Re: Sector financial balances and fiscal stimulus


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(email exchange)

Good stuff, thanks!

(Of course, I prefer to say ‘removal of fiscal drag’ rather than ‘fiscal stimulus!’ )

>   
>   On Tue, Dec 30, 2008 at 3:17 PM, Scott wrote:
>   
>   FYI . . . looking at the data on the sector financial balances for
>   Q1, Q2, and Q3 of 2008. All data are in $billions and are in
>   annualized nominal terms:
>   
>   
>    Sector: Q1 Q2 Q3
>    Household -195 110 24
>    Total Prvt -135 176 106
>    Fed Govt -346 -666 -544
>    Total Public -558 -899 -815
>   
>   Note that in Q2, the -300 change in the fed govt balance is
>   almost exactly equal to the +300 change in HH sector
>   balance. Biz sector in Q2 actually reduced net saving a bit,
>   which is what it normally does when sales/profits improve
>   (expand capacity, etc.). Note also that Q2 was when real
>   GDP was over 2%, up from 0% previously. So . . . clearly the
>   stimulus “worked” in that it improved HH balance sheets
>   while raising real GDP growth. Only problem was that the
>   stimulus wasn’t large enough and didn’t last long enough,
>   Note that smaller Fed govt deficit in Q3 corresponds to
>   smaller HH balance and slower real GDP growth in that
>   quarter.
>   
>   HH sector had been retrenching since 2006:3, when balance
>   peaked at -478B. Fed govt high was -176B in 2006:4, and
>   had been going into further deficit thereafter, so this is “the
>   hard way” you talk about in which automatic stabilizers offset
>   the slowdown, albeit not nearly enough as real GDP growth
>   deteriorated. The Q2 stimulus package was a clear “jolt” that
>   corresponds to “the easy way” of stabilization via direct fiscal
>   intervention and greater real GDP growth than otherwise,
>   albeit not nearly enough, again.
>   
>   Anyone thinking that fiscal policy doesn’t “work” needs to
>   explain this data combined with quarterly real GDP growth.
>   
>   Scott
>   


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Re: Fifty Herbert Hoovers


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(email exchange)

>   
>   On Mon, Dec 29, 2008 at 11:47 AM, Russell wrote:
>   

Fifty Herbert Hoovers

By Paul Krugman

No modern American president would repeat the fiscal mistake of 1932, in which the federal government tried to balance its budget in the face of a severe recession. The Obama administration will put deficit concerns on hold while it fights the economic crisis.

Good to hear that!

But even as Washington tries to rescue the economy, the nation will be reeling from the actions of 50 Herbert Hoovers — state governors who are slashing spending in a time of recession, often at the expense both of their most vulnerable constituents and of the nation’s economic future.

State and local governments cut back every down turn, exacerbating the recession.

Means Obama gets to do that much more- that’s a good thing!


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IMF warns of ‘disturbing’ UK debt


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IMF warns of ‘disturbing’ UK debt

The level of debt in the UK is “disturbing,” the head of the International Monetary Fund has said.

But Dominique Strauss-Kahn told the BBC that given the severity of the economic downturn, more government borrowing was the lesser of two evils.

No, he’s the greater evil. Another deficit terrorist.


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Re: Update- ECB not to terminate key Fed swap line provisions


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Thanks- good heads up by Matt Franko!

With this clarification the ECB seems to recognize the systemic support these swap lines provide, and will have to find other means of keeping a lid on the euro if that’s what they want to do.

>   
>   On Tue, Dec 23, 2008 at 9:21 AM, Cesar wrote:
>   
>   I agree with Franko comments.
>   
>   See press release from Dec 19th below.
>   
>   The Governing Council of the ECB has decided, in agreement
>   with other central banks including the Federal Reserve, to
>   continue conducting US dollar liquidity-providing operations at
>   terms of 7, 28 and 84 days. These operations will continue to
>   take the form of repurchase operations against ECB-eligible
>   collateral and to be carried out as fixed rate tenders with full
>   allotment. Given the limited demand, the operations in the
>   form of EUR/USD foreign exchange swaps will be discontinued
>   at the end of January but could be started again in the
>   future, if needed in view of prevailing market circumstances.
>   

>   
>   n Mon, Dec 22, 2008 at 8:05 PM, Warren wrote:
>   
>   Cesar, please check this out, thanks!
>   
>   W
>   

Matt says:

Mr Mosler,

I think the swap lines between the ECB and the US Fed may not be the same swap operations that last week the ECB talked about terminating at the end of Jan 09.

