EU Daily- The EU is on a financially sustainable path

Still looks like the strategy for Europe could be functionally very close to my proposal, and fiscally sustainable if they continue on the current path.

This is just inference on my part- I have no information other than what I’ve read online.

The ‘distributions’ the ECB will make will be via buying enough national govt debt in the secondary markets to keep the national govs solvent and able to fund their deficits, at least in the short term markets.

If they determine any member nation is not complying to their liking, they will start threatening to stop buying their debt, thereby isolating them from the ECB credit umbrella, while allowing the remaining nations to remain solvent.

ECB spending on anything is not (operationally) revenue constrained as the member nations are, so this policy is nominally sustainable.

The austerity measures will result in lower growth, and maybe even negative growth, but the solvency issue is gone as long as this policy is followed.

With currency strength and inflation ultimately a function of fiscal balance, the fundamental forces in place that drove the euro to 1.60 vs the dollar remain in place, while the mechanism to remove the default risk that drove the portfolio shifts that weakened the euro is in place.

While restructuring risk remains, it need not be forced by solvency risk. So restructuring need not happen.

Power has shifted to the ECB, presumably under substantial influence of the national govt finance ministers, as the ECB directly or indirectly moves to fund the entire banking system and national govt. deficits.

This is an institutional structure that is fully sustainable financially, with the economic outcome a function the size of the national govt. deficits they allow.

The conflict will remain the money interests in Europe who put currency strength as a priority, vs the exporters who favor currency weakness.

The consensus will be that unions and wages in general must be controlled.

Again, I do not know for sure that the ECB is actually moving in this direction.
They may not be.

Watch closely to see if the buying of national govt. securities remains sufficient to keep the national govts solvent.

(Feel free to distribute)

HEADLINES:

Europe Rebound Stalls in June on Market Strains, Eurocoin Shows
Barroso Says European Leaders Want to Keep Euro ‘Very Strong’
Schaeuble Says Europe Will Meet Deficit Targets, Corriere Says
Merkel faces test in vote for president
Berlin hints at move on pay deal ruling
Germany Trims 3rd-Quarter Debt Sales, Plans Bigger Cuts in 4th
Germany Faces Shortage of Skilled Workers in 2025, Study Says
French Economy Slowed to a Crawl in First Quarter of 2010
French Jobless Claims Increase as Companies Trim Workforces
Lagarde Says Pension Reform Is Priority, Sees AAA Rating Safe
Confindustria Raises Italian GDP Growth Forecast on Euro Drop
Spanish May Producer Prices Advance Most in 19 Months on Oil
Spain May Cut 426-Euro Unemployment Subsidy, Cinco Dias Reports
Greek optimistic on budget deficit reduction

ARTICLES:

Europe Rebound Stalls in June on Market Strains, Eurocoin Shows

(Bloomberg) The euro-area economic recovery stalled in June for a third month amid financial-market “strains.” The Eurocoin index measuring economic expansion in the 16 nations that share the single currency fell to 0.46 percent from 0.55 percent in May, the Center for Economic Policy Research and the Bank of Italy, which co-produce the index, said in a statement. “Recent strains in the financial markets have affected the performance of the indicator,” according to the statement. The index “has however been supported by the new improvement in foreign trade.” The index, which includes business and consumer confidence readings, industrial production, price figures and stock-market performance, aims to provide a real-time estimate of economic growth, according to the report.

Barroso Says European Leaders Want to Keep Euro ‘Very Strong’

June 25 (Bloomberg) — European Commission President Jose Barroso said the region’s leaders are determined to keep the euro a “very strong” currency.

“I have no doubts of the absolute determination of European Union leaders and European Union institutions to keep the euro as a very strong and stable currency,” Barroso said in an interview with Bloomberg Television in Toronto, where he is attending a meeting of leaders from Group of 20 countries.

Against the U.S. dollar, the euro has fallen 19 percent since its Nov. 25 high, trading yesterday at $1.2279 after reaching a four-year low of $1.1877 on June 7.

The 16-nation currency’s “real effective exchange rate has lost close to 10 percent” since its peak in October, the European Commission, the EU executive, said yesterday in its quarterly assessment of the euro-region economy.

The continent’s economic “fundamentals” are good, and Europe’s debt and deficits are smaller than some of its “main partners,” Barroso said, adding investors have been reassured by an almost $1 trillion plan by the euro nations and the International Monetary Fund to backstop the sovereign debt of the region’s weakest members.

It’s “a very important message of confidence that is being conveyed to markets as well,” Barroso said.

Barroso also said that China’s plan to provide more currency flexibility was a “move in the right direction” that increases confidence in the global economy.

Earlier yesterday, Barroso said that exit strategies from fiscal stimulus programs should be gradual, differentiated and “growth-friendly.”

Schaeuble Says Europe Will Meet Deficit Targets, Corriere Says

June 25 (Bloomberg) — German Finance Minister Wolfgang Schaeuble said he has “no doubt” that European governments will hold to their commitments to cut public deficits, Corriere della Sera reported, citing an interview.

“Too-high deficits have to be responsibly reduced,”

Corriere quoted Schaeuble as saying. “We have a shared agreement, and I have no doubt that all will abide by their commitments.”

Merkel faces test in vote for president

(FT) The presidential election – in a specially constituted federal assembly – represents the biggest challenge for Angela Merkel since she formed a government in October combining her own Christian Democratic Union with the liberal Free Democratic party. The combined popularity of the coalition parties has since dropped from 48.4 per cent to 35 per cent, according to a poll published by Stern magazine and the RTL television network. The proportion of voters saying they would vote again for Ms Merkel as chancellor has also dropped to just 39 per cent, her lowest rating for more than three years, according to a Forsa institute poll. Political scientists believe that if Christian Wulff, Ms Merkel’s candidate for the presidency, were to lose the vote on Wednesday to Joachim Gauck, the non-party candidate supported by the SPD and Greens, it could force the resignation of both the chancellor and her government.

Berlin hints at move on pay deal ruling

(FT) The German government on Thursday signalled it was considering legislation to quell protests from both company chiefs and worker representatives over a court ruling that threatens the way they agree wage deals. Judges in Erfurt, eastern Germany, on Wednesday ended a 50-year-old practice of extending in-house wage deals made between an employer and its biggest union to cover all workers in the company doing similar jobs. The judges agreed with a doctor at a hospital in Mannheim who had demanded he be paid according to the national pay deal of the doctors’ union, not the in-house deal agreed by services union Verdi. They said in their verdict that established wage-bargaining practices contravened the right of citizens freely to form alliances. There was no “basic principle” forcing a company “to adopt a uniform wage deal”, they declared.

Germany Trims 3rd-Quarter Debt Sales, Plans Bigger Cuts in 4th

(Bloomberg) Germany will sell 77 billion euros ($94.5 billion) of bonds and bills in the third quarter, 2 billion euros less than forecast in December. A larger adjustment will come in the fourth quarter, assuming the economy stays steady, a finance ministry official said. Finance Minister Wolfgang Schaeuble has pledged to cut net new borrowing by the end of the year. A federal issuance calendar released in December said gross debt sales this year would be a record 343 billion euros ($421.5 billion). The third-quarter debt issuance includes 44 billion euros of bonds and 33 billion euros of bills. Schauble’s ministry said on June 22 that the so-called structural budget deficit will be 53.2 billion euros this year, 13.4 billion euros less than the 66.6 billion euros originally expected. It also said then that net new borrowing this year will be 15 billion euros below the 80.2 billion euros in the 2010 budget plan.

Germany Faces Shortage of Skilled Workers in 2025, Study Says

June 25 (Bloomberg) — Germany faces a shortage of skilled workers in 2025 as the population is shrinking, the Federal Labor Agency’s research institute said.

Due to demographic reasons the size of the German workforce will constantly decrease until 2025 while the number of employed in the services industry may rise by more than 1.5 million, the institute said in a study published yesterday.

By contrast, the number of employees in the manufacturing industry may fall by almost 1 million over the next 15 years, the study said.

German unemployment fell more than twice as much as economists forecast in May as exports from Europe’s biggest economy surged, bolstering the recovery. The number of people out of work declined a seasonally adjusted 45,000 to 3.25 million, the lowest since December 2008, the Labor Agency said June 1.

