Have the Fed Financing Bank fund the agencies with fixed rate amortizing term funding.

Have the FFB eat the convexity and allow prepayments of advances at par as mtgs pay down.

Have Congress set the FFB’s advance rate for the mtgs for public purpose.

Have fed member banks originate agency mtgs on
Congressionally dictated terms as agents for the agencies on a fee basis.

Have the agencies hold all these newly issues loans in portfolio.

Have the banks do the servicing for a fee.

This would lower mtg rates maybe 1%.

Have the agencies offer refi’s for existing agency loans at current rates without new appraisals or income statements.

Am i missing anything?

Feel free to distribute!

MOSLER FOR SENATE

Tea Party’s Economic Agenda Would Cause Next Great Depression
Says Former Tea Party Democrat

Waterbury, CT – August 30, 2010, Warren Mosler, Independent candidate for US Senate, former Tea Party Democrat, and frequent speaker at Tea Party rallies, lashed out today at the political movement for its ill-thought demands to balance the budget which he contends is based on abject ignorance and counter to true Tea Party values. “The Tea Party’s demands to balance the budget and reduce the Federal deficit aren’t merely misguided, but dangerous, and would cause the worst depression in history,” stated Mosler, a financial expert with 37 years of experience in monetary operations. “I have been, and continue to be, a strong supporter of the core Tea Party values of lower taxes, limited government, competitive market solutions, and a return to personal responsibility. However, their proposals to balance the budget are the same suicidal policies that caused the 6 horrible depressions in the U.S. over the past 200 years. At the worst possible time to take money out of the economy, the Tea Party’s proposals would remove an estimated $1 trillion and cause the worst depression in world history, destroying tens of millions of jobs and ruining our children’s future.”

Explanation of the Modern Monetary System
Modern money, after the demise of the gold standard, is akin to a spreadsheet that simply works by computer. As Fed Chairman Bernanke explained on national television on 60 minutes, when the government spends or lends, it does so by adding numbers to private bank accounts. When it taxes, it marks those same accounts down. When it borrows, it simply shifts funds from a demand deposit (called a reserve account) at the Fed to a savings account (called a securities account) at the Fed. The money government spends doesn’t come from anywhere, and it doesn’t cost anything to produce. The government therefore cannot run out of money, nor does it need to borrow from the likes of China to finance anything. To better understand this, think about when a football team kicks a field goal; the number on the scoreboard goes from 0 to 3. Does anyone wonder where the stadium got those 3 points, or demand that the stadium keep a reserve of points in a “lock box”?

Moreover, government deficits ADD to our savings – to the penny – as a fact of accounting, not theory or philosophy. This means the Mosler payroll tax (FICA) holiday will directly increase incomes and savings, thus fixing the economy from the bottom up. For example, if the Mosler tax cut amounts to $20 billion per week, that will be the exact increase in income and savings for the rest of us as anyone in the Congressional Budget Office will confirm. For the Federal government, taxes don’t serve to collect revenue but are more like a thermostat that controls the temperature of the economy. When it is too hot, raising taxes will cool it down. And in this ice-cold economy, a very large tax cut is needed to warm the economy back up to operating temperature.

While Mosler fully supports the Tea Party desire to cut taxes, and recognizes the need to cut wasteful and unnecessary spending – in fact, his economic proposals will save the government hundreds of billions of dollars of unnecessary interest expense – he also recognizes that tax cuts have to be much larger than spending cuts in order to ensure that less money is taken out of the economy, and not more as the Tea Party is currently demanding.

About Warren Mosler
Warren Mosler is running as an Independent. His populist economic message features: 1) a full payroll tax (FICA) holiday so that people working for a living can afford to buy the goods and services they produce. 2) $500 per capita Federal revenue distribution for the states 3) An $8/hr federally funded job to anyone willing and able to work to facilitate the transition from unemployment to private sector employment. He has also pledged never to vote for cuts in Social Security payments or benefits. Warren is a native of Manchester, Conn., where his father worked in a small insurance office and his mother was a night-shift nurse. After graduating from the University of Connecticut (BA Economics, 1971), and working on financial trading desks in NYC and Chicago, Warren started his current investment firm in 1982. For the last twenty years, Warren has also been involved in the academic community, publishing numerous journal articles, and giving conference presentations around the globe. Mosler’s new book “The 7 Deadly Innocent Frauds of Economic Policy” is a non technical guide to the actual workings of the monetary system and exposes the most commonly held misconceptions. He also founded Mosler Automotive, which builds the Mosler MT900, the world’s top performance car that also gets 30 mpg at 55 mph.
Learn more at www.moslerforsenate.com


Media Contact:
Will Thompson
(267) 221-6056
will@hedgefundpr.net

Karim writes:

Yes, contrary to my opinion. This about managing expectations. With falling inflation and unemployment this high it makes no sense that they would be holding back something that could make a material difference.

Agreed.

Again, if they did have anything that would substantially increase agg demand they’d have done it.

Yes, and, again, it’s doubtful lower credit spreads will do much for the macro economy but would shift a lot of credit risks to the Fed for very little gain.

FRB: Bernanke, The Economic Outlook and Monetary Policy

At best, though, fiscal impetus and the inventory cycle can drive recovery only temporarily.

That is not correct. Fiscal adjustment can sustain demand at any politically desired level.

For a sustained expansion to take hold, growth in private final demand–notably, consumer spending and business fixed investment–must ultimately take the lead. On the whole, in the United States, that critical handoff appears to be under way.

Agreed that hand off is slowly materializing and private sector debt expansion will then drive additional growth. But sustained expansion could come immediately from a fiscal adjustment as well.

However,although private final demand, output, and employment have indeed been growing for more than a year, the pace of that growth recently appears somewhat less vigorous than we expected.

Agreed.

Among the most notable results to emerge from the recent revision of the U.S. national income data is that, in recent quarters, household saving has been higher than we thought–averaging near 6 percent of disposable income rather than 4 percent, as the earlier data showed.

Non govt net savings of financial assets = govt deficit spending by identity, and with foreign sector savings relatively constant, the majority of the increase is in the domestic economy, either businesses or households.

That means in general household savings goes up with the deficit regardless of the level of consumer spending.

However, when household savings does start to fall, it’s due to household credit expansion, at which time, if the deficit is unchanged, the savings of financial assets is shifted to either the business or the foreign sector.

And, as growth accelerates, the automatic fiscal stabilizers- increased federal revenues and falling transfer payments- reduce the deficit and therefore reduce the growth in the total net savings of the other sectors.

So the hand off process is usually characterized by the federal deficit falling as private sector debt expands to ‘replace it.’

This continues until the private sector again necessarily gets over leveraged, ending the expansion.

3 On the one hand, this finding suggests that households, collectively, are even more cautious about the economic outlook and their own prospects than we previously believed.

At best his means that he thinks with this much savings households would start leveraging more.

But on the other hand, the upward revision to the saving rate also implies greater progress in the repair of household balance sheets. Stronger balance sheets should in turn allow households to increase their spending more rapidly as credit conditions ease and the overall economy improves.

