FOMC


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Wonder if Fisher cut a deal not to dissent for the hawkish inflation language?

Karim writes:

Decision (no cut) may be hawkish relative to expectations, but wording mostly dovish.

1st paragraph-all changes highlight downside risks to gwth; slowing export gwth a new wrinkle in addition to the usual financial market strains, labor market weakness and housing.

2nd paragraph-identical to prior except mention of inflation expectations has been dropped; so a downgrading of concern over inflation.

3rd paragraph-‘stand ready to act’ but no mention of ‘in a timely manner’.

Fisher dropped his dissent

NEW

Strains in financial markets have increased significantly and labor markets have weakened further. Economic growth appears to have slowed recently, partly reflecting a softening of household spending. Tight credit conditions, the ongoing housing contraction, and some slowing in export growth are likely to weigh on economic growth over the next few quarters. Over time, the substantial easing of monetary policy, combined with ongoing measures to foster market liquidity, should help to promote moderate economic growth.

Inflation has been high, spurred by the earlier increases in the prices of energy and some other commodities. The Committee expects inflation to moderate later this year and next year, but the inflation outlook remains highly uncertain.

The downside risks to growth and the upside risks to inflation are both of significant concern to the Committee. The Committee will monitor economic and financial developments carefully and will act as needed to promote sustainable economic growth and price stability.

OLD

Economic activity expanded in the second quarter, partly reflecting growth in consumer spending and exports. However, labor markets have softened further and financial markets remain under considerable stress. Tight credit conditions, the ongoing housing contraction, and elevated energy prices are likely to weigh on economic growth over the next few quarters. Over time, the substantial easing of monetary policy, combined with ongoing measures to foster market liquidity, should help to promote moderate economic growth.

Inflation has been high, spurred by the earlier increases in the prices of energy and some other commodities, and some indicators of inflation expectations have been elevated. The Committee expects inflation to moderate later this year and next year, but the inflation outlook remains highly uncertain.

Although downside risks to growth remain, the upside risks to inflation are also of significant concern to the Committee. The Committee will continue to monitor economic and financial developments and will act as needed to promote sustainable economic growth and price stability.


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Re: Is Fischer correct?


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(an email exchange)

Not even close!

>   
>   On Mon, Aug 25, 2008 at 11:54 PM, Russell wrote:
>   
>   I found Fischer’s speech.
>   
>   ”No combination of tax hikes and spending cuts, though, will change the total
>   burden borne by current and future generations. For the existing unfunded
>   liabilities to be covered in the end, someone must pay $99.2 trillion more or
>   receive $99.2 trillion less than they have been currently promised.
>   

Why/how? Show me the debits and credits and how that changes real outcomes!

>   This is a cold, hard fact.

Yes, he believes it.

>   The decision we must make is whether to shoulder a substantial portion of that
>   burden today or compel future generations to bear its full weight.”

Yes, produce goods and services and send them back in time to pay off the debt.

>   ”We know from centuries of evidence in countless economies, from ancient
>   Rome to today’s Zimbabwe, that running the printing press to pay off today’s
>   bills leads to much worse problems later on. The inflation that results from the
>   flood of money into the economy turns out to be far worse than the fiscal pain
>   those countries hoped to avoid. ”
>   

What is ‘the printing press’ as above? Deficit spending? So why was the Fed pushing the latest fiscal package? Is this an attack on Bernanke?

>   ”Right now, we—you and I—are launching fiscal bombs against ourselves. ”

Then why is the Fed forecasting lower inflation over the next two years and beyond?


