Does this mean the Fed staffers think fiscal policy works?
How about the Fed Chairman?
;)

Fed Worries ‘Fiscal Cliff’ Is as Big a Threat as Europe

By Steve Liesman

May 10 (CNBC) — Officials at the Fed are increasingly concerned about the coming “fiscal cliff,” putting it on par with the European crisis and the housing market as among the US economy’s biggest threats.

Karim writes:

Agreed on the conclusion. It will take a lot to get the Fed to do any more QE. Not the least reason being most of them know it doesn’t actually do anything apart from getting a lot of people scared and angry, including our esteemed politicians, for example, ready to make a propaganda show out of what they like to call ‘money printing.’

Of more concern, Bill Mitchell mentioned the drop in public sector employment may be dragging us down to negative growth. He may be right, as those paychecks are probably very ‘high multiple’ and require larger federal deficits to make up for the lost aggregate demand.

Actual multiples- propensities to spend out of income- are variable and hard to get a handle on, and therefore generally must be ‘reacted to’ with fiscal adjustments.

Unfortunately, however, all political forces are currently aligned towards deficit reduction.

And note the labor force participation rate is heading back to about where it was before women entered the labor force.

We know part of the precise impact:
We know the $80 billion per year the Fed has been turning over to the Treasury would have otherwise remained in the economy.

U.K.’s Quantitative Easing Has Worked, BOE’s Bean Writes in FT

May 3 (Bloomberg) — Studies of the Federal Reserve’s large-scale asset purchases provide corroboration that quantitative easing has been effective, Bank of England Deputy Governor Charlie Bean writes in the Financial Times.


The precise impact of QE is uncertain and it’s “plausible that the effectiveness of the policy depends on the state of the economy,” Bean writes.

Warren Mosler on the Economy and the FOMC Meeting

EDIT: (Warren starts at 1 minute 20 seconds)

Not bad, but let’s take it up to the next level.

Comments below:

Fiscal and monetary policy in a liquidity trap

By Martin Wolf

With floating fx, it’s always a ‘liquidity trap’ in that adding liquidity to a system necessarily not liquidity constrained is moot.

Part 1

What is the correct approach to fiscal and monetary policy when an economy is depressed and the central bank’s rate of interest is close to zero? Does the independence of the central bank make it more difficult to reach the right decisions? These are two enormously important questions raised by current circumstances in the US, the eurozone, Japan and the UK.

With floating fx, it’s always about a fiscal adjustment, directly or indirectly.

Broadly speaking, I can identify three macroeconomic viewpoints on these questions:
1. The first is the pre-1930 belief in balanced budgets and the gold standard (or some other form of a-political money).

Yes, actual fixed fx policy, where the monetary system is continuously liquidity constrained by design.

2. The second is the religion of balanced budgets and managed money, with Milton Friedman’s monetarism at the rules-governed end of the spectrum and independent inflation-targeting central banks at the discretionary end.

Yes, the application of fixed fx logic to a floating fx regime.

3. The third demands a return to Keynesian ways of thinking, with “modern monetary theory” (in which monetary policy and central banks are permanently subservient to fiscal policy) at one end of the policy spectrum, and temporary resort to active fiscal policy at the other.

MMT recognizes the difference in monetary dynamics between fixed and floating fx regimes.

In this note, I do not intend to address the first view, though I recognise that it has substantial influence, particularly in the Republican Party. I also do not intend to address Friedman’s monetarism, which has lost purchase on contemporary policy-makers, largely because of the views that the demand for money is unstable and the nature of money ill-defined. Finally, I intend to ignore “modern monetary theory” which would require a lengthy analysis of its own.

This leaves us with the respectable contemporary view that the best way to respond to contemporary conditions is via fiscal consolidation and aggressive monetary policy, and the somewhat less respectable view that aggressive fiscal policy is essential when official interest rates are close to zero.

Two new papers bring light from the second of these perspectives. One is co-authored by Paul McCulley, former managing director of Pimco and inventor of the terms “Minsky moment” and “shadow banking”, and Zoltan Pozsar, formerly at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York and now a visiting scholar at the International Monetary Fund.* The other is co-authored by J. Bradford DeLong of the university of California at Berkeley, and Lawrence Summers, former US treasury secretary and currently at Harvard university. **

Unfortunately, and fully understood, is the imperative for you to select from ‘celebrity’ writers regardless of the quality of the content.

