Category Archives: Treasury

Thoughts on S+P action re USA

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>   
>   —– Original Message —–
>   From: Hadden, Glenn (FID)
>   Sent: Monday, April 18, 2011 04:45 PM
>   Subject: IMPORTANT – thoughts on S+P action re USA
>   

I would like to address the action taken today by S+P in revising the United
States credit outlook to negative.

Simply, I believe the argument behind S+P’s decision is flawed and displays
a misunderstanding of how the monetary system operates. My view is not
predicated on any political ideology. I am merely attempting to demonstrate
the incorrect logic regarding United States credit quality and solvency.

1. FINANCIAL BALANCE FRAMEWORK:
The first fundamental item that must be understood is how financial balances
relate to government indebtedness. In a closed economy (or an economy with a
perpetually balanced current account), government deficits must equal
private savings. If private savings desires increase, a government’s deficit
must increase by precisely the same amount all things equal. There is no
other way.

In the case of the United States, the budget deficit has grown to 10% of gdp
from approximately 4% of gdp because the savings rate has shifted from
approximately negative 2% to approximately positive 6%. Simply stated, the
federal budget isn’t a function of profligate government spending, its a
function of higher desired private savings causing a shortage of aggregate
demand. This shortage of aggregate demand is putting downward pressure on
tax revenues (lower nominal gdp implies lower tax revenues) and upward
pressures on expenditures owing to automatic stabilizers such as UI.

With this example, it is theoretically possible to have much larger
government deficit and debt levels if savings desires grow commensurately.
If private sector savings desires were to fall, which implies higher
aggregate demand (because the spending of a person in the private sector
simply creates another person’s income), the government deficit would fall
commensurately owing to higher tax revenues and possibly lower expenditures.

2. MYTHS REGARDING FOREIGN INVESTORS FUNDING THE UNITED STATES AND EXTERNAL LIABILITIES:
Firstly, the most important item to understand is the USA discharges its
debt in $US. So the entire argument of rating agencies behind ‘external
funding pressures’ is moot. Functionally there is no difference between a
holder of UST’s who is domiciled in USA or abroad, as they are both $US
dominated savers. The only difference is the foreign saver has no ‘need’ to
save in $US (where a USA investors needs $US as a means of exchange and to
pay his taxes).
So, what if foreign now dump their ust’s?
Foreign investors own ust’s and $us because they WANT to own them. By
engaging in fx driven trade policies, foreigners ‘pay up’ to get $US which
allows them greater sales into the USA market. If foreigners didn’t want to
save in $US, they would change their fx policy which would result in less
market share in USA economy. Foreigners can’t be both buyers and sellers
simultaneously. If foreigners wanted to own less $US, the result would be a
smaller current account deficit in USA, which again using a financial
balance framework would either result in more private savings, or a smaller
govt deficit. Bottom line – if foreigners want to have fewer savings in $US,
either private savers must increase savings, or the govt deficit must fall.

3. MYTHS REGARDING FOREIGN INVESTORS FUNDING THE UNITED STATES AND EXTERNAL LIABILITIES part II:
The same way banks offer savers demand deposits and term deposits (ie
chequing accounts versus savings accounts) the USA economy offers savers the
same in the form of $US (demand assets) or UST (term asset). Foreign savers
can therefore keep their $ at their Fed Reserve account and earn basically
zero (functionally a ‘chequing’ or demand account) or buy UST’s
(functionally a ‘savings’ or term account) and earn a coupon. There is no
other way to save in risk free space. As said above, foreigners who engage
in fx driven trade policies must accumulate $US demoninated assets. The only
choice they have is term vs demand assets. So indeed if foreigners declined
to own ust’s and alternatively kept their savings in $US at the Fed, the
result could be a higher and steeper term structure for USA rates. If the
Treasury decided to sell less ust’s and more tbills, this term structure
rise could be negated. Note foreigners actions are never about SOLVENCY, its
merely a function of liquidity preference.

4. THE DEFAULT BY THE SOVEREIGN OPERATING WITHIN A NON-CONVERTABLE EXCHANGE RATE REGIME IS A *FUNCTIONAL* IMPOSSIBILITY:
One must also understand the mechanics of government spending. A government
purchases goods and services from the private sector and then the Federal
Reserve credits the reserve accounts of the commercial banks whom the
sellers of such good and services bank. The Fed then debits the reserve
account of The US Treasury. The Treasury then sells ust’s, where the Fed
then credits the Treasury’s reserve account while debiting the reserve
accounts of the banking system.