Yes, as I explained. He seems to understand the sequence of the data but doesn’t seem to be quite there on the causation.

Going forward, improved affordability–the result of lower house prices and record-low mortgage rates–should boost the demand for housing. However, the overhang of foreclosed-upon and vacant housing and the difficulties of many households in obtaining mortgage financing are likely to continue to weigh on the pace of residential investment for some time yet

Yes, which is a traditional source of private sector credit expansion, along with cars, that drives the process.

Generally speaking, large firms in good financial condition can obtain credit easily and on favorable terms; moreover, many large firms are holding exceptionally large amounts of cash on their balance sheets. For these firms, willingness to expand–and, in particular, to add permanent employees–depends primarily on expected increases in demand for their products, not on financing costs.

I couldn’t agree more!
Employment is primarily a function of sales as discussed in prior posts.

Bank-dependent smaller firms, by contrast, have faced significantly greater problems obtaining credit, according to surveys and anecdotes. The Federal Reserve, together with other regulators, has been engaged in significant efforts to improve the credit environment for small businesses. For example, through the provision of specific guidance and extensive examiner training, we are working to help banks strike a good balance between appropriate prudence and reasonable willingness to make loans to creditworthy borrowers. We have also engaged in extensive outreach efforts to banks and small businesses. There is some hopeful news on this front: For the most part, bank lending terms and conditions appear to be stabilizing and are even beginning to ease in some cases, and banks reportedly have become more proactive in seeking out creditworthy borrowers.

Another problem is that the regulators are forcing small banks to reduce what’s called ‘non core funding’ in a confused strategy to enhance small bank ‘deposit stability.’ Unfortunately, at the local level the regulators have interpreted the rules to mean, for example, it’s better for a small bank’s financial stability to fund, for example, a 3 year business loan with 1 year local deposits, vs funding it with a 5 year advance from the Federal Home loan bank. It’s also a fallacy of composition, as at the macro level there aren’t enough core deposits to fund local small businesses, as many larger corporations and individuals use money center banks and leave their deposits with them. The regulatory insistence on small banks using ‘core deposits’ rather than ‘wholesale funding’ recycled from the larger banks causes a shortage of local deposits and forces the small banks to pay substantially higher rates as they compete with each other for funding artificially limited by regulation.

In lieu of adding permanent workers, some firms have increased labor input by increasing workweeks, offering full-time work to part-time workers, and making extensive use of temporary workers.

Yes, and when you include this growth in employment the economy is doing better than most analysts seem to think.

Like others, we were surprised by the sharp deterioration in the U.S. trade balance in the second quarter. However, that deterioration seems to have reflected a number of temporary and special factors. Generally, the arithmetic contribution of net exports to growth in the gross domestic product tends to be much closer to zero, and that is likely to be the case in coming quarters.

Also, part of the hand off will be US consumers going into debt (reducing savings) to buy foreign goods and services, which increases foreign sector savings of financial assets.

Overall, the incoming data suggest that the recovery of output and employment in the United States has slowed in recent months, to a pace somewhat weaker than most FOMC participants projected earlier this year. Much of the unexpected slowing is attributable to the household sector, where consumer spending and the demand for housing have both grown less quickly than was anticipated. Consumer spending may continue to grow relatively slowly in the near term as households focus on repairing their balance sheets. I expect the economy to continue to expand in the second half of this year, albeit at a relatively modest pace.

Agreed.

Despite the weaker data seen recently, the preconditions for a pickup in growth in 2011 appear to remain in place.

Agreed.

Monetary policy remains very accommodative,

Yes, for many borrowers, but the lower rates have also net reduced incomes. QE alone resulted in some $50 billion of ‘profits’ transfered to the Treasury from the Fed that would have been private sector income, for example.

and financial conditions have become more supportive of growth, in part because a concerted effort by policymakers in Europe has reduced fears related to sovereign debts and the banking system there.

Agreed.

Banks are improving their balance sheets and appear more willing to lend.

Agreed, though via a reduction in interest earned by savers that’s gone to increased net interest margins for banks.

Consumers are reducing their debt and building savings, returning household wealth-to-income ratios near to longer-term historical norms.

Yes, ‘funded’ by the federal deficit spending.

Stronger household finances, rising incomes, and some easing of credit conditions will provide the basis for more-rapid growth in household spending next year.

Yes, and that basis is credit expansion.

On the fiscal front, state and local governments continue to be under pressure; but with tax receipts showing signs of recovery, their spending should decline less rapidly than it has in the past few years. Federal fiscal stimulus seems set to continue to fade but likely not so quickly as to derail growth in coming quarters.

Yes, and traditionally matched or exceeded by private sector credit expansion as above.

Recently, inflation has declined to a level that is slightly below that which FOMC participants view as most conducive to a healthy economy in the long run. With inflation expectations reasonably stable and the economy growing, inflation should remain near current readings for some time before rising slowly toward levels more consistent with the Committee’s objectives. At this juncture, the risk of either an undesirable rise in inflation or of significant further disinflation seems low. Of course, the Federal Reserve will monitor price developments closely.

The channels through which the Fed’s purchases affect longer-term interest rates and financial conditions more generally have been subject to debate.

With the debate subsiding as more FOMC participants, but far from all of them, seem to be coming to understand the quantity of the reserves per se has no consequences.

I see the evidence as most favorable to the view that such purchases work primarily through the so-called portfolio balance channel, which holds that once short-term interest rates have reached zero, the Federal Reserve’s purchases of longer-term securities affect financial conditions by changing the quantity and mix of financial assets held by the public. Specifically, the Fed’s strategy relies on the presumption that different financial assets are not perfect substitutes in investors’ portfolios, so that changes in the net supply of an asset available to investors affect its yield and those of broadly similar assets. Thus, our purchases of Treasury, agency debt, and agency MBS likely both reduced the yields on those securities and also pushed investors into holding other assets with similar characteristics, such as credit risk and duration. For example, some investors who sold MBS to the Fed may have replaced them in their portfolios with longer-term, high-quality corporate bonds, depressing the yields on those assets as well.

This is evidence Bernanke himself has come around to the understanding that the quantity of reserves at the Fed per se is of no further economic consequence.

We decided to reinvest in Treasury securities rather than agency securities because the Federal Reserve already owns a very large share of available agency securities, suggesting that reinvestment in Treasury securities might be more effective in reducing longer-term interest rates and improving financial conditions with less chance of adverse effects on market functioning.

Again, it shows the understanding that QE channel is price (interest rates) and not quantities.
This is a very constructive move from understanding indicated in prior statements.

Also, as I already noted, reinvestment in Treasury securities is more consistent with the Committee’s longer-term objective of a portfolio made up principally of Treasury securities. We do not rule out changing the reinvestment strategy if circumstances warrant, however.