The paper co-authored by Mr McCulley and Mr Pozsar puts the case for aggressive fiscal policy. The US, they argue, is in a “liquidity trap”: even with official interest rates near zero, the incentive for extra borrowing, lending and spending in the private sector is inadequate.

An output gap is the evidence that total spending- public plus private- is inadequate. And yes, that can be remedied by an increase in private sector borrowing to spend, and/or a fiscal adjustment by the public sector towards a larger deficit via either an increase in spending and/or tax cut, depending on one’s politics.

The explanation for this exceptional state of affairs is that during the credit boom and asset-price bubble that preceded the crisis, large swathes of the private sector became over-indebted. Once asset prices fell, erstwhile borrowers were forced to reduce their debts. Financial institutions were also unwilling to lend. They needed to strengthen their balance sheets. But they also confronted a shortage of willing and creditworthy borrowers.

Yes, for any reason if private sector spending falls short of full employment levels, a fiscal adjustment can do the trick.

This raises an interesting question:

Is it ‘better’, for example, to facilitate the increase in spending through a private sector credit expansion, or through a tax cut that allows private sector spending to increase via increased income, or through a government spending increase?

The answer is entirely political. The output gap can be closed with any/some/all of those options.

In such circumstances, negative real interest rates are necessary, but contractionary economic conditions rule that out.

I see negative nominal rates as a tax that will reduce income and net financial assets of the non govt sectors, even as it may increase some private sector credit expansion. And the reduction of income and net financial assets works to reduce the credit worthiness of the non govt sectors reducing their ability to borrow to spend.

Instead, there is a danger of what the great American economist, Irving Fisher called “debt deflation”: falling prices raise the real burden of debt, making the economic contraction worse.

Yes, though he wrote in the context of fixed fx policy, where that tends to happen as well, though under somewhat different circumstances and different sets of forces.

A less extreme (and so more general) version of the idea is “balance-sheet recession”, coined by Richard Koo of Nomura. That is what Japan had to manage in the 1990s.

With floating fx they are all balance sheet recessions. There is no other type of recession.

This is how the McCulley-Pozsar paper makes the point: “deleveraging is a beast of burden that capitalism cannot bear alone. At the macroeconomic level, deleveraging must be a managed process: for the private sector to deleverage without causing a depression, the public sector has to move in the opposite direction . . . by effectively viewing the balance sheets of the monetary and fiscal authorities as a consolidated whole.

Correct, in the context of today’s floating fx. With fixed fx that option carries the risk of rising rates for the govt and default/devaluation.

“Fiscal austerity does not work in a liquidity trap and makes as much sense as putting an anorexic on a diet. Yet ‘diets’ are the very prescriptions that fiscal ‘austerians’ have imposed (or plan to impose) in the US, UK and eurozone. Austerians fail to realise, however, that everyone cannot save at the same time and that, in liquidity traps, the paradox of thrift and depression are fellow travellers that are functionally intertwined.”

Agreed for floating fx. Fixed fx is another story, where forced deflation via austerity does make the maths work, though most often at an impossible social cost.

Confronted by this line of argument, austerians (a term coined by Rob Parenteau, a research associate at the Levy Economics Institute of Bard College), make three arguments:

1. additional borrowing will add heavily to future debt and so be an unreasonable burden on future generations;
2. increased borrowing will crowd out private borrowing;
3. bond investors will stop buying and push yields up.

Which does happen with fixed fx policy.

In a liquidity trap, none of these arguments hold.

With floating fx, none of these hold in any scenario.

Experience over the last four years (not to mention Japan’s experience over the past 20 years) has demonstrated that governments operating with a (floating) currency do not suffer a constraint on their borrowing. The reason is that the private sector does not wish to borrow, but wants to cut its debt, instead. There is no crowding out.

Right, because floating fx regimes are by design not liquidity constrained.

Moreover, adjustment falls on the currency, not on the long-term rate of interest.

Right, and again, unlike fixed fx.

In the case of the US, foreigners also want to lend, partly in support of their mercantilist economic policies.

Actually, they want to accumulate dollar denominated financial assets, which we call lending.

Note that both reserve balances at the Fed and securities account balances at the Fed (treasury securities) are simply dollar deposits at the Fed.

