Countrywide fundings up

Another sign of a possible October/November bottom:

Countrywide fundings inch higher

CALABASAS, Calif. (AP) – Countrywide Financial Corp., the nation’s largest mortgage lender, said Wednesday its December loan fundings rose 1 percent from November and were ahead of internal forecasts.

The stock, which lost nearly a third of its value on Tuesday amid rumors –which the company strongly denied — of bankruptcy, rose 13 percent in premarket trading.

Countrywide said it funded $24 billion in loans in December, giving it a total of $69 billion for the fourth quarter. Average daily mortgage applications in the month slipped from November, but Countrywide attributed that to a typical seasonal decline.

The company’s banking operations had assets of $113 billion at the end of December, up from $83 billion at the end of November.

Countrywide also said it saw a slower rate of people paying off loans early, which made its servicing business more valuable. Servicers collect payments and manage loans for their owners.


Re: banking system proposal

Dear Philip,

Yes, as in my previous posts, bank stability is all about credible deposit insurance.

I would go further, and have all regulated, member banks, be able to fund via an open line to the BOE at the BOE target rate.

That would eliminate the interbank market entirely, and let all those smart people doing those jobs go out and do something useful, maybe cure cancer, for example!

This would not change the quantity of retail bank deposits, only the rate paid on those deposits, which would be something less than the BOE target rate. Loans create deposits so they are all still there, but with this proposal all the banks would necessarily bid a tad less than the BOE target rate for deposits. And note this pretty much the case anyway.

With insured deposits market discipline comes from via capital requirements, and regulators also tend to further protect their
insured deposits by creating a list of ‘legal assets’ for banks, as well as various other risk parameters. The trick is to make sure the shareholders take the risk and not the govt.

This would change nothing of macro consequence but it would enhance the efficiency and stability of the banking sector, presumably for further public purpose.

Note to that the eurozone has the same issue, only perhaps more so, as the ECB is prohibited by treaty from ‘bailing out’ failed banks. Hopefully this gets addressed before it is tested!

All the best,

Warren

On Jan 5, 2008 7:46 PM, <noreply@sundayherald.com> wrote:
>
>
> Hi Warren Moslder,
>
> Philip Arestis stopped by Sunday Herald
> website and suggested that you visit the following URL:
>
> http://www.sundayherald.com/business/businessnews/display.var.1945229.0.outbreak_of_common_sense_could_save_british_banking.php
>
> Here is their message …
>
> Dear Warren,
>
>
>
> Interesting developments over here. Would it make much difference I wonder.
>
>
>
> Best wishes, Philip
>
>


♥

A very British bubble for Mr Brown

A very British bubble for Mr Brown

Leader
Sunday December 16 2007
The Observer

The buzz words in the world of finance these days are ‘moral hazard’. That is economist-speak for what happens when people who have engaged in risky business and fallen foul of market forces are let off the hook. It is the recognition that when you give dodgy lenders and borrowers an inch, they recklessly gamble for another mile.

When the City started to feel the ‘credit crunch’ over the summer, the Bank of England at first took a tough line on moral hazard. But it subsequently changed its mind. It rescued Northern Rock.

It rescued the depositors. Hardly a moral hazard issue. The shareholders still stand to lose if the assets don’t have the hoped for cash flows over time.

Last week it joined a coordinated action with US, Canadian and European central banks to provide easy credit to any institution that can’t borrow elsewhere.

Sort of, the CB’s job is to administer policy interest rates. And, again, there is nothing yet to indicate shareholders are getting baled out.

That was the right course of action. The banking sector may be in a mess of its own making – it over-exposed itself to US sub-prime mortgages – but the danger to the wider economy of a prolonged cash drought is too big to ignore.

What is a ‘cash drought’???

But even if last week’s intervention gets the wheels of global finance moving again,

Whatever that means. GDP seems to be muddling through as before.

the danger will not have receded. That is because high street lenders have no reason to pass central bank largesse onto their customers. Ordinary people will still find it hard to borrow and will still pay more than before to service their debts.

Haven’t seen any evidence of that, apart from would be subprime borrowers who perhaps never should have had access to funds anyway.

Since Britons are some of the most indebted people in the world, that puts us in a particularly vulnerable position. Per capita, Britons borrow more than twice as much as other Europeans. The average family pays 18 per cent of disposable income servicing debt. If the world economy slumps, the bailiffs will knock at British doors first.

More confused rhetoric. Aggregate demand is about spending. The risk to output and employment remains a slump in spending.

It might not come to that. The best case scenario envisages a mild downturn, consumers turning more prudent, demand dipping and inflation falling, which would free the Bank of England to cut interest rates and re-energise the economy for a prompt comeback.

No evidence cutting rates adds to demand in a meaningful way. It takes a strong dose of fiscal for that or for the non resident sector to start spending its hoard of pounds in the UK.

