US Taxes

From the articles of Confederation, March 1st, 1781.
We had the right tax, but the wrong way to implement it:

VIII.

All charges of war, and all other expenses that shall be incurred for the common defense or general welfare, and allowed by the United States in Congress assembled, shall be defrayed out of a common treasury, which shall be supplied by the several States in proportion to the value of all land within each State, granted or surveyed for any person, as such land and the buildings and improvements thereon shall be estimated according to such mode as the United States in Congress assembled, shall from time to time direct and appoint.

The taxes for paying that proportion shall be laid and levied by the authority and direction of the legislatures of the several States within the time agreed upon by the United States in Congress assembled.

Health care

Looks like bad macro- various taxes kick in right away while increased expenses start a few years later.

It’s completely backwards for this point in the business cycle.

Health-Care Bill Would Increase Taxes On Wages, Investments

March 19 (Bloomberg) — High-income families would be hit with a tax increase on wages and a new levy on investments under President Barack Obama’s health care overhaul bill.

detail for book

The following, from a 2005 paper of mine, provides a good summary of the argument with quotations and bibliographic citations. Feel free to use for any project of Warren Mosler, as per his instructions. Also, please let me know if you have any further questions or I can provide any additional information. In addition to the information on Colonial Africa, I have added a brief section on Europe and Asia, where the same phenomenon can be found. Also, I refer to a 2006 paper of mine that provides evidence that many of the most famous names in the history of economics were well aware of the phenomenon. Also many political scientists, policy-makers, sociologists, historians, etc. Finally, I have also documented the “tax-driven cowrie shell” from both Africa and Asia, that is, contrary to what has previously been thought (by such economists as Milton Friedman), cowrie currency was not a so-called ‘primitive’ money, but was similarly tax-driven as colonial currency or today’s dollar. Let me know if you would like these references as well.

The economist “Rodney” Warren refers to is Walter Rodney, and his book is in the bibliography. I provide examples from many African colonies, such as Nigeria, German East Africa, French West Africa, British Central Africa, Upper Volta, Southern Rhodesia, and South Africa, but not specifically Ghana. If you need examples specifically from Ghana, let me know and I can provide them.

Once again, please do not hesitate to contact me directly anytime for further assistance. My contact info follows.

Sincerely,

Mathew Forstater

Professor of Economics

University of Missouri—Kansas City

From:

Mathew Forstater, 2005, “Taxation and Primitive Accumulation: The Case of Colonial Africa” in Research in Political Economy, Vol. 22, pp. 51-64.

Direct taxation [and the requirement that tax obligations be settled in colonial currency] was used to force Africans to work as wage laborers, to compel them to grow cash crops, to stimulate labor migration and control labor supply, and to monetize the African economies. Part of this latter was to further incorporate African economies into the larger emerging global capitalist system as purchasers of European goods. If Africans were working as wage laborers or growing cash crops instead of producing their own subsistence, they would be forced to purchase their means of subsistence, and that increasingly meant purchasing European goods, providing European capital with additional markets. It thus also promoted, in various ways, marketization and commoditization. [Direct taxation] appears to have been one of the most powerful policies in terms of both its wide variety of functions, its universality in the African colonial context, and its success in achieving its intended effects. Of course, taxation was not the sole determinant of primitive accumulation [note: “primitive accumulation” or similar terms such as primary accumulation or original accumulation, was a term used by the Classical economists, such as Adam Smith, David Ricardo, and Karl Marx to refer to the process by which subsistence workers became wage-laborers, and the process of early capitalist development in general]. But it has certainly been under-recognized in the literature on primitive accumulation. The history of direct taxation also has some wider theoretical implications. It shows, for example, “that ‘monetization’ did not spring forth from barter; nor did it require ‘trust’—as most stories about the origins of money claim” (Wray, 1998, p. 61). In the colonial context, money was clearly a “creature of the state”. In addition, this phenomenon was in no way unique to the African case. As will be seen following the section on Africa, the same process was also found in Europe, Asia, and elsewhere.