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2008-08-07 UK News Highlights


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Highlights:

ECB Leaves Interest Rates at Seven-Year High to Fight Inflation
German industrial orders drop
Western European Car Sales Fall by 6.7% in July, JD Power Says
German June Exports Rise the Most in Nearly Two Years
German Economy Contracted as Much as 1.5% in 2Q
French Trade Deficit Expands to Record as Euro Curbs Exports
Italian June Production Stalls as Record Oil Prices Damp Growth
Fall in output fuels Spanish recession fears

 
 
 
Article snip:

ECB Leaves Interest Rates at Seven-Year High to Fight Inflation (Bloomberg) – The ECBkept interest rates at a seven-year high to fight inflation even as evidence of an economic slump mounts. ECB policy makers meeting in Frankfurt left the benchmark lending rate at 4.25 %, as predicted by all 60 economists in a Bloomberg News survey. The bank, which raised rates last month, will wait until the second quarter of next year to cut borrowing costs, a separate survey shows. The ECB is concerned that the fastest inflation in 16 years will help unions push through demands for higher wages and prompt companies to lift prices. At the same time, record energy costs and the stronger euro are strangling growth. Economic confidence dropped the most since the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks in July and Europe’s manufacturing and service industries contracted for a second month. ECB President Jean-Claude Trichet will hold a press conference 2:30 p.m. to explain today’s decision.

Same as UK, less costly to address inflation now rather than support growth and address inflation later if it gets worse.

It’s been said in the US that the Fed needs to firm up the economy first, and then address inflation. To most Central Bankers this makes no sense, as they use weakness to bring inflation down.

In their view that means the Fed wants to get the economy strong enough to then weaken it.

The Fed majority sees it differently.

They agree with the above.

However, for the last year they have been forecasting lower inflation and lower growth were willing to take the chance that supporting growth would not result in higher inflation.

Now, a year later, the FOMC is faced with higher inflation and more growth than the UK and Eurozone, and systemic ‘market functioning’ risk remains.

The FOMC continues to give the latter priority as they struggle with fundamental liquidity issues that stem from a continuing lack of understanding of monetary operations.


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Fed Governor Mishkin on monetary policy


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In case there was any doubt things have changed.

from his July 28 speech:

Policymakers, academic economists, and the general public broadly agree that maintaining a low and stable inflation rate significantly benefits the economy. For example, low and predictable inflation simplifies the savings and retirement planning of households, facilitates firms’ production and investment decisions, and minimizes distortions that arise because the tax system is not completely indexed to inflation. Moreover, I interpret the available economic theory and empirical evidence as indicating that a long-run average inflation rate of about 2 percent, or perhaps a bit lower, is low enough to facilitate the everyday decisions of households and businesses while also alleviating the risk of debt deflation and other pitfalls of excessively low inflation.

The rationale for promoting maximum sustainable employment is also fairly obvious: Recessions weaken household income and business production, and unemployment hurts workers and their families.

No mention of lost real output. Must have been an oversight.

As I have outlined elsewhere, these two objectives are typically complementary and mutually reinforcing: that is, done properly, stabilizing inflation contributes to stabilizing economic activity around its sustainable level, and vice versa.

Hence the dual mandate is met by sustaining low and stable inflation rates.

Nevertheless, it’s important to note a fundamental difference between the objectives of price stability and maximum sustainable employment. On the one hand, the long-run average rate of inflation is solely determined by the actions of the Federal Reserve.

And they do believe that. They believe it’s all a function of the interest rates they select.

On the other hand, the level of maximum sustainable employment is not something that can be chosen by the Federal Reserve, because no central bank can control the level of real economic activity or employment over the longer run.

And they are not responsible for the level of economic activity, only the rate of inflation.

In fact, any attempt to use stimulative monetary policy to maintain employment above its long-run sustainable level would inevitably lead to an upward spiral of inflation with severe adverse consequences for household income and employment.


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Reinhart got it right


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I hadn’t noticed this back then, but Vince got it right: The Fed purchased the $30 billion of securities from JPM/Bear Stearns, with JPM agreeing that if there were any net losses it would be responsible for the first $1 billion.

It’s very odd that the Fed would call this a non-recourse loan, as they cut a better deal than that.

Unlike a non-recourse loan, if the securities turn out to be profitable, the Fed gets those funds.

So why would the Fed use language that implies the transaction was worse for the Fed than it actually was?

Perhaps there was a legal or some other restriction that prevented the Fed from purchasing the securities?

Seem there is a lot more to the story than has been revealed?

