Debt problem and policy response


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The ‘problem’ is lack of income to service the debt, not the debt per se. Take a look at the personal income chart, particularly the interest income component.

Restoring the ability to pay restores the quality of the debt.

With the deficit terrorists in charge it’s going to continue ugly for a considerable period of time for the population at large.

Meanwhile, businesses figure out how to scratch out a living with less top line growth and modestly improving earnings, and banks benefit from the net interest margins at the expense of ‘savers’ pretty much offsetting their ongoing loan losses.
So who’s been the big winner this year to date?

Stocks up 50%, financials up more with record earnings in some cases.

Corporate bonds up as corporate borrowing costs fall.

Consumer interest rates remain high.

Household savings earning near 0.

Unemployment near 10%.

GDP now around flat and forecast to modestly improve.

Real wealth is again flowing upward.

>   
>   (email exchange)
>   
>   Take a look at this next chart, which has gained some currency in
>   the worried circles of financial people. It’s worth a bit of study.
>   It shows you the other dancers on the floor.
>   

>   
>   The first thing to jump out at you is that subprime is only about
>   a $1.5 trillion market – not anywhere near the biggest of the risky
>   loans. There are other layers here.
>   


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BERNANKE’S OP ED WSJ: THE FED’S EXIT STRATEGY


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The big concern is managing inflation expectation not realizing that inflation is not a function of inflation expectations:

The Fed’s Exit Strategy

By Ben Bernanke

July 21 (WSJ) — The depth and breadth of the global recession has required a highly accommodative monetary policy. Since the onset of the financial crisis nearly two years ago, the Federal Reserve has reduced the interest-rate target for overnight lending between banks (the federal-funds rate) nearly to zero. We have also greatly expanded the size of the Fed’s balance sheet through purchases of longer-term securities and through targeted lending programs aimed at restarting the flow of credit.

These actions have softened the economic impact of the financial crisis.

There is no evidence of that.

They have also improved the functioning of key credit markets, including the markets for interbank lending, commercial paper, consumer and small-business credit, and residential mortgages.

Yes. Though the measures taken missed the direct approach and instead involved a myriad of complex and expensive programs that burned through precious political capital and delayed the repair of those markets.

My colleagues and I believe that accommodative policies will likely be warranted for an extended period. At some point, however, as economic recovery takes hold, we will need to tighten monetary policy to prevent the emergence of an inflation problem down the road.

They continue to believe that lower interest rates fan inflation and higher interest rates fight inflation.

I suggest theory and econometric evidence show that with current institutional arrangements the opposite is true.

The Federal Open Market Committee, which is responsible for setting U.S. monetary policy, has devoted considerable time to issues relating to an exit strategy. We are confident we have the necessary tools to withdraw policy accommodation, when that becomes appropriate, in a smooth and timely manner.

Nothing could be easier. This is a non issue.

The exit strategy is closely tied to the management of the Federal Reserve balance sheet. When the Fed makes loans or acquires securities, the funds enter the banking system and ultimately appear in the reserve accounts held at the Fed by banks and other depository institutions. These reserve balances now total about $800 billion, much more than normal. And given the current economic conditions, banks have generally held their reserves as balances at the Fed.

What else could they do? Lending doesn’t diminish reserve balances in aggregate. This is accounting, not theory. And clearly the FOMC doesn’t know this.

But as the economy recovers, banks should find more opportunities to lend out their reserves.

Again, that doesn’t diminish total reserves held by the banks at the fed.

That would produce faster growth in broad money (for example, M1 or M2) and easier credit conditions, which could ultimately result in inflationary pressures—

Only if the borrowing to spend increases aggregate demand, which is certainly possible.

unless we adopt countervailing policy measures.

Those would be rate hikes, which add income to the non govt sectors and can add to inflation via the cost channel as well as the fiscal channel.

When the time comes to tighten monetary policy, we must either eliminate these large reserve balances or, if they remain, neutralize any potential undesired effects on the economy.