TAXATION AND PRIMITIVE ACCUMULATION IN COLONIAL AFRICA

Colonial administrators at first believed that market incentives and persuasion might result in a forthcoming supply of labor:

Initially the French imagined that if they would only create new needs for the Africans, the indigenous people would go out to work. When this did not happen, the French introduced taxes so as to make Africans earn wages. (Coquery-Vidrovitch, 1969, pp. 170-171)

From the first it was assumed that ample cheap labor was a major asset in Africa…Practical experience soon showed, however, that Africans did not, as a rule, approximate to Indian coolies. Few in sub-Saharan African had experience of working for pay or outside the traditional subsistence economy, and few had any real need to do so. In course of time monetary incentives might generate a voluntary labor force, but during the first decades after pacification neither governments nor private investors could afford to wait indefinitely for the market to work this revolution. (Fieldhouse, 1971, p. 620)

A number of methods were utilized to compel Africans to provide labor and cash crops. Among these were work requirements, pressure for ‘volunteers’, land policy squeezing Africans into ‘reserves’ destroying the subsistence economy, and ‘contracts’ with penal sanctions (Fieldhouse, 1971, pp. 620-621). But the most successful method turned out to be direct taxation.

Direct taxation was used throughout Africa to compel Africans to produce cash crops instead of subsistence crops and to force Africans to work as wage laborers on European farms and mines:

In those parts of Africa where land was still in African hands, colonial governments forced Africans to produce cash crops no matter how low the prices were. The favourite technique was taxation. Money taxes were introduced on numerous items—cattle, land, houses, and the people themselves. Money to pay taxes was got by growing cash crops or working on European farms or in their mines. (Rodney, 1972, p. 165, original emphasis)

The requirement that taxes be paid in colonial currency rather than in-kind was essential to producing the desired outcome, as well as to monetize the African communities, another part of colonial capitalist primitive accumulation and helping to create markets for the sale of European goods:

African economies were monetised by imposing taxes and insisting on payments of taxes with European currency. The experience with paying taxes was not new to Africa. What was new was the requirement that the taxes be paid in European currency. Compulsory payment of taxes in European currency was a critical measure in the monetization of African economies as well as the spread of wage labor. (Ake, 1981, pp. 333-334)

Colonial governors and other administrators were well aware of this ‘secret’ of colonial capitalist primitive accumulation, although they often justified the taxation on other grounds, some ideological and others demonstrating the multiple purposes of taxation from the colonial point of view. “One Governor, Sir Perry Girouard, is reported to say: ‘We consider that taxation is the only possible method of compelling the native to leave his reserve for the purpose of seeking work’” (Buell, 1928, p. 331). First Governor General of the Colony and Protectorate of Nigeria, Sir Frederick Lugard’s Political Memoranda and Political Testimonies are filled with evidence regarding direct taxation: “Experience seems to point to the conclusion that in a country so fertile as this, direct taxation is a moral benefit to the people by stimulating industry and production” (Lugard, 1965a, p. 118). Lugard’s belief that “Direct taxation may be said to be the corollary of the abolition, however, gradual, of forced labour and domestic slavery” (1965a, p. 118), acknowledges the role of direct taxation in forcing Africans to become wage-laborers. Lugard was also clear that the “tax must be collected in cash wherever possible…The tax thus promotes the circulation of currency with its attendant benefits to trade” (1965a, p. 132).

Lugard and other colonial administrators cited a number of other justifications for direct taxation:

Even though the collection of the small tribute from primitive tribes may at first seem to give more trouble than it is worth, it is in my view of great importance as an acknowledgement of British Suzerainty…It is, moreover, a matter of justice that all should pay their share alike, whether civilized or uncivilized, and those who pay are quick to resent the immunity of others. Finally, and in my judgment the most cogent reason, lies in the fact that the contact with officials, which the assessment and collection necessitates, brings these tribes into touch with civilizing influences, and promotes confidence and appreciation of the aims of Government, with the security it affords from slave raids and extortion.” (Lugard, 1965b, pp. 129-130)

The tax affords a means to creating and enforcing native authority, of curbing lawlessness, and assisting in tribal evolution, and hence it becomes a moral benefit, and is justified by the immunity from slave-raids which the people now enjoy.” (p. 173)