In particular, the Committee is prepared to provide additional monetary accommodation through unconventional measures if it proves necessary, especially if the outlook were to deteriorate significantly. The issue at this stage is not whether we have the tools to help support economic activity and guard against disinflation. We do. As I will discuss next, the issue is instead whether, at any given juncture, the benefits of each tool, in terms of additional stimulus, outweigh the associated costs or risks of using the tool.

Notwithstanding the fact that the policy rate is near its zero lower bound, the Federal Reserve retains a number of tools and strategies for providing additional stimulus. I will focus here on three that have been part of recent staff analyses and discussion at FOMC meetings: (1) conducting additional purchases of longer-term securities, (2) modifying the Committee’s communication, and (3) reducing the interest paid on excess reserves. I will also comment on a fourth strategy, proposed by several economists–namely, that the FOMC increase its inflation goals.

In my humble opinion those tools carry no risk and provide no reward to the macro economy.

The Fed should offer full transparency. These are the reasons the Fed gives for secrecy:

“The Fed argued that allowing disclosure could stigmatize banks, causing a loss of confidence that could lead to deposit runs, bank failures and damage to the economy.”

The fact that the Fed fears a liquidity crisis is evidence that it doesn’t understand banking.
With the FDIC offering deposit insurance for up to 100% of any bank’s liabilities, it should be clear to the Fed the liability side of banking is not the place for market discipline. Liquidity should not be an issue and it should be provided in unlimited quantities at all times, much like most of the rest of the world’s central banks have been doing for a long time.

All the Fed has to do is simply trade in the fed funds market and offer any bank unlimited funding at the Fed’s target interest rate, and turn all of their focus on regulating the asset side of banking where it belongs.

The Fed should be audited NOW, and get this issue behind them as soon as possible.

See this and the rest of my proposals, thanks.

Fed in emergency bid to put bailout ruling on hold

Aug 25 (Reuters) — The Federal Reserve asked a U.S. appeals court to delay implementing a ruling that would force the central bank to disclose details of its emergency lending programs to banks during the financial crisis.

Wednesday’s emergency request for a 90-day delay came after the U.S. Second Circuit Court of Appeals on August 20 denied a motion by the Fed to rehear the case, which had been brought by Bloomberg LP, the parent of Bloomberg News, and News Corp’s Fox News Network.

A stay would give the Fed and the Clearing House Association, a group of major U.S. and European banks, until November 18 to appeal the ruling to the U.S. Supreme Court.

The Fed programs were designed to shore up the financial markets, and more than doubled the central bank’s balance sheet to well over $2 trillion, especially after the September 2008 collapse of Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc.

In March, the Second Circuit ordered the Fed to disclose information, including the names of bailout recipients and amounts received, that the news media had requested under the federal Freedom of Information Act.

The Fed argued that allowing disclosure could stigmatize banks, causing a loss of confidence that could lead to deposit runs, bank failures and damage to the economy.

In its Wednesday filing, the Fed said denial of a stay would “force the government to let the cat out of the bag, without any effective way of recapturing it” if the Second Circuit ruling were later reversed.

“The public policy interest identified by the government will be irreversibly lost,” it added.

Fed spokesman David Skidmore said “the stay is necessary to permit the board to consult with the Department of Justice regarding an appeal to the Supreme Court.”

Europe Loan Growth Accelerates as Economy Recovers

By Christian Vits

Aug. 26 (Bloomberg) — Loans to households and companies in Europe grew at the fastest pace in 13 months in July after the economic recovery gathered steam.

Loans to the private sector rose 0.9 percent from a year earlier after growing an annual 0.5 percent in June, the European Central Bank in Frankfurt said today. That’s the strongest increase since June 2009. M3 money supply, which the ECB uses as a gauge of future inflation, increased an annual 0.2 percent in July, the same rate recorded in the previous month.

Strengthening global demand helped Europe’s economy expand 1 percent in the second quarter, the fastest pace in four years.

Economic growth may slow as governments reduce spending to tackle bloated budget deficits and the global recovery shows signs of losing momentum. Orders for durable goods in the U.S.

increased less than forecast in July, a sign one of the few remaining bright spots in the economy is cooling, while China’s industrial output rose the least in 11 months.

This is what the Fed calls the ‘hand off’ with private sector demand increasing via credit expansion as growth causes public sector deficits to fall.

Growth can go on for many years until the public sector deficits get too small to provide the income and financial equity needed to support the increasing private sector debt needed to sustain GDP growth.

Much of Europe got to higher levels of govt deficit spending than the US, before market forces triggered the funding crisis. The ECB has now stepped in to facilitate funding and at the same time implement the widely advertised austerity measures.

With modest growth deficits will start trending down on their own, as revenues increase and transfer payments (including interest payments) moderate, as private sector credit expansion replaces public sector debt as described above.

If they actually understood how it all works they’d be calling for tax cuts rather than interest rate increases.

>   
>   (email exchange)
>   
>   On Mon, Aug 23, 2010 at 12:18 PM, wrote:
>   
>   Yes, Krugman criticised this today and I put in a kind word
>   for Mr Rajan in the comments section.
>   

I suspect Rajan is looking in part at the deflationary impact of the “fiscal channel” via the current 0% interest rate. Your NY Times colleague, Gretchen Morgenson, had a very good piece on this in the Sunday NY Times. Of course, the impact of this policy would, as you suggest, be ruinous for borrowers and highlights the comparatively diffuse impact of monetary policy, vs fiscal policy in terms of solving the problem of aggregate demand. Overall, this uncertainty points to the problems involved in using monetary policy to stimulate (or contract) the economy. It is a blunt policy instrument with ambiguous impacts.

The major problem facing the economy at present is that there is not a willingness to spend by the private sector and the resulting spending gap, has to, initially, be filled by the government using its fiscal policy capacity. I prefer direct public sector job creation to be the principle fiscal vehicle. But fiscal policy it has to be. Then when the negative sentiment is turned around, private borrowing will recommence and investment spending will grow again. Then the economy moves forward some more and the budget deficit falls.

Bernanke Must Raise Benchmark Rate 2 Points, Rajan Says

By Scott Lanman and Simon Kennedy

Aug. 22 (Bloomberg) — Raghuram Rajan accurately warned central bankers in 2005 of a potential financial crisis if banks lost confidence in each other. Now the International Monetary Fund’s former chief economist says the Federal Reserve should consider raising rates, even as almost 10 percent of the U.S. workforce remains unemployed.

Interest rates near zero risk fanning asset bubbles or propping up inefficient companies, say Rajan and William White, former head of the Bank for International Settlements’ monetary and economic department. After Europe’s debt crisis recedes, Fed Chairman Ben S. Bernanke should start increasing his benchmark rate by as much as 2 percentage points so it’s no longer negative in real terms, Rajan says.

“Low rates are not a free lunch, but people are acting as though they are,” said White, 67, who retired in 2008 from the Basel, Switzerland-based BIS and now chairs the Economic Development and Review Committee at the Paris-based Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. “There will be pressure on central banks to follow an expansionary monetary policy, and I worry that one can see the benefits, but what people inadequately appreciate are the downsides.”