French Economy Slowed to a Crawl in First Quarter of 2010

Paris (dpa) — The French economy slowed alarmingly in the first quarter of 2010, with gross domestic product (GDP) expanding by only 0.1 per cent, the government’s statistics office Insee said Friday.

The primary reason for the poor result was a drop of 0.2 per cent in domestic demand, compared to an increase of 0.5 per cent in the last quarter of 2009, when GDP rose by 0.6 per cent.

This was the second bit of bad economic news for the government in less than 24 hours. Late Thursday, the Labour Ministry said that the rolls of unemployed had grown by some 22,600 in May, the largest rise in unemployment since the beginning of the year.

Some 2.7 million people were out of work at the end of May, an unemployment rate of 9.5 per cent.

French Jobless Claims Increase as Companies Trim Workforces

(Bloomberg) The number of jobseekers in France climbed in May as manufacturers trimmed payrolls in the wake of the country’s worst recession in more than half a century. The number of unemployed actively looking for work rose by 22,600 last month, an increase of 0.8 percent, the Labor and Finance Ministries said. The total number of jobseekers was 2.7 million. While claims have risen every month this year except in March, national statistics office Insee predicts the economy is about to begin creating jobs again for the first time in two years. “Total employment fell heavily in 2009, dragged down by the drop in activity,” Insee said late yesterday. “It should progress slightly over 2010 as a whole.”

Lagarde Says Pension Reform Is Priority, Sees AAA Rating Safe

June 25 (Bloomberg) — France’s plan to lift its retirement age is a signal to investors about the seriousness of President Nicolas Sarkozy’s intention to cut the budget deficit, Finance Minister Christine Lagarde said.

“The priority is to protect the retirement system,”

Lagarde said today on France Inter radio. “We are also trying to send a message of security to the markets.”

Sarkozy’s government set out proposals last week to raise the minimum age at which workers can tap the state pension to 62 in 2018 from 60 currently. The age at which full benefits are reaped is to rise to 67 from 65 under the plan, which labor unions protested yesterday.

France is the only country among Europe’s five biggest economies not to have presented a detailed savings plan for next year. Britain set out deficit-cutting measures totaling 113 billion pounds ($167 billion) earlier this week and Germany announced cuts of 81.6 billion euros ($101 billion) on June 7.

Sarkozy has committed to reducing the deficit from 8 percent of gross domestic product this year to 6 percent in 2011 and 3 percent in 2013.

Lagarde said “there’s no reason to think” that France’s AAA credit rating is threatened, though she said the country doesn’t have the luxury of time to debate the pension overhaul.

“We have time pressure, it’s not possible to delay,”

Lagarde said. “The public finance situation doesn’t allow for it. We need to take measures quickly.”

Sarkozy and Lagarde join leaders and finance ministers of the Group of Eight later today in Huntsville, Ontario, before meeting their Group of 20 counterparts tomorrow in Toronto.

Confindustria Raises Italian GDP Growth Forecast on Euro Drop

(Bloomberg) Italian gross domestic product will expand 1.2 percent this year and 1.6 percent in 2010, up from previous forecasts of 1.1 percent and 1.3 percent respectively, Confindustria said. The single currency’s 14 percent slide against the dollar this year will “more than offset” the impact of budget cuts worth 24.9 billion euros, which will shave 0.4 percentage points of GDP in 2011 and 2012, Confindustria said. Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi’s deficit-curbing measures aim to reduce the budget deficit by an additional 1.6 percent of GDP, bringing the shortfall within the EU limit of 3 percent of GDP in 2012 from 5.3 percent last year.

Spanish May Producer Prices Advance Most in 19 Months on Oil

June 25 (Bloomberg) — Spanish producer-price inflation accelerated to the fastest in 19 months in May as higher oil prices boosted energy costs.

Prices of goods leaving Spain’s factories, mines and refineries rose 3.8 percent from a year earlier after a 3.7 percent increase in April, the National Statistics Institute in Madrid said today. That’s the biggest increase since October 2008. From the previous month, prices gained 0.2 percent.

Crude-oil prices rose 8 percent in the 12 months to the end of May, pushing up manufacturers’ costs. Still, with the economy continuing to shrink and the unemployment rate at 20 percent, consumer-price inflation remains restrained. Spain’s underlying inflation rate, which excludes volatile food and energy prices, turned negative in April for the first time on record.

The government forecasts the economy will contract 0.3 percent this year.

Spain May Cut 426-Euro Unemployment Subsidy, Cinco Dias Reports

June 25 (Bloomberg) — Spain’s Labor Minister Celestino Corbacho may cut a 426 euro-a-month ($525) subsidy paid to the unemployed whose two-year, contributions-based jobless benefit has run out, Cinco Dias reported.

The subsidy, which cost the state 1.2 billion euros since it was introduced last year, will be difficult to maintain after August as Spain tries to cut its deficit, the newspaper reported, citing an interview with Corbacho.

Greek optimistic on budget deficit reduction

(AP) Greece’s finance minister on Thursday voiced confidence that the country will meet or even surpass its ambitious targets to slash spending and boost revenues by the end of the year. “Have we won the bet? No,” George Papaconstantinou said. “But we have well-founded hopes and are optimistic that, for the first time in many years, at the end of the year the state budget will achieve or even exceed the targets we have set.” Papaconstantinou said his optimism was based on figures showing a 40 percent deficit reduction during the first five months of the year, as well an expected revenue boost from increased consumer taxes. On Friday the cabinet is set to approve a key draft law on pension and labor reforms. The government says the current pension system is not viable, and if left unchanged would come to absorb 24 percent of GDP in 2050, from the current 12 percent.

Marshall’s latest

REPEAT AFTER ME: THE USA DOES NOT HAVE A ‘GREECE PROBLEM’

By Marshall Auerback


To paraphrase Shakespeare, things are indeed rotten in the State of Denmark (and Germany, France, Italy, Greece, Spain, Portugal, and almost everywhere else in the euro zone). An entire continent appears determined to commit collective hara kiri (link), whilst the rest of the world is encouraged to draw precisely the wrong kinds of lessons from Europe’s self-imposed economic meltdown. So-called respectable policy makers continue to legitimize the continent’s fully-fledged embrace of austerity on the allegedly respectable grounds of “fiscal sustainability”.

The latest to pronounce on this matter is the Governor of the Bank of England, Mervyn King. This is a particularly sad, as the BOE – the Old Lady of Threadneedle Street – has actually played a uniquely constructive role amongst central banks in the area of financial services reform proposals. King, and his associate, Andrew Haldane, Executive Director for Financial Stability at the Bank of England, have been outspoken critics of “too big to fail” banks (link), and the asymmetric nature of banker compensation (“heads I win, tails the taxpayer loses”). This stands in marked contrast to America’s feckless triumvirate of Tim Geithner, Lawrence Summers, and Ben Bernanke, none of whom appears to have encountered a banker’s bonus that they didn’t like.

But when it comes to matters of “fiscal sustainability” King sounds no better than a court jester (or, at the very least, a member of President Obama’s National Commission on Fiscal Responsibility and Reform). In an interview with The Telegraph (link), the Bank of England Governor suggests that the US and UK – both sovereign issuers of their own currency – must deal with the challenges posed by their own fiscal deficits, lest a Greece scenario be far behind:

“It is absolutely vital, absolutely vital, for governments to get on top of this problem. We cannot afford to allow concerns about sovereign debt to spread into a wider crisis dealing with sovereign debt. Dealing with a banking crisis was bad enough. This would be worse.”

“A wider crisis dealing with sovereign debt”? Anybody’s internal BS detector ought to be flashing red when a policy maker makes sweeping statements like this. The Bank of England Governor substantially undermines his own credibility by failing to make 3 key distinctions:

1. There is a fundamental difference between debt held by the government and debt held in the non-government sector. All debt is not created equal. Private debt has to be serviced using the currency that the state issues.
2. Likewise, deficit critics, such as King, obfuscate reality when they fail to highlight the differences between the monetary arrangements of sovereign and non-sovereign nations, the latter facing a constraint comparable to private debt.
3. Related to point 2, there is a fundamental difference between public debt held in the currency of the sovereign government holding the debt and public debt held in a foreign currency. A government can never go insolvent in its own currency. If it is insolvent as a consequence of holdings of foreign debt then it should default and renegotiate the debt in its own currency. In those cases, the debtor has the power not the creditor.