Taxation was also justified on grounds that it assisted in ‘civilizing’ African peoples: “For the native,” Ponty stated in 1911, “taxation, far from being the sign of a humiliating servitude, is seen rather as proof that he is beginning to rise on the ladder of humanity, that he has entered upon the path of civilization. To ask him to contribute to our common expenses is, so to speak, to elevate him in the social hierarchy” (Conklin, 1997, p. 144). Colonial tax policies were also introduced in the name of the ‘dignity’ of, and the obligation to, work, where contact with Europeans again was emphasized:

From this need for native labor, the theory of the dignity of labor has developed; this dignity has been chiefly noticeable in connection with labor in the alienated areas. The theory has also developed that it is preferable for the native to have direct contact with the white race so that his advance in civilization should be more rapid than if he remained in his tribal area attending to his own affairs. This is the “inter-penetration” theory in contrast to the “reserve” or “separation” theory. (Dilley, 1937, p. 214)

All of these functions of direct taxation may be seen in some sense as part of colonial capitalist primitive accumulation, whether as assisting in promoting marketization or serving ideological functions in the reproduction of the colonial capitalist mode.

Several points concerning the role of direct taxation in colonial capitalist primitive accumulation need to be made. First, direct taxation means that the tax cannot be, e.g., an income tax. An income tax cannot assure that a population that possesses the means of production to produce their own subsistence will enter wage labor or grow cash crops. If they simply continue to engage in subsistence production, they can avoid the cash economy and thus escape the income tax and any need for colonial currency. The tax must therefore be a direct tax, such as the poll tax, hut tax, head tax, wife tax, and land tax. Second, although taxation was often imposed in the name of securing revenue for the colonial coffers, and the tax was justified in the name of Africans bearing some of the financial burden of running the colonial state, in fact the colonial government did not need the colonial currency held by Africans. What they needed was for the African population to need the currency, and that was the purpose of the direct tax. The colonial government and European settlers must ultimately be the source of the currency, so they did not need it from the Africans. It was a means of compelling the African to sell goods and services, especially labor services for the currency. Despite the claims by the colonial officials that the taxes were a revenue source, there is indication that they understood the working of the system well. For example, often the tax was called a “labor tax” or “prestation.” Under this system, one was relieved of their tax obligation if one could show that one had worked for some stated length of time for Europeans in the previous year (see, e.g., Christopher, 1984, pp. 56-57; Crowder, 1968, p. 185; Davidson, 1974, pp. 256-257; Dilley, 1937, p. 214; Wieschoff, 1944, p. 37). It is clear in this case that the purpose of the tax was not to produce revenue.

To achieve its intended effects, it was also important that the direct tax be enforced, and numerous penalties existed for failing to meet one’s obligation. In German East Africa, “Sanctions against non-payment were severe—huts were burnt and cattle confiscated—so tax defaulters were not numerous” (Gann and Duignan, 1977, pp. 202-203). All kinds of harsh penalties for failing to pay taxes have been documented:

If a man refused to pay his taxes, the Mossi chief was permitted to sequester his goods and sell them. If the man had neither the taxes nor the goods, the chief had to send him and his wife (or wives) to the administrative post to be punished. Sometimes, a man and his wife would be made to look at the sun from sunrise to sunset while intoning the prayer Puennam co mam ligidi (“God, give me money”). Other times a man would be made to run around the administrative post with his wife on his back; if he had several wives, he had to take each one in turn. Then his wife or wives had to carry him around. (Skinner, 1970, p. 127)

Collective punishments were also used widely to enforce the tax. At the very least, failure to “pay could be met, and regularly was met, by visits from the colonial police and spells of ‘prison labour’.” (Davidson, 1974, pp. 256-257)

Another important element in assuring the smooth functioning of the direct tax system was keeping wages low, which had the additional benefit of keeping costs down for private employers. If wages were too high relative to the tax burden, Africans would only work enough to pay off their tax obligation and the labor supply would remain limited:

While taxation is high, wages are very low. It would not do to pay the Natives too much for they would not work a day more than it was absolutely necessary to get tax money. So employers pay the minimum in order to exploit their labourers as long as possible. (Padmore, 1936, p. 67)

Direct taxation was also used to promote and control migration of wage labor. If wage labor and money for cash crops was not available locally, Africans were forced to migrate to plantations and mines to find money wages (see, e.g., Greenberg, 1987; Groves, 1969; Onselan, 1976; although see also Manchulle, 1997, especially p. 8, for a critique).