He and Rajan will have the chance to make their case at the Fed’s annual symposium in Jackson Hole, Wyoming, this week. In 2003, White told attendees central banks might need to raise rates to combat asset-price bubbles. In 2005, Rajan, 47, said risks in the banking system had increased. They were met with skepticism from then-Fed Chairman Alan Greenspan, 84, and Governor Donald Kohn, 67.

Losing Confidence

While the Fed did boost its target rate for overnight loans among banks in quarter-point steps to 5.25 percent by 2006 from 1 percent in 2004, that didn’t prevent a housing bubble, which began to pop in 2006. Banks began losing confidence in August of the same year and started charging other financial institutions higher interest on loans.

A minority of policy makers are increasingly echoing Rajan and White’s current worries, including Kansas City Fed President Thomas Hoenig, who is hosting the Aug. 26-28 symposium, and Andrew Sentance, one of nine members on the Bank of England’s monetary-policy committee.

Hoenig has dissented from all five Fed policy decisions this year, preferring to jettison a pledge to keep rates low for an “extended period.” Sentance was defeated for a third month in August in his bid to withdraw emergency stimulus by increasing the benchmark interest rate.

Few Converts

The naysayers may fail to win many converts any time soon as the recovery slows and U.S. unemployment, at 9.5 percent in July, remains near a 26-year high. The resulting extension of low rates may increase volatility of government bonds, especially in response to any stronger-than-anticipated economic data, said Marc Fovinci, head of fixed income at Ferguson Wellman Capital Management Inc.

Indications that growth will be at least 3 percent “in the coming months” would cause yields on 10-year Treasuries, which were 2.61 percent on Aug. 20, to rise to 3 percent within about a week, said Fovinci, who is based in Portland, Oregon, and helps invest $2.5 billion.

JPMorgan Chase & Co. reduced its forecast last week for growth in this quarter to an annual rate of 1.5 percent from 2.5 percent and in the last three months of 2010 to 2 percent from 3 percent.

“I’m not worried about inflation, because the economy appears to be weak,” Fovinci said. At the same time, the bond market seems to be “tightly coiled up like a spring.”

Rising Yields

Between June 3 and June 8, 2009, yields on 10-year Treasuries rose to 3.88 percent from 3.54 percent after the smallest drop in U.S. payrolls in eight months and European Central Bank President Jean-Claude Trichet’s forecast for economic growth in 2010. Two-year Treasury yields rose to 1.4 percent from 0.91 percent in the same period.

The margin for error is “incredibly thin,” said Derrick Wulf, a portfolio manager at Dwight Asset Management Co. in Burlington, Vermont, which oversees $64.3 billion. “A lot of investors have become complacent about being long” in Treasuries.

Rajan, now a professor at the University of Chicago’s Booth School of Business, says near-zero interest rates are a crisis tool and economists don’t know if the benefits from using them for longer periods outweigh the costs. While inflation isn’t the main threat now, “you can’t be totally comfortable,” he said in an Aug. 18 interview. People think “there is significant unused capacity in the economy” and that assumption may be mistaken.

‘Bad Incentives’

Near-zero rates create “bad incentives” for financial firms, he added.

“Blow the system up, we’ll come back and reward you with very low interest rates that allow you to build up capital, and then you could try it again next time around,” Rajan said.

The Fed also may be “prolonging pain” by propping up the housing market and keeping home prices from falling, he said.

Companies are sending mixed signals.

“Demand is very low across the country” for houses, Richard Dugas, chief executive officer of Bloomfield Hills, Michigan-based Pulte Group Inc., said Aug. 20 on Bloomberg Television’s “In the Loop with Betty Liu.” Meanwhile, Caterpillar Inc., the world’s largest maker of construction equipment, may add as many as 9,000 workers worldwide this year, Doug Oberhelman, chief executive officer of the Peoria, Illinois-based company, said Aug. 19.

Another Bubble

White, a Bank of Canada deputy governor from 1988 to 1994, says the benefits of low rates may already be waning “in a world with so much debt, especially household debt,” which in the U.S. totaled a near-record $11.7 trillion at the end of June. There’s also a danger they might create another bubble, he said.

Another risk is that near-zero rates allow companies to roll over nonviable loans, a practice known as “evergreening” that can create so-called zombie businesses, which happened in Japan, he added.

Rajan and White’s arguments aren’t winning over Keith Hembre, chief economist at U.S. Bancorp’s FAF Advisors Inc. in Minneapolis, where he helps oversee $86 billion.

“There’s little evidence that the very low rates today are inflicting any harm,” said Hembre, a former Fed researcher. While he has “some longer-term sympathy with the argument,” it’s “just off-base today, given the evidence available from both real-time and market indicators.”

Bernanke, 56, and the majority of Fed officials show little inclination to change course. The Fed lowered its benchmark rate to a range of zero to 0.25 percent in December 2008 and said after each policy meeting since March 2009 it will likely stay very low for an “extended period.”

Emergency Measures

The ECB has kept its main refinancing rate at 1 percent since May 2009, and the Bank of England’s key rate has been 0.5 percent since March 2009. Axel Weber, an ECB council member, said in an Aug. 19 Bloomberg Television interview that policy makers should keep emergency liquidity measures in place at least through the end of the year, beyond Trichet’s October guarantee. Bernanke and Trichet will speak at the Fed symposium Aug. 27.

White and Rajan have ruffled central-bank feathers before at Jackson Hole, where policy makers, academics, analysts and money managers from dozens of countries mix hiking and rafting in Grand Teton National Park with debate over monetary policy and bank regulation.

In 2003, White and then-colleague Claudio Borio, who was head of BIS research and policy analysis, told central bankers they might need to raise interest rates to “lean against” asset-price bubbles.

‘Cannot Work’

“The one thing I am sure about is that a mild calibration of monetary policy to address asset-price bubbles does not and cannot work,” Greenspan, who retired in 2006, responded at the conference.

Bernanke, then a Fed governor, told attendees that Japan raised rates in 1989 to prick a bubble, and as a result, “asset prices collapsed and they had a 14-year depression.”

In 2005, Rajan warned that if banks lost confidence in each other, “the interbank market could freeze up, and one could well have a full-blown financial crisis.”

Kohn disagreed in a speech after Rajan’s presentation.

“As a consequence of greater diversification of risks and of sources of funds, problems in the financial sector are less likely to intensify shocks hitting the economy and financial market,” he said.

More Open

Bernanke has since become more open to White’s view. While low interest rates didn’t cause the U.S. housing bubble, he said in a January speech, if the next wave of regulation proves “insufficient to prevent dangerous buildups of financial risks, we must remain open to using monetary policy as a supplementary tool for addressing those risks.”

Kohn, the Fed’s vice chairman from 2006 through June, said in a March speech that “serious deficiencies” with securitization of loans “exposed the banking system to risks that neither participants in financial markets nor regulators fully appreciated.”

