Category Archives: Inflation

GS US Views: OK for Now, But Slowdown Ahead (Hatzius)

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As previously discussed, no double dip, but instead continued sequential quarter to quarter gdp growth with q4 possible better than q3 as well, helped by lower gasoline prices.

The 8.5% federal budget deficit continues to provide fundamental nominal support for GDP and the domestic credit sectors are still too weak to subtract much if they do pull back.

And it still seems to me that the chances of a euro area event reducing aggregate demand in the US are reasonably low.

US Views : OK for Now, But Slowdown Ahead

By Jan Hatzius
October 9 (Goldman Sachs)

1. After the sharp slowdown earlier in the year, the US economy seems to have grown at roughly a trend pace over the summer. Our GDP “bean count” now stands at 2½% for the third quarter, the ISM indexes are broadly stable in the low 50s, payroll employment is growing at a pace of around 100k per month, and the unemployment rate has been flat for the past three months.

2. Although the recent US growth news has generally beaten low expectations, we expect a renewed deceleration to just a ½%-1% growth pace in the next two quarters and see the risk of renewed recession at about 40%. The main reason is the turmoil in the euro area, where we switched to a recession forecast last Monday. To be sure, there is more talk in Europe about the types of action that we think would help, including a larger financial safety net for sovereign issuers (perhaps achieved by “leveraging” the EFSF), proactive bank recapitalization, and monetary easing. But policy continues to move very slowly relative to the building risks in the financial system and the deterioration in the real economy. A true turnaround in the financial situation does not yet appear to be in sight, let alone a bottoming in the real economy.

3. There are several channels through which the European crisis is likely to weigh on US growth. The impact via reduced exports is the most obvious, but it is unlikely to be very large. Exports to the Euro area account for about 2% of US GDP, so an impact of much more than 0.1-0.2 percentage point would probably require a much deeper European recession than we are forecasting. The bigger issue is the significant tightening in financial conditions and the availability of credit. Since early summer, our financial conditions index has tightened by more than 50bp, a move that might shave ½ percentage point from growth over the next year. In addition, there are some early indications of tightening credit availability including an increase in the percentage of small firms reporting in the NFIB survey that “credit was harder to get” last time they tried to borrow (the next update is due on Tuesday). Tighter credit could easily shave another ½ point or more, for a total impact from Europe on US growth of 1-1½ percentage points. Should the European recession deepen, the risk of further dislocations in the financial system and greater spillovers into the US would grow (for more on this, see Andrew Tilton’s US weekly dated September 16 at US Economics Analyst: 11/37 – Will the European Storm Cross the Atlantic?).

4. One key question is whether the European crisis—and the unsettled fiscal policy environment more generally—has caused a sufficiently large increase in uncertainty to lead companies to postpone hiring and capex decisions in a self-reinforcing manner. There is some evidence that corporate behavior may be changing, as online job ads have dropped off and the percentage of firms increasing employment in the nonmanufacturing ISM survey has declined at the most rapid pace on record over the past two months (data go back to 1997). No such deterioration was visible in Friday’s payroll numbers, but online job ads lead by a month or two and most of the ISM responses probably came after the payroll survey week, so the jury is still out.

5. The other key drag on US growth is the tightening of fiscal policy. Our baseline assumption remains extension of the employee-side payroll tax cut and passage of a small business hiring incentive; we do not assume extension of emergency unemployment benefits (although this is a close call), a further expansion of the payroll tax cut as proposed by the President, additional infrastructure spending or aid to state governments, or another foreign repatriation tax break. We also expect the Congressional “supercommittee” to agree on spending cuts and revenue increases that cover part of the mandated $1.2 trillion in savings over 10 years; the remainder will likely come via automatic cuts that take place from 2013. Overall, we view the risks around our assumption of just under 1 percentage point of fiscal drag (excluding multiplier effects) in 2012 as roughly balanced at present.

6. Even in the baseline case of no recession, we expect additional monetary easing as the Federal Reserve supplements “Operation Twist” with yet more purchases of long-term securities financed by creation of excess bank reserves (that is, additional QE). We believe that this could still boost growth a bit by further reducing the term premium in the Treasury yield curve and thereby ease financial conditions. But policymakers are clearly running into diminishing returns. If they want a bigger impact, they will probably need to supplement additional QE with changes to the Fed’s monetary policy framework. A relatively incremental version of this is the proposal by Chicago Fed President Evans to promise no monetary tightening until the unemployment rate falls back to 7%-7½% and/or inflation rises to 3%. A more radical version would be a temporary increase in the Fed’s inflation target or a move to price level or nominal GDP level targeting as discussed by Jari Stehn a couple of weeks ago (see US Economics Analyst: 11/38 – The Fed’s “Unconventional” Unconventional Options).