They have no effect on the economy in any case.

To some extent, reserves held by banks at the Fed will contract automatically, as improving financial conditions lead to reduced use of our short-term lending facilities, and ultimately to their wind down. Indeed, short-term credit extended by the Fed to financial institutions and other market participants has already fallen to less than $600 billion as of mid-July from about $1.5 trillion at the end of 2008. In addition, reserves could be reduced by about $100 billion to $200 billion each year over the next few years as securities held by the Fed mature or are prepaid.

These are just exchanges of financial assets which have no effect on the economy.

However, reserves likely would remain quite high for several years unless additional policies are undertaken.

Even if our balance sheet stays large for a while, we have two broad means of tightening monetary policy at the appropriate time: paying interest on reserve balances and taking various actions that reduce the stock of reserves. We could use either of these approaches alone; however, to ensure effectiveness, we likely would use both in combination.

Yes, increasing interest rates is a simple matter operationally.

Congress granted us authority last fall to pay interest on balances held by banks at the Fed. Currently, we pay banks an interest rate of 0.25%. When the time comes to tighten policy, we can raise the rate paid on reserve balances as we increase our target for the federal funds rate.

Yes.

Banks generally will not lend funds in the money market at an interest rate lower than the rate they can earn risk-free at the Federal Reserve. Moreover, they should compete to borrow any funds that are offered in private markets at rates below the interest rate on reserve balances because, by so doing, they can earn a spread without risk.

Thus the interest rate that the Fed pays should tend to put a floor under short-term market rates, including our policy target, the federal-funds rate. Raising the rate paid on reserve balances also discourages excessive growth in money or credit, because banks will not want to lend out their reserves at rates below what they can earn at the Fed.

Considerable international experience suggests that paying interest on reserves effectively manages short-term market rates. For example, the European Central Bank allows banks to place excess reserves in an interest-paying deposit facility. Even as that central bank’s liquidity-operations substantially increased its balance sheet, the overnight interbank rate remained at or above its deposit rate. In addition, the Bank of Japan and the Bank of Canada have also used their ability to pay interest on reserves to maintain a floor under short-term market rates.

Yes, for many, many years. It’s the obvious way to go.

Despite this logic and experience, the federal-funds rate has dipped somewhat below the rate paid by the Fed, especially in October and November 2008, when the Fed first began to pay interest on reserves. This pattern partly reflected temporary factors, such as banks’ inexperience with the new system.

However, this pattern appears also to have resulted from the fact that some large lenders in the federal-funds market, notably government-sponsored enterprises such as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, are ineligible to receive interest on balances held at the Fed, and thus they have an incentive to lend in that market at rates below what the Fed pays banks.

Yes, someone in government who did not understand reserve accounting and monetary operations excluded those accounts at the Fed.

Under more normal financial conditions, the willingness of banks to engage in the simple arbitrage noted above will tend to limit the gap between the federal-funds rate and the rate the Fed pays on reserves. If that gap persists, the problem can be addressed by supplementing payment of interest on reserves with steps to reduce reserves and drain excess liquidity from markets—the second means of tightening monetary policy. Here are four options for doing this.

First, the Federal Reserve could drain bank reserves and reduce the excess liquidity at other institutions by arranging large-scale reverse repurchase agreements with financial market participants, including banks, government-sponsored enterprises and other institutions. Reverse repurchase agreements involve the sale by the Fed of securities from its portfolio with an agreement to buy the securities back at a slightly higher price at a later date.

Yes, offers interest bearing alternatives to reserve balances.

Second, the Treasury could sell bills and deposit the proceeds with the Federal Reserve. When purchasers pay for the securities, the Treasury’s account at the Federal Reserve rises and reserve balances decline.

Yes, offers interest bearing alternatives to reserve balances.