Functionally, the euro dilemma is somewhat akin to the Latin American dilemma, such as countries like Argentina regularly experienced. The nations of the European Monetary Union have given up their monetary sovereignty by giving up their national currencies, and adopting a supranational one. By divorcing fiscal and monetary authorities, they have relinquished their public sector’s capacity to provide high levels of employment and output. Non-sovereign countries are limited in their ability to spend by taxation and bond revenues and this applies perfectly well to Greece, Portugal and even countries like Germany and France. Deficit spending in effect requires borrowing in a “foreign currency”, according to the dictates of private markets and the nation states are externally constrained.

King implicitly recognizes this fact, as he acknowledges the central design flaw at the heart of the European Monetary Union – “within the Euro Area it’s become very clear that there is a need for a fiscal union to make the Monetary Union work.”

This is undoubtedly correct: To eliminate this structural problem, the countries of the EMU must either leave the euro zone, or establish a supranational fiscal entity which can fulfill the role of a sovereign government to deficit spend and fill a declining private sector output gap. Otherwise, the euro zone nations remain trapped – forced to forgo spending to repay debt and service their interest payments via a market based system of finance.

But King then inexplicably extrapolates the problems of the euro zone which stem from this uniquely Euro design flaw and exploits it to support a neo-liberal philosophy fundamentally antithetical to fiscal freedom and full employment.

The Bank of England Governor – and others of his ilk – are misguided and disingenuous when they seek to draw broader conclusions from this uniquely euro zone related crisis. Think about Japan – they have had years of deflationary environments with rising public debt obligations and relatively large deficits to GDP. Have they defaulted? Have they even once struggled to pay the interest and settlement on maturity? Of course not, even when they experienced debt downgrades from the major ratings agencies throughout the 1990s.

Retaining the current bifurcated monetary/fiscal structure of the euro zone does leave the individual countries within the EMU in the death throes of debt deflation, barring a relaxation of the self-imposed fiscal constraints, or a substantial fall in the value of the euro (which will facilitate growth via the export sector, at the cost of significantly damaging America’s own export sector). This week’s €750bn rescue package will buy time, but will not address the insolvency at the core of the problem, and may well exacerbate it, given that the funding is predicated on the maintenance of a harsh austerity regime.

José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero, Spain’s Socialist prime minister, angered his trade union allies but cheered financial markets on Wednesday when he announced a surprise 5 per cent cut in civil service pay to accelerate cuts to the budget deficit.

The austerity drive – echoing moves by Ireland and Greece – followed intense pressure from Spain’s European neighbors, the International Monetary Fund on the spurious grounds that such cuts would establish “credibility” with the markets. Well, that wasn’t exactly a winning formula for success when tried before in East Asia during the 1997/98 financial crisis, and it is unlikely to be so again this time.

Indeed, in the current context, the European authorities are simply trying to localize the income deflation in the “PIIGS” through strong orchestrated IMF-style fiscal austerity, while seeking to prevent a strong downward spiral of the euro. But the contradiction in this policy is that a deflation in the “PIIGS” will simply spread to the other members of the euro zone with an effect essentially analogous to that of a competitive devaluation internationally.

The European Union is the largest economic bloc in the world right now. This is why it is so critical that Europeans get out of the EMU straightjacket and allow government deficit spending to do its job. Anything else will entail a deflationary trap, no matter how the euro zone’s policy makers initially try to localize the deflation. And the deflation is almost certain to spread outward, if sovereign states such as the US or UK absorb the wrong lessons from Greece, as Mr., King and his fellow deficit-phobes in the US are aggressively advocating.

There are two direct contagion vectors off the fiscal retrenchment being imposed on the periphery countries of the euro zone.

First, to the banking systems of the periphery and the core nations, as private loan defaults spread on domestic private income deflation induced by the fiscal retrenchment. Second, to the core nations that export to the PIIGS and run export led growth strategies. So 30-40% of Germany’s exports go to Greece, Italy, Ireland, Portugal and Spain directly, another 30% to the rest of Europe.

These are far from trivial feedback loops, and of course, the third contagion vector is to rest of world growth as domestic private income deflation combined with a maxi euro devaluation means exporters to the euro zone, and competitors with euro zone firms in global tradable product markets, are going to see top line revenue growth dry up before year end.

Let’s repeat this for the 100th time: the US government, the Japanese Government, or the UK government, amongst others, do NOT face a Greek style constraint – they can just credit bank accounts for interest and repayment in the same fashion as if they were buying some helmets for the military or some pencils for a government school. True, individual American states do face a fiscal crisis (much like the EMU nations) as users of the dollar, which is why some 48 out of 50 now face fiscal crises (a problem that could easily be alleviated were the US Federal Government to undertake a comprehensive system of revenue sharing on a per capita basis with the various individual states). But, if any “lesson” is to be learned from Greece, Ireland, or any other euro zone nation, it is not the one that Mr. King is seeking to impart. Rather, it is the futility of imposing arbitrary limits on fiscal policy devoid of economic context. Unfortunately, few are recognizing the latter point. The prevailing “lesson” being drawn from the Greek experience, therefore, will almost certainly lead the US, and the UK, to the same miserable economic outcome along with higher deficits in the process. As they say in Europe, “Finanzkapital uber alles”.

The USA is broke and something needs to be done NOW

Yet Another ‘Innocent Fraud’ Attack On Social Security And Medicare

The Future of Public Debt

By John Mauldin

For the rest of this letter, and probably next week as well, we are going to look at a paper from the Bank of International Settlements, often thought of as the central bankers’ central bank. This paper was written by Stephen G. Cecchetti, M. S. Mohanty, and Fabrizio Zampolli. ( http://www.bis.org/publ/work300.pdf?noframes=1)

The paper looks at fiscal policy in a number of countries and, when combined with the implications of age-related spending (public pensions and health care), determines where levels of debt in terms of GDP are going. The authors don’t mince words. They write at the beginning:

“Our projections of public debt ratios lead us to conclude that the path pursued by fiscal authorities in a number of industrial countries is unsustainable.

Solvency is never the issue with non convertible currencies/ floating exchange rates. The risk is entirely inflation, yet I’ve never seen a manuscript critical of deficit spending that seriously looks at the inflation issue apart from solvency concerns.

Drastic measures are necessary to check the rapid growth of current and future liabilities of governments and reduce their adverse consequences for long-term growth and monetary stability.”

The negative consequences are always due to the moves presumed necessary to reduce deficits, not deficit spending per se.

Drastic measures is not language you typically see in an economic paper from the BIS. But the picture they paint for the 12 countries they cover is one for which drastic measures is well-warranted.

That would mean a hyper inflation scare, not solvency fear mongering.

I am going to quote extensively from the paper, as I want their words to speak for themselves, and I’ll add some color and explanation as needed. Also, all emphasis is mine.

“The politics of public debt vary by country. In some, seared by unpleasant experience, there is a culture of frugality. In others, however, profligate official spending is commonplace. In recent years, consolidation has been successful on a number of occasions. But fiscal restraint tends to deliver stable debt;

Stable public debt means stable non govt nominal savings with economies that require expanding net financial assets to support expanding credit structures and offset institutional demand leakages.

rarely does it produce substantial reductions. And, most critically, swings from deficits to surpluses have tended to come along with either falling nominal interest rates, rising real growth, or both. Today, interest rates are exceptionally low and the growth outlook for advanced economies is modest at best. This leads us to conclude that the question is when markets will start putting pressure on governments, not if.

Govts with non convertible currency/floating fx are not subject to pressure from markets with regards to funding or interest rates.

“When, in the absence of fiscal actions, will investors start demanding a much higher compensation for the risk of holding the increasingly large amounts of public debt that authorities are going to issue to finance their extravagant ways?

Investors have to take what’s offered, or exit the currency by selling it so someone else. And floating exchange rates continuously express the indifference levels

In some countries, unstable debt dynamics, in which higher debt levels lead to higher interest rates, which then lead to even higher debt levels, are already clearly on the horizon.

Only countries such as the euro zone members who are not the issuer of the euro, but users of the euro. They are analogous to us states in that regard, and are credit sensitive entities.

“It follows that the fiscal problems currently faced by industrial countries need to be tackled relatively soon and resolutely.

Agreed, except fiscal drag needs to be removed to restore private sector output and employment. They have this backwards.

Failure to do so will raise the chance of an unexpected and abrupt rise in government bond yields at medium and long maturities, which would put the nascent economic recovery at risk.