Press Release
Summary of Terms and Conditions Regarding the JPMorgan Chase Facility


March 24, 2008

The Federal Reserve Bank of New York (“New York Fed”) has agreed to lend $29 billion in connection with the acquisition of The Bear Stearns Companies Inc. by JPMorgan Chase & Co.

The loan will be against a portfolio of $30 billion in assets of Bear Stearns, based on the value of the portfolio as marked to market by Bear Stearns on March 14, 2008.

JPMorgan Chase has agreed to provide $1 billion in funding in the form of a note that will be subordinated to the Federal Reserve note. The JPMorgan Chase note will be the first to absorb losses, if any, on the liquidation of the portfolio of assets.

The New York Fed loan and the JPMorgan Chase subordinated note will be made to a Delaware limited liability company (“LLC”) established for the purpose of holding the Bear Stearns assets. Using a single entity (the LLC) will ease administration of the portfolio and will remove constraints on the money manager that might arise from retaining the assets on the books of Bear Stearns.

The loan from the New York Fed and the subordinated note from JPMorgan Chase will each be for a term of 10 years, renewable by the New York Fed.

The rate due on the loan from the New York Fed is the primary credit rate, which currently is 2.5 percent and fluctuates with the discount rate. The rate on the subordinated note from JPMorgan Chase is the primary credit rate plus 450* basis points (currently, a total of 7 percent).

BlackRock Financial Management Inc. has been retained by the New York Fed to manage and liquidate the assets.

The Federal Reserve loan is being provided under the authority granted by section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act. The Board authorized the New York Fed to enter into this loan and made the findings required by section 13(3) at a meeting on Sunday, March 16, 2008.

Repayment of the loans will begin on the second anniversary of the loan, unless the Reserve Bank determines to begin payments earlier. Payments from the liquidation of the assets in the LLC will be made in the following order (each category must be fully paid before proceeding to the next lower category):

  • to pay the necessary operating expenses of the LLC incurred in managing and liquidating the assets as of the repayment date;
  • to repay the entire $29 billion principal due to the New York Fed;
  • to pay all interest due to the New York Fed on its loan;
  • to repay the entire $1 billion subordinated note due to JPMorgan Chase;
  • to pay all interest due to JPMorgan Chase on its subordinated note;
  • to pay any other non-operating expenses of the LLC, if any.

Any remaining funds resulting from the liquidation of the assets will be paid to the New York Fed.

Where No Fed Has Gone Before

Why the Federal Reserve’s ‘loan’ for the Bear Stearns deal looks like an investment—and faces serious scrutiny


March 26, 2008

by Peter Coy

The Federal Reserve has stretched its mandate up, down, and sideways to prevent a financial market deluge. Now it appears to be stretching the English language a bit as well. What the Fed is calling a $29 billion “loan” to help finance JPMorgan Chase’s (JPM) purchase of Bear Stearns (BSC) looks much more like a $29 billion investment in securities owned by Bear. Although the Fed insists that it isn’t technically buying any assets, in practical terms it’s doing exactly that. All this adds up to a big and unacknowledged step up in the central bank’s financial intervention with Wall Street investment banks.

The Fed, of course, is the only part of government with the speed, power, and flexibility to arrest a bout of market panic. By rapidly intervening in mid-March to keep Bear from filing for bankruptcy, it may well have prevented a series of cascading failures that could have severely damaged the financial system and the economy. Many economists and analysts are happy that the Fed stepped into the breach. Nevertheless, now that things have quieted down a bit, the Fed is likely to face some tough questions about the precise nature of its actions as well as the legal justification for them.

The second-guessing has already begun. On Mar. 26, Senate Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs Chairman Christopher Dodd (D-Conn.) announced an Apr. 3 hearing to explore the “unprecedented arrangement” between the Fed, JPMorgan, and Bear. Top officials from the Fed and other regulators, as well as Bear Stearns CEO Alan Schwartz and JPMorgan CEO Jamie Dimon, will likely be grilled about the details.

“That Looks Like Equity”
Meanwhile, Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson gave the Fed a gentle prod on Mar. 26 in a speech to the Chamber of Commerce. While saying he fully supported the Fed’s recent actions, Paulson stressed that “the process for obtaining funds by nonbanks must continue to be as transparent as possible.” He also urged the Fed to continue to work with other agencies to get the information necessary for “making informed lending decisions.”

