Responses to comments on the ‘Comments on Brian Wesbury article’ post

Post: Comments on Brian Wesbury article

Comment by ‘Hoover Printing Press‘:

Warren congrats on your new website.

Thanks!

I keep reading that the bond insurers have let banks keep lots of “accounting issues” off the books – thus affecting tier 1 capital requirements – currently to the banks advantage. Without the bond insurers and their AAA rating by moody and sp (fitch has already lowered ratings down from AAA) the banks will have to scramble for lots of capital without the insurance, barclays recent estimate upwards of 150 billion. I remember Buffet referring to Financial WMD’s.

Yes, but that’s a matter of institutional structure. The government has several options.

For example:

  • The government could change bank ‘haircuts’ to capital by allowing AA insured bonds to have the same or only marginally higher capital charges as AAA bonds. The capital requirements are somewhat arbitrary to being with and meant to serve public purpose.
  • The government could offer some for of supplemental insurance at a fee to investors holding the AAA insured bonds in question. Again, for example, the fee could perhaps be 1%, and the government could guarantee a price of 97 to any investor who paid the fee. The government will probably make a profit on this type of program, as the monolines’ capital will still be in first lost position, and even if they are downgraded to AA, the implication is they will have more than sufficient capital to cover all losses. That is what AA means.

I read articles that NY is in a mad scramble to get buffet and others to bring some assurances to the bond insurance industry because the muni debt market is going to seize up without bond insurance and what the AAA ratings of that insurance lends to capital requirements and “accounting issues.”

Yes. There are some institutional ‘land mines’ in place that the government can either prevent from being tripped or defuse directly (for a fee), as above.

In hoover’s time I remember reading from Rothbard’s great depression I believe that he printed but the banks used the money to shore up their reserves, they did not want to lend and spur the economy at the cost of their own survival.

Under that gold standard regime, the government was limited in what it could do. Deficit spending carried the risk of loss of gold reserves, for example. And, in fact, the US was forced off the gold standard in 1934 domestically and devalued for foreign holders of $. This was the only actual default in US history.

So why is Bush and congress giving joe six pack 150B when he could have used that to back the bond insurers and the banks?

No comment.. You must be new here??? :)

Possibly getting the ratings agency to save some face and for fitch to bring AAA ratings back to the bond insurers?

Or the supplemental plan, above, that doesn’t bail out the insurers.

On another point, you claim a large difference between hoover’s problems and our problems today is the gold standard and floating exchange rates. Unfortunately I must press you as to how that is so when the folks at the top of this chart (china) http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_current_account_balance have fixed exchange rates relating to the folks at the bottome of it (USA). Soros is claiming the USA will soon lose reserve currency status.

A fixed exchange rate ‘forces’ you to run a trade surplus to sustain sufficient reserves of gold or the reserve currency of choice. It also limits the ability to conduct countercyclical deficit spending as that leads to loss of reserves and default/devaluation/etc.

China has a ‘dirty float’, which means the currency is not convertible, but instead they intervene at various prices.

Not at all the same thing.

I am not so sure the Euro will be able to weather a global financial meltdown and perhaps in economic warfare, keeping reserve currency status is worth fighting over.

What is it, and why do you care?

With bush selling lots of scatter bombs to the house of Saud, at least we are trying to keep friends who have control over oil.

Still with the USA’s current account balance the worst of any country on the planet,

Imports are real benefits, exports real costs. In general, the larger your trade deficit, the higher your standard of living.

40K nukular bombs and a war machine that eats up large domestic resources, and a consumer base whose only skill is to shop till princess drops,

Consumption is the only point of economics.

I am not so sure what you are trying to save to get USA to deficit spend even MORE?

Right now, more deficit spending of the type proposed will mainly increase inflation.

Would it be so bad if that guy “dfense” from the mike douglas movie “FALLING DOWN” gets put out of a missle building job and starts fishing on the dock of the bay wasting time?


Comment by Scott Fullwiler:

Wesbury’s basically a monetarist (everything that goes wrong is the Fed’s fault for creating either too much or too little “liquidity”) operating with a gold standard model.

Yes, that’s where we don’t agree on causation and risks. But interesting that even in that paradigm, he doesn’t see the risks the Fed does, as they are in the same gold standard paradigm.

That said, he’s been bullish on the economy since 2002, and he’s been mostly right in that, except that he’s also been saying inflation is right around the corner since then, too, given weak dollar, strong gold.

And I’ve seen inflation underway due to Saudis acting as the swing producer and hiking price continuously.

And I see the weak $ as a change in preferences of non-resident holdings of financial assets.

