Category Archives: ECB

How to fix the euro banking system

Posted on by

The banks need, and I propose, ECB deposit insurance for all euro zone banks.

Currently the member governments insure their own member bank deposits and do the regulation and supervision.

So to get from here to there politically they need to turn over banking supervision to the ECB.

Let me suggest that’s a change pretty much no one would notice or care about from a practical/operational point of view?

The political problem would come from losses from existing portfolios that, in the case of a bank failure due to losses in excess of equity capital, currently would be charged to the appropriate member nations.

So under my proposal, for the ECB to suffer actual losses a member bank that it supervises and regulates would have to suffer losses in excess of its capital.

And none of the member governments currently think that their banks have negative capital, especially if they assume member governments don’t default on their debt to the banks.

And this ‘fix’ for the banking system would help insure the member governments don’t default on their obligations to their banks.

The euro zone has three financial issues at this point. One is bank liquidity which this proposal fixes. Second is national government solvency, and third is the output gap.

They need to allow larger government deficits to narrow the output gap, but that first requires fixing the solvency issue.

The solvency issue can be addressed by having the ECB guarantee all of the member government debt, which then raises the moral hazard issue.

The moral hazard issue can be addressed by giving the EU the option of not having the ECB insure new government debt and forbidding its banks to buy new government debt as a penalty for violators of the debt and deficit limits of the Stability and Growth Pact.

Share

Looking like a euro zone solution has evolved

Posted on by

Looks like the drama could be about over, with the ECB now deciding to support the entire banking system.

The ECB guarantees bank liquidity via lending to any member bank with qualifying collateral. The list of qualifying collateral is kept sufficiently inclusive and haircuts sufficiently low to ensure liquidity.

With national govt debt on the list of qualifying collateral, this allows the banking system to support national govt funding needs.

And it all comes at a time where euro zone deficit spending is sufficient to support flat to modest growth. And at a time when the politics are unlikely to push for additional material proactive austerity measures.

With modest growth and relative stability will come proclamations along the lines of ‘the austerity worked’, however, without the austerity it all would have ‘worked’ just as well, but from a starting point of a lower output gap.

Share

Dallara Says Greek Euro Exit May Exceed 1 Trillion Euros

Posted on by

>   
>    Apparently, MMT is a hard concept for the IIF to grasp.
>   

Yes!
Incompetent disgrace.
No reason an exit has to cost them anything in real terms.

But because they believe otherwise they’ll work to keep Greece in.

Dallara Says Greek Euro Exit May Exceed 1 Trillion Euros

By Andrew Davis and Rebecca Christie

May 25 (Bloomberg) — The cost of Greece exiting the euro would be unmanageable and probably exceed the 1 trillion euros ($1.25 trillion) previously estimated by the Institute of International Finance, the group’s managing director said.

The Washington-based IIF’s projection from earlier this year is “a bit dated now” and “probably on the low side,”Charles Dallara said in an interview in Rome today. “Those who think that Europe, and more broadly the global economy, are really prepared for a Greek exit should think again.”

The European Central Bank’s exposure to Greek liabilities is more than twice as big as the ECB’s capital, said Dallara, who represented banks in their negotiations with the Greek government on its debt restructuring. As a result, he predicted the bank would be unable to provide liquidity and stabilize the euro-area financial sector.

“The ECB will be insolvent” if Greece were to exit the euro, Dallara said. “Europe would have to first and foremost recapitalize its central bank.”

Share

Frozen Europe Means ECB Must Resort to ELA

Posted on by

They have become resigned to the idea that the ECB must write the check for the banking system as do all currency issuers directly or indirectly as previously discussed.

And they now also know the ECB is writing the check for the whole shooting match directly or indirectly also as previously discussed.

With deficits as high as they are and bank and government liquidity sort of there, the euro economy can now muddle through with flattish growth and a large output gap. Ok for stocks and bonds and not so good for people.

Next the action moves to moral hazard risk in an attempt to keep fiscal policies tight without market discipline.

But that’s for another day as first the work on an acceptable framing of the full ECB support they’ve backed into.

Frozen Europe Means ECB Must Resort to ELA

By Dara Doyle and Jeff Black

May 25 (Bloomberg) — The first rule of ELA is you don’t talk about ELA.

The European Central Bank is trying to limit the flow of information about so-called Emergency Liquidity Assistance, which is increasingly being tapped by distressed euro-region financial institutions as the debt crisis worsens. Focus on the program intensified last week after it emerged that the ECB moved some Greek banks out of its regular refinancing operations and onto ELA until they are sufficiently capitalized.