The Treasury has been conducting such operations since last fall under its Supplementary Financing Program. Although the Treasury’s operations are helpful, to protect the independence of monetary policy, we must take care to ensure that we can achieve our policy objectives without reliance on the Treasury.

Why??? It’s all the same government.

Third, using the authority Congress gave us to pay interest on banks’ balances at the Fed, we can offer term deposits to banks—analogous to the certificates of deposit that banks offer their customers. Bank funds held in term deposits at the Fed would not be available for the federal funds market.

Yes, and, more important, this can be used to set the term structure of rates the same way treasury securities do. They are functionally identical.

Fourth, if necessary, the Fed could reduce reserves by selling a portion of its holdings of long-term securities into the open market.

Yes, which also support longer term rates at higher levels.

Each of these policies would help to raise short-term interest rates and limit the growth of broad measures of money and credit, thereby tightening monetary policy.

And only limits the growth of broad money (which presumably matters even though the fed stopped publishing M3 because they found no evidence it did matter) if the higher rates limit borrowing.

Overall, the Federal Reserve has many effective tools to tighten monetary policy when the economic outlook requires us to do so. As my colleagues and I have stated, however, economic conditions are not likely to warrant tighter monetary policy for an extended period. We will calibrate the timing and pace of any future tightening, together with the mix of tools to best foster our dual objectives of maximum employment and price stability.

—Mr. Bernanke is chairman of the Federal Reserve.


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European Commission sees permanent decline in euro area’s potential output

a name=”2009-07-05_ec_top”>
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Potential output is what you can produce with ‘everyone working’ in the broad sense, and productivity increasing as quickly as possible, unconstrained by policy.

The monetary system is always ready and able to be adjusted to allow this to happen.

It does help to have an administration that understands the monetary system, however.

Since that seems to be in short supply, yes, growth rates can very well be subdued for quite a while.

European Commission sees permanent decline in euro area’s potential output

As so often, it is best not to read the media coverage, but the original documents. The European Commission’s Quarterly Report on the Euro Area contains a rare bombshell – a special essay on the long implications of the financial crisis, which says that the crisis will cause long-term damage to the euro area, and turn its feeble long-term economic growth prospects into something altogether more sinister.

The financial crisis affects both component of productivity – capital accumulation through lower investment rates, and total factor productivity through the credit crunch – and this is likely to have a lasting negative long-term impact on potential output.

In the short run, the effect on potential output growth is a fall of 1.6% in 2007 to 0.7% in 2010. After the crisis, the potential output growth should grow again, but it may never reach its pre-crisis level again. On page 34 it says:
“In other words, the crisis will entail a permanent loss in the level of potential output. One of the factors that will shape the size of this loss is the speed at which the economy reverts to long-term trends. The slower the adjustment to long-term trends, the greater the final loss in potential output level compared with a pre-crisis expansion path. The risks that the adjustment process will be protracted appear unfortunately to be high due to the specific characteristics of the current crisis, including its duration, its global nature and underlying changes in risk behaviour.”


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China pushing domestic consumption


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Looks like they are moving towards higher levels of domestic consumption to sustain output and employment.

(must be reading my blog…)

China’s Central Bank Pledges to Keep Money Flowing

China to Start Trial Rural Pension System to Boost Consumption

China’s Central Bank Pledges to Keep Money Flowing

June 25 (Bloomberg) — China’s central bank pledged to keep
pumping money into the financial system to support a recovery in
the world’s third-biggest economy.

The economy is in a “critical” stage and the central bank
will maintain a “moderately loose” monetary policy, the
People’s Bank of China reiterated in a statement on its Web site
today after a quarterly meeting.

The central bank triggered an explosion in credit by
scrapping quotas on lending in November to back the government’s
4 trillion yuan ($585 billion) stimulus plan. Record lending is
stoking concern that a recovery may come at the expense of asset
bubbles, bad debts for banks and inflation in the long term.