Like Japan? Triple the ‘debt’ of the US with a 1.3% 10 year note? And never a hint of missing a payment. And Japan, the US, UK, etc. all have the same institutional structure.

It will also complicate the task of central banks in controlling inflation in the immediate future and might ultimately threaten the credibility of present monetary policy arrangements.

Yes, inflation is the potential risk, which is mainly a political risk. People don’t like inflation and will topple a govt over it. But there is no economic evidence that inflation is a negative for growth and employment.

“While fiscal problems need to be tackled soon, how to do that without seriously jeopardising the incipient economic recovery is the current key challenge for fiscal authorities.”

Yes, exactly. Because they have it wrong. The fiscal problem that has to be tackled soon is that it’s too tight, as evidenced by the high rates of unemployment.

They start by dealing with the growth in fiscal (government) deficits and the growth in debt. The US has exploded from a fiscal deficit of 2.8% to 10.4% today, with only a small 1.3% reduction for 2011 projected. Debt will explode (the correct word!) from 62% of GDP to an estimated 100% of GDP by the end of 2011.

Yes, and not nearly enough, as unemployment is projected to still be over 9%, and core inflation is what is considered to be dangerously low.

Remember that Rogoff and Reinhart show that when the ratio of debt to GDP rises above 90%, there seems to be a reduction of about 1% in GDP. The authors of this paper, and others, suggest that this might come from the cost of the public debt crowding out productive private investment.

Can be true for fixed exchange rate regimes/convertible currency, but not true for today’s non convertible currency and floating fx regimes. And today, deficits generally rise due to slowdowns that drive up transfer payments and cut revenues ‘automatically’ (automatic stabilizers) so it’s no mystery that rising deficits are associated with slowing economies, but the causation is the reverse RR imply.

Think about that for a moment. We are on an almost certain path to a debt level of 100% of GDP in less than two years. If trend growth has been a yearly rise of 3.5% in GDP, then we are reducing that growth to 2.5% at best. And 2.5% trend GDP growth will NOT get us back to full employment. We are locking in high unemployment for a very long time, and just when some one million people will soon be falling off the extended unemployment compensation rolls.

Nothing that a sufficient tax cut won’t cure. There is a screaming shortage of aggregate demand that’s easily restored by a simple fiscal adjustment- tax cut and/or spending increase.

Government transfer payments of some type now make up more than 20% of all household income. That is set up to fall rather significantly over the year ahead unless unemployment payments are extended beyond the current 99 weeks. There seems to be little desire in Congress for such a measure. That will be a significant headwind to consumer spending.

Yes, backwards policy. They need to work to restore demand, not reduce it.

My first proposal is for a full payroll tax (fica) holiday, for example.

Government debt-to-GDP for Britain will double from 47% in 2007 to 94% in 2011 and rise 10% a year unless serious fiscal measures are taken.

Or unless the economy rebounds. In that case the deficit comes down and the danger is they let it fall too far as happens with every cycle.

Greece’s level will swell from 104% to 130%,

Yes, and they are credit sensitive like the US states.
This is ponzi.
Ponzi is when you must borrow to pay maturing debt

The US, UK, Japan, etc. Have no borrowing imperative to pay debt, the way Greece does.
They make all payments the same way- they just mark up numbers on their computers at their own central banks:

(SCOTT PELLEY) Is that tax money that the Fed is spending?
(CHAIRMAN BERNANKE) It’s not tax money. The banks have accounts with the Fed, much the same way that you have an account in a commercial bank. So, to lend to a bank, we simply use the computer to mark up the size of the account that they have with the Fed.

Bernanke didn’t call china to beg for a loan or check with the IRS to see if they could bring in some quick cash. He just changed numbers up with his computer.

so the US and Britain are working hard to catch up to Greece, a dubious race indeed.

Confused!

Spain is set to rise from 42% to 74% and “only” 5% a year thereafter; but their economy is in recession, so GDP is shrinking and unemployment is 20%. Portugal? 71% to 97% in the next two years, and there is almost no way Portugal can grow its way out of its problems.

Yes, they are in Ponzi

Japan will end 2011 with a debt ratio of 204% and growing by 9% a year. They are taking almost all the savings of the country into government bonds, crowding out productive private capital.

Nothing is crowded out with non convertible currency and floating fx. Banks have no shortage of yen lending power. The yen the govt net spends can be thought of as the yen that buy the jgb’s (japan govt bonds)

Reinhart and Rogoff, with whom you should by now be familiar, note that three years after a typical banking crisis the absolute level of public debt is 86% higher, but in many cases of severe crisis the debt could grow by as much as 300%. Ireland has more than tripled its debt in just five years.

Ireland is in Ponzi as they are users of the euro.

The BIS continues:

“We doubt that the current crisis will be typical in its impact on deficits and debt. The reason is that, in many countries, employment and growth are unlikely to return to their pre-crisis levels in the foreseeable future. As a result, unemployment and other benefits will need to be paid for several years, and high levels of public investment might also have to be maintained.

“The permanent loss of potential output caused by the crisis also means that government revenues may have to be permanently lower in many countries. Between 2007 and 2009, the ratio of government revenue to GDP fell by 2-4 percentage points in Ireland, Spain, the United States and the United Kingdom.

Again, failure to recognize the critical differences between issuers and users of the currency.

It is difficult to know how much of this will be reversed as the recovery progresses. Experience tells us that the longer households and firms are unemployed and underemployed, as well as the longer they are cut off from credit markets, the bigger the shadow economy becomes.”

Yes, responsible fiscal policy would not have let demand fall this far. The US should have had a full payroll tax holiday no later than sept 08, and most of the damage to the real economy would have been avoided.

We are going to skip a few sections and jump to the heart of their debt projections. Again, I am going to quote extensively, and my comments will be in brackets [].Note that these graphs are in color and are easier to read in color (but not too difficult if you are printing it out). Also, I usually summarize, but this is important. I want you to get the full impact. Then I will make some closing observations.

The Future Public Debt Trajectory

“We now turn to a set of 30-year projections for the path of the debt/GDP ratio in a dozen major industrial economies (Austria, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, the United Kingdom and the United States). We choose a 30-year horizon with a view to capturing the large unfunded liabilities stemming from future age-related expenditure without making overly strong assumptions about the future path of fiscal policy (which is unlikely to be constant). In our baseline case, we assume that government total revenue and non-age-related primary spending remain a constant percentage of GDP at the 2011 level as projected by the OECD. Using the CBO and European Commission projections for age-related spending, we then proceed to generate a path for total primary government spending and the primary balance over the next 30 years. Throughout the projection period, the real interest rate that determines the cost of funding is assumed to remain constant at its 1998-2007 average, and potential real GDP growth is set to the OECD-estimated post-crisis rate.

[That makes these estimates quite conservative, as growth-rate estimates by the OECD are well on the optimistic side.]

Yes, future liabilities are always quoted in isolation from future demand leakages including growth of reserves in pension funds, insurance companies, corps, foreign govts, etc.

And they are always used to imply solvency issues. No actual calculations are ever done regarding inflation.

Debt Projections

“From this exercise, we are able to come to a number of conclusions. First, in our baseline scenario, conventionally computed deficits will rise precipitously. Unless the stance of fiscal policy changes, or age-related spending is cut, by 2020 the primary deficit/GDP ratio will rise to 13% in Ireland; 8-10% in Japan, Spain, the United Kingdom and the United States; [Wow!] and 3-7% in Austria, Germany, Greece, the Netherlands and Portugal. Only in Italy do these policy settings keep the primary deficits relatively well contained – a consequence of the fact that the country entered the crisis with a nearly balanced budget and did not implement any real stimulus over the past several years.

Yes, this is big trouble for the solvency of the euro zone members, but not the rest.

“But the main point of this exercise is the impact that this will have on debt. The results plotted as the red line in Graph 4 [below] show that, in the baseline scenario, debt/GDP ratios rise rapidly in the next decade, exceeding 300% of GDP in Japan; 200% in the United Kingdom; and 150% in Belgium, France, Ireland, Greece, Italy and the United States. And, as is clear from the slope of the line, without a change in policy, the path is unstable. This is confirmed by the projected interest rate paths, again in our baseline scenario. Graph 5 [below] shows the fraction absorbed by interest payments in each of these countries.From around 5% today, these numbers rise to over 10% in all cases, and as high as 27% in the United Kingdom.