European stocks fell and the euro weakened to a four-month low as investors sought clarity on how the Greek financial system would be kept alive. The episode highlights the ECB’s dilemma as it tries to save banks without taking too much risk onto its own balance sheet. While policy makers argue that secrecy is needed around ELA to prevent panic, the risk is that markets jump to the worst conclusion anyway.

“The lack of transparency is a double-edged sword,” said David Owen, chief European economist at Jefferies Securities International in London. “On the one hand, it increases uncertainty, but at the same time we do not necessarily want to know how bad things are as it can add fuel to the fire.”

Under ELA, the 17 national central banks in the euro area are able to provide emergency liquidity to banks that can’t put up collateral acceptable to the ECB. The risk is borne by the central bank in question, ensuring any losses stay within the country concerned and aren’t shared across all euro members, known as the euro system.

ECB Approval

Each ELA loan requires the assent of the ECB’s 23-member Governing Council and carries a penalty interest rate, though the terms are never made public. Owen estimates that euro-area central banks are currently on the hook for about 150 billion euros ($189 billion) of ELA loans.

The program has been deployed in countries including Germany, Belgium, Ireland and now Greece. An ECB spokesman declined to comment on matters relating to ELA for this article.

The ECB buries information about ELA in its weekly financial statement. While it announced on April 24 that it was harmonizing the disclosure of ELA on the euro system’s balance sheet under “other claims on euro-area credit institutions,” this item contains more than just ELA. It stood at 212.5 billion euros this week, up from 184.7 billion euros three weeks ago.

The ECB has declined to divulge how much of the amount is accounted for by ELA.

Ireland’s Case

Further clues can be found in individual central banks’ balance sheets. In Ireland, home to Europe’s worst banking crisis, the central bank’s claims on euro-area credit institutions, where it now accounts for ELA, stood at 41.3 billion euros on April 27.

Greek banks tapped their central bank for 54 billion euros in January, according to its most recently published figures. That has since risen to about 100 billion euros, the Financial Times reported on May 22, without citing anyone.

Ireland’s central bank said last year it received “formal comfort” from the country’s finance minister that it wouldn’t sustain losses on collateral received from banks in return for ELA.

“If the collateral underpinning the ELA falls short, the government steps in,” said Philip Lane, head of economics at Trinity College Dublin. “Essentially, ELA represents the ECB passing the risk back to the sovereign. That could be the trigger for potential default or, in Greece’s case, potential exit.”

Greek Exit

The prospect of Greece leaving the euro region increased after parties opposed to the terms of the nation’s second international bailout dominated May 6 elections. A new vote will be held on June 17 after politicians failed to form a coalition, and European leaders are now openly discussing the possibility of Greece exiting the euro.

A Greek departure could spark a further flight of deposits from banks in other troubled euro nations, according to UBS AG economists, leaving them more reliant on funding from monetary authorities. Banks in Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain saw a decline of 80.6 billion euros, or 3.2 percent, in household and corporate deposits from the end of 2010 through March this year, according to ECB data.

“ELA is a symptom of the strain in the system, and Greece is the tip of the iceberg here,” Owen said. “As concerns mount about break-up, that sparks deposit flight. Suddenly we’re talking about 350 billion, 400 billion as bigger countries avail of ELA.”

German ELA

ELA emerged as part of the euro system’s furniture in 2008, when the global financial crisis led to the bailouts of German property lender Hypo-Real Estate AG and Belgian banking group Dexia. While the Bundesbank’s ELA facility has now been closed, Dexia Chief Executive Officer Pierre Mariani told the bank’s shareholders on May 9 that it continues to access around 12 billion euros of ELA funds.

ELA was a measure that gave central banks more flexibility to keep their banks afloat in situations of short-term stress, said Juergen Michels, chief euro-area economist at Citigroup Global Markets in London.

“It seems to be now a more permanent feature in the periphery countries,” Michels said, adding there’s a risk that “the ECB loses control to some extent over what’s going on.”

The ECB was forced to confirm on May 17 it had moved some Greek banks onto ELA after the news leaked out, roiling financial markets. The ECB said in an e-mail that as soon as the banks are recapitalized, which it expected to happen “soon,” they will regain access to its refinancing operations. The ECB “continues to support Greek banks,” it added.

‘Life Support’

By approving ELA requests, the ECB is ensuring that banks that would otherwise not qualify for its loans have access to liquidity.