Spyros Andreopoulos, a London-based global economist at Morgan Stanley, says he worries about the inflationary implications of extreme monetary accommodation beyond the next two to three years, with policy makers likely to lean toward low rates because of the fear of deflation.

“Imagine a car that’s stuck in the mud,” he said. “When you press on the gas, the car doesn’t emerge smoothly; it jumps up. My fear is when economies pick up after the stimulus, you’ll see inflation faster than was expected.”

On Thu, Aug 19, 2010 at 11:40 AM, wrote:

Mr. Mosler,

I am an analyst in the Employment Projections Program at the Bureau of Labor Statistics and am currently working on a report on the future of the financial industry. My main focus is the impact of the Dodd-Frank regulatory bill, and I would like to know your assessment of it:

1) Proprietary trading by depository institutions is limited to 3% of a depository firm’s Tier 1 capital. Could you give me a sense of how significant this is? How much are firms like Citibank and JP Morgan putting into proprietary trading now and how much will it have to decrease?

Banks are public private partnerships, part of the public infrastructure, established to promote public purpose.

I’m not sure I see any public purpose in prop trading, which means there shouldn’t be any.

But to your question, I’d guess it won’t but a material limitation.

2) The overall sense on the derivatives exchange is that the effect will be largely distributional. Information on prevailing prices used to favor major firms like Goldman Sachs, and this exchange will take that away, but it will probably allow for a greater volume of derivatives trading. Do you agree with this take?

Yes, to some degree.

I developed a futures contract for libor swaps many years ago that was quashed by the dealers when the LIFE tried to get it approved.

Also, if the Treasury or Fed had an unlimited securities lending program for all tsy secs the tsy market would replace much of the swap market as we know it, eliminate netting issues, and provide total transparency.

3) Capital requirements and leverage caps are left to the discretion of regulators and will likely follow the standards set by an international agreement. Do you have a sense of that these figures will wind up being?

No, but they miss the purpose of capital requirements, which is all about the pricing of risk when making loans, and nothing about ‘protecting taxpayers money’ which is what they all think it’s about.

So when it’s all being conceptualized incorrectly the odds of getting it right dwindle.

4) What will be the most important effects of the Consumer Financial Protection Agency? How significant is the decision whether or not to appoint Elizabeth Warren as its chief?

Not a bad idea if it’s done right, but, again, there seems to be no understanding of what banking actually is, which reduces the odds of getting it right.

5) The financial industry has seen rapid growth relative to the rest of the economy since the 1990s. Do you see anything in this bill that will slow down that trend?

The strength of the financial sector is a function of the strength of the real economy, and not the other way around.

I see nothing that will change that, so I expect the financial sector to grow as its ‘food supply’- the real sectors- recover.

Any insights would be greatly appreciated.

See my proposals here.

Karim writes:

Yes, Q2 GDP to be revised down, but it’s been down. Q2 is history. Corporate earnings were based on the actual numbers- sales, costs, profits.

In other words, we know what the S&P were able to earn even with very modest headline GDP growth.

The higher final demand is also at least sustainable.
The relatively large and ongoing fiscal deficit that added that much income and savings to the non govt sectors allowed for the higher final demand AND higher savings.

While the QE from the Fed does nothing beyond causing term rates to be marginally lower than other wise, it does add some support for asset prices via implied discount rates.

As discussed earlier this year, markets are figuring out that the economy is flying without a net. All the Fed can do is alter interest rates which, with each passing day since the recession began, has been shown to not be able to support output and employment, or even prices and lending. (Just like Japan has shown for going on 20 years.)

And a Congress and Administration that thinks it’s run out of money and is dependent on borrowing and leaving the bill to our grand children to be able to spend is unlikely to provide meaningful fiscal adjustments to support aggregate demand.

So we muddle through with unthinkably high levels of unemployment and modest GDP growth waiting for an increase in private sector demand to kick in via credit expansion from the usual channels- cars and housing.

The risk to growth is now primarily proactive fiscal consolidation- spending cuts and/or tax hikes- in advance of private sector credit expansion. So far I haven’t seen anything meaningful enough to be of consequence. But the anti deficit rhetoric is certainly there, counterbalanced to some degree by the call for jobs.

So it remains a pretty good equity environment but a very ugly political environment.

Karim writes:

Yes, which means it remains a good market for stocks.

High unemployment is good for cost control and helps keep the Fed on hold. And 0 rates remain a deflationary influence as well.

Top line growth is modestly positive growing by productivity increases plus some hours and employment gains.

Earnings trend remains positive with productivity gains, some top line growth, and a loose labor market.

All supported by a federal deficit that still exceeds 8% of gdp.

Tough political environment with most of the real wealth going to the top as unemployment remains near the highs.

With modest GDP growth and a 1.4 trillion deficit downside to equities can only come from an external shock.

High unemployment keeps the Fed on hold and the 0 rate policy keeps costs of production down and keeps personal income gains modest.

At least for now, the combo of 0 rates and an 8%+ budget deficit continues to be supportive of only modest aggregate demand growth and only very modest employment growth.

Again, good for stocks, where a bit of top line growth and productivity gains keep earnings growth positive.

Karim writes:

I tend to agree with Karim and Fed Chairman Bernanke.
Modestly improving GDP growth with unemployment coming down very gradually until a consumer credit expansion takes hold.

Good for stocks, not so good for most of the people still struggling to survive, as the Obama administration continues to preside over what might be the largest transfer of wealth from bottom to top in the history of the world.

And no credible energy policy. We are completely at the mercy of the Saudis who can unilaterally hike prices any time they feel like it.

Karim writes:

• “Business in July was strong, the best month since October 2008.” (Fabricated Metal Products)
• “Slow economy has killed sales for new equipment orders.” (Machinery)
• “Quoting activity and sales are slow, and backlog is dropping.” (Computer & Electronic Products)
• “Business continues to be sluggish and has fallen slightly as the economic ills continue.” (Nonmetallic Mineral Products)
• “Retailers are still unwilling to gamble on inventory.” (Printing & Related Support Activities)

Bernanke

While the support to economic activity from stimulative fiscal policies and firms’ restocking of their inventories will diminish over time, rising demand from households and businesses should help sustain growth. In particular, in the household sector, growth in real consumer spending seems likely to pick up in coming quarters from its recent modest pace, supported by gains in income and improving credit conditions. In the business sector, investment in equipment and software has been increasing rapidly, in part as a result of the deferral of capital outlays during the downturn and the need of many businesses to replace aging equipment. At the same time, rising U.S. exports, reflecting the expansion of the global economy and the recovery of world trade, have helped foster growth in the U.S. manufacturing sector.

To be sure, notable restraints on the recovery persist. The housing market has remained weak, with the overhang of vacant or foreclosed houses weighing on home prices and new construction. Similarly, poor economic fundamentals and tight credit are holding back investment in nonresidential structures, such as office buildings, hotels, and shopping malls.

It’s not just him, the all say ‘quantitative easing’ will ‘work’ when they should now have enough evidence and theory to know all it does is lower interest rates which are already plenty low with regards encouraging lending.