“Seeing that the status quo is untenable, countries are embarking on fiscal consolidation plans. In the United States, the aim is to bring the total federal budget deficit down from 11% to 4% of GDP by 2015. In the United Kingdom, the consolidation plan envisages reducing budget deficits by 1.3 percentage points of GDP each year from 2010 to 2013 (see eg OECD (2009a)).

Why would anyone who understood actual monetary operations want to increase fiscal drag with elevated unemployment and excess capacity .

“To examine the long-run implications of a gradual fiscal adjustment similar to the ones being proposed, we project the debt ratio assuming that the primary balance improves by 1 percentage point of GDP in each year for five years starting in 2012. The results are presented as the green line in Graph 4. Although such an adjustment path would slow the rate of debt accumulation compared with our baseline scenario, it would leave several major industrial economies with substantial debt ratios in the next decade.

“This suggests that consolidations along the lines currently being discussed will not be sufficient to ensure that debt levels remain within reasonable bounds over the next several decades.

“An alternative to traditional spending cuts and revenue increases is to change the promises that are as yet unmet. Here, that means embarking on the politically treacherous task of cutting future age-related liabilities.

Here we go- this is too often the ‘hidden agenda’

It’s all about cutting social security and medicare.

Who would have thought!!!

Yes, the euro zone’s institutional arrangements that make member govt spending revenue constrained have it on the road to collapse, maybe very soon, and for reasons other than long term liabilities.

The rest of the world doesn’t have that issue, as govt spending is not revenue constrained, and the risk to prosperity is acting as if we all have the same revenue constraints as the euro zone.

With this possibility in mind, we construct a third scenario that combines gradual fiscal improvement with a freezing of age-related spending-to-GDP at the projected level for 2011. The blue line in Graph 4 shows the consequences of this draconian policy. Given its severity, the result is no surprise: what was a rising debt/GDP ratio reverses course and starts heading down in Austria, Germany and the Netherlands. In several others, the policy yields a significant slowdown in debt accumulation. Interestingly, in France, Ireland, the United Kingdom and the United States, even this policy is not sufficient to bring rising debt under control.

SOVS Update

It’s all moving very quickly now.

The US 10 year is down over 25 bp from the highs, US stocks are leveling off as the dollar is looking up, hurting foreign earning translations as are rising risks of more serious trouble in the euro zone.

It’s also becoming more apparent that the austerity measures do not ‘fix’ anything but instead slow growth and cause the automatic stabilizers to keep the national gov. deficits high and growing, causing further credit deterioration.

While higher deficits are the answer for growth, at the same time they reduce already deteriorating creditworthiness.

The question is now whether the deficits get large enough to support the needed GDP growth that might restore credit worthiness before the loss of credit worthiness causes widespread defaults.

On Thu, Apr 22, 2010 at 6:35 AM, wrote:
EU release of budget deficit estimates for 2009 which were revised higher hurting the peripherals

Ref Entity 5y$ COD 5y/10y Coupon

Germany 35-39 1.5 4/5 25x
France 59-64 4 3/5 25x
Netherland 37-41 2 3/5 25x
Finland 26-30 1.5 3/5 25x
Norway 17-20 0.5 2/4 25x
Denmark 35-40 1.5 3/5 25x

Belgium 68-73 4.5 2/4 100x
Austria 66-70 4.5 2/4 100x
Sweden 36-40 2 3/5 100x

Greece 545-585 85 -120/-85 100x
Portugal 268-278 45.5 -22/-15 100x
Spain 178-188 23 -8/-3 100x
Italy 148-153 17.5 -1/3 100x
Ireland 175-180 24.5 -3/3 100x

USA €’s 38-41 0 2/4 25x
Switzerland 45-55 0 2/5 25x
UK 73-76 2 1/3 100x

GS on GREECE – INITIAL IMPRESSIONS AND MARKET

This remains the tricky part, seems:

Several key issues remain outstanding, however:

1. The budgetary and reform milestones which need to be cleared in order for Greece to receive funding have yet to be hammered out with the lenders. The statement suggests that discussions will start tomorrow and may last weeks, potentially resulting in market volatility if there are disagreements.

2. Availability and drawdown conditions have yet to be decided. Specifically, the one reached over the weekend is a political agreement and each EMU government will now need to go seek legislative approval in Parliament. Related open questions include: Where will the loans rank with respect to other existing Greek debt? Where will these loans show up in the lenders’ books (i.e., will they increase the deficit and debt)? Will they require extra funding in the capital markets?

3. Most importantly, as Erik Nielsen has commented in a note this afternoon, the issue of medium term debt sustainability remains open. It will depend on measures and reforms put in place by the Greek authorities, the response of domestic activity, and the external economic environment.

Best Regards. FUG
Francesco U. Garzarelli

EU Daily

The institutional structure puts the Eurozone in a very awkward position.

The higher deficits desired by the economy to restore non govt net financial assets at the same cause a deterioration in the credit worthiness of the member nations running the deficits, which seems to limit the process as these to two forces collide in a counterproductive, unstable and turbulent manner.

The higher member nation deficits also are a force that moves the euro lower which can continue until exports somehow resume via the foreign sector reducing its net financial euro assets as evidenced by a pickup in net euro zone exports. That process can be drawn out and problematic as well in a world where global politics is driven by export desires from all governments.

EU Headlines:

Trichet Expects Investors to ‘Recognize’ Greek Moves

Italian Consumer Prices Rose in March on Energy Costs

Europe Inflation Jumps More Than Economists Forecast

Euro Area Needs to Substantially Improve Governance, EU Says

German Unemployment Unexpectedly Declined in March

German Machine Orders Jumped 26% in February on Foreign Demand

France’s 2009 deficit hits record high 7.5 percent of GDP

yet more on greece

Gets stranger by the day:

Broke? Buy a few warships, France tells Greece

March 23 (Economic Times) — In a bizarre twist to the Greek debt crisis, France and Germany are pressing Greece to buy their gunboats and warplanes, even as they urge it to
cut public spending and curb its deficit.


Indeed, some Greek officials privately say Paris and Berlin are using the crisis as leverage to advance arms contracts or settle payment disputes, just when the Greeks are trying to reduce defense spending.

“No one is saying ‘Buy our warships or we won’t bail you out’, but the clear implication is that they will be more supportive if we do what they want on the armaments front,” said an adviser to Prime Minister George Papandreou, speaking on condition of anonymity because of the diplomatic sensitivity.

Greece spends more of its gross domestic product on the military than any other European Union country, largely due to long-standing tension with its neighbour, historic rival and NATO ally, Turkey.

“The Germans and the French have them over a barrel now,” said Nick Witney, a former head of the European Defense Agency.

“If you are trying to repair Greek public finances, it’s a ludicrous way to go about things.”

France is pushing to sell six frigates, 15 helicopters and up to 40 top-of-the-range Rafale fighter aircraft.

Greek and French officials said President Nicolas Sarkozy was personally involved and had broached the matter when Papandreou visited France last month to seek support in the financial crisis.

FRIGATE PURCHASE

The Greeks were so sensitive to Sarkozy’s concerns that they announced on the day Papandreou went to Paris that they would go ahead with buying six Fremm frigates worth 2.5 billion euros ($3.38 billion), despite their budget woes.

The ships are made by the state-controlled shipyard DCNS, which is a quarter owned by defense electronics group Thales and may have to lay workers off in the downturn.

Greece is also in talks buy 15 French Super Puma search-and-rescue helicopters made by aerospace giant EADS for an estimated 400 million euros.

The Rafale, made by Dassault Aviation, is a more distant and vastly dearer prospect. There is no published price, but each costs over $100 million, plus weapons.

Germany is meanwhile pressing Athens to pay for a diesel-electric submarine from ThyssenKrupp, of which it refused to take delivery in 2006 because the craft listed during sea trials following a disputed refurbishment in Kiel.

Payment would clear the way for ThyssenKrupp to sell its loss-making Greek unit Hellenic Shipyards, the biggest shipbuilder in the eastern Mediterranean, to Abu Dhabi MAR, industry sources said.

ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems last year canceled a Greek order for four other submarines over the dispute, in which it said Athens’ arrears exceeded 520 million euros.

Witney, now at the European Council on Foreign Relations, said German officials were embittered by Greek behavior in the long-running dispute, as well as previous payment problems over the purchase of German Leopard II tanks.