TAXATION AND PRIMITIVE ACCUMULATION IN EUROPE AND ASIA

In arguing that taxation played an important role in primitive accumulation, this paper has focused on the case of Colonial Africa, but this should in no way imply that the process was limited to Africa. Evidence has already been mentioned in passing with reference to Russia and elsewhere. Vries, in a section entitled “Taxes, the Financial Revolution, War, Primitive Accumulation, and Empire” from his article “Governing Growth: A Comparative Analysis of the Role of the State in the Rise of the West” (Vries, 2002), argues that:

Praising Europe’s state-system and its mercantilist competition implies, whether one likes it or not, praising taxes. The increase of taxation we see in mercantilist countries may also have been a blessing in disguise. Paying them may have been an unpleasant experience, but it need not necessarily have been a bad thing from a macro-economic point of view. It is not farfetched to expect that ever-increasing taxes forced people to work harder and longer. Since the economy of large parts of early modern Europe was characterized by un(der)employment and under-utilization of the available means of production, there was plenty of room for increased production. Moreover, the fact that taxes were collected in money, led to increasing commercialization. Which in turn could increase government income via indirect taxes. (Vries, 2002, p. 75)

Despite Vries’ view of the process as a ‘blessing’, etc., it is clear that the description highlights the ways in which money taxes affected labor supply and monetization in early modern Europe, and even uses the term ‘primitive accumulation’. Later in the article, Vries reports that, in China, “one finds officials proclaiming that taxes ought to be raised to force the populace to work harder” (Vries, 2002, p. 95; for more on China, see Von Glahn, 1996). Vries goes on to report that this development took place throughout Europe and Asia:

When it comes to the way taxes were levied, monetization appears to be the tendency in the entire Eurasian continent. This process had progressed furthest in Europe. All governments preferred to get their income in money and to a very large extent managed to do so. In China an important grain levy continued to exist, but all other important government taxes had gradually been transformed into monetary payments. In India taxes for the central government had to be paid in cash. In the Ottoman Empire monetization made the least progress, but with the increasing weight of cizye, avariz, and tax farming, here too cash payments were on the rise. (Vries, p. 98)

Additional support for Europe and Western Asia is provided by Banaji (2001). Evidence for the notion that money taxes force pressures for increased market activity is provided by the reverse development, namely that a “decline in the exaction of money taxes brought about a decline in trade” (Hopkins, 1980, p. 116, quoted in Banaji, 2001, p. 16). Banaji goes on to report that:

the relentless pressure for taxation in money would also mean that despite the commercial decline which is supposed to have occurred in the Mediterranean of the seventh century, Egyptian landowners and rural communities were undoubtedly forced to meet their monetary obligations through increased production for the market (or participation in it as wage-labourers). (Banaji, 2001, p. 158)

Additional research is necessary to provide a more comprehensive and detailed documentation of the role of monetary taxation in monetization, marketization, and the creation of wage-labor and cash crop production in other regions and time periods, but it is clear that the historical process was in no way confined to Colonial Africa. The fact that various aspects of the phenomenon were recognized by economists as geographically, temporally, and theoretically diverse as Adam Smith, John Stuart Mill, Karl Marx, Fred M. Taylor, Philip Henry Wicksteed, W. Stanley Jevons, Karl Polanyi, and John Maynard Keynes supports the position that it existed with a great deal of generality (see Forstater, 2006).

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Ake, Claude, 1981, A Political Economy of Africa, Essex, England: Longman Press.

Amin, Samir, 1976, Unequal Development, New York: Monthly Review Press.

Banaji, Jairus, 2001, Agrarian Change in Late Antiquity, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Buell, Raymond Leslie, 1928, The Native Problem in Africa, Vol. 1, New York: Macmillan.

Christopher, A. J., 1984, Colonial Africa, London: Croom Helm.

Conklin, Alice L., 1997, A Mission to Civilize: The Republican Idea of Empire in France and West Africa, 1895-1930, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

Coquery-Vidrovitch, Catherine, 1969, “French Colonization in Africa to 1920: Administration and Economic Development,” in L. H. Gann and P. Duignan (eds.), Colonialism in Africa, 1870-1914, Volume 1: The History and Politics of Colonialism, 1870-1914, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Coquery-Vidrovitch, Catherine, 1986, “French Black Africa,” in A. D. Roberts (ed.), The Cambridge History of Africa, Volume 7, from 1905 to 1940, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Crowder Michael, 1968, West Africa Under Colonial Rule, Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press.