Alas, argue Mr McCulley and Mr Pozsar, “held back by concerns borne out of these orthodoxies, . . . governments are not spending with passionate purpose. They are victims of intellectual paralysis borne out of inertia of dogma . . . As a result, their acting responsibly, relative to orthodoxy, and going forth with austerity may drag economies down the vortex of deflation and depression.”

Right. Orthodoxy happens to be acting as if one was operating under a fixed fx regime even though it’s in fact a floating fx regime.

Finally, they note, “the importance of fiscal expansion and the impotence of conventional monetary policy measures in a liquidity trap have profound implications for the conduct of central banks. This is because in a liquidity trap, the fat-tail risk of inflation is replaced by the fat-tail risk of deflation.”

The risk of excess aggregate demand is replaced by the risk of inadequate aggregate demand.

And the case can be made that lower rates reduce aggregate demand via the interest income channels, as the govt is a net payer of interest.

In this situation, we do not need independent central banks that offset – and so punish – fiscally irresponsible governments. We need central banks that finance – and so encourage – economically responsible (though “fiscally irresponsible”) governments.

Not the way I would say it but understood.

When private sector credit growth is constrained, monetisation of public debt is not inflationary.

While I understand the point, note that ‘monetisation’ is a fixed fx term not directly applicable to floating fx in this context.

Indeed, it would be rather good if it were inflationary, since that would mean a stronger recovery, which would demand swift reversal of the unorthodox policy mix.

The conclusion of the McCulley-Pozsar paper is, in brief, that aggressive fiscal policy does work in the unusual circumstances of a liquidity trap, particularly if combined with monetisation. But conventional wisdom blocks full use of the unorthodox tool kit. Historically, political pressure has destroyed such resistance. Political pressure drove the UK off gold in 1931. But it also brought Hitler to power in Germany in 1933. The eurozone should take note.

Remarkably, in the circumstances of a liquidity trap, enlarged fiscal deficits are likely to reduce future levels of privately held public debt rather than raise them.

As if that aspect matters?

The view that fiscal deficits might provide such a free lunch is the core argument of the paper by DeLong and Summers, to which I will turn in a second post.

Free lunch entirely misses the point.

Why does the size the balances in Fed securities accounts matter as suggested, with floating fx policy?

From a comment on Mike Norman’s blog.
This helps to ensure a wide output gap.

From Bernanke’s testimony from a couple of weeks ago:

“Having a large and increasing level of government debt relative to national income runs the risk of serious economic consequences. Over the longer term, the current trajectory of federal debt threatens to crowd out private capital formation and thus reduce productivity growth. To the extent that increasing debt is financed by borrowing from abroad, a growing share of our future income would be devoted to interest payments on foreign-held federal debt. High levels of debt also impair the ability of policymakers to respond effectively to future economic shocks and other adverse events.

Even the prospect of unsustainable deficits has costs, including an increased possibility of a sudden fiscal crisis. As we have seen in a number of countries recently, interest rates can soar quickly if investors lose confidence in the ability of a government to manage its fiscal policy. Although historical experience and economic theory do not indicate the exact threshold at which the perceived risks associated with the U.S. public debt would increase markedly, we can be sure that, without corrective action, our fiscal trajectory will move the nation ever closer to that point.”

Full prepared remarks

President Obama’s ‘Fairness’ Vision Would Bankrupt Nation

April 11 (IBD) — Economy: In two recent high-profile policy speeches, President Obama has struggled to make a case for his big-government, high-tax vision for the economy. But his comments reveal just how bankrupt his vision is.

Last I read, he’s actually reduced govt head count for maybe the first time in history, and spending as a % of GDP is up only because of transfer payments due to the recession, with taxes as a % of GDP reaching extremely low levels as well.

It’s ironic that President Obama would make two speeches this week in Florida about “fairness,” sandwiched as they were between $10,000-a-plate fundraising dinners. But that’s the level of hypocrisy coming from the White House these days.

To be polite, most of the comments Obama makes these days about the economy, taxes and, especially, “fairness” stretch all credibility. Hearing the large number of outright falsehoods and partial truths he uses to support his argument, it’s impossible not to believe it’s simply a ploy to get votes from those who envy the rich and the successful.

A full unpacking of Obama’s whoppers would require a much larger space than we have here. Here are just a few examples:

“I believe the free market is the greatest force for economic progress in human history.”

If he believed that, he would not have signed the $787 billion stimulus bill.

