Fed loan to AIG


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My question remains: can they give the shareholders less than they would have gotten in a bankruptcy?

The burden of proof may be on the government to show that the shareholders are better off with the 20% of net worth they are giving them due to the value added of the loan facility, vs 100% of the net worth in a straight bankruptcy.

Press Release

Release Date: September 16, 2008

For release at 9:00 p.m. EDT

The Federal Reserve Board on Tuesday, with the full support of the Treasury Department, authorized the Federal Reserve Bank of New York to lend up to $85 billion to the American International Group (AIG) under Section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act. The secured loan has terms and conditions designed to protect the interests of the U.S. government and taxpayers.

The Board determined that, in current circumstances, a disorderly failure of AIG could add to already significant levels of financial market fragility and lead to substantially higher borrowing costs, reduced household wealth and materially weaker economic performance.

The purpose of this liquidity facility is to assist AIG in meeting its obligations as they come due. This loan will facilitate a process under which AIG will sell certain of its businesses in an orderly manner, with the least possible disruption to the overall economy.

The AIG facility has a 24-month term. Interest will accrue on the outstanding balance at a rate of three-month Libor plus 850 basis points. AIG will be permitted to draw up to $85 billion under the facility.

The interests of taxpayers are protected by key terms of the loan. The loan is collateralized by all the assets of AIG, and of its primary non-regulated subsidiaries. These assets include the stock of substantially all of the regulated subsidiaries. The loan is expected to be repaid from the proceeds of the sale of the firm’s assets. The U.S. government will receive a 79.9 percent equity interest in AIG and has the right to veto the payment of dividends to common and preferred shareholders.


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FOMC


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Wonder if Fisher cut a deal not to dissent for the hawkish inflation language?

Karim writes:

Decision (no cut) may be hawkish relative to expectations, but wording mostly dovish.

1st paragraph-all changes highlight downside risks to gwth; slowing export gwth a new wrinkle in addition to the usual financial market strains, labor market weakness and housing.

2nd paragraph-identical to prior except mention of inflation expectations has been dropped; so a downgrading of concern over inflation.

3rd paragraph-‘stand ready to act’ but no mention of ‘in a timely manner’.

Fisher dropped his dissent

NEW

Strains in financial markets have increased significantly and labor markets have weakened further. Economic growth appears to have slowed recently, partly reflecting a softening of household spending. Tight credit conditions, the ongoing housing contraction, and some slowing in export growth are likely to weigh on economic growth over the next few quarters. Over time, the substantial easing of monetary policy, combined with ongoing measures to foster market liquidity, should help to promote moderate economic growth.

Inflation has been high, spurred by the earlier increases in the prices of energy and some other commodities. The Committee expects inflation to moderate later this year and next year, but the inflation outlook remains highly uncertain.

The downside risks to growth and the upside risks to inflation are both of significant concern to the Committee. The Committee will monitor economic and financial developments carefully and will act as needed to promote sustainable economic growth and price stability.

OLD

Economic activity expanded in the second quarter, partly reflecting growth in consumer spending and exports. However, labor markets have softened further and financial markets remain under considerable stress. Tight credit conditions, the ongoing housing contraction, and elevated energy prices are likely to weigh on economic growth over the next few quarters. Over time, the substantial easing of monetary policy, combined with ongoing measures to foster market liquidity, should help to promote moderate economic growth.

Inflation has been high, spurred by the earlier increases in the prices of energy and some other commodities, and some indicators of inflation expectations have been elevated. The Committee expects inflation to moderate later this year and next year, but the inflation outlook remains highly uncertain.

Although downside risks to growth remain, the upside risks to inflation are also of significant concern to the Committee. The Committee will continue to monitor economic and financial developments and will act as needed to promote sustainable economic growth and price stability.