The ECB currently offers term US$ liquidity (US$ that has been provided from the Fed via a previous swap between central banks) 2 ways. 1 way is via a collateralized operation, and 2 is a swap of euros for dollars.

On 15 October the ECB announced the swap facility:

“Provision of US dollar liquidity through foreign exchange swaps: As from 21 October 2008, and at least until the end of January 2009, in parallel with the existing tenders in which the Eurosystem offers US dollar liquidity against ECB-eligible collateral, the Eurosystem will also offer US dollar liquidity through EUR/USD foreign exchange swaps. The EUR/USD foreign exchange swap tenders will be carried out at a fixed price (i.e. swap point) with full allotment. Further details on the tender procedures for EUR/USD foreign exchange swaps will be released shortly.”

These “swap” type of transactions look like they never caught on (real Euros would have to be provided after all!), as most of the USD provided by the ECB ($100s of billions) have gone the “collateralized” auction route. For instance last week they did a 28-day where the collateralized operation had 47 bidders for $47.5 billion and the swap had one bidder for $70 million. So I think the ECB is just eliminating this liquidity swap vehicle because of “lack of interest”, but plans on providing US$ liquidity via collateralized auctions until at least the April 30 current expiration of the overall ECB to US Fed swap lines.

I could be mis-reading this but I offer my observations.


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Re: Budget surpluses cause depressions


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(email exchange)

All a bunch of true but not relevant crapola.

All 6 US depressions were preceded by the first 6 periods of budget surpluses.

The 7th ended in 2001, as Bloomberg announced it was the longest surplus since 1927-1930.

The difference now we are not on the gold standard so the Treasury can deficit spend at will to restore and sustain aggregate demand.

Yes, it is that simple.

A payroll tax holiday and a few hundred billion of revenue sharing and within a few weeks everyone will wonder what all the fuss was about.

And if nothing fiscally is done, it will be like the early 90’s where the deficit went up via falling tax revenues and rising transfer payments until it gets large enough to restore output and employment.

But that can take a few years.

And nothing is gained by not doing a proactive fiscal adjustment.

(And don’t forget the energy policy to keep gasoline and crude oil consumption down!)

Happy Holidays!

Warren

>   
>   On Mon, Dec 22, 2008 at 7:24 PM, Morris wrote:
>   

How Recessions become Great Depressions

By Martin Hutchinson

Remember the Great Depression of 1921? Or of 1947? Or of 1981? Each of those years began with many of the same problems evident today, or that were evident in 1929-30. Yet they did not produce more than garden-variety recessions, which were soon over. It is instructive to examine why.

The preconditions for depression in 1921, 1947 and 1981 were similar to those operating today, and rather more severe than those of 1929-30. In each case, a large percentage of U.S. assets, built up over the preceding few years, had become obsolete and needed to be scrapped. In 1921 and 1947 the excesses consisted of surplus capacity built to provide munitions for World Wars I and II, together with the boom-time optimism additions of 1919 and 1946. In 1981, the excess consisted of a combination of U.S. factories that had become hopelessly internationally uncompetitive (think Youngstown, Ohio) and capacity that was impossible to retrofit to meet new tighter environmental standards, imposed with such enthusiasm in the 1970s.

All three of these downturns involved an “overhang” of assets that were no longer worth their cost, and associated debt that would default, similar to the housing overhang of 2008. Only in 1929-30 was the overhang less obvious initially, but an overhang was produced during the downturn by the insane political imposition of the Smoot-Hawley tariff, decimating world trade.

The 1921, 1947 and 1981 recessions were short and fairly mild, and 1929-32 became the Great Depression because of government action responding to the initial downturn. In 1929-32, as is well known, government produced the Smoot-Hawley tariff and the huge tax increase of 1932; and the Federal Reserve failed to prevent money supply collapsing after the Bank of the United States crashed in 1930, sparking widespread runs on banks across the country. As a minor addendum, President Herbert Hoover and his acolytes also followed a policy of keeping wage rates high, which was continued by President Franklin Roosevelt and the Democrats after 1933 – thus condemning 20% of the workforce to a decade of unemployment while unionized labor fattened its working conditions.

The mistaken policies of 1929-33 were generally not followed in other downturns. In 1921, Treasury Secretary Andrew Mellon, who believed in allowing the private sector to liquidate its way out of recession, was at the peak of his powers; he therefore organized no bailouts, but instead cut public spending to reduce government’s burden on the economy (he was still there in 1929, but was consistently overruled by Hoover.) In 1947, the Republican 80th Congress also cut public spending sharply and passed the Taft-Hartley Act restricting union power. The backlog of growth potential from technological advances made during the Great Depression and World War II might have lessened the destructive force of 1947’s downturn anyway, but Congress certainly helped rather than hurt. In 1981, incoming President Ronald Reagan restricted government’s spending growth, cut top marginal tax rates and allowed the Paul Volcker Fed to squeeze inflation out of the system – all actions that brought recovery closer.