Banks are set to lend more in June than in May, the same
newspaper reported June 22, citing unidentified sources. Last
month, new loans more than doubled from a year earlier.

China to Start Trial Rural Pension System to Boost Consumption

June 25 (Bloomberg) —China, home to 700 million rural
residents, approved a pilot pension program as the government
tries to encourage farmers to spend more
to help revive economic
growth.

The new system, which aims to cover 10 percent of rural
counties this year, will help narrow a wealth gap with cities
and spur domestic demand, according to a statement today from
the State Council, China’s cabinet.

China has expanded its social safety net to reduce
precautionary saving by citizens planning for ill health and old
age. Premier Wen Jiabao has pledged to boost domestic
consumption to help the world’s third-biggest economy recover
from its deepest slump in a decade and lessen dependence on
exports and investment.

“The rural pension system has been almost non-existent,”
said Kevin Lai, an economist with Daiwa Institute of Research in
Hong Kong. “Once you build a stronger social safety net, people
will be more inclined to spend without having to worry about the
future.”

The government in late January also announced it would
spend 850 billion yuan ($124 billion) over three years to ensure
that at least 90 percent of its 1.3 billion citizens have basic
health insurance by 2011.

China’s economy grew 6.1 percent in the first quarter, the
slowest pace in almost a decade.


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Twin deficit terrorists Ferguson and Buiter


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This is the exact same line Niall Ferguson is spewing.
He also says the two choices are inflating or defaulting.

The inflation would be from too much aggregate demand and a too small output gap.

That would mean that fatefull day would be an economy with maybe 4% unemployment and 90%+ capacity utilization and an overheating economy in general.

Sounds like that’s the goal of deficit spending to me- so in faccct he’s saying deficit spending works with his rant on why it doesn’t.

And if we do need to raise taxes to cool things down some day, we can start with a tax on interest income if we want to cut payments to bond holders.

Regarding the supposed default alternative to inflation, in the full employment and high capacity utilization scenario that might call for a tax increase to cool it down, I don’t see how default fits in or why it would even be considered.

In fact, with our countercyclical tax structure, strong growth that follows deficits automatically drives down the deficit, and can even drive it into surplus, as happened in the 1990’s. In that case one must be quick to reverse the growth constraining surplus should the economy fall apart as happend shortly after y2k.

Feel free to pass this along to either.

The fiscal black hole in the US

June 12 (FT)—US budgetary prospects are dire, disastrous even. Without a major permanent fiscal tightening, starting as soon as cyclical considerations permit, and preferably sooner, the country is headed straight for a build up of public debt that will either have to be inflated away or that will be ‘resolved’ through sovereign default.


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deficits and future taxes


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(email exchange)

The latest noise is that today’s deficits mean higher taxes later.

Answer:

1. Taxes function to reduce aggregate demand.

2. A tax hike is never in order with a weak economy, no matter how high the deficit or how high the interest payments may be.

3. Future tax increases would be a consideration should demand rise to the point where unemployment fell ‘too far’- maybe below 4%.

4. That is a scenario of prosperity and an economy growing so fast that it might be causing inflation which might need a tax hike or spending cut to cool it down.

So when someone states that today’s high deficit mean higher taxes later, he is in fact saying that today’s high deficits might cause the economy to grow so fast that it will require tax increases or spending cuts to slow it down.

Sounds like a good thing to me — who can be against that?

And, of course, the government always has the option to tax interest income if interest on the debt is deemed a problem at that time.

>    On Fri, Jun 12, 2009 at 8:46 AM, James Galbraith wrote:
>   
>   A comment in the National Journal, on the ever-green deficit alarmism that so preoccupies
>   people in Washington, to no good effect.
>   
>   Also, my June 5 lecture in Dublin, at the Institute for International and European Affairs, on the
>   crisis.
>   
>   With Q&A
>   
>   And a small postscript, reprising the old story of Eliza in Cuba, which I’ve promised her I
>   will now retire
>   
>   Jamie


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National Journal Expert Blog debate on fiscal sustainability


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What Is Fiscally — And Politically — ‘Sustainable’?