Until a year and a half ago he was also claiming that the large spread b/n st and lt Treasuries was another a sign of inflation,

And I say it’s a sign of what investors think the Fed will be doing next. So to that extent, the curve reflects investor expectations. But there is also a lot of institutional structure that steers maturity preferences; so, the result is a mix of the two.

though he decided bond markets were being irrational once the yield curve inverted (again, if inflation is right around the corner).

Again, that reflects investor expectations.

I’ve used him in my classes for several years as a “balance” to the Levy view of “debt deflation’s around the corner.” Interesting to see that you and he are on the same page now at least regarding state of the economy, since you’ve been pessimistic (at least in long run, given small govt deficit) while he’s been a non-stop bull.

Yes, I’ve been expecting lower domestic demand since the financial obligations ratio go to where it go in Q2 2006, due to the shrinking budget deficit. What I missed was how strong exports would be, mainly on our three pronged weak dollar policy that has been scaring foreigners away from holding $US financial assets.

This includes calling CB’s currency manipulators if they buy $US, aggressive Middle Eastern policy, and the Fed’s apparent lack of concern for the value of the currency (inflation). Fundamentally, the falling budget deficit is good for the $US, but technically government policy has triggered an ‘inventory liquidation’ over seas that is causing exports to boom.

And now we are learning the hard way (or should be) what an export driven economy looks like – weak domestic demand due to high prices and full employment as we build goods and services for others.


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Why I expect US exports to continue to be very strong..

The desire to accumulate $US financial assets has been diminished for at least the following reasons:

  1. Treasury policy – Paulson is actively pushing both a strong yuan and threatening any other CB that buys $US with the label of ‘currency manipulator.’ CB’s had been perhaps the largest source of $US financial assets accumulation and are now limited to compounding of interest.
  2. US foreign policy is probably driving CB’s in less than friendly nations to diversify their reserves away from $US financial assets.
  3. Fed policy has the appearance of a ‘beggar thy neighbor’/’inflate your way out of debt’ policy, as the Fed aggressively cuts rates in the face of inflation not seen in 25 years.

This all sets in motion a downward pricing of the $US as non residents sell them to each other at lower and lower prices in this effort to lower their rate of accumulation of $US financial assets. But these financial assets can only ‘go away’ when they get spent or invested in the US, when US prices are low enough to cause this to happen. The rapid rise in exports and accelerated non resident buying of US real estate and other assets is anecdotal evidence this is taking place as theory predicts.

This is a very large cyclical force that should continue to drive rapidly rising exports for perhaps a year or more. Weak foreign economies should have little effect on this process, as that weakness doesn’t reduce the desire of portfolio managers to shift out of $US financial assets.

This is also highly inflationary for the US. This buying by non residents both drives down the $US and drives up the prices of US exports, now rising at a 7% clip last I checked.

The desired shift is probably well over $1 trillion which means exports will increase by a good part of that to facilitate this transfer.

This can sustain US GDP in the face of falling domestic demand, which will stay relatively low until housing picks up. Employment will remain reasonably good, but standards of living fall as we produce as much, but export more and consume less. We get paid to work but can buy less due to high prices, with our remaining production exported to those wishing to reduce their accumulated $US financial assets.

We’ve been talking about this possibility about a long time, but seems our trade negotiators have finally got their wish.

Meanwhile, Saudis continue to act the swing producer. In fact, they told Bush today they have 2 million bpd capacity in reserve, and that markets are well supplied. At their price, of course.

Probably have been some year end allocations out of crude by pension funds as with the price hikes they would need to sell some to keep the same ‘weight’ in their portfolios. That should be ending soon.

And I agree with Karim, the Fed is not likely to act on inflation until core starts to rise or their measures of inflation expectations start to rise, despite the fact that mainstream theory clearly says if any of that happens it’s too late. Seems to me the senior FOMC members are putting their jobs on the line by taking that kind of systemic risk, which their own theory tells them is far higher than the risk of any lost output from a .


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China – Passing higher food prices to Asia

It makes political sense to use export taxes as a form of a domestic subsidy for basic necessities, and from a macro economic
point of view, it a good way to express the political desire as well.

A negative is this will give domestic producers an incentive to ‘cheat’ to avoid the tax. Enforcement costs depend on they type of borders, etc.

It also puts downward pressure on the currency, though very modestly in this case, as it now takes more fx to buy the same products.

China – Passing higher food prices to Asia

Barclays Capital Research
by Wai Ho Leong

Tax on food grain exports comes shortly after subsidies removed.