So all that has happened is the government has created savings in the
economy by spending (from point 1 above: govt spending = private savings).
So as is illustrated, there is no issue of ‘solvency’ per se. The
government, by spending, is creating the savings to buy the ust’s. The only
issue here is the term gap. Specifically if savers only want demand assets
(ie $us), while the Treasury only wants to sell term assets (ie ust’s), the
resolution will be price and risk premium: ie how much interest rate spread
will a bank or arbitrageur need to intermediate this imbalance. This can all
be negated of course, if the Treasury only issued T-bills.

5. THE DEFAULT BY THE SOVEREIGN OPERATING WITHIN A NON-CONVERTABLE EXCHANGE RATE REGIME IS A *FUNCTIONAL* IMPOSSIBILITY part II:
This is the fundamental flaw of the S+P decision. The basis of their
sovereign rating criteria is as they describe it is: “The capacity and
willingness to pay its debts on time”. As mentioned above, there is
functionally no reason for the USA to ever not pay its debts – the USA’s
debts are and will always be equal to savings desires of the private and
foreign sectors. So ‘CAPACITY’ can never be an issue.

Hence the only reason the USA would ever default was because they ‘wanted’
to default, they never under any circumstance NEED to default so long as the
$US remains a non-convertable currency. The implications for a voluntary
default (again, this is the only kind of default possible by the USA) make
such a default an impossibility. The reason is because the 2nd largest
liability of the federal government is deposit insurance. If the USA decided
it wanted to default to escape its obligations, it would bankrupt its
banking system, who’s holdings of ust’s are greater than system-wide bank
capital of $1.4 Trillion. In fact the contingent liability put the
government has issue via deposit insurance is almost as large as USA debt
held by the public at $6.2 Trillion. So essentially a voluntary default
would actually INCREASE USA indebtedness by almost 100% while
simultaneouslybankrupting its banking system. So if ABILITY to pay is
assured, and a voluntary default actually raises indebtedness while
collapsing the banking system and economy, why would USA ever voluntarily
default? So S+P’s criteria of ‘WILLINGNESS’ to pay is also not applicable.

SUMMARY:
So as demonstrated, the bottom line is ABILITY to pay can never be an issue
in a non-convertable currency system. The only issue is WILLINGNESS to pay.
So if the argument by S+P relates to “the capacity and willingness to pay
its debts on time” as they described on Monday’s call, then their argument
simply isn’t cogent.

The last point I want to make is it would be incorrect to attempt to draw an
analogy to the placement of the UK on credit watch in mid May 2009 relating
to market performance. Yes indeed gilts sold off shortly after this
announcement. However this was more a function of the unhinging of the USA
MBS market. There existed a perception that the Fed via QE1 was attempting
to cap current coupon mortgage rates at 4%. Once this level was breached and
it became clear in mid/late May that this view was incorrect, a convexity
sell event hit the USA rates market which dragged all global bond yields
higher including Gilts.

To conclude – I view the decision today by S+P as having zero impact on
valuations of USA sovereign debt. We continue to engage in trades that
express the correct view that the solvency of the United States can never be
an issue in nominal terms; specifically we are buyers of 30yr assets swaps
at -25bps.

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Joe Firestone post on sidestepping the debt ceiling issue with Coin Seigniorage

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Joe Firestone has a new post on Coin Seigniorage, where he gives credit to our own Beowolf’s comment on this website.

As far as I’ve been able to determine, it does work operationally. It seems the US Treasury is already legally empowered to simply mint it’s own platinum coin in any denomination it wants and effectively deposit it in its Fed account, rather than sell bonds to the public to fund its Fed account.

This process doesn’t change actual govt spending, so doing it this way doesn’t add to inflation, nor does it change the fact that govt deficit spending adds income and net financial assets to the other, non govt sectors. It’s just that the new financial assets will simply be new reserve balances at the Fed, rather than new Treasury securities (which are also simply accounts at the Fed).

What issuing these coins does do is remove the legal need for the debt ceiling to be raised, and also reduce the amount of outstanding Treasury securities, which is what is called govt debt. So while both reserves and Treasury securities are, functionally, govt liabilities and differ in name (and sometimes duration) only, the headline rhetoric does make that distinction. So technically, this process eliminates the ‘national debt’ and removes any (misguided) notion of solvency risk:

Links to the post on various websites:

Correntewire

Firedoglake

Our Future

Daily Kos

The most discussion is at Kos.