By James K. Galbraith
Professor of Economics, University of Texas

June 11th —Chairman Bernanke may, if he likes, try to define “fiscal sustainability” as a stable ratio of public debt to GDP. But this is, of course, nonsense. It is Ben Bernanke as Humpty-Dumpty, straight from Lewis Carroll, announcing that words mean whatever he chooses them to mean.

Now, we may admit that the power of the Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System is very great. But would someone please point out to me, the section of the Federal Reserve Act, wherein that functionary is empowered to define phrases just as he likes?

A stable ratio of federal debt to GDP may or may not be the right policy objective. But it is neither more nor less “sustainable,” under different economic conditions, than a rising or a falling ratio.

In World War II, from 1940 through 1945, the ratio of US federal debt to GDP rose to about 125 percent. Was this unsustainable? Evidently not. The country won the war, and went on to 30 years of prosperity, during which the debt/GDP ratio gradually fell. Then, beginning in the early 1980s, the ratio started rising again, peaked around 1993, and fell once more.

Thus, a stable ratio of debt to GDP is not a normal feature of modern history. Gradual drift in one direction or the other is normal. There seems no great reason to fear drift in one direction or the other, so long as it is appropriate to the underlying economic conditions.

History has a second lesson. In a crisis, the ratio of public debt to GDP must rise. Why? Because a crisis – and this really is by definition – is a national emergency, and national emergencies demand government action. That was true of the Great Depression, true of war, and true of the Great Crisis we’re now in. Moreover, we’ve designed the system to do much of this work automatically. As income falls and unemployment rises, we have an automatic system of progressive taxation and relief, which generates large budget deficits and rising deficits. Hooray! This is precisely what puts dollars in the pockets of households and private businesses, and stabilizes the economy. Then, when the private economy recovers, the same mechanisms go to work in the opposite direction.

For this reason, a sharp rise in the ratio of debt to GDP, reflecting the strong fiscal response to the crisis, was necessary, desirable, and a good thing. It is not a hidden evil. It is not a secret shame, or even an embarrassment. It does not need to be reversed in the near or even the medium term. If and as the private economy recovers, the ratio will begin again to drift down. And if the private economy does not recover, we will have much bigger problems to worry about, than the debt-to-GDP ratio.

It is therefore a big mistake to argue that the next thing the administration and Congress should do, is focus on stabilizing the debt-to- GDP ratio or bringing it back to some “desired” value. Instead, the ratio should go to whatever value is consistent with a policy of economic recovery and a return to high employment. The primary test of the policy is not what happens to the debt ratio, but what happens to the economy.

*****

Now, what about those frightening budget projections? My friend Bob Reischauer has a scary scenario, in which a very high public-debt-to-GDP ratio leaves the US vulnerable to “pressure from foreign creditors” – a euphemism, one presumes, for the very scary Chinese. Under that pressure, interest rates rise, and interest payments crowd out other spending, forcing draconian cuts down the line. To avert this, Bob has persuaded himself that cuts are required now, not less draconian but implemented gradually. Thus the frog should be cooked bit by bit, to avoid an unpleasant scene later on when the water is really boiling hot.

With due respect, Bob’s argument displays a very vague view of monetary operations and the determination of interest rates. The reality is in front of our noses: Ben Bernanke sets whatever short term interest rate he likes. And Treasury can and does issue whatever short-term securities it likes at a rate pretty close to Bernanke’s fed funds rate. If the Treasury doesn’t like the long term rate, it doesn’t need to issue long-term securities: it can always fund itself at very close to whatever short rate Ben Bernanke chooses to set.

