Updated JGBi Index Ratio Table

(an interoffice email)

Hi Dave,

If core inflation is finally showing up in Japan that says a lot for world inflation in general!

warren

On Dec 28, 2007 8:12 AM, Dave Vealey wrote:
>
>
>
> With last nights stronger then expected release of core inflation in Japan
> (+0.4% y/y vs. +0.3% expected), January will see linkers pickup another 0.10
> in their index ratio. Prior to last nights release the index ratio was
> expected to be unchanged for the month of Jan.
>
>
>
> DV
>
>

Re: Is $700 billion a big number

(an email and an article)

On Dec 23, 2007 5:37 PM, Russell Huntley wrote:
>
>
>
> For a very bearish take on the credit crisis, see: Crisis may make 1929 look
> a ‘walk in the park’. The article includes a $700 billion loss estimate from
> the head of credit at Barclays capital:
>
> Goldman Sachs caused shock last month when it predicted that total crunch
> losses would reach $500bn,

Yes, could be. Rearranging of financial assets.

leading to a $2 trillion contraction in lending
> as bank multiples kick into reverse.

I don’t see this as a consequence. Bank lending will go in reverse only if there are no profitable loans to be made.

With floating exchange rates, bank capital in endogenous and will respond to returns on equity.

This already seems humdrum.
>
> “Our counterparties are telling us that losses may reach $700bn,” says Rob
> McAdie, head of credit at Barclays Capital. Where will it end? The big banks
> face a further $200bn of defaults in commercial property. On it goes.

Been less than 100 billion so far. Maybe they are talking cumulatively over the next five years?

>
> UPDATE: My main interest in this article was the quote from Barclays
> Capital. There has been a growing agreement that the mortgage credit crisis
> would result in losses of perhaps $400B to $500B; this is the first estimate
> I’ve seen significantly above that number.
>
> I noted last week that a $1+ trillion mortgage loss number is possible if it
> becomes socially acceptable for the middle class to walk away from their
> upside down mortgages.

Historically, people just don’t walk out onto the streets. They are personally liable for the payments regardless of current equity positions, and incomes are still strong, nationally broader surveys show home prices still up a tad ear over year.

Yes, some condo flippers and speculators will walk. But demand from that source has already gone to zero – did so over a yar ago, so that doesn’t alter aggregate demand from this point.

And that doesn’t include losses in CRE, corporate
> debt and the decrease in household net worth.

Different things, but again, the key to GDP is whether demand will hold up, including exports.

And probably half of aggregate demand comes directly or indirectly from the government. Don’t see that going negative. And AMT tax just cut fifty billion for 2008 will help demand marginally.

>
> The S&L crisis was $160B, so even adjusting for inflation, the current
> crisis is much worse than the S&L crisis (see page 13 of this GAO document).

That was net government losses? Shareholders/investors lost a lot more?

And a $1 trillion per day move in the world equity values happens all the time.

Q4 GPD being revised up to the 2% range. This has happened every quarter for quite a while.

Yes, it can all fall apart, but it hasn’t happened yet. And while there are risks to demand, negative GDP is far from obvious. Those predicting recessions mainly use yield curve correlations with past cycles and things like that.

Interesting that the one thing that is ‘real’ and currently happening is ‘inflation’, which the fed doesn’t seem to care about. And it won’t stop until crude stops climbing.


♥

Repo Mkts and TAF

(an interoffice email)

On 12/21/07, Pat Doyle
wrote:
>
>
>
> It is becoming apparent that the funding pressures for year end are ebbing.
> The ease in pressure has a lot to do with the TAF and coordinated CBK
> interventions. The Fed is getting the cash to the people who need it.
> Discount window borrowings have been slowly climbing as well approx 4.6bb
> now. The Fed statement that they will provide this TAF facility for as long
> as needed is easing concerns amongst banks and providing a reliable source
> of funding for “hard to fund” assets.