The best comments are at Correntewire.

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Kucinich

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pitiful stupidity/ignorance of monetary operations.

Very good post/critique by Bill on same goes into more detail:

http://bilbo.economicoutlook.net/blog/?p=12866

On Thu, Dec 23, 2010 at 10:55 AM, Scott Fullwiler wrote:
 

http://www.scribd.com/doc/45753797/NEED-ACT
 

Kucinich wants to end “private money creation” by banks or anyone else.
 

“Sec. 102. Unlawful for Persons to Create Money.
Any person who creates or originates United States money by lending against deposits, through so-called fractional reserve banking, or by any other means, after the effective date shall be fined under Title 18, United States Code, imprisoned for not more than 5 years, or both.”

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QE dynamics one more time- it’s about price, not quantity

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Believe it or not I’m still getting a lot of questions about how QE works,
so I’ve reorganized the discussion some:

First, recognize that, in fact, reserves, functionally, are nothing more than 1 day t bills.

And, for all practical purposes, the difference between issuing 1 day t bills and 3 month t bills is inconsequential.

So since currently the shortest thing the Treasury issues are 3 mo bills,
I can say that:

QE- the Fed buying longer term treasury securities- is functionally identical for the economy to the Treasury having issued 3 month t bills instead of those longer term securities the Fed bought.

Now the more tricky part.

The yields on the approx. $13 trillion of various Treasury securities and reserve balances continuously gravitate towards what are called indifference levels.

That means that for any given composition of reserve balances at the Fed and Treasury securities (also Fed accounts), there is a term structure of interest rates that adjusts to investor preferences at any given time.

So, for example, with govt providing investors with the combination of $2 trillion in reserves and $11 trillion in various Treasury securities, the yield curve will reflect investor preferences given the current circumstances.

That means if investors expect Fed rate hikes, the front end of the curve would steepen accordingly. And if instead they expect 0 rates for a considerable period of time, the curve would flatten for the first few years to reflect that.

If the Fed then buys another $1 trillion of securities, reserves go to $3 trillion and there are $10 trillion longer term Treasury securities outstanding.

And to actually purchase those reserves, the Fed would have to drive the term structure of rates to levels where investors voluntarily are indifferent with that mix of offerings, given all the other current conditions.
The Fed doesn’t force anyone to sell anything.
It just offers to buy at prices (interest rates) that adjust to where people want to sell at those prices.

So even if the Fed owned a total of $10 trillion of securities, and there were only $3 trillion left outstanding for investors, if investors believed the Fed was going to hike rates by 3%, for example, the term structure of rates on Treasury securities would reflect that.

What I’m trying to say is that QE does not mean rates will actually go down. The yield curve is still a function of investor expectations.

But the yield curve is also a function of ‘technicals.’
This means the quantity of 30 year securities offered for sale, for example, can alter the yield of that sector more than it alters the yields of the other sectors.

This is because, in general, there tends to be fewer ‘natural’ buyers of 30 year securities than 3 month bills.
For most of us, we are a lot more cautious about investing for 30 years at a fixed rate than for 3 months at a fixed rate.
And it takes relative large moves in 30 year rates to cause those investors to shift our preferences to either buy them if govt wants to issue more, or sell them if the Fed wants to buy them back.

On the other hand, there are pension funds who ‘automatically’ buy 30 year securities regardless of yield because they are matching the purchases to 30 year liabilities.

So altogether, the yield curve is function of both investor expectations for interest rates and the ‘technicals’ of supply and demand (desires by issuers and investors).

And while there might be no amount of 3 month bills the Treasury could issue that would materially drive up 3 month t bill rates, relatively small amounts of 30 year bonds do alter the yields of 30 year securities. Insiders would say the 30 year market is a lot ‘thinner’ than the 3 month market.

So what is QE?

QE is nothing more than the govt altering the mix of investments offered to investors.

The Fed buying longer term securities reduces the amount of longer term securities and increases the amount of reserves (one day securities)

Interest rates, as always, continuously gravitate to reflect current investor expectations of future Fed rate changes and current ‘technicals’ of supply and demand.

QE changes the technicals, and possibly expectations, and results in a yield curve that reflects those current conditions.

So all QE does is alter the term structure rates, as investors express preferences for the term structure of interest rates, given the securities and reserves of the varying maturities offered by the Fed and Treasury and all the current conditions.