So far, few people have focused on what exactly the Fed is getting in exchange for supplying $29 billion to JPMorgan Chase. That’s a bit surprising because whatever the deal is, it’s far from a standard loan. The strangest twist is that even though the money goes to JPMorgan, that firm isn’t the borrower. So the Fed can’t demand repayment from JPMorgan if the Bear assets turn out to be worth less than promised.

What’s also odd is that if there’s money left after loans are paid off, the Fed gets to keep the residual value for itself. That’s what one would expect if the Fed were buying the assets, not just treating them as collateral for a loan. Vincent R. Reinhart, a former director of the Fed’s Division of Monetary Affairs and now a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, said in an interview on Mar. 26: “The New York Fed is the residual claimant. That doesn’t look to me like a loan. That looks like equity.”


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Bernanke testimony on inflation


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The last few Michigan surveys had one-year inflation expectations over 5%.

This is not lost on an FOMC that believes inflation expectations cause inflation.

Chairman Bernanke said this yesterday after outlining the inflation expectations/inflation process:

“A critical responsibility of monetary policy makers is to prevent that process from taking hold.”

‘Prevent’ implies action, not ‘monitoring’.

Might just be a poor choice of words.


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Bernanke’s July 07 speech and today’s inflation issue


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From Chairman Bernanke’s July 07 speech:

As you know, the control of inflation is central to good monetary policy. Price stability, which is one leg of the Federal Reserve’s dual mandate from the Congress, is a good thing in itself, for reasons that economists understand much better today than they did a few decades ago. Inflation injects noise into the price system, makes long-term financial planning more complex, and interacts in perverse ways with imperfectly indexed tax and accounting rules. In the short-to-medium term, the maintenance of price stability helps avoid the pattern of stop-go monetary policies that were the source of much instability in output and employment in the past. More fundamentally, experience suggests that high and persistent inflation undermines public confidence in the economy and in the management of economic policy generally, with potentially adverse effects on risk-taking, investment, and other productive activities that are sensitive to the public’s assessments of the prospects for future economic stability. In the long term, low inflation promotes growth, efficiency, and stability–which, all else being equal, support maximum sustainable employment, the other leg of the mandate given to the Federal Reserve by the Congress.

Note that the current anti-‘inflation’ argument within the FOMC is that the high prices for imports take discretionary income from consumers that reduces domestic demand and reduces the ability to service domestic debt. There was no thought or mention of that reason for ‘inflation’ being a ‘bad thing’ a year ago.

I suppose one could argue that this problem is due to there not being inflation, as with wages ‘well-anchored’ there is only a relative value story. If we did have ‘real inflation’ with rising wages, we wouldn’t have the problem of insufficient consumer income to support domestic demand, but we would have the traditional negatives from inflation.

But Bernanke’s response to Congress was that exports are replacing domestic consumption and that is a ‘good thing’ as it brings the US trade back to ‘balance’ and restores ‘national savings’ – the old mercantilist, gold standard imperatives. But it does leave weak domestic demand and rising prices. That brings us back to the tail end of Bernanke’s statement:

Admittedly, measuring the long-term relationship between growth or productivity and inflation is difficult. For example, it may be that low inflation has accompanied good economic performance in part because countries that maintain low inflation tend to pursue other sound economic policies as well. Still, I think we can agree that, at a minimum, the opposite proposition–that inflationary policies promote employment growth in the long run–has been entirely discredited and, indeed, that policies based on this proposition have led to very bad outcomes whenever they have been applied.

Seems that either way you look at it, rising prices (whether you call it inflation or not) lead to ‘bad’ outcomes.

And it sure looks to the dissenters in the FOMC that this is exactly what is happening. Only time will tell, but all Fed speakers now agree the risk of inflation is elevated substantially, and we will soon see if they still agree the cost of letting the inflation cat out of the bag is far higher than letting a near-term recession run its course and (hopefully) contain prices and keep a relative value story from turning into an inflation story.