7. While additional easing is likely eventually, we currently do not expect a big move at the November 1-2 FOMC meeting. This is based partly on the somewhat better data and partly on Fed Chairman Bernanke’s remark in his congressional testimony that Fed officials had “no immediate plans” to ease further. Of course, since Bernanke also said that he saw the economy as “close to faltering,” it probably would not take a huge amount of new information to change his mind, but for now our best guess is that the next statement will be less eventful than its two predecessors.

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Shanghai New Home Sales Plunge 77% Y/y to 6-Year Low

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This doesn’t need to mean hard landing, but it means the state has to be that much more countercyclical to hold it all together, and they are facing what they consider a serious inflation problem.

Shanghai New Home Sales Plunge 77% Y/y to 6-Year Low, Uwin Says

Oct. 10 (Bloomberg) — Transactions fell to 85,400 square meters in the week ended Oct. 9, fall of 40% w/w, property consultant Shanghai Uwin Real Estate Information Services Co. says in e-mail statement today.

* New home sales in week of Oct. 9 28% lower than same period during 2008 financial crisis, Uwin chief analyst Zhijian Huang says
* New home supplies slumped 81% w/w in week of Oct.9
* Traditional “golden” September turns weakest month for home sales this year excl. Feb. and Mar.: Huang
* Situation to be more negative for developers should they continue to resist price cuts, and cuts may shift to plunging from gradually falling: Huang

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Merkel does not want to allow Greece to default

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To my point,
Merkel’s view is now that allowing Greece to default is a gift to the Greek govt. that
rewards bad behavior, introduces moral hazard, etc.

The trick is to support Greece and not permit default without using German taxpayer funds and without weakening the credit capacity of Germany.

Hence, the current policy of ECB bond buying,
which accomplished all of the above,
is not inflationary,
carries austerity as it’s prime term and condition,
holds Greece to it’s obligations,
enhances ECB earnings and capital,
and is operationally sustainable,
is likely to continue.

Merkel said that her “entire council” of economic advisers says Greek debt should be restructured, advice that she is not prepared to take. “If we tell a country ‘We cancel half of your debt,’ that’s a great deal,” she said. “Then the next guy will immediately show up and say he wants the same.”

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Mosler: Greek Default Not Logical Path Out of Crisis

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Mosler: Greek Default Not Logical Path Out of Crisis

By Forrest Jones and Kathleen Walter

September 30 — Letting Greece default won’t end Europe’s crisis and won’t allow Germany and other core nations to brush themselves off and move merrily on their way, says Warren Mosler, principal and co-founder of AVM, an international bond firm with 30 years of experience in Europe and author of the 2010 book, “The 7 Deadly Innocent Frauds of Economic Policy.”

In fact, it will do the opposite. It will cost money and rattle key export markets for Germany and other countries targeting European periphery countries.

Greece has run up debts and may default and exit the euro, yet many in wealthier nations such as Germany oppose bailouts for Greece and other debt-ridden Mediterranean nations.

They also have opposed backing euro-wide bonds, which basically shores up the Greek economy via the financial backing of the Greece’s richer northern neighbors.

However, allowing the European Central Bank to play a role in Greece’s economic reform will not put the load on German, French and other taxpayers, Mosler says.

“It’s a question if a bailout now is good for Germany and France but not so good for Greece, because if Greece is allowed to default, then their debt goes away. They are agreeing to wipe out their debt and it reduces their payments,” he said in an exclusive Newsmax.TV interview.

“But if they fund Greece, and don’t allow them to default, then Greece has to continue to make these payments. So the whole dynamic has changed from doing Greece a favor to disciplining Greece by not allowing them to default.”

That makes default, arguably, less imminent.

“I would think the odds are shifting to the endgame where Greece doesn’t default, where at the end of the day Greece is forced though the austerity measures to run a primary balance or primary surplus, the interest payments will largely wind up with up with the European Central Bank, who is buying Greek debt in the marketplace,” Mosler says.

Furthermore, the logic that applies to keeping Greece in the eurozone applies to the other nations such as Italy.