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2008-09-16 JN Highlights


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Highlights:

Aug Consumer Sentiment Hits Record Low For 3rd Month
Govt Panel To Call For Cutting Corporate Tax To 30% By FY15
Ota Reelected As New Komeito Leader For Another 2 Years
Extra Budget To Total 1.81tn Yen, Govt Eyes 400bn Yen Bonds
Lehman Failure Not To Mar Japan Financial System: Ibuki
BOJ Injects Y1.5tln To Calm Markets
New-Condo Offerings Tumble 38% In Tokyo, Rise 7% In Osaka For Aug
Forex Focus: Yen To Benefit From Banking Woes
Stocks: Slide To 3-Year Low As Banks, Insurers Tumble
Bonds: Surge After Lehman Bankruptcy, Market Turmoil

 

Note Japan’s proposed fiscal responses: cutting corp tax and extra budget, while the proposed increased consumption tax has been delayed.

Same in most nations around the world.

Fiscal responses ‘work’ while interest rate cuts don’t.

The US tax rebates worked while there is no econometric evidence the rate cuts did anything, except maybe make things worse as they reduced personal income and contributed psychologically to a USD sell off and spike in import prices that probably hurt consumers at least as much as it helped exporters.

The Fed could to anything today from unchanged to a 50 cut.

They seemed to have decided to use interest rates for ‘monetary policy’ and other tools for ‘market functioning’.

So for market functioning they just expanded the scope of the TAF and the Treasury lending facility, and may do more of that type of thing at today’s meeting, including adjusting the terms of the discount rate.

The question is whether falling commodities and the stronger USD will lead to a further rate cut.

What the Fed knows and has recognized since the Bear Stearns episode is that markets are going to open every day and do their thing, as the last week’s activity has demonstrated.

The Fed’s perceived risk of markets simply not opening and not trading has subsided.

Also, with the Treasury take over of the agencies mtg rates have dropped over 50 bp and availability of mortgage funding has been sustained.

The Fed considers this an ‘easing of financial conditions’ and is the move they’ve wanted to see to support housing, which has shown signs of stabilizing.

And the Treasury has shown it’s there to ‘write the check’ as it sees the need to prevent systemic risk.

So from that point of view there has already been a substantial ease in ‘financial conditions’, and the Fed may not see a need for further immediate ease.

Their forecasts will continue to show ‘moderating inflation and continued downside risks to growth’.

It all depends on their fear factor. They could leave fed funds unchanged or cut up to 50, depending on their concern regarding systemic risk.


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AS: Fed moves


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I’ve been recommending the following for the Fed for quite a while (see Proposals for the Fed):

  1. Lower the discount rate the Fed Funds rate and:
    1. Accept a pledge of any bank legal collateral from any member bank.
    2. Impose no restriction on quantity borrowed.
    3. Impose no restriction on the duration of any member bank borrowing.
  1. Likewise, remove collateral restrictions on the TAF operations.
    1. Set the maturity and interest rate for each TAF operation.
    2. Leave demand open-ended, rather than the current policy of limiting quantity.

Failure to implement the above shows a failure to understand fundamental monetary operations.

These policy changes would alleviate critical liquidity issues, and not, per se, alter net bank reserve demand (not that the size of the bank reserve ‘matters’).

Part of the current crisis is due to the failure to implement the above changes that would have:

  1. Normalized bank liquidity.
  2. Prevented the forced sales of investment grade, unimpaired, bank legal assets.
  3. Allowed banks to finance bank legal assets for third parties.
  4. Allowed markets to function to deleverage impaired assets.

The Fed is slowly moving in that direction, but, unfortunately, not proactively to ‘fix’ a flawed institutional structure, but reactively as things fall apart in no small part due to lack of action:

Federal Reserve lowers standards for collateral from primary dealers

The collateral eligible to be pledged at the Primary Dealer Credit Facility (PDCF) has been broadened to closely match the types of collateral that can be pledged in the tri-party repo systems of the two major clearing banks. Previously, PDCF collateral had been limited to investment-grade debt securities.