In none of the 1921, 1947 or 1981 recessions did government engage in massive bailouts (the Chrysler bailout – only $1.5 billion, less than 0.1% of Gross Domestic Product – was passed in 1979, before the main leg of recession hit). Neither did the government indulge in stimulus packages in 1921, 1947 or 1981 (although President Reagan’s tax cuts had some stimulative effect in 1982-83); instead its stand on public spending on all three occasions was markedly restrictive. Finally, at no time in 1921, 1941 or 1981 did the Fed run a negative real interest rate policy; instead real interest rates were positive in all three years, sharply so in 1921 and 1981.

Internationally, the potential to become Great Depressions: 2001 was marginal as the asset overhang, from stock and telecom sectors, and was bailed out by the Fed (at the cost, we now know, of a worse recession 7 years later.); 1991 had only a modest overhang of bad housing finance assets – the rest of the economy was in great shape after the ebullient 1980s; 1974 had a substantial overhang, but the novelty of both high oil prices and environmental restrictions made the overhang less obvious than in 1981, and President Gerald Ford’s restrictive public spending policy, together with a 2001-like monetary bailout through high inflation and lower interest rates prevented it from metastasizing; 1970, 1958 and 1937 had no great new asset overhangs to deal with, although in 1937 the economy was still unbalanced from 1929-32. Thus only about a third of recessions have the potential to turn really nasty, and it appears that government actions, in one direction or the other, determine whether they do so.

Internationally, the Japanese recession after 1990 involved a huge asset overhang, from stock and real estate investments made during the 1980s bubble. The Japanese authorities got policy partly right. They did not sharply increase taxes as did Hoover in 1932, nor did they become significantly more protectionist – indeed they liberalized somewhat. On the other hand, they indulged in an orgy of unproductive infrastructure spending, driving their public debt ratio to over 180% of GDP and “crowding out” private sector borrowing, which was restricted anyway by banks’ lack of capital. After 1998, they drove real interest rates below zero, reducing the domestic savings rate and delaying true recovery.

That recovery only occurred when Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi cut wasteful infrastructure spending and moved towards a balanced budget, thus freeing up finance for the private sector. However, new Prime Minister Taro Aso’s insistence on wasting yet more money on public spending and the Bank of Japan’s failure in 2006-08 to raise interest rates to a positive real level may well produce in Japan a recurrence of downturn like that of 1937 in the United States, an entirely unnecessary aftereffect of poor public policy.

In the United States in 2008, the current unpleasantness clearly has the potential to become much worse. The asset overhang from the housing bubble is comparable to those of 1921 and 1981 (relative to the U.S. economy) and probably larger than that of 1947, when the memory of Great Depression prevented much postwar “irrational exuberance.” Moreover, public policies of bailout, spending stimulus and negative real interest rates all tend towards producing a “Great Depression” although some of the worst mistakes (protectionism, savage tax rises) of 1929-32 have so far been avoided.

This time around, bailouts have been used on a scale greater than Hoover’s Reconstruction Finance Corporation. The Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) gave a spendthrift lame-duck administration and a personally conflicted Treasury secretary complete license to throw money at any problem that appears politically threatening – thus the current attempt to use bank bailout money to assist auto manufacturers, even after Congress has failed to pass an aid package. An initial recapitalization of the banking system, costing about $200 billion, may have been necessary, but the TARP proposal to spend $700 billion on dodgy mortgage assets was an appalling waste of money and in the event unworkable.

In any case, the initial injection of capital to banks should have been definitive. When Citigroup came back for more, only weeks after having been given $25 billion of new capital, it should have been forced into bankruptcy, possibly through an orderly liquidation under government-appointed administrators to minimize market disturbance and unanticipated losses. The financial services industry needs to downsize, which involves removing the worst-run competitors, an accolade for which Citigroup certainly qualifies. Conversely the automobile industry should be able to survive, but only after Chapter 11 filings have removed old union contracts and pension obligations, and allowed the U.S.-owned auto companies to streamline their model ranges and reduce wage costs to their competitors’.