Might just be managing expectations but more likely they still actually believe it.

*DJ Fed’s Bullard: Worried About Possible Deflationary Outcome For US(DJ)
*DJ Bullard: Says More Quantitative Easing Will Work(DJ)
*DJ Bullard: Says Deflation Not Most Likely Economic Scenario(DJ)
*DJ Fed’s Bullard: Most Likely Scenario Is That Recovery Will Continue(DJ)
*DJ Bullard: Acknowledges Weaker US Data Over Last Two Months(DJ)
*DJ Bullard: Euro Zone Has Done Reasonable Job Containing Crisis(DJ)

Karim writes:

Haven’t yet hit the ‘get a job buy a car’ accelerator.

Watch for car sales to be the indicator of more rapid growth.

Meantime, muddling through with modest growth remains an ok equity environment as fear of becoming the next Greece is turning us into the next Japan.

And, of course, we continue to underestimate the deflationary effect of the Fed’s zero rate policy which should be a good thing in that it allows us to have lower taxes for a given size govt.

The staff still expected that the pace of economic activity through 2011 would be sufficient to reduce the existing margins of economic slack, although the anticipated decline in the unemployment rate was somewhat slower than in the previous projection.

Karim writes:

Table below is average of FOMC members, not staff, but appears to have similar profile. Average expectations for 2011 growth at 3.85% from 3.95% prior..

A few participants cited some risk of deflation. Other participants, however, thought that inflation was unlikely to fall appreciably further given the stability of inflation expectations in recent years and very accommodative monetary policy. Over the medium term, participants saw both upside and downside risks to inflation.

Deflation talk still seems contained to a ‘few’ members.

Members noted that in addition to continuing to develop and test instruments to exit from the period of unusually accommodative monetary policy, the Committee would need to consider whether further policy stimulus might become appropriate if the outlook were to worsen appreciably.

This was only mention of QE2 – not very extensive.

Small banks, already penalized with a higher cost of funds than the large banks (link) have more recently been forced to contract due to ‘wholesale funding’ restrictions being imposed by the regulators.

Bank regulators distinguish between what they call ‘retail’ and ‘wholesale’ funding, and have set limits of small banks for ‘wholesale’ funding. This policy is meant to reduce the liquidity risk of a bank not being able to roll over its funding should depositors decide to take their dollars to another bank. The theory is that ‘retail’ deposits are ’sticky’ and less likely to move to another bank, while ‘wholesale’ deposits are more likely to move. And the ‘better’ the ‘account relationship’ the more likely the funds are to stay with the bank. Oddly, when I inquired if the maturity of the deposit is a consideration the regulators responded ‘no.’ So that means a 10 year CD obtained through a broker is considered a wholesale deposit, which must be limited, while money market deposits from local depositors that can leave the next day are the core retail deposits required by the regulators for ’stability.’

But apart from this obvious regulatory failure to recognize what’s more stable and what’s less stable for individual banks, there is also a highly problematic macro issue. In the banking system as a whole, loans create deposits, meaning that for each loan made by a bank (bank assets) there exists a bank deposit of the same amount originally created at the time of the loan as that bank’s liability. In short, for the banking system as a whole, loans equal deposits.

The problem is that money center banks attract more of these total deposits than the small banks in the normal course of business. That leaves the small banks short of deposits by an equal amount. This is easily resolved by the small banks needing funding borrowing the excess funds held by the large banks. And if the large banks decide to keep their excess funds at the Federal Reserve Bank the small banks can simply borrow from the Fed to cover their shortage. In any case the total funding of the banking system remains equal to the total loans outstanding, with the Fed acting as a ‘broker’ to facilitate system wide liquidity. However, when regulators restrict this ‘wholesale funding’ between banks, and also deem borrowings from the Fed ‘wholesale funding,’ they put powerful forces in place that force the small banks to either pay higher rates to attract deposits from the large banks, which is often impossible as large corporate customers can’t deal with small banks, or force the small banks to cut back on lending to reduce their dependence on wholesale funding.

The net result is a misguided regulatory policy that is both increasing the cost of funds to small banks and forcing small banks to cut back on lending.

The remedy is quite simple, have the Fed offer funding (fed funds) to all member banks at it’s target interest rate, which is the rate the Fed desires to in fact be the cost of funds for its banking system as a matter of public policy. In any case, bank borrowing and lending is rightly constrained by capital and other regulatory requirements, and not available funding, which is always attainable at a price. Using the liability side of banking for market discipline, as is currently the practice for small banks, is always evidence of a lack of understanding of banking fundamentals and counter to further public purpose.

Please distribute this to your favorite regulator, Congressman, and Fed official, thanks!

Overcoming the Debt Trap

By Dean Baker

The deficit hawk gang is again trying to take our children hostage with new threats of enormous debt burdens. As in the past, most of what they claim is very misleading, if not outright false.

Agreed.

First and foremost, the basis of the bulk of their horror story has nothing to do with spending being out of control, but rather a broken private health care system. If per person health care costs were comparable to the costs in any other wealthy country, we would be looking at long-term budget surpluses, not gigantic deficits. This would lead honest people to focus their energies on fixing the US health care system, but not the deficit hawk gang.

I’d guess the deficit would be much the same as it grew counter cyclically with the automatic stabilizers kicking in as the economy weakened to the point the deficit got large enough to where it provided the income and net financial assets needed to stabilize output and employment. Not that there isn’t much to be done to fix the US health care system.

But there is another part of their story that contains some truth. The government is borrowing large amounts of money right now to sustain demand in the wake of the collapse of private sector spending following the deflation of the housing bubble.

Yes, the government is spending large amounts to sustain demand, but that spending is not dependent on borrowing, though it is associated with borrowing.

If the deficit continues on the projected path, the country will substantially increase its debt burden over the course of the decade.

Yes, the deficit could go higher but ‘burden’ isn’t the right term. The national debt is the dollar savings of the ‘non government’ sectors, and as such lightens the financial burden of those sectors.

A higher debt burden will imply much larger transfers from taxpayers to bondholders in future years. This will require either higher taxes or cuts in other spending.

Not necessarily. Taxes function to regulate aggregate demand. So tax increases and/or spending cuts would be in order only should aggregate demand be deemed too high, evidenced by unemployment being too low. In that case, taxes increases and/or spending cuts would serve to cool demand, not to make payments on the debt. Also, the interest on the debt only alters demand if it gets spent, which does not necessarily happen. Japan has never spent a penny of their interest income, for example.

Alternatively, the government could run larger deficits.

The informed approach is, for a given amount of spending, to adjust taxes to the level that corresponds to desired levels of employment, whatever size deficit that might mean.

However, in a decade or so, if the economy is again near full employment, higher deficits will either lead to higher inflation if the Fed opts to accommodate the deficits, or higher interest rates if it targets a low rate of inflation. The latter could crimp investment and long-run growth.