“It used to be if Germany, France and the others bailed out Greece, and then suddenly they have to bail out Ireland, Portugal, Spain and Italy, they could never have the capacity to do that. It’s now understood that there is no limit, no nominal limit to the check that the European Central Bank can write,” Mosler says.

Plus, Europe can expect no side effects of such Central Bank involvement.

“It will not weaken the euro, it will not cause inflation and it will not increase total spending in the region. In fact it will help reduce total spending in the region because the European Central Bank imposes terms and conditions when it intervenes.”

Should Greece default, however, Europe would feel the pain, but it shouldn’t be too bad in the United States, Mosler says.

Yes, regulators would have to react.

“The FDIC would have to decide how they would want to respond to a drop in equity. Would they want the banks to raise more capital? Would they give them time to do it?”

But they wouldn’t have to react too much.

“They don’t need to shut the banks down, it doesn’t need to be disruptive to the real economy.”

Turning to the United States and President Barack Obama’s economic policies, Mosler says the president is on the right track by running deficits, but adds he’s doing a poor job of explaining the rationale behind his policies.

Or he just doesn’t understand it.

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Deficit Reduction Super Committee Fighting the Battle of New Orleans

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I realize it’s not a perfect analogy,
but, due to poor communications,
the battle of New Orleans was fought
well after the War of 1812 had ended.

Likewise, the Congressional super committee is fighting the battle for deficit reduction
long after the vaporization of the primary reason driving that move towards deficit.

The main difference is the stakes are much higher this time,
with the real cost of the lost output from the excessive, ongoing,
global output gap far exceeding
all the real losses of all the wars in history combined.

The headline reason for deficit reduction was
the rhetoric about the immediate danger of the US
suddenly becoming the next Greece,
with the US govt being cut off from credit,
interest rates spiking,
and visions of the US Treasury Secretary
on his knees, hat in hand,
begging the IMF for funding and mercy.

And the looming flash point was the threat of a US downgrade if
a credible deficit reduction package wasn’t passed before the Aug 2 deadline,
when the Congressionally self-imposed US borrowing authority was to expire.

After a prolonged Congressional process that was
even uglier than the healthcare process,
with already dismal Congression approval ratings moving even lower,
the debt ceiling was extended with a measure that contained some deficit reduction,
and also set up the current super committee to ensure further deficit reduction.

Soon after, however, Standard and Poor’s decided it all wasn’t enough,
and the dreaded downgrade was announced.

And then the unexpected happened.
Rather than spike up as widely feared,
market forces drove US Treasury interest rates down, substantially.

What was happening? Where had the mainstream gone wrong?
Former Fed Chairman Greenspan and celebrity investor Warren Buffet
both immediately had the answer.
S&P was wrong.
The US is not Greece.
The US govt prints its own money, while Greece does not.
The US always has the ability to pay any amount of dollars,
that markets can’t take away.

And everyone agreed.

And the driving force behind deficit reduction was suddenly not there,
and the rhetoric of becoming the next Greece vanished from the national TV screens.

And, unfortunately, just like the news that the War of 1812 had ended
didn’t get to New Orleans in time to prevent thousands from
losing their lives in that bloody battle that would otherwise not have been fought,

the news that the US isn’t Greece apparently hasn’t gotten through
to the Congressional members of the super committee
now fighting the current battle over deficit reduction.

What was learned after the downgrade was that
there is no such thing as a solvency problem for the US govt.
Short term or long term.

True, excessive deficit spending may indeed someday cause unwelcome inflation,
but the US government is never in any danger of not being able
to make any payment (in dollars) that it wants to.

And yes, the discussion could be shifted to a discussion
as to whether current long term deficits forecasts
translate into unwelcome inflation in the future
that may demand action today.

However no specific research has been done along those lines.
And, in fact, inflation forecasts,
which all assume our current fiscal trajectory,
don’t show any signs of an inflation problem.
Nor are the long term US Treasury inflation indexed bonds flashing any inflation warnings.
In fact, the Fed and most other forecasters remain more concerned over the risk of deflation.
And Japan, with a debt to GDP ratio about triple that of the US,
has been fighting its battle against deflation for nearly two decades.

So, clearly, shooting from the hip on this issue,
by suddenly declaring long term deficits
must be immediately addressed
with cuts to Social Security,
and with tax hikes,
to prevent a looming inflation problem,
(now that the prior errant reason, that the US could be the next Greece, has been dismissed)
could only be considered
highly irresponsible behavior
on the part of the super committee.