That helped the private sector and ‘free markets’ even though I didn’t like the details.

He wouldn’t have imposed onerous new green regulations on businesses.

Without federal pollution regulation the states get into a race to the bottom where whoever allows the most pollution gets the most businesses.

He wouldn’t have taken over the auto and banking industries.

Banking with FDIC deposit insurance makes banking a 90/10 public private partnership. And he didn’t take over banking in any case.

Nor would he seek massive new tax hikes on businesses, or use the frightening power of government — including thousands of new IRS agents to enforce ObamaCare — to pursue his utopian vision of “fairness.”

First, I’m against corporate taxes in general. But even so, he cut payroll taxes for business and the proposed increases were about closing loopholes. And Obamacare took 500 billion out of medicare to give to insurance companies- hardly pro govt/anti business.

If Obama truly believed in the free market,

And remember, there is no ‘free market’ as by definitions markets operate only within institutional structure including contract law and enforcement.

he’d eliminate Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, the EPA, the Energy Department and many other federal departments and agencies that distort free markets.

All govt and all taxation necessarily distorts markets. All govt works on coercion. Nor are there competitive markets when there is limited competition and monopoly power, which means some form of govt regulation is required.

He would roll back thousands of costly, ineffective regulations that estimates say cost the U.S. $1.8 trillion a year.

I’d have to see the specifics, which the rest of this article makes me doubtful of.

“The gap between those at the very, very top and everybody else keeps growing wider and wider and wider and wider.”

In fact, the top 1% have a lower share of total household income than they did in 1920 — just after World War I.

So maybe 1920 was a particularly high year because of the war? Don’t know his point, except pointing to 1920 is a smokescreen to disguise the fact that the share of income has been rising dramatically for a long time.

Though the top 1% have recently boosted their share, that’s largely due to the tech boom of the 1980s, 1990s and 2000s, which made all Americans richer.

I thought it was the financial sector??? But even so, a tech boom doesn’t necessarily do that to income distribution. It doesn’t explain why the football coach earns $10 million while the professor who cured cancer gets $100,000. It’s all about institutional structure.

Even so, the so-called Gini Coefficient — the federal government’s own measure of income inequality — is today lower than it was during the Clinton era.

“At the beginning of the last decade, the wealthiest Americans got two huge tax cuts, in 2001 and 2003.”

The rich, with everyone else, did get their top tax rates cut. But the actual taxes they paid rose sharply.

Right, because their incomes rose that much more. This is out of context writing throughout, laced with lies of omission.

Don’t believe it? Just before those tax cuts were passed, the top 1% earned 18% of all adjusted gross income and paid 34% of all federal taxes.

Only because they conveniently don’t include FICA when they talk about taxes like this. But they do include it when it’s going up or down- tax cut or tax hike. And it’s something approaching half of all federal income taxes.

By 2009, the last full year for which there are data, the top 1% share of AGI had fallen to 17%, according to IRS data. But they paid 37% of all taxes.

Not including FICA

As for the bottom 50% of income earners: In 2009 they took home 13% of income but paid less than 3% of federal income taxes. And today, nearly half of all Americans don’t pay taxes at all.

Not including FICA which is 7.6% of income from dollar one, with a cap at something like $105,000. Including FICA it could be something like 30% paid by lower income earners.

In short, during the 2000s, top earners took home a smaller share of the income pie but paid a larger share of the taxes. Is that what Obama means by “fairness?”

Does leaving out FICA count as fairness?

As for the so-called Buffett Rule that Obama wants, it would impose a minimum tax of 30% on millionaires to make them pay their “fair share.” It’s premised on investor Warren Buffett’s assertion that he pays a lower tax rate than his secretary.

Nonsense. Those with incomes over $1 million pay about 30% in taxes on average, about twice the average for those with middle incomes, like Buffett’s assistant.

Not counting FICA.

Simply put, this is class warfare. The tax would only raise $47 billion over the next decade — a drop in the bucket compared to the $45 trillion in spending and $9.6 trillion in deficits under Obama’s budget.

And just under $1 trillion per year of FICA taxes

Unfortunately, by raising the capital gains tax from 15% to over 30%, it would kill millions of American jobs and send small business creation into a tailspin.

Any tax hike can reduce aggregate demand. And not having income taxes and cap gains at the same rate merely causes income to shift to the lowest taxed category, and provide massive fees for the accounting firms and financial sector as well.