Crowder, Michael, 1970, “The White Chiefs of Tropical Africa,” in L. H. Gann and P. Duignan (eds.), Colonialism in Africa, 1870-1960, Volume II: The History and Politics of Colonialism, 1914-1960, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Davidson, Basil, 1974, Africa in History, new revised edition, New York: Collier.

Dilley, Marjorie Ruth, 1937, British Policy in Kenya, New York: Barnes and Noble.

Fieldhouse, David K., 1971, “The Economic Exploitation of Africa: Some British and French Comparisons,” in P. Gifford and W. R. Louis (eds.), France and Britain in Africa: Imperial Rivalry and Colonial Rule, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Forstater, Mathew, 2006, “Tax-Driven Money: Additional Evidence from the History of Thought, Economic History, and Economic Policy,” in M. Setterfield, ed., Complexity, Endogenous Money, and Exogenous Interest Rates: Festschrift in Honor of Basil J. Moore, Cheltenham, U.K.: Edward Elgar.

Freund, Bill, 1984, The Making of Contemporary Africa, Bloomington, Indiana University Press.

Gann, L. H. and Peter Duignan, 1977, The Rulers of German Africa, 1884-1914, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

Greenberg, Stanley B., 1987, Legitimating the Illegitimate: State, Markets, and Resistance in South Africa, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

Groves, Charles Pelham, 1969, “Missionary and Humanitarian Aspects of Imperialism from 1870 to 1914,” in L. H. Gann and P. Duignan (eds.), Colonialism in Africa, 1870-1914, Volume 1: The History and Politics of Colonialism, 1870-1914, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Lugard, F. D., 1965a [1906, 1918], “Lugard’s Political Memoranda: Taxation, Memo No. 5” in A. H. M. Kirk-Greene (ed.), The Principles of Native Administration in Nigeria: Selected Documents, 1900-1947, London: Oxford University Press.

Lugard, F. D., 1965b [1922], “Lugard’s Political Testimony,” in A. H. M. Kirk-Greene (ed.), The Principles of Native Administration in Nigeria: Selected Documents, 1900-1947, London: Oxford University Press.

Manchulle, François, 1997, Willing Migrants: Soninke Labor Diasporas, 1848-1960, Athens, OH: Ohio University Press.

McCracken, John, 1986, “British Central Africa,” in A. D. Roberts (ed.), The Cambridge History of Africa, Volume 7, from 1905 to 1940, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Onselan, Charles van, 1976, Chibaro: African Mine Labour in Southern Rhodesia, 1900-1933, London: Pluto Press.

Padmore, George, 1936, How Britain Rules Africa, New York: Negro Universities Press.

Rodney, Walter, 1972, How Europe Underdeveloped Africa, Washington, D. C.: Howard University Press.

Skinner, Elliott P., 1970, “French Colonialism and Transformation of Traditional Elites: Case of Upper Volta,” in W. Cartey and M. Kilson (eds.), The Africa Reader: Colonial Africa, New York: Random House.

Temu, A., and B. Swai, 1981, Historians and Africanist History: A Critique, London: Zed Books.

Thomas, Clive Y., 1984, The Rise of the Authoritarian State in Peripheral Societies, New York: Monthly Review Press.

Von Glahn, Richard, 1996, Fountain of Fortune, Berkeley: University of California Press.

Vries, P. H. H., 2002, ““Governing Growth: A Comparative Analysis of the Role of the State in the Rise of the West,” Journal of World History, Vol. 13, No. 1, pp. 67-138.

Wieschoff, H. A., 1944, Colonial Policies in Africa, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.

medicare tax hike

Same macro result as a tax hike.


Premiums Jump 14% on Medicare Private Plans

By Ricardo Alonso-Zaldivar

Feb. 19 (AP) —Millions of seniors who signed up for popular private health plans through Medicare are facing sharp premium increases this year — another sign that spiraling costs are a problem even for those with solid insurance.

A study to be released Friday by a major consulting firm found that premiums for Medicare Advantage plans offering medical and prescription drug coverage jumped 14.2 percent on average in 2010, after an increase of only 5.2 percent the previous year. Some 8.5 million elderly and disabled Americans are in the plans, which provide more comprehensive coverage than traditional Medicare.