The collateral for the Term Securities Lending Facility (TSLF) also has been expanded; eligible collateral for Schedule 2 auctions will now include all investment-grade debt securities. Previously, only Treasury securities, agency securities, and AAA-rated mortgage-backed and asset-backed securities could be pledged.

These changes represent a significant broadening in the collateral accepted under both programs and should enhance the effectiveness of these facilities in supporting the liquidity of primary dealers and financial markets more generally.

Also, Schedule 2 TSLF auctions will be conducted each week; previously, Schedule 2 auctions had been conducted every two weeks. In addition, the amounts offered under Schedule 2 auctions will be increased to a total of $150 billion, from a total of $125 billion. Amounts offered in Schedule 1 auctions will remain at a total of $50 billion. Thus, the total amount offered in the TSLF program will rise to $200 billion from $175 billion.

The Board also adopted an interim final rule that provides a temporary exception to the limitations in section 23A of the Federal Reserve Act. It allows all insured depository institutions to provide liquidity to their affiliates for assets typically funded in the tri-party repo market. This exception expires on January 30, 2009, unless extended by the Board, and is subject to various conditions to promote safety and soundness.


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Racing to the bottom


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Here’s how I see the problem:

  1. The Fed and Treasury have set precedents of, for all practical purposes, wiping out shareholders when providing what they consider ‘taxpayer money at risk’.
  1. With FNMA, the Treasury provided funding on their own initiative without consent of management.

 
 
Therefore, while justified or not, this means the government can, on its own, decide to provide ‘taxpayer money’ AND eliminate all shareholder value.

This creates a serious risk for any shareholder for ANY business.

For an extreme example, the Treasury could decide unilaterally, that ANY corporation (including, for the strongest example, GE) needs a Treasury guarantee to be sure it can fund itself and won’t fail.

And any such action could carry with it eliminating any/all shareholder value.

This is the risk to Lehman shareholders.

Lehman may be perfectly able to function at some level without the need of new capital to survive.

But markets must now discount that possibility that the Treasury or Fed could decide Lehman’s counterparty risk poses sufficient systemic risk to justify intervention with ‘taxpayer money’ at risk, which would carry with it the elimination of all shareholder value.

The means the risk to shareholders from government intervention is much higher than the risk of bankruptcy or any other form of liquidation.

There was no economic reason for the Treasury to take 79.9% of the housing agencies capital. ‘Tax payer money’ was already as senior as the Treasury wanted it, and any funds added by Treasury also carried any type of interest and various other payments the Treasury desired.

All that wiping out most of the residual value for shareholders did was add a new element of catastrophic risk for all shareholders.

So when a stock like Lehman goes down, which increases the perception of risk of government intervention, the risk of shareholder value going to zero due to government intervention increases as well.

Not my first choice of institutional structure.


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Re: Letter from Kohn to you, 1994


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(an email exchange PLUS pdf of Kohn letter)

consider it public information,
as you can see, he’s one of the few who understand monetary operations

thanks!

>   
>   On Mon, Aug 25, 2008 at 7:58 PM, Steve wrote:
>   
>   Hi Warren,
>   
>   Hope all is well with you.
>   
>   A year or two ago, William Hummel was kind enough to give me a copy of the
>   response you received from Donald Kohn regarding Fed/Treasury money
>   mechanics, confirming what you had laid out in S.C.E.; copy of letter is
>   attached.
>   
>   I might want to use that sometime in the future, if the occasion arises, to help
>   bolster an argument or two — but wanted to ask you permission beforehand.
>   If you’d like to keep it private, I’ll just paraphrase it as necessary.
>   
>   Thanks, and take care,
>   Steve
>   
>   ps- If you still have a copy of your letter to Greenspan, I wouldn’t mind seeing
>   how you worded your questions to him.
>   

Letter from Kohn to Warren, 1994


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Re: Is Fischer correct?


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(an email exchange)

Not even close!