But in the worst case scenario, the credit crunch turns into a consumer recession.

If it results in a cut in aggregate demand, which it might, but somehow this discussion does not get into that connection.

House prices fall dramatically. People feel much poorer and stop spending.

OK, there is a possible channel, but it is a weak argument. Seems to take a cut in income for spending to fall.

Small businesses can’t get credit and fold.

Could happen, but if consumers spend at the remaining businesses that do not fold and employment and income stays constant, GDP stays pretty much the same.

But high fuel and commodity prices keep inflation high. Unemployment rises

When that happens, it is trouble for GDP, but he skirts around the channels that might lead to a loss of income, spending, and employment.

and millions of people default on their debts. Boom turns to bust.

Right, and the policy response can be an immediate fiscal measure that sustains demand and prevents that from happening.

The problem is with ‘high inflation’ and an inherent fear of government deficits; policy makers may not want to go that route.

The government can hope for the best, but it must prepare for the worst.

Fallout shelters?

That means talking to banks, regulators and debt relief charities to work out ways to help people at risk of insolvency.

Actually, bankruptcy is a means of sustaining demand. Past debts are gone and earned income goes toward spending and often spending beyond current income via new debt.

They must look first at reform of Individual Voluntary Arrangements. These are debt restructuring packages that fall short of personal bankruptcy declarations. In theory, they allow people to consolidate and write off some of their debt, paying the rest in installments.

This could hurt demand unless the installment payments get spend by the recipients.

There is no debtors prison over there anymore, last I heard?

But in practice they are sometimes scarcely more generous than credit card balance transfer deals, with large arrangement fees and tricky small print. There is emerging evidence they have been mis-sold to desperate debtors.

In theory, individuals can also negotiate debt relief directly with banks. But that requires the pairing of a financially literate, assertive consumer with a generous-hearted lender – not the most common combination. The government and banks should already be planning their strategy to make impartial brokering of such deals easier.

But the first hurdle on the way to easing a private debt crisis is political. Gordon Brown has constructed a mythology of himself as the alchemist Chancellor who eliminated the cycle of boom-and-bust from Britain’s economy. To stay consistent with that line, he has to pretend that Britain is well insulated from financial turbulence originating in the US.

Banning CNBC would help out a lot!

That simply isn’t true. The excessive level of consumer borrowing in recent years is a very British bubble and the government can deny it no longer. If the bubble bursts, we will face a kind of moral hazard very different from the one calculated by central banks when bailing out the City. It is the hazard of millions of people falling into penury.

Rising incomes can sustain rising debt indefinitely. It is up to the banks to make loans to people who can service them; otherwise, their shareholders lose. That is the market discipline, not short term bank funding issues.


AMT tax reduction passes

Looks like it adds about $50 billion to 2008 after tax incomes.

Demand can use all the help it can get right now!

Congress Gives AMT Relief For 20 Million Taxpayers

Congress acted in its final hours Wednesday to block growth of the alternative minimum tax, putting off an economic hardship affecting more than 20 million taxpayers and avoiding what would have been a political black mark for both parties.
AP
——————————————————————————–
The House voted 352-64 for a one-year fix of the AMT, a four-decade tax originally meant only to touch super-rich tax dodgers but now hitting millions of middle- and upper-middle income level households. Without that fix, an annual ritual of Congress, those subject to the tax would have risen from 4 million in 2006 to about 25 million in 2007, with the average levy of $2,000 a taxpayer.

“What we are hearing across the country today is a collective sigh of relief,” said Rep. Eric Cantor, R-Va.

The legislation now goes to President Bush, who says he will sign it because, bowing to White House and GOP demands, it does not include tax increases or other new sources of revenue to pay for the $50 billion cost of the tax relief.


Roubini blog

Roubini totally doesn’t get it.

The point of CB intervention is to keep interest rates at their target rates, not to provide funds for lending, as described in previous posts.

This plan will succeed at doing that, best I can tell.

It’s all about price, not quantity.

That’s all a CB can do.

Also, insolvency matters to the real economy only as it reduces aggregate demand.

The largest current risk to aggregate demand in my estimation is the media frightening businesses and consumers from spending.

That’s always a risk to a monetary economy where the government isn’t standing by to net spend when demand sags. When government does that there is little or no risk of negative growth or unemployment as we currently define it.

Nouriel Roubini | Dec 12, 2007

Given the worsening of the global liquidity and credit crunch – with a variety of short term interbank Libor spreads relative to policy rates and relative to government bonds of same maturity being even higher recently than at the peak of the crisis in August – it is no surprise that central banks were really desperate to do something.

The announcement today of coordinated liquidity injections by FED, ECB, BoE, BoC, SNB is however too little too late and it will fail to resolve the liquidity and credit crunch for the same reasons why hundreds of billions of dollars of liquidity injections by these central banks – and some easing of policy rates by Fed, BoC and BoE – has totally and miserably failed to resolve this crunch in the last five months. What was announced today are band-aid palliative that will not address the core causes of this most severe liquidity and credit crunch.