An informed Congress might recognize
the reason for the urgent action to reduce the federal deficit
and the reason for the super committee
is no longer there.
And, therefore, in informed Congress might suspend the super committee,
and regroup and reconsider before taking action.

It is widely agreed the current problem is a massive lack of aggregate demand.
It is widely agreed that a combination of tax cuts and/or spending increases
will restore sales, output and employment.

But instead of a compromise where the Republicans get some of their tax cuts
and the Democrats some of their spending increases, and the economy booms,
both sides are instead going the other way and pushing proposals to reduce aggregate demand,
even though they no longer have good reason to do so.

The battle of New Orleans was fought after the reason for fighting it had ended,
And, likewise, long after the reason for deficit reduction vaporized,
this battle continues to be fought
with both parties continuing acting counter agenda.

(feel free to distribute)

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Mosler Bonds for the ECB, and reasons why Greece will not be allowed to default

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First, The ECB should turn the bonds it buys into Mosler bonds, by requiring the govt of issue to legally state that in the case of non payment, the bearer on demand can use those bonds for payment of taxes to the govt of issue.

The ECB holding Mosler bonds will shift the default option from the issuer to the ECB, as in the case of non payment,
the ECB would have the option to make it’s holdings available for sale to tax payers of that nation to offset their taxes.

Therefore, conversion to Mosler bonds will ensure that the ECB’s holdings of national govt debt are ‘money good’ without regard to external credit ratings, and give the ECB control over the default process.

Second, I see several substantial reasons Greece should not be allowed to default, which center around why it’s in the best interest of Germany for Greece not to default.

Sustaining Greece with ECB purchases of Greek debt costs German tax payers nothing.

The purchases are not inflationary because they are directly tied to reduced Greek spending and increased Greek taxes, which are both deflationary forces for the euro zone.

Funding Greece facilitates the purchase of German exports to Greece.

Funding Greece does not reward Greek bad behavior.
Instead, it exacts a price from Greece for its bad behavior.

With the ECB prospectively owning the majority of Greek debt, and, potentially, Greek Mosler bonds, Greece will be paying interest primarily to the ECB.

The funding of Greece by the ECB carries with it austerity measures that will bring the Greek budget into primary balance.

That means Greek taxes will be approximately equal to Greek govt expenditures, not including interest, which will then be largely payments to the ECB.

So if default is not allowed, the Greek govt spending will be limited to what it taxes, and additional tax revenues will be required as well to pay interest primarily to the ECB.

But if default is facilitated, Greece will still be required to spend only from tax revenues, but the debt forgiveness will mean substantially lower interest payments to the ECB than otherwise.

And while without default, it can be said that the holders of Greek bonds have been bailed out, the euro zone will be considering the following:

The ECB buys Greek bonds at a discount, indicating holders of those bonds have, on average, taken a loss.

The EU in general did not consider the purchase of Greek bonds as bad behavior that is rightly punished with a default.

In fact, it was EU regulation and guidelines that resulted in the initial purchases of Greek bonds by its banking system.

Therefore, I see the main reason Greece will not be allowed to default is that not allowing default serves the further purpose of Germany and the EU by every measure I can think of.

It sustains the transfer of control of fiscal policy to the ECB.
It’s deflationary which helps support the value of the currency.
It provides for an ongoing income stream from Greece to the ECB.

Note, however, that not long ago it was not widely recognized as it now is that the ECB can write the check without nominal limit.

Before the EU leaders recognized that fundamental of monetary operations, Greek default was serious consideration for financial reasons as it was believed the funding of Greece and subsequently the rest of the ‘weaker’ euro zone nations would threaten the entire euro zone’s ability to fund itself.

It is the realization that the ECB is the issuer of the currency, and is therefore not revenue constrained, that leads to the conclusion that not allowing Greece to default best serves public purpose.

(as always, feel free to distribute, repost, etc.)

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China’s Squeeze on Property Market Nearing ‘Tipping Point’

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If China gets by this we should be ok.
If not, could be a serious setback for a few days,
but ultimately the lower commodity prices are a plus for the US.
And even more of a plus if we knew how to sustain aggregate demand at full employment levels.

China’s Squeeze on Property Market Nearing ‘Tipping Point’
By Bloomberg News

Sept. 23 (Bloomberg) — The squeeze on China’s property market may be reaching a “tipping point” that drives growth lower just when exports are under threat from a global slowdown and investor confidence is plunging, said Zhang Zhiwei, Hong Kong-based chief China economist at Nomura Holdings Inc.
 
