NY Fed To Begin $200 Billion TALF March 17


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Yes, which is interesting as the banks are the Fed’s ‘designated agents’ for lending.

Seems they could figure out how to continue to use them for that purpose, rather than set up a form of an in house shadow infrastructure to do the same thing.

They are in this way over their heads.

>   
>   The Fed’s now trying to bypass the banks and lend directly to the market via third party >   mediums.
>   

>   
>   On Tue, Mar 3 at 11:30 AM, Mauer wrote:
>   
>   This language below was in the last version of TALF also but it sends a big message.
>   
>   ”Can a newly formed investment fund borrow from the TALF?”
>   ”Yes, so long as it satisfies all the eligible borrower requirements set forth above.”
>   
>   By the way, in Shiller’s new book, Animal Spirits he specifically talks about TALF and says >   that it is a very important part of the recovery program.
>   

Sad but true, though I would say fiscal balance can always do the trick.

And the Fed has failed to utilize its member banks for that public purpose.

>   
>   He seems to think that it is incrementally more important than other programs if you think
>   about how much space he devotes to discussing it.
>   
>   I read part of Koo’s book last night.
>   
>   He really gives fiscal policy a big push. Says that Romer, Friedman and Terin are off base
>   because they don’t give fiscal policy enough credit.
>   

Agreed!

>   
>   His charts as to the level of recovery and the tax revenues that the fiscal stimulus created
>   are very important.
>   
>   He should have been consulted by the administration.
>   
>   He is a big fan of FDR’s stimulus and obviously doesn’t think much of those that caused
>   FDR to cut deficit to zero in 1937.
>   
>   He charts indicate that the economy was well on road to recovery before start of war
>   although you need to give lend lease credit for some of that.
>   
>   But that goes back to the fiscal stimulus again as opposed to monetary.
>   

Yes, exactly.

>   
>   ”Problem here is that most of the borrowing demand – but not all- is likely to be distress
>   debt demand as few households are likely to remain convinced they can maintain a deficit
>   spending profile in this type of macro environment.”
>   
>   ”the Fed’s now trying to bypass the banks and lend directly to the market via third party
>   mediums.”
>   

The fed could set up a program for the banks to deal with that with appropriate fed guarantees and ‘profit caps’.

>   
>   On Tue, Mar 3, 2009 at 11:28 AM, Scott wrote:
>   
>   Like just having the Treasury buy conforming mortgages at 4%.
>   
>   Yes, WAY over their heads.
>   

Exactly!

There are all kinds of creative ways to use the banking system to bring down rates and/or increase funding if that’s what they want to do.

>   
>   On Tue, Mar 3, 2009 at 11:58 AM, Pat wrote:
>   
>   So how does the FED get liquidity to investors if the banks and banking regulations require
>   them not to lend given the current state of their balance sheets and capital.???
>   

Change the regulations.

Use Fed guarantees that put the Fed in the same risk position they are currently in anyway.

>   
>   How do you use the current infrastructure without removing the regulatory constraints?
>   

You alter the regulations which are always a work in progress.

>   
>   Simply put the banks don’t have the balance sheet available to lend at the levels they used
>   to.
>   

With Fed guarantees they don’t need balance sheet any more than the Fed does.

>   
>   We have seen estimates on repo balance sheet that has left the street or really just
>   evaporated in excess of $3 trillion. The correlation between market cap (see below) and
>   balance sheet is very high. So when 3+ trillion goes away from repo those securities
>   bought using repo financing get sold/bought for cash (de-levered / liquidated).
>   

Right. Repo only intermediates.

>   
>   The levered bid for securities disappears not to return w/o balance sheet support.
>   

Right.

Banks are levered institutions and should all have unlimited unsecured lines with the fed, as i have been suggesting for a very long time.

>   
>   That levered bid was VERY LARGE particularly for MBS. The repo market is a very large
>   CP conduit where money providers earn short term market rates financing portfolio
>   manager’s long term positions and for a spread a broker dealer was the pipeline between
>   the 2 entities. The pipeline is tiny now (see market cap graph below) and cannot meet
>   the liquidity needs of the larger market.

Right.

Banks can fill in the gap with appropriate Fed support.

Not that I would recommend filling all the gaps!

But in any case investors can buy bank CD’s and banks can invest in short term loans vs securities if the Fed so desires.

Problem is the Fed doesn’t know how to get from here to there.


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Re: Tax cuts may heighten deflation risks – NY Fed study


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(email exchange)

It doesn’t make sense in any model this side of sanity. Comments below:

>   
>   On Sun, Feb 22, 2009 at 7:47 PM, Steve wrote:
>   
>   Does this make sense in your model of fiscal policy?….interesting
>   counter intuitive argument…
>   

Tax cuts may heighten deflation risks- NY Fed study

Feb 18 (Reuters) — Cutting taxes to try to stimulate the economy could do more harm than good in a zero interest rate environment as it can heighten the risk of deflation, according to a recent New York Federal Reserve study.

Policies that are aimed at increasing the supply of goods can be counterproductive when the main problem is insufficient demand, New York Fed economist Gauti Eggertsson said in a research paper entitled “Can tax cuts deepen the recession?”

Increasing the supply of public goods is never contractionary. Though wise investment can bring down real costs and prices and thereby increase productivity and our real standards of living.

“The emphasis should be on policies that stimulate spending,” Eggertsson said, adding that his research found the impact of tax cuts is “fundamentally different” with interest rates near zero.