Also, not how the Fed continues to use ‘other tools’ for market functioning as Bernanke just now indicates they will keep lending directly to their primary dealers.


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Re: Mishkin signal?


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(an email exchange)

>
>   On Tue, Jun 10, 2008 at 8:12 AM, anonymous wrote:
>

>   Fisher’s remark induces one to wonder if Ambrose Evans-Pritchard is
>   correct in stating that Fed policy is now being concocted from Dallas.
>
>   The recent spate of criticism directed at Bernanke and Fed doves by
>   various current and past Fed officials, including Paul Volcker, implies
>   that there has been a revolt within the Fed. Mishkin’s resignation
>   supports the view that the hawks have won.
>
>

Agreed. I’ve been calling it a ‘palace revolt’.

Bernanke’s limit was inflation expectations as anticipated back in August, but he let it go a lot further than I thought he would.

The dallas crew is confused on a lot of things as well, but inflation expectations are the unifying force of the FOMC right now. When Yellen cried uncle, that was my signal.


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June 9 Bernanke speech


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Outstanding Issues in the Analysis of Inflation

Nonetheless, much remains to be learned about both inflation forecasting and inflation control. In the spirit of this conference, my remarks this evening will highlight some key areas where additional research could help to provide a still-firmer foundation for monetary policymaking.

Good start!

Before turning to those issues, however, I would like to provide a brief update on the outlook for the economy and policy, beginning with the prospects for growth. Despite the unwelcome rise in the unemployment rate that was reported last week, the recent incoming data, taken as a whole, have affected the outlook for economic activity and employment only modestly. Indeed, although activity during the current quarter is likely to be weak, the risk that the economy has entered a substantial downturn appears to have diminished over the past month or so. Over the remainder of 2008, the effects of monetary and fiscal stimulus, a gradual ebbing of the drag from residential construction, further progress in the repair of financial and credit markets, and still-solid demand from abroad should provide some offset to the headwinds that still face the economy. However, the ongoing contraction in the housing market and continuing increases in energy prices suggest that growth risks remain to the downside.

Downside risks diminished, but still remain.

One of the most effective means by which the Federal Reserve can help to restore moderate growth over time and to reduce the associated downside risks is by supporting the return of financial markets to more-normal functioning. We have taken a number of actions to promote financial stability and remain strongly committed to that objective.

Technical market functioning action vs. interest rate cuts.

Inflation has remained high, largely reflecting sharp increases in the prices of globally traded commodities. Thus far, the pass-through of high raw materials costs to the prices of most other products and to domestic labor costs has been limited, in part because of softening domestic demand. However, the continuation of this pattern is not guaranteed and future developments in this regard will bear close attention. Moreover, the latest round of increases in energy prices has added to the upside risks to inflation and inflation expectations. The Federal Open Market Committee will strongly resist an erosion of longer-term inflation expectations, as an unanchoring of those expectations would be destabilizing for growth as well as for inflation.

Upside risks to inflation and inflation expectations have increased as the downside risks to growth have diminished.

Turning now to the principal topic of my remarks, I will briefly touch on four topics of particular interest for policymakers: commodity prices and inflation, the role of labor costs in the price-setting process, issues arising from the necessity of making policy in real time, and the determinants and effects of changes in inflation expectations.

Commodity Prices and Inflation

Rapidly rising prices for globally traded commodities have been the major source of the relatively high rates of inflation we have experienced in recent years, underscoring the importance for policy of both forecasting commodity price changes and understanding the factors that drive those changes.

Policymakers and other analysts have often relied on quotes from commodity futures markets to derive forecasts of the prices of key commodities. However, as you know, futures markets quotes have underpredicted commodity price increases in recent years, leading to corresponding underpredictions of overall inflation. The poor recent record of commodity futures markets in forecasting the course of prices raises the question of whether policymakers should continue to use this source of information and, if so, how.

It’s worse – they have been reading the market information incorrectly, confusing the difference between perishable from non-perishable commodities in regards to the term structures of futures contracts.