Should have done this in August!
>
>
> There is and has been a lot of cash in the markets still looking for a home.
> Balance sheets are slowly cleaning up but balance sheet premiums (repo) will
> remain stubbornly high as long as the level 3 type assets remain on
> dealer/bank balance sheets.
>
>
>
> The current spread between the 1×4 FRA vs. 1×4 OIS is 57bps..

This looks like a good play – seems unlikely LIBOR will be at a wider spread than the discount rate. Load up the truck?

1×2 FRA vs.
> 1×2 OIS is 40bps. Spot 1mos LIBOR VS 1MOS FFs is 4.86 vs. 4.25 or 61bps.
> These spreads still represent continued unwillingness to lend in the
> interbank market and also illustrate a steeper credit curve.
>
>
>
> Turn funding has not changed substantially. While funding appears to be
> stabilizing, balance sheets are still bloated and capital ratios are still
> under pressure therefore balance sheets will remain expensive in repo land.
>
>
>
> From another bank;
>
> Mortgages over the year-end turn traded at 5.25 today, which we still feel
>
> is a good buy here considering the amount of liquidity the fed has been
> dumping
>
> into the system as of late (via the TAF and standard RP operations) and the
>
> expectation that they will continue to do so on Dec 31. Treasuries also
> traded
>
> over the turn traded today at 2.50, the first treasury turn trade we’ve seen
> in
>
> quite some time.
>
>
>
>
>
> Yesterday Tsy GC O/N’s backed up from the low 3s to 3.70. The FED has been
> actively trying to increase the supply of treasuries in the repo markets.
>
>
>
> AGENCY MBS repo has been steadily improving. 1mos OIS vs 1mos AGCY MBS has
> gone from a spreads of 63bps last week to 15bps last night. And spreads to
> 1month LIBOR have widened by 33bps AGCY MBS from L-23 12/13 to L-56 12/20.
> Again LIBOR still showing the unwillingness of banks to lend to each other.
>
>
> -Pat
>
>
>
>
> Patrick D. Doyle Jr.
>
> AVM, L.P. / III Associates
>
> 777 Yamato Road
>
> Suite 300
>
> Boca Raton, Fl. 33431
>
> 561-544-4575
>
>


♥

SOV CDS

From: ABNAMRO CREDIT SALES (ABN AMRO)
At: 12/20 5:18:53

10YR 5YR
BELGUIM 19/21 11/15
FRANCE 10/12 6/9
GERMANY 8/10 4/7
GREECE 29/31 22/24
ITALY 29/31 21/23
PORTUGAL 26/28 20/22
SPAIN 25 1/2/27 1/2 19/21
UK 9/11 5/8
USA 8/11 5/8

In the Eurozone, it’s probably the case that if one goes, they all go, and the shorter the better as if they don’t go bad, market will continue to think they never will and you’ll be able to reload reasonably. That’s why I bought two-year Germany a while back at maybe two cents. Don’t know where that is now.

And by buying the least expensive, you can buy more of it for the same price.

US and UK look way overpriced, as Japan was. No inherent default risk for the US, though congress could elect to default for political purpose, which happened in 1996 (?), when Ruben tricked them into not defaulting.


♥

Libor rates & spreads: down in GBP & EUR, stable in US

Thanks, Dave, my thought are the Fed will also ‘do what it takes’ which means setting price and letting quantity for term funding float.

The ECB doing 500 billion without ‘monetary consequences’ beyond lowering the term rates should have been no surprise to anyone who understands monetary ops, and confirmation of same for those central bankers who may have needed it demonstrated.


Libor rates; no surprises, most of them are down, especially in longer expiries (3mth+) -see table below-. GBP3m -18bp helped by yesterday’s auction. EUR 3m -4.75bp and probably more tomorrow.

Libor spreads.- In 3mth -spot- rates, sharp declines in EUR (-6bp to 78bp) and GBP (-14bp to 76bp) while the US spread remains fairly stable at 80.3bp (-1bp).

It seems the BoE and ECB have taken bolder actions to provide liquidity (see this morning’s message on the ECB LTRO). Let’s see the results of the 1st $20bn TAF later today.