The Chinese can do nothing about this. If they choose not to renew their T-bills as they mature, what does the Federal Reserve do? It debits the securities account, and credits the reserve account! This is like moving funds from a savings account to a checking account. Pretty soon, a Beijing bureaucrat will have to answer why he isn’t earning the tiny bit of extra interest available on the T-bills. End of story.

The only thing the scary foreign creditors can do, if they really do not like the returns available from the US, is sell their dollar assets for some other currency. This will cause a decline in the dollar, some rise in US inflation, and an improvement in our exports. (It will also cause shrieks of pain from European exporters, who will urge their central bank to buy the dollars that the foreigners choose to sell.) The rise in inflation will bring up nominal GDP relative to the debt, and lower the debt-to-GDP ratio. Thus, the crowding-out scenario Bob sketches will not occur.

I’m not particularly in favor of this outcome. But unlike Bob Reischauer’s scenario, this one could possibly occur. And if it did, it would lower real living standards across the board. This is unpleasant, but it would be much fairer than focusing preemptive cuts on the low-income and vulnerable elderly, as those who keep talking about Social Security and Medicare would do.

****

Now, it is true, of course, that you can run a model in which some part of the budget – say, health care – is projected to grow more rapidly than GDP for, say, 50 years, thus blowing itself up to some fantastic proportion of total income and blowing the public finances to smithereens. But this ignores Stein’s Law, which states that when a trend cannot continue it will stop, and Galbraith’s Corollary, which states that when something is impossible, it will not happen.

Why can’t health care rise to 50 percent of GDP? Because, obviously, such a cost inflation would show up in – the inflation statistics! – which are part of GDP. So the assumption of gross, uncontrolled inflation in health care costs contradicts the assumption of stable nominal GDP growth. Again, the consequence of uncontrolled inflation is… inflation! And this increases GDP relative to the debt, so that the ratio of debt to GDP does not, in fact, explode as predicted.

I do not know why the CBO and OMB continue to issue blatantly inconsistent forecasts, but someone should ask them.

Further confusion in this area stems from treating Social Security alongside Medicare as part of some common “entitlement problem.” In reality, health care costs and haphazard health insurance coverage are genuine problems, and should be dealt with. Social Security is just a transfer program. It merely rearranges income. For this reason it cannot be inflationary; the only issue posed is whether the elderly population as a whole deserves to kept out of poverty, or not.

Paying the expenses of the elderly through a public insurance program has the enormous advantage of spreading the burden over all other citizens, whether they have living parents or not, and of ensuring that all the elderly are covered, whether they have living children or not. A public system is also low-cost and efficient, and this too is a big advantage. Apart from that, whether the identical revenue streams are passed through public or private budgets obviously has no implications whatever for the fiscal sustainability of the country as a whole.

****

What is politically sustainable is nothing more than what the political community agrees to at any given time. I have been surprised, and pleased, by the political community’s acquiescence in the working of the automatic stabilizers and expansion program so far. The deficits are bigger, and therefore more effective, than many economists thought would be tolerated. That’s a good sign. But it would be a tragedy if alarmist arguments now prevailed, grossly undermining job prospects for millions of the unemployed.

Let me note, in passing, that Chairman Bernanke should please read the Federal Reserve Act, and focus on the objectives actually specified in it, including “maximum employment, stable prices and moderate long-term interest rates.” He does not have a remit to add stable debt-to-GDP ratios or other transient academic ideas to the list. One might think that the embarrassing experience with inflation targeting would be enough to warn the Chairman against bringing too much of his academic baggage to the day job.


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Payrolls


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With productivity up more than expected Q2 GDP can be flat with hours declining.