Despite this recent record, I do not think it is reasonable, when forecasting commodity prices, to ignore the substantial amounts of information about supply and demand conditions that are aggregated by futures markets. Indeed, the use of some simple alternatives–such as extrapolating recent commodity price trends–would require us to assume that investors in commodity futures can expect to earn supernormal risk-adjusted returns, inconsistent with principles of financial arbitrage. However, it does seem reasonable–and consistent with the wide distributions of commodity price expectations implied by options prices–to treat the forecasts of commodity prices obtained from futures markets, and consequently the forecasts of aggregate price inflation, as highly uncertain.

Futures markets for non-perishables express inventory conditions, not price expectations per se.

These considerations raise several questions for researchers: First, is it possible to improve our forecasts of commodity prices, using information from futures markets but possibly other information as well? For example, the markets for longer-dated futures contracts are often quite illiquid, suggesting that the associated futures prices may not effectively aggregate all available information. Second, what are the implications for the conduct of monetary policy of the high degree of uncertainty that attends forecasts of commodity prices? Although theoretical analyses often focus on the case in which policymakers care only about expected economic outcomes and not the uncertainty surrounding those outcomes, in practice policymakers are concerned about the risks to their projections as well as the projections themselves. How should those concerns affect the setting of policy in this context?

They need to understand what futures markets for non-perishables express.

Empirical work on inflation, including much of the classic work on Phillips curves, has generally treated changes in commodity prices as an exogenous influence on the inflation process, driven by market-specific factors such as weather conditions or geopolitical developments.

Or imperfect competition? Like the Saudis and/or Russians and/or Iranians setting price?

By contrast, some analysts emphasize the endogeneity of commodity prices to broad macroeconomic and monetary developments such as expected growth, expected inflation, interest rates, and currency movements. Of course, in reality, commodity prices are influenced by both market-specific and aggregate factors. Market-specific influences are evident in the significant differences in price behavior across individual commodities, which often can be traced to idiosyncratic supply and demand factors. Aggregate influences are suggested by the fact that the prices of several major classes of commodities, including energy, metals, and grains, have all shown broad-based gains in recent years. In particular, it seems clear that commodity prices have been importantly influenced by secular global trends affecting the conditions of demand and supply for raw materials.

And at least some influence from pension funds engaging in passive commodity strategies?

We have seen rapid growth in the worldwide demand for raw materials, which in turn is largely the result of sustained global growth–particularly resources-intensive growth in emerging market economies. And factors including inadequate investment, long lags in the development of new capacity, and underlying resource constraints have caused the supplies of a number of important commodity classes, including energy and metals, to lag global demand. These problems have been exacerbated to some extent by a systematic underprediction of demand and overprediction of productive capacity for a number of key commodities, notably oil. Further analysis of the range of aggregate and idiosyncratic determinants of commodity prices would be fruitful.

And biofuels converting our food supply to energy, thus linking the price of the two?

I have only mentioned a few of the issues raised by commodity price behavior for inflation and monetary policy. Here are a few other questions that researchers could usefully address: First, how should monetary policy deal with increases in commodity prices that are not only large but potentially persistent?

Attempt to add to demand with aggressive rate cuts like the FOMC has done?

Second, does the link between global growth and commodity prices imply a role for global slack, along with domestic slack, in the Phillips curve? Finally, what information about the broader economy is contained in commodity prices? For example, what signal should we take from recent changes in commodity prices about the strength of global demand or about expectations of future growth and inflation?

Or the emergence of imperfect competition and price setters as excess capacity dwindles?

The Role of Labor Costs in Price Setting

Basic microeconomics tells us that marginal cost should play a central role in firms’ pricing decisions.

More precisely, they have been assuming pricing where marginal cost and marginal revenue curves cross, not cost plus pricing.

And, notwithstanding the effects of changes in commodity prices on the cost of production, for the economy as a whole, by far the most important cost is the cost of labor.

Yes, and the cost of labor is also closely tied to the share of the output that goes to labor.

Over the past decade, formal work in the modeling of inflation has treated marginal cost, particularly the marginal cost of labor, as central to the determination of inflation.2 However, the empirical evidence for this linkage is less definitive than we would like.

‘Like’??? Yes, they blamed labor unions for the 1970s inflation, and now they would ‘like’ support for that presumption?