19-Dec
Libor Rate
18-Dec
Libor Rate
Change in
% Points
18-Dec
Libor
17-Dec
Libor
Change in
% Points
USD Overnight 4.34500% 4.40000% -0.05500% 4.40000% 4.41750% -0.01750%
USD 1 Week 4.38875% 4.38625% 0.00250% 4.38625% 4.36375% 0.02250%
USD 3 Month 4.91000% 4.92625% -0.01625% 4.92625% 4.94125% -0.01500%
USD 12 Month 4.41750% 4.47188% -0.05438% 4.47188% 4.51875% -0.04687%
EUR Overnight 3.86125% 3.82750% 0.03375% 3.82750% 3.98875% -0.16125%
EUR 1 Week 4.01000% 4.01625% -0.00625% 4.01625% 4.06625% -0.05000%
EUR 3 Month 4.80125% 4.84875% -0.04750% 4.84875% 4.94688% -0.09813%
EUR 12 Month 4.80250% 4.80750% -0.00500% 4.80750% 4.88313% -0.07563%
GBP Overnight 5.58750% 5.59750% -0.01000% 5.59750% 5.59750% 0.00000%
GBP 1 Week 5.61125% 5.63250% -0.02125% 5.63250% 5.64125% -0.00875%
GBP 3 Month 6.20563% 6.38625% -0.18062% 6.38625% 6.43125% -0.04500%
GBP 12 Month 5.88000% 5.94500% -0.06500% 5.94500% 5.96375% -0.01875%

Re: ffm questions

On Dec 18, 2007 1:09 AM, Scott Fullwiler wrote:
> Hi Warren
>
> A few questions on your take on fed funds market data–
>
> Std dev of fed funds rate is way up since summer compared to normal, but
> looking at the high-low numbers, the deviation (at least max deviation) is
> most significant on the low end (since August 15, it’s been more than 0.5
> below the target rate 54 times and more than 1% below 37 times) .  The high
> has only been more than 1% above the target a few times (7), though it’s
> been above 0.5% more than the target 26 times since mid-August (so much for
> doing away with frown costs).
>
> Anyway . . . what are your thoughts regarding how this persistent, sizable
> deviation on the low end is consistent with the story you’re generally
> telling? (i.e., Fed needs to lower discount rate to target and eliminate
> stigma)

Hi Scott,

My best guess is with the discount rate above the funds rate the NY Fed can’t keep the banks in a ‘net borrowed’ position or the bid for funds gaps up to something over the discount rate.  So instead, they are trying to target ‘flat’ and err on the side of letting banks be a bit long as evidenced by funds dipping below the target, and then acting to offset that move.

Also, the NY Fed sets a ‘stop’ on the repo rate when it intervenes, and with the spread between ff and repo fluctuating more than before ‘the crisis’ it may be more difficult for the NY desk to pick the right repo rate to correspond with their interest rate target.

When the discount rate was below the ff rate it was a lot easier – they just kept banks net borrowed which caused them bid funds up above the discount rate and the Fed allowed them to continue higher until the got about 1/8% above the ff target and then intervene to make reserves available via open market operations at the equiv. repo rate.

The NY Fed isn’t saying anything about what they see happening, and why there is so much variation, which doesn’t help either.  Here’s a spot where a little transparency and guidance can go a long way.

Further thoughts?

Warren

Is it as simple as saying there’s a lot more uncertainty in money
> markets and regarding the Fed’s reactions to the uncertainty?  Perhaps,
> since the effective rate has been above the target (37 times) almost as much
> as below (45 times).
>
> Thanks.
> Scott
>
> —
> ******************************

************************
> Scott T. Fullwiler, Ph.D.
> Associate Professor of Economics
> James A. Leach Chair in Banking and Monetary Economics
>
> Department of Business Administration and Economics
> Wartburg College
> 100 Wartburg Blvd
> Waverly, IA  50677

MBS Repo Markets

Thanks Pat, good report.

Yes, the Fed knows the assets won’t go away, and all they want is to see funding spreads narrow to help insure the banks aren’t forced to sell due to funding issues and thereby distort prices beyond prudent repricing of risk.