Karim writes:

  • Rate of decline definitely slowing overall and across a number of industries
  • But to put the ‘blowout’ number (according to CNBC) in perspective: The -345k drop in employment was only exceeded 6 times since 1960 prior to the current recession
  • NFP -345k and net revisions +82k

Details:

Good News

  • Diffusion index 25.8 to 32.7
  • Relative improvement despite 7k decline in govt jobs
  • Consistent pattern of slower rate of contraction across several industries (retail, construction, temp, hospitality)

Bad News

  • Unemployment rate up from 8.9% to 9.4%
  • Duration of unemployment up from 21.4 weeks to 22.5 weeks
  • Hours down 0.7%
  • Total Unemployed and Underemployed up from 15.8% to 16.4%


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Niall Ferguson


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Someone needs to tell this guy the deficit spending IS the private savings. If any of you know him, please forward this, thanks.

Niall Ferguson jumped in with both feet. Calling the government’s growth forecasts ‘crazily optimistic’ he predicted federal debt would soon reach 140% of GDP and that private savings could not possibly absorb it all. “I hate to teach arithmetic to a Nobel laureate but it doesn’t quite add up,” he said.


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2008-06-23 Valance Weekly Economic Graph Packet


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Real GDP

Can you find the recession? Year over year will be reasonable until last year’s large Q3 number drops out without similar sized q3 this year.


   

Capacity Utilization, ISM Manufacturing

Down but not out as GDP muddles through.


   

Philly Fed Index, Chicago PMI, ISM Non-Manufacturing, Empire Manufacturing Index

Limping along, but off the lows
The survey numbers seem to be depressed by inflation.


   

Retail Sales, Retail Sales Ex Autos, Total Vehicle Sales, Redbook Retail Sales Growth


   

Personal Spending, Personal Income

Apart from cars and trucks, retail muddling through, and getting some support from the fiscal package.


Non-farm Payrolls, Average Hourly Earnings, Average Weekly Hours, Unemployment Rate

Certainly on the soft side, but still positive year over year, earnings still increasing, and unemployment still relatively low (the last print was distorted a couple of tenths or so by technicals).


Total Hours Worked, Labor Participation Rate, Duration of Unemployment, Household Job Growth


Help Wanted Index, Chicago Unemployment, ISM Manufacturing Employment, ISM Non-Manufacturing Employment


Philly Fed Employment, Challenger Layoffs

Most of the labor indicators are on the weak side, but not in a state of collapse. And GDP is picking up some from the fiscal package which should stabilize employment.


NAHB Housing Index, NAHB Future Sales Index


Housing Starts, Building Permits, Housing Affordability, Pending Home Sales

Leveling off to improving a touch.
Housing is still way down and could bounce 35% at any time.
And still be at relatively low levels.


MBA Mortgage Applications

Mortgage apps are down but they are still at levels previously associated with 1.5 million starts vs today’s approx 1 million starts (annual rate).


Fiscal Balance, Govt Public Debt, Govt Spending, Govt Revenue

It’s an election year, and here comes the Govt. spending which is already elevating GDP.


CPI, Core CPI, PCE Price Index, Core PCE


PPI, Core PPI, Import Prices, Import Prices Ex Petro


Export Prices, U of Michigan Inflation Expectations, CRB Index, Saudi Oil Production

The ‘inflation’ is only going to work its way higher as it pours through the import and export channels.
And with Saudi production completely demand driven, there’s no sign of a fall off of world demand for crude at current prices.
Yes, the world’s growing numbers of newly rich are outbidding America’s lower income consumers for gasoline, as US demand falls off and rest of world demand increases.


Empire Prices Paid, Empire Prices Received, Philly Fed Prices Paid, Philly Prices Received

All the price surveys are pretty much the same as ‘inflation’ pours in.


ABC Consumer Confidence, ABC Econ Component, ABC Finance Component, ABC Buying Component

And all the surveys look pretty much the same as ‘inflation’ eats into confidence


10Y Tsy Yield

And with all the weakness rates have generally moved higher as it seems inflation is doing more harm than ultra low interest rates are helping, perhaps causing the Fed to reverse course.


10Y Tips

The TIPS market has been discounting higher ‘real’ rates from the Fed.


Dow Index

Even as stocks look to test the lows

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