That brings us back to the question of what QE means for the economy, inflation, value of the currency, etc.

Which comes down to the question of what the term structure of rates means for the economy, inflation, the value of the currency, etc.

QE is nothing more than a tool for changing interest rates by adjusting the available supply of securities of various maturities (technicals). And it’s not a particularly strong tool at that.

It’s the resulting interest rates that may or may not alter the economy, inflation, and the value of the dollar, etc. and not the quantities of reserves and Treasury securities per se.

And it is clear to me that the FOMC does not fully understand this.

If they did, they’d be in discussion with the Treasury about cutting issuance.

And, additionally, If they wanted the term structure of interest rates to be lower, they would simply target their desired term structure of rates by offering to buy unlimited amounts of Treasury securities at their desired rate targets, and not worry about the mix between reserves and Treasury securities that resulted. Which is what they did in the WWII era. And how they target the fed funds rate.

With today’s central banking and monetary policy with its own currency, it’s always about price (interest rates) and not quantities.

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NYFed

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Good find!

I recommended this years ago when Karim first introduced me to his Treasury contacts.
It moved forward and was passed around for discussion, but the dealers quashed it.

An unlimited lending program could replace much of the generic libor swap market.

Wish they would revisit it.

Why Is the U.S. Treasury Contemplating Becoming a Lender of Last Resort for Treasury Securities?

“A backstop lending facility turns this understanding on its head: the Treasury would be issuing securities not because it needs cash, but because market participants need securities.”

They don’t notice a difference between gold standard and “modern money”, actually they draw a parallel:

“… the markets for borrowing and lending Treasury securities in the 21st century are broadly analogous to the 19th century market for borrowing and lending money. Dealers and other market participants today have short-term liabilities denominated in Treasury notes; 19th century banks had deposit liabilities. Additionally, there is limited elasticity in the supply of individual Treasury securities today, just as there was limited elasticity in the supply of base money in the 19th century. A backstop securities lending facility would enhance the elasticity of supply of Treasury securities in the same way that the Federal Reserve Banks enhanced the elasticity of currency a century ago. It would mitigate chronic settlement fails, just as the Federal Reserve System mitigated suspensions of convertibility of bank deposits.”

They don’t discuss interest on reserves (and they should, these being functionally equivalent to Tsy securities).

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Greenspan in WSJ: U.S. Debt and the Greece Analogy

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History will not be kind to the former Fed Chairman with regard to his understanding of monetary operations.

He understands solvency is not an issues which does seem to put him ahead of most. But he lacks a critical understanding of interest rate determination, particularly with regard to how the entire term structure of risk free rates is set by Fed policy (or lack of it), with US Treasury securities functioning to alter those risk free rates, and not funding expenditures per se:

“The U.S. government can create dollars at will to meet any obligation,
and it will doubtless continue to do so. U.S. Treasurys are thus free of
credit risk. But they are not free of interest rate risk. If Treasury
net debt issuance were to double overnight, for example, newly issued
Treasury securities would continue free of credit risk, but the Treasury
would have to pay much higher interest rates to market its newly issued
securities.”

U.S. Debt and the Greece Analogy

By Alan Greenspan

June 18 (WSJ) —Don’t be fooled by today’s low interest rates. The
government could very quickly discover the limits of its borrowing capacity.

An urgency to rein in budget deficits seems to be gaining some traction
among American lawmakers. If so, it is none too soon. Perceptions of a
large U.S. borrowing capacity are misleading.

Despite the surge in federal debt to the public during the past 18
months-to $8.6 trillion from $5.5 trillion-inflation and long-term
interest rates, the typical symptoms of fiscal excess, have remained
remarkably subdued. This is regrettable, because it is fostering a sense
of complacency that can have dire consequences.

The roots of the apparent debt market calm are clear enough. The
financial crisis, triggered by the unexpected default of Lehman Brothers
in September 2008, created a collapse in global demand that engendered a
high degree of deflationary slack in our economy. The very large
contraction of private financing demand freed private saving to finance
the explosion of federal debt. Although our financial institutions have
recovered perceptibly and returned to a degree of solvency, banks,
pending a significant increase in capital, remain reluctant to lend.

Beneath the calm, there are market signals that do not bode well for the
future. For generations there had been a large buffer between the
borrowing capacity of the U.S. government and the level of its debt to
the public. But in the aftermath of the Lehman Brothers collapse, that
gap began to narrow rapidly. Federal debt to the public rose to 59% of
GDP by mid-June 2010 from 38% in September 2008. How much borrowing
leeway at current interest rates remains for U.S. Treasury financing is
highly uncertain.