Land transactions in 133 cities tracked by Soufun Holdings Ltd., the country’s biggest real-estate website, fell 14 percent by area in August from a month earlier. Prices of new homes declined in 16 of 70 cities last month compared with July, according to government data.
 
Property construction is a mainstay of investment that last year drove more than a half of economic growth while land sales contributed 40 percent of revenues earned by local authorities that have amassed 10.7 trillion yuan ($1.67 trillion) of debt. A funding squeeze on developers risks a “domino effect” as companies needing cash cut prices, forcing others to follow, Credit Suisse Group AG said yesterday.
 
“We’re reaching a tipping point where land sales are dropping much faster than before, developers are losing more access to bank financing, and housing prices are showing weakness,” Nomura’s Zhang said in an interview in Beijing yesterday.
 
The People’s Bank of China has raised interest rates five times over the past year, curbed lending to property developers and raised down payments on home loans as part of Premier Wen Jiabao’s campaign to rein in surging consumer and property prices. The government has also limited purchases of housing in cities where gains have been deemed excessive.
 
Loan Approval Withdrawn
 
Real-estate development accounted for a fifth of China’s urban fixed-asset investment last year, government data show.
 
Shanghai-based Shui On Land Ltd. had a loan approval from a Chinese bank withdrawn after the lender changed its policy, Vincent Lo, the company’s billionaire chairman, said in a Sept. 13 interview. Cancellations by that bank, which he wouldn’t name, are “happening quite frequently” to other developers, he said, adding that the credit squeeze may slow property development.
 
The price of land in Beijing slumped 76 percent in August from a month earlier, while in Guangzhou it plummeted 53 percent, according to Soufun. Land auction failures surged 242 percent in the first seven months of this year because of government curbs on the property market, the Beijing Times reported Aug. 3.
 
Debt Servicing Difficulties
 
The decline may make it more difficult for some of the thousands of companies set up by local governments to service debts taken on to fund infrastructure investment. China Real Estate Information Corp., a Shanghai-based property information and consulting firm, estimates 40 percent of overall local government revenue came from land sales last year.
 
In a sign financing vehicles in some provinces are struggling, the auditor of northeast Liaoning province estimated in July that about 85 percent of such companies in the region had insufficient income last year to cover all their debt servicing payments.
 
Some developers have turned to trust firms for financing, usually in the form of loans that are repackaged into investment products and sold to retail investors. The debt is typically funded by banks or investors themselves, according to Samsung Securities Asia Ltd.
 
Many real-estate companies have received about half of their new financing from trust firms over the past year, according to Jinsong Du, an analyst with Credit Suisse in Hong Kong. New bank lending to property developers in the second quarter of this year sank to 42 billion yuan from 169 billion yuan in the first quarter, he said, citing central bank data.
 
Stocks Drop
 
Shares in China property companies slumped yesterday on concern tightened access to loans will force them to cut prices. Greentown China Holdings Ltd. plunged 16 percent in Hong Kong, the most in almost three years, and was 6.5 percent lower at HK$4.20 at 3:34 p.m. today.
 
Greentown, the largest builder in the eastern province of Zhejiang, yesterday denied media reports the banking regulator ordered trust companies to provide details of their business dealings with the company and its units.
 
The China Banking Regulatory Commission is looking into financing of developers through trust companies as part of a broader evaluation of real-estate lending, a person familiar with the matter said today. The inquiries are part of regular monitoring and aren’t targeting any particular company, said the person, who declined to be identified because the regulator’s queries were meant to be private.
 
The “possibility of developers defaulting on debt has definitely increased and towards the end of the year that’s pretty likely,” Du said in a telephone interview yesterday.
 
‘Tip of the Iceberg’
 
Developer Dalian Rightway Real Estate entered preliminary restructuring talks with lenders after missing a loan repayment, the Hong Kong-based South China Morning Post newspaper reported Sept. 9, citing three unidentified people involved in the situation.
 
Funding problems are just “the tip of the iceberg” and “sharp declines in property sales and prices are likely in the next two to three months,” said Shen Jianguang, an economist at Mizuho Securities Asia Ltd. in Hong Kong.
 
Premier Wen reiterated this month that stabilizing consumer prices remains the government’s top priority and that the direction of government policies won’t change. The slowdown in economic growth is “within expectations,” he said.
 