Should the informed approach be taken, and taxes lowered and the deficit thereby increased to the level that coincides with full employment, yes, the government could then go too far and keep taxes too low and sustain excess demand that drives up prices. This would be the case whether the Fed ‘accommodated the deficits’ or not. And if the Fed did elect to implement policy to raise rates to slow inflation, the point would be to slow nominal spending without slowing real spending. And in any case there is no such thing as crowding out investment, as investment is a function of consumption, with demand driving prices to a level where investment is funded.

For these reasons, it is desirable to prevent the debt from reaching the levels now projected, even if the outcome may not be the disaster promised by the deficit hawks.

Nor is the outcome that promised by the deficit doves. US deficits incurred as a by product of fiscal balance that sustains full employment do not have negative side effects if managed by an informed government.

There is a simple way to avoid a sharp rise in the interest burden associated with a higher debt. The Federal Reserve Board can buy and hold the debt that is currently being issued by the Treasury to finance the deficit.

The Fed buying the debt is functionally the same as the Treasury not issuing it. And I have supported the Treasury not issuing anything longer than 3 month T bills for a long time, etc. More on that below.

The logic of this is straightforward. If the Fed holds the debt, then the interest on the debt is paid to the Fed. The Fed then returns the interest to the Treasury each year, meaning the net cost to the government is zero.

Not exactly. What that policy would do is add the deficit spending to bank reserve balances held at the Fed, which currently pay what for all practical purposes is the overnight rate of interest targeted by the Fed. The Fed controls the fed funds rate by offering and paying interest on the overnight balances held at the Fed. This rate is currently .25%. Interestingly, 3 month Treasury bills are purchased to yield only .14% for technical reasons. I do support the policy of the Treasury not issuing securities longer than 3 months, which will produce similar results. But in either case, should the Fed decide to hike rates the balances created by federal deficit spending will earn those rates under current institutional arrangements. One way to avoid all interest payments on deficit spending would be to increase required reserves for the banking system and not pay interest on them. That, however, becomes a ‘bank tax’ that is passed through to all borrowers, passing the interest rate burden on to them.

This is not slight of hand. The point is that the economy has a huge amount of idle resources in the form of unemployed workers and excess capacity. In this situation, the increased demand created by government spending does not have to come at the expense of existing demand. The economy can simply expand to fill the additional demand created by larger deficits.

This is 100% true and I fully support the policy of adjusting the fiscal balance to that which coincides with full employment, without consideration of the interest paid on balances created by deficit spending, as above.

While that may not be true in five or ten years, assuming the economy is again near full employment, right now deficits need not lead to either higher interest rates or higher inflation.

Again, fully agreed with the conclusion.

In fact, the financial markets and the “bond market vigilantes” should even support the decision to have the Fed purchase and hold the government debt being issued now to finance the deficit. This practice will lessen the future interest burden on the Treasury. In fact, interest should be seen as an entitlement like Social Security and Medicare since it is paid each year without new authorization by Congress. If the deficit hawks had any integrity they would be insisting that we should require the Fed to hold the government debt issued during this downturn. It is a sure fire way to substantially reduce entitlement spending.

Again, the Fed buying Tsy securities is functionally identical to and nothing more than the Treasury not issuing it in the first place. Nothing more.

Of course, no one ever accused deficit hawks of being consistent. Not only do they not advocate having the Fed buy and hold the debt, they don’t even want this policy discussed in their “everything is on the table” sessions. Keeping this simple solution off the table makes good sense if your concern is not deficit reduction, but rather cutting Social Security, Medicare and other important social programs.

Fortunately, the rest of us don’t have to be bound by the deficit hawks’ agenda. If Social Security and Medicare are on the table, then having the Fed hold the debt better be on the table; otherwise, this exercise is just a charade to cut the country’s most important social programs.

Social Security has no business being on the table even under current policy of issuing longer term Treasury securities, no matter how large the deficit might be, if there is excess capacity/unemployment. How could it possibly make sense to cut aggregate demand in the current environment? It’s not like our seniors are consuming scarce real resources and creating shortages for the rest of us.

This will be a great lie detector test. We will soon know whether the deficit hawks care about the interest burden on our children or just want to destroy the social safety net.

The doves are on the right side of this argument, but if they don’t get their act together on monetary operations and reserve accounting it looks like they will continue to go down to defeat with what are inherently winning hands, with all of us the losers.

With sufficient deficit spending private credit isn’t needed at all to sustain growth and employment, so the shift from private sector credit growth (falling M3) to 3% growth sustained by deficits of 10% of gdp is perfectly sustainable.

In fact, I’d prefer, for a given size govt, lower taxes rather than higher private sector credit growth. And a larger trade deficit means we can have taxes that much lower still. And cut out much the military expenditures for Afghanistan and cut taxes that much more, thanks! etc!

Unfortunately 3% growth doesn’t close the output gap, but that’s another (very ugly) story, but with the same answer. Agg demand is about a trillion a year short of potential right now, hence my proposal for a full payroll tax (FICA) holiday to restore private sector sales, output, and employment.

US money supply plunges at 1930s pace as Obama eyes fresh stimulus

By Ambrose Evans-Pritchard

May 26 (Telegraph) — The M3 money supply in the United States is contracting at an accelerating rate that now matches the average decline seen from 1929 to 1933, despite near zero interest rates and the biggest fiscal blitz in history.

The M3 figures – which include broad range of bank accounts and are tracked by British and European monetarists for warning signals about the direction of the US economy a year or so in advance – began shrinking last summer. The pace has since quickened.

The stock of money fell from $14.2 trillion to $13.9 trillion in the three months to April, amounting to an annual rate of contraction of 9.6pc. The assets of insitutional money market funds fell at a 37pc rate, the sharpest drop ever.

“It’s frightening,” said Professor Tim Congdon from International Monetary Research. “The plunge in M3 has no precedent since the Great Depression. The dominant reason for this is that regulators across the world are pressing banks to raise capital asset ratios and to shrink their risk assets. This is why the US is not recovering properly,” he said.

The US authorities have an entirely different explanation for the failure of stimulus measures to gain full traction. They are opting instead for yet further doses of Keynesian spending, despite warnings from the IMF that the gross public debt of the US will reach 97pc of GDP next year and 110pc by 2015.

Larry Summers, President Barack Obama’s top economic adviser, has asked Congress to “grit its teeth” and approve a fresh fiscal boost of $200bn to keep growth on track. “We are nearly 8m jobs short of normal employment. For millions of Americans the economic emergency grinds on,” he said.

David Rosenberg from Gluskin Sheff said the White House appears to have reversed course just weeks after Mr Obama vowed to rein in a budget deficit of $1.5 trillion (9.4pc of GDP) this year and set up a commission to target cuts. “You truly cannot make this stuff up. The US governnment is freaked out about the prospect of a double-dip,” he said.

The White House request is a tacit admission that the economy is already losing thrust and may stall later this year as stimulus from the original $800bn package starts to fade.