The U.S. government can create dollars at will to meet any obligation,
and it will doubtless continue to do so. U.S. Treasurys are thus free of
credit risk. But they are not free of interest rate risk. If Treasury
net debt issuance were to double overnight, for example, newly issued
Treasury securities would continue free of credit risk, but the Treasury
would have to pay much higher interest rates to market its newly issued
securities.

In the wake of recent massive budget deficits, the difference between
the 10-year swap rate and 10-year Treasury note yield (the swap spread)
declined to an unprecedented negative 13 basis points this March from a
positive 77 basis points in September 2008. This indicated that
investors were requiring the U.S. Treasury to pay an interest rate
higher than rates that prevailed on comparable maturity private swaps.

(A private swap rate is the fixed interest rate required of a private
bank or corporation to be exchanged for a series of cash flow payments,
based on floating interest rates, for a particular length of time. A
dollar swap spread is the swap rate less the interest rate on U.S.
Treasury debt of the same maturity.)

At the height of budget surplus euphoria in 2000, the Office of
Management and Budget, the Congressional Budget Office and the Federal
Reserve foresaw an elimination of marketable federal debt securities
outstanding. The 10-year swap spread in August 2000 reached a record 130
basis points. As the projected surplus disappeared and deficits mounted,
the 10-year swap spread progressively declined, turning negative this
March, and continued to deteriorate until the unexpected euro-zone
crisis granted a reprieve to the U.S.

The 10-year swap spread quickly regained positive territory and by June
14 stood at a plus 12 basis points. The sharp decline in the euro-dollar
exchange rate since March reflects a large, but temporary, swing in the
intermediate demand for U.S. Treasury securities at the expense of euro
issues.

The 10-year swap spread understandably has emerged as a sensitive proxy
of Treasury borrowing capacity: a so-called canary in the coal mine.

I grant that low long-term interest rates could continue for months, or
even well into next year. But just as easily, long-term rate increases
can emerge with unexpected suddenness. Between early October 1979 and
late February 1980, for example, the yield on the 10-year note rose
almost four percentage points.

In the 1950s, as I remember them, U.S. federal budget deficits were no
more politically acceptable than households spending beyond their means.
Regrettably, that now quaint notion gave way over the decades, such that
today it is the rare politician who doesn’t run on seemingly costless
spending increases or tax cuts with borrowed money. A low tax burden is
essential to maintain America’s global competitiveness. But tax cuts
need to be funded by permanent outlay reductions.

The current federal debt explosion is being driven by an inability to
stem new spending initiatives. Having appropriated hundreds of billions
of dollars on new programs in the last year and a half, it is very
difficult for Congress to deny an additional one or two billion dollars
for programs that significant constituencies perceive as urgent. The
federal government is currently saddled with commitments for the next
three decades that it will be unable to meet in real terms. This is not
new. For at least a quarter century analysts have been aware of the
pending surge in baby boomer retirees.

We cannot grow out of these fiscal pressures. The modest-sized
post-baby-boom labor force, if history is any guide, will not be able to
consistently increase output per hour by more than 3% annually. The
product of a slowly growing labor force and limited productivity growth
will not provide the real resources necessary to meet existing
commitments. (We must avoid persistent borrowing from abroad. We cannot
count on foreigners to finance our current account deficit
indefinitely.)

Only politically toxic cuts or rationing of medical care, a marked rise
in the eligible age for health and retirement benefits, or significant
inflation, can close the deficit. I rule out large tax increases that
would sap economic growth (and the tax base) and accordingly achieve
little added revenues.

With huge deficits currently having no evident effect on either
inflation or long-term interest rates, the budget constraints of the
past are missing. It is little comfort that the dollar is still the
least worst of the major fiat currencies. But the inexorable rise in the
price of gold indicates a large number of investors are seeking a safe
haven beyond fiat currencies.

The United States, and most of the rest of the developed world, is in
need of a tectonic shift in fiscal policy. Incremental change will not
be adequate. In the past decade the U.S. has been unable to cut any
federal spending programs of significance.

I believe the fears of budget contraction inducing a renewed decline of
economic activity are misplaced. The current spending momentum is so
pressing that it is highly unlikely that any politically feasible fiscal
constraint will unleash new deflationary forces. I do not believe that
our lawmakers or others are aware of the degree of impairment of our
fiscal brakes. If we contained the amount of issuance of Treasury
securities, pressures on private capital markets would be eased.