Too Complacent
 
Consumer-price increases in August slowed to 6.2 percent from a year earlier, down from a three-year high of 6.5 percent the previous month. Economists at Citigroup, Mizuho Securities Asia Ltd. and Macquarie Securities Ltd. say inflation probably peaked in July.
 
Policy makers may be too complacent about the economy’s performance, Mizuho’s Shen said, pointing to the deteriorating outlook for exports as Europe’s debt crisis deepens and the U.S. risks slipping back into recession.
 
The International Monetary Fund this week cut its forecasts for global expansion this year and next and said downside risks to growth are rising.
 
In signs China’s economy is cooling, a preliminary index of purchasing managers released yesterday by HSBC Holdings Plc and Markit Economics showed manufacturing may shrink for a third month in September, the longest contraction since 2009, as measures of export orders and output decline.
 
“The risk of China replaying the hard landing of 2008 is increasing as the property sector cools and exports weaken,” Shen said. “ I fear that once the real economy deteriorates and officials do loosen policies, it will already be too late.”

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The euro zone is operationally sustainable as is

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While the way the euro zone is currently function would not be my first choice for public policy, it is operationally sustainable.

The ECB is writing the check, and can continue to do so indefinitely.

For example,
as long as the ECB buys sufficient quantities of Greek bonds in the secondary markets,
Greece will be able to fund itself.

The ECB debt purchases merely shift net financial assets held by the ‘economy’ from Greek govt. liabilities
to ECB liabilities in the form of clearing balances at the ECB, which does not alter any ‘flows’ in the real economy.

So as long as the ECB imposes austeric terms and conditions, their bond buying will not be inflationary.
Inflation from this channel comes from spending,
and in this case the ECB support comes only with reduced spending.

For the ECB this also means they accrue substantial net interest margins on their portfolio of Greek debt.
And as long as they keep funding Greece in any manner, Greece need not default.

This means the ECB books profits from their portfolio that adds to their stated capital.
While this is of no operational consequence,
it does help satisfy political concerns over ECB capital adequacy.

Nor is this ‘Ponzi’ in any sense,
as the ECB is not dependent on external funding
to make payments in euro.

Additionally, the ECB no officially has stated it will provide unlimited euro liquidity to its banks.
This too is not inflationary or expansionary, as bank assets remain constrained by regulation
including capital adequacy and asset eligibility which is required for them to receive ECB support.

So while politics is and will always be a factor in government in general, the current state of affairs can be operationally sustained.

The problem then shifts to political sustainability which is necessarily less certain.

The near universally accepted austerity theme is likely to result in continually elevated unemployment,
and a large output gap in general characterized by a lagging standard of living and high personal stress in general.

With ECB continuing to fund, this can, operationally be readily adjusted via a loosening of the Growth and Stability Pact budget constraints, but politically this possibility remains remote without a substantial increase in popular opposition.

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econ recap- Fed driven sell off

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As previously suggested, the Fed doing anything would cause markets to believe it’s all going bad out there.

However, the US economic news still looks like modest improvement,
so I still suspect the reaction to the Fed will be temporary, and start wearing off around noon Eastern time today.

q3 still looking up from q2 which was up from q1.

And gasoline prices now moving lower help the consumer a bit more,
so q4 should be up more than q3.

With GDP sequentially better all year, makes sense to me that earnings in general will continue to grow.

Employment not doing much as there is still some underlying productivity growth
which also helps keep unit labor costs in check.

This means stocks still be in their ugly trading range, with the lower bound somewhere around current levels.

Though potential external shocks remain.

With the ECB again writing the check today by buying Italian and Spanish bonds
the current situation is in fact operationally sustainable, and I suspect what we are seeing
is the resolution. The ECB buys as needed in conjunction with imposing austerity,
and the euro zone muddles through with flat to modestly negative growth and deficits higher than they’d like.
Note too, that the ECB buys bonds are relatively high yields, and pays relative low rates of interest on the clearing balances it creates
to make the purchases. This results in a profit for the ECB that adds to their stated capital and their stated capacities.
So as long as they keep buying there’s no default and not only no losses, but rising ECB profits.
And there’s no inflationary consequences because none of this increases actual spending by the national govts.
All it does is allow them to fund their austerity budgets as dictated by the ECB.

China continues to decelerate and so far avoid reporting a hard landing,
and while the jury is still out on that score, trade and demand growth is slowing.
They know how to increase demand but are holding back due to concerns of inflation.