“The ELA is a perfect life-support system, but it’s not a system for what happens after that,” said Lorcan Roche Kelly, chief Europe strategist at Trend Macrolytics LLC in Clare, Ireland. “What you need is a bank resolution mechanism, a method to get rid of a bank that’s insolvent. In Ireland, and perhaps in Greece as well, the problem is that you’ve got banking systems that are insolvent.”

For Citigroup chief economist Willem Buiter, there is a bigger issue at stake. ELA breaks a key rule that is designed to bind the monetary union together, he said.

“It constitutes a breach of the principle of one monetary, credit and liquidity policy on uniform terms and conditions for the whole euro system. The existence of ELA undermines the monetary union.”

Share

Still no political support to leave euro

Posted on by

*GREEK DATA RC POLL CONDUCTED MAY 21 TO MAY 23 ON 1,019 PEOPLE
*GREEK DATA RC POLL SHOWS 56% GREEKS SAY DRACHMA A CATASTROPHE
*GREEK DATA RC POLL SAYS 83% GREEKS WANT TO KEEP EURO
*GREEK DATA RC POLL SAYS 64% GREEKS WON’T ABANDON EURO
*GREEK DATA RC POLL SAYS 30% GREEKS THINK LIKELY TO LEAVE EURO
*GREEK DATA RC POLL GIVES DEMOCRATIC LEFT 3.3% SUPPORT
*GREEK DATA RC POLL SHOWS PASOK WITH 10.6% SUPPORT

Share

Secret Greek Fund Revealed

Posted on by

Except it’s just about an ‘allowable entry’, not a ‘fund’.

The BOG, functionally a ‘branch’ of the ECB, just ‘accounts for’ negative member bank balances as loans.

Presumably on a ‘legally’ collateralized basis.

That’s what CB’s do in the normal course of business.

CB’s don’t ‘have funds’ in their currency of issue any more than the scorekeeper in a card game has any points.

Europe Shares Seen Higher; Secret Greek Fund Revealed

By Matthew West

May 22 (CNBC) — European shares were set to open higher on Tuesday as investors came to the conclusion that the markets were most likely over-sold and news emerged overnight of around 100 billion euros ($127 billion) of liquidity provided by the European Central Bank to the Greek central bank to prop up Greece’s financial system.

Share

Trichet proposal

Posted on by

Not much of a plan, but note that it now makes ECB centric proposals respectable.

This is serious progress:

Ex-ECB Chief Trichet Unveils Bold Plan to Save Euro

May 17 (Reuters) — Europe could strengthen its monetary union by giving European politicians the power to declare a sovereign state bankrupt and take over its fiscal policy, the former head of the European Central Bank said on Thursday in unveiling a bold proposal to salvage the euro.

The plan offered by Jean-Claude Trichet, who stepped down last November as ECB president, would address a fundamental weakness of the 13-year-old single currency, the survival of which is threatened by the Greek crisis.

The monetary union has always defied economic principles, because the euro was launched ahead of European fiscal or political union. This has caused strains for countries running huge budget deficits – namely Greece, Portugal, Ireland, Spain and Italy – that have led to financing difficulties and over-stretched banking systems.

For the European Union, a fully fledged United States of Europe where nation states cede a large chunk of fiscal authority to the federal government appears politically unpalatable, Trichet said.

An alternative is to activate the EU federal powers only in exceptional circumstances when a country’s budgetary policies threaten the broader monetary union, he said.

“Federation by exception seems to me not only necessary to make sure we have a solid Economic and Monetary Union, but it might also fit with the very nature of Europe in the long run. I don’t think we will have a big (centralized) EU budget,” Trichet said in a speech before the Peterson Institute of International Economics here.

“It is a quantum leap of governance, which I trust is necessary for the next step of European integration,” he said.

His proposal was presented in Washington on the eve of the G8 meeting of the world’s major economies, hosted by U.S. President Barack Obama who will press Europe to intensify its efforts to resolve the sovereign debt crisis, which threatens a fragile global recovery.

It also comes ahead of a critical meeting of EU leaders on May 23 to discuss ways to support growth. Its strict budgetary policies to date have led to recessions in many countries, political unrest and in Greece a political stalemate after recent elections.

Trichet said the building blocks already are in place for moving ahead with his fiscal plan.

Countries have agreed to surveillance of each other’s budgets and they have agreed to levy fines on countries that run excessive budget deficits, giving them fiscal oversight authority.