Minneapolis Fed President Kocherlakota Warns Massive Debt Load Can Only Be Paid By Tax Collections Or Debt Monetization

Maybe someday we will get an FOMC that actually understands reserve accounting and monetary operations, and maybe even recognizes the currency for the simple public monopoly that it is and moves away from ‘expectations theory’ as the reason for ‘inflation.’

But for now that seems to be only a very remote possibility.

“Why might households expect an increase in inflation? The amount of federal government debt held by the private sector has gone up by over 30 percent since the beginning of 2008. This debt can only be paid by tax collections or by the Federal Reserve’s debt monetization (that is, by printing dollars to pay off the obligations incurred by Congress). If households begin to expect that the latter will be true—even if it is not—their inflationary expectations will rise as well.”

Mankiw, you’re welcome…


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By N. GREGORY MANKIW
Published: December 12, 2009

IMAGINE you are a physician and a patient arrives in your office with a troubling and mysterious disease. Some of the symptoms are familiar, but others are not. You have never treated anyone with quite this set of problems.
David G. Klein

Weekend Business Podcast: Greg Mankiw on Fiscal Stimulus

Based on your training and experience, imperfect as it is, you come up with a proposed remedy. The patient leaves with a prescription in hand. You hope and pray that it works.

A week later, however, the patient comes back and the symptoms are, in some ways, worse. What do you do now? You have three options:

STAY THE COURSE Perhaps the patient was sicker than you thought, and it will take longer for your remedy to kick in.

UP THE DOSAGE Perhaps the remedy was right but the quantity was wrong. The patient might need more medicine.

RETHINK THE REMEDY Perhaps the treatment you prescribed wasn’t right after all. Maybe a different mixture of medicines would work better.

Choosing among these three reasonable courses of action is not easy. In many ways, the Obama administration faces a similar situation right now.

How hard is it to recognize a shortage of aggregate demand of this magnitude?????

When President Obama was elected, the economy was sick and getting sicker. Before he was even in office in January, his economic team released a report on the problem.

If nothing was done, the report said, the unemployment rate would keep rising, reaching 9 percent in early 2010. But if the nation embarked on a fiscal stimulus of $775 billion, mainly in the form of increased government spending, the unemployment rate was predicted to stay under 8 percent.

In fact, the Congress passed a sizable fiscal stimulus. Yet things turned out worse than the White House expected. The unemployment rate is now 10 percent — a full percentage point above what the administration economists said would occur without any stimulus.

To be sure, there are some positive signs, like reduced credit spreads, gross domestic product growth and diminishing job losses. But the recovery is not yet as robust as the president and his economic team had originally hoped.

So what to do now? The administration seems most intent on staying the course, although in a speech Tuesday, the president showed interest in upping the dosage. The better path, however, might be to rethink the remedy.

When devising its fiscal package, the Obama administration relied on conventional economic models based in part on ideas of John Maynard Keynes. Keynesian theory says that government spending is more potent than tax policy for jump-starting a stalled economy.

Yes, govt spending has a higher ‘multiplier’ than tax cuts, but either way that completely misses the point

With non convertible currency and floating fx. The choice between the two is a political decision. Tax cuts will restore private consumption with income led growth, while spending increases generally first increase public consumption by producing public goods and services. With excess capacity it’s a matter of what we want. Once that’s decided, the ‘multiplier’ only gives some idea of how far to go with either tax cuts or spending increases. The size of the spending and/or tax cuts is of no consequence beyond the effects on the real economy.

Personally, I have a notion of what the ‘right sized’ govt is, and would target that in any case. I’d have it a lot smaller in many areas where it tries to perform tasks directly, while broadening funding intiatives to meet national goals. But that’s another story.

The report in January put numbers to this conclusion. It says that an extra dollar of government spending raises G.D.P. by $1.57, while a dollar of tax cuts raises G.D.P. by only 99 cents. The implication is that if we are going to increase the budget deficit to promote growth and jobs, it is better to spend more than tax less.

This is a disgrace to Professor Mankiw and the rest of the economics profession that might agree and support this view.

The amount to spend and/or the amount of taxes cut per se is of no further economic consequence.