Commodities are finally selling off and heading towards their marginal costs of production,
just as the textbooks describe, as global tight fiscal keeps demand in check.

And with seemingly no one in any position of responsibility understanding how their monetary systems work,
and instead carrying on as if they were all operating under some sort of fixed exchange rate constraint,
the odds of an acceleration in aggregate demand any time soon remain remote.

Initial jobless claims dropped by 9,000 to 423,000 the week ended Sept. 17, as expected. Continuing claims fell by 28,000 to 3,727,000 in the week ended Sept. 10. The four-week moving average of new claims, a more reliable indicator of the labor market’s recent performance, rose by 500 to 421,000

 
FHFA House Price Index Up 0.8 Percent in July

 
The Conference Board Leading Economic Index® (LEI) for the U.S. increased 0.3 percent in August to 116.2 (2004 = 100), following a 0.6 percent increase in July and a 0.3 percent increase in June.

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my Dec 30 2010 post revisited

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COMMENTS ON MYSELF IN CAPS:

Karim on Jobless Claims Data and Year End Comments

Posted by WARREN MOSLER on 30th December 2010

Agreed with Karim, the relatively modest recovery remains on track.

Left alone, I see GDP in the 3.5%-5.5% range for next year, and possibly more.

***WRONG ON THAT! THOUGH FOR REASONS SUBSEQUENTLY DISCUSSED IN THE SAME POST.

AND THE SURPRISE EARTHQUAKE NOT HELPING MATTERS AFTER WHAT TURNED OUT TO BE A MUCH WEAKER FIRST QUARTER

Though they didn’t add much, the latest tax adjustments did take away the down side risk of taxes going up at year end.

***TRUE, AND ON A LOOK BACK THE REMOVAL OF ‘WORK FOR PAY’ MAY HAVE BEEN A FAR STRONGER NEGATIVE THAN THE POSITIVE OF THE PARTIAL CUT IN FICA

I do, however, see several negatives with maybe up to 25% possibilities each, meaning collectively the odds of any one of them happening are a lot higher than that.

The new Congress is serious about deficit reduction. The risk is they will be successful, and it seems they even have the votes to get a balanced budget amendment passed.

***THOUGH NOT A LOT OF ACTUAL TIGHTENING YET, THIS HAS BEEN A STRONG INFLUENCE.

China could get it wrong in their fight against inflation and cause a pretty severe slump. In fact, I can’t recall any nation that didn’t cause a widening of their output gap in their various fights against inflation.

***THIS IS HAPPENING AS WELL.

LAST NIGHT’S NEGATIVE MANUFACTURING NUMBER CONTINUES THE PATTERN OF WEAKNESS

The ECB’s imposed austerity in return for funding at some point reverses the current modest growth of that region. Not to mention the small but real risk the ECB decides to not buy any more member nation debt in the secondary markets.

***THIS HAS ALSO TURNED OUT TO BE THE CASE WITH AUSTERITY NOW TAKING OVERALL GDP GROWTH TO NEAR 0, AND THE ECB COMING IN ONLY AS COLLAPSE IS THREATENED.

While a less important economy for the world, the UK austerity looks ill timed as well.

***ALSO CAUSING SERIOUS DOMESTIC WEAKNESS.

The Saudis could continue to hike their posted prices which could reduce US demand for domestic output. The spike to the 150 level in 08 was a significant contributor to the severity of the financial collapse that followed.

***THIS DIDN’T HAPPEN, AS THE SAUDIS INSTEAD ANNOUNCED A RANGE OF $80-90 WHICH WAS ACHIEVED FOR WEST TEXAS DUE TO LOCAL SUPPLY ISSUES, BUT WITH BRENT AND THE REST OF THE WORLD HOVERING AROUND THE $110-115/BARREL RANGE THAT PRICE IS A HIGHER TAX ON GLOBAL CONSUMERS.

There are also several lesser factors I’ve been listing the last few weeks that could cause aggregate demand to disappoint.

*INTERESTINGLY, MOST QUARTERLY FORECASTS FOR 2011 STARTED OUT AT AROUND 4%, ONLY TO BE REVISED DOWN UNTIL THE ACTUAL RESULTS CAME IN ABOUT HALF THAT.