Who would that help?

“We tried (free market economics) for eight years before I took office. … We were told the same thing we’re being told now — this is going to lead to faster job growth, it’s going to lead to greater prosperity for everybody. Guess what? It didn’t.”

Obama has repeatedly suggested all the economy’s problems are due to President Bush.

But Bush, like Obama, entered office during a recession. Not only did he take over after the biggest stock market crash since the Depression, but the Fed had more than doubled interest rates, killing growth.

The Fed doubled rates from very low levels after the economy started growing from the combo Bush proactively expanding the deficit and from the up leg of the sub prime adventure. It ended with the shrinking of the deficit and the down leg of the sub prime adventure.

Worse, within eight months of entering office, the U.S. was hit with the 9/11 terrorist attacks — the first on the American homeland since World War II. Within the space of just 90 days, a million jobs were lost.

Jobs were lost because private sector credit expansion ended after being stretched past it’s limits during the late 90′s, with the govt budget surplus draining off hundreds of billions of dollars of net financial assets as well.

Obama’s right. President Bush did cut tax rates. What was the result? We had 52 straight months of job growth, with 8 million new jobs over six years.

Propelled by the larger deficit and the expansion phase of the sub prime adventure.

For Bush’s entire presidency, the unemployment rate averaged 5.3%. Under Obama, it’s not been below 8%.

Yes, because the deficit is too small, and both sides want to make it smaller. Good luck to us…

Real after-tax income per person rose more than 11% under Bush, while real GDP from 2000 to 2007 grew $2.1 trillion, or 17%. In 2007, the deficit fell to $162 billion — roughly 1% of GDP.

Yes, not large enough to support aggregate demand after support from the sub prime expansion phase ended.

Does Obama really want to compare himself to that? Since he’s entered office, we’ve lost 1.7 million jobs, and unemployment has averaged over 8%.

His deficits have averaged $1.4 trillion — about 8% of GDP, a record. On his watch, debt has soared from $10.7 trillion to $16 trillion. America now has more debt than the entire euro zone and Great Britain — combined.

And still not nearly enough to restore aggregate demand.

Under Obama spending has surged. The federal government now accounts for 25% of the economy, vs. the long-term average of 20%.

Due mainly to automatic counter cyclical transfer payments, not expanded regular spending.

Through his big-government policies, Obama took a bad recession and made sure our recovery would be the worst ever — and then blamed it on everyone but himself.

Meanwhile, get ready for “taxmageddon” — the $494 billion tax hike that hits in 2013 as the Bush tax cuts expire, something Obama is doing nothing about.

Wasn’t it the opposition trying to not allow the extension this year?

Our economy, in short, will never regain its old vitality until a new president is elected, and Obama’s top-down, government-centered policies are laid to rest.

I’ve been a harsh critic of Obama’s policies all along, but this is all a pile of intellectually dishonest propaganda.

Good to see someone telling it like it is!

Was Quantitative Easing a Tax?

By John Carney

March 29 (CNBC) — In the last of his four lectures to students at George Washington University, Ben Bernanke explained how the Fed’s quantitative easing programs worked. As it turns out, they were akin to a tax hike.

This aspect of government asset purchase-and-resale-for-profit programs is not well understood. I explained it in terms of a Treasury program last week.

A tax takes dollars out of the private sector, leaving households and businesses with fewer dollars and the government with more dollars. When the government buys something for $10 and sells it back to the private sector for $12, the net effect is the same as if the government had taxed away those $2.

Bernanke doesn’t come out and call quantitative easing a tax. But he comes close.

“The Fed’s asset purchases are not government spending, because the assets the Fed acquired will ultimately be sold back into the market. Indeed, the Fed has made money on its purchases so far, transferring about $200 billion to the Treasury from 2009 through 2011, money that benefited taxpayers by reducing the federal deficit,” he explains in one of the prepared slides.

Here’s a good rule of thumb. If something reduces the federal deficit, it is either the equivalent of a spending cut or a tax hike.