>   
>   On Mon, Aug 25, 2008 at 11:54 PM, Russell wrote:
>   
>   I found Fischer’s speech.
>   
>   ”No combination of tax hikes and spending cuts, though, will change the total
>   burden borne by current and future generations. For the existing unfunded
>   liabilities to be covered in the end, someone must pay $99.2 trillion more or
>   receive $99.2 trillion less than they have been currently promised.
>   

Why/how? Show me the debits and credits and how that changes real outcomes!

>   This is a cold, hard fact.

Yes, he believes it.

>   The decision we must make is whether to shoulder a substantial portion of that
>   burden today or compel future generations to bear its full weight.”

Yes, produce goods and services and send them back in time to pay off the debt.

>   ”We know from centuries of evidence in countless economies, from ancient
>   Rome to today’s Zimbabwe, that running the printing press to pay off today’s
>   bills leads to much worse problems later on. The inflation that results from the
>   flood of money into the economy turns out to be far worse than the fiscal pain
>   those countries hoped to avoid. ”
>   

What is ‘the printing press’ as above? Deficit spending? So why was the Fed pushing the latest fiscal package? Is this an attack on Bernanke?

>   ”Right now, we—you and I—are launching fiscal bombs against ourselves. ”

Then why is the Fed forecasting lower inflation over the next two years and beyond?


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The Daily Telegraph: Bank borrowing from ECB


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[written on Sunday]

While not a problem in the US for the Fed to do this and more (in fact it should be standard operating procedure), the eurozone has self imposed treaty issues that make it very problematic.

If there are defaults its the national governments that will probably be called on to repay the ECB for any losses, but given the national governments didn’t approve the transactions the result will be chaotic at best.

Without bank defaults it will probably all muddle through indefinitely.

As before, the systemic risk is in the eurozone.

Valve repair tomorrow, going to try to smuggle in a knife under my gown to even the odds…

Bank borrowing from ECB is out of control

by Ambrose Evans-Pritchard

The European Central Bank has issued the clearest warning to date that it cannot serve as a perpetual crutch for lenders caught off-guard by the severity of the credit crunch.

Not Wellink, the Dutch central bank chief and a major figure on the ECB council, said that banks were becoming addicted to the liquidity window in Frankfurt and were putting the authorities in an invidious position.

“There is a limit how long you can do this. There is a point where you take over the market,” he told Het Finacieele Dagblad, the Dutch financial daily.

“If we see banks becoming very dependent on central banks, then we must push them to tap other sources of funding,” he said.

While he did not name the chief culprits, there are growing concerns about the scale of ECB borrowing by small Spanish lenders and ‘cajas’ with heavy exposed to the country’s property crash. Dutch banks have also been hungry clients at the ECB window.

One ECB source told The Daily Telegraph that over-reliance on the ECB funds has become an increasingly bitter issue at the bank because the policy amounts to a covert bail-out of lenders in southern Europe.

“Nobody dares pinpoint the country involved because as soon as we do it will cause a market reaction and lead to a meltdown for the banks,” said the source.

This “soft bail-out” is largely underwritten by German and North European taxpayers, though it is occurring in a surreptitious way. It has become a neuralgic issue for the increasingly tense politics of EMU.

The latest data from the Bank of Spain shows that the country’s banks have increased their ECB borrowing to a record €49.6bn (£39bn). A number have been issuing mortgage securities for the sole purpose of drawing funds from Frankfurt.

These banks are heavily reliant on short-term and medium funding from the capital markets. This spigot of credit is now almost entirely closed, making it very hard to roll over loans as they expire.

The ECB has accepted a very wide range of mortgage collateral from the start of the credit crunch. This is a key reason why the eurozone has so far avoided a major crisis along the lines of Bear Stearns or Northern Rock.

While this policy buys time, it leaves the ECB holding large amounts of questionable debt and may be storing up problems for later.