This mixed evidence is one reason that much Phillips curve analysis has centered on price-price equations with no explicit role for wages.

Problems in the measurement of labor costs may help explain the absence of a clearer empirical relationship between labor costs and prices. Compensation per hour in the nonfarm business sector, a commonly used measure of labor cost, displays substantial volatility from quarter to quarter and year to year, is often revised significantly, and includes compensation that is largely unrelated to marginal costs–for example, exercises (as opposed to grants) of stock options. These and other problems carry through to the published estimates of labor’s share in the nonfarm business sector–the proxy for real marginal cost that is typically used in empirical work. A second commonly used measure of aggregate hourly labor compensation, the employment cost index, has its own set of drawbacks as a measure of marginal cost. Indeed, these two compensation measures not infrequently generate conflicting signals of trends in labor costs and thus differing implications for inflation.

The interpretation of changes in labor productivity also affects the measurement of marginal cost. As economists have recognized for half a century, labor productivity tends to be procyclical, in contrast to the theoretical prediction that movements along a stable, conventional production function should generate countercyclical productivity behavior. Many explanations for procyclical productivity have been advanced, ranging from labor hoarding in downturns to procyclical technological progress. A better understanding of the observed procyclicality of productivity would help us to interpret cyclical movements in unit labor costs and to better measure marginal cost.

The relationship between marginal cost, properly measured, and prices also depends on the markups that firms can impose.

Right, this assumes they attempt to price where marginal cost curves cross with marginal revenue curves.

One important open question is the degree to which variation over time in average markups may be obscuring the empirical link between prices and labor costs. Considerable work has also been done on the role of time-varying markups in the inflation process, but a consensus on the role of changing markups on the inflation process remains elusive. More research in this area, particularly with an empirical orientation, would be welcome.

Real-Time Policymaking

The measurement issues I just raised point to another important concern of policymakers, namely, the necessity of making decisions in “real time,” under conditions of great uncertainty–including uncertainty about the underlying state of the economy–and without the benefit of hindsight.

In the context of Phillips curve analysis, a number of researchers have highlighted the difficulty of assessing the output gap–the difference between actual and potential output–in real time. An inability to measure the output gap in real time obviously limits the usefulness of the concept in practical policymaking. On the other hand, to argue that output gaps are very difficult to measure in real time is not the same as arguing that economic slack does not influence inflation; indeed, the bulk of the evidence suggests that there is a relationship, albeit one that may be less pronounced than in the past.

That’s a big issue. They suspect the Phillips Curve is very flat, which means large changes in the output gap are needed to change the price level.

These observations suggest two useful directions for research: First, more obviously, there is scope to continue the search for measures or indicators of output gaps that provide useful information in real time. Second, we need to continue to think through the decision procedures that policymakers should use under conditions of substantial uncertainty about the state of the economy and underlying economic relationships. For example, even if the output gap is poorly measured, by taking appropriate account of measurement uncertainties and combining information about the output gap with information from other sources, we may be able to achieve better policy outcomes than would be possible if we simply ignored noisy output gap measures. Of course, similar considerations apply to other types of real-time economic information.

This is particularly problematic as ultimately they see their role as altering the output gap to control inflation expectations.

Inflation itself can pose real-time measurement challenges. We have multiple measures of inflation, each of which reflects different coverage, methods of construction, and seasonality, and each of which is subject to statistical noise arising from sampling, imputation of certain prices, and temporary or special factors affecting certain markets. From these measures and other information, policymakers attempt to infer the “true” underlying rate of inflation. In other words, policymakers must read the incoming data in real time to judge which changes in inflation are likely to be transitory and which may prove more persistent.

Seems more important for the FOMC should be to determine what measure of inflation, if held stable, optimizes long-term growth and employment? Without that, what do they have under mainstream theory?

Getting this distinction right has first-order implications for monetary policy: Because monetary policy works with a lag, policy should be calibrated based on forecasts of medium-term inflation, which may differ from the current inflation rate. The need to distinguish changes in the inflation trend from temporary movements around that trend has motivated attention to various measures of “core,” or underlying, inflation, including measures that exclude certain prices (such as those of food and energy), “trimmed mean” measures, and others, but other approaches are certainly worth consideration.8 Further work on the problem of filtering the incoming data so as to obtain better measures of the underlying inflation trend could be of great value to policymakers.