• Austerity everywhere keeps domestic demand in check and export channels muted
• Non govt credit expansion pretty much stone cold dead in the US and Europe
• Rising oil energy prices subduing global aggregate demand
• US federal deficit just about enough to muddle through with modest GDP growth
• Rest of world public deficits also insufficient to close output gaps, including China which has calmed down considerably
• Zero rate policies/QE/etc. in the US, Japan, and Europe doing their thing to keep aggregate demand down and inflation low as monetary authorities continue to get that causation backwards
• All good for stocks and shareholders, not good for most people trying to work for a living
• Europe still in slow motion train wreck mode, with psi bond tax risk keeping investors at bay and ECB waiting for things to get bad enough before intervening

So still looking to me like a case of

‘Because we fear becoming the next Greece, we continue to turn ourselves into the next Japan’

The only way out at this point is a private sector credit expansion, which, in the US, traditionally comes from housing, but doesn’t seem to be happening this time. Past cycles have seen it come from the sub prime expansion phase, the .com/y2k boom, the S&L expansion phase, and the emerging market lending boom.

But this time we’re being more careful of ‘bubbles’ (just like Japan has done for the last two decades). So I don’t see much hope there.

Still watching for the euro bond tax idea to surface, which I see as the immediate possibility of systemic risk, but no real sign yet.

Seems low interest rates aren’t all the tool they’re cracked up to be?
But they’ve only been low for a bit over 3 years.
Monetary policy works with a lag and all that.
Much like Japan.
Again like the carpenter said of his piece of wood, no matter how much cut off it’s still too short?

Along the same lines, next thing they’ll be doing is increasing savings incentives to help investment.

And note the slight twist on the same theme, increasing bank capital requirements to support confidence.

It’s about aggregate demand, and how you can’t drain yourself to prosperity.

How hard is that?

New Home Sales Unexpectedly Slip 1.6% in February

March 23 (Reuters) — New U.S. single-family home sales fell in February, but a jump in prices to their highest level in eight months kept hopes alive of a recovery in the housing market.

The Commerce Department said on Friday sales slipped 1.6 percent to a seasonally adjusted 313,000-unit annual rate. January’s sales pace was revised down to 318,000 units from the previously reported 321,000 units.

Sales for November and December were revised up a bit.

Economists polled by Reuters had forecast sales at a 325,000-unit rate in February. Compared to February last year, new home sales were up 11.4 percent.

The median price for a new home rose 8.3 percent to $233,700, the highest level since June. Compared to February last year, the median price was up 6.2 percent.

The report, which rounded off a week of mixed housing data, followed a similar pattern seen in the market for used homes. Home resales fell in February, but prices rose from a year earlier. Housing starts slipped, while permits for home building approached a 3-1/2 year high in February.

Did Taxpayers Really ‘Profit’ From Treasury Mortgage Program?

By John Carney

Seems all those hyper inflation forecasts haven’t had all that much influence.

;)

Cleveland Fed Estimates of Inflation Expectations

The Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland reports that its latest estimate of 10-year expected inflation is 1.38 percent. In other words, the public currently expects the inflation rate to be less than 2 percent on average over the next decade.

From: Fed Weighs ‘Sterilized’ Bond Buying if It Act

Many Fed officials believe strongly the bank reserves it has created as part of this money creation aren’t an inflation threat. But they are acutely aware of a popular perception, also held by a few inside the Fed itself, that the money the Fed has created could cause an inflation problem down the road.

Karim writes:

Dealing with perceptions not reality.

Karim writes:

Fits in with the following from their last Statement (where they eased):

While indicators point to some further improvement in overall labor market conditions, the unemployment rate remains elevated. Household spending has continued to advance, but growth in business fixed investment has slowed, and the housing sector remains depressed.

Feel free to forward to your local Fed President, to remind them that rate cuts do remove income from savers and from the economy in general, as the economy is a net saver to the tune of the cumulative govt debt (to the penny). (And not to forget the $80 billion or so per year of lost income due to QE.)

Lower rates remove income from ‘savers,’ with everyone who works for a living and contributes to any kind of retirement plan a ‘saver.’

Yes, with most major corporations, the additional contributions come from earnings, which reduces shareholder incomes rather than employee earnings.

But in any case, contributions to retirement funds are ‘demand leakages’ that directly or indirectly reduce income and, to some degree, reduce spending.

The obvious fiscal response should be along the lines of a FICA suspension to sustain sales, output, and employment…

GE to 3M Pension Pain Mounts as Rates Boost Liabilities

By Thomas Black

February 28 (Bloomberg) — General Electric Co. (GE), Boeing Co. (BA) and 3M Co. (MMM) will join big U.S. employers in making a record $100 billion in 2012 pension contributions, 67 percent more than two years ago, as low interest rates boost companies’ liabilities.