Fortunately, the very severity of the pending crisis and growing
analogies to Greece set the stage for a serious response. That response
needs to recognize that the range of error of long-term U.S. budget
forecasts (especially of Medicare) is, in historic perspective,
exceptionally wide. Our economy cannot afford a major mistake in
underestimating the corrosive momentum of this fiscal crisis. Our policy
focus must therefore err significantly on the side of restraint.

Mr. Greenspan, former chairman of the Federal Reserve, is president of
Greenspan Associates LLC and author of “The Age of Turbulence:
Adventures in a New World” (Penguin, 2007).

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Response to Dem debate

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I arrived in Connecticut to begin a ‘listening tour’ before making the decision to run in the Democratic primary for United States Senate. Tonight I listened carefully to the Democratic candidates as they put forth their agendas for restoring the US economy and both fell far short of the mark. Neither had a credible economic agenda, and what they did propose- tax increases- would only make matters worse.

Making sure that people working for a living are paid enough to be able to buy the goods and services they produce has long been a core economic value of the Democratic party. And what drives the lion’s share of business, both large and small, is the competition to attract the consumer’s dollars by producing the goods and services working people want. Unfortunately, the current situation is clearly one where people working for a living are not taking home enough money to buy what business is desperately trying to sell. Consequently, business has been contracting and laying people off, which makes matters even worse.

The Republican response has traditionally been to give tax cuts and other monetary incentives to business rather than to the people doing the work. That does not result in new hires for the businesses, as business only hire when orders and sales pick up. Instead, it results in higher profits with the hope that those profiting will hire more domestic help and more gardeners, and produce a few jobs that way, which is known as trickle-down economics.

So while, in addition to tax hikes, both Democratic candidates for US Senate proposed tax relief, it was for small businesses- the traditional Republican approach, and indeed, the approach of the Obama administration. Note that last week’s jobs bill featured a $5,000 payroll tax reduction for businesses, and not for employees. In contrast, I have long been proposing a full ‘payroll tax holiday’ where a couple earning a combined $100,000 per year would see their take home pay rise by over $650 per month. That would be enough to fix the economy as people could then make their mortgage payments and car payments, and even do a little shopping. This is the Democratic approach which also gives businesses what they really need- people with enough money to spend to buy their products. It’s people with money to spend that creates the backlog of orders which then quickly results in the millions of new jobs we need to restore our economy to full employment levels and prosperity. The payroll tax holiday also reduces costs for business. In a competitive environment this translates into a combination of both lower prices and better cash flow for business that can be used for the new investment the recession has long delayed.

The reason the Democrats don’t propose this kind of tax cut is because they can’t answer the question of ‘how are you to replace the lost revenues.’ And, in fact the Obama administration has currently put Medicare and social security cuts on the table to ‘pay for’ what they’ve already spent. What both Democratic candidates are displaying is a failure to understand the difference between the function of Federal taxation and State and local government taxation. I grew up on the money desk at Banker’s Trust on Wall St. in the 1970’s, ran my own investment funds and securities dealer for 15 years, currently own a small Florida bank, and visit the Fed (Federal Reserve Bank) regularly to discuss monetary policy and monetary operations. I know how the payment system works, as does the Fed’s operations staff.

What we all know is that when Federal taxes are paid, all the Fed does is change the numbers down in our bank accounts. For example, if you have $5,000 in your bank account, and you pay a Federal tax of $1,000, all the Fed does is change the 5 on your bank statement to a 4, so you then have only $4,000 in your account. With online banking you can watch exactly that happen on your computer screen. The Fed doesn’t ‘get’ anything. It just changes the numbers in your account. And when the Federal government spends, it just changes numbers up in our bank accounts. It doesn’t ‘use up’ anything. In fact, the Federal government (unlike State and local governments and the rest of us who do need money in our accounts to be able to spend) never has nor doesn’t have dollars. Think if it as the score keeper for the dollar. When a touchdown is scored and 6 points go up on the scoreboard, does anyone ask where he stadium got those 6 points? Can the stadium run out of points to post on the score board? Of course not!