Greek Deputy Defense Minister Panos Beglitis told Reuters the dispute was on the brink of settlement but denied the timing had anything to do with Athens’ bid to clinch German backing this week for a financial safety net for Greek debt.

“(The submarine) Papanicolis has been carefully inspected by German and Greek experts. It has been greatly improved and declared seaworthy. We will take it, sell it and make a profit,” he said in an interview.

“We are paying 300 million (euros) and we will sell it for 350 million,” Beglitis said. Witney questioned Greece’s chances of turning a profit on a second-hand submarine.

NO LINKAGE?

Asked whether big European suppliers were using the crisis to press arms sales on Athens, he said: “This has always been the case with these countries. It is not because of the crisis, there is no link.”

Beglitis said this year’s defense budget was set at 2.8 per cent of GDP, down from 3.1 per cent in 2009. Non-government sources say the real level of military spending may be higher.

“Our strategy is continuously and steadily to reduce spending. This is also in line with the Greek stability and growth program,” Beglitis said. The program, submitted to the EU, pledges to reduce the budget deficit from 12.9 per cent last year to below 3 per cent by the end of 2012.

Western officials and economists have advocated a radical reduction of the armed forces as a long-term way of reducing structural spending, but Greek officials say that would require a real improvement in relations with Turkey.

Despite warmer ties, the two countries remain in dispute over Cyprus and maritime boundaries and have sporadic aerial incidents over the Aegean Sea.

French economist Jacques Delpla said Greece could reap big savings if it moved jointly with Turkey and Cyprus to settle disputes in the Aegean and Eastern Mediterranean and engaged in mutual disarmament.

“Unlike Portugal or Ireland, Greece could benefit from significant peace dividends to reduce its titanic fiscal deficits,” he said.

>   
>   On Mon, Mar 22, 2010 at 10:18 AM, wrote:
>   
>   Warren, don’t know if you saw this analysis from David Kelly.
>   

Thanks,

My current take is very similar:

Looks to me like this is about health care insurance and not health care per se.

Most all that seems to have happened is that government is now helping/funding up to 30 million more people to purchase private health insurance.

It’s a health care insurance bill, not a health care bill. It uses taxes and medicare cuts to ‘pay for’ private sector insurance company premiums.

So most of the funding goes to insurance companies, a portion of which will then be paid to providers and pharma.

The underlying health care system, with all it’s problems, remains largely unchanged.

It requires insurance companies to accept high risks, extend coverages, etc. and therefore raises costs for the insurance companies. This would raise premiums, however there are some controls on that, which would narrow margins.

This is a very odd mixture- using public funds to subsidize private sector insurance premiums.

After reviewing the timing of expenses and taxes and cuts I agree it doesn’t look like there’s much of an immediate macro issue. Maybe a very small negative bias upfront if some expenses go up.

The Investment Implications of Health Care Reform

By David Kelly

This morning, after almost a year of heated debate, the President has achieved his goal of a major reform to the health care system. Yesterday, the House voted to approve the 2409 page Senate Bill passed in December along with 153 pages worth of amendments, on the understanding that the Democratic majority in the Senate would accept these amendments without alteration. Presuming that Senate Democrats do not renege on their pledge, the combined bills will shortly become law.

So what does all of this mean for investors?

First, we need to recognize that in discussing this issue, like any other issue in investing, it is critical to leave politics and emotion to one side. People have very strong opinions on all sides of the health care debate – they are entitled to those opinions. These comments are solely focused on the investment implications of the combined bills.

So passing over the generally recognized positive of expanding coverage to roughly 30 million of the 50 million U.S. residents who don’t currently have insurance, what does it all mean for the economy and markets?

Taxes: The most obvious quantifiable impact of the bill is an increase in taxes for upper income Americans, particularly on investment income. Starting in 2013, the Medicare tax rate on households with income over $250,000 will be increased from 1.45% to 2.35%. In addition, a new 3.8% Medicare tax will be introduced for the same group on investment income.

Currently, the tax rate on dividends and long-term capital gains is 15%. In 2011, those rates are expected to rise to 20% for households earning over $250,000 and with the new Medicare tax, these rates will rise to 23.8% for the same group. Under current tax law, investors get to keep 85% of the income stream from taxable stock market investments. Under this new law this will be cut by 8.8% to 76.2%, reducing the value of the income stream by 10.4% (that is 8.8% of 85%). This is obviously a significant number. However, it is worth noting three things about this:

* First, roughly half of U.S. stocks are owned by households with income under $250,000 and roughly half are held in non-taxable accounts. Thus, using a number of broad assumptions, the value of the average stock should be reduced by one quarter of 10.4% or 2.6% – not good obviously, but also not an overwhelming reason to avoid stocks after 12 month period in which they rose by over 70% and still appear undervalued.

* Second, this bill does not put stocks at a further disadvantage relative to fixed income. The maximum federal tax rate on bonds and cash accounts is currently 35% and with tax changes coming in 2011 combined with these changes, that maximum rate will rise to 43.4% for households with income over $250,000 in 2013.

* And, third, it’s not like we haven’t been here before. On average over the past 40 years the maximum federal tax on capital gains was 24.7% and the maximum tax rate on dividends was 44.6%.

For the Medical Care Industry, this bill will expand demand without much effort to reign in costs. A combination of federal subsidies and mandates will increase the pool of insured, and while there many constraints preventing insurance companies from limiting coverage there are few which limit how much they can charge for it.

The pharmaceutical industry will benefit for this as well as a plan to remove the donut hole from the Medicare prescription drug benefit program by 2020. Early in the debate on health care, the White House negotiated deals with pharmaceutical, insurance and medical device companies to dissuade them from fighting the reform effort. Under these deals, they appear to retain autonomy on price setting. However, they will pay cumulative taxes of $107 billion between 2011 and 2019. To the extent that they are able to pass these costs on to consumers they may all do OK in this reform, although they may still be a target for future reform efforts.

The American Medical Association and American Hospital Association have both endorsed the health reform effort with a number of reservations. For the most part, the legislation does not interfere with patient-doctor relationships and, by expanding the pool of the insured, will reduce the number of hours which doctors are forced to devote to charity cases. Most doctors are naturally happy to see patients not lose their coverage due to pre-existing conditions clauses, annual caps or non-renewal of existing insurance due to illnesses.

For the Federal Deficit: According to the Congressional Budget Office, the passage of this legislation would reduce federal deficits by a cumulative $143 billion between 2010 and 2019 and by greater amounts in the following decade. However, these estimates should be taken with more than a grain of salt. It is obviously very hard to estimate what total federal health care spending will be over the next decade. However, whatever else is said about this bill there is nothing in it to suggest a reduction in either the quantity or prices of health care services consumed.

* There is no meaningful malpractice reform.
* There is no reduction in drug patent lives.
* There is no compulsion to force insurance companies to compete across state lines.
* There is no effort to limit health care procedures in the last year of life.
* There is no movement in the direction of forcing consumers to confront the cost of services at the point of purchase, and,
* There are no meaningful incentives to force the insured to take better care of their own health.

In fact, for the most part this bill moves away from, rather than towards, the principles of market economics. In 2007, the U.S. devoted 16% of its GDP to health care spending compared to 11% in the country with the second highest spending which was France. Despite this it ranks 38th in the world in life expectancy at birth. Sadly, this bill isn’t likely to change either of these numbers for the better.

For the economy: Despite dire predictions, it’s not clear that health care reform will really slow economic growth that much. Most of the tax provisions don’t kick in until 2013 and the mandates on businesses and individuals don’t kick in in a big way until 2016. Between now and then, the economy is quite capable of staging a full cyclical recovery. It may be that businesses will, in the end, be forced to pay more for the health care of their workers – however, overall, American business is quite capable of limiting wage increases to add to benefit costs. It may be that America as a society ends up spending more on health care. However, if we spend more on health care and less on housing or education or hamburgers, that is our choice. The jobs created in the health care field are American jobs and still some the highest skilled and best paid jobs out there. It should be noted, however, that to the extent that the government incurs more debt to pay for higher health care costs, it probably does mean higher long-term interest rates.

Finally, for politics: The passage of health care reform is a huge victory for the President and it may ultimately work out better for him politically than many Republicans had hoped or Democrats had feared. The economy is improving, and if it continues to do so, many may feel that their fears about health care reform were unfounded. The reality is more complicated. Health care reform wasn’t about to stop the economy in its tracks anyway and the President will be the beneficiary of a cyclical bounce-back which, on its face, appears to owe much more to pent-up demand than government stimulus. Either way the Democrats will lose seats in the mid-term election. However, the end-game for health care reform may well mean less of a swing to the Republicans in November than many had thought.

