. Which further translates into reduced tax collections and increased public sector transfer payments, as the austerity measures designed to reduce public sector debt instead serve to increase it.

Now adding to that is this latest tax on investors in Greek debt, and if the propensity to spend any of the lost funds of those holders was greater than 0, aggregate demand will see an additional decline, with public sector debt climbing that much higher as well.

All of which serves to make the euro ‘harder to get’ and further support the value of the euro, which serves to keep a lid on the net export channel. The ‘answer’ to the export dilemma would be to have the ECB, for example, buy dollars as Germany used to do with the mark, and as China and Japan have done to support their exporters. But ideologically this is off the table in the euro zone, as they believe in a strong euro, and in any case they don’t want to build dollar reserves and give the appearance that the dollar is ‘backing’ the euro.

And all of which works to move all the euro member nation deficits higher as the ‘sustainability math’ of all deteriorate as well, increasing the odds of the ‘investor tax’ expanding to the other member nations that continues the negative feedback loop.

Given the demand leakages of the institutional structure, as a point of logic prosperity can only come from some combination of increased net exports, a private sector credit expansion, or a public sector credit expansion.

And right now it looks like they are still going backwards on all three.

Share

Greece

Posted on by

Comes back to the idea that resolving solvency issues in the euro zone doesn’t fix the economy.

And with negative growth the solvency math doesn’t work for any of the euro members.

And what’s with the ECB threatening to back away on liquidity support for the banking system?

So looks to me like the Greek resolution is not the end of the solvency issues, but that the focus simply moves on to the next weaker sister.

And, as previously discussed, the risk remains elevated that if Greece gets to haircut its obligations and gets funding, others will ask for the same, triggering a general, global, catastrophic financial meltdown.

My first order proposal remains an ECB distribution on a per capita basis to the euro member nations of maybe 10% of euro zone GDP per year to put the solvency issue behind them. Along with relaxed budget rules, maybe allowing deficits up to 6% of GDP annually, further supported by the ECB funding a transition job at a non disruptive wage to facilitate the transition from unemployment to private sector employment. I might also recommend deficits be increased by suspending VAT as a way to increase aggregate demand and lower prices at the same time.

Alternatively, the ECB could simply guarantee all national govt debt and rely on the growth and stability pact for fiscal discipline, which would probably require enhanced authorities.

And rather than trying to bring Greece’s deficit down to current target levels, they could instead relax the growth and stability pact limits to something closer to full employment levels. And, again, I’d look into suspending VAT to both increase aggregate demand and lower prices.

Meanwhile, elsewhere in today’s world news:

The likes of Ford adding to pension funds makes the point of the increasing and ongoing demand leakages putting a damper on GDP.

And oil prices have now crept up enough to materially cut into aggregate demand as well.

Nor are banks adding to capital to meet expanding demand for credit, which remains anemic.

Headlines:

Data Suggests Euro Zone May Slide Back Into Recession
German Manufacturing Slows as New Export Orders Fall
China’s Factory Activity Shrinks for Fourth Month
ECB Preparing to Close Liquidity Floodgates
Ford Pours $3.8 Billion Into Pension Plan
Oil Could Turn to Headwind as Dow Flirts With 13,000
UBS to Issue More Loss-Absorbing Capital
Iran ‘Winning’ on Oil Sanctions: Top Trader
Greek Bailout Puts Focus Back on Credit Default Swaps
Iran Fuels Oil-Price Rally—And Prices Could Keep Rising

Share