But it is the predominant view thats allowed the US economy to get into this mess in the first place.

Yes, there was a financial crisis, but gross ignorance is the only excuse for letting it spill over into the real economy, and stay spilled over for well over a year.

But various recent studies suggest that conventional wisdom is backward.

Those studies remain ‘out of paradigm’ as well, of course.

One piece of evidence comes from Christina D. Romer, the chairwoman of the president’s Council of Economic Advisers. In work with her husband, David H. Romer, written at the University of California, Berkeley, just months before she took her current job, Ms. Romer found that tax policy has a powerful influence on economic activity.

According to the Romers, each dollar of tax cuts has historically raised G.D.P. by about $3 — three times the figure used in the administration report. That is also far greater than most estimates of the effects of government spending.

Like it matters, as above. It’s the blind leading the blind, and giving each other Nobel prizes along the way.

Other recent work supports the Romers’ findings. In a December 2008 working paper, Andrew Mountford of the University of London and Harald Uhlig of the University of Chicago apply state-of-the-art statistical tools to United States data to compare the effects of deficit-financed spending, deficit-financed tax cuts and tax-financed spending. They report that “deficit-financed tax cuts work best among these three scenarios to improve G.D.P.”

Notice the prefix ‘debt financed’ which is an inapplicable gold standard term.

My Harvard colleagues Alberto Alesina and Silvia Ardagna have recently conducted a comprehensive analysis of the issue. In an October study, they looked at large changes in fiscal policy in 21 nations in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. They identified 91 episodes since 1970 in which policy moved to stimulate the economy. They then compared the policy interventions that succeeded — that is, those that were actually followed by robust growth — with those that failed.

The results are striking. Successful stimulus relies almost entirely on cuts in business and income taxes. Failed stimulus relies mostly on increases in government spending.

All these findings suggest that conventional models leave something out. A clue as to what that might be can be found in a 2002 study by Olivier Blanchard and Roberto Perotti. (Mr. Perotti is a professor at Boccini University in Milano, Italy; Mr. Blanchard is now chief economist at the International Monetary Fund.) They report that “both increases in taxes and increases in government spending have a strong negative effect on private investment spending. This effect is difficult to reconcile with Keynesian theory.”

The problem is none of them have the fundamental understanding of how a currency works to be capable of understanding what they have compiled.

Do they seriously believe, for example, that if govt went out and hired 10 million people private investment spending would go down, all else equal? Any of you want to take that bet???

These studies point toward tax policy as the best fiscal tool to combat recession,

Again with the word ‘best’ that implies taxing less than spending per se is ‘bad.’

particularly tax changes that influence incentives to invest, like an investment tax credit. Sending out lump-sum rebates, as was done in spring 2008, makes less sense, as it provides little impetus for spending or production.

The main incentives for investing are a backlog of orders and cost cutting.

And while the lump sum rebates were not anywhere near the top of my long list for policy options, they did add to aggregate demand and kept things from being even worse.

Like our doctor facing a mysterious illness, economists should remain humble and open-minded when considering how best to fix an ailing economy. A growing body of evidence suggests that traditional Keynesian nostrums might not be the best medicine.

N. Gregory Mankiw is a professor of economics at Harvard. He was an adviser to President George W. Bush.

Feel free to send this along to him, thanks.


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taxes and money


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you are addressing a room full of people.

you tell them taxes turn litter into money.

you try to sell your business cards to the group for $5 each.

probably no takers.

you offer your cards to anyone who stays to help clean up the room

no takers.

you then point to the man at the door with the 9mm who’s the tax collector, and no one leaves without 10 of your business cards.

you then repeat the questions.


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Four-Year-Old Got Homebuyer Tax Credit, Treasury Says


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Thanks, this type of thing fuels the ‘govt can’t do anything right’ constituency.

I’m always careful to make proposals that minimize incentives for fraud and abuse, and also minimize the amount of regulation and supervision needed to ensure compliance.

Hence, I’ve proposed the payroll tax holiday and per capita revenue distributions to the states to support aggregate demand.

Four-Year-Old Got Homebuyer Tax Credit, Treasury Says

By Dawn Kopecki

Oct. 22 (Bloomberg) — Children as young as four years old have
improperly received first-time homebuyers tax credits
as the U.S. failed
to adequately screen filings, a Treasury inspector general told
lawmakers today.