So why then does the Federal government tax, when it doesn’t get actual revenue (it just changes numbers down in our accounts) and it does not use up anything when it spends (it just changes numbers up in our accounts)? The fact is, taxes function to regulate the economy by controlling our take home pay. If taxes are too low, the result is excessive spending and the strong upward pressure on prices we call inflation. If we are over taxed, as we are today, and the Federal government is taking too much out of our paychecks, the result is a drop off in sales by businesses, and rising unemployment. Federal taxes are like the thermostat. If the economy is too hot (something I have never seen in my 37 years in the financial markets), they can be raised to cool it down. And when the economy goes ice cold, like it is now, my full payroll tax holiday is in order. The Federal government’s job is to keep the economy just right by keeping taxes low enough so people working for a living can afford to buy the goods and services they are capable of producing.

That’s what fiscal responsibility is all about. But until our politicians understand the difference between State finances and Federal finances, the will continue to fail to make sure our take home pay is high enough to sustain the high levels of output and employment that are the hallmarks of American prosperity.

Let me conclude with a word about China. It was stated in the Democratic debates and not disputed that the US was borrowing $4 billion from China to pay for the war in Afghanistan. However, close examination of monetary operations shows this is not at all as it seems. China has what amounts to a checking account at the Federal Reserve Bank. China gets its dollars by selling goods and services to the US, and those dollars are paid into that checking account at the Fed. And US Treasury securities are nothing more than fancy names for savings accounts at the Fed. So when China buys US Treasury securities, all the Fed does is shift China’s dollars from its checking account at the Fed to a savings account at the Fed. And when those Treasury securities become due and payable, all the Fed does is shift the dollars in the savings accounts (plus interest) back to China’s checking account at the Fed. That’s it. Debt paid. And it happens exactly this way every week as billions of Treasury securities are purchased and mature. And this process has no connection to Federal government spending for the war or anything else. Spending is always nothing more than the Fed changing numbers up in people’s bank accounts, no matter what China might be doing with their Fed accounts. That’s why the ‘national debt,’ which is nothing more than dollars in savings accounts at the Fed, has never created a financial problem, and never will, either for us or for our children. Yet the administration, the media, and the two Democratic candidates for US Senate from Connecticut have the story completely wrong as well, which results in proposals which are bad for Connecticut and bad for America.

America is grossly overtaxed and needs a full payroll tax holiday NOW to stop the bleeding and restore the American dream. The only thing standing in the way of economic prosperity is a lack of understanding of our monetary system.

Sincerely,
Warren Mosler

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Geithner Headlines

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[Skip to the end]

Not exactly a unified front for the team.

TREASURY SECRETARY GEITHNER HAS EXPRESSED RESERVATIONS ABOUT PROPOSED U.S.
BIG BANK LIMITS ANNOUNCED ON TUESDAY–FINANCIAL INDUSTRY SOURCES

GEITHNER HAS CONCERNS LIMITS DO NOT NECESSARILY GET AT PROBLEMS THAT FUELED
FINANCIAL CRISIS–SOURCES

GEITHNER HAS CONCERNS THAT POLITICS INFLUENCING REFORMS–SOURCES


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Thoughts/Response to Bill Gross Piece

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Well stated and agreed!!!

A few highlights(mine), below:

On Thu, Jan 7, 2010 at 8:57 AM, Lando, Joseph wrote:

In a bit of a surprising philosophical shift, Bill Gross came out yesterday strongly bearish and firmly in the camp of the deficit hawks: Link . My reaction:

1. Any major tightening of financial conditions due to a spike in rates right now, particularly back-end rates, would just be met with more QE anyway. That much was certainly clear in the Fed Minutes yesterday.

2. Given a battle between the fundamental input of deflation and the technical factor of supply, deflation will win hands down. And though many seem to disagree, the data and the Fed and our own economists still think risks are tilted the other way. This input is making the 100-200bp difference in 10yr yields. Supply issues make the ‘1-2 standard deviations rich/cheap’ (speaking in Sudoku terms) differences of 20-30bps. Which wins?

3. I actually think the technicals are the other way. New supply of private label AAA securities is down 1T MORE than Treasury supply is UP. De-levering is, BY DEFINTION, a reduction in the overall supply of investible term fixed income assets. Here’s a picture from a couple months ago from our Global Markets group.