Payments may total $400 billion from 2011 through 2015 to ease underfunding at the 100 largest defined-benefit programs, according to consultant Milliman Inc., which estimated that assets in January were enough to cover less than three-fourths of projected payouts.

“It’s been called the wall of contributions,” said Alan Glickstein, a senior retirement consultant at Towers Watson & Co. (TW) in New York. “All of a sudden this thing jumps up and stays there for a few years. That’s what it looks like — a wall.”

Companies from defense contractor Lockheed Martin Corp. (LMT) to aviation-electronics maker Honeywell International Inc. are caught in a vise: the Federal Reserve Board’s vow to keep rates at current levels until 2014 means pension plans’ fixed-income investments are stagnating just as new rules shorten the time available to shore up funding.

“They’re going to have to kick money in,” said John Ehrhardt, a consulting actuary at Seattle-based Milliman. “We’re basically seeing historically low interest rates driving historically high employer contribution requirements.”

That’s money that won’t go back to shareholders through dividends or buybacks, or toward expansion, said Kevin McLaughlin, a pension risk management specialist with consultant Mercer in New York.

Seven Years

Under the federal Pension Protection Act, which was passed in 2006 and mostly took effect in 2008, tighter accounting rules gave employers seven years to fully fund their retirement plans and required them to use a specified, market-based rate of return to compute liabilities instead of a company estimate.

Those liabilities are calculated by projecting future payments and discounting to the present based on interest rates pegged to a basket of corporate bonds. Liabilities rise when rates fall — and the Fed has held its discount rate at 0.75 percent since February 2010, down from as high as 6.25 percent in June 2007. The Fed said Jan. 25 it expected rates to stay at current levels until 2014.

3M’s pension plan in the U.S., which started 2011 with assets of $11.6 billion, shows the challenge for employers.

Assets rose to $12.1 billion by year’s end because of investments and contributions, even after payments of $680 million, according to a Feb. 16 filing. At the same time, the funding shortfall more than tripled, to $2.4 billion, because projected benefit obligations rose 18 percent to $14.5 billion.

‘Liabilities Did Increase’

“With the declining interest rates here in 2011, our liabilities did increase,” 3M Chief Financial Officer David Meline said Feb. 23 at a Barclays Plc industrial conference.

While 401(k) savings accounts are more common at younger companies, traditional manufacturers such are among the employers most affected by the pension pinch because they’re still making payments under defined-benefit plans. St. Paul, Minnesota-based 3M’s 2012 pension contribution will almost double to as much as $1 billion.

Pension expense is “a variable that we consider among many when we look at a company and what it could mean to their profitability,” said Mark Luschini, chief investment strategist at Philadelphia-based Janney Montgomery Scott LLC, which manages $54 billion. “If that were something that we said we wouldn’t want to own, we’d probably have a fairly limited universe of companies we could buy.”

S&P Industrials

The Standard & Poor’s 500 Industrials Index (S5INDU), whose 61 companies include manufacturers such as Boeing with defined- benefit programs, climbed 10 percent this year through yesterday, topping the S&P 500’s 8.7 percent gain.

Boeing’s pension cost will jump to $2.6 billion, 63 percent more than a year earlier, the company said in January. GE told investors in December it plans to add $1 billion, the first contribution since 1987, and expects to add about $2.1 billion in 2013. The Fairfield, Connecticut-based company closed its U.S. defined-benefits pension plan to all new hires this year.

Honeywell (HON) probably will make a contribution of as much as $1 billion, after low interest rates dashed a goal of full funding in four years, CFO Dave Anderson said. The plan was 83 percent funded at the end of 2011.

‘Little Bit Longer’

“I’d hoped to be there by 2015 to have more of a full resolution of that issue, but it’s going to take a little bit longer probably,” Anderson said in an interview. “Interest rates are at historic low levels and there’s no change in sight for that.”

Pension sponsors usually average rates over 24 months, so 2012 may be the peak year for companies’ pension contributions, said Glickstein of Towers Watson.

“We have a very unusual governmental intervention in the wake of a financial crisis,” he said. “Whatever other merits it may have, it’s clearly distorting the measures of pension obligations and putting a lot of extra pressure on plan sponsors.”