The practice is also skirts legality and risks setting off a political storm. The Maastricht treaty prohibits long-term taxpayer support of this kind for the EMU banking system.

Few officials thought this problem would arise. It was widely presumed that the capital markets would recover quickly, allowing distressed lenders to return to normal sources of funding. Instead, the credit crunch has worsened in Europe.

Not to miss out, Nationwide recently announced that it was setting up operations in Ireland, partly in order to be able to take advantage of ECB liquidity if necessary. Any bank can tap ECB funds if they have a registered branch in the eurozone, although collateral must be denominated in euros.

Jean-Pierre Roth, head of the Swiss National Bank, complained this week that lenders were getting into the habit of shopping for funds from those authorities that offer the best terms. The practice is playing havoc monetary policy.

“What we should avoid is some kind of arbitrage by banks, which say they are going to go to central bank X, instead of central bank Y, because conditions are more attractive,” he said.


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Bernanke


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Karim writes:

Overall tone->On hold->Economy to stay weak->Recognizes rates are low amid inflation risk->But no mention of acting in a timely manner->Credit strains remain high->Commodities and USD offering respite on inflation outlook. Bulk of speech dedicated to financial infrastructure and supervision.

Click to read Bernanke’s Speech

  • Although we have seen improved functioning in some markets, the financial storm that reached gale force some weeks before our last meeting here in Jackson Hole has not yet subsided, and its effects on the broader economy are becoming apparent in the form of softening economic activity and rising unemployment. Add to this mix a jump in inflation, in part the product of a global commodity boom, and the result has been one of the most challenging economic and policy environments in memory.
  • We have recently extended our special programs for primary dealers beyond the end of the year, based on our assessment that financial conditions remain unusual and exigent. We will continue to review all of our liquidity facilities to determine if they are having their intended effects or require modification.


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The 8000lb bear in the room


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There’s nothing credit issues can do to GDP that fiscal policy can’t handle.

Congress has seemingly figured that out and probably the rest of the world as well as evidenced by the new proposed fiscal packages popping up around the world.

Yes, we can lose a bank or two, and lending standards tighten further, but GDP will continue to muddle through even if that means a series of fiscal measures.

And Congress was born to spend; so, they are all over this one.

The only thing that might slow them down is inflation, and so far they’ve seemed to support the Fed trying to step hard on the inflation pedal, rather than ‘tighten’ which presumably helps inflation.

And no one seems to notice the 8000lb bear in the room.

Our response to Russia reminds me of Monty Python’s coconut clapping Arthur trying to intimidate the French defenders of the fort with his credentials.

We threaten them with diplomatic isolation, trade sanctions, etc. as if they care.

They don’t care.

They do care about the new missiles going into Poland.

And we are committed to considering an attack on Poland or any other NATO member as an attack on US soil, as Rice reminded them and even maybe dared them to try something.

We can’t defend anyone against against Russia with our own troops without risking nuclear war.

And Russia will be a lot quicker to that trigger than we will.

And they still have maybe thousands of nuclear warheads aimed our way.

Their next step for Russia is probably to make an offer to the rest of the ex-Soviet Union members they can’t refuse.

Russia sells the Eurozone something like 30% of their oil and gas and can do it at any price they want, and demand any real terms of trade they want.

The risk is we try to draw a line in the sand in some nowhere place over there, and it escalates to where we back down or get involved in lobbing nukes.

I suppose it’s just another case of this administration not seeing the forest for the trees.

We’ve let Russia be reorganized by the ex-KGB leadership that’s a lot smarter than ours, and now we’re paying the price.

Both the inflation and cold war of the 1970s is back, except this time our opposition is far stronger.

There is no even semi-quick supply response to dislodge the Saudis and/or Russians from setting any terms of trade they want.

The Russian consolidation is on the way up supported by a bath of capitalist type riches rather than crumbling under its own weight of a failed socialist economy.

Apart from that, I’m optimistic.


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