“At zero short-term nominal interest rates, tax cuts reduce output in a standard New Keynesian (economic) model. They do so because they increase deflationary pressure,” he wrote. Eggertsson’s study focused primarily on labor taxes and some sales taxes.

There’s the problem- the standard ‘new Keynesian model’ is garbage.

Cutting payroll taxes, for example, would create an incentive for people to work more. But if there are not enough jobs, this could have a negative effect: creating more demand for work and thus driving down wages.

Huh? First of all, for me personally at least, when my income is cut I tend to work more to at least try to make the same income. And when taxes are cut I certainly don’t work more. But that’s just anecdotal.

The main point is there are already millions of unemployed so even if somehow cutting payroll taxes so people struggling to make ends meet can better do so causes a few more people to seek work the pressure on wages can hardly go up.

And maybe the strongest point, these new people supposedly seeking work due to a cut in payroll taxes will only work at the higher wage as a point of this (convoluted) logic which is far different from a market and wage level pressure point of view than the millions of others willing to work at current wages who can’t find work.

Last, the notion that changes in payroll tax could measurably alter wage seekers is extremely far fetched at best and not statistically significant in any case.

And with interest rates near zero, the Fed cannot cut rates further to fight deflation.

As if cutting rates does or ever has fought deflation.

If anything the causation is reversed. The new Keynesian model has this all wrong.

President Barack Obama on Tuesday signed into law a $787 billion package of measures to lift the recession-mired U.S. economy that included about $287 billion in tax cuts.

Eggertsson’s findings counter the argument that cutting taxes to put an extra buck in consumers’ pockets will boost their spending. Instead, given the current economic backdrop, it is likely people would save money from temporary tax cuts,

Yes, this is likely, and not a ‘bad thing’ as it means taxes can be cut at least that much further and/or spending increased further.

given the recession and expectations that tax increases are inevitable in the future.

This is the ‘Ricardian Equivalent’ argument put forth by some of the ‘new Keynesians’ and has largely been dismissed as nonsensical by most. The idea that tax cuts do nothing because people automatically expect higher taxes later as they ‘know’ the budget must eventually be balanced, taken to the extreme, means totally eliminating taxes does nothing for demand which of course is ridiculous.

He said that while a number of economists have argued that aggressive tax cuts are needed to revive the U.S. economy, policy-makers should “view with a great deal of skepticism” studies that use post World War Two data — a period characterized by positive interest rates.

Interest rates have nothing to do with the effect of tax cuts. And history (and all other theory) has shown that tax cuts add to demand, tax increases lower demand.

The best ways to stimulate spending, according to Eggertsson’s study, is through traditional government spending and a credible commitment to boosting inflation, creating an incentive to spend now before prices rise. (Reporting by Kristina Cooke; Editing by Diane Craft)

Good old ‘inflation expectations theory’ again from the new Keynesians, which is also nonsense. It’s a ‘plug’ due to no other theory of where the price level comes from, as they have yet to recognize the currency itself is a public monopoly, and monopolists are necessarily price setters.


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Re: ffm questions

On Dec 18, 2007 1:09 AM, Scott Fullwiler wrote:
> Hi Warren
>
> A few questions on your take on fed funds market data–
>
> Std dev of fed funds rate is way up since summer compared to normal, but
> looking at the high-low numbers, the deviation (at least max deviation) is
> most significant on the low end (since August 15, it’s been more than 0.5
> below the target rate 54 times and more than 1% below 37 times) .  The high
> has only been more than 1% above the target a few times (7), though it’s
> been above 0.5% more than the target 26 times since mid-August (so much for
> doing away with frown costs).
>
> Anyway . . . what are your thoughts regarding how this persistent, sizable
> deviation on the low end is consistent with the story you’re generally
> telling? (i.e., Fed needs to lower discount rate to target and eliminate
> stigma)

Hi Scott,

My best guess is with the discount rate above the funds rate the NY Fed can’t keep the banks in a ‘net borrowed’ position or the bid for funds gaps up to something over the discount rate.  So instead, they are trying to target ‘flat’ and err on the side of letting banks be a bit long as evidenced by funds dipping below the target, and then acting to offset that move.

Also, the NY Fed sets a ‘stop’ on the repo rate when it intervenes, and with the spread between ff and repo fluctuating more than before ‘the crisis’ it may be more difficult for the NY desk to pick the right repo rate to correspond with their interest rate target.

When the discount rate was below the ff rate it was a lot easier – they just kept banks net borrowed which caused them bid funds up above the discount rate and the Fed allowed them to continue higher until the got about 1/8% above the ff target and then intervene to make reserves available via open market operations at the equiv. repo rate.

The NY Fed isn’t saying anything about what they see happening, and why there is so much variation, which doesn’t help either.  Here’s a spot where a little transparency and guidance can go a long way.

Further thoughts?

Warren

Is it as simple as saying there’s a lot more uncertainty in money
> markets and regarding the Fed’s reactions to the uncertainty?  Perhaps,
> since the effective rate has been above the target (37 times) almost as much
> as below (45 times).
>
> Thanks.
> Scott
>
> —
> ******************************

************************
> Scott T. Fullwiler, Ph.D.
> Associate Professor of Economics
> James A. Leach Chair in Banking and Monetary Economics
>
> Department of Business Administration and Economics
> Wartburg College
> 100 Wartburg Blvd
> Waverly, IA  50677