TAF auction (20bb) results announcement will come out tomorrow Wednesday 12/19 at 10:30am. Results of the program have had limited impact on repo rates but have reduced Libor rates by 20bps.Turn levels from Bank of America

UST GC= 2.80 / 2.40

AGCY MBS = 5.15

The problem with funding balance sheets hasn’t disappeared. The TAF and The Treasuries TTL programs have simply reduced the cost of funding but have not, and cannot, make an impact on balance sheet size or composition problems. Balance sheets are bloated with ABCP/ CLO / CDO / Enhanced Cash / Structured ABS / etc….

A quick survey of 4 dealers illustrates how balance sheet pressures and the liquidity of balance sheets have affected the bid for repo collateral. Usually dealers across the maturities dealers are within 5bps of each other. Currently the dispersion of bids is very wide.

At the same time we are finding dealers with balance sheet to lend. It’s just the prices of cash vary by dealer and by term and depend on which banks have bought term liquidity and what term they bought it for.

  1w 1m 3m 6m 9m 1y
MS 4.50 4.75 4.55 4.36   4.15
Citi 4.65 5.20 5.05 4.95 4.70 4.55
CSFB 4.45 4.90 4.80 4.70 4.60  
BoA 4.80 5.10 4.65 4.40 4.30 4.20
Ave 4.60 4.99 4.76 4.60 4.53 4.30
Range 0.35 0.45 0.50 0.59 0.40 0.40

The MBS spreads to LIBOR has narrowed as well. Agcy MBS had been trading as much as L-50 for 3m and longer terms. Now we are close to L-20. This seems to be a result of the TAF and CBK liquidity programs providing cheaper funds along the curve and reflects a relative downward move in LIBOR rates as the MBS and OIS markets are essentially unchanged from a week ago.


Re: liquidity or insolvency–does it matter?

(email with Randall Wray)

On Dec 15, 2007 9:05 PM, Wray, Randall wrote:
> By ________
>
> This time the magic isn’t working.
>
> Why not? Because the problem with the markets isn’t just a lack of liquidity – there’s also a fundamental problem of solvency.
>
> Let me explain the difference with a hypothetical example.
>
> Suppose that there’s a nasty rumor about the First Bank of Pottersville: people say that the bank made a huge loan to the president’s brother-in-law, who squandered the money on a failed business venture.
>
> Even if the rumor is false, it can break the bank. If everyone, believing that the bank is about to go bust, demands their money out at the same time, the bank would have to raise cash by selling off assets at fire-sale prices – and it may indeed go bust even though it didn’t really make that bum loan.
>
> And because loss of confidence can be a self-fulfilling prophecy, even depositors who don’t believe the rumor would join in the bank run, trying to get their money out while they can.

If there wasn’t credible deposit insurance.

>
> But the Fed can come to the rescue. If the rumor is false, the bank has enough assets to cover its debts; all it lacks is liquidity – the ability to raise cash on short notice. And the Fed can solve that problem by giving the bank a temporary loan, tiding it over until things calm down.

Yes.

> Matters are very different, however, if the rumor is true: the bank really did make a big bad loan. Then the problem isn’t how to restore confidence; it’s how to deal with the fact that the bank is really, truly insolvent, that is, busted.

Fed closes the bank, declares it insolvent, ‘sells’ the assets, and transfers the liabilities to another bank, sometimes along with a check if shareholder’s equity wasn’t enough to cover the losses, and life goes on. Just like the S and L crisis.

>
> My story about a basically sound bank beset by a crisis of confidence, which can be rescued with a temporary loan from the Fed, is more or less what happened to the financial system as a whole in 1998. Russia’s default led to the collapse of the giant hedge fund Long Term Capital Management, and for a few weeks there was panic in the markets.
>
> But when all was said and done, not that much money had been lost; a temporary expansion of credit by the Fed gave everyone time to regain their nerve, and the crisis soon passed.

More was lost then than now, at least so far. 100 billion was lost immediately due to the Russian default and more subsequently. So far announced losses have been less than that, and ‘inflation adjusted’ losses would have to be at least 200 billion to begin to match the first day of the 1998 crisis (August 17).