In a further attempt to rein in food price inflation, China will introduce a one-year tax on grain exports beginning in January 2008. This will require exporters of 57 types of food grains to pay temporary taxes of 5-25%. Exporters of wheat, rye, barley and oats will be required to pay a 20% tax, while exporters of corn, rice and soy beans will have to pay 5%. Soaring food prices (+18% Y/Y in November), which have a 33% weight in the CPI, drove inflation to an 11-year high of 6.9% in November. The tax applies only to basic food grains. Other agricultural and processed products are not included, reflecting the government’s continued emphasis on promoting higher-value-added agricultural exports.

This latest administrative measure comes less than two weeks after China scrapped a 13% rebate on 84 types of exported food grains on 18 December. Prices have been rising, even though government reserves of corn and wheat were opened up earlier this year to meet domestic demand. The administrative measures taken in China will compound these pressures further, particularly in North Asian countries.


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Perspective

Perspective

by Steve Hanke

US Mercantilist Machismo, China replaces Japan

The United States has recorded a trade deficit in each year since 1975.

That is a good thing – exports are real costs, imports benefits.

This is not surprising because savings in the US have been less than investment.

This is a tautology from the above misconceived notion and of no casual consequence.

The trade deficit can be reduced by some combination of lower government consumption, lower private consumption

Yes, if we get less net goods and services from non residents, our trade deficit goes down, as does our real terms of trade and our standard of living.

Real terms of trade are the real goods and services you export versus the real goods and services you import.

In economics, it is better to receive (real goods and services) than to give.

or lower private domestic investment.

We could (and would if ‘profitable’) ‘borrow to invest’ domestically (loans ‘create’ deposits, not applicable/no such thing as ‘borrowing from abroad’ etc.)

But said, domestic borrowing decreases ‘savings’ equal to the increased domestic investment (accounting identity). So, the trade gap would remain the same if we invested more or less via domestic funding.

So, his above statement is a tautology of no casual interest.

But you wouldn’t know it from listening to the rhetoric of Washington’s politicians and special interest groups. Many of them are intent on displaying their mercantilist machismo. This is unfortunate. A reduction of the trade deficit should not even be a primary objective of federal policy. Never mind. Washington seems to thrive on counter-productive trade “wars” that damage both the US and its trading partners.

Almost sounds like he gets it! But don’t get your hopes up..

From the early 1970s until 1995, Japan was an enemy. The mercantilists in Washington asserted that unfair Japanese trading practices caused the US trade deficit and that the US bilateral trade deficit with Japan could be reduced if the yen appreciated against the dollar.

Washington even tried to convince Tokyo that an ever-appreciating yen would be good for Japan. Unfortunately, the Japanese
complied and the yen appreciated, moving from 360 to the greenback in 1971 to 80 in 1995. In April 1995, Secretary of the Treasury Robert Rubin belatedly realized that the yen’s great appreciation was causing the Japanese economy to sink into a deflationary quagmire.

Actually, it was the fiscal surplus they allowed from 1987-1992 that drained net yen income and financial assets that removed support for the yen credit structure and ended the expansion.

In consequence, the US stopped arm-twisting the Japanese government about the value of the yen and Secretary Rubin began to evoke his now-famous strong-dollar mantra. But while this policy switch was welcomed, it was too late. Even today, Japan continues to suffer from the mess created by the yen’s appreciation.

The mess was created by the surplus and repeated attempts to reduce the following countercyclical deficits. Only when the deficit was left alone and grew to 7% of GDP a few years ago did the economy finally get the net income and financial assets it needed to recover. Only to be undermined recently by a political blunder regarding building codes. Japan should do better in 2008, as that obstacle is overcome.

As Japan’s economy stagnated, its contribution to the increasing US trade deficit declined, falling from its 1991 peak of almost 60% to about 11%.

Sad to see that happens. Now Americans have to build the cars here as their new factories are now in the US.

While Japan’s contribution declined, China’s surged from slightly more than 9% in 1990 to almost 28% last year.

Yes, they have workers willing to consume fewer calories than those in Japan.

With these trends, the Chinese yuan replaced the Japanese yen as the mercantilists’ whipping boy. Interestingly, the combined Japanese–Chinese contribution has actually declined from its 1991 peak of over 70% to only 39% last year. This hasn’t stopped the mercantilists from claiming that the Chinese yuan is grossly undervalued, and that this creates unfair Chinese competition and a US bilateral trade deficit with China.

The unfair part is their workers are willing to work for a lot less real consumption and become the world’s slaves via net exports.

And we don’t know how to sustain our own domestic demand via internal policy; so, our politicians blame the foreigners.

I was introduced to the Chinese currency controversy five years ago when I appeared as a witness before the US Senate Banking Committee on May 1, 2002. The purpose of those hearings was to determine, among other things, whether China was manipulating its exchange rate.