THEN, IN LATE JULY IF I RECALL CORRECTLY, THE GOVT. REVISED DOWN THE ALREADY REVISED DOWN RESULTS SUBSTANTIALLY FURTHER, WITH Q1 NOW REPORTED AT ONLY .5%, Q2 1%, AND Q3 NOW FORECAST FOR ABOUT 1-1.5%.

On the positive side is always the possibility of a private sector credit expansion taking hold.

***SO FAR ONLY A MODEST INCREASE IN CONSUMER CREDIT EXPANSION.

Traditionally that would be borrowing to spend on housing and cars.

***CAR SALES WERE GROWING REASONABLY WELL UNTIL THE EARTHQUAKE SET THEM BACK, AND THEN POLICY RESPONSE TO THE EARTHQUAKE WAS TOO WEAK TO SUSTAIN AGGREGATE DEMAND.

Federal deficit spending has done its job of restoring incomes and monetary savings, and will continue to do so.
Financial burdens ratios are down, car sales are showing some modest growth, and housing looks to have at least bottomed. And both are at low enough levels where there could be a lot of growth and they’d still be very low, especially housing.

*FEDERAL DEFICIT SPENDING DOES CONTINUE TO BE SUFFICIENT TO KEEP GROWTH MODESTLY ABOVE 0, AND UNEMPLOYMENT, THOUGH FAR TOO HIGH, HAS AT LEAST STOPPED RISING.

I don’t see inflation as a risk (unless crude spikes a lot higher), nor deflation (unless one of the above shocks kicks in).

And I do see the ‘because we think we could be the next Greece we’re turning ourselves into the next Japan’ theme continuing, as it seems highly unlikely to me we will get back to, say, the 4% unemployment level for a very long time, if ever, until there’s a paradigm change regarding fiscal policy.

*THE TERM STRUCTURE OF RATES IS FALLING IN A JAPAN LIKE WAY, REAL ESTATE CONTINUE TO BEHAVE VERY JAPAN LIKE, AND STOCKS SEEM TO BE IN AN UGLY, JAPAN LIKE TYPE OF TRADING RANGE.

The full employment budget deficit might be up to 4% of GDP or higher, and our current tax structure probably still delivers a cycle ending surplus at full employment.

*THOUGH AT THIS RATE IT WILL BE A LONG TIME BEFORE THAT GETS TESTED.

BUT, MORE IMPORTANT, IT MEANS A FULL FICA SUSPENSION WOULD BE LIKELY TO BE PERMANENT.

In other words, with our current tax structure and size of govt, full employment remains unsustainable.

Lastly, my feel is that there’s about a better than even chance of an equity and commodity sell off. Stocks as well as commodities look like they are pretty much pricing in all the good economic news, some of which is bogus, like QE being inflationary, as previously discussed. There could also be dollar strength which would contribute to equity and commodity weakness. And the stock and commodity weakness would also work to bring the term structure of rates lower as well, particularly as rates seem to have gone higher recently more due to supply factors during a holiday week and maybe year end selling than anything else. The forwards ED forwards don’t look to me to be at all low with respect to mainstream expectations of future fed rate settings. And it also looks like the annual portfolio rebalancing will be that of selling stocks which went up last year and buying bonds which went down, to get all the portfolio ratios back in line with marching orders from higher ups.

*THIS WAS ALSO DISCUSSED IN MY POST ON THE QE BUBBLE, WHERE I SUGGESTED ALL THAT MOVED BASED ON QE HAD DONE SO OUT BY ‘MISTAKE’ AS MARKET PARTICIPANTS BELIEVED QE ACTUALLY WORKS TO INFLATE, ETC, WHEN IN REALITY QE IS AT BEST A DEFLATIONARY TAX.

THAT ‘UNWIND’ CONTINUES TO PLAY OUT WITH GOLD PERHAPS BEING THE LAST OBJECT OF INVESTORS HEDGING AGAINST ‘INFLATION’ TURNING SOUTH SOON AFTER IT WAS REALIZED THAT CHAVEZ’S GOLD DID EXIST AND WAS BEING SHIPPED BACK TO HIM.

DEFLATIONARY FISCAL POLICIES TEND TO TAKE AWAY SPENDING POWER TO THE POINT WHERE SPECULATION IN GENERAL LOSES ITS FUNDING AND ECONOMIC FORCES OF SUPPLY AND DEMAND TEND TO DRIVE PRICES TO AND BELOW MARGINAL COSTS OF PRODUCTION IN A VERY TEXT BOOK LIKE MANNER.

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