4. The yield curve is offering more yield enhancement than EITHER vol OR credit spread to the investment community. Not to mention Treasuries are 0% weighted (AND state/local tax-advantaged). Where do you think banks will turn to generate NIM? At some point, they will change their behavior. Look at CURVE vs both VOL and CREDIT regression below. Perhaps most notably…


5. The deficit hawk premise is flawed to begin with. Government buys a bridge, bridgebuilder buys a coat, coatmaker deposits or saves the money…it’s a closed loop in which deficit spending CREATES the precise funding for the deficit itself. All that moves around is DURATION as the need for 10yr savings or 30yr savings is swapped around vs the demand for say, overnight savings (like T-bills or banks reserves). Deficits in the US (unlike a Muni or a EU power or a Corporation) don’t have a problem funding. The ‘problem’ is if the Treasury wants to issue 30yr paper and people only really want 5yr paper. Actually, the market sells off when the sum of all borrowers’ duration is longer than the sum of all the lender’s preferences/liabilities. Not when there is a mismatch in AMOUNT. The AMOUNT is the same! Which takes us to…

6. Japan.

7. I also respectfully but strongly disagree with Gross’ interpretation of QE. The Fed has actually been swapping the bank and fixed-income universe OUT of their term treasuries and mortgages and into cash. By definition they have actually been crowding OUT overall NIM in the universe. And generating revenue for the Treasury. It’s actually an investor tax not a bailout. When they step away, those (and by parity zero-sum principles they are there) who were swapped out of their investments and into cash will swap back into term duration. Asset transfers themselves are zero sum. Additionally, in getting mortgage rates down, the Fed has been TEMPERING the pace of de-levering by ensuring mortgage refi’s can continue. They ‘made happen’ many of the mortgages that they bought. It’s a very self-regulating supply universe. If they slow down, there are just plain fewer mortgages being originated for people to buy, and the pace of overall deleveraging picks back up, and well…it’s not bearish, for sure.

8. Actually I hope 10s go to 4.25 because that just means there will be more to make in the big rally that I think starts in 6 weeks or so when the data turns back from fiscal stimulus withdrawal, and the Treasury’s ‘extension of average maturity’ program – what is TRULY the cause of the steepening of the yield curve – tapers off. For now, am only tactical in the back-end.

But that’s why we all have a market and life, as ever, will remain interesting in fixed income this year.






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Deficit terrorism has not let up

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No telling which way the Obama administration will go.

Probably the middle path which will mean muddling through with high, repressive output gaps

that do the most damage to their own constituency.

It’s not a bad environment for stocks, the near term risk remaing a strong dollar that reduces translations of foreign earnings and

softens exports, while reduced personal income (including a large drop in net interest income) keeps consumption relatively low.

7 deadly innocent frauds updated draft:

Link

Gov’t Spending Is Like Tiger’s Dating

By Jim Rogers

Dec. 11 (CNBC) — The U.S. government’s plan to increase spending as a way to kick-start the economy will leave the country with no way to help its way out of the next crisis, Jim Rogers, chairman of Jim Rogers Holdings, told CNBC Thursday.

The Treasury Department “has been putting out all of this stimulus and now they’re talking about extending the (Troubled Asset Relief Program),” Rogers said.

On Thursday Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner announced TARP would be extended into next year in part to free up public money for job creation, but also as insurance against another crisis.

Geithner “is a very smart person,” but “he’s been wrong about everything for the last 15 years,” Rogers said.

“Why are we listening to any of those guys down there? They’re making our situation worse,” he said. “They said in writing yesterday the solution to our problem is to spend more money … that’s what got us into this problem: too much debt.”

“That’s like saying to Tiger Woods, ‘you get another girlfriend and it will solve your problems’ or ‘five more girlfriends and you will solve your problems,'” he said.

“We’re all going to pay the price for this in, one, two, three years,” Rogers added. “The next time that we have problems in the economy, which will not be too long, we don’t have any bullets left. We’ve shot everything we had to solve our problems.”

“What are they going to do, quadruple the debt again? Print more money? We don’t have any trees left. We’re running out of trees.”

Long the Dollar, but Likely to Lose Money

Looking to his investment positions, Rogers said he is betting on the dollar more than he has been in two to three months, but that his short-term trades rarely work out.

“I am sure I’m going to lose money because whenever I try to short-term trade I almost always nearly lose money, so I am sure I deserve to lose money for trying it again,” he said.

The reason he thinks there might be rally in the greenback is that everybody — including himself — is pessimistic on the currency, Rogers said.

Rogers also predicted a currency crisis or semi-crisis.

“You already see Vietnam devalued. Last week Brazil put on the special taxes for currencies,” he said. “You’re seeing what’s happening in Dubai. Greece is in trouble. Ukraine, Argentina; there are plenty of people who we could put on the list. Spain. Ireland.”


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