The next step would be to take a country into receivership when its political leaders or its parliament cannot implement sound budgetary policies approved by the EU. The action would have democratic accountability if it were approved by the European Council of EU heads of states and the elected European Parliament, he said.

The idea earned a warm reception from leading economists and prominent Europeans attending the session.

“It is a very radical proposal, couched as a modest step,” said Richard Cooper, international economist at Harvard.

Caio Koch Weser, former German economics minister, said he found it “very attractive” because it addresses the problem of a strong European Central Bank, a weak European Commission which acts as the EU’s executive branch, and a confused European Council, which provides political leadership.

Share

Quick update

Posted on by

US economy muddling through, growing modestly, particularly given the output gap, but growing nonetheless.

Lower crude prices should also help some.

I had guessed the Saudis would hold prices at the $120 Brent level, given their output of just over 10 million bpd showed strong demand
and their capacity to increase to their stated 12.5 million bpd capacity remains suspect. And so with the Seaway pipeline now open (last I heard)
to take crude from Cushing to Brent priced markets I’d guessed WTI would trade up to Brent.

But what has happened is the Saudi oil minister started making noises about lower prices and when ‘market prices’ started selling off the Saudis ‘followed’ by lowering their posted prices, sustaining the myth that they are ‘price takers’ when in reality they are price setters.

So to date, contrary to my prior guess, both wti and brent have sold off quite a bit, and cheaper imported crude is a plus for the US economy. Which is also a plus for the $US, as a lower import bill makes $US ‘harder to get’ for foreigners.

But the trade for quite a while has been strong dollar = weak US stocks due to export pricing/foreign earnings translations, and also because US stocks have weakened on signs of euro zone stress, which has been associated with a weaker euro. So when things seem to be looking up for the euro zone, the euro tends to go up vs the dollar, with US stocks doing better with any sign of ‘improvement’ in the euro zone.

It’s all a tangled case of cross currents, which makes forecasting anything particularly difficult.

Not to mention possible dislocations from the whale, which may or may not have run their course, etc.

And then there’s the news from Greece.

First, they made a full bond payment yesterday of nearly 500 million euro to bond holders who did not accept the PSI discounts. This is confounding for the obvious reasons, signals it sends, moral hazard, credibility, etc. etc. But it’s also a sign the politicians are doing what they think it takes to keep the euro going as the currency of the euro zone. Same goes for the decision to fund Greece as per prior agreements even when there is no Greek govt to talk to, and lots of signs any new govt may not honor the arrangements.

Even if that means tricking private investors out of 100 billion, rewarding those who defy them, whatever. Tactics may be continuously reaching new lows but all for the end of keeping the euro as the single currency.

It also means that while, for example, 10 year Spanish yields may go up or down, the intention is for Spain, one way or another, to fund itself, even if short term. Doesn’t matter.

And more EFSF type discussions. The plan may be to start using those types of funds as needed, keeping the ECB out of it for that much longer, regardless of where longer term bonds happen to trade.

As for the euro zone economy, yes, growth is probably negative, but if they hold off on further fiscal adjustments, the 6%+ deficit they currently are running for the region is probably, at this point, enough to muddle through around the 0 growth neighborhood. The upside isn’t much from there, as with limited private sector credit growth opportunities, and substantial net export growth unlikely, and strong ‘automatic stabilizers’ any growth could be limited by those automatic fiscal stabilizers. Not to mention that this type of optimistic scenario likely strengthens the euro and keeps a lid on net exports as well.

And sad that this ‘bullish scenario’ for the euro zone means their massive output gap doesn’t even begin to close any time soon.

For the US, this bullish scenario has similar limitations, but not quite as severe, so the output gap could start to narrow some and employment as a percentage of the population begin to improve. But only modestly.

The US fiscal cliff is for real, but still far enough away to not be a day to day factor. And it at least does show that fiscal policy does work, at least according to every known forecaster with any credibility, which might open the door to proactive fiscal? Note the increasing chatter about how deficits don’t seem to drive up interest rates? And the increasing chatter about how the US, Japan, UK, etc. aren’t like the euro zone members with regards to interest rates?

Same in the euro zone, where discussion is now common regarding how austerity doesn’t work to grow their economies, with the reason to maintain it now down to the need to restore solvency. This is beginning to mean that if they solved the solvency riddle some other way they might back off on the austerity. And now there is a political imperative to do just that, so things could move in that direction, meaning ECB support for member nation funding, directly or indirectly, which removes the ‘ponzi’ aspect.

Share