By prolonging the life of incompetent banks and overstuffed union contracts, the government is making matters worse and increasing the probability of serious trouble. It is essential that TARP be closed down and that the window for government bailouts, in banking and elsewhere, is slammed firmly shut. By preventing the market’s destruction process from operating, the government makes the recession almost certainly deeper and without doubt horribly artificially prolonged.

Stimulus plans also raise the chance of a Great Depression because of the deficits they cause. When the government sucks more than $400 billion out of the U.S. economy in two months, it should not be surprised when the credit crunch worsens for the private sector. Indeed, the earlier tax rebate stimulus of the summer may well have caused the surge in unemployment, of over 400,000 per month, which occurred from September onwards. The crunch point for finance availability in a crisis occurs not in the large companies (except those that are due to fail anyway) but in medium-sized and smaller companies, the principal creators of jobs, who find credit lines pulled and survival impossible. The money for stimulus packages has to come from somewhere; when the public sector deficit is already bloated, it comes straight from the job prospects of small company employees and the self-employed.

Loose monetary policy can work either way. When an asset overhang is limited, it can make finance cheaper, raising equilibrium asset prices and limiting the force of a downturn. It was successful in doing this in 1974 and 2001, at the cost of worsening inflation in the 1970s and a more virulent asset bubble in the 2000s. However, when the asset overhang is large enough and the collapse in banking confidence sufficiently severe, loose money can no longer bail the system out of a downturn. Instead it becomes a further depressing factor, eliminating the returns for saving, preventing capital formation and keeping stock and asset prices above the depressed level at which further investment is truly economically attractive. That’s what happened after the Smoot-Hawley tariff disrupted economic activity in 1930, and it is what appears to be happening after the banking crisis of September-October. Whether or not negative real interest rates produce inflation, they will certainly in such circumstances delay recovery.

Current policies could potentially turn today’s recession into tomorrow’s Great Depression. Let us hope that President-elect Barack Obama’s team of economic wizards can figure out a way of preventing this.


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Re: Fed cut


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The Fed has no way of ‘pumping money into the economy’ = they only alter interest rates.

Except by making loans they don’t plan on collecting (the swap line advances to CB’s?)

Which is functionally equivalent to fiscal spending which does add income and financial assets to the economy.

>   
>   Rodger wrote:
>   
>   You and I were talking about a 0% fed funds rate. Almost there, now. Last I
>   heard, down to .25%. It will have no benefit. Wait, correction on that. There
>   will be one benefit. It gets us almost to the point where the Fed will stop
>   focusing on useless interest rate cuts, and start pumping money into the
>   economy. I hope.
>   
>   Rodger
>   


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Re: Fed swaps up $85.6 to $628B


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Thanks, way up!

Probably means USD credit is tightening up for non-US institutions, and maybe the unlimited lines are starting to get used for a lot more than just funding previously existing assets.

>   
>   On Fri, Dec 12, 2008 at 9:53 PM, Cesar wrote:
>   
>   Fed swaps up $85.6 to $628B.
>   


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Re: Will the Fed Issue Debt?


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Paying interest on reserves is functionally identical to issuing debt.

The difference would just be the different maturities.

This could be used to support higher short term rates, if that’s what they want.

Lots of CB’s have done this.

>   
>   On Thu, Dec 11, 2008 at 12:50 AM, Scott wrote:
>   
>   I hope all is well down under. This is interesting!
>   

BOTTOM LINE: News reports indicate that Fed officials may be considering issuing debt. At this stage, we do not know how credible this is. They certainly do not need this to expand their balance sheet but may be motivated either by perceptions that existing options (reserve expansion) are too inflationary or by plans to acquire longer-term risky assets. The idea is not without risk as the existence of Federal Reserve debt would provide the basis on which markets could then take positions on the solvency of the central bank.

MAIN POINTS:

1. According to news reports, Fed officials are considering issuance of debt as an alternative way of expanding their balance sheet. Apart from the fact that these reports have appeared in several places, which often signals that they have some basis, we do not know if Fed officials are seriously considering this alternative. If they are, we think they would need Congressional authorization before proceeding and suspect they would seek it even if they did not think it necessary from a legal standpoint.

2. The idea is a bit puzzling as the Fed already has an effective means of expanding its balance sheet without limit by creating reserves. For example, if officials want to increase the size of an existing liquidity facility or create a new one, all they have to do is extend a loan in one of these facilities and credit the reserve account of the bank that borrows the funds. (If the counterparty is not a bank, then the Fed can provide the funds as Federal Reserve notes – i.e., “print money”). In normal circumstances this would push the federal funds rate down, which officials might not want to do, but currently the effective funds rate is so close to zero that this would not seem to be a significant consideration.