“Some key controls were missing to prevent an individual from
erroneously or fraudulently claiming the credit and receiving an
erroneous refund of up to $8,000,” Treasury’s J.
Russell George told the House Ways and Means Committee’s oversight
panel.

More than 1.2 million borrowers through Oct. 9 have claimed almost
$8.5 billion of the $13.6 billion set aside for “first- time” homebuyer
tax credits this year, George said.

George said the IRS has identified almost 74,000 claims that may
not have qualified as first-time homebuyers.
They also found that 580
taxpayers under 18 years old and therefore ineligible to buy a home
claimed almost $4 million in tax credits.

The credits, which are available for taxpayers who haven’t owned a
home in the last two years, are credited by Realtors and mortgage
bankers with helping to stabilize home sales this year following the
worst housing slump since the Great Depression.

Lawmakers in the Senate are pushing to extend the credit beyond its
Nov. 30 expiration and expand it to more borrowers.

“Every time Congress creates a new refundable credit — meaning
that individuals can get a check from the government whether or not they
have actual tax liability — the incentive for fraud is magnified,”

Louisiana Representative Charles Boustany, the subcommittee’s
top-ranking Republican, said during the hearing.

Waste, Fraud and Abuse

If Congress extends the credit, the IRS needs to institute better
controls to prevent waste, fraud and abuse, Boustany and Chairman John
Lewis, a Georgia Democrat, said.

Federal auditors also found claims in excess of the maximum amount
allowed, with improper documentation or that exceeded the income
requirements of $75,000 per individual and $150,000 per couple.

Senate Banking Committee Chairman Christopher Dodd and Senator
Johnny Isakson, a Georgia Republican and former Realtor, urged
colleagues at a separate hearing this week to extend the credit through
next June and to expand it to all couples earning $300,000 or less.
Isakson estimated that his plan would cost less than $17 billion in lost
tax revenue.

Purchases of existing homes in August were up 3.4 percent compared
with a year earlier, the National Association of Realtors said. New home
sales were up 30 percent from January’s record low, government figures
show.

Shaun Donovan, secretary of the Housing and Urban Development
Department, called the tax credit a “positive force” in the housing
market during the Oct. 20 hearing before the Senate Banking Committee.

“The end of the tax credit would have some negative affect in the
market,” he said. He said he doesn’t think it would cause a
“catastrophic decline” in home prices.


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Home-Buyer Credit Is Focus of Inquiry


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>   
>   (email exchange)
>   
>   On Tue, Oct 20, 2009 at 12:13 AM, Russell wrote:
>   

Reference article:

Home-Buyer Credit Is Focus of Inquiry

>   
>   The Internal Revenue Service is examining more than 100,000 suspicious
>   claims for the first-time home-buyer tax break …
>   
>   The tax credit is completely refundable, even if the homebuyer has no tax
>   liability – and this makes it a target for fraud. From the IRS:

Link

>   
>   ”[The tax credit is] fully refundable, meaning the credit will be paid out
>   to eligible taxpayers, even if they owe no tax or the credit is more than
>   the tax owed.”
>   
>   Also, the credit is separate from the closing, and the WSJ article suggests
>   this is contributing to the “widespread” fraud.
>   
>   Bonnie Speedy, national director of AARP Tax-Aide … suggested that abuse of
>   the home-purchase credit appeared to be widespread …
>   
>   And – not mentioned in the article – the homebuyers are required to pay back
>   the tax credit if they do not own and live in the home for three years … so
>   there will probably be more fraud in the future. More IRS:

Link

>   
>   The obligation to repay the credit on a home purchased in 2009 arises only if
>   the home ceases to be your principal residence within 36 months from the date
>   of purchase. The full amount of the credit received becomes due on the return
>   for the year the home ceased being your principal residence.
>   

Right, critical parts of any legislation include compliance/enforcement.

All of my proposals look to reduce real compliance and enforcement costs, and to minimize the potential for fraud.

For example, the payroll tax holiday has none of those issues, nor does it place any demands on govt.
Same with the per capita revenue sharing. The main risk is States that may somehow inflate their population estimates, but that is trivial, and the distributions are done on past estimates.


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