I’m sure they are troubled about cutting rates into a triple negative supply shock based on forecasts of lower inflation that didn’t materialize.

The necessity of making policy in real time highlights the importance of maintaining and improving the economic data infrastructure and, in particular, working to make economic data timelier and more accurate. I noted earlier the problems in interpreting existing measures of labor compensation. Significant scope exists to improve the quality of price data as well–for example, by using the wealth of information available from checkout scanners or finding better ways to adjust for quality change. I encourage researchers to become more familiar with the strengths and shortcomings of the data that they routinely use. Besides leading to better analysis, attention to data quality issues by researchers often leads to better data in the longer term, both because of the insights generated by research and because researchers are important and influential clients of data collection agencies.

Implying that ‘if only they had better data they might not have made the same decisions’.

Inflation Expectations

Finally, I will say a few words on inflation expectations, which most economists see as central to inflation dynamics.

All mainstream economists. As Vice Chairman Kohn stated a few years ago, ‘the entire success of the US economy over the last twenty years can be attributed to successfully controlling inflation expectations’.

But there is much we do not understand about inflation expectations, their determination, and their implications. I will divide my list of questions into three categories.

First, we need to understand better the factors that determine the public’s inflation expectations. As I discussed in some detail in a talk at the National Bureau of Economic Research last summer, much evidence suggests that expectations have become better anchored than they were a few decades ago, but that they nonetheless remain imperfectly anchored. It would be quite useful for policymakers to know more about how inflation expectations are influenced by monetary policy actions, monetary policy communication, and other economic developments such as oil price shocks.

The growing literature on learning in macroeconomic models appears to be a useful vehicle to address many of these issues.10 In a traditional model with rational expectations, a fixed economic structure, and stable policy objectives, there is no role for learning by the public. In such a model, there is generally a unique long-run equilibrium inflation rate which is fully anticipated; in particular, the public makes no inferences based on central bankers’ words or deeds. But in fact, the public has only incomplete information about both the economy and policymakers’ objectives, which themselves may change over time. Allowing for the possibility of learning by the public is more realistic and tends to generate more reasonable conclusions about how inflation expectations change and, in particular, about how they can be influenced by monetary policy actions and communications.

Yes, the mainstream does consider that a serious topic of discussion!

The second category of questions involves the channels through which inflation expectations affect actual inflation. Is the primary linkage from inflation expectations to wage bargains, or are other channels important? One somewhat puzzling finding comes from a survey of business pricing decisions conducted by Blinder, Canetti, Lebow, and Rudd, in which only a small share of respondents claimed that expected aggregate inflation affected their pricing at all. How do we reconcile this result with our strong presumption that expectations are of central importance for explaining inflation?

Easy – they don’t matter at all. But then they are left with no theory of the price level, apart from the relative prices; so, they MUST matter.

Perhaps expectations affect actual inflation through some channel that is relatively indirect. The growing literature on disaggregated price setting may be able to shed some light on this question.

Good luck.

Finally, a large set of questions revolve around how the central bank can best monitor the public’s inflation expectations. Many measures of expected inflation exist, including expectations taken from surveys of households, forecasts by professional economists, and information extracted from markets for inflation-indexed securities. Unfortunately, only very limited information is available on expectations of price-setters themselves, namely businesses. Which of these agents’ expectations are most important for inflation dynamics, and how can central bankers best extract the relevant information from the various available measures?

Someday they will realize the currency itself is a simple public monopoly, and the price level is necessarily a function of prices paid by government. But that someday is nowhere in site; so, keep your eye on what they consider inflation expectations for clues to their next move.

Conclusion

This evening I have touched on only a few of the questions that confront policymakers as we deal with the challenges we face. The contributions of economic researchers in helping us to address these and other important questions have been and will continue to be invaluable. I will conclude by offering my best wishes for an interesting and productive conference.


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