3. So why consider the alternative of issuing debt? We can think of two motivations:

a) Fed officials are uncomfortable with the speed with which the monetary base (bank reserves plus currency in circulation) has expanded over the past two months, either on their own account or because the public may see this as creating a huge inflation problem down the road. In the week ended December 3, the monetary base was $1.47trn; three months earlier it was $843bn. However, in our view this is a misguided concern for a couple of reasons:

i) At a time when concerns about deflation are mounting, Fed officials should want the public to see its current liquidity program as inflationary, to prevent such concerns from translating into expectations that prices will fall in a broad-based and sustained fashion.

ii) Such concerns usually take as an implied premise that the liquidity will be difficult to remove – in essence that the Fed will find itself on a razor’s edge of having to withdraw massive amounts of liquidity in a very short period once the economy starts to improve. This is highly unlikely in our view. By our reckoning, the output gap is already 4% of GDP (unemployment is about 2 points above the natural rate, and each point is worth 2% of GDP) and likely to go much higher before the economy starts to grow at a trend rate. This should give the Fed plenty of time to put its balance sheet back in order before inflation becomes a genuine risk.

Moreover, as the economy starts to improve, the excess liquidity should unwind on its own, as banks’ needs for liquidity facilities diminish in a natural fashion and the Fed begins to raise the federal funds rate target.

b) The other possible motivation is to lay the financing groundwork for large-scale direct purchases of longer-term risky assets, such as private-label mortgages and corporate bonds (which would also require congressional approval). If this is the motivation, then one implication is that the debt would be long-term in nature (again, we have no way of knowing what officials themselves are thinking in this regard). The idea would be such financing might need to be in place long after the liquidity facilities have been unwound, as the assets thus acquired take time to mature or be sold back into the private markets.

4. If the Fed were to issue debt, some interesting questions and possible unintended consequences arise, which we simply raise at this point for further discussion: (a) how would Fed debt stand relative to Treasury debt of comparable maturity? Would it be senior, junior, or pari passu? (b) would it be subject to some limit, as the Treasury’s debt is, and if not could this facilitate a situation in which some programs currently authorized for the Treasury (like TARP) would effectively be financed by comparable operations undertaken by the Fed? (c) if Fed debt does come into existence and begin to trade in the markets, prices on such debt (and on the inevitable CDS to be based on it) would allow the markets effectively to trade on the credibility of the central bank. It is not obvious to us that Fed officials would really want this to happen.


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Perspective


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>  
>  On 12/5/08, Jason wrote:
>  
>  Factoid for the weekend: 1yr ago RBS & co. paid 80bn for Abn, largely in cash.
>  
>  Today that’d buy you Citi (22.5bn), MS (10.5bn), GS (21bn), Mer
>  
>  (12.3bn), DB (13bn), Barclays (12.7bn) and leave you with 8bn
>  
>  in leftover change to shore up the b/s.
>  


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Re: Harvard University to Sell Bonds to Repay Debt


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(email exchange)

>  
>  On 12/6/08, Jason wrote:
>  
>  This will be a bellweather for the muni cash market. Harvard is one of the best credits in
>  muni space outside the AAA state GOs. They plan to bring 500mm deal. if market can
>  not absorb this, it does not bode well for muni cash.
>  
>  It also potentially represents a very attractive buying opportunity for muni investors. This
>  very high quality deal may come at a big concession
>  
>  Lastly, Harvard is doing this to refinance there VRDNs. The VRDNS were most likely
>  originally on with pay fixed swaps. Thus as they pay off the VRDNs they are potentially
>  net receivers of BMA swaps. hence the move lower in ratios. More of this to come in my
>  opinion.

Hedging cash munis with BMA swaps has to be another large hedge gone bad.

It’s another mixed metaphor strategy, sort of like corporate basis.

The unwind side could easily result in serious overshooting in the other direction.

Harvard University to Sell Bonds to Repay Debt, Cancel Swaps

By Bryan Keogh

Dec. 5 (Bloomberg) — Harvard University, the oldest U.S. college, plans to sell taxable and non-taxable bonds to repay debt and terminate interest-rate swap agreements.

The university will offer $600 million of top-rated, tax-exempt bonds next week, Bloomberg data show. Cambridge, Massachusetts-based Harvard also plans a separate sale of 5-, 10- and 30-year debt as soon as today, according to a person familiar with the transaction.

And the big winner is:

JPMorgan Chase & Co., Goldman Sachs Group Inc. and Morgan Stanley are managing the bond sale. New York-based JPMorgan is managing the municipal sale.


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