All in all, a lot to consider but also, more importantly, a lot to keep in proper perspective.

detail for book

The following, from a 2005 paper of mine, provides a good summary of the argument with quotations and bibliographic citations. Feel free to use for any project of Warren Mosler, as per his instructions. Also, please let me know if you have any further questions or I can provide any additional information. In addition to the information on Colonial Africa, I have added a brief section on Europe and Asia, where the same phenomenon can be found. Also, I refer to a 2006 paper of mine that provides evidence that many of the most famous names in the history of economics were well aware of the phenomenon. Also many political scientists, policy-makers, sociologists, historians, etc. Finally, I have also documented the “tax-driven cowrie shell” from both Africa and Asia, that is, contrary to what has previously been thought (by such economists as Milton Friedman), cowrie currency was not a so-called ‘primitive’ money, but was similarly tax-driven as colonial currency or today’s dollar. Let me know if you would like these references as well.

The economist “Rodney” Warren refers to is Walter Rodney, and his book is in the bibliography. I provide examples from many African colonies, such as Nigeria, German East Africa, French West Africa, British Central Africa, Upper Volta, Southern Rhodesia, and South Africa, but not specifically Ghana. If you need examples specifically from Ghana, let me know and I can provide them.

Once again, please do not hesitate to contact me directly anytime for further assistance. My contact info follows.

Sincerely,

Mathew Forstater

Professor of Economics

University of Missouri—Kansas City

From:

Mathew Forstater, 2005, “Taxation and Primitive Accumulation: The Case of Colonial Africa” in Research in Political Economy, Vol. 22, pp. 51-64.

Direct taxation [and the requirement that tax obligations be settled in colonial currency] was used to force Africans to work as wage laborers, to compel them to grow cash crops, to stimulate labor migration and control labor supply, and to monetize the African economies. Part of this latter was to further incorporate African economies into the larger emerging global capitalist system as purchasers of European goods. If Africans were working as wage laborers or growing cash crops instead of producing their own subsistence, they would be forced to purchase their means of subsistence, and that increasingly meant purchasing European goods, providing European capital with additional markets. It thus also promoted, in various ways, marketization and commoditization. [Direct taxation] appears to have been one of the most powerful policies in terms of both its wide variety of functions, its universality in the African colonial context, and its success in achieving its intended effects. Of course, taxation was not the sole determinant of primitive accumulation [note: “primitive accumulation” or similar terms such as primary accumulation or original accumulation, was a term used by the Classical economists, such as Adam Smith, David Ricardo, and Karl Marx to refer to the process by which subsistence workers became wage-laborers, and the process of early capitalist development in general]. But it has certainly been under-recognized in the literature on primitive accumulation. The history of direct taxation also has some wider theoretical implications. It shows, for example, “that ‘monetization’ did not spring forth from barter; nor did it require ‘trust’—as most stories about the origins of money claim” (Wray, 1998, p. 61). In the colonial context, money was clearly a “creature of the state”. In addition, this phenomenon was in no way unique to the African case. As will be seen following the section on Africa, the same process was also found in Europe, Asia, and elsewhere.

TAXATION AND PRIMITIVE ACCUMULATION IN COLONIAL AFRICA

Colonial administrators at first believed that market incentives and persuasion might result in a forthcoming supply of labor:

Initially the French imagined that if they would only create new needs for the Africans, the indigenous people would go out to work. When this did not happen, the French introduced taxes so as to make Africans earn wages. (Coquery-Vidrovitch, 1969, pp. 170-171)

From the first it was assumed that ample cheap labor was a major asset in Africa…Practical experience soon showed, however, that Africans did not, as a rule, approximate to Indian coolies. Few in sub-Saharan African had experience of working for pay or outside the traditional subsistence economy, and few had any real need to do so. In course of time monetary incentives might generate a voluntary labor force, but during the first decades after pacification neither governments nor private investors could afford to wait indefinitely for the market to work this revolution. (Fieldhouse, 1971, p. 620)

A number of methods were utilized to compel Africans to provide labor and cash crops. Among these were work requirements, pressure for ‘volunteers’, land policy squeezing Africans into ‘reserves’ destroying the subsistence economy, and ‘contracts’ with penal sanctions (Fieldhouse, 1971, pp. 620-621). But the most successful method turned out to be direct taxation.

Direct taxation was used throughout Africa to compel Africans to produce cash crops instead of subsistence crops and to force Africans to work as wage laborers on European farms and mines:

In those parts of Africa where land was still in African hands, colonial governments forced Africans to produce cash crops no matter how low the prices were. The favourite technique was taxation. Money taxes were introduced on numerous items—cattle, land, houses, and the people themselves. Money to pay taxes was got by growing cash crops or working on European farms or in their mines. (Rodney, 1972, p. 165, original emphasis)

The requirement that taxes be paid in colonial currency rather than in-kind was essential to producing the desired outcome, as well as to monetize the African communities, another part of colonial capitalist primitive accumulation and helping to create markets for the sale of European goods:

African economies were monetised by imposing taxes and insisting on payments of taxes with European currency. The experience with paying taxes was not new to Africa. What was new was the requirement that the taxes be paid in European currency. Compulsory payment of taxes in European currency was a critical measure in the monetization of African economies as well as the spread of wage labor. (Ake, 1981, pp. 333-334)

Colonial governors and other administrators were well aware of this ‘secret’ of colonial capitalist primitive accumulation, although they often justified the taxation on other grounds, some ideological and others demonstrating the multiple purposes of taxation from the colonial point of view. “One Governor, Sir Perry Girouard, is reported to say: ‘We consider that taxation is the only possible method of compelling the native to leave his reserve for the purpose of seeking work’” (Buell, 1928, p. 331). First Governor General of the Colony and Protectorate of Nigeria, Sir Frederick Lugard’s Political Memoranda and Political Testimonies are filled with evidence regarding direct taxation: “Experience seems to point to the conclusion that in a country so fertile as this, direct taxation is a moral benefit to the people by stimulating industry and production” (Lugard, 1965a, p. 118). Lugard’s belief that “Direct taxation may be said to be the corollary of the abolition, however, gradual, of forced labour and domestic slavery” (1965a, p. 118), acknowledges the role of direct taxation in forcing Africans to become wage-laborers. Lugard was also clear that the “tax must be collected in cash wherever possible…The tax thus promotes the circulation of currency with its attendant benefits to trade” (1965a, p. 132).

Lugard and other colonial administrators cited a number of other justifications for direct taxation:

Even though the collection of the small tribute from primitive tribes may at first seem to give more trouble than it is worth, it is in my view of great importance as an acknowledgement of British Suzerainty…It is, moreover, a matter of justice that all should pay their share alike, whether civilized or uncivilized, and those who pay are quick to resent the immunity of others. Finally, and in my judgment the most cogent reason, lies in the fact that the contact with officials, which the assessment and collection necessitates, brings these tribes into touch with civilizing influences, and promotes confidence and appreciation of the aims of Government, with the security it affords from slave raids and extortion.” (Lugard, 1965b, pp. 129-130)

The tax affords a means to creating and enforcing native authority, of curbing lawlessness, and assisting in tribal evolution, and hence it becomes a moral benefit, and is justified by the immunity from slave-raids which the people now enjoy.” (p. 173)

Taxation was also justified on grounds that it assisted in ‘civilizing’ African peoples: “For the native,” Ponty stated in 1911, “taxation, far from being the sign of a humiliating servitude, is seen rather as proof that he is beginning to rise on the ladder of humanity, that he has entered upon the path of civilization. To ask him to contribute to our common expenses is, so to speak, to elevate him in the social hierarchy” (Conklin, 1997, p. 144). Colonial tax policies were also introduced in the name of the ‘dignity’ of, and the obligation to, work, where contact with Europeans again was emphasized:

From this need for native labor, the theory of the dignity of labor has developed; this dignity has been chiefly noticeable in connection with labor in the alienated areas. The theory has also developed that it is preferable for the native to have direct contact with the white race so that his advance in civilization should be more rapid than if he remained in his tribal area attending to his own affairs. This is the “inter-penetration” theory in contrast to the “reserve” or “separation” theory. (Dilley, 1937, p. 214)

All of these functions of direct taxation may be seen in some sense as part of colonial capitalist primitive accumulation, whether as assisting in promoting marketization or serving ideological functions in the reproduction of the colonial capitalist mode.