All state currencies are public monopolies, and value is a function of various fiscal/monetary policies. So in that sense, all currencies are necessarily ‘manipulated’ as all monopolists are inherently ‘price setters’.

So, this entire point is moot, though far from mute.

United States law requires the US Treasury Department, in consultation with the International Monetary Fund, to report biyearly as to whether countries – like China – are gaining an “unfair” competitive advantage in international trade by
manipulating their currencies.

Clearly no understanding that exports are real costs, and imports are real benefits. The entire worlds seems backwards on this.

The US Treasury failed to name China a currency manipulator back in May 2002, and it hasn’t done so since then. This isn’t too surprising since the term “currency manipulation” is hard to define and, therefore, is not an operational concept that can be used for economic analysis. The US Treasury acknowledged this fact in reports to the US Congress in 2005. But this fact has not stopped politicians and special interest groups in the United States, and elsewhere, from asserting that China manipulates the yuan.

Yes, to keep their wages low so they can produce, and we can consume.

Protectionists from both political parties in the US have threatened to impose tariffs on imported Chinese goods if Beijing does not dramatically appreciate the yuan. These protectionists even claim that China would be much better off if it allowed the yuan to become stronger vis-à-vis the US dollar.

They would – it would lower their net exports, a real benefit at the macro level.

Percenta

This is not the first time US special interests have made assertions in the name of helping China. During his first term, Franklin D. Roosevelt delivered on a promise to do something to help silver producers. Using the authority granted by the Thomas Amendment of 1933 and the Silver Purchase Act of 1934, the Roosevelt Administration bought silver.

Can’t think of a better way to help a producer!

This, in addition to bullish rumors about US silver policies, helped push the price of silver up by 128% (calculated as
an annual average) in the 1932-35 period.

(It has gone up more here in the last three years without the government buying any.)

Bizarre arguments contributed mightily to the agitation for high silver prices. One centered on China and the fact that it was on the silver standard. Silver interests asserted that higher silver prices—which would bring with them an appreciation in the yuan—would benefit the Chinese by increasing their purchasing power.

Yes – whoever is long silver wins when the price goes up.

As a special committee of the US Senate reported in 1932, “silver is the measure of their wealth and purchasing power; it serves as a reserve, their bank account. This is wealth that enables such peoples to purchase our exports.”

Things didn’t work according to Washington’s scenario. As the dollar price of silver and of the yuan shot up, China was thrown into the jaws of depression and deflation. In the 1932-34 period, gross domestic product fell by 26% and wholesale prices in the capital city, Nanjing, fell by 20%.

In an attempt to secure relief from the economic hardships imposed by US silver policies, China sought modifications in the US
Treasury’s silver purchase program.

They didn’t know how to sustain domestic demand. They needed to float the currency, offer a public service job at a non disruptive wage to anyone willing and able to work, and leave the overnight risk free rate at 0%. (See ‘Full Employment and Price Stability‘.)

But its pleas fell on deaf ears.

Maybe ears with different special interests?

After many evasive replies, the Roosevelt Administration finally indicated on October 12, 1934 that it was merely carrying out a policy mandated by the US Congress. Realizing that all hope was lost, China was forced to effectively abandon the silver standard on October 14, 1934, though an official statement was postponed until November 3, 1935.

About the same time the US abandoned the gold standard domestically for much the same reason.

This spelled the beginning of the end for Chiang Kaishek’s Nationalist government.

He let unemployment go too high out of ignorance of how to sustain domestic demand. A common story throughout history.

History doesn’t have to repeat itself. Foreign politicians should stop bashing the Chinese about the yuan’s exchange rate. This would allow the Chinese to focus on important currency and trade issues: making the yuan fully convertible, respecting intellectual property rights and meeting accepted health and safety standards for their exports.

Why do we want to encourage anything that reduces their net exports???
(rhetorical question)

Steve H. Hanke is a Professor of Applied Economics at The Johns Hopkins University in Baltimore and a Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute in Washington, D.C.


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China’s export prices

Checked with our China economist, it appears that China’s export price has been rising since early 06. Compared to the price by end of 06, export prices are already 7.4% higher (See charts attached)-an interoffice email

2007-12-11 China Export Input Prices2007-12-11 China Export Prices vs Term of Trade

While headlines focus on China’s internal inflation issues, more relevant to the fed are China’s export prices, which become our import prices.

And it is not wrong to view import prices as functionally equivalent to unit labor costs, due to outsourcing of labor investment inputs.

And a weaker $ vs Yuan will add to our ‘import inflation’.

Fed hawks know this and probably sense a ripping inflation in the pipeline.