Lockheed Martin anticipated the rise in liabilities by pumping $6 billion into its plan over the last three years, curbing the projected 2012 contribution to $1.1 billion, according to a company filing.

Many pension plans, including GE’s, were overfunded before the December 2007 onset of the worst recession since World War II. Then pension assets began shriveling as stocks slumped, and lower interest rates increased liabilities.

Funding Levels

For the 100 largest defined-benefit plans, average funding levels sank to 74 percent in January from 105 percent in 2007, according to Milliman. Some companies may need to funnel cash to their pension plans for years.

Pension plan assets at Atlanta-based Delta Air Lines Inc. (DAL) covered only about 40 percent of obligations at the end of 2011, down from 47 percent the previous year, according to the carrier’s latest annual report. The funding shortfall widened to $11.5 billion from $9.3 billion in 2010, the filing showed.

Even after Delta ended pilots’ pensions before its 2007 bankruptcy exit and closed other plans to new hires, CFO Hank Halter said Jan. 25 that the airline still expects to contribute as much as $675 million in 2012. Defined-benefit programs taking new employees fell 26 percent in six years to 20,381 in 2009, according to the latest U.S. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp. figures for plans with 25 or more workers.

The threat of future contributions is driving many sponsors of defined-benefit plans to seek ways to blunt risk, said Jeffrey Saef, chief of Bank of New York Mellon Corp. (BK)’s investment strategy and solutions group in Boston. That often means using more fixed-income investments to help match pension assets more closely to liabilities, he said in an interview.

Clients struggling with the cash drain from pensions have a universal query, Saef said: “‘When will it go away?’”

With Fed Chairman Ben S. Bernanke’s thumb on interest rates, that won’t be any time soon, said McLaughlin, the Mercer consultant.

“Right now, everybody is hoping for the best, which is equity markets performing and interest rates not falling any lower,” he said.

So look what slipped into a Fed statement:

*DJ Fed’s Williams: Current Economic Conditions Call For Strong Fed Response
*DJ Williams: Weak Total Demand Calls Supports Fed Policy Action
*DJ Williams: Sees Value In Targeted Stimulus Actions
*DJ Williams: Mortgage Bond Buying Has Helped Housing Market
*DJ Williams: Fiscal Actions May Also Help Revive Housing, Aid Economy
*DJ Williams: Fiscal Stimulus May Be More Potent Than Monetary Policy Now
*DJ Williams: Housing Has Hurt Economy, Not Sole Cause Of Slow Recovery

From the NY Fed:

Deficits, Public Debt Dynamics, and Tax and Spending Multipliers

Cutting government spending on goods and services increases the budget deficit if the nominal interest rate is close to zero. This is the message of a simple but standard New Keynesian DSGE model calibrated with Bayesian methods. The cut in spending reduces output and thus—holding rates for labor and sales taxes constant—reduces revenues by even more than what is saved by the spending cut. Similarly, increasing sales taxes can increase the budget deficit rather than reduce it. Both results suggest limitations of “austerity measures” in low interest rate economies to cut budget deficits. Running budget deficits can by itself be either expansionary or contractionary for output, depending on how deficits interact with expectations about the long run in the model. If deficits trigger expectations of i) lower long-run government spending, ii) higher long-run sales taxes, or iii) higher future inflation, they are expansionary. If deficits trigger expectations of higher long-run labor taxes or lower long-run productivity, they are contractionary.

*DJ Fed’s Plosser:’Monetary Policy Has Exposed Us To Substantial Inflation Risk’

Maybe it’s a learning disability…

Not much progress here:

Rising Deficits Pose Major Threat to Economy: Bernanke

By Jeff Cox

Feb 2 (CNBC) — Rising federal budget deficits are posing a significant threat to the U.S. economy and are likely to cause a crisis if not brought under control, Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke told Congress Thursday.

Calling the situation “unsustainable,” the central bank leader pointed out that surging health-care costs, along with the high level of government spending used to pull the economy out of recession, are creating fiscal hazard.

“Having a large and increasing level of government debt relative to national income runs the risk of serious economic consequences,” Bernanke told the House Budget Committee. “Over the longer term, the current trajectory of federal debt threatens to crowd out private capital formation and thus reduce productivity growth.”

At the same time, he also warned Congress not to pull the reins too tightly so as to threaten growth.

Barry Armstrong Show