>
> In August, the Fed tried again to do what it did in 1998, and at first it seemed to work. But then the crisis of confidence came back, worse than ever. And the reason is that this time the financial system – both banks and, probably even more important, nonbank financial institutions – made a lot of loans that are likely to go very, very bad.

Same in 1998. It ended only when it was announced Deutsche Bank was buying Banker’s Trust and seemed the next day it all started ‘flowing’ again.

>
> It’s easy to get lost in the details of subprime mortgages, resets, collateralized debt obligations, and so on. But there are two important facts that may give you a sense of just how big the problem is.
>
> First, we had an enormous housing bubble in the middle of this decade. To restore a historically normal ratio of housing prices to rents or incomes, average home prices would have to fall about 30 percent from their current levels.

Incomes are sufficient to support the current prices. That’s why they haven’t gone down that much yet and are still up year over year. Earnings from export industries are helping a lot so far.

>
> Second, there was a tremendous amount of borrowing into the bubble, as new home buyers purchased houses with little or no money down, and as people who already owned houses refinanced their mortgages as a way of converting rising home prices into cash.

Yes, there was a large drop in aggregate demand when borrowers could no longer buy homes, and that was over a year ago. That was a real effect, and if exports had not stepped in to carry the ball, GDP would not have been sustained at current levels.

>
> As home prices come back down to earth, many of these borrowers will find themselves with negative equity – owing more than their houses are worth. Negative equity, in turn, often leads to foreclosures and big losses for lenders.

‘Often’? There will be some losses, but so far they have not been sufficient to somehow reduce aggregate demand more than exports are adding to demand. Yes, that may change, but it hasn’t yet. Q4 GDP forecasts were just revised up 2% for example.

>
> And the numbers are huge. The financial blog Calculated Risk, using data from First American CoreLogic, estimates that if home prices fall 20 percent there will be 13.7 million homeowners with negative equity. If prices fall 30 percent, that number would rise to more than 20 million.

Not likely if income holds up. That’s why the fed said it was watching labor markets closely.

And government tax receipts seem OK through November, which is a pretty good coincident indicator incomes are holding up.

>
> That translates into a lot of losses, and explains why liquidity has dried up. What’s going on in the markets isn’t an irrational panic. It’s a wholly rational panic, because there’s a lot of bad debt out there, and you don’t know how much of that bad debt is held by the guy who wants to borrow your money.

Enough money funds in particular have decided to not get involved in anyting but treasury securities, driving those rates down. That will sort itself out as investors in those funds put their money directly in banks ans other investments paing more than the funds are now earning, but that will take a while.

>
> How will it all end?

This goes on forever – I’ve been watching it for 35 years – no end in sight!

> Markets won’t start functioning normally until investors are
> reasonably sure that they know where the bodies – I mean, the bad
> debts – are buried. And that probably won’t happen until house prices
> have finished falling and financial institutions have come clean about
> all their losses.

And by then it’s too late to invest and all assets prices returned to ‘normal’ – that’s how markets seem to work.

> All of this will probably take years.
>
> Meanwhile, anyone who expects the Fed or anyone else to come up with a plan that makes this financial crisis just go away will be sorely disappointed.

Right, only a fiscal response can restore aggregate demand, and no one is in favor of that at the moment. A baby step will be repealing the AMT and not ‘paying for it’ which may happen.

Meanwhile, given the inflationary bias due to food, crude, and import and export prices in genera, a fiscal boost will be higly controversial as well.


♥

Re: fed action to alleaviate turn

(interoffice email)

> The Fed through it’s SOMA account injected reserves in the
> market through a repo operation that included only AGCY
> MBS. 8bb for 43 days (1/10/08).
>
> This should help to keep the spread between GC Tsy and
> AGCY MBS GC from widening much further. MBS recently
> traded as high as 6% over the turn while treasuries are trading
> in the low3’s..

Thanks, Pat – should make a difference. Also, they did trade, which is pretty much all the fed wants – risk getting repriced and markets functioning.