Several points concerning the role of direct taxation in colonial capitalist primitive accumulation need to be made. First, direct taxation means that the tax cannot be, e.g., an income tax. An income tax cannot assure that a population that possesses the means of production to produce their own subsistence will enter wage labor or grow cash crops. If they simply continue to engage in subsistence production, they can avoid the cash economy and thus escape the income tax and any need for colonial currency. The tax must therefore be a direct tax, such as the poll tax, hut tax, head tax, wife tax, and land tax. Second, although taxation was often imposed in the name of securing revenue for the colonial coffers, and the tax was justified in the name of Africans bearing some of the financial burden of running the colonial state, in fact the colonial government did not need the colonial currency held by Africans. What they needed was for the African population to need the currency, and that was the purpose of the direct tax. The colonial government and European settlers must ultimately be the source of the currency, so they did not need it from the Africans. It was a means of compelling the African to sell goods and services, especially labor services for the currency. Despite the claims by the colonial officials that the taxes were a revenue source, there is indication that they understood the working of the system well. For example, often the tax was called a “labor tax” or “prestation.” Under this system, one was relieved of their tax obligation if one could show that one had worked for some stated length of time for Europeans in the previous year (see, e.g., Christopher, 1984, pp. 56-57; Crowder, 1968, p. 185; Davidson, 1974, pp. 256-257; Dilley, 1937, p. 214; Wieschoff, 1944, p. 37). It is clear in this case that the purpose of the tax was not to produce revenue.

To achieve its intended effects, it was also important that the direct tax be enforced, and numerous penalties existed for failing to meet one’s obligation. In German East Africa, “Sanctions against non-payment were severe—huts were burnt and cattle confiscated—so tax defaulters were not numerous” (Gann and Duignan, 1977, pp. 202-203). All kinds of harsh penalties for failing to pay taxes have been documented:

If a man refused to pay his taxes, the Mossi chief was permitted to sequester his goods and sell them. If the man had neither the taxes nor the goods, the chief had to send him and his wife (or wives) to the administrative post to be punished. Sometimes, a man and his wife would be made to look at the sun from sunrise to sunset while intoning the prayer Puennam co mam ligidi (“God, give me money”). Other times a man would be made to run around the administrative post with his wife on his back; if he had several wives, he had to take each one in turn. Then his wife or wives had to carry him around. (Skinner, 1970, p. 127)

Collective punishments were also used widely to enforce the tax. At the very least, failure to “pay could be met, and regularly was met, by visits from the colonial police and spells of ‘prison labour’.” (Davidson, 1974, pp. 256-257)

Another important element in assuring the smooth functioning of the direct tax system was keeping wages low, which had the additional benefit of keeping costs down for private employers. If wages were too high relative to the tax burden, Africans would only work enough to pay off their tax obligation and the labor supply would remain limited:

While taxation is high, wages are very low. It would not do to pay the Natives too much for they would not work a day more than it was absolutely necessary to get tax money. So employers pay the minimum in order to exploit their labourers as long as possible. (Padmore, 1936, p. 67)

Direct taxation was also used to promote and control migration of wage labor. If wage labor and money for cash crops was not available locally, Africans were forced to migrate to plantations and mines to find money wages (see, e.g., Greenberg, 1987; Groves, 1969; Onselan, 1976; although see also Manchulle, 1997, especially p. 8, for a critique).

TAXATION AND PRIMITIVE ACCUMULATION IN EUROPE AND ASIA

In arguing that taxation played an important role in primitive accumulation, this paper has focused on the case of Colonial Africa, but this should in no way imply that the process was limited to Africa. Evidence has already been mentioned in passing with reference to Russia and elsewhere. Vries, in a section entitled “Taxes, the Financial Revolution, War, Primitive Accumulation, and Empire” from his article “Governing Growth: A Comparative Analysis of the Role of the State in the Rise of the West” (Vries, 2002), argues that:

Praising Europe’s state-system and its mercantilist competition implies, whether one likes it or not, praising taxes. The increase of taxation we see in mercantilist countries may also have been a blessing in disguise. Paying them may have been an unpleasant experience, but it need not necessarily have been a bad thing from a macro-economic point of view. It is not farfetched to expect that ever-increasing taxes forced people to work harder and longer. Since the economy of large parts of early modern Europe was characterized by un(der)employment and under-utilization of the available means of production, there was plenty of room for increased production. Moreover, the fact that taxes were collected in money, led to increasing commercialization. Which in turn could increase government income via indirect taxes. (Vries, 2002, p. 75)

Despite Vries’ view of the process as a ‘blessing’, etc., it is clear that the description highlights the ways in which money taxes affected labor supply and monetization in early modern Europe, and even uses the term ‘primitive accumulation’. Later in the article, Vries reports that, in China, “one finds officials proclaiming that taxes ought to be raised to force the populace to work harder” (Vries, 2002, p. 95; for more on China, see Von Glahn, 1996). Vries goes on to report that this development took place throughout Europe and Asia:

When it comes to the way taxes were levied, monetization appears to be the tendency in the entire Eurasian continent. This process had progressed furthest in Europe. All governments preferred to get their income in money and to a very large extent managed to do so. In China an important grain levy continued to exist, but all other important government taxes had gradually been transformed into monetary payments. In India taxes for the central government had to be paid in cash. In the Ottoman Empire monetization made the least progress, but with the increasing weight of cizye, avariz, and tax farming, here too cash payments were on the rise. (Vries, p. 98)

Additional support for Europe and Western Asia is provided by Banaji (2001). Evidence for the notion that money taxes force pressures for increased market activity is provided by the reverse development, namely that a “decline in the exaction of money taxes brought about a decline in trade” (Hopkins, 1980, p. 116, quoted in Banaji, 2001, p. 16). Banaji goes on to report that:

the relentless pressure for taxation in money would also mean that despite the commercial decline which is supposed to have occurred in the Mediterranean of the seventh century, Egyptian landowners and rural communities were undoubtedly forced to meet their monetary obligations through increased production for the market (or participation in it as wage-labourers). (Banaji, 2001, p. 158)

Additional research is necessary to provide a more comprehensive and detailed documentation of the role of monetary taxation in monetization, marketization, and the creation of wage-labor and cash crop production in other regions and time periods, but it is clear that the historical process was in no way confined to Colonial Africa. The fact that various aspects of the phenomenon were recognized by economists as geographically, temporally, and theoretically diverse as Adam Smith, John Stuart Mill, Karl Marx, Fred M. Taylor, Philip Henry Wicksteed, W. Stanley Jevons, Karl Polanyi, and John Maynard Keynes supports the position that it existed with a great deal of generality (see Forstater, 2006).

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Eurozone downward spiral continues

Looks to me to be getting more desperate with increasing rhetorical nonsense.

Higher deficits due to falling revenues and rising transfer payments simultaneously weaken both the euro and national govt credit worthiness in a race against time.

And any budget cuts will only further cut aggregate demand and output, cut already falling tax revenues,
and increase unemployment and transfer payments, adding to deficits and further eroding creditworthiness.

The only hope is for a quick enough recovery that brings down deficits through exports, or, evern more unlikely, through domestic credit expansion, before the rapidly deteriorating national govt credit worthiness results in systemic failure of the payments system.

The ramifications of a banking sytem where deposits are guaranteed only by the national govts as yet
to make front page discussion, but nonetheless this structural flaw remains an ongoing source of system
risk capable of shutting down the entire euro payments system.

My proposal for an immediate and annual distribution of 1 trillion euro from the ECB to the national govts on a per capita basis will end the crisis and provide the framework for the national govt credit worthiness needed to reverse current downward spiral.

And not only does it not introduce moral hazard risk, it does the reverse by allowing
for withholding of future payments for non compliance of EU mandates.

Germany’s IG Metall, Employers Agree on Pay, Job Security

German States’ Budget Deficit Increases, Handelsblatt Reports

France’s Lagarde Sees ‘Fragile, Painstaking’ Economic Recovery

Isae Raises Italy’s 2010 Growth Forecast to 1% on Exports

Premier Insists Spain’s Economic Recovery Is Near but Offers Few Details