There has some heated debate in recent weeks on whether the liquidity crunch is due to:

  1. short-term year end liquidity needs (the “Turn”);
  1. a more persistent liquidity risk premium;
  1. a rise on counterparty risk and broader perceived credit problems of counterparties; i.e. serious problems of insolvency rather than illiquidity alone.
  1. a more general increase in risk aversion due to severe credit problems and information asymmetries (risk aversion due to uncertainty about the size of the financial losses and uncertainty on who is holding the toxic waste of RMBS, CDOs and other ABS products);
  1. the failure of the monetary transmission mechanism in a financial system where most financial institutions are now non-bank and thus do not have direct access to the central banks’ liquidity or lender of last resort support.

The severe financial crunch is likely due to all of the factors above; but the measures announced today can only partly deal with the first of the two explanations above of the crunch and will do nothing to address the other causes of the crunch. These measures will not be successful for a variety of reasons.

First, you cannot use monetary policy to resolve credit and insolvency problems in the economy; and most of the crunch is due not just to illiquidity but rather to serious credit and solvency problems of many economic agents (households, mortgage borrowers, subprime, near prime and prime mortgage lenders, homebuilders, highly leveraged and distressed financial institutions, weak corporate sector firms).

Second, monetary injections cannot resolve the information asymmetries and generalized uncertainty of a financial system where financial globalization and securitization have led to lack of transparency and greater opacity of financial markets; these asymmetric information problems that generate lack of trust and confidence and significant counterparty risk cannot be resolved with monetary policy.

Third, the US is at this point headed towards a recession regardless of what the Fed does as the build-up of real and financial problems (worst housing recession ever, oil at $90, a severe credit crunch, falling capex spending by the corporate sector, a saving-less and debt burdened consumer buffeted by ten separate negative shocks) in the economy make a recession unavoidable at this point; similarly other economies are also now headed towards a hard landing as the US real and financial mess lead to significant contagion and recoupling.

Thus, to mitigate the effects of an unavoidable US recession and global economic slump the Fed and other central banks should be cutting rates much more aggressively. The 25bps cut by the Fed yesterday is puny relative to what is needed; 25bps by BoE and BoC does not even start to deal with the increase in nominal and real borrowing rates that the sharp spike in Libor rates (the true cost of short term capital for the private sector) has induced.

And the ECB decision not to cut policy rates – and deluding itself that it may be able to raise them once the alleged “temporary” credit crunch is gone – is dangerous and ensures a sharp slowdown in a Eurozone where deflating housing bubbles, oil at $90 and a strong Euro are already sharply slowing down growth. Central banks should have announced today a coordinated 50bps reduction in their policy rates as a way to signal that they are serious about avoiding a global hard landing. Instead the Fed yesterday gave a paltry 25bps with a neutral bias rather than the necessary easing bias.

Fourth, the actions by the Fed today provide more liquidity to a greater variety of institutions but, as the Fed announced, these institutions are only “depository” institutions, i.e. only banks. The severe liquidity and credit problems affect today a financial market dominated by non-bank that do not have direct access to the liquidity support of the Fed; these include: broker dealers and investment banks that do not have a commercial bank arm; money market funds; hedge funds; mortgage lenders that do not take deposit; SIVs, conduits and other off-balance sheet special purpose vehicles; states and local governments funds (Florida, Orange County, etc.).

All these non-bank institutions do not have direct access to the Fed and other central banks liquidity support and they are now at risk of a liquidity run as their liabilities are short term while many of their assets are longer term and illiquid; so the risk of something equivalent to a bank run for non-bank financial institutions is now rising. And there is no chance that depository institutions will re-lend to these to these non-banks the funds borrowed by central banks as these banks have severe liquidity problems themselves and they do not trust their non-bank counterparties. So now monetary policy is totally impotent with dealing with the liquidity problems and the risks of runs on liquid liabilities of a large fraction of the financial system (in a world where these non-bank financial institutions play a larger role in financial markets than non-banks).

And let us be clear: the Federal Reserve Act striclty forbids the Fed from lending to non-depository institutions apart from very emergency situations that would require a complex and cumbersome approval process and the provision of high quality collateral. And the Fed has never – in its history – used this procedure and lent money to non-depository institutions.

Fifth, as discussed before on this blog, this is the first real crisis of financial globalization and securitization; it will take years of major policy, regulatory and supervisors reform to clean up this disaster and create a sounder global financial system; monetary policy cannot resolve years of reckless behavior by regulators and supervisors that were asleep at the wheel while the credit excesses of the last few years were taking place. Now the US hard landing and global sharp slowdown is unavoidable and monetary policy – if aggressive enough with much greater and rapid reduction in policy rates – may only be able to affect how long and protracted this hard landing will be.