Recent data have been mixed. Durable goods orders jumped 2.9pc in April but house prices have been falling for several months and mortgage applications have dropped to a 13-year low. The ECRI leading index of US economic activity has been sliding continuously since its peak in October, suffering the steepest one-week drop ever recorded in mid-May.

Mr Summers acknowledged in a speech this week that the eurozone crisis had shone a spotlight on the dangers of spiralling public debt. He said deficit spending delays the day of reckoning and leaves the US at the mercy of foreign creditors. Ultimately, “failure begets failure” in fiscal policy as the logic of compound interest does its worst.

However, Mr Summers said it would be “pennywise and pound foolish” to skimp just as the kindling wood of recovery starts to catch fire. He said fiscal policy comes into its own at at time when the economy “faces a liquidity trap” and the Fed is constrained by zero interest rates.

Mr Congdon said the Obama policy risks repeating the strategic errors of Japan, which pushed debt to dangerously high levels with one fiscal boost after another during its Lost Decade, instead of resorting to full-blown “Friedmanite” monetary stimulus.

“Fiscal policy does not work. The US has just tried the biggest fiscal experiment in history and it has failed. What matters is the quantity of money and in extremis that can be increased easily by quantititave easing. If the Fed doesn’t act, a double-dip recession is a virtual certainty,” he said.

Mr Congdon said the dominant voices in US policy-making – Nobel laureates Paul Krugman and Joe Stiglitz, as well as Mr Summers and Fed chair Ben Bernanke – are all Keynesians of different stripes who “despise traditional monetary theory and have a religious aversion to any mention of the quantity of money”. The great opus by Milton Friedman and Anna Schwartz – The Monetary History of the United States – has been left to gather dust.

Mr Bernanke no longer pays attention to the M3 data. The bank stopped publishing the data five years ago, deeming it too erratic to be of much use.

This may have been a serious error since double-digit growth of M3 during the US housing bubble gave clear warnings that the boom was out of control. The sudden slowdown in M3 in early to mid-2008 – just as the Fed talked of raising rates – gave a second warning that the economy was about to go into a nosedive.

Mr Bernanke built his academic reputation on the study of the credit mechanism. This model offers a radically different theory for how the financial system works. While so-called “creditism” has become the new orthodoxy in US central banking, it has not yet been tested over time and may yet prove to be a misadventure.

Paul Ashworth at Capital Economics said the decline in M3 is worrying and points to a growing risk of deflation. “Core inflation is already the lowest since 1966, so we don’t have much margin for error here. Deflation becomes a threat if it goes on long enough to become entrenched,” he said.

However, Mr Ashworth warned against a mechanical interpretation of money supply figures. “You could argue that M3 has been going down because people have been taking their money out of accounts to buy stocks, property and other assets,” he said.

Events may soon tell us whether this is benign or malign. It is certainly remarkable.

On Thu, May 27, 2010 at 12:04 PM, Marshall wrote:

Yes! For some odd reason there is a myth about the Great Depression that could not be more removed from the reality of the time. Most people believe the economy crashed between 1929 and 1932 and then remained depressed until the Second World War which finally mobilized the economy’s idle resources and brought about a full recovery. That’s complete bunk if you calculate the unemployment data correctly. Even leaving aside that fact, it is true that, once the Great Depression hit bottom in early 1933, it embarked on four years of economic expansion that constituted the biggest cyclical boom in U.S. economic history. For four years real GDP grew at a 12% rate and nominal GDP grew at a 14% rate. There was another shorter and shallower depression in 1937 CAUSED BY RENEWED FISCAL TIGHTENING. It was this second depression that has led to the misconception that the central bank was pushing on a string throughout all of the 1930s until the giant fiscal stimulus of the war time effort finally brought the economy up from depression. The financial dynamics of that huge economic recovery between 1933 and 1937 are extremely striking. Despite their insistence that changes in the stock of money were behind all the cyclical ups and downs in U.S. economic history, even Freidman and Schwartz in their “Monetary History of the United States” conceded that the money aggregates did not lead the U.S. economy out of the depression in 1932-1933. More striking, private credit seemingly had nothing to do with the take off of that economy. Industrial production off the 1932 low doubled by 1935. By contrast, bank credit to the private sector fell until the middle of 1935. Because of the collapse in nominal income during the depression, the U.S. private sector was more indebted than ever on the depression lows. Yet, somehow it took off and sustained its takeoff with no growth in private credit whatsoever. The 14% average annual increase in nominal GDP from early 1932 to 1935 resulted in huge private deleveraging because nominal income outran lagging private.

Fiscal policy is going to undergo a complete reversal as the $850 billion fiscal stimulus package wanes and the scheduled tax increases at the Federal level come into play early next year. It may be much worse if financially strapped state and local governments have to cut expenditures and raise taxes over the same time period – which is highly likely, especially as we get to the states’ budget year end which is mainly to June 30th. By then, if they haven’t got to their mandated balanced budgets, they’ll cut more staff off the payroll as that will temporarily get them to balance (from an accounting perspective). That will exacerbate the double dip, which is coming straight on schedule, as Randy predicted last year in his piece with Eric.

“While each component makes sense in its own narrow terms, the EU policy as a whole is madness for a currency union. Stephen Lewis from Monument Securities says Europe’s leaders have forgotten the lesson of the “Gold Bloc” in the second phase of the Great Depression, when a reactionary and over-proud Continent ground itself into slump by clinging to deflationary totemism long after the circumstances had rendered this policy suicidal. We all know how it ended.”

Ambrose Evans-Pritchard

The meeting took 14 hours and produced numbers large enough and rhetoric credible enough to trigger today’s short covering that might continue at least through half of tomorrow.

But all the actual announced funding comes from the same nations that are having the funding issues. There is no external funding of consequence of national govt borrowing needs coming any source other than the euro governments, nor can there be, as the the funding needs are in euro. And the ECB, the only entity that can provide the euro zone with the needed net financial assets, remains limited to ‘liquidity’ provision which does not address the core funding issue.

Yes, the funding needs have been move evenly distributed among the national governments. But even the financially strongest member, Germany, is structurally in need of continually borrowing increasing quantities of euro to roll over existing debt and fund continuing deficits, with no foreseeable prospects of even stabilizing its debt to GDP ratio or debt to revenue ratio. Adding this new financing burden only makes matters worse, and do the austerity measures now under way in all the member nations.

The one bright spot is the ‘whatever it takes’ language that presumably includes the only move that can make it work financially- actual funding of national govt. debt by the ECB either directly or indirectly through guarantees. But there can be no assurance, of course, that it’s just another bluff to buy time, hoping for a large enough increase in net exports which would be evidence of the rest of the world deciding to reduce its euro net financial assets via the purchase of goods and services from the euro zone.

And with a meaningful increase in exports likely to happen in a meaningful way only with a much lower euro, the terms and conditions of today’s announcements introduce conflicting forces. The austerity measures work to strengthen the euro to the extent they succeed, and to weaken it to the extent they result in increased national govt debt and changes in portfolio preferences.

My best guess is that market forces will soon be testing this new package and its core weaknesses.